Lords Reform White Paper and Draft Bill
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GS Misc 1004 GENERAL SYNOD House of Lords Reform A Submission from the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Government’s Draft Bill and White Paper. General principles 1. More than a decade ago, the then Archbishops‟ submission to the Royal Commission on House of Lords Reform said that the test of reform was whether it would enable Parliament as a whole to serve the people better. That has remained the consistent position of Church of England submissions since. 2. As with any constitutional change, it is important, therefore, that there is clarity over the problems that reform is intended to address and a reasonable measure of assurance that the proposed solutions will work and avoid unintended consequences. Fundamental changes to how we are governed should also command a wide measure of consent within the country as well as in Parliament. 3. In his initial response of May 2011 to the White Paper and Draft Bill the Lords Spiritual Convenor, the Bishop of Leicester, said: “Some reform of the Lords is overdue, not least to resolve the problem of its ever-increasing membership. But getting the balance of reform right, so that we retain what is good in our current arrangements, whilst freeing up the House to operate more effectively and efficiently, is crucial.”1 In particular, the proposal to reduce the overall size of the House is welcome. But it is far less clear that wholesale reform of the House of Lords along the lines now envisaged gets the balance right. 4. For so long as the majority of the House of Lords consisted of the hereditary peerage there was manifestly a compelling case for reform. Whatever the arguments for appointment as against election there was no cogent case for a legislature where the hereditary voice was potentially predominant – indeed still around two-thirds of the total membership in 1997. 5. The 1999 legislation has, however, largely addressed that issue. The appointed component of the House has now increased from around a third in 1997 to around 85%. A case can certainly be made for completing the process of reform and ending the practice of reserved places for hereditary peers. Introducing retirement ages for appointed peers and the ability for them to resign also makes sense. 1 Statement on Government white paper on House of Lords reform, 17/5/11, online at: http://bit.ly/l0oR2u 1 GS Misc 1004 GENERAL SYNOD 6. The more fundamental issue however, is the rationale for going beyond this and substantially reducing - or even abandoning - the appointed component in favour of a partly or wholly elected House of Lords. 7. We recognise both the nature of arguments for election motivated by concerns for democratic legitimacy, and the political consensus reflected in the 2010 General Election manifestoes. Any reform that enables parliament as a whole to maintain a wide and enduring level of public respect is likely to attract our support. However, the declared view of the three main parties that the Upper House should be wholly or mainly elected does not appear to proceed from any settled view as to the fundamental purpose of the second chamber of the legislature, what its powers should be and – crucially - what its relationship should be with the House of Commons. 8. The Church of England and its bishops claim no special expertise in relation to systems of governance. The sheer diversity of constitutional arrangements across the democratic world should, however, in our view, instil a sense of humility in relation to claims that any one approach is manifestly superior to another. It also makes us cautious of changes which derive their justification from abstract theory or supposed universal norms. 9. Constitutions appear to reflect the particular histories, cultures and circumstances of each nation. The fact that ours has evolved over a particularly long period is not an argument against its further significant evolution. But it does seem to us to create a presumption in favour of adaptation and specific reforms to address manifest problems rather than far- reaching changes which sweep away all the familiar landmarks. 10. At a time of considerable public concern over our national political life and the conduct of those who serve the nation in Parliament, it must at the very least be highly questionable whether a reformed House consisting very largely or wholly of those elected from party lists would increase public confidence in our constitutional arrangements, or be a recipe for effective and accountable government. 11. Nor at a time of great economic uncertainty, when very substantial sums are being removed from the public purse, does it seem easy to justify a salaried House at substantially increased cost to the Exchequer, in the process, depriving Parliament of the expertise (brought far less expensively) by a very substantial appointed component. 12. In summary, if, as we believe, the second chamber should remain essentially a revising chamber and if, as we also believe, the primacy of the House of Commons is to be maintained, the argument that such a chamber can only be effective and have proper legitimacy if it is wholly or mainly elected is no more than an assertion. 2 GS Misc 1004 GENERAL SYNOD Powers, Functions and Legitimacy 13. In their speeches in the House of Lords on 29th June the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Leicester argued that there was a compelling case for retaining a second chamber that, both in its powers and composition, was distinctive from the House of Commons. 14. The Archbishop of York identified three objectives for the second chamber: to ensure the just use of power entrusted to the government of the day, which necessarily commands a majority in the House of Commons; to ensure true and impartial accountability; and to represent the breadth and diversity of civil society and intellectual life. 15. Consistent with this, the Bishop of Leicester underlined the crucial role of the second chamber in scrutinising and revising government legislation with a degree of independence not possible in the House of Commons. 16. It seems to us that reforms which bring the second chamber further under the control of the main political parties, especially if the governing party or coalition can rely on a majority in the second chamber, will inevitably damage the independence of the House of Lords and its ability to require governments to think again about specific legislative proposals. 17. There are several conclusions that could fairly be drawn from the claim made in that debate that over the past five years some 40% of the legislative amendments passed by the Lords against the advice of the Government have subsequently passed into law. They do not include casting doubt on the effectiveness of the present House of Lords as an effective second chamber. 18. The objective embodied in Clause 2 of the draft bill- to maintain the present relationship between Commons and Lords- seems to us to be right but inconsistent with the rest of the legislation. Once the second chamber were granted electoral legitimacy- not least under a proportional system which many would see as conferring greater democratic legitimacy than the first past the post system- the two Houses would over time increasingly find themselves in conflict with each other. In this respect we concur with the relevant conclusion of the November 2006 report of the Joint Committee on Conventions, chaired by Lord Cunningham. 19. Moreover, it seems to be the common experience with all legislative assemblies created in recent times (the European Parliament, the devolved bodies) that the moment their members are elected they demand more powers. The Royal Commission expressed its strong opposition „to a situation in which the two Houses of Parliament had equivalent electoral legitimacy. It would represent a substantial change in the present constitutional settlement in the United Kingdom and would almost certainly be a recipe for damaging conflict.‟2 Whatever reservations there might now be about the specific 2 11.6, A House for the Future, report of the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords (2000) 3 GS Misc 1004 GENERAL SYNOD proposals of the Royal Commission, its conclusion on this point seems to us compelling. 20. Speaking in the Lords in 2009 the Bishop of Liverpool described the value of the present arrangement in the following way: “We need to recover the unity of Parliament in the constitutional debate—two Houses, but one Parliament: a Commons that is elected and with the authority of having the last word, and a revising Chamber to advise, revise and refine the legislation….A mutuality between the two Houses, each distinctive in character and composition but mutually dependent, the elected looking to the other for the wisdom of experience, the appointed deferring to the elected and acknowledging their authority to have the last word as the voice of the people: one Parliament of two Houses under the Crown, as a sign that our own accountability is in two directions; below to the people, above to the source of our moral intuition."3 21. We are concerned that the proposals in the Draft Bill may, by leading inevitably to a more assertive approach to conflict and disagreement with the Commons, make it harder for the institution as a whole to sustain the trust and confidence of the electorate. The then Bishop of Durham, also speaking in the Lords in 2009, said: “Legitimacy does not arise just from having people vote for you. Legitimacy is also sustained by doing the job and being trusted. Public consent and approval can come through the ballot box, or in other ways.