Welfare Manifesto

POLICY EXCHANGE

WELFARE MANIFESTO

STEVE HUGHES GUY MISCAMPBELL

#WELFAREMANIFESTO “ The UK is at the cutting edge of welfare policy, discovering, facing, and solving issues which have not been addressed anywhere else in the world. The challenges we face are unprecedented, and the solutions unclear. In short, there is no roadmap for how to fix the problems in the welfare state.”

2 – Welfare Manifesto BY 2020 BRITAIN SHOULD AIM TO…

Create a system which reduces both dependency on government, and poverty

Ensure that the welfare state is trusted and fair

Make the welfare state more affordable

Restore the concept that contributions count

Make the welfare system simpler to understand and use

Chapter Title – 3 ABOUT THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL POLICY UNIT

Policy Exchange wants to see a high growth, For more information about our work visit: enterprise led economy in the UK with freer www.policyexchange.org.uk/economics-and- markets driving growth and opportunity. social-policy or contact one of the team: Where individuals, families and communities Steve Hughes, Head of Unit: steve.hughes@ are encouraged to take responsibility and are policyexchange.org.uk/@sc_hughes able to flourish. We are optimistic about the country’s future and the power of freedom Jonathan Dupont, Research Fellow: jonathan. and responsibility to improve people’s lives. [email protected]/@jondupont

Damian Hind, Research Fellow: damian.hind@ policyexchange.org.uk/@Damian_AH

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Policy Exchange would like to thank the We would also like to express our gratitude wide range of individuals, businesses and to the Policy Exchange alumni of Ruth Porter, other organisations that shared their ideas, Ed Holmes, Matt Tinsley, and Matt Oakley perspectives and insights during the course for their various contributions. Any errors or of our work. Thanks in particular to the omissions remain our own. Hadley Trust for partnering with us on this project, and on the work over the last few years that forms the basis of the manifesto.

4 – Welfare Manifesto CONTENTS

Introduction 6

Effective 9 Recommendations 11

Fair 14 Recommendations 16

Affordable 18 Recommendations 20

Rewards contribution 23 Recommendations 25

Simple 28 Recommendations 30

Endnotes 32

About the Authors 35

Contents – 5 INTRODUCTION

The British welfare state is in the middle of a once in a generation upheaval. Ensuring that social security provision comes out of it strengthened requires politicians and policymakers to have an honest debate about the issues. An effective welfare system is an integral part of a fair society.

Across the developed world, social security and personal fulfilment. Supporting the is undergoing a profound transformation. elderly and vulnerable is the right thing to Nowhere is this truer than in the United do. Reducing dependency and poverty is not Kingdom. An ageing population, the simply an abstract exercise in statistics, but a changing nature of employment, and weak real way that lives are changed and improved. public finances all mean that whoever wins Building a system reflecting these principles, the general election will have to answer however, is easier said than done. Nevertheless, serious questions about how they can guar- the Coalition has implemented policies that antee a fair and effective welfare system for improve work incentives, offer more compre- years to come. hensive employment support for the hardest Not many people would disagree with the to help, and provide greater long-term finan- principles that should guide the design of cial sustainability for the public purse. the welfare state. Providing a safety net is Some of the most radical changes include: integral to creating a just society. Helping the advent of Universal Credit, limiting the people into work provides them with dignity

6 – Welfare Manifesto marginal effective tax rate a welfare recipient chiefly to blame. They were viewed as more will face to 76.2% of their earnings1; the intro- culpable than UK benefit claimants for falsely duction of the Work Programme as one of claiming benefits (20%), benefit tourists the most advanced pieces of commissioned (16%), or the European Union (15%).5 No party employment support in the world, with esti- outranked the answer “none” when asked mates that 2.1 million people will be referred to “which of the main parties do you trust most it by March 20162; and, the increase in the State on the issue of welfare benefits?”. Pension age being brought forward, saving The media has an obvious role in informing tens of billions of pounds in future years.3 public perceptions. Sometimes, however, In short, progress is being made, and now these perceptions can be divorced from we need to look at what is next, and to reality. A 2013 poll found that, on average, ensure that the welfare system is fit for respondents believed that 41% of the welfare the 21st Century. budget was spent on unemployment benefit, and that 27% of the welfare budget was In doing this, the public needs to be claimed fraudulently. Respectively, the true convinced that the provision of welfare is figures in monetary terms are 1.8% and 0.7%.6 becoming fairer. There is strong support for although the nature of fraud was not defined social security and safety nets, with a 2012 by respondents.7 poll finding 70% of respondents agreeing with the sentiment that the welfare state is That these misconceptions exist does not “one of Britain’s proudest achievements.” mean that they are trivial issues that should However, the same survey found widespread be ignored – entirely eliminating fraud, for concern about the state of the system, with example, would save enough money to some 64% thinking that the benefits system increase the Personal Tax Allowance by could be improved quite a lot, or needs to be £200.8 It is also true that policy changes that completely overhauled.4 have a relatively small impact on the public finances can become totemic in the welfare When a 2013 poll asked why the welfare state debate, with the Spare Room Subsidy and is facing severe problems, 32% of respondents Household Benefit Cap being particularly said that politician mismanagement was relevant recent examples.

Introduction – 7 However, reducing fraud and error has to be a zz Is effective at reducing both two way street. While claimants are required dependency on the state, and poverty. to meet conditions to receive payments, zz Ensures trust and fairness. government should keep its side of the bargain zz Is affordable. in administering them efficiently, and commu- zz Recognises the concept that nicating changes clearly. A recent inquiry contributions count. found that the single biggest reason for food zz Is simple to understand and use. bank referrals was the poor administration of benefits.9 This is not good enough.

In the past few years there has been an enormous appetite for testing and learning. From government to charities to individuals, there is an enthusiasm to be smarter, more effective, and more innovative. That is why, come May 2015, every party must have a plan and vision for welfare, and a knowledge of what this means practically. This vision should include five key values – a welfare system that:

8 – Welfare Manifesto EFFECTIVE

The welfare system should act as a safety net, encourage self-sufficiency, aim to reduce dependency and poverty, and protect the vulnerable.

