Reflections on Representation and Reform in the House of Lords
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Written Evidence from the Public Relations and Communications Association1 (PGG12)
Written evidence from the Public Relations and Communications Association1 (PGG12) The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Propriety of governance in light of Greensill inquiry Executive Summary: As the voice of the public affairs and lobbying industry, we believe that lobbying is integral to a thriving democracy and contributes positively to the decision-making process. However, the Government must make a number of reforms to improve transparency, accountability, and trust in the UK political system. The Lobbying Act should be expanded to cover all of those engaged in lobbying – the inclusion of in-house lobbyists is crucial for public confidence. The interactions covered by the Act should be expanded to include Special Advisers and senior civil servants, from Director General level up. The Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists should no longer allow registrants to declare self-written and self-policed codes which are neither independent nor independently enforceable. The Government should extend the existing limitations on former Ministers taking paid lobbying positions and institute a five-year ban, including on in-house roles. Former Ministers should consistently behave in the spirit of the Nolan Principles. Ministers should stop ignoring the rules under which they are legally obliged to publish Ministerial Diaries in a timely manner. The process governing the award of Parliamentary Passes should be reviewed and tightened significantly. Detailed Commentary: The PRCA’s response addresses the following issues: 1 The Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry. The PRCA is the world’s largest professional PR body. We represent and regulate more than 35,000 PR professionals in 70 countries worldwide. -
Download PDF on Watching the Watchmen
REPORT Watching the Watchmen The Growing Case for Recall Elections and Increased Accountability for MPs Sam Goodman About the Author Sam Goodman is the author of the Imperial Premiership: The Role of the Modern Prime Minister in Foreign Policy Making, 1964-2015 (Manchester University Press: 2015). He is currently working as a political adviser to Peter Dowd MP the current Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury and has previously worked for a variety of Labour Members of Parliament including: Julie Cooper MP, Sir Mark Hendrick MP, Michael Dugher MP, and Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP. Watching the Watchmen: The Growing Case for Recall Elections and Increased Accountability for MPs Members of the House of Commons have long flirted parliamentary conventions and much procedure with the idea of British exceptionalism—citing the is arcane, which makes it difficult even for the UK’s role as the ‘mother of all parliaments’, its most ardent politically engaged citizen to follow unwritten constitution, its unitary voting system, proceedings and debates in the House of Commons. and the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament This separation between the governors and over the people—as a bulwark against the instability governed is exacerbated further by the limited customarily found in other western democracies. avenues available to the public to hold those elected In modern times, this argument held water as to account, which is exemplified by recent political it delivered stable parliamentary majorities, scandals, including allegations of bullying and peaceful transfers of power between governments, sexual harassment in the House of Commons. At the and kept in check the ideological fringes of both time of writing this report, no MP has been forced major political parties. -
Lords Reform White Paper and Draft Bill
GS Misc 1004 GENERAL SYNOD House of Lords Reform A Submission from the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Government’s Draft Bill and White Paper. General principles 1. More than a decade ago, the then Archbishops‟ submission to the Royal Commission on House of Lords Reform said that the test of reform was whether it would enable Parliament as a whole to serve the people better. That has remained the consistent position of Church of England submissions since. 2. As with any constitutional change, it is important, therefore, that there is clarity over the problems that reform is intended to address and a reasonable measure of assurance that the proposed solutions will work and avoid unintended consequences. Fundamental changes to how we are governed should also command a wide measure of consent within the country as well as in Parliament. 3. In his initial response of May 2011 to the White Paper and Draft Bill the Lords Spiritual Convenor, the Bishop of Leicester, said: “Some reform of the Lords is overdue, not least to resolve the problem of its ever-increasing membership. But getting the balance of reform right, so that we retain what is good in our current arrangements, whilst freeing up the House to operate more effectively and efficiently, is crucial.”1 In particular, the proposal to reduce the overall size of the House is welcome. But it is far less clear that wholesale reform of the House of Lords along the lines now envisaged gets the balance right. 4. For so long as the majority of the House of Lords consisted of the hereditary peerage there was manifestly a compelling case for reform. -
