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Trade, Globalization and the Financial Crisis by Mark A VOL. 4, NO. 8 NOVEMBER 2009­­ EconomicLetter Insights from the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS Trade, Globalization and the Financial Crisis by Mark A. Wynne and Erasmus K. Kersting The financial crisis that began in August 2007 and intensified in the The recession’s heavy fall of 2008 pushed the global economy into a severe downturn that some have toll on world trade called the Great Recession. World trade collapsed at a pace unseen since the Great raises the possibility Depression of the 1930s. The decline in trade and the protectionist instincts that of deglobalization. invariably come to the fore in difficult economic times have raised concerns that today’s crisis may lead to deglobalization—a reversal of the globalization that has characterized the past three decades. In this Economic Letter, we will illustrate the crisis’ impact on world trade and examine the typical patterns of international trade over the business cycle. We urge caution in using trade data to estimate the extent of globalization or deglobalization. And we present evidence that international trade has fallen by more than expected given the course of the current business cycle. This raises the question of what unprecedented. During the recession might have accounted for the excess of 2001, for example, global trade decline. We look at two possibilities: increased 0.3 percent, largely due to first, a direct effect on trade flows continued export growth in the emerg- associated with a drying up of trade ing market economies. finance at the height of the crisis; One measure, based on work second, a breakout of protectionist by the economic historians Barry measures. We conclude that trade Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, finance is the most likely explana- suggests that declines in international Declines in tion. However, it’s vitally important trade have exceeded the losses dur- to remain vigilant to the risks of ing the 1930s. Indexing to the peaks international trade protectionism. The Great Depression in global industrial production in of the 1930s would have been less both episodes, global trade fell 32 have exceeded the severe had countries not resorted to percent during the first year of the ultimately self-defeating protectionist Great Recession, compared with 15 losses during measures. percent during the first year of the Great Depression (Chart 2). Of course, the 1930s. International Trade Collapses trade continued to ebb for years in the According to the October 2009 1930s, an unlikely prospect this time edition of the International Monetary around given the recent improvements Fund’s World Economic Outlook, in the world economy. international trade as measured by The collapse of world trade has total exports of goods and services manifested itself in shipping costs. will decline 11.9 percent this year. While we don’t have a comprehensive Advanced economies’ exports will measure of how much it costs to ship fall 13.6 percent, while emerging and goods around the world, two closely developing economies face a more watched indexes capture significant modest 7.2 percent slump (Chart segments of the market. 1). Declines of these magnitudes are The Baltic Dry Index tells us what is going on with dry bulk commodi- ties, such as coal, iron ore and grain. After peaking at 11,793 on May 20, 2008, the index collapsed to 663 on Chart 1 Dec. 5, then posted gradual improve- Global Trade Falls in Financial Crisis ments over the course of this year. The Harpex index, produced on a Annual percent change in volume of exports of goods and services weekly basis by the shipbroking firm 15 Harper Petersen, measures the cost of shipping containers. It dropped 76 10 percent between February 2008 and June 2009. 5 Of course, the U.S. hasn’t been immune to these developments (Chart 3). U.S. import volume peaked in the 0 third quarter of 2007, when the finan- Emerging and developing economies cial crisis began. Export volume con- –5 World Advanced economies tinued to rise until the second quarter of 2008, when the crisis went global. –10 So what, if anything, do these data tell us about the fate of globalization? –15 Has globalization gone into reverse? To 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 address this question, we consider two SOURCE: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, October 2009. issues. The first centers on the normal behavior of international trade flows EconomicLetter 2 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS EconomicLetter over the business cycle. Are imports and exports more volatile than overall Chart 2 economic activity, or less volatile? The second involves the usefulness of trade Trade Losses: Great Depression Vs. Great Recession flows to measure globalization. Does more international trade always mean Index 130 more globalization? 120 Considering Deglobalization 110 June 1929 = 100 Two points are noteworthy once 100 we isolate U.S. business-cycle ups and 90 downs from the economy’s long-run growth. First, exports and imports 80 tend to move in the same direction 70 April 2008 = 100 as GDP—that is, they’re procyclical 60 (Chart 4). Second, exports and imports 50 are more volatile than the overall economy. 40 The scatter of points in Chart 30 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 4A plots the cyclical component of Months since peak U.S. exports each quarter against SOURCE: Authors’ calculations following “A Tale of Two Depressions,” by Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, the cyclical component of U.S. GDP. VoxEU.org, September 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421. Note that the line fitted to the scat- ter is steeper than the 45-degree line. That is, when the cyclical component of GDP declines by a given amount, the cyclical component of exports Chart 3 tends to decline by more. Likewise, when the cyclical component of GDP U.S. Trade Tails Off, Too increases by a given amount, the cyclical component of exports tends Index, 2005 = 100 to increase by more. A similar pattern 140 is seen in the scatter for the cyclical 120 component of U.S. imports and GDP in Chart 4B. 100 GDP’s cyclical movements range Exports of goods and services (volume) between –5 percent and 5 percent, 80 well below the low of –15 and high of 15 percent for both exports and 60 imports. The average volatility of GDP (standard deviation) is about 1.7 per- 40 Imports of goods and cent, compared with 5.6 percent for services (volume) exports and 5.2 percent for imports. 20 Why are trade flows so much more volatile than the overall econ- 0 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 omy? Part of the reason may be that NOTE: Shaded areas represent U.S. recessions. trade is still heavily skewed toward SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis. goods rather than services. Measured by value, goods make up 70 per- cent of U.S. exports and 84 percent of imports. By comparison, goods account for only a fifth of overall U.S. production, measured as a share of value added. Using a broader defini- EconomicLetter FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 3 EconomicLetter tion—the sum of agriculture, mining, One can illustrate this point with a construction and manufacturing—rais- simple supply and demand picture for es goods’ share of the economy, but some hypothetical good traded inter- only to 30 percent. nationally (Chart 5A). Assume a world Because trade flows depend heav- price at which we can buy as much ily on the volatile goods sector, they as we want—thus, the supply curve is tend to increase more in good times flat. How much we purchase will be and decline more in bad times than determined by the domestic demand A global recession the rest of the economy. If that’s so, it for imports of this good, the down- shouldn’t come as a great surprise that ward slope indicating we’ll buy more that reduced import trade flows have dried up in the midst as it gets cheaper. of a severe global recession. Far from Transportation costs, barri- demand will lead to telling us about incipient deglobaliza- ers to trade and other factors create tion, the decline in trade may simply a gap between the domestic and declines in trade— be a cyclical phenomenon. world prices. The size of this distor- There are other reasons to be tion will determine just how much of but it needn’t skeptical of what trade flows can tell the good we import and consume. us about globalization. To economists, Improvements in transport and com- signify a reversal of globalization is about the integration of munications technology and more lib- national economies into a single global eral trade policies will reduce the dif- economic integration. market. While imports and exports ference between the home and world may be symptomatic of such integra- prices (Chart 5B). As domestic prices tion, they’re not synonymous with it. fall, trade will increase. This is what Economists generally favor another we mean by globalization. measure—how close domestic prices But note that trade volumes are to the ones prevailing on world can change without markets becom- markets. ing more integrated. For example, a Chart 4 Business Cycle Volatility Is Greater for Trade Flows A. Exports B. Imports Cycle in exports (percent) Cycle in imports (percent) 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 5 –5 –10 –10 –15 –15 –20 –20 –25 –25 –25 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 20 25 –25 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Cycle in GDP (percent) Cycle in GDP (percent) SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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