The problems faced by each person in receipt out of short-term work, can sometimes be of of state support are different, and a one-size- questionable value (See Chart 1). Sustained fits-all approach will not always work to tackle employment should be the ultimate aim. them. Equally, issues should not just be dealt The government’s Work Programme recog- with after they have become acute and with nises this, operating with a remit to offer the bare minimum of support, but identified increasingly specialist services to around 2.1 and addressed as early as possible. million people between 2011 and 2016.10 It Some people will just need a little help or a works on a “payment by results” basis, with push down the right path; some will need large a focus on sustained job outcomes, meaning amounts of assistance, or direct intervention. that providers receive most of their fees only This is especially true for welfare to work after jobseekers have held employment for policy. Greater personalisation will reduce a set period of time. However, it still has a unemployment, which will in turn reduce way to go before its potential is realised. As government expenditure. It will also mean the with all commissioning of this scale, there system is fairer, by ensuring that claimants are many inbuilt design issues, and there get the help that is appropriate before being are question marks hanging over how new faced with a conditionality regime. More contracts will work alongside the transition generally, finding people employment of any to Universal Credit.11 kind, meaning that claimants cycle in and

Effective – 9 Tailored support does not simply mean improving services for the hardest to help, but providing more appropriate support at every level.

The biggest problem that the Work are high, and they are even higher when the Programme faces is that financial incen- waste of human potential through welfare tives for providers are not properly aligned dependency is considered. with a claimant’s distance from the labour Tailored support does not simply mean market. Known as “creaming and parking”, improving services for the hardest to help, help is focused upon those that are closest but providing more appropriate support at to the labour market (the creaming), and every level. For those closest to returning to less resource is applied to those unlikely to work this may mean a lighter touch approach enter sustainable employment and generate which allows them to focus on finding employ- a fee for the contractor (the parking). ment; for others it may be expanding the New Put another way, the payment for getting Enterprise Allowance scheme so they can somebody with many barriers to work into start their own business. Personalised support sustained employment does not reflect the means exactly that – a focus on tacking the difficulty of achieving it. This is not a criti- unique barriers each individual has. cism of providers, who are taking the rational course of action to deliver the best outcomes Sitting below the big pieces of commissioning, for the highest number of individuals, but there have been some attempts to move social does highlight that the most vulnerable policy to more targeted interventions. The claimants may not always receive the most Troubled Families Programme, for instance, has effective support from the Programme’s the potential to better address a range of influ- current design. ences and barriers, including domestic violence, relationship breakdown and physical health Whoever wins the next election will have to problems.13 With a move towards devolution make decisions over the next round of Work through the establishment of City Deals there Programme contracts, and set a course for is an opportunity for cities to bid for greater how employment support should be deliv- autonomy over the functioning of Jobcentre ered in the near future. This is not an insig- Plus, commissioning of the Work Programme, nificant set of decisions. Payments to Prime and support for the hardest to help. This would Contractors on the Work Programme are allow a much more effective joining up of set to total £2.8bn between 2011 and 2020, support locally, so that specific community which is forecast to realise £450m of benefit and family issues can be addressed. Ultimately, savings.12 In purely financial terms the stakes

10 – Welfare Manifesto CHART 1 All JSA claimants Proportion of JSA claimants leaving benefit Leave JSA by 6 months (75%) and entering sustained work

Enter employment (68% of those leaving)

Continuously in work after 7 or 8 months of leaving JSA (71% of those entering employment or just 36% of all claimants)

there are very different labour market needs risk of identifying only the symptoms rather across the UK at regional, sub-regional and than the deeper causes of poverty. We should community levels (see Chart 2). look at the full range of the needs of children, not just measurement of incomes. Measured At the heart of this is creating a system of outcomes should include, at least, quality of appropriate incentives and focussing on housing, family debt levels, and educational long-term solutions rather than short-term attainment.15 In short, effective policy requires fixes. This necessarily means incentivising a proper understanding of the problem. Jobcentres, external providers, and individuals to find and maintain employment. The way to do this is to fundamentally reconsider what Recommendations success would mean for an individual and their 1. Support should become more family, and to evaluate what this should mean personalised. Different people face for the government. It will mean focussing on different issues which prevent them from the destination rather than the journey, and on finding work and being self-sufficient. outcomes, not processes. As part of this, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) should To understand the destination requires a continue with its attempts to develop a better way of the government measuring its diagnostic tool that segments claimants progress. The Child Poverty target is a case in on how they are likely to respond to point. Focussing on relative income measures different interventions. This should be has the potential to skew policy responses based on the Job Seeker Classification Instrument used in Australia, which that have guaranteed effects on household analyses 49 questions to identify 18 risk incomes (in this case, redistribution through factors of long-term unemployment. Tax Credits).14 This type of target runs the

Effective – 11 FACT 1 “11 per cent of adults (5.3 million people) in the UK experience, at any one time, three or more of six areas of disadvantage (poor educational attainment, health, employment, income, social support, housing and local environment).”16

FACT 2 The DWP estimates it will cost £2.8bn to refer 2.1m people to the Work Programme by 2016. It is estimated that this will save £450m in benefit spending.17

The risk factors range from access to 3. Specialist provision for those who have transport to phone contactability. Where not so far found employment through the particular barriers are identified further Work Programme should be established. assessments are undertaken so that the Creating a ‘Route2Work’ scheme would claimants can be referred to the most help around 65,000 people who exit the appropriate service. Work Programme each year. Unlike the 2. Future iterations of Work Programme Work Programme, social enterprises and contracts should have better incentives specialist charities would be paid upfront to help the hardest to help. Contracts to provide intensive and personalised should be based around claimants’ employment support services, to avoid distance from the labour market, rather the cashflow problems that smaller than just primary benefit type and claim. providers experience in a payment by This ultimately means that differential results system. This could include building pricing is used to reflect claimants’ employment skills by working in a social degree of barriers to work. Providers enterprise, or joining up health and social should likewise be incentivised to place care with employment and skills support. some claimants in “mini jobs” below 16 In general, groups in the community who hours a week, which could play a role in understand the local labour market will be supporting the hardest to help back into better placed to provide people the help the work place. To better support the they need to find work. Programme’s ability to adjust for local 4. Local approaches should be enabled labour market conditions, alternative by making funding follow individuals arrangements such as commissioning on to a suitable provider of their choice, Local Enterprise Partnership boundaries rather than commissioning services should be explored. directly. A system which funds local

