THE ROLE OF THE OAS IN THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF VENEZUELA
(APRIL 11, 2002- MAY 31, 2003)
A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the Center for International Studies of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Masters of Arts
Jesus Sanchez Melean
November 2005
This thesis entitled
ROLE OF THE OAS IN POLITICAL CRISIS OF VENEZUELA
(APRIL 11, 2002- MAY 31, 2003)
by
JESUS SANCHEZ MELEAN
has been approved for
the Program of Latin American Studies
and the Center for International Studies of Ohio University by
Thomas Walker
Professor of Political Science
Josep Rota
Director, Center for International Studies
SANCHEZ MELEAN, JESUS. MA. November 2005. International Affairs
The Role of OAS in the Political Crisis of Venezuela (144 pp.)
Director of Thesis: Thomas Walker
This thesis describes the intervention of the OAS in the Venezuelan political crisis between April 2002 and May 2003. Invoking for first time its Democratic Charter, the OAS became the principal actor in Venezuela using symbolic diplomacy, good offices, and third party mediation. The OAS clearly signaled to domestic and regional actors that antidemocratic actions would not be tolerated in the region and created conditions for local actors to engage in dialogue and negotiation which reduced the level of violence and conflict. Nevertheless, the OAS's intervention in Venezuela reveals the limited consensus among its members as to how the Inter-American Charter should be applied to democratic crises that are beyond the scope of coups and self-coups. Also, the creation of the OAS-backed roundtable and the Group of Friends of Gaviria reveals that the US dictated the terms under which the OAS intervention took place in Venezuela.
Sources for the thesis are: published documents; OAS's and Venezuelan government internal documents; interviews with participants; newspapers and magazines of North,
Central, and South America; and secondary literature.
Approved:
Thomas Walker
Professor of Political Science
Dedication
The author dedicates this thesis to his wife, daughter, and son whose love, support, and
encouragement have been an inspiration throughout his graduate studies.
5
Table of Contents
Abstract...... 3 Dedication...... 4 List of tables...... 7 List of abbreviations ...... 8 Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 9 Chapter 2: The OAS and the defense of democracy...... 16 Historical precedents for the principle of the collective defense of democracy...... 16 Collective defense of democracy after the end of the Cold War ...... 21 Responses to the interruption of elected regimes ...... 26 Intervention without intervening...... 29 Chapter 3: The Inter-American Democratic Charter: content and context...... 37 The Peruvian initiative...... 37 The flourishing collective understanding of democracy...... 38 The Liberal vision...... 43 A hegemon's desire ...... 48 Chapter 4: Early response (April- June 2002) ...... 55 Chavez's fall and return...... 55 The Rio Group's determination...... 57 The OAS's hesitancy...... 60 The US's reversal ...... 70 Chapter 5: Pre-negotiation (July –October 2002)...... 74 Chavez's rhetorical commitment to dialogue and reconciliation ...... 74 The OAS offer of help ...... 77 Carter's mission to convince Chavez ...... 79 The tripartite mission comes in...... 85 Toledo's and Gaviria's impatience ...... 89 Bases of the OAS-backed roundtable ...... 91
6
Chapter 6: Roundtable working (November 2002-May 2003) ...... 96 The roundtable's ineffectiveness and the general strike...... 96 Hemispheric actors and a solution ...... 99 The OAS's dilemma and Chavez ...... 104 Mobilizing Gaviria's friends to end the strike...... 110 The agreement...... 118 Chapter 7: Conclusion...... 125 A new pattern? ...... 125 Motives ...... 129 Bibliography ...... 133
7
List of tables
Table 1: OAS responses to the interruption of democratic order (1991-2001) .....30
Table 2: Democratic Clause in the Americas ...... 47
8
List of abbreviations
AD: Accion Democratica Party ALADI: Latin American Integration Association CACM: Central America Common Market CAN: Andean Community of Nations CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market CD: Coordinadora Democratica CNE: National Electoral Commission COPEI: Comite Politico Electoral Independiente CTV: Venezuelan Confederation of Workers IACHR: Inter-American Commission of Human Hights IDC: Inter-American Democratic Charter MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo MERCOSUR: MVR: Movimiento Quinta Republica OAS: Organization of American States PJ: Primero Justicia party PDVSA: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. UNDP: United Nations Development Program
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Venezuela has been in the news since April, 2002, when a group of the military disobeyed President Hugo Chavez and overthrew him from the Presidency for 48 hours.
Not only was the abrupt restoration of Chavez a surprise but also the outpouring of condemnations and commendations for the interruption of constitutional order and the subsequent instatement of a provisional government was amazing. The US government cheered Chavez’s ousting but avoided qualifying the action as a coup d’etat, leaving questions about its possible connection with the military attempt. On the other hand, the international community unanimously deplored the April 11th events. In fact, the Rio
Group as a community, and the presidents of Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil,
individually, rejected the coup and invited the international community to do the same.
Soon after, the European Union and, most importantly, the Organization of American
States (OAS) acted in the same manner.
It is important to emphasize the subsequent role played by the OAS. On April 13,
using the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC), the OAS Permanent Council
declared the events as a threat against democratic institutions and carried out actions to
reinstate the rule of law. In addition, the OAS General Assembly, held in Washington on
April 18, 2002, noted its “satisfaction at the restoration of the constitutional order and the
democratically elected government.” 1 It is clear that the OAS undertook another
important job at the end of 2002, by authorizing its Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, to
become the facilitator of the dialogue between the government and the opposition. After
six months of discussions, on May 29, 2003, the parties signed an agreement following
1 OAS, Support for democracy in Venezuela, AG/Res.1(XXIX-E02) (Washington, D.C, April 18, 2002) 10 the agenda set by the OAS alongside other international organizations. Chavez’s recall referendum, held in August 15, 2004, resulted from the OAS-backed settlement among political contenders.
In the last twenty years, the OAS has approved a set of documents and embarked on a great number of activities, both of which clearly reveal a renewed commitment to democracy. The legislation and jurisprudence support what Cooper and Legler call the democratic solidarity paradigm.2 The authors identify principles and action repertoire that
now guide OAS pro-democracy activism. Most importantly, the western hemisphere
countries have consented to act collectively in order to face the threats posed against democratic consolidation in the area. As a result, some authors consider that the OAS has gradually abandoned its rigid and traditional commitment to non-intervention in favor of a new commitment to protecting democracy.3
The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC) synthesizes all previous
resolutions, giving more tools for the OAS’s efforts of promoting the democracy in the
region. This document expresses the consensus of state members to intervene collectively
not only to restore elected authorities, but also to guarantee healthy democratic
2 A. Cooper and Thomas Legler, “The OAS democratic solidarity paradigm: Questions of collective and national leadership,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 43 (Spring 2001): 103-126; Thomas Legler, “The Inter-American Democratic Charter: From Peru to Venezuela and Beyond,” (paper, Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, 2003). 3 T. Farer, “Collectively defending democracy in the western hemisphere,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively defending democracy in the Americas, ed. T. Farer, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1-25.; R. Parish, “Kantian, liberalism, and the collective defense of democracy in Latin America,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no.2 (March 2002).; H. Munoz, “The right to democracy in the Americas: From the commitment of Santiago to the democratic charter”(lecture, Meeting of the American Association of Political Science, Washington D.C., September, 2002,) ; Mauricio Alice, La evaluation de la eficacia de la OEA en crisis democraticas en el continente (Buenos Aires: Nuevo Hacer, 2002); E. Ferrero, “Seguimiento de la Carta Democrática Inter-Americana”(Speech, OAS-General Assembly, June 4, 2002,).
11 institutions in the long term. For that reason, the new mechanisms of the charter formalized preventive action by the OAS.4 The critics, however, highlight that the most
important weakness of the IDC is a lack of concrete instruments of operation. Pastor
considers that it needs substance to back up its set of “wondrous phrases”. 5
In addition to the IDC, new practices have continued enriching the collective
democratic paradigm. Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian Foreign Minister and OAS
General Assembly president, relates how the OAS action in Peru in 2000 set a model of
“soft intervention” in pursuit of democracy that was supported even for the non-
interventionist paladins, Brazil and Mexico.6 The OAS intervened in the internal affairs
of Peru, creating and facilitating roundtable dialogue between the Fujimori government and the opposition. The OAS General Assembly gave power to the Secretary General to recommend reforms and demand results with the threat of punishment. According to
Cameron, despite the fact that the roundtable dialogue, together with other jurisprudence, are components of the OAS repertoire of tools, they have not been formalized. The author says that these practices still involve “contested understandings of sovereignty, democracy, and constitutionalism.” 7
4 Robert Pastor, “A community of democracies in the Americas: instilling substance into wondrous phrases”, Canadian Foreign Policy 10, 3 (Spring 2003):15-29; M. Cameron, “Strengthening checks and balances: Democracy defense and promotion in the Americas,” Canadian Foreign Policy 10, 3, (Spring 2003): 101-115; M. Cameron, “Inter-American Democratic Charter: Toward a plan of action” (lecture, Liu Institute for Global Issues, July, 2003); Jennifer McCoy, “Comments on the Inter-American Charter,” Summit of the Americas Bulletin 1, no. 1(2001),http://www.summit-americas.org/bulletin/boletin1-eng.doc; A. Lloyd, “A model for promoting democracy in the Americas,” Canadian Foreign Policy 10, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 13-14; T. Legler, “The Inter-American Democratic Charter,” 19-26. 5 Pastor, “A community,” 16. 6 Lloyd, “A model,” 14. 7 Cameron, “Strengthening checks,” 112. 12
In Venezuela, the OAS made use of its 2001 democratic charter for the first time.8
Therefore, in describing the intervention of the OAS from April 11, 2002 to May 30,
2003, it is possible to find evidence for understanding the updated role of this organization. This new role of OAS raises questions that need to be addressed. Is it possible to identify a new pattern of behavior of the OAS using as evidence its intervention in the Venezuelan crisis? How did the OAS use the Inter-American
Democratic Charter’s tools for supporting democracy in Venezuela? Did the OAS involvement in Venezuela collide with the principle of non-intervention? How is the intervention of the OAS in Venezuela different from its intervention in previous crises in the area? What are the similarities and differences between the OAS intervention in
Venezuela (2002) and Peru (2000)? Why did the OAS decide to deal with that particular crisis? Did the OAS resolutions and activities in the Venezuela crisis reflect the US perspective?
The OAS action in the Venezuela crisis and the use of the IDC for the first time has been analyzed by some authors. Legler considers that the OAS became stronger because of its response to the coup d’etat in Venezuela.9 He indicates that the democratic
charter proved to be effective, finding an appropriate response to the crisis and helping
OAS’s role in third-party mediation. The hemispheric organization, however, could
8 Lionel Alexander Hursi, representative of the Antigua and Barbuda to the OAS, affirms that in December, 2001, after the National Palace attack by opposition forces in Haiti, the OAS Permanent Council considered invoking the Charter. Hursi claims that CARICOM countries rejected forcing the Haitian government to ask OAS for help. As a result, there was not consensus to apply the IDC. See: Lionel Alexander Hursi, “Antigua and Barbuda,” in Carta Democratica Interamericana: Documentos e interpretaciones (Washington: OAS, 2003), 254-255.
9. Legler, ““The Inter-American Democratic Charter,” 19-26; Legler, “Peru then and now: the Inter- American Democratic Charter and Peruvian democratization,” Canadian Foreign Policy 10, no. 3(Spring 2003), 61-72 13 neither avert the escalation of more conflicts nor help in the advancement in democracy- building. In Legler’s words, “while crisis prevention continues to be a haunting challenge for the OAS, the organization has shown that it can use the charter effectively as the basis for defending democracy in actual moments of crisis, for follow up, and facilitation or third party mediation.” 10
Cameron and Pastor’s visions of the OAS's role in Venezuela were more severe
than Legler’s.11 According to Cameron, while OAS evoked the IDC to pass a profuse
number of resolutions for a pacific solution of the political crisis in Venezuela, the
organization avoided explicitly applying the democratic charter in order to press for a
solution. In fact, the author gives evidence that Gaviria acted as a round table facilitator
without special power from the OAS.12 Cameron believes that it is clear that some OAS
members perceive the 2001 democratic charter as a supportive instrument.13 Cameron
also says that
the OAS has been actively involved, with repeated resolutions and declarations
calling for dialogue and compromise. These calls have fallen on deaf ears, and
progress toward a resolution has been slow or unperceivable. The charter has not
been explicitly invoked in either case [Haiti and Venezuela], despite ample
justification, because the leaders of both countries [Haiti and Venezuela] (and
10 Legler, “Peru then,” 71. 11 Cameron, “Strengthening checks,” 112-115; Cameron, “Inter-American Democratic,” 10; Pastor, “A community,” 18-21. 12 Cameron, “Strengthening checks,” 110. 13.Cameron, “Inter-American democratic,” 10. 14
their immediate regional neighbors) have rejected the use of the instruments
provided by the charter, which they see as punitive. 14
In the same vein, Pastor considers that the performance of the OAS in Venezuela is characterized by being limited and contradictory. He praises, however, the involvement of the OAS Secretary General with Venezuela’s crisis. Pastor claims that “although the
OAS secretary general has been active and daring on Venezuela in 2002-2003, the most significant case since approval of the IDC, the organization has been reticent and inconsistent.” 15
Based on specific evidence, I argue in this thesis that the OAS helped the local
actors to make a compromise and reach a political agreement, which reduced the violence
and conflict in Venezuela. Nevertheless, it fell short of using the democratic charter
instruments. The imminent restoration of Chavez determined the OAS position after the
coup. The OAS seemed unable to convince Venezuela’s government to accept a formal
role for the OAS in finding a political settlement with the opposition. There was no
consensus for giving Gaviria special power to solve the crisis in December 2002. The
OAS yielded its right to follow 2003 May accords. The OAS involvement in Venezuela
makes it clear that the OAS members do not visualize a strong hemispheric political
organization, and, most importantly, they do not have the intention of applying the Inter-
American Democratic Charter beyond the scope of coup and self-coups.
In part one I begin by analyzing the concept of collective defense of democracy, and the non-intervention principles, showing how the two coexist. Here I present an
14 Ibid., 6. 15 Pastor, “A community,” 13. 15 overview of the OAS legal instruments and interventions supporting democracy. I finish part one with an analysis of the content and context of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter and also consider various problems with and challenges of the democratic charter that will become important when looking at OAS involvement in Venezuela’s crisis.
The second part of this work constitutes the case study. I analyze the OAS action in Venezuela in chronological order dividing the period into three periods: a) early response, from April 11 to June 4, 2002; b) pre-negotiation, from July 4 to October 22; and c) roundtable work, from November 8 to May 29. To carry out this study, primary sources were used, including OAS and Venezuelan internal government documents, interviews with participants, published Venezuelan government documents, and online versions of newspapers and magazines of North, Central, and South America. In addition, some information about the OAS decisions on Venezuela was either obtained or complemented through the examination of secondary material.
16
Chapter 2: The OAS and the defense of democracy
Historical precedents for the principle of the collective defense of the democracy
The Inter-American system has come a long way since the beginning of the last century in laying the foundations of collective action to defend democratic regimes. As early as December 1936, in the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, twenty states of the Western hemisphere signed the Declaration of Principles of Inter-
American Solidarity and Cooperation, which recognized the need for "a common democracy throughout America."16 Proposed by US President F.D. Roosevelt, the object of the conference was to seek protection against internal and external threats to peace in the region. At the time, the member states viewed Germany's rearmament, Japan's aggression in to China, and Italy's incursion in Ethiopia, with alarm. 17 Together with the rhetorical commitment to democracy, the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American
Solidarity and Cooperation stated that every act susceptible to disturbing the peace of
America affected all states and justified initiation of consultation in order to decide how to deal with the threat collectively.
Signed more than a decade later, the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Treaty) stated in its preamble that
the ''American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juridical organization
is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that peace is founded on
justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and
protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the
16 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, The International Conferences of American States, Res/27 Supp I (Buenos Aires: IACMP, 1933-40), 160. 17 G. Pope Atkins, Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System (Westport: Greenwood, 1997), 235-236. 17
people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of
justice and security."18
In addition, Article 6 of the treaty stipulated that the Organ of Consultation would meet
and agree on measures to be taken if the inviolability, the territorial integrity, the
sovereignty, or the political independence of any American state should be affected by,
among other things, any fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."
According to the Rio Treaty, the signatories could undertake any action to defend
democratic regimes in the region in the name of justice and security. Latin American
governments, however, understood the treaty as a tool for protecting their state sovereignty against external threats rather than for defending democratic institutions. 19
In 1948, the OAS Charter proclaimed democracy as the only form of government that can realize the goals of the OAS and to this end committed the organization to defend it. The preamble to the charter states that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.” 20Article
3(d) in the body of the Charter elaborates on the previous principle, expressing that the solidarity among the state members required them to organize as genuine representative democracies. Also, article 2(b) encourages state members to promote and consolidate representative democracy, but they must do so with due respect for the principle of non- intervention.
18 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio de Janeiro, August 15-September 2, 1947). 19 Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, "The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy," in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 135. 20 Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States (Washington, D.C: April 30, 1948). 18
According to the OAS Charter, it is mandatory for OAS members to enjoy democratic institutions and to assure that this kind of institution is prevalent in the rest of the region. The charter, however, prioritizes the principle of non-intervention over the defense of democracy. According to Article 12, the hemispheric organization has "no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by the Charter and none of whose provisions authorize it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of
Member States." The OAS Charter restricts the organization’s powers to enforcing its rhetorical commitment to democracy.
The precedence of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interventionism over the commitment to democracy was a logical option for Latin American states, which feared that the defense of democracy would be used as a cover for US unilateral intervention in domestic affairs.21 In fact, in 1954, based on the resolution of the tenth
Inter-American Conference, which declared Marxist regimes a threat to peace and
security, the US arranged the overthrow of Guatemala's elected president Jacobo
Arbenz.22
In the Cold War context, the US was inconsistent in using the OAS democratic
mission and non-intervention principle, depending on its foreign policy objectives
regarding Communist incursion in the region. Although US orchestrated an intervention
in Guatemala to oust a “communist” government, Five years later, it supported the
preeminence of the inter-American commitment to nonintervention. In August 1959, the
21 Chistopher Sabatini, "Plowing the Sea? International Defense of Democracy in the Age of Illiberal Democracy," in Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America, edit. Richard Hillman, John Peeler, and Elsa Cardozo (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 22 Atkins, Encyclopedia, 201-203 19
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the OAS was held to discuss Venezuela's proposal for a compromise of the non-intervention principle in order to oppose dictatorial regimes, protect human rights, and promote democracy. US Secretary of State Christian Herter opposed Venezuela's proposal, arguing that intervention to overthrow oppressive regimes would result in disorder and tension that would provide political opportunity for communists. The recent events in Cuba were Herter’s case in point. The overwhelming majority of Foreign Affairs Ministers, together with the US Secretary of State, opposed any concession of the non-intervention principle, although the final resolution condemned dictatorial governments without mentioning names. 23 In 1962, at the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, the United States asked its partners in the
OAS to apply Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in order to force the government of Cuba to
adopt the institutions of representative democracy. The US considered that collective
action against illegitimate governments did not constitute a violation of the principle of
non-intervention. The ministers rejected any intervention in Cuba as the US requested,
but they decided to exclude Cuba's government from participation in the system.24
Over the next three decades, East-West competition prevented the countries of the hemisphere from invoking the OAS Charter to fulfill their rhetorical commitment to democracy. There were, however, three notable exceptions. It was not until the end of the
1970s that the OAS embarked on another collective action in defense of democracy. In
June 1979, at the peak of the Nicaraguan revolutionary struggle, the OAS called for the end of Somoza's autocratic rule and the installation of a democratic government. The
23 Ibid.,235-236. 24 Ibid., 332-334. 20
OAS censure of Somoza's regime was based on an Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights report that showed grave human rights abuses. Even though the OAS
Resolution left the solution in the hands of the Nicaraguan people, the OAS asked to integrate a transition government with representatives of groups opposing Somoza and called for free elections as soon as possible. 25 In their 1996 article, Acevedo and
Grossman emphasize that the OAS stance on Nicaragua opened possibilities for establishing regional parameters concerning the performance of member states.26
A decade later, the peace process in Central America provide a the OAS a chance to get involved in peacemaking and electoral observation for the first time. Resulting from successful efforts led by Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica, the Esquipulus II
Accords recognized that democratic government and human rights were the necessary conditions for domestic peace in Central American countries. Most importantly, the pact emphasized that collective, extra sub-region involvement was essential to the establishment of national peace. The OAS as well as the United Nations acted as guarantors of the agreement and shouldered the responsibility of monitoring the peace process and electoral events. In August 1989, the OAS assumed the mission of overseeing the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Contras. Also, the OAS undertook operations to observe and verify the Nicaraguan electoral process held in February,
1990.27
The OAS also took action to criticize the violation of democratic standards in
Panama. In May 1989, the commander of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and de
25 Ibid,356-358. 26 Acevedo and Grossman, "The organization," 137-138. 27 Ibid., 12-13; Atkins, Encyclopedia, 352-356. 21 facto president of Panama, Manuel Antonio Noriega, nullified the results of internationally monitored elections and installed a puppet president. The OAS condemned Noriega's maneuvers in annulling the election and the violence against the opposition candidates and citizenry. In addition, the Twenty-First Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers decided to send a mission to Panama in order to organize direct negotiations among the executive branch, the Defense Force, pro- government parties, and opposition parties. 28 The OAS promoted dialogue among the parties, but did not make strong efforts to ask for a democratically elected official to be put in office; this was because many states feared that such a pronouncement would facilitate U.S intervention. Tom Farer considers that it was a mistake for the OAS to assume such a contradictory stance. 29 Farer argues that the OAS "lost an opportunity to
dictate the timing, the dimensions, and the goals of the intervention and to more deeply
enmesh the United States in collective decision-making. There is no reason to doubt that
the United States, having sought collective action, would have paid a price to obtain it.”30
Collective defense of democracy after the end of the Cold War
In June 1991, in Santiago, Chile, the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States recognized the need for organizational renewal in the light of new
global, regional, political, and economic changes as well as the end of the cold war and
thus expanded the Inter-American commitment to the promotion and defense of
representative democracy. The Foreign Affair Ministers declared their commitment to
28 Atkins, Encyclopedia, 404-407 29 Tom Farer, "Collectivelly Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: Introduction and overview," in Beyond Sovereinty: Collectivelly Defending Democracy in the Americas, edit. Tom Farer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 13-14. 30 Ibid., 14. 22 the defense and promotion of representative democracy and human rights in the region, within the framework of respect for the principles of self determination and non- intervention. They resolved to stimulate the renewal of the Organization of American
States and prepared a relevant agenda for the Organization. The Foreign Affairs Ministers assigned special priority during the decade to strengthening representative democracy together with struggling against poverty, promoting human rights, promoting liberalization of trade and expansion of investments, protecting the environment, combating illicit narcotics traffic and the related clandestine traffic of arms, furthering the regional integration process, and increasing technical cooperation and transfer of technology. 31
The Santiago Commitment was possible because there was no more East-West confrontation and the US pressure on Latin American allies to support illegitimate regimes had ended. In fact, the US had embraced the strategy of enlarging democracy as well as the promotion of liberal economic policies. Every country in Latin America except Cuba had an elected president, and the renewed commitment by the OAS to democracy let the weak Latin America democracies consolidate their institutions and protect against domestic threats. The Santiago Commitment also reflected the regional enthusiasm for trade and economic integration existing in the region at the beginning of the 1990s. 32
31 OAS General Assembly, Twenty-First Regular Session, The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System ( Washington, D.C.:General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, June 4, 1991). 32 Parish and Peceny, "Kantian Liberalism,” 230. 23
The foreign affairs ministers also adopted Resolution 1080 on the topic of
"Representative Democracy." Following the OAS Charter preamble, Resolution 1080 stated that the representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region, and affirmed the necessity of protecting the democratic institutions in the region with operative legal instruments. The ministers expressed concern because the OAS lacked effective instruments for dealing with the interruption of constitutional democracy. 33 The political crisis in Panama in 1989
represented a direct precedent for OAS limitations in protecting democracy.34 In addition,
there is evidence that Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela, asked the OAS
Secretary General and lobbied among other Latin American presidents for the OAS
General Assembly to create a mechanism against coup d'etats. Perez feared a coup
attempt in Venezuela and believed that the OAS had to move toward more effective
mechanisms to defend democratic regimes than diplomacy. 35
Resolution 1080 created an automatic mechanism to respond to coup d'etats in
any member state. It was mandatory for the Secretary General of the OAS to immediately
convene the OAS's Permanent Council in the case of any event giving rise to the sudden
or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the
legitimate exercise of power by democratically elected government in any of the
Organization's member states. The Permanent Council was instructed within the
33 OAS General Assembly, Twenty-First Regular Session , Representative Democracy, (Washington, D.C: General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, June 6, 1991). 34 Atkins, Encyclopedia, 424. 35 Richard Bloomfield, "Making the Western Hemisphere safe for democracy? The OAS Defense-of- Democracy Regime," in Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The case of Latin America and the Caribbean, edit. Carl Kaysen, Robert Pastor, and Laura Reeds( Cambridge: Committee on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Art and Sciences, 1994), 24-25. 24 framework of the Charter to examine the situation and to decide on an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or a special session of the General Assembly if the constitutional interruption persisted. Resolution 1080 demanded a decision from the
Permanent Council no more than ten days after the convocation. 36 The purpose of both
of the meetings was to look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed
appropriate, in accordance with the OAS Charter and international law.