The Sovereignty of the Crown Dependencies and the British Overseas Territories in the Brexit Era
Island Studies Journal, 15(1), 2020, 151-168 The sovereignty of the Crown Dependencies and the British Overseas Territories in the Brexit era Maria Mut Bosque School of Law, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Spain MINECO DER 2017-86138, Ministry of Economic Affairs & Digital Transformation, Spain Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, UK [email protected] (corresponding author) Abstract: This paper focuses on an analysis of the sovereignty of two territorial entities that have unique relations with the United Kingdom: the Crown Dependencies and the British Overseas Territories (BOTs). Each of these entities includes very different territories, with different legal statuses and varying forms of self-administration and constitutional linkages with the UK. However, they also share similarities and challenges that enable an analysis of these territories as a complete set. The incomplete sovereignty of the Crown Dependencies and BOTs has entailed that all these territories (except Gibraltar) have not been allowed to participate in the 2016 Brexit referendum or in the withdrawal negotiations with the EU. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that Brexit is not an exceptional situation. In the future there will be more and more relevant international issues for these territories which will remain outside of their direct control, but will have a direct impact on them. Thus, if no adjustments are made to their statuses, these territories will have to keep trusting that the UK will be able to represent their interests at the same level as its own interests. Keywords: Brexit, British Overseas Territories (BOTs), constitutional status, Crown Dependencies, sovereignty https://doi.org/10.24043/isj.114 • Received June 2019, accepted March 2020 © 2020—Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada. -
BBC Guide to Parliament (Updated to 2021)
BBC Guide to Parliament (Updated to 2021) There has been a parliament at Westminster since the 13th Century. Today it remains the centre of British government, boasting a colourful history and frequently adding new chapters. Parliament is the place where politicians meet to decide laws and make decisions on running the UK, although some issues in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are now dealt with by their respective parliaments and assemblies. Decisions on setting taxes to fund the government's policies are also FACT: MPs and made in Parliament. Lords do not refer to The business of Parliament takes place in two "houses": the elected each other's debating chambers House of Commons and the House of Lords, whose members are by name - instead mostly appointed. they refer to "the Their work is similar: making laws (legislation), checking the work of other place”. the government (scrutiny), and debating current issues. Generally, the decisions made in one house have to be approved by the other, but the Commons is by far the more powerful of the two chambers. No longer 646; now 650 Now between 700 - 800 Term Definition Minister Backbencher Whip Crossbencher Law Lord Opposition Shadow Government The government is normally formed by the leader of the party that wins the most seats in the general election. If the party wins an overall majority (more than half – i.e. at least 326) of the seats, the government will comprise some of the elected members belonging to that party - and possibly some of its members in the House of Lords. If the leading party does not have an overall majority, its leader may have to approach other parties to enable it to form a minority government (Recent example: in 2017 Theresa May’s minority government was supported for 2 years by the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) from N.Ireland) or form a coalition and allow the coalition partners to have representation in the government( e.g. -
British Overseas Territories Law