12 – Welfare Manifesto North East CHART 2 North West ONS: Claimant Yorkshire and The Humber count rate by East Midlands region West Midlands East of England London South East South West Wales Scotland UK

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

and innovative approaches is preferable Measures could include outcomes to directly commissioning large-scale payments tied to the individual’s future programmes. It allows providers to be earnings, tied to a sustained period more responsive, increases the options in work, or tied to measures such as available to individuals, and avoids being off Universal Credit and out of the pitfalls of large-scale government poverty. While short-term measures can commissioning. be useful in public policy to achieve 5. Measures of success for Jobcentre a desired aim quickly, we should Plus (JCP) and other providers encourage interventions with long-term should be evaluated on the basis of gains, rather than temporary outcomes. sustainable employment rather than how many people leave benefits.

Effective – 13 FAIR

People in receipt of out of work benefits should do everything they can to try to find employment. There should be an accepted set of rights and responsibilities, backed up by a fair system of enforcing them.

The concept of rights and responsibilities is At their best, sanctions can influence at the heart of our welfare system. It is fair behaviour by stimulating short term partici- that the most vulnerable in our society are pation in programs that may assist claimants’ protected, but it is also fair they are asked to attempts to find employment. But longer-term do whatever is feasible to reduce their depen- negative effects on earnings and hardship dence on the state and taxpayers. have been regularly identified. The implication of these findings is the importance of applying It should be emphasised that the large sanctions as fairly as possible, and ensuring majority of the unemployed are making that they are aimed at maximising the shorter great efforts to find employment, and it term positive effects, and minimising any of is only a small minority for who this is not the problematic long-term effects.18 the case. Despite this, it should not be possible to get something for nothing, and Sanctions and conditionality do not exist it is reasonable to place conditions on the for their own sake. Their purpose is to be receipt of benefit. Having a system of condi- part of a wider strategy to return people to tionality necessarily means that there must work as quickly as possible. People should be sanctions for those who do not fulfil their only be sanctioned when they have not side of the bargain. met the requirements placed upon them,

14 – Welfare Manifesto 100% CHART 3 Oakley Review 95% of Sanctions: Decisions to 90% apply sanction for those on mandatory19 85% schemes, by scheme 80%

75% 2 2 2 3 3 12 12 13 13 /1 /1 /1 /1 v/ y/ v/ y/ eb/12 eb/13 Jul/12 Jul/13 Jan/12 Jan/13 Mar Apr Mar Apr Jun/13 Oct/12 Oct/13 Sep/12 F Sep/13 F No No Dec/1 Ma Dec/13 Ma Aug/12 Aug/13 Jun/12

Work Programme Day One Support for Young People Skills Conditionality Mandatory Work Activity New Enterprise Allowance, Sector-based Work Academy, Community Action Programme and the sanctions should be proportionate. the system may help reduce confusion, and This becomes even more important under the government has focused on how to deal Universal Credit, with the prospect that with a number of discrete issues, from the those in-work will be subject to some form communication of sanctions for those on the of conditionality. Policy Exchange has esti- Work Programme (see Chart 3),23 to how to mated that around 1.3 million people could implement in-work conditionality.24 be affected.20 These moves reflect a desire to get the system, These are not trivial issues, and Policy and decisions, correct the first time. However, Exchange has previously estimated that this is not always the case. For example, around 14% of the claimant count is referred Policy Exchange has previously estimated for sanctions, and 6% sanctioned each month.21 that around 68,000 people a year wrongfully This means the requirements placed on receive a ‘first, lower tier’ sanction that is later claimants need to be clearly communicated, overturned. This amounts to around 29% of ensuring that sanctions are only received by people within that category (See Chart 4).25 If those who are not making genuine efforts to decisions are consistently wrong, then some- find work. thing needs to be done to mitigate the impact of those wrongful decisions. The government has made progress in this area, with the introduction of the Claimant There is also a wider risk that sanctions can Commitment to make expectations of claim- have a counterproductive effect for certain ants explicit.22 Similarly, attempts to simplify groups – causing them to become distracted

Fair – 15 FACT 3 The percentage of the public who believe that those 49% who refuse job offers or interviews should “lose a large amount of their benefits, say half, but keep enough to cover their basic needs.” 26

FACT 4 There were over 890,000 adverse sanctions decisions applied between July 2013 and June 2014.27

from their jobsearch. This does not mean that Recommendations the principle is wrong, but rather that the form the sanction takes can be inappropriate 6. Conditionality should continue to be at in certain circumstances. Whilst most do not the heart of our welfare system, with rights and responsibilities communicated contest the principle behind them, there is effectively. In return for receiving an open question as to whether they could support, it is reasonable to require be improved. individuals to do all they can to find Of course, perceptions of fairness are arbi- work. This means setting proportional conditions on benefit receipt, based trary to an extent, and perceived unfairness around encouraging actions to help in the welfare system can take many forms. people return to work. A system of Somebody over the age of 25 can receive conditionality cannot work if people income based Jobseeker’s Allowance at a rate do not understand what is required of of £72.40, the same amount as somebody that them, and why they should carry it out. receives Contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance The Claimant Commitment is a welcome that reflects work history. This could be step towards ensuring they have the regarded as unfair. As could the policy that necessary knowledge, and similar steps some people’s benefits are capped at £26,000 to publicise and explain the welfare (which, depending on your view point could system should be undertaken. be too high a cap, or an unjustified way of 7. Non-financial sanctions should be controlling benefit expenditure on individuals considered as part of enforcing the with high housing costs and large families). It conditionality regime. Removal of is the responsibility of government to justify benefits for minor offences can cause why the welfare system is constructed in the hardship, with evidence suggesting way that it is. Not doing so fosters resentment; that a significant proportion of food this, in turn, can result in bad policy decisions. bank referrals result from benefit