According to Resolution 1080, the hemispheric community had the right to look
into domestic issues of OAS members that represented a movement beyond the
traditional concept of sovereignty. The illegal replacement of an elected government
would trigger the collective assessment of the domestic affairs of any OAS member
mainly because the OAS would protect the will of the people. Although the Resolution
established an automatic mechanism of consultation, there was not a consensus among
the states as to what should be done to restore democracy in the case of a coup.
Resolution 1080 did not provide for any automatic sanctions, despite the
aspiration of the proponents of the resolution. Several months before the General
Assembly, Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela's president and promoter of collective
intervention on behalf of democracy, had convinced the presidents of the Andean region
to support an automatic break in diplomatic relations with any regime that took power by
force. This represented an important departure from the traditional practice of the OAS
members. Also, Argentina, Canada, Chile, and the United States joined in the support for
the pro-democracy stance of Venezuela. 37 On the other hand, Mexico, Brazil, and
36 OAS General Assembly, Twenty- First Regular Session. 37 Bloomfield, "Making the Western," 24-26. 25
Colombia led the non-interventionist block, which was reluctant to consider any overthrow of a democratic regime as a threat to hemispheric peace. They believed that the OAS Charter and international law provided enough tools for the OAS in responding to the ouster of a constitutional government.38 Richard Bloomfield, American scholar and
former diplomat, believes that Resolution 1080 showed that a contradiction between the
non-intervention principle and democratic commitment persisted. According to
Bloomfield, Resolution 1080 was a compromise between the interventionist block led by
Venezuela and the non-interventionist countries.39
In the following years, two OAS documents reinforced the collective defense of
democracy approach. In December 1992, the Sixteenth Special Session of the General
Assembly approved a protocol of amendment of the OAS Charter, which added a new
tool for increasing the repercussions for overthrowing democratic regimes in the
Americas.40 The Protocol of Washington, which was totally incorporated in the OAS
Charter and ratified in 1997, provided for the temporary suspension of member states in
which the democratic process had been illegally interrupted. It states that a member of the
OAS whose "democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force, may
be suspended from the exercise of its rights to participate in the meetings of the General
Assembly" and in the meetings of several other OAS bodies. The new Article 9 of the
38 Ibid., 20-24. 39 Ibid., 20, 28. 40 The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States "Protocol of Washington", approved on December 14, 1992, at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly.It was included in the OAS Charter as Article 9 in Chapter III. 26
OAS Charter recommended negotiations prior to the eventual suspension, a decision that must be ratified by a two-thirds vote.41 Only Mexico voted against the amendment.
In 1993, the Declaration of Managua by the General Assembly elaborated on the
OAS collective support of democracy. The Declaration stated that the OAS had to avert
political crises from arising or thwart their escalation, through a creative diplomacy that
must include fomenting dialogue, cooperation, and confidence building among political
actors in the conflict. According to the OAS General Assembly, such a preventative role would contribute to the stability and consolidation of democratic institutions. Most importantly, this new OAS mission expanded the leverage of the hemispheric community in the domestic affairs of OAS members. 42
Responses to the interruption of elected regimes
During the 1990s, the OAS responded collectively to the overt interruption of
constitutional governments in the region. The rationale of the collective defense of
democracy was that those tempted to seize power by force would take into calculation the
threat of sanctions that their act would trigger and determine it to be too costly. To be
effective and to deter potential plotters, the OAS repertoire of sanctions needed to be
sufficiently strong and to promise a cost to the offending regime or individual actors. 43
There was a regional consensus on measures that protect against and punish overt and clear transgressions of democracy. Although there was no automatic escalation of sanctions, the OAS focused on three types of responses: symbolic, political and
41 Ibid. 42 "Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development," in The Future of the Organization of American States, ed. Viron Vaky and Heraldo Muñoz (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993), 107-108. 43 Sabatini, "Plowing the Sea?" 80 27 economic. The symbolic response of the OAS consisted of condemning those who attempted to overthrow democracy and encouraging member states to take collective action. Also, the OAS signaled to the local actors and the rest of the international community which actions were considered to be legitimate or illegitimate, which helped to build a consensus against the regimes engaged in illegitimate behavior. 44
Political ostracism became another instrument for the OAS to pressure non-
elected regimes. It was the purpose of the Washington Protocol to prevent de facto
regimes from participating in the different bodies of the Inter-American System. The sub
regional accords –Mercosur and the Andean Community– also included the mechanism
of exclusion of their benefits for illegitimate governments. Finally, the hemispheric
community accepted the principle that economic sanctions, including the interruption of
aid from multilateral financial institutions, should be part of the anti-coup regime options.
Before 1991, Latin American countries were staunchly opposed to the use of economic
sanctions for any purpose. Despite accepting economic sanctions, there was not
consensus among OAS members allowing the use of force as a valid response against de
facto governments.45
Robert Pastor listed specific options for OAS in dealing with coup d'etats in the
region.46 Pastor organized the different options from the most severe –the use of force which is decided only by the UN Security Council– to the most lenient–no response.
44 Ibid.; also in : Robert Pastor, "Forward to the Beginnign : The Widening Scope for Global Collective Action," in Emerging Normas of Justified Intervention, edit. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), 139-141; Bloomfield, "Making the Western," 25-27; Parish and Peceny, "Kantian Liberalism," 237-244. 45 Ibid. 46 Brett Leeds and Carl Kaysen, "Rapporteur's Report," in Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The case of Latin America and the Caribbean, edit. Carl Kaysen, Robert Pastor, and Laura Reeds( Cambridge: Committee on International) Security Studies of the American Academy of Art and Sciences, 1994), 157. 28
Using Pastor's scale, it is clear that the OAS followed a similar pattern in its responses to the interruption of democratic order in Haiti (1991-1994), Peru (1992), Guatemala
(1993), and Paraguay (1996), when Resolution 1080 was invoked (see Table 1).
In Haiti a military junta led by Raul Cedras deposed the first elected president,
Jean Bertrand Aristide. It took three years and demanded the intervention of the UN multilateral force for Aristide to be restored to the presidency. 47Also, the 1996 political
crisis in Paraguay originated in a military attempt to seize power. Contrary to the
situation in Haiti, the attempt by General Oviedo to oust the constitutional government
failed, in part due to forty hours of negotiation and international pressure.48 In Peru and
Guatemala, the incumbent presidents at that time were the perpetrators of the attack against the rule of law of their countries. In April 1992, Alberto Fujimori closed the
Peruvian Congress and the Supreme Court as a result of a self–staged coup. Because of
international pressure, Fujimori restored the rule of law and convene for elections of a
constitutional congress, which wrote a new constitution and exercised legislative power
until 1995.49 In 1993, following the example of Fujimori, Jorge Serrano, the elected president of Guatemala, dissolved the Congress and the Supreme Court and announced the suspension of the constitution. Contrary to Fujimori's coup, Serrano found internal
47 E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of democracy in Haiti," Democratization.R. Diprizio,"Haiti:Operation Restore Democracy," in Armed Humanitarian: US interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo, R. Diprizio,(New York: The Eagle,2002), 87-103; A. Dupuy, Haiti in the new world order: The limits of the democratic revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). 48 Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay: The coup that didn't happen," Journal of democracy 8, no.1 (1997): 43- 55; Alice, La evaluation,” 139-141. 49 David Palmer, "Peru: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere," in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, edit, Tom Farer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Bloomfield, "Making the Western," 18-19; Parish and Peceny, "Kantian liberalism," 239-242. 29 resistance to his plan and had to hand the presidency to the Guatemalan Attorney General for Human Rights.50
The four crises had different origins and results, but in all of these cases the OAS
Permanent Council met within 24 hours of the disruptions of the democratic rules, the
Secretary General and fact-finding missions went to the country to collect information on
the situation, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met within ten days, approving strong
condemnations of the events and deciding on other political and economic sanctions.
While the OAS actions helped in the immediate restoration of democratic rule in
Guatemala and Paraguay, they were less effective in Haiti and Peru were.
Intervention without intervening
The collective defense of democracy in the Western Hemisphere succeeded in
deterring a more traditional style of coup d'etat in the decade of the 1990s. It sought
clarity that the countries of the Western Hemisphere had accepted civilian control of the
military and would not tolerate more military dictatorships. At the same time, however, two types of ambiguous but equally serious cases of disruption of democratic institutions between 1995 and 2001 did not meet with collective reproach or action by the OAS.
50 Alice, La evaluation, 104-111; Parish and Peceny, "Kantian liberalism," 242-243; 30
Table 1
OAS responses to the interruption of democratic order (1991-2001)
Options* \ Haiti Peru Guatemala Paraguay Countries (1991-1994) (1992) (1993) ( 1996)
Use of Force** X (collective intervention) Peacekeeping
Resolution for Individual Action Sanctions / Diplomatic X X X Isolation
Fact finding X X X X Mission Resolution of Condemnation X X X X
Foreign ministers X X X X meetings
No response
*Options listed by Pastor (1993), “Forward to the Beginning: The Widening Scope for Global Collective Action”, in Emerging Norms of justified intervention, edit. by Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences) p.139. ** Decision of the U.N Security Council. None of the documents of the OAS authorizes use of force
31
Civilian coups comprise the first type of non-conventional alteration of democratic institutions. In this case, constitutionally elected leaders are removed when voters and elected institutions demand such action. In 1997, the Ecuadorian Congress removed President Abdala Bucaram on grounds of mental incompetence. The Congress did not permit the Vice-President to assume power, as required by the Constitution, but appointed the President of the Senate to the presidency. Meanwhile the Ecuadorian military remained in the background as the critical arbiter. After several days the military threw its weight behind the congressional decision. Three years later, an alliance of indigenous groups led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador
(CONAIE) and middle and lower-ranking military officers seized the Congress and appointed a junta, which removed the elected President, Jamil Mahuad, from power. The threat of international isolation forced the junta to resign and to appoint the elected Vice- president, Gustavo Noboa, to the presidency.51
To face both Ecuadorian crises, the OAS Permanent Council met in emergency
sessions and condemned the removal of constitutional presidents Bucaram and Mahuad.
The OAS, however, neither formally invoked Resolution 1080 and the Washington
Protocol nor decided on additional action to normalize the rule of law in Ecuador.52
According to Christopher Sabatini, there was not a consensus toward a more active OAS involvement because the majority of the members believe it would appear as an OAS intervention in internal Ecuadorian politics. Most importantly, Sabatini believes that the
51 Sabatini, "Plowing," 89-93. 52 Ibid.; Alice, La evaluation, 141-143, 145-151. 32
OAS stance during the Ecuadorian crises signaled that the OAS would accept a coup as long as a man in uniform did not assume the leading role.53
Plebiscitary model democracies represent the second threat to a genuine
democratic system. In such a model, elected leaders use their popular support to
aggrandize their power at the expense of other institutions, eliminating basic institutional
checks and balances essential to democratic governance.54 Both Fujimori's and Chavez's
regimes constitute the best examples of plebiscitary or delegative democracies.
After winning the presidency of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez Frias promoted
a Constitutional Assembly that wrote a new constitution giving him virtually unlimited
power. A critical point in the country occurred in December 1999. After the new constitution was drafted and approved by referendum, the National Constituent Assembly
(ANC) dissolved the Congress of Venezuela, arguing that the national legislative body no longer had constitutional authority. The ANC created a twenty-one member commission made up of Chavez supporters and gave it legislative functions, including appointing judicial officials, electoral authorities, the public defender, the comptroller general, and the general prosecutor. Between January and August 2000 the OAS did not embark on collective assessment of the political change in Venezuela because the majority of OAS members believed that there was little cause under Resolution 1080 to justify such action.55
53 Sabatini, "Plowing," 89-93 54 Ibid., 77; G. Schmidt, Delegative democracy in Peru?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and world affairs 42, no. 1(Spring 2000): 99-100; H. Wiarda and Kline H, An introduction to Latin American Politics and development (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 46-47. 55 Sabatini, "Plowing," 91-92. 33
Like the situation in Venezuela in early 2000, Fujimori’s efforts to win a third term in office showed the erosion of democratic norms by elected officials. In the April
9th, 2000 election, Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo competed for the presidency of
Peru. A second round was needed because neither Fujimori nor Toledo won the majority
of votes. The OAS electoral mission asked the Peruvian electoral authority to postpone
the second round in order to solve the problems detected in the first round. Because of the
government’s opposition to such recommendations, the OAS electoral mission left the
country before the second round of the 2000 elections and the opposition candidate
withdrew his candidacy. The lack of respect for international standards in the electoral
process fueled doubts about Fujimori's victory, undermining the legitimacy of the new
administration. 56
The OAS General Assembly held in Windsor in June 2000 was dedicated entirely
to considering the Peruvian events. After listening to the report of the OAS Peruvian
electoral mission, the Assembly focused on the discussion of whether or not the case met
the conditions of Resolution 1080 in order to produce a collective denunciation of the
2000 elections and apply sanctions. While the US led a block of countries that supported
invoking Resolution 1080, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela argued that the electoral
process was an internal affair, and that proposing international sanctions meant
interfering in domestic issues. The Assembly reached a compromise between the blocks,
approving the Resolution 1753 that expressed concern for the outcome of process, but
also decided to send the President of the General Assembly, Lloyd Axworthy, and the
56 Alice, La evaluacion, 155-159 34
OAS Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, to explore ways to strengthen Peruvian democracy with the political actors. 57
After consultation with the government and the opposition, the OAS mission built
an agenda for strengthening democratic institutions in Peru. This consensus made it
possible to create a roundtable, which worked from July 2000 to January 2001. An OAS
representative acted as a facilitator of the Peruvian roundtable which reached agreement
on 16 of the 29 items of the agenda. The most important accord of the roundtable was
reforming the constitution to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the
transparency of electoral procedures. Although the OAS did not denounce Fujimori's
election, the organization embarked in a third party mediation formula to reduce political
conflict in the country. 58
Cooper and Legler named the method used by the OAS in Peru “intervention without intervening.”59 According to the authors, the OAS primarily promoted discussion
among the political elite. Non political representatives also participated in the
deliberations, although they did not have a vote. Conditions were set not only to discuss
but also to reach accords. The Peruvian roundtable consisted of 12 members: 6 members
appointed by government and the other 6 coming from the opposition. Each side had an
advisor team. Cooper and Andrew emphasize that the OAS representative acted as
facilitator rather than mediator or arbiter. The OAS witnessed the discussion, but the
decisions remained in the hands of national citizens. The roundtable agreed on the agenda
57 OAS, Mission of the President of the General Assembly and the OAS Secretary General to Peru,AG/Res 1753(XXX 0/00) (Windsor, June 4, 2000). 58 Alice, La evaluation, 155-159.; Sabatini, "Plowing," 81-86. 59.A.Cooper and T. Legler, "A model for the future?" Journal of democracy 12, no.4 (Oct. 2001): 123-136. 35 before starting the negotiations. However, it was inevitable for the roundtable to go beyond its agenda and get involve in other issues. Both sides had a moral obligation to fulfill the agreement of the roundtable and the OAS monitored the execution.60
Cooper and Legler believe that the roundtable was innovative and improvisational
at the same time. They argue there was no precedent to guide such an experience. The
OAS prioritized efficiency rather than representation of all sectors of the country. The
Peruvian roundtable was mainly a place for a close discussion between the old and new political elite. Despite its weakness, the roundtable became the firefighter of the political system because it filled the institutional vacuum caused by the crisis of power. Cooper and Legler emphasize that the roundtable represented the locus of real decision making in the final days of the Fujimori government. 61 Cooper and Legler argue that
the OAS managed to improvise a sustained, flexible, and highly effective mission
to Peru. Although sensitive in principle to the doctrine of non-intervention, the
OAS initiative experienced significant 'mission creep' and intruded in the
domestic affairs of a member state…the OAS mission became fixture in Peruvian
political life, fostering dialogue among the polarized forces of the country's
government, elected opposition, and civil society.62
In contrast, McClintock has an unenthusiastic view about the OAS role in Peru. 63
She states that the OAS should have condemned the 2000 elections as a fraud because it revealed the intention of OAS member to helping a government that lacked legitimacy.
60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 135. 63 C. McClintock, "Room for improvement: The OAS in Peru," Journal of democracy 12, no. 4(Oct. 2001): 137-140. 36
McClintock remarks that the roundtable did not contribute to the solution of the Peruvian crisis. Instead, she claims that the disclosure of a video of Vladimiro Montesino, Chief of the Intelligence Service, offering a bribe to a congressman and Fujimori's resignation were the real catalysts for change in Peru. However, she recognizes that the OAS involvement indicated that the international community was watching political events, which thus limited the options of the government. Like Cooper and Legler, McClintock believes that the reform accords facilitated the work of the transition government.64
In the four decades after its foundation in 1948, the OAS has failed to fulfill its
rhetorical commitment to defend democracy. The OAS prioritized the principle of non-
intervention and prevented any collective action to support democracy. During this time
the OAS played the Cold War game with the US, its most powerful member. With the
end of the Cold War, the OAS approved Resolution 1080 and the Washington Protocol,
which renewed the OAS's democratic mission. The responses to democratic crises in
Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay showed the vitality of the emerging collective
defense of democratic regime in the Americas. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, it
was clear that the new approach of the OAS was limited to protection against the traditional enemy of democracies, the military coup. There was neither consensus nor formal mechanisms for not dealing with authoritarian behavior by democratically elected incumbent governments. The OAS backed roundtable in Peru, after the 2000 presidential
elections, was an informal response to the problem.
64 Ibid. 37
Chapter 3: Context and content of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
The Peruvian initiative
On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the New York and Washington D.C terrorist attacks, an Extraordinary Assembly General of the OAS meeting in Lima, Peru approved the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC). 65 The IDC updated and
gathered, in one instrument, the resolutions, declarations, and documents related to
democracy, giving the organization more tools to protect democratic regimes against
traditional coups d'etats and other more subtle threats.
Under the auspices of Valentin Paniagua's transitional government, Peru had
advanced a charter on democracy to the OAS in the spring of 2001. With the notable
exception of Venezuela's President, Hugo Chavez, the American's heads of state met in
Quebec, Canada in April, 2001, to formally accept the Peruvian proposition. At this time,
the signatories agreed to have their foreign affairs ministers prepare a draft of the charter
for adoption by the OAS General Assembly at its regular session in Costa Rica in June,
2001. The Quebec City Summit of Presidents also adopted the "Democratic Clause”
which claims that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order
constitutes an unavoidable obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the
Summit of the Americas' conferences.66
After the Quebec Summit, a working group of the OAS Permanent Council, led
by a Peruvian representative, Manuel Rodriguez prepared a draft of the charter which was
65 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter (Lima, September 11, 2001). www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. 66 Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Quebec City (Quebec: Summit of the Americas, April 21, 2001). http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.summitamericas.or.
38 submitted to the General Assembly of the OAS at its regular session in June 2001. The
Peruvian-led project was supported by Canada, Argentina, Costa Rica, and the US.