British Overseas Territories Law Second Edition Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson HART PUBLISHING Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Kemp House , Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford , OX2 9PH , UK HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2018 First edition published in 2011 Copyright © Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson , 2018 Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identifi ed as Authors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright © . All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright © . This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 ( http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/ open-government-licence/version/3 ) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ , 1998–2018. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. -
Accountability Mechanisms of the Bank of England and of The
STUDY Requested by the ECON committee Monetary Dialogue Papers, September 2020 Accountability Mechanisms of the Bank of England and of the European Central Bank Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies Author: Rosa M. LASTRA EN PE 652.744 - September 2020 Accountability Mechanisms of the Bank of England and of the European Central Bank Monetary Dialogue Papers September 2020 Abstract This paper analyses the accountability mechanisms of the European Central Bank and of the Bank of England and focuses on parliamentary accountability for the monetary policy functions. The paper suggests ways to improve the Monetary Dialogue between the ECB and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (European Parliament). This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. AUTHORS Rosa M. LASTRA, CCLS, Queen Mary University of London ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE Drazen RAKIC EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Janetta CUJKOVA LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal policies. To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to: Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies European Parliament L-2929 - Luxembourg Email: [email protected] Manuscript completed: September 2020 Date of publication: September 2020 © European Union, 2020 This document is available on the internet at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/econ-policies/monetary-dialogue DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. -
THE 422 Mps WHO BACKED the MOTION Conservative 1. Bim
THE 422 MPs WHO BACKED THE MOTION Conservative 1. Bim Afolami 2. Peter Aldous 3. Edward Argar 4. Victoria Atkins 5. Harriett Baldwin 6. Steve Barclay 7. Henry Bellingham 8. Guto Bebb 9. Richard Benyon 10. Paul Beresford 11. Peter Bottomley 12. Andrew Bowie 13. Karen Bradley 14. Steve Brine 15. James Brokenshire 16. Robert Buckland 17. Alex Burghart 18. Alistair Burt 19. Alun Cairns 20. James Cartlidge 21. Alex Chalk 22. Jo Churchill 23. Greg Clark 24. Colin Clark 25. Ken Clarke 26. James Cleverly 27. Thérèse Coffey 28. Alberto Costa 29. Glyn Davies 30. Jonathan Djanogly 31. Leo Docherty 32. Oliver Dowden 33. David Duguid 34. Alan Duncan 35. Philip Dunne 36. Michael Ellis 37. Tobias Ellwood 38. Mark Field 39. Vicky Ford 40. Kevin Foster 41. Lucy Frazer 42. George Freeman 43. Mike Freer 44. Mark Garnier 45. David Gauke 46. Nick Gibb 47. John Glen 48. Robert Goodwill 49. Michael Gove 50. Luke Graham 51. Richard Graham 52. Bill Grant 53. Helen Grant 54. Damian Green 55. Justine Greening 56. Dominic Grieve 57. Sam Gyimah 58. Kirstene Hair 59. Luke Hall 60. Philip Hammond 61. Stephen Hammond 62. Matt Hancock 63. Richard Harrington 64. Simon Hart 65. Oliver Heald 66. Peter Heaton-Jones 67. Damian Hinds 68. Simon Hoare 69. George Hollingbery 70. Kevin Hollinrake 71. Nigel Huddleston 72. Jeremy Hunt 73. Nick Hurd 74. Alister Jack (Teller) 75. Margot James 76. Sajid Javid 77. Robert Jenrick 78. Jo Johnson 79. Andrew Jones 80. Gillian Keegan 81. Seema Kennedy 82. Stephen Kerr 83. Mark Lancaster 84. -
The Strange Revival of Bicameralism
The Strange Revival of Bicameralism Coakley, J. (2014). The Strange Revival of Bicameralism. Journal of Legislative Studies, 20(4), 542-572. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2014.926168 Published in: Journal of Legislative Studies Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights © 2014 Taylor & Francis. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact [email protected]. Download date:01. Oct. 2021 Published in Journal of Legislative Studies , 20 (4) 2014, pp. 542-572; doi: 10.1080/13572334.2014.926168 THE STRANGE REVIVAL OF BICAMERALISM John Coakley School of Politics and International Relations University College Dublin School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy Queen’s University Belfast [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed a surprising reversal of the long-observed trend towards the disappearance of second chambers in unitary states, with 25 countries— all but one of them unitary—adopting the bicameral system. -
Balance of Power Senate Projections, Spring 2018
