Populism on a Local Level in Flanders Understanding the Results of the 2018 Local Elections

POPULISM ON A LOCAL LEVEL IN FLANDERS UNDERSTANDING THE RESULTS OF THE 2018 LOCAL ELECTIONS

Aantal woorden/Word count: 26 496

Céline Vermeiren Stamnummer/student number: 000150660703

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Claire Dupont

Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van: Master’s dissertation submitted to obtain the degree of:

Master in de Bestuurskunde en het Publiek Management Master of Science in Public Administration and Management

Academiejaar/academic year: 2018-2019

Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat. Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.

This page is not available because it contains personal information. Ghent University, Library, 2021.

Abstract (Dutch)

Doel: Het hoofddoel van deze masterproef was om verklaringen te vinden voor het electorale succes van populistische partijen tijdens de lokale verkiezingen van 2018 in Vlaanderen. Er is reeds vrij veel onderzoek gedaan naar de stemmotieven om op Vlaams Belang te stemmen, maar zoals de resultaten van de verkiezingen van 2018 aangeven zijn zij niet meer de enige populistische partij met electoraal succes. Bovendien is er nog geen onderzoek gevoerd naar populistische partijen op lokaal niveau in Vlaanderen, uitsluitend het nationale niveau werd onderzocht. In deze thesis is dan ook onderzoek gedaan naar drie verschillende populistische partijen. Hiervoor werd gebruik gemaakt van cases die gekozen werd aan de hand van een aantal criteria: er moest voldoende variatie in ideologie zijn en het behaalde resultaat tijdens de verkiezingen van 2018 moest hoger liggen dan het gemiddelde in Vlaanderen. Zo werd er gekozen voor de cases Forza Ninove, PVDA Zelzate en Lijst Dedecker (LDD) in Middelkerke. Om het argument hard te kunnen maken dat deze partijen populistisch zijn, werd er in het eerste deel van deze thesis bewijs aangeleverd uit partijprogramma’s en interviews met lokale experten. Daarna kon er overgegaan worden naar het onderzoeken van de centrale onderzoeksvraag, die door zes subonderzoeksvragen werd ondersteund. Zo werd er onderzoek gedaan naar de sociaal-economische toestand van de gemeente, het vertrouwen van de inwoners in de overheden, culturele problemen, onveiligheidsgevoel en het effect van een charismatische lijsttrekker. Design: Om de centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze thesis te beantwoorden werd gebruikt gemaakt van mixed methods, wat betekent dat meerdere methoden werden gebruikt. Ten eerste werden de cijfers vanuit de Gemeentemonitor onderzocht om een eerste globale beeld te krijgen van de gemeenten. Die cijfers werden gecheckt en in context geplaatst door middel van interviews met lokale experten. Resultaten: De rode draad die het electoraal succes van deze drie partijen kan verklaren het lage vertrouwen in de overheid is en de aanwezigheid van een charismatische lijsttrekker. Daarnaast is er ook bewijs aangeleverd dat aantoont dat de drie onderzochte partijen populistische elementen vertonen. Verder onderzoek is echter nodig. Implicaties: Het blijkt dat onderzoek dat op nationaal niveau is gebeurd, bevestigd kon worden op lokaal niveau. Dat onderzoek op nationaal niveau had ook vertrouwen in de overheid geïdentificeerd als belangrijke drijfveer om op populistische partijen te stemmen.

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Acknowledgements

The process of writing this Master’s Dissertation was a bumpy ride. It was hard for me to stop the ‘reading process’ and start the ‘writing process’, also because of the fact that populism is a very complex concept. However, I am grateful to Ghent University for giving me the chance to investigate this contemporary issue. What is recently going on in our society and in current politics is of great interest to me and the underlying motive for writing this thesis was – naïve as I am – to change the world and to make the world a better place. I was also very curious; why do people in Flanders vote on extreme, sometimes even racist parties when we are living in one of the most beautiful, prosperous and wealthiest countries in the world? And how does it come that people believe populists when they present ‘easy’ solutions for complex problems? Unfortunately, it seems that the real impact of this dissertation will be less spectacular. I have received a lot of help in the process of writing this dissertation. Therefore, the first person I would like to thank is my promotor, Prof. dr. C. Dupont. Thanks a lot for the support, guidance and feedback. I also would like to thank Prof. dr. J. Voets for his useful feedback during the sessions of ‘research methods’. I also would like to acknowledge Prof. dr. T. Pauwels for the useful phone conversation we had, in which he gave me tips, tricks and useful sources to write this dissertation. He also sent me his book ‘Populism in Western Europe’, which was of great help and acted as a guide in the writing and structuring process. I am profoundly grateful for this. Next to that, the interviewees were of fundamental importance for this dissertation and I would like to thank them as well. Without them, this would have never been possible. Last but not least, I want to thank my friends and my mother, who were of great support to me. Special thanks to Ann-Sophie for proofreading this dissertation, for the tips and for the support. Thank you all!