Venezuela's Foreign Minister Luis Alfonzo Davila continued his opposition to the charter draft on the grounds that democracy should not be defined solely by the narrow confines of representative democracy. According to the Venezuelan government, participatory democracy should be equal to representative democracy in the charter. Mexico and
Caricom representatives asked for more time for discussion which unraveled the consensus behind the Peruvian project. The OAS General Assembly, however, decided to give the working group another chance to prepare a second version of the charter. Only then did a special session of the OAS General Assembly reach a consensus on the morning of September 11, 2001.
The proponents of the Charter, Manuel Rodriguez, then Peruvian Representative to the OAS; Diego Garcia-Sayan, then Minister of Justice of Peru; and Javier Perez de
Cuellar, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Peru, believed that the OAS' collective defense of democracies was incapable of reversing Alberto Fujimori's unconstitutional practices.
They considered it mandatory that the OAS approve norms and procedures to extend the scope of Resolution 1080 which guarantees correct procedures for democratic crises.
They also argued that the new norms of democracy in the Americas needed to be connected to human rights instruments.67
The flourishing collective understanding of democracy
The Peruvian experience was a catalyst for approving the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that new identities of the OAS's
67 Legler, "The Inter-American," 6-7. 39 members made it possible for the OAS to gradually abandon its rigid and traditional non- interventionist stance in favor of collective intervention. According to Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory of international relations, states embrace ideas which inspire the development of norms and institutions that provide structures to their international relations. These ideas, norms, and institutions shape the identities and interests of states.
This means that ideas, norms, and institutions constitute a state's' identity and interests
rather simply regulating or limiting their behavior. Wendt's constructivist approach maintains that international reality is a social construction driven by collective understanding, including norms, which emerge from social interaction. 68 Following this
constructivist theory, the 2001 Democratic Charter reflects the positive influence that the
collective defense of the democracy regime had in shaping identities of the Americas
during the 1990s. They reached a consensus that protecting democracy was more
important than maintaining a non-interventionist policy.
The IDC resulted from previous evolutions in OAS democratic activism. Not only
does the IDC hold that the Western Hemisphere forms a community of democracies but it
also elevates democracy to a basic human right. Alongside all other human rights, Article
1 declares that people have a right to democracy and their governments must defend that
right. Heraldo Muñoz, a Chilean diplomat and former President of the OAS Permanent
Council, argues that there is now a right to democracy in the Americas. He claims that the
concern for the promotion and defense of democracy in the Inter-American system has
68 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it," in International Politics: Enduring concepts and contemporary issues, ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson, 1989), 61-63. 40 evolved into a normative obligation and, most importantly, is being implemented through collective action.69
OAS members also agreed that a free and fair election was not enough to characterize a regime as democratic. Articles 3 and 4 of the IDC emphasize that other essential components of democracy are respect for the rule of law and human rights, a pluralistic political system of parties and civilian organizations, a separation of powers, governmental transparency, freedom of expression, a free press, and civilian control of the military. The Charter furnished a list of the essential elements of democracy that can be used as benchmarks to assess the state of democracy in OAS member states.
The IDC addressed Brazil's concern that the OAS was promoting a single model
of democracy by including an exhaustive list of essential elements and components of
democracy. After the IDC altered their document, Brazilian representatives believed that
the IDC's conception of democracy was flexible enough to permit a wide degree of
variation in terms of practices across countries. 70
The IDC ratified the democratic consensus of the previous decade and advanced
the idea of collective intervention as instrument of democratic preservation. Articles 17 to
21 provide the possible responses of the OAS to a political crisis by level of intensity,
ranging from intervention in support of an incumbent government to suspension of
membership to any unconstitutional regime. According to Article 17, the OAS can
intervene to support an incumbent government of one state member in response to the
69 Heraldo Muñoz, "The right to democracy in the Americas: From the commitment of Santiago to the democratic charter," (Speech at the meeting of the American Association of Political Science, Washington, D.C: September, 2002). 70 Missão Permanente da OEA, " IDC," in Carta Democrática Interamericana: Documentos e interpretações, OAS (Washington, D.C: 2003), 257. 41 request of this government. The state can ask the intervening OAS to deal with the internal threat to its stability. This article was proposed by Venezuela and Mexico following the successful intervention of the OAS in Guatemala in March 2001 to support
President Alonso Portillo. 71 Article 18 gives the OAS Secretary General or Permanent
Council the right to visit any member state if the situation is deemed a threat to democratic institutions. Based on the visit, the Permanent Council could decide to take collective action. The self-help of Article 17 and the collective vigilance of Article 18
clearly build on the idea of preventive and proactive collective action.
On the opposite side of the scale, Articles 19, 20, and 21 provide for more
punitive actions. Article 19 reiterates that a government whose origin is not constitutional can not exert country's membership in the OAS. Most importantly, Article 19 maintains
that the constitutional governments would jeopardize their memberships in the OAS and
the entire Inter-American system if they embark on unconstitutional alterations of
democratic rule. The IDC rectified Resolution 1080's main weaknesses. Rather than just
applying to coup d'etat situations, the IDC claimed that incumbent governments would be
punished if they violated the rule of law.
Article 20 preserved the mechanism for rapid response to a political crisis. Like
Resolution 1080, Article 20 authorizes the Secretary General or any state member to
request an extraordinary session of the Permanent Council in order to assess collectively
a political crisis in a member state. Like Resolution 1080, it is an open ended clause that
authorizes the OAS to take decisions it deems appropriate. Article 20, however,
authorizes the OAS to activate rapid response mechanisms even before an
71 Jorge Valero( Venezuela's representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 42 unconstitutional interruption would happen. The OAS can embark in a collective assessment when there is evidence of unconstitutional alterations of democratic rules. In order to deal with unconstitutional alterations, Article 20 formalizes the use of good offices methods such as missions and third party mediation. According to Legler, the intervention of the OAS, in the Peruvian crisis in 2000, inspired the inclusion of diplomatic initiatives in Article 20.72 In 2000, the OAS sent a High Level Mission to Peru
and facilitated a roundtable which assisted the Peruvians in restoring democracy.
The harshest measure the OAS has in its arsenal would be deployed when the
organization verifies the overthrow of a constitutional government of any member state.
Consistent with the Protocol of Washington, Article 21 provides for the suspension of
membership to any unconstitutional regime. The General Assembly would exclude
unconstitutional regimes with a two-thirds vote of its member states.
The IDC reveals that there is a multilateral consensus among member states to let
the OAS intervene whenever a democratic regime is threatened. The IDC, however,
preserved for the member states some privileges which weaken the power of the
democratic ideal and the autonomy of the OAS. Except for coup d'etat situations, the
intervention of the OAS in member states has to be by invitation or prior consent of such
states. 73 The same principle is especially valid for the electoral observation mission
provisions in articles 23, 24, and 25. Neither does the IDC specify what represents an
unconstitutional alteration of the democratic rule nor are the reports from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights or any other independent body presented as
72 Legler, "The Inter-American," 9. 73 See Articles 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the Inter-American Democractic Charter. OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter (Lima, September 11, 2001). www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. 43 tools for monitoring and evaluating the democratic state of OAS members. The IDC leaves in the hands of the OAS Permanent Council the decision of whether or not events in a member state may be called unconstitutional alterations of the democratic order. In some respects, protecting democracy in the Americas is not a law enforcement problem, but a political problem.
The Liberal vision
Classical liberal theorists have theorized about the relationship of democracy, global trade, and international organizations. Immanuel Kant argued that republics were more conducive to commercial and free markets than authoritarian regimes. Kant maintained that authoritarian regimes were unreliable commercial partners because they rejected international legal constraints that limited their domestic and international conduct.74 Kant believed that republics had to act together in order to face their internal
and external enemies. Federations of sovereign republics would help their members to
promote commerce and to guarantee collective security. Kant, however, insisted that such
international institutions were not conceived to interfere in domestic affairs unless the
Federation could use diplomacy to avoid a war.75 In Kant’s terms, a federation of liberal
states was the main tool for the defense of free markets and international commerce.
Contemporary neoliberal theorists have built upon Kant's ideas by explaining the
need for international institutions to protect democracy and promote commerce.
According to Robert Keohane, the formation of international regimes responds to
74 Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and world politics", American Political Science Review 80 (1986, December): 1151-69; Parish and Penecy," Kantian, liberalism," 231. Research,
uncertainty and transaction costs which help maintaining the agreements. 77 This means that once they emerge, states become interested in maintaining international regimes because they solve practical problems.
Interdependence is also important in linking international organizations with
democracy and free markets. Keohane and Nye maintain that nations have become
interdependent in many aspects of social life, but especially in economic issues. Such
interdependence has raised the demands for international cooperation. 78 Under strong
interdependence, the distinction between domestic and international issues almost
disappeared. It is costly or even impossible for a government to try to break this
interdependence.79 If the states behave contrary to international norms or expectations, it
would be isolated and would lose the benefits of the global economy. Isolation from the
global economy acts as a deterrent to dissenter states.80
76 Robert Keohane, "Institutional theory and the realist challenge after the cold war," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate, edit. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 274. 77 Ibid. 78 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. "Complex Interdependence and the role of force," in International Politics: Enduring concepts and contemporary issues, ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson, 1989), 199-206. 79 Ibid, 205. 80 Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the problem of international cooperation: The limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the future of realist theory,” in in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate, edit. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 309. 45
There is not doubt that the reform of the Inter-American system in the early 1990s had its origins in liberal political ideas. At that time, the region embraced liberal economic reforms and full integration into global markets. Without the exception of
Cuba, all countries in the hemisphere adopted fluctuating exchange rate systems, worked for fiscal equilibrium, reformed financial sectors, liberated capital markets, and reduced tariffs and barriers. The region also opted for intraregional integration in order to compete in the global market. The creation of Mercosur, the Caribbean Community & Common
Market (CARICOM), and Central American Common Market and the renovation of the
Andean Pact showed a renewed interest in economic integration. In 1993, the US,
Canada, and Mexico endorsed NAFTA. In December, 1994, the first Summit of the
Americas congregated in Miami and the presidents of the Western Hemisphere countries decided to negotiate a free trade agreement for all of the Americas. They were convinced that there were conditions for creating a regionalist option to compete against the
European Union and the East Asia free trade zone.81Motivated by the economic sense of
free trade, countries in the region created an international regime.
The spread of democracy represented a critical factor in the success of hemispheric economic strategy. However, the democracies of the region were far from stable. Instead, all of them, the new democracies of the Southern cone and the older
Colombian and Venezuelan democratic systems, faced internal enemies capable of interrupting the democratic experience. Despite the internal threats, the failure of democracy would endanger the liberal reforms. The 1991 Santiago Commitment
81 Farer, "Collective defending", 23-24; R. Bloomfield, "Making the western ,” 15-29; Robert Pastor, "A community of democracies,” 15-22. 46 represented an agreement among continental leaders to face their domestic threats. In
1992, the Washington Protocol reiterated the hemisphere’s intention of punishing non- democratic regimes. These sub-regional economic accords also understood the connection between democracy and free market institutions as all contained a clause to suspend unconstitutional governments. By 1995, Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the Rio
Group, the Central America Community, and the Summit of Presidents of the Andes had approved democratic clauses. (Table 2)
The Paraguayan crises showed the Inter-American institution's support for
democracy in action. In 1996, the OAS activated diplomatic mechanisms to neutralize a
developing coup. At the same time, Brazil and Argentine warned that a return to
dictatorship in Paraguay would trigger the country's exclusion from Mercosur. In March
1998, similar pressures dissuaded the Paraguayan President from canceling presidential
elections.82 During the 1990s, in the Americas, the core belief in the liberal philosophy
was a reality: stronger international organizations worked to spread and protect
democracy while promoting global commerce.
In part, the IDC reflects the same liberal assumptions of the Inter-American
system transformation of the 1990s. According to the charter, the OAS's mission is to
help member states to consolidate democracy. The charter contains mechanisms to punish
member states when democratic regimes are interrupted. It gives power to the Secretary
General or the Permanent Council to apply different levels of diplomatic and economic
sanctions against de facto regimes. Also, the OAS Assembly General can ask the United
82 Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay,” 65-79. 47
Table 2 Democratic clause in the Americas
Region Organization Year Documents incluiding a democratic clause Rio Group 1988 Decision regarding Panama (suspending the government of Panama from the group after its decision to annul the Presidential elections of 1988) Andean Community (CAN) 1991 Resolution 59 of the Andean Council of Presidents
Americas 1998 Aditional protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, "Andean countries commitment to democracy." Organization of American 1992 Protocol of Washington States (OAS)
1995 XVII Summit of Presidents- Central America Community Treaty of democratic security of Central America
1998 Commitment of TUXTLA II
Mercosur 1995 Treaty of Ouro Preto
1998 Protocol of Ushuaia
Summit of the Americas 2001 Declaration of Quebec City, April 21, 2001.
Source: Data from Humberto de la Calle, "Colombia," in Carta Democratica Interamericana: Documentos e Interpretaciones, OAS (Washington D.C: OAS, 2003), 284-285 and author's own research.
48
Nations Security Council to order the use of force. 83 It is assumed that those tempted to
seize power by force would take into their calculation the threat of diplomatic, economic,
and political sanctions closely.
In previous OAS resolutions on democracy, there were specific mentions of the
link between democracy and the free market. The charter, however, obviated any mention
of economic liberalism. Nor did the charter make reference to the Free Trade Agreement
for the Americas. Instead, Articles 11 to 16 of the charter emphasized the need to improve levels of human development in order to consolidate democratic institutions. It
seems that liberal discourse lost momentum after the failure of economic policies inspired
by liberalism in the region.
A hegemon’s desire
According to Arthur Stein, great powers can structure the choices and preferences
of minor powers and shape regional outcomes. 84 In this way, after World War II, the US
structured the choices and preferences of American states. The US organized the Inter-
American system following the pattern of the cooperative arrangement it had created for
Western Europe. The Inter-American Development Bank and the OAS were the pivots of
this structure. Although Latin America and the United States would interact as partners,
this community operated under the leadership of the regional hegemon.
After the US government's meddling in Guatemala in 1954, however, the previous harmonic US-Latin America relationship turned into distrust and, in some instances, was
completely antagonistic. In fact, until the end of the Cold War, most Latin American
83 Organization of American States, "Inter-American Democratic Charter," article 20. 84 Arthur Stein, "Coordination and collaboration," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 48-49. 49 countries voted against the US in the United Nations.85 Some Latin American countries developed close relationships with other countries outside of the Western Hemisphere.
For instance, Venezuela associated with Arabic countries to create the OPEC and the
Peruvian military government of Velazco Alvarado contracted military equipment and assistance from the Soviet Union.86 Moreover, Latin America embarked in multilateral
negotiations in Central America, overtly challenging the Reagan administration approach
to that region's civil war and unrest.
During the Cold War, the discord between the US and Latin America caused the
OAS to take no action to defend democracy. In reaction, the US became less inclined to
use the OAS for resolving hemispheric disputes and practiced unilateralism in resolving
its disputes in the region. On the other hand, Latin American countries developed a strong
commitment with the non-intervention principle. 87
Joseph Nye helps to explain the change of US policies after the end of the Cold
War. Nye argued that if the US wanted to legitimize its power in the perception of other
countries, it should promote international institutions and encourage other countries to participate in them. 88 It was mandatory to convince other countries to agree to US
modeled norms by attraction rather than coercion. According to Nye, exerting soft power
through norms and institutions would avoid expenditure of costly economic and military
85 Farer, "Collectively defending,"16-18.. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Joseph Nye, Bound to lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 180-184. 50 resources.89 It is clear to Nye, that international institutions would help the US set the
agenda and shape the preferences of Latin America.
Nye's argument about the role of norms and institutions is consistent with the US national security strategy of the Post Cold War era. According to Paul Wolfowitz's sole hegemon doctrine, now that the danger of communism is past, the US should work to promote its global supremacy. According to Wolfowitz, no global or regional competitor should jeopardize US leadership. Supporting democracy represented an American tool for obtaining stability and spreading US influence abroad. Even though Latin America does not constitute an area for vital defense like the former Soviet Union territories,
Western Europe, and East Asia, it represents an opportunity to spread democracy.
Supporting democratic regimes would reduce the possibility of US citizens being affected by domestic crises happening in the Western hemisphere.90
The Clinton administrations first National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, has
elaborated on Wolfowitz' doctrine.91 Unlike Wolfowitz, who affirmed that foreign policy should simply be nothing more that the promotion of American interest abroad, Lake
believes that American power should be employed to promote democracy and freedom.
For Wolfowitz, promoting democracy was primarily a strategy for deterring conflicts and
threats. In contrast, Lake argues that together with creating stable and peaceful political
environments, democracy creates conditions for economic prosperity under free market
ideas. Unlike Wolfowitz, who paid little heed to international cooperation, Lake insists
89 Ibid., 199-201. 90 Excerpts from the Pentagon's plan: Prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, New York Times , Mar 8, 1992, 14. 91 Anthony Lake, "The reach of democracy," New York Times, Sep 23, 1994, A-35.
51 on the necessity for creating and overhauling security and economic institutions for multinational or collective support of democracy. 92 Spreading democracy became an
integral part of US international security and economic strategy.
It is possible to argue that the Democratic Charter constitutes one of these
instruments for the US exertion of soft power. There is historical evidence that the United
States wanted to give more authority to the OAS to intervene in regional crises. After the
assassination of Paraguayan Vice-President, Ricardo Argaña, the US representative to the
OAS proposed, at the 1999 General Assembly, to strengthen the role of the OAS in
mediating domestic political crises. The United States wanted to expand the legal
authority and capacity of the OAS to offer its good offices to situations of domestic
turmoil before a conflict became a crisis. As the proposal came from the United States, it
was voted down by the general assembly. 93 The 1999 General Assembly, however,
adopted a compromise that granted the OAS Secretary General broader power to
domestic turmoil and democratic crisis. The proposal left a number of points open for
debate, including the steps that would trigger the secretary general’s action and the
latitude of the secretary general to act on behalf of the larger body. 94 It was not a total defeat for the United States because strengthening the OAS Secretary General's authority was consistent with the US expectation of a stronger organization.
In April 2001, it was the Peruvian representative who asked the OAS to approve a
democratic charter. The Peruvian idea, however, was much like the US proposal of 1999.
The IDC draft approved by the 2001 General Assembly in Costa Rica gave formal power
92 Ibid. 93 Cameron, "The Inter-American Democratic,” 3; Sabatini, "Plowing," 81. 94 Cameron, "The Inter-American," 3. 52 to the Secretary General to mediate political crises and contemplate automatic suspension of membership for non-democratic regimes. Most importantly, the IDC's first draft contained clear procedures to deal with the alternation of constitutional orders by elected governments. This IDC draft subscribed a normative approach, minimizing political bargains.95
The extraordinary General Assembly in Peru during 2001 saw the approval of a
version of the IDC that differed from the Peruvian-American project. The OAS assembly
approved the automatic suspension of membership for regimes originating from a
traditional coup d'etat and gave that power of suspension to the Secretary General. The
final version of the IDC, however, took the form of a political resolution rather than a
protocol. The IDC did not contain clear procedures to deal with alterations of a
constitutional order, nor does the charter link specific violations to specific sanctions. The
Permanent Council or the General Assembly needed to exhaust diplomatic methods
before deciding on suspension or any other sanction. The US representative to OAS
wanted this version of the charter to be approved in the 2001 Assembly General in Costa
Rica. The Antigua and Barbuda representative to OAS, Lionel Alexander Hursi, noted
that the “US ambassador applied his considerable energy, talent, and country influence to
get an agreement." 96 In addition, the Antigua and Barbuda ambassador referred to a
diplomatic note, dispatched for the US embassies in CARICOM countries, to the foreign
ministers that sought to win the support of each CARICOM member state to the draft.97
The US ambassador to the OAS, Roger Noriega expressed in the diplomatic dispatch that
95 Ibid. 96 Hursi, “Antigua and Barbuda,” 254-255. 97 Ibid. 53
“those who would not move forward were already labeled spoilers.” 98The CARICOM
ambassadors to the OAS informed their respective governments that "there were gaping
holes in the draft which could not be fixed by a quick make over in Costa Rica.” 99 In
sum, CARICOM members asked to extend the negation period.
How do we explain that the weaker countries in the hemisphere, traditional US
allies, adopted oppositional attitudes rather than seeking accommodations with the global
hegemon? It was expected that smaller nations like those Caribbean countries would have
tried to accommodate the local hegemon, in the hopes of receiving rewards and
privileges. Maybe they could have obtained better conditions in bilateral agreements. 100
The response of the weak countries to the US supported initiative reflects the "binding thesis." According to Joseph Grieco, smaller countries can opt for seeking and
undertaking negotiations of rules that try to create or improve collaborative arrangements.
In this way, the smaller countries would search for rules that provide them with opportunities to voice there interests and reduce the power of the hegemon. 101 The process of constructing the IDC shows that Caribbean countries and the rest of Latin
America received effective opportunities for them to ameliorate or manage US domination. At the same time, the US could institutionalize stronger rules for punishing non-democratic regimes with the consent of its OAS partners.
The IDC showed an unprecedented consensus among OAS members to promote
democratic standards throughout the region, both reaffirming the existing hemispheric
98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Grieco, "Understanding the problem," 328-335. 101 Ibid, 331. 54 commitment to democracy and addressing some of the weakness of such regimes. The
IDC elevated democracy to a human right and elaborated on the elements that characterize a genuine democracy. It provided the OAS with new tools for exerting soft power in order to prevent major crises and to deal with incumbent governments which continually violate the rule of law. It took the combined force of Peruvian transitional government officials, the renewed pro-democracy attitudes in the Americas, and the desire of the regional hegemon to create the IDC.
55
Chapter 4: Early response (April – June 2002)
Between April 11, 2002 and May 28, 2003, it is possible to identify three chronological and functional stages of OAS involvement in Venezuela: early response, pre-negotiation, and roundtable work.