16 – Welfare Manifesto Of those who lose their jobseeker’s benefits CHART 4 for a minor first time breach of conditions: The amount are found to have been of people 29% wrongly sanctioned incorrectly sanctioned That means 68,000 people a year see their benefits withdrawn for as long as 4 weeks

stoppage. There are several options testing variations in signing-on regimes for non-financial sanctions – such as that in-work claimants face; financial increasing sign-on requirements, paying incentives for claimants, such as shares benefits on ‘yellow cards’, or different in any benefit savings realised from work activities. The important aspect in-work progression; and, financial is ensuring that these approaches are incentives for jobcentre advisers that properly trialled and the feedback is help claimants to progress in-work. used to inform future policy choices. 9. External contractors such as Work 8. The DWP should pilot different Programme providers should have a interventions to determine how greater level of flexibility in applying claimants will respond to in-work conditionality. Currently, at least some conditionality. A stated aim of issues with incorrectly applied sanctions government welfare policy is to help arise because Work Programme claimants of in-work benefits to sustain providers are contractually obliged their jobs for longer and increase their to report attendance and compliance earnings. However, existing evidence tells issues. They can apply no discretion us that this can be extremely difficult for individuals with relatively low levels about minor breaches of conditionality. of qualifications, and for employees Frontline advisers should have more in low-income jobs.28 There are three flexibility in applying the conditionality areas in which DWP should undertake regime, which would make the system pilots to inform future policy decisions: more effective.29

Fair – 17 AFFORDABLE

Welfare accounts for around 30% of all government expenditure each year, and this figure is set to increase. Commitments to deficit reduction over the course of the next Parliament have triggered a debate about social security spending in the short-term, but an ageing population necessitates a debate about social security spending in the long-term as well.

The repair of the public finances has domi- Saving small sums of money whilst ridding nated the economic debate in the current the system of anomalies is worthwhile, if only Parliament, and is likely to continue to do so to help reduce negative perceptions of the after the General Election in 2015. The Coalition welfare state. For example, limiting the award has performed well at checking the historic of the Winter Fuel Payment to people living in increase in welfare costs (See Chart 5), but warmer countries than the UK will only reduce at around a third of all state expenditure, the the welfare bill by around 0.0001%, but doing cost of social security programmes will have it makes for a fairer system. to be considered in any future government’s Universal benefits are also an area that can attempts to achieve spending reductions. create perceived unfairness. Some argue that The majority of welfare expenditure is justifi- switching from universality to means testing able, but we need to make sure that resources would stigmatise those that continued to are being spent as effectively as possible. be eligible, and would be a complicated

18 – Welfare Manifesto 74% of people believed that Winter Fuel Allowance should only be available for those with income or savings below a certain level.

process. The simple fact is, though, that earnings growth are currently running below universal benefits are currently paid to 1.5%, the State Pension is guaranteed to rise some people that do not need the support. by at least 2.5%. There have been calls from Universal pensioner benefits are a prime across the political spectrum for this system example. Despite general public support for to be scrapped to save money, with both the the nature of the payment, there is some Fabian Society and the Institute of Economic public acknowledgement that they are too Affairs questioning its viability.34 generous: in 2012, 74% of people believed Beyond changing eligibility or limiting that Winter Fuel Allowance should only be payments, the government can reduce available for those with income or savings welfare spending by addressing its funda- below a certain level.30 mental causes. Government expenditure on Entirely eliminating quirks and reforming Housing Benefit is expected to be £24.6bn universal payments will not, however, alter the in 2014/15, up from £15.6bn in 1994/5, driven long-term outlook for the public finances in a by an increase in market rents.35 Addressing meaningful way. An ageing population will see the UK’s housing supply shortage could have the State Pension – and as a consequence the positive impacts for this area of government entire welfare bill – growing as a share of GDP spending. In general, there needs to be more in the coming decades.31 Indeed, the State recognition of how changing eligibility in Pension already consumes over 40% of every- one part of the system may impact on other thing that is spent on welfare (See Chart 6). areas of government spending, such as Local Authorities. The Office for Budget Responsibility has said that upward pressure on State Pension A cap on welfare spending from 2015/16 to spending over the long term will come from 2018/19 was introduced in the 2014 Budget. If the “Triple-Lock” method of uprating.32 The it is forecast that the cap will be broken, the government has argued that this is justified Government must explicitly either increase because pensioners cannot easily adjust the cap, explain why the breach is justified, or their circumstances to gain further income, reduce the welfare spend. This should provide as someone of working age would be able greater transparency on what the state to do.33 While other benefits are frozen actually spends on social security, but several or capped, and while annual inflation and benefits are excluded from inclusion, including

Affordable – 19 Nominal cost: £ billion Per cent of GDP CHART 5 Real cost: £ billion (2013–14 prices) Total welfare Forecast Forecast 300 16 spending in the UK36 14 250 12 200 10

150 8

6 100 4 50 2

0 0

19 98 –12 98 –12 19

2011 97– 2011 1983–84 1990–91 1997– 20 18– 1990–91 19 2004–05 1983–84 2004–05 20 18–

Jobseeker’s Allowance, passported Housing Cap because spending is dependent Benefit, and the State Pension. upon the economic cycle, and is more difficult for the government Confronting the costs of welfare is not to control. The costs of the State optional, either in the next Parliament or Pension, however, can be controlled over the next ten Parliaments. As a start, we by government. This does not mean should aim to root out waste and increase limiting increases in the State Pension, fairness, regardless of whether that saves but does mean that a more accurate the Exchequer tens of millions, hundred of picture of welfare expenditure would millions or billions of pounds. But even entirely be presented. eliminating waste would not be the end of the 11. Greater use should be made of the City story; the older the population gets, and the Deals process to pilot and test new ideas more of national income that pension costs that save money. Under this model, local consume, the more there needs to be a debate areas could keep benefit savings that are realised by pilot programmes that get about what we want our social security people into work and off welfare. The system to be. intended consequence of this would be allowing local areas the freedom to be Recommendations innovative when reducing the benefits bill. As an example, benefits over a 10. The State Pension should be included multi-year period for whole cohorts of in the Welfare Cap. It makes sense that claimants could be rolled up and given Jobseeker’s Allowance and Housing in a lump sum to a local commissioner Benefits should be left outside of the

20 – Welfare Manifesto FACT 5 Welfare payments will take up 28% of all Government expenditure in 2015/16.37