Table of contents

Confidentiality agreement ...... II

Abstract (Dutch) ...... III

Acknowledgements ...... IV

List of abbreviations ...... VIII

List of tables ...... VIII

List of figures ...... IX

1 Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Specific topic of interest and research question ...... 2 1.2 Research design ...... 2 1.2.1 Sub-questions ...... 3 1.2.2 Case selection ...... 5 1.2.3 Additional research questions that strengthen the main research question ...... 6 1.2.4 Methodology ...... 6

1.3 Relevance of the research ...... 7 1.3.1 Contribution to society ...... 7 1.3.2 Contribution to the literature ...... 8

1.4 Structure of the remaining part of this work ...... 8

2 Theoretical framework: definition of populism ...... 9

2.1 The search for a clear definition...... 9 2.2 ... starts here ...... 10 2.3 ... goes around three waves of populism ...... 11 2.4 ... and different meanings of populism ...... 12 2.5 ... to finally end here? ...... 14 2.5.1 The people ...... 15 2.5.2 The elite ...... 15 2.5.3 The general will ...... 16

2.6 It ain’t over till the fat lady sings ...... 16

PART 1: A case study research into the concept of ‘populism’ on a local level in Flanders...... 18

1 Literature study ...... 18

1.1 Vlaams Belang (VB) ...... 19 1.2 Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA) ...... 22 1.3 Lijst Dedecker/Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (LDD) ...... 24

2 Methodology ...... 26

3 Results ...... 28

3.1 Forza Ninove ...... 28 3.1.1 The people ...... 28 3.1.2 The elite ...... 29 3.1.3 The general will ...... 29

3.2 PVDA Zelzate ...... 30 3.2.1 The people ...... 30 3.2.2 The elite ...... 30 3.2.3 The general will ...... 31

3.3 LDD Middelkerke ...... 31 3.3.1 The people ...... 31 3.3.2 The elite ...... 32 3.3.3 The general will ...... 33

4 Discussion ...... 33

PART 2: What can explain the populist vote? Analysis of the results of the local elections of 2018...... 36

1 Literature study ...... 36

1.1 Ecological fallacy ...... 37 1.2 Municipal vs. national elections ...... 38 1.3 Supply of vs. demand side of populism ...... 39 1.4 Variables on the demand side of populism ...... 39 1.4.1 Impact of socio-economic position on the populist vote ...... 39 1.4.2 Impact of the (dis)satisfaction with democracy ...... 40 1.4.3 Impact of immigrants and cultural differences ...... 42 1.4.4 Sense of insecurity ...... 42

1.5 Variable on the supply side of populism ...... 43 1.5.1 Impact of a charismatic party leader ...... 43

2 Methodology ...... 44

3 Results ...... 46

3.1 Ninove ...... 46 3.1.1 Demand side of populism ...... 47 3.1.2 Supply side of populism ...... 52 3.1.3 Ranking of variables ...... 53

3.2 Zelzate ...... 53 3.2.1 Demand side of populism ...... 54 3.2.2 Supply side of populism ...... 58 3.2.3 Ranking of variables ...... 59

3.3 Middelkerke ...... 60 3.3.1 Demand side of populism ...... 60 3.3.2 Supply side of populism ...... 64 3.3.3 Comparison ...... 64

4 Discussion ...... 65

Conclusion ...... 70

Afterthoughts on this master’s dissertation ...... 72

Bibliography ...... X

Attachments ...... XV

Attachment 1: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove ...... XV Attachment 2: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove ...... XV Attachment 3: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove ...... XVI Attachment 4: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove ...... XVI Attachment 5: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate ...... XVII Attachment 6: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate ...... XVII Attachment 7: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate ...... XVII Attachment 8: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Lijst Dedecker ...... XVIII Attachment 9: Questions of the interview with T. De Jonge and C. Van den Houte ...... XVIII Attachment 10: Questions of the interview with K. Vereecke ...... XXII Attachment 11: Questions of the interview with T. Van Assche ...... XXVI

VII

List of abbreviations

VB Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) PVDA Partij van de Arbeid (Workers’ Party of Belgium) LDD Lijst Dedecker/Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (List Dedecker, Libertarian, Direct, Democratic) CD&V Christen-democratisch & Vlaams (Christian Democratic and Flemish party) N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance) SP.a Socialistische Partij Anders (Socialist Party Differently) (Open) VLD (Open) Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten ((Open) Flemish Liberals and Democrats)

List of tables

Table 1: Sample of the Municipal Monitor ...... 45 Table 2: Result 2018 local elections Ninove ...... 47 Table 3: Average income per inhabitant in Ninove ...... 47 Table 4: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Ninove ...... 48 Table 5: Share of inhabitants (in %) who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality ...... 50 Table 6: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Ninove ...... 51 Table 7: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Ninove ...... 52 Table 8: Scoring of the variables in Ninove ...... 53 Table 9: Results of the 2018 local elections in Zelzate ...... 54 Table 10: Average income per inhabitant in Zelzate ...... 54 Table 11: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Zelzate ...... 56 Table 12: Share of inhabitants (in %) who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality ...... 57