Chavez's fall and return
Many events happened in Venezuela in the forty-four hours after the slaughter of nineteen people in Caracas in April 11, 2000. The elected government of the country was deposed, but a provisional regime could not be formally established and the deposed constitutional president was restored. In April 11, 2002, the fourth day of a national strike, a massive demonstration organized by the opposition forces was directed toward the presidential palace. The Army, Navy and Air Force commanders disobeyed Chavez’s instructions of deploying soldiers in order to dissolve the march, blocking its arrival at the president’s office. The National Guard, at that time loyalist, moved to protect the presidential palace. Being close to its destination, the demonstrators were attacked by unknown shooters who killed nineteen people. In a public speech, the high command of the four military forces blamed the President for the events and asked for Chavez’s resignation. Shortly before midnight, after Army Commander Gen. Lucas Rincon announced Chavez’s resignation, the military formed and new government and held
President Chavez under arrest. 102
102 1. Political Scientists, historians, and journalists present the chronology of these events in: Margarita Lopez-Maya, “The Military coup in Venezuela,” Foreign Affairs in Focus (April 15, 2002), http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0204venezuela_body.html; S. Elner and F. Rosen, “Venezuela’s failed coup, the US’ role, and the future of Hugo Chavez,” Foreign Policy in Focus (June, 2002): 1-4; S. Elner and F. Rosen, “The remarkable fall and rise of Hugo Chavez,” NACLA Report on the Americas (July/August, 2002): 9-15; L. Carvajal, El Laberinto de Chavez (Caracas: Grijalbo,2002); S. La 56
The next day, April 12, 2000, the military appointed interim President, Pedro
Carmona, leader of the business sector organization, suspended the Congress and the
Supreme Court and abolished the 1999 Constitution. Carmona did not have the chance to appoint his cabinet because Chavez’s military loyalist faction took control of the presidential offices and organized the rescue and release of the elected president. Before sunrise on April 14, 2000, Carmona had resigned and Hugo Chavez was in Miraflores again. 103
During its short life, the transition government faced internal opposition. Not only
did Chavez’s loyalist military faction regain the control of the presidential palace but they also helped Chavez's supporters stay and guarding the presidential palace. On April 13,
Chavez’s followers rioted in western areas of Caracas. Important leaders of the
opposition also rejected Carmona’s regime. In fact, the other leader of the national strike,
Carlos Ortega, President of the Labor Union Confederation (CTV), did not sign the
charter of the new government. The Army commander, Gen. Efrain Vazquez Velazco,
whose public intervention had been critical for ousting Chavez, conditioned the army’s
support of the transition government. Civilian and military leaders asked Carmona to
modify the decrees by which he had concentrated all state power in his hand.104 Different sectors of the country demanded the restitution of the legislative and judiciary branches of power. Under pressure, Carmona acceded to the petition of his critics in the evening of
Fuente and A. Meza, El Acertijo de Abril (Caracas: Editorial El Nacional, 2003); Armando Duran, Venezuela en Llamas (Caracas: Debate, 2004). 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 57
April 13.105 But, by this time, a military faction was rescuing President Chavez in the
Orchila, his provisional place of imprisonment.
The Rio Group's determination
External actors also contributed to weaken Carmona’s regime. On April 12, while the US considered the event in Venezuela a change of government rather than a coup,
nineteen Western hemisphere presidents, members of the Rio Group , met in Costa Rica,
condemning the Venezuelan interim president’s decisions of suspending the Congress
and the Supreme Court and abolishing the 1999 Constitution. They asked for an
emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council following Article 20 of the
Democratic Charter. The initial declaration of the Rio Group called on re-establishing full
democracy and holding elections soon.106 The return to power of Chavez was not a major
consideration in order to restore the rule of law. It was a fact that Chavez had removed
the vice president and the cabinet resigned.
In clear opposition to the US point of view, the Rio Group formally activated the
mechanisms of the OAS’s Democratic Charter and, most importantly, the group’s
declaration showed the hemispheric commitment to democratic principles; otherwise,
they would have lost international credibility and kept alive hopes of potential plotters in
their own countries.107 Alejandro Toledo, president of Peru, said: “We are not defending
105 Duran, “Venezuela,” 28. 106 Grupo de Rio, Declaration del Grupo de Rio sobre la situacion politica en Venezuela (San Jose, April 12, 2002), 107 Legler, 2003a. 58 the democratic characteristic of a particular government; we are defending the principle of the rule of law”.108
The Rio Group declaration obstructed the Carmona efforts for gaining
recognition. Carmona admits that no country recognized his regime. He explains that he
focused on getting the support of Venezuela’s closest neighbors; nevertheless, he could
not explain his plans to the Rio Group Presidents. In a letter to the author on April 19,
2004, Pedro Carmona says that
there was a natural concern about the events in Venezuela. From Costa Rica
where the group was celebrating a meeting, some representatives of Rio Group
expressed their support for rescuing the constitutional order in Venezuela.
However, the Latin American countries neither recognized nor refused to
recognize the transition government of Venezuela, during its brief existence…On
Saturday April 13 in the morning, I started the calls to OAS and other heads of
state of Venezuela’s neighbors; nevertheless, it would take more time to complete
this job. I did not have the chance of talking to the presidents who met in Costa
Rica and the Salvadorian government expression lacked formal character like the
manifestation of other countries, which mainly sympathized with my selection
because they knew me. It was more obvious the satisfaction expressed by some
media and Latin American and world leaders about Chavez’s resignation and the
political change in Venezuela, which displeased Chavez’s administration and
motivated it to have a retaliatory feeling. It is not possible to ignore that public
108 M. O’ Grady,"In dealing with the misdeeds of Chavez, the OAS is awol," The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2002. 59
opinion does not sympathize with the Chavez administration, especially, because
of its radicalism and illegitimacy after the April 11 events. 109
The presidents who met in Costa Rica agreed in the condemnation of the coup and
the need of applying the IDC. Nevertheless, they were divided about the causes of the
events and, most importantly, the proper response.110 Some believed that there was a
traditional coup d’etat; in this case, it was mandatory to condemn and not recognize the
provisional government. These countries demanded the active involvement of the
hemispheric community to assure the restitution of the rule of law. They wanted to apply
the OAS Democratic Charter in order to punish the unconstitutional alteration of a
constitutional regime. This position was sustained by Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico,
Brazil, and Chile. Eduardo Duhalde, President of Argentina, stated that nobody could consider Carmona’s regime legitimate because it was the product of a military coup. The
President of Paraguay, Luis Gonzalez, agreed with Duhalde in qualifying the provisional government of Venezuela as illegitimate. Vicente Fox, President of Mexico, reiterated
Mexico’s tradition of non-recognition, and admitted his concerns about the legality of
Carmona’s decisions.111
A second group of countries maintained that the succession of events was not
clear, and that the wise position should have been to wait. Both Costa Rica and Peru had
this opinion. In fact, Diego Garcia Saying, foreign minister of Peru affirmed that its
country would express its position once there was a formal government in Venezuela.
109 Pedro Carmona, letter to the author, April 19, 2004. 110 Valiente, Bernardo, “Latinoamerica dividida tras caida de Hugo Chavez,” La Prensa Grafica, Abril 13, 2002 ; “America Latina debate legitimidad de nuevo gobierno venezolano,” El Mundo, Abril 13, 2002. 111 Ibid. 60
Miguel Rodriguez, president of Costa Rica asked the government to call for new elections immediately, but he avoided condemning Carmona’s regime.112 A third group
of countries blamed Chavez for the April 11 events; Chavez had provoked his own fall given his alleged suppression of the mass demonstration. Therefore, they would accommodate Carmona’s regime to gain legitimacy and invoke the democratic charter in order to help the provisional government rather than to punish it. Jorge Castañeda
affirmed that Francisco Flores and Andres Pastrana, Presidents of El Salvador and
Colombia, respectively, lobbied for other Rio Group members to recognize Carmona’s
government. Castañeda attributed such positions of El Salvador and Colombia to the
close relationship between those countries and the US.113
The OAS's hesitancy
The discussion inside the Rio Group extended to the OAS. Although the
Secretary General of the OAS had no intention of calling a Permanent Council session or
Meeting of Consultation according to his statement in Venezuela of April 11, the Rio
Group’s decision forced the Secretary General to organize an extraordinary session on
April 13.114 The purpose of the session was to undertake a collective assessment of the
political crisis and to decide the OAS’s response. On the lengthy Permanent Council of
Saturday April 13, there were three clear stances on how to use the Democratic Charter.
Jorge Valero, Venezuela’s representative to the OAS, asked a more extreme response.
112 Ibid. 113 “Relations with US turn tenser,” Latinnews Daily, Dec. 3, 2004. 114 OAS, Statement of the OAS Secretary General on the situation in Venezuela (Washington, D.C, April 11). OAS-Secretary General, Nota del Secretario General remitiendo solicitud de los Ministros de Relationes Exteriores del Grupo de Rio de convocar una sesion del Consejo Permanente para realizar una apreciacion colectiva de la situacion en la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela (Washington, D.C, April 12, 2002). 61
Valero had not been formally replaced, so he could participate in the OAS Permanent
Council session of April 13 due to the request of Brazil and some Caribbean countries’ representatives. He demanded that the OAS to apply article 21 to the provisional government of Venezuela.115 This would have resulted in excluding Venezuela from the
OAS. Valero’s motion was rejected. Although some countries were convinced Carmona’s regime was illegitimate, they considered that it was necessary to know the intentions of the interim government before deciding to suspend Venezuela’s membership. 116
There was no consensus for an automatic expulsion of Venezuela from the Inter-
American system. Instead, some countries considered that the OAS should follow the spirit of the declaration of the Rio Group. Partisans of this option believed that the OAS had to condemn the illegitimate origin of the provisional governments and urge the de facto authorities to reinstate the rule of law. Following Article 20, Mexico, Argentina and
Chile claimed that the OAS should undertake diplomatic action for the restitution of legislative and judiciary powers and a certain time table for new elections.117 Canada joined this position insisting in the lack of legitimacy of Carmona’s regime.118
Another group of countries took a pragmatic position rather than a principled
stand against the provisional government. They believed that the OAS had to invoke
Article 17 of the IDC, which suggest that the OAS would accept Carmona’s regime. The
supporters of this position argued that Chavez’ overthrow was a fact, and that the OAS
should help the provisional government to gain governability. There would be no delay in
115 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 116 Ibid. 117 Latin American representative in discussion with the author, February, 2004 118 Legler, “The Inter-American ,” 13. 62
OAS’s decision to avoid a major crisis in Venezuela. The Ecuadorian representative’s position was illustrative of this.119 Nevertheless, the authoritarian signals of Carmona’s
government represented an obstacle for accepting such an argument. Cesar Gaviria
explained that Carmona had informed him that he would amend his previous decrees in
order to get OAS support. 120 Additionally, Gaviria read a letter in which Carmona
reiterated the promises he had made to Gaviria by phone.121
Carmona admits he sent a letter to the OAS Secretary General requesting OAS support and inviting the OAS Permanent Council President and the Secretary General, respectively, to visit Venezuela as soon as possible. In his letter, Carmona offered the
OAS Permanent Council to modify his April 12 decrees and convene elections in less than a year. In an e-mail to the author, Carmona revealed that
the transitional government was determined to invoke the Article 17 of the IDC in
order to get the OAS support for recovering constitutional order in Venezuela. By
phone, I communicated that decision to Cesar Gaviria, Secretary General of the
OAS, on Saturday April 13 in the morning. In addition, I asked Gaviria to have
the OAS send an urgent mission headed by the OAS Permanent Council President
and Secretary General to Venezuela. In fact, the mission that arrived to the
country after the restoration of Chavez, lead by Gaviria, was requested by me not
by Chavez…. The appointed Foreign Affairs Minister, Jose Rodriguez Iturbe, was
commissioned to write and send a formal request of my verbal demand, together
119 Latin American representative in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 120 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004; Legler, “The Inter-American,” 13. 121 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004 63
with the notification of the removal of the Chavez’s government representative at
the OAS, Jorge Valero. As an anecdote, Rodriguez Iturbe had a lot of trouble
faxing the letters to the OAS given that the communications in the presidential
palace had been damaged since the night before and were interfered with by the
presidential guard [which remained loyal to Chavez]…. It was the point, to
convene a meeting of Foreign Ministers for the next week. Then, the OAS
mission would be important because it would appreciate the situation and certify
the promise of the transitional government to reestablish rule of law, and call a
legislative and presidential election in ninety days and two hundred forty days,
respectively. It was the purpose to call the original constitutional power, the
people, in which the Constitutional power resides, in order to legitimate the new
authorities by elections….The OAS had understood that Chavez’s resignation was
a fact and the most important point was to regain the rule of law immediately.122
According to Jorge Valero, Venezuela’s representative to the OAS, invoking
Article 17 of the Democratic Charter was the strategy of the US for getting the Carmona
government recognized internationally. 123 Valero affirms that US State Department
officials were in touch with Carmona on April 12 and 13. There is evidence of the visit
by the US ambassador in Venezuela, Charles Shapiro, to the presidential palace and the phone conversation between Carmona and Otto Reich, US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western hemisphere. 124 More importantly, a letter from Phillip Chicola,
Department State representative, showed the US government’s help to Carmona.
122 Pedro Carmona, letter to the author, April 19, 2004 123 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 124 Ibid. 64
According to Valero, Chicola recommended that Carmona preserve the Constitution, get an evidence of Chavez’s resignation, obtain congressional approval of Chavez’s resignation, announce elections in a reasonable period of time, and more importantly, ask the OAS support of Article 17 of the IDC.125 Pedro Carmona and Jose Rodriguez Iturbe,
Foreign Affairs Minister of the provisional government, denied knowing of this
correspondence from Phillip Chicola. 126 Although the US representative to the OAS,
Roger Noriega, kept a low profile for most of the Permanent Council meeting of April
13, Valero affirms that Noriega together with other officials of the US mission to the
OAS lobbied to find support for Carmona’s regime.127
Valero also emphasizes that Cesar Gaviria made efforts in the Permanent Council
session to convince OAS representatives of the democratic commitment of Carmona.128
According to Valero, the intervention of Gaviria was crucial for Carmona’s request to the
OAS.
Until April 13 in the afternoon, the IDC was supposed to support the coup
government….Carmona asked Gaviria help in recovering the rule of law. Gaviria
convinced Carmona to invoke article 17 of the IDC and accept the mission of the
OAS. Gaviria received the Carmona’s letter and used it in the April 13 meeting.
Had the coup succeeded, the OAS and some countries would have recognized
Carmona. They would have fixed the situation suggesting he request usage of the
article 17 of the IDC….Instead of condemning the promoter of a coup, the
125 Ibid. 126 Pedro Carmona, letter to the author, April 19, 2004; Jose Rodriguez-Iturbe, email to the author, March 1, 2004. 127 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004 128 Ibid. 65
hemispheric community was helping him and restoring a democracy with
illegitimate authorities.129
Lionel Alexander Hurst, representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the OAS,
confirms the claim that the US and other OAS members were inclined to soften the
position of the Rio Group’s leaders toward Carmona’s regime. He says that CARICOM
disagreed with the US and other countries whose ambassadors wanted to help Carmona’s
government. Hurst affirms that CARICOM accused these countries of acting out of
expediency rather than principles.130
Here, the views of the CARICOM clashed with the lone super-power in our OAS
midst…. Several Caricom countries vociferously raised their objections to
attempts to undermine the principles of democratic rule as embodied in the
Democratic Charter.131
Consistent with Hurst’s testimony, Jorge Castañeda, former Mexican foreign
minister, affirms that Mexico and Chile together with the Caricom were stronger
opponents to the US and Spain’s efforts in helping the Carmona’s regime. 132 As an observer in the OAS, Spain’s representative could undertake diplomatic action in support of Carmona, following the position of Madrid. On April 12, while Rio Group claimed that the change of government in Venezuela had been a coup d’etat, the European Union, whose temporary presidency was in the hands of Spain, expressed confidence in the
129 Ibid. 130 Lionel Alexander Hurst, “Antigua and Barbuda,” in Carta Democratica Inter-Americana: Documentos e interpretaciones, by OAS (Washington, D.C: OAS): 253-254. 131 Ibid. 132 “Relations with US turn tenser,” Latinnews Daily, Dec. 3, 2004 66 provisional government’s democratic commitment.133 In addition, it is a fact that Charles
Shapiro, US ambassador in Venezuela, visited Pedro Carmona at the presidential palace
in the company of the Spain’s ambassador in Venezuela on the morning of April 13. 134
Because the situation in Venezuela evolved and the transitional government
weakened, the possibility of accommodating Carmona’s regime lost momentum.
Nevertheless, using Article 17 as a response to the crisis reflects a particular interpretation of the OAS’s role. It means that the hemispheric community would have obtained the formal right of intervening in internal affairs of one member state. In other words, the OAS would have assumed the tutelage of the transition government.
After ten hours of discussion, neither the punitive nor the accommodating
postures were transformed into a consensus. Most countries felt that the situation was
fluid and available information lacked reliability. A wait-and-see position was necessary
in order to learn more through a fact finding mission. A decision was possible close to
midnight because it was clear that Chavez had been restored to power.135
The OAS Permanent Council’s first declaration on Venezuela opted for the
application of Article 20 of the IDC. The OAS Permanent Council censured the rupture
of the constitutional order in Venezuela and asked immediate re-establishment of full
democracy. In its Resolution 811, the OAS Permanent Council convened an
extraordinary session of the General Assembly, which would receive the report of a fact
finding mission that would visit the country as soon as possible. The OAS Secretary
133 Unión Europea, Declaración de la Presidencia sobre la situación en Venezuela ( Madrid, April 12, 2002). 134 Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s representative to OAS), in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 135 Legler, “The Inter-American,” 13. 67
General, who was a member of the mission, was instructed to make contact with the situation and to use the good office to restitute the rule of law. 136Like the Rio Group’s
vision, Resolution 811 portrayed the event as a traditional coup d’etat. Nevertheless, with
this resolution, the promoters of the accommodating posture fulfilled their aspiration of
an OAS engagement on Venezuela’s crisis.
Mauricio Alice, former Chilean representative to OAS (2002), affirms that the
negotiation and approbation of the OAS Permanent Council resolution took more time
than the solution of the events that motivated the meeting. There was no consensus on the
application of the Democratic Charter until Chavez came back to the presidency. 137
Based on the evidence, it is possible to argue that Chavez’s restitution determined the
OAS’s response. Paradoxically, the OAS invoked the IDC for the first time for supporting Chavez, who had been the main adversary of that legal instrument.
When Cesar Gaviria visited Venezuela, Chavez was in power again. In his report of his visit, Gaviria realized that the interim government was the result of a decision of a military-faction and it was reversed by the reaction of another faction of officers of the
Armed Forces loyal to Chavez and by a vigorous reaction by citizens, both defenders and opponents of the government of President Chavez. 138 The OAS Secretary General
highlighted that Venezuela was a polarized society. Not only was there division among
the political actors in the government and the political parties but there were also
confrontations between the government and the Catholic Church, the labor unions, the
136 OAS/Permanent Council, Situation in Venezuela- CP/RES. 811(1315/02) (Washington, April 13, 2002). 137 Alice, La evaluación, 114-116. 138 OAS, Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Cesar Gaviria, pursuant to resolution CP/Res. 811(1315/02)- AG/doc.9(XXIX-E/02) (Washington, D.C., April 18, 2002). 68 business organizations, civil society organizations, and the media. Gaviria said there had been increasing reports of human rights violations most of which related to the freedom of expression. At the same time, in his report, the secretary general reproached the part of opposition forces that had chosen unconstitutional methods. Gaviria valued as positive the intention of President Chavez to call for national reconciliation.139
On April 18, the OAS General Assembly validated the vision of the Secretary
General. As a result, Resolution 1 of the General Assembly expressed satisfaction in the
restoration of the elected president and condemned the use of violence to replace the
government.140According to the OAS General Assembly pertaining to Venezuela, the
government must respect the elements and components of the democracy as defined in
Articles 3 and 4 of the Democratic Charter and the opposition should engage in activities in accordance with the rule of law. Resolution 1 encouraged the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) to conduct the on-site visit to Venezuela that
had been postponed from 1999. The General Assembly celebrated Chavez’s disposition
to an all-inclusive national dialogue and, most importantly, offered the OAS assistance
for developing such an initiative. 141
The laudatory terms of the General Assembly, celebrating the restoration of the
constitutional president, helped to legitimize the Chavez government. Resolution 1,
however, challenged the government showing concern for human rights and emphasizing
the need of dialogue and reconciliation. Luis Alfonzo Davila, Venezuela’s Foreign
139 Ibid 140 OAS, Support for democracy in Venezuela-AG/Res.1(XXIX-E02) (Washington, D.C., April 18, 2002).
141 Ibid. 69
Affairs Minister, addressed both aspects in his speech on April 18, 2002. 142 Davila emphasized that there were no violations of human rights in Venezuela and the government was following the precepts of the Bolivarian constitution and Venezuela subscribed to international conventions on human rights. He expressed gratitude for OAS support; nevertheless, he showed no intention of the Chavez’ government to convene
OAS involvement in the reconciliation efforts.143 Davila said: “we appreciate any support
from that organization at this moment, but I want to emphasize that we are equally able to
improve autonomously and with sovereignty our system of government.” 144
Two academics valued the terms of Resolution 1. Jennifer McCoy, Director of
Americas Program of the Carter Center and professor at Georgia State University, agreed
with OAS assuming a more active role to protect democracy in cases of serious threats. In
fact, she felt that the OAS should have acted when the signals of democratic undermining
appeared. McCoy recommended that the OAS should lead the national dialogue in
Venezuela promoting a mechanism like the Peruvian roundtable.145 In the same way,
Michael Shifter, vice-president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue and a professor
at Georgetown University, said that the OAS had to encourage dialogue in Venezuela,
following the spirit of the democratic charter. He argued that the hemispheric community
should have taken advantage of their unprecedented authority and legitimacy on the
142 Discurso Sr. Luis Alfonso Davila, Canciller ante la Asamblea Extraordinaria de la OEA( Washington D.C, April 18, 2002). 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Jennifer McCoy, “Chavez’s second chance,” The New York Times, April 18, 2002. 70 democratic question and engaged constructively with the Chavez government to help advance reconciliation in Venezuela.146
There is no question that the OAS’s response to the rupture of the democratic
order in Venezuela as energetic. Because of the alteration of the constitutional order in
Venezuela, there was a consensus to activate and use the tools of the OAS Democratic
Charter. Thus, the OAS state members embarked in a collective view of the situation,
sending local and international actors a strong pro-democracy signal. The OAS, however,
did not gain a formal role in the reconciliation process, which remains in the hands of
Venezuela’s government.
