The Role of the Oas in the Political Crisis of Venezuela
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THE ROLE OF THE OAS IN THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF VENEZUELA (APRIL 11, 2002- MAY 31, 2003) A thesis presented to the faculty of the Center for International Studies of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Arts Jesus Sanchez Melean November 2005 This thesis entitled ROLE OF THE OAS IN POLITICAL CRISIS OF VENEZUELA (APRIL 11, 2002- MAY 31, 2003) by JESUS SANCHEZ MELEAN has been approved for the Program of Latin American Studies and the Center for International Studies of Ohio University by Thomas Walker Professor of Political Science Josep Rota Director, Center for International Studies SANCHEZ MELEAN, JESUS. MA. November 2005. International Affairs The Role of OAS in the Political Crisis of Venezuela (144 pp.) Director of Thesis: Thomas Walker This thesis describes the intervention of the OAS in the Venezuelan political crisis between April 2002 and May 2003. Invoking for first time its Democratic Charter, the OAS became the principal actor in Venezuela using symbolic diplomacy, good offices, and third party mediation. The OAS clearly signaled to domestic and regional actors that antidemocratic actions would not be tolerated in the region and created conditions for local actors to engage in dialogue and negotiation which reduced the level of violence and conflict. Nevertheless, the OAS's intervention in Venezuela reveals the limited consensus among its members as to how the Inter-American Charter should be applied to democratic crises that are beyond the scope of coups and self-coups. Also, the creation of the OAS-backed roundtable and the Group of Friends of Gaviria reveals that the US dictated the terms under which the OAS intervention took place in Venezuela. Sources for the thesis are: published documents; OAS's and Venezuelan government internal documents; interviews with participants; newspapers and magazines of North, Central, and South America; and secondary literature. Approved: Thomas Walker Professor of Political Science Dedication The author dedicates this thesis to his wife, daughter, and son whose love, support, and encouragement have been an inspiration throughout his graduate studies. 5 Table of Contents Abstract................................................................................................................................3 Dedication............................................................................................................................4 List of tables.........................................................................................................................7 List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................8 Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................9 Chapter 2: The OAS and the defense of democracy.....................................................16 Historical precedents for the principle of the collective defense of democracy..........16 Collective defense of democracy after the end of the Cold War .................................21 Responses to the interruption of elected regimes .......................................................26 Intervention without intervening..................................................................................29 Chapter 3: The Inter-American Democratic Charter: content and context..............37 The Peruvian initiative.................................................................................................37 The flourishing collective understanding of democracy..............................................38 The Liberal vision........................................................................................................43 A hegemon's desire ......................................................................................................48 Chapter 4: Early response (April- June 2002) ..............................................................55 Chavez's fall and return................................................................................................55 The Rio Group's determination....................................................................................57 The OAS's hesitancy....................................................................................................60 The US's reversal .........................................................................................................70 Chapter 5: Pre-negotiation (July –October 2002).........................................................74 Chavez's rhetorical commitment to dialogue and reconciliation .................................74 The OAS offer of help .................................................................................................77 Carter's mission to convince Chavez ...........................................................................79 The tripartite mission comes in....................................................................................85 Toledo's and Gaviria's impatience ...............................................................................89 Bases of the OAS-backed roundtable ..........................................................................91 6 Chapter 6: Roundtable working (November 2002-May 2003) ....................................96 The roundtable's ineffectiveness and the general strike...............................................96 Hemispheric actors and a solution ...............................................................................99 The OAS's dilemma and Chavez ...............................................................................104 Mobilizing Gaviria's friends to end the strike............................................................110 The agreement............................................................................................................118 Chapter 7: Conclusion...................................................................................................125 A new pattern? ...........................................................................................................125 Motives ......................................................................................................................129 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................133 7 List of tables Table 1: OAS responses to the interruption of democratic order (1991-2001) .....30 Table 2: Democratic Clause in the Americas ........................................................47 8 List of abbreviations AD: Accion Democratica Party ALADI: Latin American Integration Association CACM: Central America Common Market CAN: Andean Community of Nations CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market CD: Coordinadora Democratica CNE: National Electoral Commission COPEI: Comite Politico Electoral Independiente CTV: Venezuelan Confederation of Workers IACHR: Inter-American Commission of Human Hights IDC: Inter-American Democratic Charter MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo MERCOSUR: MVR: Movimiento Quinta Republica OAS: Organization of American States PJ: Primero Justicia party PDVSA: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. UNDP: United Nations Development Program 9 Chapter 1: Introduction Venezuela has been in the news since April, 2002, when a group of the military disobeyed President Hugo Chavez and overthrew him from the Presidency for 48 hours. Not only was the abrupt restoration of Chavez a surprise but also the outpouring of condemnations and commendations for the interruption of constitutional order and the subsequent instatement of a provisional government was amazing. The US government cheered Chavez’s ousting but avoided qualifying the action as a coup d’etat, leaving questions about its possible connection with the military attempt. On the other hand, the international community unanimously deplored the April 11th events. In fact, the Rio Group as a community, and the presidents of Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, individually, rejected the coup and invited the international community to do the same. Soon after, the European Union and, most importantly, the Organization of American States (OAS) acted in the same manner. It is important to emphasize the subsequent role played by the OAS. On April 13, using the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC), the OAS Permanent Council declared the events as a threat against democratic institutions and carried out actions to reinstate the rule of law. In addition, the OAS General Assembly, held in Washington on April 18, 2002, noted its “satisfaction at the restoration of the constitutional order and the democratically elected government.” 1 It is clear that the OAS undertook another important job at the end of 2002, by authorizing its Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, to become the facilitator of the dialogue between the government and the opposition. After six months of discussions, on May 29, 2003, the parties signed an agreement following 1 OAS, Support for democracy in Venezuela, AG/Res.1(XXIX-E02) (Washington, D.C, April 18, 2002) 10 the agenda set by the OAS alongside other international organizations. Chavez’s recall referendum, held in August 15, 2004, resulted from the OAS-backed settlement among political contenders. In the last twenty years, the OAS has approved a set of documents and embarked on a great number of activities, both of which clearly reveal a renewed commitment