FACT 6 The State Pension is projected to rise in cost from 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2018–19 to 7.9 per cent of GDP in 2063–64.38

of services. This could apply to specific We estimate that this policy would save types or groups of benefit claimants, approximately £1bn by 2019/2020, if or the benefit costs of particular areas introduced in 2016/17 and accompanied or estates. Commissioners would then by uprating limits. hold responsibility for coordinating 13. The Winter Fuel Payment should and joining up support services and be changed to an opt-in system. reimbursing DWP for any benefit costs This would maintain universality, as over the contract period. Any savings everybody currently eligible still would from large portions of the group moving be. But it would bring the payments into work could be kept by the local in line with other parts of the welfare organisation: providing sharp incentives system, where eligible recipients have to provide effective services. to make a conscious choice to receive 12. Eligibility for child benefit should them. Currently, the majority of these be capped at four children, and the payments are made automatically payment level tapered from the first meaning that they are passively child to the fourth. Some evidence received. To protect low income suggests that the marginal cost of recipients, those in receipt of Pension an extra child reduces as family size Credit could retain automatic payment. increases39, which is inconsistent with This has the potential to save the the design of the current system where Exchequer £400m per year. every child after the first is awarded an 14. The Benefit Cap could be changed to equal payment. Polling suggests that a two-tier system to reflect regional public opinion believes that Child Benefit differences in incomes and housing payments for an unlimited number of costs. The cost of living varies across children are unfair. This reform could be regions, and both Labour and the introduced at a point in the future so that Conservatives have indicated that potential recipients are fully aware of the regional differences in the cost of living number of children that would be eligible could be reflected in welfare design.40 when making decisions over family size. The first stage in creating a regionalised

Affordable – 21 15% CHART 6 OBR: Welfare spending by type of benefit41 10% ent of GDP

5% Per c

0% 9 9 4 –1 1983–84 2018 1988–8 1993–94 1998–99 20 13 –1 2003–04 2008–09 State pensions Housing benefit Jobseeker's allowance Incapacity/disability Child benefit Other benefits Income support Tax credits

system would be to create two levels London and the South East, and the of Benefit Cap, one for London and highest average income region in the the South East where average incomes rest of the UK. There would be a choice within the UK are highest, and one for of what level to put the higher cap area the whole of the rest of the UK. The at. It could be the £26,000 currently level of the two caps could be set to in place; it could be higher or it could reflect the relative difference between be lower. the lowest average income region in

22 – Welfare Manifesto REWARDS CONTRIBUTION

There is a lack of faith in the welfare system, with many feeling that the contributions that they put in do not count. A sustainable system has to reward what people have put in, whilst not compromising a base level of welfare.

The role of contributions in working age contributed into the system43 … regardless welfare has been eroded over a number of their level of need,”44 and a 2013 poll of years (see Chart 7). Alongside this, the suggesting that 68% of people believe that government’s method of funding contribu- “you should only benefit from state services tory benefits – with the large majority of the if you have been paying into the pot which cost attributed to the State Pension – has funds them.”45 essentially become “pay as you go”. National Perceptions that those on welfare are Insurance (NI) revenue meets benefit expendi- receiving ‘something for nothing’ have ture for the same year, rather than pay for the grown. Six in ten people think that benefits benefits of the contributing individual in the are “…too high and discourage [the unem- future.42 NI is now a form of taxation, rather ployed] from finding jobs”, more than twice than a system of insurance. the proportion that thought the same thing The contributory principle is supported by 20 years ago.46 This has resulted in politicians the public. 49% of respondents to a 2012 paying an increasing amount of lip service to poll believed that unemployment benefits restoring contribution, with little action. The should “only be available to those who have Labour Party has gone the furthest, with a

Rewards Contribution – 23 100% CHART 7 90% Historic 80% expenditure 70% on working 60% age welfare 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

1 7 7 7 5 81 91 /11 85 83 93 89 99 03 05 09 / / /8 /9 / /0 / 78/79 2010 2012/13 1980 1990 19 1982/ 1992/ 1986 1996 1984 1988/ 199 4/9 1998/ 200 0/0 2002/ 2006 2004 2008/

Contributory Non-Contributory Sick and Disabled Means-tested Child Benefit

proposal to increase Contributory Jobseeker’s in the scheme through a reduction in NI Allowance by £20–£30 a week for a set for employees. period if a recipient has worked for more The insurance scheme, run by the private than five years.47 sector but guaranteed by the government, But this is little more than tinkering. If we are would cover the costs of the first three months to properly restore the principle that contri- of unemployment. Should a person remain butions count, it is necessary for there to unemployed after three months then they be a complete step-change in how we view could draw down the contents from their welfare and contributions. An entirely new MyFund account to support themselves, or design needs to be introduced, which utilises – if their funds were insufficient – they would a combination of personal welfare accounts be supported by Universal Credit. and a system of collective private insurance People would be able to build up their (see Chart 8). fund over the course of their working lives, Under this system, every worker in Britain drawing down on it in times of need, such would contribute a small proportion of their as to retrain for a new profession. Upon weekly earnings into both a new nation- retirement, any money left in an individual’s wide unemployment insurance scheme account would go towards their pension and a personal pot called MyFund. To make package. In order to ensure that the system sure workers do not lose out, the govern- recognises employment rather than ability ment would offset the cost of participating to pay, the funds put in after purchasing

24 – Welfare Manifesto FACT 7 think that unemployment benefits should “only be 49% available to those who have contributed into the system, regardless of their payment into the system.” 48

FACT 8 Contributory benefits accounted for 41% of the working age welfare bill in the late 1970s, in comparison to 10% now.