The US's reversal
The US position needs special attention at this moment. On April 18, the US
government supported the OAS General Assembly resolution and expressed
condemnation for the event that happened in Venezuela for the first time. Even though
the US had also endorsed the OAS Permanent Council, US representatives had avoided
condemning the coup publicly. On April 12, while Rio Group rejected Carmona’s
regime, Erich Fleischer, White House speaker, refused to term the military overthrow of
Chavez as a coup, insisting instead that the action encouraged by the Chavez government
provoked the crisis. Fleischer emphasized that Chavez had suppressed peaceful
demonstrations, blocked media broadcasts of these events, and, more importantly,
ordered his supporters to fire on unarmed protesters. 147
146 M. Shifter, “Democracy in Venezuela, unsettling as ever,” The Washington Post, April 21, 2002.
147 T. Weiner, “A coup by any other name,” The New York Times, April 14, 2004. 71
On Saturday April 13, Charles Shapiro, US ambassador in Venezuela, visited
Carmona to express the Bush administration’s concern about the dissolution of the
National Assembly and suggested general terms to put the government back on a more democratic footing. 148 Shapiro, however, did not publicly censure Carmona’s regime. A
few hours after Chavez’s restoration, on the TV program Meet the Press, Condoleezza
Rice, US National Security Advisor, warned Chavez to respect the Constitution. Rice
stated that “I hope that Chavez takes the message that his people sent him that his own
policies are not working and that he’s dealing with them in a highhanded fashion.”149
On April 15, Philip Reeker, state department spokesman, argued that the US had
decided to wait for the OAS fact finding mission before expressing any new
pronouncement about the events in Venezuela. 150 Reeker said it was the US
government’s expectation that “the Secretary General’s mission will examine all the
circumstances leading to the recent events in Venezuela and that the OAS and the IDC
will play a vital role in strengthening the essential elements of democracy in
Venezuela.”151 Reeker emphasized that US had joined OAS members in approving the
resolution of the Permanent Council and was working to see that Venezuela can get back
to the right path. 152 Reeker affirmed that the April 12 stance of the US government
reflected “the need for governments’ restrain and respect for peaceful expression of
political opinion.” 153
148 S. Wilson, “Chavez regained power while plotters bickered coup was not planned, ex-leader says,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2002. 149 M. Alterman, The Book on Bush( New York: Viking, 2004):206. 150 State Department, State Department regular news brief (April 15, 2002), lexis-nexis[03/30/2004]. 151 Ibid., 4. 152 Ibid., 5. 153 Ibid. 72
Colin Powell’s speech at the OAS General Assembly represented an important shift in the previous US public positions after April 11. For the first time, the US agreed publicly with its hemispheric partners terming the events in Venezuela as a coup. Powell said: “We condemn the blows to constitutional order that Venezuela has suffered.”154
Nevertheless, like Condoleezza Rice, he criticized Chavez’ political style. Powell affirmed that “democracies do not remain democracies for long if elected leaders use undemocratic methods…and defending democracy by resorting to undemocratic means destroys democracy.” 155Most importantly, Powell described how the US conceived the
mission of the hemispheric community in Venezuela. He considered that the OAS
members had to use the IDC in order to support reconciliation and to strengthen
democratic institutions. As a result, he proposed the OAS General Assembly appointing
Cesar Gaviria as facilitator of national dialogue in Venezuela. “All of us must examine
how we could have used the mechanisms of the IDC before April 11….Venezuelans
themselves must resolve their problems, but they need our support. With our support,
they must address the underlying causes of the current crisis.” 156
The resolution reflected, in part, the US vision of solving the crisis in Venezuela.
Roger Noriega, US representative to the OAS, stated that the April 18 Resolution opened
the toolbox of the IDC for the purpose of reinforcing democratic institutions in
Venezuela. 157Noriega maintains that the resolution focused regional attention on the
154 Remarks of Colin Powell, Secretary of State of the USA, to the special session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (Washington, D.C., April 18, 2002). 155 Ibid, 1. 156 Ibid. 157 Roger Noriega, “The US and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,” in Carta Democratica Interamericana: Documentos e interpretaciones, by OAS (Washington, D.C.: OAS, 2004): 334. 73
Venezuela political crisis and assured that the OAS would take part in the solution.
Noriega admits, however, that the degree of OAS involvement would depend on the
Venezuelan government’s acquiescence. 158 Noriega wanted the resolution to refer
explicitly to the violation of human rights by the Chavez administration. The Canadian
representative did not support the US position; as a result, the US dropped of its
proposal.159
158 Ibid. 159 Diplomat of Latin American country in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 74
Chapter 5: Pre-negotiation (July- October 2002)
Chavez's rhetorical commitment to dialogue and reconciliation
The main condition for President Chavez to regain control of the country was a serious effort for national reconciliation. The same day of his restoration, Chavez recognized the right of the opposition to express disagreement with the government, but he asked them to do so without confrontational tone. Chavez said, “there has to be communication among the different sectors of Venezuelan society.”160 On May 28, the
OAS Venezuela representative, Jorge Valero explained the government’s efforts to
promote dialogue to the OAS Permanent Council. 161 Valero informed the Permanent
Council that the executive branch had created the Presidential Commission for Dialogue
and Conciliation and had installed forums around the country to get ideas for dealing with the main social, economic, and political problems of the nation. Valero highlighted that the government was seeking an approach to the leadership of labor unions, entrepreneurs, mass media, and the Catholic Church, which represented its main sources of opposition.
According to Valero, the legislative branch’s decisions had accompanied the executive’s initiatives for reconciliation. The National Assembly had created an ad hoc commission to investigate April 11 events, and, more importantly, it was working to pass a law for creating an independent Truth Commission, following the successful Argentine and
Chilean experiences of investigation of human rights violations. Valero insisted that
160 Elner, “Venezuela’s failed coup,” 3. 161 OAS, The current situation in Venezuela, Document presented by the delegation of Venezuela at the meeting of the Permanent Council held on May 28, 2002(Washington, D.C, May 28, 2002). 75
Venezuela’s government was capable of resolving its problems on its own, without additional assistance of the hemispheric organization.162
The governmental efforts to foster dialogue failed. It is possible to argue that the
President’s style blocked the reconciliation. The speech Chavez gave was a double-
edged sword. On one hand the speech was conciliatory, reaching out to all Venezuelans;
on the other hand he employed an “us-against-them” message which excluded all except
his supporters.163 After his restoration, Chavez agreed to modify some laws, change some
members of the executive cabinet, and appoint new leadership in Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), which was claimed by the opposition. Chavez, however, kept the main
objective of his government, insisting that his revolution was not tradeable. On June 15,
2002, in response to civil society movements that had announced a new demonstration,
Chavez demanded that his supporters defend the revolution with their lives.164 It is clear
that Chavez’ confrontational style reinforced polarization rather than creating conditions
that might help gain the confidence of the opposition. President Chavez set the
conditions for the dialogue, chose the opposition representative, and, most importantly,
remained in the position of avoiding international mediation.165 In the report of their visit
to Venezuela, the members of the IACHR affirmed that the government-backed forums
of dialogue were not all-inclusive and left the opinion of important social and political
sectors without consideration.166
162 Ibid. 163 Elner, “Venezuela’s,” 4. 164 “Solicitaran amparo al TSJ para la marcha del 11 de Julio,” El Nacional, June 18, 2002. 165 Leonardo Carvajal, El laberinto, 57. 166 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Observaciones preliminaries de la Comision Interamericana de Decrechos Humanos al culminar su visita a la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela (Washington, D.C: May 1, 2002) 76
The opposition refused to participate in the dialogue round-tables claiming that the government did not offer any possibility of compromise. Opposition groups had recovered from their failure in April and agreed to create a body of coordination,
Coordinadora Democratica ; nevertheless, they were divided about how to confront the government. According to Leonardo Carvajal, some in the opposition believed in a fast- tracked solution to the crisis; as a result, they embraced even a non-democratic option to put Chavez out of the presidency.167 These sectors believed that the opposition had to promote insurrectional strikes, civil disobedience, military insubordination, and other dramatic action to press Chavez to resign in the short term. Dialogue was not in the repertoire of these sectors. Others in the opposition were confident in a lengthy, but institutional, solution. They maintained that the opposition should confine its action to the constitution; therefore, the opposition should focus on a constitutional amendment, a consultative referendum, or a recall referendum.168 For this sector of the opposition, the
dialogue with the government, and even more, an internationally monitored dialogue was
advantageous. Carvajal maintains that the Coordinadora Democratica could not reach a
consensus about its political strategy. By late June, although the Coordinadora
Democratica formally agreed that the opposition had to promote a constitutional
amendment in order to shorten the presidential term and to introduce the possibility of early elections, an important political sector of the Coordinadora Democratica tied to the
167 Carvajal, El Laberinto, 57-59. 168 Ibid. 77
Accion Democratica (AD) party insisted on a fast-tracked solution.169 This duality of
objectives undermined international confidence in the opposition leadership.
The OAS offer of help
Despite its inability to promote dialogue, the government stood firm on its refusal
to OAS involvement in the resolution of Venezuela’s political crisis. Nevertheless, on
June 4, 2002, the General Assembly approved a declaration that reiterated the OAS’s
disposition to promote dialogue among the political actors in Venezuela. The OAS
Assembly General encouraged the government to explore the opportunities the OAS
could provide for the national dialogue. 170
In the OAS General Assembly, neither Venezuela’s government nor other
countries supported the US proposal for giving the OAS a formal role in Venezuela. The
Venezuelan representative to the OAS, Jorge Valero, and Foreign Minister Roy
Charderton refused the US proposal of invoking Article 17 of the IDC. A South
American diplomat relates that Roger Noriega, US representative to the OAS, lobbied to
include Article 17 of the IDC in Barbados resolution.171 Noriega visited Venezuela’s
mission to the OAS in Washington two days before the meeting in Barbados. Noriega
tried to persuade Venezuela’s representative, Jorge Valero, to modify the draft of the
resolution presented by Venezuela’s mission, including the invitation from Venezuela’s
government to the OAS. Noriega claimed to have support of other delegations.
Venezuela’s representative argued that he had to consult President Chavez and had his
officials to contact the rest of the OAS delegations in order to inform them that
169 Ibid. 170 OAS, Declaration on Democracy-AG/CG/doc.16/02 ( Barbados: June 4, 2002) 171 Latin-American diplomat in discussion with the author, February 2004 78
Venezuela would reiterate the terms of the previous delivered resolution draft.
Nevertheless, in Barbados, the night of June 3, 2002, OAS’s Chilean representative convinced Roy Charderton, Foreign Affairs Minister of Venezuela, to listen to the US proposal and to negotiate it. Venezuela’s Foreign Minister’s staff accepted some of the
US’s suggestions to the resolution draft. On the morning of June 4, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela decided to keep the resolution draft without the suggestion of the US representative. Because of Venezuela’s opposition, the US representative did not present his proposal to the 2002 OAS General Assembly. 172
If the proposal of the US representative had been accepted by the Venezuelan
government, the international community could have been involved in the solution of the
political crisis. As a result, the government would have requested OAS sending a
facilitating mission and providing technical support to work following the spirit of Article
17 of the IDC. According to the US draft resolution, the government of Venezuela should
have authorized more visits of the IACHR and the OAS Secretary General, who would
have informed the Permanent Council and Assembly General of any progress in
Venezuela. 173 The rationale behind Noriega’s proposal is that
the government has an obligation to let us [OAS] help. The Inter-American
Democratic Charter is a valuable instrument of prevention and a remedial
mechanism to forestall further deterioration of their political order. In other
words, I would like to see countries in trouble recognizing their own problems,
172 Ibid. 173 M. Palacios, “La OEA reafirmo oferta de ayuda a Venezuela pero no descarto envio de misión facilitadota,” El Nacional, June 5, 2002 79
and requesting assistance under Article 17 to strengthen institutions and forestall
crises, like the one we see in Venezuela.174
By early July 2002, the political conflict had increased in Venezuela and there was no possibility of reconciliation. Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, became the focus of continuous small disturbances that threatened to transform into more violent ones.
Civilians on both sides were stockpiling weapons in anticipation of a renewal of the street fighting.175 Any demonstration by the opposition was answered with another organized by supporters of the government. In the expectation of convincing Chavez to resign, the radicalized opponents prepared a demonstration with the same components of the April events: civilian and military support. The march that was supposed to end in the
Presidential Palace would be followed by a military pronouncement.176
Carter's mission to convince Chavez
The government realized the urgent need for reducing internal unrest and international pressure for the sake of stability. President Chavez decided to invite Jimmy
Carter to visit the country and help him foster the dialogue with the opposition. Inviting
Jimmy Carter was interpreted as an attempt to calm the opposition and avoid OAS involvement.177 Carter was a good option for Chavez because he did not represent an international organization, and thus any compromise with Carter was merely moral but
174 Roger Noriega, “The US and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,” in Carta Democrática Interamericana: Documentos e interpretaciones by OAS (Washington, D.C: OAS, 2003): 334. 175 “Venezuela’s danger,” The Washington Post, July 11,2002. 176 Ibid. 177 Armando Duran, Venezuela en llamas(Caracas: Debate, 2004):63-74 80 not legally biding. Channeling dissent into the legal arena would have required concessions from Chavez. 178
The government had failed to convince the opposition to accept Carter’s
mediation. On July 6, Carter arrived in Caracas in order to prepare a meeting between
the government and the opposition. Although Carter prepared the agenda for the
dialogue after meeting with all political actors, the union was held in absence of the
opposition. Carter notes that the representatives of Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS)
informed him that none of the opposition groups would participate in the proposed
meeting with the government because they would find other means to resolve their
controversy with the government.179 As a statement on this failed experience, Carter
said, “the resolution of the divisive issues in Venezuela depends upon good faith on all
sides and the establishment of a system dialogue that is mutually acceptable. It seems
obvious that the international community needs to be involved in the discussion”.180
The media reported the failure of Carter’s efforts as a consequence of inflexible
positions of both the government and the opposition. A Washington Post article
maintained that
so polarized are the two sides that they have troubles accepting any mediator:
Mr. Chavez has resisted intervention by the OAS, while his opponents are
178 Ibid. 179 J. Carter, “Situation in Venezuela” (statement at the conclusion of his trip to Venezuela,Atlanta, July 9, 2002. 180 Ibid, 3 81
suspicious of Mr. Carter, who recently paid a visit to the president’s only foreign
ally, Fidel Castro.181
Carter, however, helped to break such a stalemate because he convinced Chavez to accept
international involvement in the reconciliation process. Carter had suggested to Chavez
that a credible and mutually accepted system of negotiation and dialogue would require
the participation of international actors such as the OAS, the UN, and former presidents
in this hemisphere. 182On July 13, Vice President of Venezuela, Jose Vicente Rangel,
announced that the Carter Center would meet soon with the United Nations and the OAS
to build a proposal to facilitate dialogue in Venezuela. 183
Evidence of the rapport of Chavez and Carter was expressed by Jennifer McCoy,
America’s Program Director of the Carter Center: “President Carter has traveled several
times to Venezuela, including monitoring the 1998 and 2000 elections. He and President
Chavez built a very good personal relationship.” The Carter Center got the mission of
formulating a mechanism for dialogue process in Venezuela. McCoy noted: “The Carter
Center established an unprecedented relationship with two international organizations:
the United Nations Development Program(UNDP) and the Organization of American
States, forming a tripartite working group to lead a national dialogue.” 184
The Carter Center formed the Tripartite Working Group that visited Venezuela in
late July, 2002 in order to explore ways in which the three organizations might facilitate
181 “Venezuela in danger,” 2. 182 Carter, ‘Situation in Venezuela,” 1.
183 A. Leal, “J.V. Rangel anuncia reformulación del dialogo ante nueva realidad,” El Nacional, July 13, 2002. 184 Interview with Jennifer McCoy, director of The Carter Center's Americas Program. http:www.cartercenter.org/printdoc.asp?docID=1690&submenu=news. 82 dialogue between government and opposition.185 Fernando Jaramillo, Chief of Staff of
the Office of the OAS Secretary General comprised the group of representatives of the
Carter Center and the UNDP. Jaramillo’s presence, however, did not mean the OAS’s
formal involvement in Venezuela yet. Neither did Jaramillo have any of the ranks that
officially represented the organization nor did the Permanent Council designate him for a
mission in Venezuela. Instead, Jaramillo was a representative of the General Secretariat
of the OAS.186 Despite the informal representation of the OAS, Otto Reich, US Assistant
Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere at that time, maintained that the OAS
should lead the facilitation team because Carter’s good offices had small results and the
dialogue had not advanced.187 Reich also affirmed that “the government of Venezuela
should understand that OAS involvement does not mean to yield sovereignty.”188
On August 2, Venezuela’s government announced that it had accepted dialogue
with international facilitators. Jose Vicente Rangel, Vice-president of Venezuela,
informed the OAS Secretary General that the government had agreed with the proposal of
the Tripartite Working Group to act as facilitators of the national dialogue. Rangel,
however, emphasized that it would be an open dialogue, without tutelage, even from the
government.189 The government rejected the mediation mechanism and opted for a more
flexible, third party facilitation by representatives of the OAS, UNDP, and the Carter
Center. In a letter to the OAS, Rangel expressed, “the willingness of the government to
185 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts of the Secretary General in Venezuela-AG/doc.4231/03 add.1.(Washington. D.C, June 7, 2003). 186 OAS, Support for the process of dialogue in Venezuela-CP/RES.821 -1329/02 (Washington, D.C, August 14, 2002).http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res821.asp. 187 “Aceptar la mediación de la OEA no afectara la soberanía venezolana,” El Nacional, July 19, 2002 188 Ibid. 189 A. Leal, “Gobierno acepta asistencia internacional para el dialogo,” El Nacional, August 2, 2002. 83 seek a mutually agreed mechanism for reconciliation among the government, the representatives of the various opposition groups, and other segments of Venezuelan society, which would include the appointment of one or more persons versed in international affairs to facilitate dialogue and the quest for democratic agreements within the framework of the country’s Constitution.” 190 In its letter to the OAS Secretary
General, the Vice-president omitted mentioning Article 17 and asked for an OAS special
mission to Venezuela. The Venezuelan government finally accepted international
facilitation; nevertheless, it set strict limits on the international actors’ involvement in the
country.
Similarly, in a letter addressed to the OAS Secretary General, the representatives
of the Coordinadora Democratica expressed their satisfaction with the proposal of the
Tripartite Group. They said: “We expect that an internationally monitored mechanism
will result in a legally binding agreement.”191 While the government tried to minimize
the role of the OAS, the Coordinadora Democratica expected the participation of
international actors in the dialogue process would force the government to a compromise.
Permanent Council Resolution 821, approved on August 14, welcomed the
Venezuelan government’s acceptance of international participation in the process of
dialogue and ratified the OAS’s willingness to support and assist the government of
Venezuela in that process. 192 More importantly, Resolution 821 provided the formal
mandate for OAS to play a role in the facilitating of dialogue in Venezuela. Resolution
190 OAS, Note from the permanent mission of Venezuela forwarding a draft accord on the dialogue process in Venezuela-CP/doc. 3640/02 (Washington D.C, August 13, 2002) 191 OAS, Nota de la Secretaria General transmitiendo la comunicacion de Coordinadora Democratica de Venezuela de fecha 9 de Agosto de 2002- CP/INF. 4732/02 (Washington DC, August 13, 2002) 192 OAS, Support for the process of dialogue in Venezuela, 2. 84
821 quoted the letter the Coordinadora Democratica sent to the OAS Secretary General, which means that the opposition received legal recognition by the OAS.193
Despite accepting international facilitation, the government took action to limit
the latitude of OAS intervention. In the OAS Permanent Council of August 19, 2000, the
Foreign Minister of the Chavez Administration, Roy Charderton, stated that the
Venezuelan government permitted OAS’ involvement with two conditions: that the IDC
document was not be mentioned and that representatives of the organization acted as
facilitators rather than mediators.194 In that sense, the dialogue process in Venezuela
would emulate the 2000 Peruvian round-table model. Nevertheless, Charderton
maintained that “in the Peruvian case there was a personal approach that denaturalized
the OAS mission, and that is what the government tries to avoid.” 195In Peru, the OAS
General Assembly gave the OAS high level commissioners a mandate to suggest reforms, and to press for solutions.196 Unlike Peru, the OAS conditioned the participation of its
representatives to Venezuela’s governments’ request; there was no a specific mandate for
the OAS representatives. Unlike Paniagua’s transition government that facilitated the
labor of the round-table, the Chavez’s administration did not hide its efforts to limit the
agenda of discussion with the opposition and to dilute hemispheric organization
participation in internal affairs. 197
193 Ibid. 194 F. Zerpa, “Charderton rechaza aplicacion de ‘cartillas burocraticas’,” El Nacional, August 20, 2002 195 A. Leal, “J.V. Rangel: La conspiracion tambien es continuada,” El Nacional, August 27, 2002. 196 M. Cameron, “Strengthening checks," 110 197 Thomas Legler, “Peru then," 61-72; Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, “A model for the future?” Journal of democracy (2001): 123-136. 85
The tripartite mission comes in
During the next three months, a joint commission of OAS, UNDP, and the Carter
Center worked together with the government and the Coordinadora Democratica in order to set parameters for the dialogue. Nevertheless, reaching a consensus proved to be an arduous task. The tripartite mission visited Venezuela between September 8 and
September 13, 2002 to help the parties in the search and design of a mechanism that would be mutually acceptable for them in order to deal with substantive issues of their interest.198 The mission helped the parties to study the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy draft and to identify an agenda of primary and secondary subjects to
resolve.199 According to the mission, the more pressing issues for the discussion were to find a constitutional mechanism for consulting the public about the removal or continuation of elected authorities, to establish responsibilities for the April 2002 events, and to disarm the civilian population.200 The tripartite mission, however, found that a
broader agenda for a political discussion should include eliminating military-political
deliberation, clarifying labor union leaders’ representativeness, and legitimating the
moral, electoral, and judiciary branches of government. 201 The tripartite group emphasized that giving new legitimacy to the branches of government would demand political agreements in the framework of the Constitution and the law. In this sense, the joint declaration underscores the idea that deputies of the National Assembly were ready to consider any proposed law derived from the dialogue process. The mission also
198 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts. 199 Ibid. 200 OAS, Support for the process. 201 Ibid. 86 recommended that the government put into operation precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR).202
The joint mission left the country without any concrete agreement between the parties. They neither signed the Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy nor agreed in the scope and topics of the negotiation. After a meeting with the members of
the tripartite mission, Chavez said he hoped the opposition would abandon terrorism and
violence and would accept to talk now that there would be international actors
participating. Chavez emphasized that the dialogue would be within the framework of the
Constitution and the law. 203 In other words, being consistent with his previous
declarations, Chavez reiterated that for him the only valid solution for solving the crisis
might be activating a recall referendum not only for him but also for all elected
authorities. According to the 1999 Constitution, it would only happen after August 2003,
when the second half of his current term would start. Nevertheless, immediately after the
tripartite mission leaving the country, President Chavez affirmed that he refused to
discuss legitimating the term of any authority other than National Electoral
Commission.204
While the President wanted to postpone such a consultation for the next year, or
better, to avoid any formula for the relegitimation of his term, the Coordinadora
Democratica was looking for a way for Chavez’s earlier removal. According to the joint
mission representatives, some national political actors believed that the proposed forum
202 Ibid. 203 A. Leal, “Misión internacional insta a conseguir soluciones dentro del marco constitucional,” El Nacional, Sep.11, 2002 204 N. Pérez, “Exhortan a evitar acciones y discusiones contrarias a la paz,” El Nacional, Sep. 14, 2002 87 of dialogue had to deal with more aspects than finding a mechanism to prove the legitimacy of the President. The Coordinadora Democratica’s leadership, however, maintained they needed to focus on Chavez’s removal.205 Carlos Ortega, president of
CTV, was skeptical about the agreement between the government and the opposition
because he doubted the mission’s impartiality. Ortega criticized the Carter Center for
receiving a $2 million contribution at the beginning of 2002 from Venezuela’s
government.206 For the opposition, the dialogue was not its only option. At that moment, the opposition worked in a multiplicity of simultaneous strategies to reach its political objectives such as invoking civilian disobedience of Article 350 of the Constitution and another civilian-military coup. 207
Both sides welcomed the efforts of the tripartite mission, but neither of them
appeared interested in a compromise. As a result, Cesar Gaviria assumed the leadership
of the tripartite mission in order to break the deadlock. In early October 2002, Gaviria
visited Venezuela to make the parties agree to a common agenda and to start
negotiations. Gaviria could not convince the parties to choose a common agenda.