Balance of power Senate projections, Spring 2018 The Australia Institute conducts a quarterly poll of Senate voting intention. Our analysis shows that major parties should expect the crossbench to remain large and diverse for the foreseeable future. Senate projections series, no. 2 Bill Browne November 2018 ABOUT THE AUSTRALIA INSTITUTE The Australia Institute is an independent public policy think tank based in Canberra. It is funded by donations from philanthropic trusts and individuals and commissioned research. We barrack for ideas, not political parties or candidates. Since its launch in 1994, the Institute has carried out highly influential research on a broad range of economic, social and environmental issues. OUR PHILOSOPHY As we begin the 21st century, new dilemmas confront our society and our planet. Unprecedented levels of consumption co-exist with extreme poverty. Through new technology we are more connected than we have ever been, yet civic engagement is declining. Environmental neglect continues despite heightened ecological awareness. A better balance is urgently needed. The Australia Institute’s directors, staff and supporters represent a broad range of views and priorities. What unites us is a belief that through a combination of research and creativity we can promote new solutions and ways of thinking. OUR PURPOSE – ‘RESEARCH THAT MATTERS’ The Institute publishes research that contributes to a more just, sustainable and peaceful society. Our goal is to gather, interpret and communicate evidence in order to both diagnose the problems we face and propose new solutions to tackle them. The Institute is wholly independent and not affiliated with any other organisation. Donations to its Research Fund are tax deductible for the donor. -
Draft Vagrancy Act Repeal Bill
Vagrancy Act (Repeal) Bill A B I L L TO Make provision to repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824; to make provision about the exercise of certain powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in relation to persons begging or sleeping in public places; and for connected purposes. BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: – 1 Repeal of Vagrancy Act 1824 (1) The Vagrancy Act 1824 is repealed. (2) The consequential repeals set out in the Schedule have effect. 2 Interpretation In this Act— “the 2014 Act” means the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014; “begging” means asking for money on streets or in other public places; and “sleeping rough” refers to homeless people sleeping on streets or in other public places. 3 Enforcement principles The following principles are to be applied in the exercise of powers under the 2014 Act— (a) begging or sleeping rough does not in itself amount to action causing alarm or distress (in the absence of other factors); (b) policing and other enforcement action should balance protection of the community with sensitivity to the problems that cause people to engage in begging or sleeping rough; and (c) powers under the 2014 Act should not in general be used in relation to people sleeping rough, and should be used in relation to people begging only where no other approach is reasonably available. -
Time for Reflection
All-Party Parliamentary Humanist Group TIME FOR REFLECTION A REPORT OF THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY HUMANIST GROUP ON RELIGION OR BELIEF IN THE UK PARLIAMENT The All-Party Parliamentary Humanist Group acts to bring together non-religious MPs and peers to discuss matters of shared interests. More details of the group can be found at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/190508/humanist.htm. This report was written by Cordelia Tucker O’Sullivan with assistance from Richy Thompson and David Pollock, both of Humanists UK. Layout and design by Laura Reid. This is not an official publication of the House of Commons or the House of Lords. It has not been approved by either House or its committees. All-Party Groups are informal groups of Members of both Houses with a common interest in particular issues. The views expressed in this report are those of the Group. © All-Party Parliamentary Humanist Group, 2019-20. TIME FOR REFLECTION CONTENTS FOREWORD 4 INTRODUCTION 6 Recommendations 7 THE CHAPLAIN TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 8 BISHOPS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 10 Cost of the Lords Spiritual 12 Retired Lords Spiritual 12 Other religious leaders in the Lords 12 Influence of the bishops on the outcome of votes 13 Arguments made for retaining the Lords Spiritual 14 Arguments against retaining the Lords Spiritual 15 House of Lords reform proposals 15 PRAYERS IN PARLIAMENT 18 PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN GOVERNING THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 20 Parliamentary oversight of the Church Commissioners 21 ANNEX 1: FORMER LORDS SPIRITUAL IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 22 ANNEX 2: THE INFLUENCE OF LORDS SPIRITUAL ON THE OUTCOME OF VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 24 Votes decided by the Lords Spiritual 24 Votes decided by current and former bishops 28 3 All-Party Parliamentary Humanist Group FOREWORD The UK is more diverse than ever before.