insurance would be split equally between all specific ‘pot’ which belongs to them workers’ accounts. In short, the contribution and represents their contribution into of each week’s work would be recognised the system. The funds in these accounts in the same manner, regardless of their job should be used for two purposes: or net pay. purchasing short-term compulsory insurance against unemployment, and The accounts would also give the indi- providing a ‘pot’ of resources which can viduals a greater degree of control and be drawn on. At initial unemployment ownership, creating a recognisable area benefits would be drawn equally where their contributions count. This type of from both, followed by the pot being gradually drawn down. approach is necessary; trust must be restored to the system, and any further erosion of 16. The system should recognise the contributory principle would render it employment rather than ability to pay. almost non-existent outside of the State To achieve this, the funds which do not go on the insurance program should Pension. A new design, which promotes be split equally between the accounts self-reliance, individual contribution, and a of all those contributing, ensuring that tailored approach would be the best way the system remains redistributive and to reverse this decline. rewards a week’s work identically for anyone who is part of the scheme. Recommendations 17. This system should be used to provide extra flexibility and tailored support 15. Contributory Jobseekers Allowance for individuals. The pot could be drawn should be replaced by a new system of down to provide more flexible support, individual accounts, with a 1% reduction including retraining, purchasing of goods in the main National Insurance rate in an emergency, or to cover interim to offset the impact on workers. This costs when returning to work. would allow individuals to build up a

Rewards Contribution – 25 Working Life Timeline CHART 8 (each section denotes 1 year) How the MyFund Enters Each year, MyFund provides contributing scheme would work workforce individuals with:

Unemployment insurance

Over £250 of flexible funds in their MyFund personal account

If an individual becomes unemployed, MyFund will fund Unemployment the initial three months of unemployment benefit from a period combination of the unemployment insurance and the funds (3 months) in the MyFund personal account. Individuals with sufficient funds would be able to top up their benefit by drawing up to an additional £100 a week from their MyFund account

Unemployment insurance replenishes after 6 months contribution

Benefits would not cut off at 6 months as they do now Unemployment under JSA(c), as individuals would be able to draw-down period their MyFund personal account to support themselves in (7 months) longer periods of unemployment Unemployment period (12 months)

Those who have exhausted their MyFund account would receive: A level of basic assistance equivalent to (and under the same eligibility requirements as) unemployment benefit today (£72.40 a week)

Reaching retirement Any money left in the MyFund account at retirement would be taken as part of the individual’s pension package. For someone with a full working life and relatively few spells of unemployment, this could be Retirement well in excess of £10,000

26 – Welfare Manifesto 18. This system should be integrated into 19. The value of the pot should be Universal Credit, in order to become preserved and converted if it is not used part of a welfare system suitable for by the time an individual retires. This the 21st century. For those not eligible would provide a vital boost to pension for Universal Credit, drawing down pots for those who did not draw down elements of their pot would be optional, their pot, and would be taxable under and for those eligible these payments normal pension rules. This would help would be deducted pound for pound reinforce the concept of contribution and from Universal Credit eligibility until a tangible reward for those who have they were exhausted. put into the system.

Rewards Contribution – 27 SIMPLE

Rather than facing endless complexity, people should be able to clearly understand the principles of the welfare state, and how it operates.

In the past, anyone who did not have exten- withdrawal of state support as an individual’s sive experience of the benefits system would earnings rise. The aim is to ensure that it will be forgiven for finding it utterly bewildering. always be financially worthwhile to increase A myriad of forms and referrals would char- hours worked or to enter employment. The acterise a claimant’s attempts to receive “taper rate”, which dictates the speed that the credits, benefits, and services they were state support is withdrawn as earnings entitled to, often being administered by increase, is currently set at 65% before tax, separate government departments. and at a maximum of 76.2% after tax (See Chart 9). Not only this, but the lack of integration meant it could actually cost money for The principles that underpin Universal someone to leave benefits and enter employ- Credit have support from across the political ment. In some cases, the interaction of spectrum, but problems with its implementa- welfare payments and earnings resulted in tion have attracted criticism. Overly ambitious benefits being reduced by one pound for timetables for roll-out, IT failures, and poor every extra pound earned.49 project governance have all delayed introduction.50 Full roll-out is not now expected to be Universal Credit is a landmark attempt to completed until the end of 2019, two years solve both problems, combining a series of later than originally planned.51 benefit payments into one with a consistent

28 – Welfare Manifesto A: Marginal effective tax rate B: Average effective tax rate CHART 9 Universal credit Universal credit OECD OECD charts Existing system Existing system of Marginal 200% 200% Effective Tax Rate, 150% 150% and Average

100% 100% Effective Tax Rate for the

50% 50% primary earner in a couple with 52 0% 0% two children

-50% -50% 055 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 0 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Hours per week Hours per week

The Labour Party has said that it would passported benefits, such as Free School “pause” Universal Credit implementation, Meals and Free Prescriptions, are even should it be elected, so that the National counted53 – could both save the Exchequer Audit Office can assess it for taxpayer value money and make the system simpler. for money. While regular external monitoring While Universal Credit is the flagship initiative of roll-out makes sense, whoever takes office to simplify the welfare system, there is plenty should recognise the additional trust in the that needs to be done – and can be done – to system created by Universal Credit is hard to reduce complexity outside of its influence. The quantify in a traditional cost/benefit analysis. way in which an individual claimant interacts Its introduction means that claimants can have with the organisations that support the welfare faith that they will always be financially better state is particularly convoluted. At present, the off in work than out of work, and that changes institutions that provide access to benefits, to their circumstances will be more effectively employment support and training are a baffling and efficiently dealt with. hotchpotch, which lead to poorer outcomes for While the priority for Universal Credit within some individuals (See Chart 10). Users of the the next Parliament should be a smooth roll- welfare system should be able to better identify out, there is still an opportunity to research how they can access state support. possible design improvements. The project A jobseeker might suffer from a diverse has embraced a “test and learn” approach so range of overlapping issues that prevent them far in its existence, and this should continue. from finding and sustaining work. Often, these In addition, understanding how to incorporate issues are not effectively addressed within any of the 21 benefits that remain outside the current system. Claimants can be referred of the Universal Credit framework – before

Simple – 29 FACT 9 Under the pre-Universal Credit system 700,000 individuals in low paid work lost more than 80 per cent of an increase in their earnings because of higher tax or withdrawn benefits.54