Nevertheless, he made the parties sign the Declaration of Principles for Peace and
Democracy in which they pledged their support for the forum of dialogue and rejection for non-democratic courses of action. 208 In the report of trip, Gaviria affirms that
205 J. Forero, “Approaches the brink,” The New York Times, Sep.22, 2002; Carvajal, El laberinto. 206 Leal, “Mision Internacional.” 207 Carvajal, El Laberinto. 208 Declaration de Principios por la Paz y la Democracia en Venezuela (Caracas, October 15, 2002). http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/latestnews/latestne ws.asp 88
they [government and opposition] promised to cooperate with the working group
in order to explore the preparatory phases for implementing an observable and
verifiable process of agreements for achieving, through a consensus-based
mechanism, political solutions consistent with the constitutional framework, and
they reaffirmed their conviction that Venezuela and the Venezuelan people will
be able to the overcome the current situation in a peaceful and democratic way,
ensuring thereby the rule of law and the dignity of all citizens.209
Gaviria expressed concern over the level of polarization in Venezuela. In fact, he affirmed that he wanted “to calm the country.”210 Nevertheless, in the middle of October
2002, the tension in the country increased because of a succession of events. First,
Primero Justicia (PJ) political party intensified its efforts for collecting signatures needed to request the National Electoral Commission (CNE) to call a consultative referendum against President Chavez. It would not be mandatory for Chavez to resign in case of the majority of people favoring ending his term; the proponents, however, believed a negative result would a be a moral burden to Chavez. Secondly, followers and opponents of the government demonstrated again in Caracas. A one-day general strike (the first after April, but the third in the last 12 months) paralyzed the country on October 21. The strike was an attempt to press President Chavez to resign or to call early elections.
Finally, on October 22, the next day of the strike, a group of military officers declared themselves in disobedience and gathered in the Plaza Altamira square in Caracas.
Thousands of people were to join the dissenting military officers in the square, but the
209 Ibid; OAS, Secretario general de la OEA informa sobre la Declaracion de Principios por la Paz en Venezuela (Washington D.C, Oct. 16, 2002) 210 Ibid. 89 rebels failed to convince commanders of military garrison for a rebellion. All garrison commanders declared their support for Chavez, dispelling fears of a barrack rebellion.
Although condemning the action, the Coordinadora Democratica claimed that the persecution of officers who did not support the government was the cause of the mutiny; a radical sector of the opposition disobeyed the leadership of the Coordinadora
Democratica and joined the military dissidents.211
Toledo's and Gaviria’s impatience
The increased conflict in Venezuela and the real possibility of another alteration
of the constitutional order motivated a reaction of the international community. The
Peruvian President, Alejandro Toledo, promoted a diplomatic action to push the government and the opposition to choose a mechanism for solving their dispute. Toledo
admitted that on October 12 he had convened the foreign affairs ministers of the Andes
Region to initiate consultations following the compromises of the IDC and the common
foreign policy of the Andean Nations Community. Toledo sought to activate the OAS democratic charter in order to undertake a collective assessment of the political crisis in
Venezuela. Toledo maintained that a special meeting of Foreign Ministers would find a more effective plan for the conclusion of the pre-negotiation phase. He believed that the dangerous situation in Venezuela required direct involvement of the presidents of the
Andean region in order to negotiate and supervise early elections in Venezuela.212 The
Andean Community would take a role similar to that CARICOM played in the Haitian
211 Duran, Venezuela en llamas, 126-144; J. Forero, “Approaches the brink,” The New York Times, Sept. 22, 2002; J. Forero, “Throngs again demand Venezuela leader quit,” The New York Times, Oct. 11, 2002 212 R. Ferreira, “Un fuerza para lidiar con Venezuela,” El Nuevo Herald, Oct. 15,2002; Andres Oppenheimer, “La bomba de tiempo en Venezuela,” El Nuevo Herald, Oct. 17, 2002; C. Lozada, “South America’s era of civil coups.” The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 22, 2002 90 crisis in December 2001. The OAS provided a mandate to the Presidents of member countries of CARICOM to deal with the post election conflict in Haiti. Toledo maintained that the presidents of the region had more authority than the tripartite mission representatives. 213 A diplomat source reinforces Toledo’s rationale: “[T]he dialogue
failed because Chavez did not trust the OAS and the opposition did not trust the Carter
Center.” 214
Toledo’s proposition reflected a concern not only for the Venezuela crisis but also
for the impact of this crisis in the fragile democracies of the Andean Community.
According to Toledo, the example of Venezuela’s instability would have a contagious
effect in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru.215 Toledo argued:
I am concerned that institutional rule will be broken; at the same time, I worry
about the lack of democratic attitude of President Chavez…. If one country falls,
it can drag others with it… Venezuela might set a precedent through which
presidents are removed even if they’ve been elected. If the international efforts to
put the parties to negotiate fail, the next step would be a civil war. 216
The foreign ministers of the Andean Community found consensus neither among
themselves nor among representatives of other regional groups to go forward with
Toledo’s proposal. According to Andres Oppenheimer, such a decision would have
required the acquiescence of Brazil, whose presidential term was close to end. Without
Brazilian approval, the other members of Mercosur such as Argentina, Uruguay, and
213 Ferreira, “Una fuerza.” 214 Oppenheimer, “La bomba.” 215 Ferreira, “Una fuerza.”; Lozada, “South America’s.” 216 Ferreira, “Una fuerza.” 91
Paraguay, would not make a decision because Mercosur members practiced a foreign policy of consensus.217 For the moment, the government of Peru abandoned its proposal.
The permanent mission of Peru to the OAS, however, issued a statement condemning the
uprising of Plaza Altamira dissidents. 218
Gaviria also rejected the attempt of a new military insurrection in Venezuela. The
statement on Venezuela by the OAS Secretary General indicated that the recent events
would revive the dangerous trend of military meddling in Latin America, weakening the
principle of military subordination to civilian rule, which is one of the essential elements
of democracy according to the IDC. Gaviria maintained that the military rebellion
underscored the persistent and deep polarization of the country and the urgent need to
move from an environment of confrontation to direct negotiation. 219It is clear that the
situation created by the military uprising paved the way for Gaviria to convince the
parties to initiate a formal negotiation.
The bases for the OAS-backed roundtable
Both parties finally agreed on the basis for the dialogue because they had to show
international opinion their democratic commitment. The Coordinadora Democratica
desisted from the request of the immediate resignation of Chavez and admitted to
discussing other mechanisms for solving the crisis with the government. The opposition
leadership also consented to appoint new authorities in the National Electoral
Commission (CNE). But, the Coordinadora Democratica demanded to include the
217 Oppenheimer, “La bomba.” 218 Delegation of Peru to the OAS. Text of the statement by the Government of Peru, issued on October 22, on the situation in Venezuela(Washington, D.C, Oct. 23, 2002). 219 OAS, Statement on Venezuela by OAS Secretary General-2002.E-214/02 (Madrid, Oct. 23, 2002). 92 disarmament of the civilian population, especially the pro-government Circulos
Bolivarianos, in the agenda of discussion. 220 Venezuela’s representative to the OAS,
Jorge Valero, affirmed that the government finally accepted Cesar Gaviria acting as facilitator. Nevertheless, Gaviria’s mission had to be a solo performance, denuded of his condition of OAS Secretary General. 221 The hemispheric community accepted
Venezuela’s governmental condition for Gaviria’s personal rather than institutional
performance, and there was no particular OAS mandate to Gaviria for his new role in
Venezuela other than to follow the spirit of the OAS Resolution 821.
The last week of October, 2002, Gaviria visited Venezuela again to present both
parties a proposal outlining processes and general guidelines for the dialogue.222 Gaviria had acquired a European Commission donation of 600,000 euros to support the project.223 He proposed facilitating the process by establishing a Working Forum for
dialogue and negotiation. The forum should be given a mandate of approximately one
month, until December 4, after which it could be extended by the agreement of the
parties. Gaviria asked the parties to give some room for procedural maneuver to the
facilitation body in order to carry out its functions effectively. According to Gaviria’s
proposal, Venezuelans must resolve their problems by themselves, protecting the national
interest rather than group interests. More importantly, Gaviria asserted that the
international community would have an important role in the dialogue. 224 In the
220 Carvajal, El Laberinto, 237 221 Jorge Valero, Venezuela’s representative to the OAS, in discussion with the author, February 2004 222 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts. 223 Ibid 224 Ibid. 93
Executive Summary for establishing of the Forum for Negotiation and Agreements the
Secretary General asserts that
the international community , through the Tripartite Mission, will have an active
part in the process, embracing three basic rules: (i) providing political support to
the international facilitator for the Forum on Negotiation and Agreements, with
the help of an operational team; (ii) observing, verifying and or guaranteeing the
rules of the game, the negotiating process, and compliance with any agreements
reached, through mechanisms agreed with the parties; (iii) helping to
communicate progress in the Forum for negotiation and agreement, at both the
hemispheric and the international level. 225
On November 7, the parties agreed to formalize the dialogue with the publication
of the Operational Synthesis of the Forum for Negotiation and Agreement.226 The parties
ratified Cesar Gaviria as facilitator and admitted professional personnel of the Carter
Center, the PNUD, and the OAS to assist the facilitation task. The same number of
representatives of both parties would comprise the forum, six members for each. The
document reiterated that the main objective of the roundtable was to find an electoral
solution for the crisis. In addition, it was mandatory for the Forum to deal with the
disarming of the civilian population and the April 11 Truth Commission. The OAS,
Carter Center, and PNUD would guarantee the transparency of the process and monitor
implementation of the accords reached.227
225 Ibid, 6 226 Executive Summary for the Forum of Negotiations and Agreement. (Caracas, Nov. 7, 2002). 227 Ibid. 94
As with what happened in the Peruvian experience, the OAS backed-roundtable in
Venezuela created the conditions for the political elite to reflect and to reach an agreement. In Venezuela, as well in Peru, the OAS representative was a facilitator rather a mediator or arbiter. Nevertheless, in both cases the OAS, together with other international organizations, would certify the negotiation process. Once again, the OAS would orient the local actors to respect the hemispheric democratic standards. In
Venezuela, the opposition was legitimated. The Coordinadora Democratica became a valid interlocutor in the dialogue in the same way the political parties in the opposition were in Peru. However, in contrast to Peruvian round-tables, in Venezuela, the civil society participated in the same conditions as the political parties because both sectors were integrated in the Coordinadora Democratica.
Although Venezuela’s government accepted the OAS’s involvement, the government succeeded in limiting foreign involvement. Cesar Gaviria undertook the role of facilitator, but it was a personal rather than an institutional task. There was no specific mandate of the OAS appointment. In contrast, in Peru there was no intention of blocking foreign involvement. The officials did not believe in Fujimori’s authority; they facilitated
OAS involvement.228
According to Janet Kelly, the presence of international actors prevented the
government from violating human rights. At the same time, they contained the radical sectors of the opposition, which considered civilian disobedience and rebellion valid
responses against a government they considered illegitimate. Kelly considers that the
main role of the OAS and other international organizations at that time would be to use
228 Latin-American diplomat in discussion with the author, February 2004 95 the power of international public opinion to assure that the national actors follow the democratic standards. 229
229 Janet Kelly, “La embestida quijotesca de Hugo Chavez,” Foreign Affairs en Espanol 2, no.3(Autumn/Winter, 2002): 198-212 96
Chapter 6: Roundtable working (November 2002- May 2003)
The roundtable's ineffectiveness and the general strike
On November 8, 2002, the Forum of Negotiation and Agreement was formally installed.230 At the end of the first session, Gaviria reiterated the need for the government and the opposition to come to an understanding. Gaviria said, “we know that the constitution must be respected, but a solution to the grave impasse we are facing must emerge from an agreement between the government and the Coordinadora
Democratica.”231 The parties had agreed to meet in the forum, but both insisted on their previous positions. While the opposition wanted Chavez to quit or call a nonbinding referendum, Chavez welcomed the possibility of a binding referendum on his presidency after August 2003, as permitted by the constitution. While the opposition wanted to rush into having a decision about a date for the consultative referendum, the government asked for time. 232Gaviria’s purpose was to convince the parties to modify their stance and
reach an agreement in the next thirty days.
During the first month of the forum, the parties advanced in none of the three
points of the forum’s agenda. Instead, the political confrontation increased in the country.
The Primero Justicia party presented the signatures for a consultative referendum to the
230 Government appointed as its representatives: Jose Vicente Rangel(Vice-president of the Republic); Roy Charderton (Foreign Affairs minister), Aristobulo Izturiz( Minister of Education), Maria Cristina Iglesias( Minister of Labor), Ronal Blanco (Governor of State of Tachira), Nicolas Maduro(Deputy to the National Assembly), and Jorge Valero (Venezuela’s Ambassador to the OAS) as advisor. The Coordinadora Democratica named Timoteo Zambrano(Alianza Bravo Pueblo), Americo Martin( Non-governmental organizations), Alejandro Armas (Deputy to the National Assembly), Eduardo Lapi (Governor of State of Yaracuy), Manuel Cova (Secretary General of the Central de Trajadores de Venezuela), Rafael Alfonzo (member of Fedecamaras), and Juan Rafalli (Primero Justicia) as advisor. 231 Andy Webb, “Chavez talks in balance as rivals manoeuvre,” Finantial Times, Nov. 8, 2002.Lexisnexis. 232 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 5 97
CNE. The government alleged the signatures were fraudulent and responded with a political strategy to block the action of the CNE. The government demanded the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) to declare unconstitutional calling a referendum on the mandate of a popularly elected official such as the President of the Republic, as demanded by the opposition. 233 In addition, two pro-government
members of the CNE resigned in a government effort to create a power vacuum in the
electoral authority.234 To undermine the force of the opposition in a potential new coup
attempt, the government removed the police force from the mayor of Caracas, who was a
prominent leader of the opposition. 235
On November 20, Gaviria was notified by Carlos Ortega, president of the
Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (CTV) that the opposition would call a national
strike, starting on November 25, 2002.236 According to Ortega, this strike, the fourth of
2002, was a clear necessity to pressure what he called a stubborn, non-democratic
government into agreeing to a nonbinding referendum that would badly embarrass the
government, forcing the president to resign or agree to early elections.237 Gaviria met
with the leadership of the Coordinadora Democratica to convey that the calling for the
strike put into a risk his negotiation task. After his meeting with Gaviria, Carlos Ortega
233 Duran, Venezuela, 139-141. 234 According to the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly was responsible for appointing new authorities to the National Electoral Council (CNE). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice would assume such a task if the National Assembly had failed to fulfill its mandate and a vacuum of power would arise. In fact, this happened. Since December 2002 to July 2003, the political parties in the National Assembly did not reach an agreement to appoint new authorities in the CNE. Then, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice designated the CNE’s members on August 2003. While the government lack of absolute majority in the National Assembly, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice was composed of pro-government judiciaries. 235 Duran, Venezuela, 127. 236 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 8. 237 Duran, Venezuela, 131 98 announced December 2 as the new date for the strike. Gaviria convinced the Coodinadora to postpone the strike, but he could not have them desist from this action. Gaviria brought the strike issue to the forum and made the government and the opposition representatives negotiate the suspension of the strike until a few hours before its beginning, although there was no accord.238
The opposition got a partial victory extending the strike for three days, but it was
destined to die soon. On December 4, the government’s brutal repression of a
demonstration of PDVSA employees revitalized the protest. The strike became an
indefinite stoppage and it was joined by the majority of the oil industry workers. The
third day after the oil industry joined to the strike, Venezuela stopped providing oil to
external and local markets. PDVSA had to invoke the major clause involving
unavoidable circumstances to avoid legal actions and other sanctions from its customers
around the world.
From December 2 through the following two months, the Forum devoted itself
exclusively to dealing with the suspension of the strike. 239 Once the oil industry
incorporated the work stoppage, government representatives abandoned the forum, as a
way to compel the opposition to end the strike. On December 7, Gaviria convinced the
government to return, after issuing the ultimatum of invoking the IDC.240 Nevertheless,
the meetings of the forum resumed the day after, on Dec 8, after three people were
assassinated in a demonstration by the opposition in the Plaza Altamira in Caracas. The government realized that the forum was important to temper the escalating violence in the
238 Ibid, 146-147 239 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 9-10. 240 Duran, Venezuela, 165. 99 streets. 241 Gaviria affirmed that the resumption of meetings of the Forum served to
provide a permanent and open channel of communication, which averted many
confrontations. 242
In a telephone conversation with the author, Timoteo Zambrano, representative of
the Coordinadora Democratica in the roundtable, revealed that an agreement was
reached on December 8.243 The opposition had agree to suspend the strike in exchange
for the government’s acceptance of early elections. In addition, the government agreed to
return control of the Caracas’s municipal police to Mayor Alfredo Pena. According to
Zambrano, five hours after the agreement in the early morning of December 9, the
government changed its position. It was not possible to achieve any accord and the
government would focus on the activation of the petroleum industry. After this moment,
the government strengthened its position, claiming that the constitutional referendum in
the middle of the presidential term was the only electoral solution and the situation of the
petroleum workers had to be excluded from the dialogue.244 Despite its formal contact in
the forum, the parties could not reach an agreement to stop the violence and, most
importantly, lift the strike.
Hemispheric actors and a solution
The lack of agreement to stop the strike and the weakening of the general
conditions in the country concerned the hemispheric community and motivated it to
241 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 9-10. 242 Ibid, 142. 243 Timoteo Zambrano, opposition representative to Forum of Dialogue and Negotiation, phoned conversation with the author, June 15, 2003. 244 Ibid.
100 abandon its neutrality. A manifestation of the alarm of the hemisphere was the expression of support to the dialogue process and Gaviria’s facilitation by several countries and international organizations during the last week of November and the first week of
December. The foreign ministers of Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and the United States declared their support for
Gaviria’s role in Venezuela.245 The Permanent Council of the OAS stated that the parties in Venezuela should move to agreement through dialogue and within the constitutional framework. 246 In the same terms, the Rio Group, Caricom, Mercosur, CAN, Central
America countries, and the EU(as OAS observer) stated that the dialogue and the strict
adherence to the rule of law constituted the only way to achieve a solution to Venezuela’s
crisis. 247 Although the hemispheric community sent a clear signal to Venezuela’s
political actors, their message showed Gaviria’s inability to break the deadlock. Gaviria
was acting as facilitator, not as a negotiator. He did not have the possibilities to have the
parties reach an agreement easily.
The hemisphere also exhibited its concern in the report of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (ICHR). On December 12, the ICHR expressed concern
that the human rights situation had deteriorated in Venezuela since its last visit in May
2002. The ICHR urged OAS members to use all available mechanisms of the OAS
Charter and the IDC in order to assure the Venezuelan government’s adherence to the
rule of law. The commission reported that it had issued twelve measures to protect the
245 Nina Negron and Reinaldo Trombetta, “Hay una action concertada del continente,” El Nacional, Nov. 30, 2002. 246 OAS, Statement of the chair of the Permanent Council of the OAS on Venezuela- E242/02 (Washington, D.C, December 9, 2002) 247 Negron and Trombetta, “Hay una acción.” 101 life and rights of human rights defenders and journalists, which had been obviated by the government.248
On December 9, Jimmy Carter affirmed that there was impatience in the
hemisphere over the slowness of the negotiations in Venezuela. He encouraged President
Chavez to ask the people whether or not they wanted him to continue in the
presidency.249
In terms similar to Carter’s , the US asked for an electoral solution. On December
13, Ari Fleischer, White House spokesman, announced that the US believed the only way
out of the crisis was the holding of early elections, even if it meant passing a
constitutional amendment. According to the US, Venezuela’s government should have
followed the Argentine example of the previous year, dissipating the prospect of an
increasingly violent situation by an electoral solution. 250Nevertheless, within 72 hours,
the Bush administration moderated its stance and called for a referendum, something the
Venezuelan constitution allowed. Fleischer emerged again to explain that his previous
remarks were an umbrella statement under which the constitution was considered.251
Some officials of the State Department and the Pentagon argued that such a
statement emanated from the National Security Council with little advance consultation with anyone outside of the White House. They believed this misguided statement put in danger the equilibrium developing in Caracas after weeks of negotiations between the
248 IACHR, La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos urge a los estados miembros de la OEA a tomar acciones inmmediatas para detener el progresivo deterioro del estado de derecho en Venezuela, news release, Dec. 12, 2002.
