China and Global Financial Governance: Centripetalism, Elevation and Disparity
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90 International Journal of Area Studies 8:1, 2013 DOI: 10.2478/ijas-2013-0005 Falin Zhang MCMaSTER UniVERSiTY China and Global Financial Governance: Centripetalism, Elevation and Disparity Abstract In the post-2008 global financial crisis era, the global financial governance system has experienced dramatic changes and a comparatively new network system comes into the fore. Meanwhile, China’s extraordinary performance during the crisis by virtue of its unique political and economic systems urged the elevation of its role in the new system. Against this backdrop, three words are appropriate to describe the new system and China’s role in it in the post-crisis era–centripetalism (rather than centrifugalism), elevation (rather than domination) and disparity (rather than coherence). Centripetalism means that patched global financial governance network system has more force to coordinate states and related international organizations. Elevation refers to a relatively more important role of China in the new system, but, by no means, a dominant (or hegemonic) role. China is an indispensable participant rather than a leading power in global financial governance. Disparity indicates the differed strategies of China in various global financial governance institutions or toward different events. 摘要 后危机时代,国际金融管理系统经历了巨大的变革,一个新的网状系统逐渐形成。 同时, 凭借独特的政治和经济体系以及在此次金融危机中的优异表现, 中国在此新管理 体系中的地位得到大幅提升。鉴于此, 国际金融管理和中国在其中的地位可以概括为三 个词---向心 (而非离心)、提升 (而非主导) 和差异 (而非一致)。“向心”是指新的国 际金融管理网络体系能更好的协调主权国家和相关的国际金融管理机构。“提升”指的是 中国在新体系中的地位更加重要, 对稳定国际金融体系的作用更为明显。尽管如此,中 国依然只是一个重要的参与者, 而非领导者或者霸权。“差异”是指中国在国际金融管理体 系中的政策和策略并不是一致的, 尤其是对不同的国际金融管理机构或国际金融管理事件。 Keywords: China, Global Governance, Global Financial Governance, Centripetalism, Elevation, Disparity Acknowledgement For comments and suggestions, I am indebted to Professor Michelle Dion, Professor Robert O’Brien and Professor Tony Porter. Introduction In the post-2008 global financial crisis era, the global financial governance system has experienced dramatic changes and a comparatively new network Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/9/16 5:12 PM FALIN ZHANG. China and Global Financial Governance 91 system comes into the fore. Meanwhile, China’s extraordinary performance during the crisis by virtue of its unique political and economic systems urged the elevation of its role in this new system. Consequently, China, as an emerging power, has played an increasingly important role in global governance in general and global financial governance in particular. Against this backdrop, many research puzzles emerge in related studies, which include but are not limited to the following ones. What changes have occurred in global financial governance responding to the 2008 global financial crisis? What role does China play in the new global financial governance system? What are China’s strategies in global financial governance? The related literatures have delved into these questions, and left these conundrums unconvincingly-answered. One consensus regarding the changes of the global financial governance system against the 2008 global financial crisis is that it was flawed and has been reformed. The new financial governance system is called “Networked International Financial Governance” (NIFG) and still has three distinct accountability problems – uneven representation of countries, overly technocratic character and the risk of capture by the financial industry (Helleiner and Porter 2009, p.14). Helleiner (2009) observed that the crisis has not only led to reregulation of international financial markets by the leading Western governments, but unleashed centrifugal pressures that may lead toward a more decentralized and fragmented form of global financial governance over the medium term. Reflecting on this idea and inspired by the network analysis that is introduced to international politics studies by such scholars like Sheng (2010) and Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery (2009), I argue in this paper that the recent reforms only patched, but not revolutionized, the previous system. The patched system is a network centered on the G20 and Financial Stability Board (FSB) and generates centripetal (rather than centrifugal) force to connect the previously fragmented global financial governance system. China’s role in the new network is also hotly debated. A fact is that the position of China in this new system has been enhanced structurally. The increase of China’s quotas and voting power in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) and the incorporation of China into the G20 and FSB are direct evidence. Disputes lie in two respects. First, is China a rising star or leader in the new global financial governance system? Second, what is China’s strategy in this new system, a status-quo power or a revisionist? With regard to the first question, Garrett (2010, p.29) answered that “the world will be characterized by a de facto China–US G 2 after the financial crisis”. On the contrary, Overholt (2010, p.24) pointed out that “China’s strategy for growth had been fabulously successful but was becoming obsolescent”. As a result, China is unlikely to be a leader in global financial governance. Hamilton-Hart (2012) focused more broadly on the Eastern Asian region and argued that despite the comparatively strong Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/9/16 5:12 PM 92 International Journal of Area Studies 8:1, 2013 positions of this region during the crisis, it remains structurally embedded within the global markets, especially Western markets. This paper concentrates on the structural position of China in the new global financial governance system and concludes that China is more powerful in this new system, but far from being a leader. The domestic economic achievements of China are the root cause for the structural elevation, while the domestice conomic and societal challenges impede China to be a leader in global financial governance in the short or medium term. China’s strategy in global governance in general and global financial governance in particular has generated three competing views. The first view argues, China is a revisionist power in international system and global governance, which seeks to restructure the international system and order for its own benefit and in its own interests. The arguments of this view are closely related to political Realism that posits that rational and self- interest states are the primary actors in the anarchic international system and are inclined towards competition and conflict or their own survival and security (Grieco 1990). Therefore, “states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals” (Mearsheimer 2006, p.160). According to this theoretical view, a rising China in terms of economy growth will inevitably challenge the existing power of balance and tend to change the international order in China’s favor. The second view, which has been more popular in the recent years, is that China is more likely a status quo power that actively seeks to work within the existing international system without challenging the current order. This view is, theoretically and mainly, based on the Neoliberal Institutionalism, which holds that although states are competitive and in conflicts in international system, inter-state cooperation is still possible through international institutions. In this view, many scholars argue China is cooperative and a status quo power in the international system. For example, Johnston (2003, p.56) argues if China is not a wholly status quo power, it at least “is more status quo-oriented relative to its past”. Kim (2004) observes that except where sovereignty-bound issues are involved, such as Taiwan issue, China is a status quo power without any unsettling revisionist or norm-defying behavior in the international system. Shirk (2008, p.108) asks “why shouldn’t China support the status quo”, given the flourishing of China in the current system. One potential theoretical explanation of these observations, as Neoliberal Institutionalist contends, is that China has paid more attention to the absolute gains, rather than the relative gains, that have been achieved under the current international order. In contrast, the third view holds that China is neither an absolute revisionist nor a pure status quo power. Some scholars focus on other factors like culture, knowledge and ideas, rather than only the realist power of balance. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/9/16 5:12 PM FALIN ZHANG. China and Global Financial Governance 93 For example, Hass (1992, p.3) holds that epistemic communities, which are a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”, play a crucial role in shaping state behavior, as well as the power and structural considerations stressed by realists. Combes (2011) contends that China is not a wholly status quo or wholly revisionist power. “Not being one does not mean to suggest that it is wholly the other” (Combes 2011, p.6) and there is a huge amount of middle ground between the two. In this paper, by exploring China’s specific strategies towards various global financial governance institutions or events, I argue that China is not an innate status quo power or revisionist in global financial governance, and China’s behaviors or strategies are determined by its varying interests and preferences, which are not innate either, but affected by internal and external factors.