FACT 10 Only 18 per cent of JSA claimants felt that the service that they received from the Department of Work and Pensions needed no improvement.55

to a variety of different services that operate Recommendations independently of each other. For example, someone suffering from a lack of training, 20. Citizen Support Centres should be mental health issues and who has been out of established as a single point of contact for government services. In general, work for a long period of time, might receive Jobcentre Plus performs well at the support from six different providers including administration of benefits and getting the jobcentre, a work programme provider, an some people into the labour market. external charity, the local authority, and health However, where there are individuals services. The extent to which these services with more complex barriers to overcome then work together is limited, meaning before entering work question marks hang cross-cutting issues are sometimes not over how effective it is at dealing with addressed effectively. This is confusing for the them. Jobcentres should be completely user, and expensive for the government. overhauled, and replaced with Citizen Support Centres. These centres should roll Moving towards a one-stop-shop for accessing in the referral functions for other services services and benefits would be one way of such as skills, career, or local authority making this journey simpler, more understand- support. This would allow a customer able, and more accessible. It would also help to access the services they needed reflect the changing nature of support – not quickly and easily. Co-locating this body simply making jobcentres somewhere for the in community spaces, such as libraries, unemployed – but a wider place where services would make the system more accessible. are accessed by the population. The approach 21. The next Government should continue has been adopted in Canada, where Service to support the principle of implementing Canada provides a single point of access to a and rolling out Universal Credit by 2019. range of government services and benefits, and After years of iterative changes to the could be used as a blueprint for the UK. welfare system, this is a bold reform that underpins a much needed simplification.

30 – Welfare Manifesto User Referral Delivery CHART 10 Simplifying JobCentre Assessment Diagnosis/ Employment Plus of Eligibility Referral Support the service user journey56 Assessment Diagnosis/ Skills Skills Support Providers of Eligibility Referral Service User Local Assessment Diagnosis/ Council Council of Eligibility Referral Services A. Approximated customer journey Assessment Diagnosis/ Charity Charities under the current of Eligibility Referral Support system

User Referral Delivery

Employment Support

Skills Support Service Citizen Support Diagnosis/ Lead User Centre Referral Provider Council Services B. Approximated customer journey Charity under the proposed Support system

Reversing all or part of its implementation 23. Government should take advantage would be a retrograde step. The of increased capacity to test, adapt, alternative to backing Universal Credit is and improve Universal Credit. There is the status quo of complexity, perverse a willingness and enthusiasm to tweak incentives and sticking plaster reforms. and amend welfare policy in different 22. The next Government should explore ways. With increased capacity to which benefits outside of Universal Credit monitor hours worked, moves into and could be incorporated into the system out of employment and so on, it will and provide the rationale for doing so. be easier to run effective randomised There are several possible justifications for controlled trials. This should become bringing those benefits that sit outside of the standard for new policies. More Universal Credit into the system. These specifically, experiments should focus include: better administration, Exchequer on how adjusting the taper rate or savings, and improved incentives. A full understanding of the impacts of such work allowance within Universal Credit changes would be necessary, but the might improve work incentives. These principle should be that Universal Credit approaches should be piloted within the can grow. next Parliament.

Simple – 31 ENDNOTES

1. Policy In Practice, Universal Credit: Towards and 11. Policy Exchange, Work Programme 2.0, October Effective Poverty Reduction Strategy, http://poli- 2014, http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publica- cyinpractice.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ tions/category/item/work-20-helping-the-hard- Universal-Credit-A-Review-by-Policy-in-Practice. est-to-help-targeted-assistance-incentives-and- pdf. the-work-programme. 2. NAO, The Work Programme, July 2014, 12. NAO, July 2014, The Work Programme, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2014/07/The-work-programme.pdf. uploads/2014/07/The-work-programme.pdf. 3. Pensions Bill Impact Assessment, October 2013, 13. DCLG, March 2012, The Troubled Families https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ Programme, https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/attachment_data/file/253610/b-pen- uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ sions-bill-state-pension-age-ia-oct-2013.pdf. file/11469/2117840.pdf. 4. Comres, November 2012. BBC R4 Welfare Poll, 14. IFS, June 2012, ‘Living Standards, poverty and http://comres.co.uk/polls/BBC_Welfare_Poll_ inequality in the UK: 2012.’ http://www.ifs.org.uk/ November2012.pdf. comms/comm124.pdf. 5. Theos, Perceptions of the Welfare State, 2013, 15. Policy Exchange, “Outcomes, Not Just Incomes: http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/files/files/ Improving Britain’s understanding and measure- Polling/Theos%20_%20Perceptions%20of%20 ment of Child Poverty”, February 2013, the%20Welfare%20State_%20Final%20Data%20 http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publications/ Tables.pdf. category/item/outcomes-not-just-incomes-im- 6. Figures based on 2014/15 expected expenditure. proving-britain-s-understanding-and-measure- Jobseekers Allowance only is used for estimates of ment-of-child-poverty. unemployment benefit. 16. HMG, Social Justice: Transforming Lives, 7. TUC Survey, January 2013, http://www.tuc.org.uk/ March 2012, p.8, https://www.gov.uk/government/ sites/default/files/Welfarepoll_summaryresults. uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ pdf. file/49515/social-justice-transforming-lives.pdf. 8. DWP fraud statistics show that £1.2bn is lost to 17. NAO, The Work Programme, July 2014, p.4, fraud. Personal allowance number is taken from http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ HMRC’s tax ready reckoner. uploads/2014/07/The-work-programme.pdf. 9. APPG, Inquiry into Hunger and Food Poverty in 18. Policy Exchange, Smarter Sanctions, Britain, December, 2014, https://foodpovertyin- http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publi- quiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/food-pover- cations/smarter%20sanctions.pdf. ty-feeding-britain-final.pdf. 19. Oakley Review, Page 22, https://www.gov.uk/ 10. NAO, July 2014, The Work Programme, government/uploads/system/uploads/attach- http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ ment_data/file/335144/jsa-sanctions-indepen- uploads/2014/07/The-work-programme.pdf. dent-review.pdf.