249 Duran, Venezuela, 181. 250 S. Wilson, S. “Venezuela crisis lack impartial referee,” The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2002. 251 Ibid. 102 government and its opponents. 252 Other officials claimed that the US action was
deliberated, a code language supporting the opposition and weakening Chavez’s
position.253 The US, however, had an additional reason for asking for an urgent solution of Venezuela’s crisis. When the US government was planning the intervention in Iraq, the indefinite stoppage of the oil workers in Venezuela would negatively impact the world oil market and disrupt oil supplies from Venezuela. By 2002, Venezuela was providing 13 percent of US imports of oil. Sources mentioned by Phil Gunson, journalist of the Christian Science Monitor, argued that statements of support from governments from Canada to Chile for the OAS Secretary General’s efforts had been orchestrated behind the scenes by the US, because of its heavy reliance on Venezuela’s oil. 254
The intensification of the crisis also motivated Peru to insist on its previous
proposal for a direct participation by the hemisphere in Venezuela. Peru lobbied and got
explicit support from Costa Rica, Argentina, and Bolivia and covertly from US and
Canada to call for a meeting of consultation of foreign affairs ministers in order to discuss a plan for solving the crisis in Venezuela.255 These countries believed that the
hemisphere had to play a role to push an agreement between the parties, using the tools of
the IDC. They argued that the foreign ministers’ meeting had to give more power for
Gaviria to act. Gaviria would be instructed to report to the OAS Permanent Council on a
252Alterman, The book, 207; K. De Young, “Confusing remarks a symptom of Iraq focus,” The Washington Post, Dec. 21, 2002. 253 Wilson, “Venezuela crisis;” De Young, “Confusing.” 254 Phil Gunson, “Oil factor could be tipping point in Venezuela,” The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 10, 2002. 255 Jorge Valero, Memorandum of the extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Council, Dec 13 to Dec. 16, 2002, unpublished material (cited with permission of his author). 103 regular basis so that the Council would follow the details of the situation in Venezuela and, most importantly, the Council might have adopted such decisions to help Gaviria.256
Venezuela knew about the Peruvian initiative and anticipated calling for an
extraordinary meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, rather than a foreign affairs
ministers’ meeting, as was the Peruvian intention. 257 According to Jorge Valero, the
Peruvian government had instructed its representative to the OAS, Eduardo Ferrero, to study the Venezuelan crisis and to prepare for a Permanent Council meeting and the eventuality of calling a Foreign Affairs meeting. It was supposed that these institutions would activate the IDC in its articles 18, 19 or in another case urging the Venezuelan government to use article 17. Valero affirmed that the consequence would be the same:
OAS tutelage. He claimed that: “Gaviria would be an emperor with power to appoint commissions and to invite foreign personalities to visit Venezuela and advice about internal affairs.” 258
Instead of OAS tutelage, the Venezuelan government wanted to obtain a
declaration of support from the hemisphere, in the same way the President of Guatemala,
Alfonzo Portillo, had been supported by the OAS through Permanent Council Resolution
784, when he faced destabilizing events that put into risk the institutions on March of
2001.259 Venezuela’s representative to the OAS made a diplomatic lobby to gain support
from other countries, describing the strike as a sabotage oriented to destabilize the
256 Ibid. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid ; OAS, Support for the democratic government of the Constitutional President of the Republic of Guatemala, Alfonso Portillo, and for the institutions of the rule of law, CP/RES 784(126601) (Washington, D.C, March, 2001). 104 country and topple Chavez from power. 260Jorge Valero affirmed that in the preliminary
consultations with the regional groups in the OAS, Caricom and some Central American
countries agreed to support the Venezuelan sabotage thesis in the Permanent Council meeting, but he admitted that none of ALADI group members explicitly supported it
because they thought the main purpose of the session must be to help Gaviria.261
The OAS's dilemma and Chavez
After receiving the note of request from Venezuela’s representative, the president
of the OAS Permanent Council convene an extraordinary session of this body on
December 13, 2002. Together with the request for the meeting, Venezuela’s
representative handed in the draft resolution through which the OAS members would express direct support for President Chavez and condemn the opposition activities. In particular, Venezuela’s representative wanted the OAS to disapprove of the attitude of the mass media in the country and petroleum workers. 262 Venezuela’s representative
presented the destabilizing plan of the opposition and asked the support of the OAS
following the spirit of the General Assembly Resolutions of April 18, 2002 and June 4,
2002, in which the OAS had reiterated its willingness to provide the support and
260 Jorge Valero, Memorandum of the extraordinary meeting.
261 Ibid.; The members of OAS organize informally by the regional groups which are CARICOM (Antigua-Barbuda, Haiti, Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Kitts, Belize, Santa Lucia, Dominica, San Vincent, Grenada, Suriname, Guyana, Tri & Tob, and Dominican Republic), Central America( Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama), North America (US and Canada), and ALADI(Mexico,Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela). ALADI refers to the Latin American Integration Association. Headquartered in Montevideo, ALADI was established in August 1980 to replace the twenty-year-old Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/uruguay/uy_glos.html. 262 Delegation of Venezuela to the OAS. Support for the democratically –elected government of the Constitutional President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez Frias, OAS/CP/ doc. 367602, draft resolution presented by the Delegation of Venezuela to the OAS (Washington, D.C, Dec.12, 2002). 105 assistance that the government of Venezuela requires to consolidate the democratic institutions. 263
On December 13, a few hours before the beginning of the extraordinary session of
the Permanent Council, the representatives of Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica
introduced a document with amendments to a draft of a resolution presented by
Venezuela. 264 Instead of expressing direct support for President Chavez, they believed the OAS had to support the democratic institutions of Venezuela without mention of
Hugo Chavez Frias. Instead of condemning the opposition and the media directly, they
urged the Chavez administration to respect and guarantee the essential elements of
democracy as the only way to create an environment conducive to a peaceful solution.
Peru and the other three countries insisted that the OAS members had to express that the hemisphere rejected the use of violence to replace any democratic government and urged the political actors in Venezuela to find a solution through dialogue and negotiation. They supported OAS Secretary General’s facilitation efforts and maintained that Gaviria had to
report to the Permanent Council on the advancement of the negotiations in Venezuela, so
that the Council would decide on additional actions it considered appropriate. The
Peruvian-led proposition was based on the five previous resolutions of the OAS on
Venezuela and, most importantly, on in the articles 1, 3, 4, and 17 of the IDC. 265
The extraordinary session of the Permanent Council extended for thirty-eight
hours in order to decide by consensus between two contrasting proposals. While
263 Ibid. 264 Delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru to the OAS. Proposed amendments to draft resolution CP/doc. 3676/02, OAS/CP/doc.3677/02, presented by the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru to the OAS (Washington, D.C, Dec 13, 2002). 265 Ibid. 106
Venezuela’s representative wanted the OAS to express direct support for President
Chavez, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica believed that the OAS had to encourage Gaviria’s facilitation task and even to consider giving him a stronger mandate to settle the dispute. The Council was developed in private except for the Venezuelan representative’s speech, which was recorded by the media.
According to Jorge Valero’s version of the Permanent Council, Cesar Gaviria described the agenda he followed in Venezuela and his efforts for avoiding the strike in his speech. 266 Gaviria admitted that before the strike the parties were close to an
agreement, but the agreement was not possible because each side misjudged the power of
the other side. Gaviria informed the Permanent Council that he had received support from
the Rio Group, Caricom, Mercosur, CAN, EU, Central America countries, and OAS
observers. In addition, Gaviria reported the permanent interest of the presidents of the
Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Brazil, who had kept in touch with him since the
beginning of the dialogue process. Gaviria argued that helping Venezuela was supporting
the work of the roundtable. For him, a new OAS resolution on Venezuela must focus on
the negotiations and condemn the possibility of another coup d’etat attempt, but only in a
generic form. Gaviria affirmed that the OAS should put pressure to the parties to
negotiate with a sense of urgency. Valero affirmed that Gaviria tried to influence the
debate and subsequently the resolution in order to have them focusing on his facilitation
job rather than considering the report of the Venezuelan government.267
266 Jorge Valero, Memorandum of the extraordinary meeting. 267 Ibid. 107
Valero’s memorandum to President Chavez described the arguments of the countries that more actively supported strengthening Gaviria’s power. Reiterating the terms of the draft resolution to which Peru had subscribed, Eduardo Ferrero, Peruvian representative, insisted that the OAS had to condemn the acts of violence and intolerance, but he claimed that the resolution must avoid using the name of the Venezuelan
President, arguing that an unbalanced position could negatively affect Gaviria’s efforts.
He insisted that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was needed to consider a plan of action to support Gaviria. The Argentinean Representative, Hugo Gil, insisted that there were conditions for calling the meeting of foreign affairs ministers. The representative of Bolivia argued that there were conditions for invoking article 18 of the
IDC based on Gaviria’s report. Central America and Colombia also publicly favored the proposal to give more power to Gaviria. Colombia opposed any condemnation to the
Venezuelan media. According to Valero, despite Canadian and American support for the
Peruvian proposal, these countries had low profiles during the session. 268
In his report about the situation in Venezuela, Valero explained that the indefinite
strike of the oil workers was criminal action to destabilize the democratic institutions.
The Venezuelan government requested OAS support, as previous presidents of the region
such as Alfonzo Portillo from Guatemala, Luis Gonzalez from Paraguay, and Gustavo
Novoa from Ecuador who received OAS support when they were concerned about to the
stability of their governments. The Venezuelan representative gained the support of
CARICOM, Panama, México, and Brazil. Miguel Ruiz, Mexico’s representative claimed
that there were political plans for isolating Venezuela’s government. The Brazilian
268 Ibid. 108 representative criticized the punitive terms of the Peruvian and Argentinian proposal and asked to find other mechanisms of the Inter-American System to face the crisis in
Venezuela. Although Chile did not support Venezuela in the private session, Esteban
Tonic, the Chilean representative agreed with the inclusion of the name of President
Chavez in the resolution and criticism of the Venezuelan media. 269 According to Valero, the arguments of Venezuela’s government convinced most of the OAS members, so that if Venezuela had asked for a public vote rather than consensus, the election would had favored Venezuela.270
At the end of its deliberations, the Permanent Council adopted Resolution 833.271
Valero was correct that the Venezuelan government had reasons to celebrate Resolution
833 as a triumph. This, however, was a pyrrhic victory. Resolution 833 backed President
Chavez, but only by implication. It called for supporting democracy in Venezuela,
“whose government is headed by Hugo Chavez Frias.” Resolution 833 criticized all
social actors that promote violence and confrontation, which clearly alluded to the
conduct of the mass media in Venezuela. However, the Permanent Council urged the
government to guarantee freedom of expression and of the press, following the
recommendations of the Inter-American Commission Human Rights of December 12. 272
Resolution 833 also condemned the use of violence as a means for replacing a
democratic government in the hemisphere and its intention to continue applying the IDC in the preservation and defense of democracy. Despite this warning against any
269 Ibid. 270 Ibid 271 OAS, Support for the Democratic institutional structure in Venezuela and the facilitation efforts of the OAS Secretary General, CP/RES. 833(1348/02).(Washington, D.C: OAS, December 16, 2002). 272 Ibid. 109 unconstitutional action to topple the government by the opposition, the resolution urged the government to respect opposition demands for an electoral solution to the crisis. The
Permanent Council wanted the executive branch to guarantee the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government, avoiding executive pressure to the other branches of government to block a popular referendum or elections. 273Although
Resolution 833 indicated that there were real threats to the stability of the democratic institutions in Venezuela, the OAS Permanent Council did not believe completely in the democratic commitment of the Chavez administration.
Finally, Resolution 833 expressed an explicit and strong support to Gaviria’s facilitation efforts, exhorting the parts to negotiate a “constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and electoral solution” with the help of the OAS Secretary General. The resolution established that the Secretary General would deliver his report of facilitation efforts to the Permanent Council and the Council would adopt whatever measures of the inter-American system that it deemed appropriate. Resolution 833 mentioned that calling a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be a specific measure, as was the suggestion of Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Bolivia.274
Resolution 833 did not change the nature of Gaviria’s mission; it renovated and
extended Gaviria’s mandate to act as facilitator, requesting him to convey the details of
the situation in Venezuela to the Permanent Council. Resolution 833 did not meet
completely the aspiration of Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Bolivia of an immediate
and overt intervention of the OAS in Venezuela, but it showed the OAS members’
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid. 110 concern for the consequences of the current situation in Venezuela and the spillover effect of a prolonged crisis. Most importantly, it showed the hemispheric intention of participating more actively and effectively if there was not a short-term solution.
Mobilizing Gaviria’s friends to end the strike
By the middle of January, the OAS-sponsored negotiations entered into a stalemate. The opposition was confident that its actions would unequivocally compel
Chavez into accepting a non-binding referendum or calling early elections. The
Coordinadora Democratica was optimistic because the strike had lasted for forty five days and middle and working classes had remained politically mobilized. The New York
Times correspondent in Venezuela, Ginger Thompson, reported that, since the beginning of December, 2002, “housewives and professional, rich and working class”, had embarked in the daily rituals of demonstrating, pot-banging and blowing whistles against the government.275 The government resisted acceding to the opposition’s demands and
tried to reactivate oil production with the help of technicians from Algeria, India,
Philippines, Mexico, and Trinidad & Tobago. The last week of December, the
government regained the control of the oil tankers’ float. Chavez insisted that what was
going on in Venezuela was not a strike but a coup attempt organized by “terrorists who
are blocking oil and food distribution and sabotaging refineries.” He argued that the
government would defeat these terrorists and plotters rather than negotiate with
them.276On January 17, 2003, the representatives of the government again abandoned the
275 Ginger Thompson, “Strike’s effects tear at social fabric in Venezuela,” The New York Times, January 16, 2003. 276 Larry Rohter, “Venezuela’s chief proposes global effort to end strike,” The New York Time, January 3, 2003 111
Forum of Dialogue and Negotiation. 277 Neither side was convinced that the dialogue
represented its best option for fulfilling its objectives.
The hemispheric community, notably Brazil and the US, took action to revive the
stalled negotiations in Venezuela. On January 15, 2003 in Quito, Ecuador, during the
inauguration of Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutierrez, the President of Brazil, Luis
Inacio Lula da Silva led a summit of Latin American presidents with the purpose of
discussing the political crisis in Venezuela. The presidents of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
and Peru and several foreign ministers of the region agreed with a proposal of Brazil and
the US for reinforcing the Gaviria facilitation effort with the help of an advisory
commission of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the region. The group that would join Gaviria
at the negotiation table, having the option of offering its own proposal to end the political
crisis, consisted of the foreign ministers of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Spain, Portugal, and
the United States.278
Brazil and the US assumed the leading role in lobbying for the Group of Friends,
although they had different vision about the solution of the crisis and a dissimilar
motivation to act. According to an editorial of the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper, Lula
decided to play a larger diplomatic role in order to help an ideologically friendly
regime.279 Lula had rejected the possibility of early elections in Venezuela and now had embarked in a political initiative that would meddle in internal affairs. Brazilian diplomats believed that siding with Chavez against the opposition would perturb
277 Duran, Venezuela, 197.
278 Group of friends to support secretary general in his facilitations efforts in Venezuela, press release, January 16, 2003. 279 “Respaldo a Chávez provoca malestar en la diplomacia brasileña,” El Comercio, January 17, 2003. 112
Brazilian-American relations. 280Another analyst affirmed that the real motive of Lula’s
support of Chavez was not ideological, but economic; he was interested in a strategic
economic alliance with Venezuela.281
In December 2002, in Caracas, Chavez had asked Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula’s
international advisor, for the help of the new Brazilian government to create the Group of
Friends in order to minimize and to weaken the influence of Gaviria and the OAS in
Venezuela. Chavez thought the group had to work parallel to the OAS facilitation and
must have been composed of governments friendly to the Chavez administration such as
Brazil, Cuba, France, Russia, and some OPEC country members. The US must be
excluded from the group.282 In Quito, Chavez realized that Lula had a different intention
with the creation of the diplomatic group. Unlike Chavez’s comrade group, Lula was
persuaded to organize the group of Friends of Venezuela, trusted by both sides of the
conflict, which would develop and guarantee a compromise through an existing
mediation effort by the OAS. The US’s inclusion represented the condition for the
opposition’s acceptance of the group.283 After leaving Quito, Chavez reacted negatively
to the creation of the Group of Friends. In the United Nations General Assembly, Chavez
criticized the mechanism of hemispheric action which was recently approved and asked
Kofi Annan for support for his administration.284 In Caracas, in a speech in the National
Assembly of Venezuela, Chavez rejected the creation of the Group of Friends and
280 Ibid. 281 Duran, Venezuela, 199. 282 Fábio Zanini, “Criação de Grupo buscou equilíbrio Brasil-EUA,” Folha de São Paulo, January 17, 2003. 283 “Lula y Chavez, en una reunion a puerta cerrada,” El Comercio, January 17, 2003; Duran, Venezuela, 185-186, 197-200; Zanini, “Criação.” 284 “Chavez pede ajuda a ONU para solucionar crise na Venezuela,” Folha de São Paulo, January 16, 2003. 113 maintained that Gaviria’s work represented a solo performance. 285 Chavez could not convince Lula to include France and Cuba as members of the Group of Friends. Lula’s decision prioritized his good relations with Washington. 286
After keeping a low profile because of the events that followed April 11, 2002, the US decided it was time for an overt involvement in Venezuela. On December 2002,
the White House opted for supporting early elections or any other constitutional
mechanism that would create confidence among the political actors and motivate the end of the oil industry workers’ strike. Until that moment, the US had seen the fight between
Chavez and the opposition as a conflict of communism and anti-communism, which was
the vision of veterans of the contra wars in Central America such as Otto Reich and
Roger Noriega, who were in charge of the Bureau of the Western Hemisphere in the State
Department.287 The US was concerned about its oil supply as it prepared for a war with
Iraq that could restrain Middle East oil shipments. Since the beginning of the strike, the
production of PDVSA had dropped ninety percent, which motivated the suspension of oil
exports from Venezuela to the US. Also, the disturbance in Venezuela triggered a raise in
the world price of a barrel of oil, which reached $ 30 in January 2003, an increase of six
percent compared to the price at the beginning of December 2002. Without the
normalization of Venezuela’s oil production, the costs of the war on Iraq to the American
economy would be higher.288 The media reported that the Bush administration debated
285 Duran, Venezuela, 198-200. 286 Zanini, “Criação;” Eliane Cantanhede, “Chavez vê Lula hoje para tentar mudar grupo,” Folha de São Paulo, January 18, 2003 287 M. Cameron, “Inter-American Democratic Charter: Toward a plan of action,” (lecture, Liu Institute for Global Issues, Canada, July, 2003). 288 K. De Young, “Confusing remarks a symptom of Iraq focus,” The Washington Post, Dec. 21, 2002; K. De Young, “US plan seeks to end conflict,” The Washington Post, January 10, 2003; “The Venezuela’s 114 plans to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve of the US if the situation in
Venezuela worsened. 289 The US focused on the Venezuelan conflict because of the
importance of oil supplies in the context of war in Iraq.
The Group of Friends represented a political tool for the US pressing for the end
of the conflict in Venezuela. After the failure of the attempt to empower Gaviria the
previous December, Colin Powell discussed a new diplomatic initiative with Mexican
Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda, as well as with Brazilian officials, Kofi Annan, the
U.N. Secretary General, and Gaviria. 290 The US responded to Chavez’s attempt to weaken the OAS backed roundtable with the creation of a pro-government international commission. Richard Boucher, White house speaker, responded directly to Chavez that there was neither the possibility of creating a group separated from the OAS backed rountable nor the need for the involvement of any government outside the hemisphere, except Spain. In addition, Boucher reiterated the disposition of the US to participate in any political effort to strengthen OAS facilitation. 291
The hemisphere showed a renewed intention of acting collectively to solve the political crisis in Venezuela. In December, the OAS Permanent Council assessed the recent events in Venezuela and decided to extend the mandate for Gaviria’s facilitation.
In January, a commission of Foreign Affairs ministers joined OAS efforts in order to press the parties to reach an agreement. The negotiations in Venezuela were suspended in
stalemate,” The Washington Post, January 2, 2003; S. Wilson, “Demands scaled backs as government said to have little reason to compromise,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2003; James Dao and Neela Banerjee, “Venezuela crisis complicates Iraq situation,” The New York Times, January 11, 2003; Juan Forero, “Venezuela’s navy is sent to reclaim striking oil tanker,” New York Times, December 6, 2002). 289 De Young, “US plan.” 290 Wilson, “Demands.” 291 Ibid. 115 mid-January because the government’s representative abandoned the forum. The Group of Friends met for the first time in Washington on January 24, 2003 and in two other successive meetings in Caracas and Brasilia. They agreed that the crisis in Venezuela was a problem of great urgency that required the hemisphere to act immediately, exploring proposals for the normalization of activities in Venezuela. The Brazilian minister of foreign affairs, Celso Amorim, sent clear messages to the parties. He maintained that the group would help in the facilitation process, and most importantly, that the Group of
Friends would ensure that the agreements reached were implemented. The group asked the parties for mutual concessions. 292
The efforts of the hemisphere were successful this time. On February 2, 2003, the
Coordinadora Democratica announced the end of the indefinite strike and called the
people to sign the petition for a referendum on Chavez’s rule. The leaders of the
opposition explained that part of their objectives had been fulfilled by putting the
government in a difficult political and economic position; it was mandatory to come back
to the normal activity of the country. The Coordinadora Democratica believed that the
international mediation would guarantee that the government would comply with any
promise for an electoral solution. 293
Armando Duran, political analyst and journalist, explained that the opposition was
divided about whether it was appropriate to end the strike. The division was between
those who believed that international pressure was enough to convince Chavez to accept
consulting the people about his mandate and those who maintained that the government
292 Transcripcion de la conferencia de prensa final de la reunion del grupo de amigos, http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Venezuela/Transcription012403.htm. 293 Duran, Venezuela, 185,195, 206-207,220-221. 116 had to give its word to the Group of Friends for the day and hour of the referendum on
Chavez’s rule and guarantee jobs for all oil workers on strike.294 The opposition lifted the
strike without any specific concession from the government, only with the Group of
Friends’ promise for guaranteeing government compliance of a future referendum on the rule.
After the end of the sixty-two-day-strike, the representatives of the government
came back to the Forum of Dialogue and Negotiation. It was supposed that international
mediation would have convinced the government to make concessions to the opposition
and to advance in the definite reconciliation of the country. Contrary to expectations,
Chavez’s administration radicalized its conduct. It assumed the end of the strike as the
second victory after April 11, 2002. The government fired 18,000 workers of the oil
industry because they had participated in the strike and filled the oil industry with pro-
government workers. In order to ensure the control of the judiciary branch, Chavez’s
supporters in the National Assembly started a discussion bill to increase the number of
members of the Supreme Court Tribunal and to approve appointing the new judiciary
with simple majority in the Assembly. The National Assembly also started the discussion
of the bill of Social responsibility of Radio and Television in order to impose restrictions
and to muzzle the mass media. After denouncing of the General Attorney, a judge issued
warrants for the arrest of the leaders of the strike, Carlos Ortega and Carlos Fernandez,
president of the CTV and president of Fedecamaras, respectively. 295
294 Ibid., 206-207. 295 Ibid, 233-238. 117
Cesar Gaviria and the Group of Friend criticized most of these actions, but in particular they asked the government to reverse the action against the leaders of the opposition. Chavez reacted to this petition with an aggressive speech which accused them of intervening in internal affairs of Venezuela. The day after Chavez’s harangue, there were bomb explosions in the embassies of Spain and Colombia in Caracas. Duran argues that there were no evidences for blaming the government for these actions; in fact, if the explosions were a governmental initiative, it was a wrong calculation because they created a negative impression of the situation in Venezuela. Duran, however, argues that
Chavez’s criticism of international intervention was an attempt for quickly ending the work of Gaviria and the Group of Friends. 296
Lula stated that Chavez’s intransigent attitude did not contribute to reconciliation and dialogue. Instead, he believed Chavez promoted confrontation and instability.297 This
was not the first time that Lula criticized Chavez. He had affirmed that Chavez lacked
political experience and needed more political wisdom. At the beginning of November
2003, Lula said
I remember telling Chavez, ‘I would advise you to be more political. A president
can not fight with everybody at the same time. You need more political wisdom.
You have to split your adversaries so that you can divide the rule and govern with
296 Ibid, 233, 235, 237. 297 Eliane Cantanhede, “Intransigência de Chavez irita o Brasil,” Folha de São Paulo, February 4, 2003; Marcio Aith, “Declarações de Chavez poêm em risco grupo de amigos da Venezuela,” Folha de São Paulo, February 25, 2002. 118
them. I believe he is paying the price for his lack of political experience. He
comes from a military background.298
After capitalizing the end of the strike, the government came back to the roundtable to negotiate from a position of strength. In fact, it easily could impose the conditions for the final agreement to the representatives of the Coordinadora
Democratica. For Gaviria, the possibility of an agreement, even one in such unbalanced circumstances, represented an honorable end to his job, after six months of ineffective efforts.
The Agreement
Of the three points of the original agenda of the OAS backed-roundtable, the parties agreed to only one. Gaviria elaborated and presented a bill for the creation of a truth commission for the April 11 events to the parties. While the opposition representatives agreed with Gaviria's proposal, the pro-government members promised to the send the project to the National Assembly for consideration, but they never expressed their opinion about that proposal. There was neither additional discussion nor accord on the creation of the April 11 Truth Commission. 299In Article 11 of the final agreement of the forum, the parties left this issue in the hands of the National Assembly.300
Like the Truth Commission proposal, a bill for the disarmament of the civilian population never received governmental assent. Instead, the parties subscribed to a
298 "The man with Plan," The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 2002. 299 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 11. 300 Agreement between the representatives of the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the political and social supporting it, and the Coordinadora Democratica and the political and civil society organizations supporting it, May 29, 2003 http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/latestnews.asp. 119 generic pronouncement condemning the violence. In the "Declaration Against Violence and for Peace and Democracy," the parties refused any form of intolerance and committed to a campaign to disarm the civilian population on the basis of a law passed by the National Assembly. 301 This document might have been useful for creating the
conditions to normalize the economic activity after two months of intense political
mobilization of the Venezuelan society. Nevertheless, this declaration of good intentions
would not reduce the real threat to peace that represented the civilian militias in the country. The "Declaration Against Violence and for Peace and Democracy" did not improve the political climate in the country because immediately after the parties signed it, arrest warrants were issued against the leaders of the opposition that promoted the
strike. In Article 10 of the final document of the roundtable, the parties left the
responsibility for a disarmament plan in the hands of the National Assembly. 302
The roundtable agreed on the electoral mechanism to solve the crisis of the
country, which represented one of the three objectives of the agenda set by the parties in
October, 2002. As the government had insisted since the beginning of the negotiation, the
opposition agreed to apply Article 72 of the Constitution, which provides for a
referendum in the mandate of elected authorities, such as the President of the Republic.
In January, 2003, Jimmy Carter presented two proposals. Carter suggested a
referendum on the rule with a fixed date or a general election after a popularly approved
301 Declaración contra la violencia, por la paz y la democracia, February 18, 2003.http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/latestnews/lat estnews.asp 302 Agreement between the representative of the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the political and social groups supporting it, and the Coordinadora Democratica and the political and civil society organizations supporting it, April,11,2003. http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Venezuela/Agreement-041103.htm. 120 constitutional amendment which would shorten the terms of the president and the
National Assembly. 303 The opposition was eager to discuss both options; in fact, on
February 2, 2003, they collected signatures for supporting both the constitutional
amendment and a the referendum on Chavez's rule. Consistent with Chavez's stance, the
government's representatives rejected the possibility of the constitutional amendment and asked the forum to focus on the recall referendum. After more than a month of discussions, the opposition desisted from the idea of general elections and agreed with the government to working for a referendum.304
The facilitator of the round-table prepared a proposal combining both parties’
ideas about a recall referendum. The parties discussed Gaviria's proposal and decided that
the final agreement should include not only the description of the electoral mechanism
but also their agreement on the political and electoral climate, good governance, and
violence. On April 11, 2003, Gaviria announced that the parties had reached an accord
and they would sign the document in a public event on April 15. The government rejected
the accord and presented another draft of the agreement to the forum on April 24. The
government argued that its new draft of the accord was focusing attention to the opinion
of its supporting social and political forces. This time, the opposition refused to subscribe
to an agreement because of the amendments made by the government. Both parties,
however, signed this last version of the agreement on May 29, 2003. 305
303 J. Carter, A proposal to restore peace and harmony in Venezuela, to be tabled at the Mesa de Negociaciones y Acuerdos. http/www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Ve _infCarter012103-1.htm. 304 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 11. 305 Ibid. 121
There was sharp contrast between Carter’s referendum recall and the proposal of the referendum announced by Gaviria on April 11, 2003. Carter recommended to use
Article 72 of the Venezuelan Constitution, which provided the possibility of referendums on elected authorities who had served one-half of their term if such referendums were formally requested by the requisite number of voters, as specified by the Constitution, and approved by the electoral authority. In addition to the formalities of Article 72, Carter suggested a basic political accord. The opposition would accept appointing a new
National Electoral Commission (CNE). The National Assembly would make the designation of the new CEN; nevertheless, the parties would agree that the Supreme
Court would assume such a task if the legislature failed to do so in one month. According to Carter, the Supreme Court (TSJ) had to ratify its earlier decision that the second-half of the President’s term started on August 18, 2003. Carter requested that Chavez consents to a referendum on his rule no later than August 19th, 2003. Most importantly, according to
Carter’s proposal there would be a joint commission of Venezuelan and international
officials to supervise the electoral process, working at least one month ahead of the event.
This commission would provide technical assistance, monitor the process, and monitor
the media coverage. 306
While Carter’s proposal appeared in the middle of January 2003 when the
opposition was asking a compromise from the government to stop the strike, Gaviria’s
draft of the agreement reflected the political circumstances after the end of the strike that
tended to favor the government. Unlike Carter, who proposed a referendum with a
specific date, the OAS Secretary General presented the option of a midterm presidential
306 Jimmy. Carter, A proposal to restore. 122 referendum to be held once the constitutional and legal requirements had been meet. In other words, the decision for the date and opportunity of the referendum was left in the hand of the electoral authority. While Carter set a restriction of time for the appointment of the new CNE, there was no time for the National Assembly’s task of designating a new CNE. Contrary to Carter’s project for a joint commission of international and national officials to deal with technical and political aspects of the referendum, the draft agreement of April 11, 2003, established that the participation of the OAS, the Carter
Center, and the United Nations would form by request of the electoral authority. The participation of these international actors would focus on technical assistance from the pre-election activities to electoral observation; nevertheless, there was not specification of how many days or months ahead of the event such international actors could be allowed to work in the country. In contrast to Carter’s proposal, the draft agreement of
April 11 showed no political accord other than using article 72 and limiting the action of the international actors in the electoral process. 307
The agreement signed on May 29, 2003, was very similar to the draft of the
agreement of April 11. The final agreement repeated the words of Article 72, insisting
that only if the requirements would have been met, the referendum against Chavez or
other elected authorities would be called. Also, the final agreement insisted on a need for
a new electoral arbiter and the disposition of the parties to facilitate an understanding in
the National Assembly for the CNE authorities designation. Finally, the May agreement
307 Agreement between the representative, April 11, 2003. 123 limited even more the OAS and other international actors’ involvement in the future electoral event. 308
The government had argued that it would not subscribe to the April pre-accord
because the document suggested that the government might fail to observe precepts that
were enshrined in the Constitution and the law, and that it was therefore unnecessary to
reiterate them.309 Instead, the government made some modification in the wording and
asked that the opposition promise to respect the Constitution. A different reason motived
Chavez’s rejection of the agreement. Chavez wanted to limit Gaviria and the OAS’s
direct involvement in the future electoral event in Venezuela. According to an Article in the Folha de Sao Paulo, Chavez accepted government representatives’ signing the agreement only in exchange for the end of the Forum of Negotiation and Agreement. 310
According to the pre-accord, the roundtable would continue in order to address
the matters not yet settled, such as the creation of the April 11 Truth Commission and the
plan for disarming the civilian population, and to implement and monitor the issues
related to the referendum. The document established that the facilitator would remain
available to parties in order to support them in implementing the agreements, or in
clarifying any differences that might have arisen.311 On the contrary, the final accord
expressed clearly that the task of the OAS, particularly its Secretary General, the Carter
Center, and the United Nations Development program would conclude with the signing
308 Agreement between the representative, May,29. 309 OAS, Report on facilitation efforts, 12. 310 André Solari and Wilson Silveira, “Lula presiona Chavez a aceitar acordo com oposição,” Folha de São Paulo, April 26, 2003; Eliane Cantanhede, “Intransigência de Chavez irrita o Brasil,” Folha de São Paulo, April 2, 2003. 311 Agreement between the representative, April,1. 124 of the agreement. A joint commission of two representatives of each party was created to keep channels of communication open between the parties and to take measures for effective fulfillment of the provisions of the accords. This follow-up commission would contact international facilitation when parties considered it necessary. According to the final document, Gaviria, the OAS, the Carter Center, and the United Nations
Development program guaranteed the accords, but they were discharged from the implementation of them. 312
312 Agreement between the representative, May,29. 125
Chapter 7: Conclusion
A new pattern?
Between April 2002 and May 2003, the OAS became the principal actor in solving Venezuela's political crisis. The OAS employed intense symbolic diplomacy consisting of six resolutions, two from the General Assembly and four from the
Permanent Council. These resolutions insisted that Venezuelan political actors respect democratic rules and avoid the use of violence. The OAS was consistent in encouraging the government and opposition to start a process of negotiations which settled their differences through a political agreement. Every resolution warned the parties of the
OAS's determination to apply mechanisms of the Inter-American Democratic Charter for the preservation of democracy. The OAS's discourse delegitimized authoritarian attitudes from the government and opposition. With these declarations, the OAS clearly signaled to domestic and regional actors that antidemocratic actions would not be tolerated.
The OAS did not apply punitive measures in Venezuela. On April 13, the OAS decided to condemn the unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime, and following Article 20 of the IDC activated the mechanism for immediate response. The
OAS's condemnation of the military coup in April 2002, however, was not accompanied with the membership suspension of Carmona's regime and threats of economic sanctions, political isolation and military intervention. In fact, some in the Permanent Council discussed recognizing Carmona in exchange for restoration of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. Instead of punitive measures, the OAS opted for the Secretary
General's good offices and a fact-finding mission in order to reestablish the rule of law. 126
In its response to the constitutional alteration in Venezuela, the OAS rejected punitive measures and opted for supportive ones.
At the end of 2002, there was no a consensus in the OAS to apply Article 18 of the IDC which allows for direct monitoring of member states. With the support of
Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Canada, and the US, the Peruvian government attempted to convince other countries that the conditions were ripe for calling a Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting to assess the Venezuelan situation and approve OAS vigilance. According to the Peruvian government, the rebellion of three hundred military officers in October, 2002, and the general strike in December, 2002 represented dangerous threats to Venezuela's stability. The rejection of the Peruvian proposal reveals the limited consensus among members as to how the IDC should be applied to democratic crises that are beyond the scope of coups and self-coups.
In Venezuela, the OAS again put into practice its model of "intervention without intervening." The OAS Secretary General became the facilitator of the roundtable for negotiation and accords between the government and the opposition. Through the
Secretary General, the OAS played the role of guarantor of the accord between the political actors who controlled the referendum on Chavez's rule. Thanks to OAS efforts, local actors found a space for dialogue which reduced the level of violence and conflict.
The OAS's soft intervention in Venezuela represented an example of preventive diplomacy.
The OAS action in Venezuela from April 2002 to May 2003 is especially appealing when examined in historical perspective. It clearly departs from the OAS's 127 practices from the 1950s through the 1980s, when the hemispheric organization ignored authoritarian trends in the Americas and all its members subscribed to a rigid sovereignty approach. The OAS's response to the political crisis in Panama illustrates this point. In
1988, the Armed Forces commander in chief, Manuel Noriega, nullified the presidential elections because of the victory of the opposition's candidate. Although Noriega’s action was a flagrant violation of democratic rule, the OAS's response fell short of convincing
Noriega to reverse his decision. At that moment, the OAS was limited to symbolic diplomacy and good offices.
The intervention in Venezuela is consistent with OAS pro-democracy activism that started in the 1990s with the Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080. Like its responses to political crises in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay before 1995, the
OAS activated a mechanism and responded to the unconstitutional alterations in
Venezuela. Nevertheless, unlike its condemnation of Cedras, Fujimori Serrano, and
Ovideo, in Venezuela, the OAS never reached a consensus about whether to condemn the de facto regime of Carmona. The OAS Permanent Council approved its first resolution on
Venezuela, after Chavez was restore to the presidency. In Venezuela, the early response to the crisis reflected a lack of consensus on the application of the norms of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter.
The OAS-backed roundtable in Venezuela in 2002, as well as in Peru in 2000, revealed a renewed intention of preventing crises. Most importantly, both of these experiences showed the weakening of more traditional concepts of sovereignty. In both cases, a OAS representative joined domestic actors in mediating a political crisis. 128
Nevertheless, there were important differences between Peruvian and Venezuelan roundtable experiences. In Peru, the facilitator of the roundtable received a specific mandate from the OAS and was authorized to demand results with the threat of punishment. The Peruvian government officials facilitated OAS involvement rather than blocking it. These officials lost confidence in Fujimori’s authority. 313 The Peruvian
roundtable reached agreement on 16 of the 25 issues of its agenda and a constitutional
reform formalized some of roundtable accords. The OAS stayed in Peru to verify the
implementation of the accords.
In contrast, in Venezuela, the OAS spent four months convincing the government to accept a formal role in solving the crisis. The OAS Secretary General did not receive
specific mandate from the OAS to act as facilitator and Venezuela's government deemed
Gaviria's facilitation task as a personal performance. The lack of a clear mandate for
Gaviria reduced his effectiveness as a mediator. Despite its narrower objectives, the roundtable in Venezuela only reached agreement on the electoral solution. The final
accord between the parties eliminated the OAS's direct involvement in the
implementation of the accords.
The OAS's soft intervention model indicates a weakening in the non-intervention
principle, but not its complete elimination. Venezuela's government resisted OAS
involvement in the solution of the crisis and allowed its participation after reducing the
Gaviria's role to a personal performance. Also, President Chavez successfully avoided the
OAS's presence in Venezuela after the signature of the accords at the roundtable.
313 Latin American diplomat in discussion with the author, February, 2004. 129
Motives
The constructivist approach sees international organizations' behaviors as driven by a normative consensus among member states. Ideas and norms, for these scholars, do not operate merely as constraints on state behavior, but shape state interests themselves.314 In this manner, it is possible to predict that the OAS would act on behalf of the superior ideal of supporting democracy expressed in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and a commitment to democracy would trigger a unified OAS
response to any democratic crisis. Also, to fulfill the right to democracy, the member
states would accept OAS monitoring of domestic politics.
The OAS response to the democratic crisis in Venezuela lends partial support to
the idea of a strong democratic commitment in the Americas. The OAS resolutions on
Venezuela and the support for the Forum for Dialogue and Accords showed the OAS'
respect for pro-democracy principles and norms. The OAS persisted and finally
succeeded in its efforts to promote a political agreement between the Venezuelan
government and the opposition.
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the crisis in Venezuela the OAS democratic
consensus broke. In April 2002, the conflict generated by the overthrow of Chavez was
ultimately over before the OAS decided how to respond. It was the Rio Group which first
condemned the coup and called a special session of the Permanent Council not the OAS
Secretary General. Neither in October nor in December 2002 was there a consensus to
approve OAS monitoring of the Venezuelan situation to force an agreement between the
314 Wendt, "Anarchy is what," 61-67; Jack Snyder, "One World, rival theories," Foreign Policy, December 2004, 53-62; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist turn in International Relations theory," World Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 324-348. 130 parties and, most importantly, address the observations of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). After its visit to Venezuela in May 2002, the
IACHR urged OAS members to take immediate action to halt erosion of the rule of law in Venezuela. The IDCH noted a lack of judiciary independence, limitations on freedom of expression, political involvement by the armed forces, the extreme polarization of the society, death squad activities, and poor credibility of oversight agencies because of their pro government stance.315
Also, the OAS focused on convincing the government to start a process of
negotiation with its opponents; however, the discussion agenda limited it to an electoral
solution and excluded the discussion of other aspects that represented essential
components of genuine democracies. A group of countries believed that the OAS should
have gone further in facing the Venezuelan crisis. This was the spirit of the proposal of
Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Peru in December 2002.316 However, OAS members
were not unified on how to mediate the political conflict between the government and the
opposition.
The normative commitment to democracy accounted for part of the OAS's action
in Venezuela. The realist theory of international relations, however, would complement
the understanding of the OAS's motives. Realists believe that international organizations
pursue selfish interests of state members, mainly the interest of the great powers.317
315 IACHR, La comisión interamericana. 316 Proposed amendments to draft resolution CP/doc 3676/02, presented by the delegation of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru, CP/doc.3677/02, December 13, 2002. 317 John Mearsheimer, "The false promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no.2 (1994-1995): 5-49; John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the struggle for Power," in International Politics: Enduring concepts and contemporary issues, edits. Robert Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson, 2005). 131
Following the realist approach, it is possible to affirm that US interests constitute the driving force of OAS action. If this theory is true, the OAS's activism in democracy depends on US interests and policies.
The OAS intervention in Venezuela did not seriously challenge the realist assumption. The US exerted a definite influence in shaping the OAS responses to the crisis. Although there is no evidence of US collaboration with the coup, it is clear that the ousting of Chavez from power would have favored US strategic interests. There is evidence of US officials' efforts to convince Carmona to restore the authorities of the legislative and judiciary branches and to prevent the OAS's condemnatory resolution of
Carmona. After the strong condemnation of the Rio Group, signed personally by Vicente
Fox, Eduardo Duhalde, Ricardo Lagos, and Fernando E. Cardozo, presidents of Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, could a reason have existed for the lack of OAS consensus for condemning Carmona other than US interests?
After the restoration of Chavez, the US demanded the OAS's formal role in
Venezuela. On April 18, at the special General Assembly, Colin Powell proposed that the
OAS General Assembly mandate that the Secretary General facilitate the national dialogue in Venezuela. Powell reiterated this petition in June, 2002 at the General
Assembly in Barbados. Venezuela's government resisted such ideas and tried to promote
Jimmy Carter as facilitator rather than Gaviria. Finally, the Forum of Dialogue and
Accords fulfilled the aspirations of the US for a OAS formal presence in Venezuela.
The Venezuelan government succeeded in avoiding a formal mandate of Gaviria by the OAS and postponed a compromise with the opposition. The US, however, found a
132 way of circumventing Gaviria's lacking power by convincing Brazil and Mexico to force an agreement between the government and the opposition. The Group of Friends of
Gaviria represented a US effort to avoid the negative consequences of the Venezuelan oil industry stoppage in the world market and the American economy previous to the Iraq invasion. The creation of the roundtable and the Group of Friends evidences that the US dictated the terms under which OAS intervention took place in Venezuela.
Although the constructivist and the realist theories of international relations, viewed separately, could not explain the OAS intervention in the Venezuelan crisis between April, 2002 and May 2003, they are valid frameworks and complement the understanding of the OAS’s motives. The interaction among democratic regimes has forged a minimal OAS’ consensus on protecting democracies threatened by traditional coups. The government of Venezuela resisted OAS’ direct involvement and succeeded in avoiding it during the first three months of the 2002 crisis. Nevertheless, after July 2002, the OAS put into practice the crisis solving mechanism that the US designed.
133
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Venezuelan media El Nacional El Universal Union Radio
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Peruvian media La Republica Caretas 138
Colombian media El tiempo Cambio
Argentinean media El Clarín
Ecuador El Comercio de Quito
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