32 – Welfare Manifesto 20. Policy Exchange, Slow Progress: Improving 32. OBR, Welfare Trends Report, http://budgetrespon- progression in the UK labour market, March 2013, sibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/Welfare_trends_ http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publi- report_2014_dn2B.pdf. cations/slow%20progress.pdf. 33. Daily Telegraph, 27 January, “Tories will protect 21. Policy Exchange, Smarter Sanctions, pensioner benefits if elected in May”, http:// http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publi- www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cam- cations/smarter%20sanctions.pdf. eron/11371572/Tories-will-protect-pensioner- 22. UK Government, Simplifying the welfare system benefits-if-elected-David-Cameron-strongly-hints. and making sure work pays, https://www.gov.uk/ html government/policies/simplifying-the-welfare- 34. IEA: http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/the-tri- system-and-making-sure-work-pays/support- ple-lock-unjustified-and-unaffordable ing-pages/introducing-the-jobseekers-allow- Fabian Society: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ ance-claimant-commitment. ce79d38a-aa8e-11e2-9a38-00144feabdc0. 23. DWP, Government Response to the Oakley Review, html#axzz3PTvRcdgF. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 35. Real terms, 2014/15 prices, uploads/attachment_data/file/332137/jsa-sanc- https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ tions-independent-review-government-response. benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2014. pdf. 36. OBR, Welfare Trends Report, P.6, http://budget- 24. DWP, Extending labour market interventions to responsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/Welfare_ in-work claimants, https://www.gov.uk/govern- trends_report_2014_dn2B.pdf. ment/consultations/extending-labour-market-in- 37. Benefit Caseload and Expenditure Tables. terventions-to-in-work-claimants. 38. OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report, July 2014, 25. Policy Exchange, Smarter Sanctions, http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org. http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publi- uk/41298-OBR-accessible.pdf. cations/smarter%20sanctions.pdf. 39. Expenditure on Children by Families, August 2013, 26. Policy Exchange, Just Deserts? , April 2011, http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/publications/crc/ http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publi- crc2012.pdf. cations/just%20deserts%20-%20apr%2011.pdf. 40. Ed Balls, http://www.labour.org.uk/striking- 27. Sanctions Dataset, the-right-balance-for-the-british-economy. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ Mark Hoban: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ jobseekers-allowance-sanctions. politics/10183788/Mark-Hoban-benefits-cap-may- 28. Policy Exchange, Slow Progress, http://www.poli- be-too-high-outside-London.html. cyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/slow%20 41. OBR, Welfare Trends Report, P.47, http://budget- progress.pdf. responsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/Welfare_ 29. Community Links, December 2014, trends_report_2014_dn2B.pdf. http://www.community-links.org/uploads/ 42. Parliamentary Briefing. National Insurance Fund, editor/file/CommunityLinks_submission_WPSC_ www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn04517.pdf. SanctionsInquiry.pdf. 43. E.g. by working or caring for someone. 30. ComRes – 2012, BBC R4 Welfare Poll, http://comres.co.uk/poll/795/bbc-radio-4-social- 44. Yougov/IPPR – 2012, Weighted sample of 1,751 welfare-poll.htm. GB Adults, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront. net/cumulus_uploads/document/q2gwnjvttm/ 31. OBR, Fiscal Sustainability Report, July 2014, YG-IPPR-Archive-results-090812-Role-of- http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org. state-UK.pdf. uk/41298-OBR-accessible.pdf.

Endnotes – 33 45. Theos – Perceptions of the Welfare State – 2013, 51. NAO, Universal Credit: Progress Update, 2,027 GB Adults, http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/ November 2014, http://www.nao.org.uk/report/ files/files/Polling/Theos%20_%20Perceptions%20 universal-credit-progress-update-2/. of%20the%20Welfare%20State_%20Final%20 52. OECD, Work Incentives and Universal Credit, Data%20Tables.pdf. http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/ 46. British Social Attitudes Survey, http://www.bsa-30. publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/ natcen.ac.uk/read-the-report/spending-and-wel- WKP%282013%2925&docLanguage=En. fare/welfare-benefits.aspx. 53. Author’s estimates from Outturn and Forecast 47. Opposition Policy Costings, https://www.gov.uk/ expenditure 2012–2013. Benefits costing in government/uploads/system/uploads/attach- excess of £1m–£5 in 2016–2017 (estimated UC ment_data/file/391703/Opposition_costing_-_ rollout date). increasing_JSA_payments_for_those_who_have_ 54. The Government’s Universal Credit Impact made_at_least_five_years_on_national_insur- Assessment, December 2012, https://www.gov. ance_contributions.pdf. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach- 48. Yougov/IPPR, 2012, http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloud- ment_data/file/220177/universal-credit-wr2011-ia. front.net/cumulus_uploads/document/q2gwn- pdf. jvttm/YG-IPPR-Archive-results-090812-Role-of- 55. DWP Claimant Service and Experience Survey, state-UK.pdf. October 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 49. DWP, “Universal Credit: welfare that works”, uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/ file/364303/884summary-research-re- uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ port-dwp-claimant-survey-2013.pdf. file/48897/universal-credit-full-document.pdf. 56. Policy Exchange, Joined Up Welfare: The next 50. NAO, Universal Credit: Early Progress, steps for personalisation, July 2014, http://www. September 2013, http://www.nao.org.uk/report/ policyexchange.org.uk/publications/category/ universal-credit-early-progress-2/. item/joined-up-welfare-the-next-steps-for-personalisation

34 – Welfare Manifesto ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Steve Hughes is the Head of Economic and Guy Miscampbell worked as a Research Social Policy. Before joining Policy Exchange, Fellow in the Economics and Social Policy Steve worked at the Bank of England, where Unit from 2012 and 2014. He currently he conducted research into the circulation of studies an MPP at the University of Toronto’s banknotes, and helped manage the regulatory School of Public Policy and Governance and system that governs cash distribution in the is a Research Assistant at the Institute for UK. Prior to this, Steve worked at the British Municipal Finance and Governance. Prior to Chambers of Commerce, producing economic joining Policy Exchange he read Economics indicators and advising on tax, international and Politics at Durham University, interned trade and SME finance policy. He has also in the U.S. House of Representatives, and worked in Parliament, researching HM Treasury won the inaugural Global Debate and Public and Department for Work and Pensions Policy Championship. legislation as it passed through the House of Commons. Steve read economics at the University of Nottingham.

Chapter Title – 35 Policy Exchange is the UK’s leading think tank. We are an educational charity whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas that will deliver better public services, a stronger society and a more dynamic economy. Registered Charity no: 1096300.

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36 – Welfare Manifesto