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Table 13: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Zelzate ...... 57 Table 14: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Zelzate ...... 58 Table 15: Scoring of the variables in Zelzate ...... 59 Table 16: Result 2018 local elections Middelkerke ...... 60 Table 17: Average income per inhabitant in Middelkerke ...... 61 Table 18: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Middelkerke ...... 61 Table 19: Share of inhabitants who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality ...... 62 Table 20: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Middelkerke ...... 63 Table 21: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Middelkerke ...... 63 Table 22: Scoring of the variables in Middelkerke ...... 65

List of figures

Illustration 1: Cartoon that was spread all over Middelkerke by LDD in 2017 ...... 32

1 Introduction

Populism is a modern phenomenon that originated at the end of the nineteenth century in Russia and the United States. Nowadays, populism can be found on every continent, in every political system, although it appears the most in democratic countries in Europe and North- and South- America (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In Latin America, the form of populism that emerges there is not identical to the one in Europe. Populism in Latin America is left-wing, economic and inclusive while in Europe it is right-wing, identity-based and exclusionary. In the United States, it is the Tea Party that has become very influential and in Western Europe, the populist radical right is the most successful among the new parties since the Second World War (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014). Although sometimes other figures are used, studies have shown that in general, populist votes are on the rise and moreover, that populism is currently at its highest level since the 1930s in the European Union (Akkerman et al., 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lessebski, Kavrakova, Long, Longton, & Weber, 2019; Norris, 2016).

Populist parties emerged in Western democracies in the 1980s and this is also the case for Belgium. Flanders can be seen as a real textbook example of populism with the emergence of Vlaams Belang (Flemish interest, VB) but also of Lijst Dedecker (List Dedecker, LDD) and more recently, the Partij van de Arbeid (Workers’ Party of Belgium, PVDA). Vlaams Blok (the previous name of Vlaams Belang, VB) was founded in 1978 and has known electoral successes since the 1980s, with a breakthrough in 1991. The election day in that year was called Zwarte Zondag (Black Sunday), because the country was shocked that an anti-immigrant and Flemish nationalist party with anti-party sentiments could receive so many votes (Mudde, 2007). The party received 24% of the votes in 2004, which made VB the largest individual party (Pauwels, 2014). Due to the success of VB, this party and the underlying motives for the many votes for the party has been a common research topic (De Decker, Kesteloot, De Maesschalck, & Vranken, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011a, 2014; Van Haute, Pauwels, & Sinardet, 2018). However, studies that explain populism on a local level in Flanders are limited; an example is a study that focusses on the populist voters where, by means of a large conversation of inhabitants of Antwerp, the motivations of VB voters are identified (Kochuyt & Abts, 2017). Another interesting study is a quantitative one, that empirically identified contextual determinants of the success of VB in the

2000 local elections (Coffé, Heyndels, & Vermeir, 2007). But these studies only focus on the VB, while there are also other populist parties that seem to be on the upsurge in Flanders, as the results of the 2018 local elections show. A clear research gap can be identified here and therefore, it seemed interesting to investigate if voter bases of different kinds of populist parties have something in common and not just VB voters. As will be shown in the next paragraph, parties that are labelled by journalists and scholars as populist, won the 2018 elections in some municipalities.

1.1 Specific topic of interest and research question According to Albertazzi & McDonnell (2008) the rise of populism in Western Europe can be explained as a reaction to the inadequate response of traditional parties to a series of phenomena such as globalisation, the speed of European integration, immigration, the exposure of elite corruption... (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). But can these findings also explain the rise of populist parties on a local level? This brings us to the aim of this investigation, that is to investigate and explain the reasons for a populist vote on a local level in Flanders. Much research has already been done on populism on a national level (Belgium) and on a regional level (Flanders) but studies on populism on a local level are very limited. Next to that, it is Mudde (2007) that claims that characteristics of the local level can impact the voting behaviour more than the national level, because there is a closer link between the social context and the individual, what makes it more likely that socio-economic or demographic characteristics of a neighbourhood impact voting behaviour (Mudde, 2007). This brings us to the main research question: What can explain the electoral success of populist political parties in the 2018 local elections in Flanders?

1.2 Research design In this section, the sub-questions will be discussed that will further guide the research. Next, the case selection will be discussed and after that, some additional research questions will be presented that are necessary in order to investigate the main research question. Lastly, the methodology will be outlined that is used to investigate this research topic.

1.2.1 Sub-questions The main research question is used as a guide throughout this research, but in order to answer this question it needs to be narrowed down, which is done in the following sub-questions. These sub-questions will be categorised in two ways as both characteristics of the electorate will be discussed and characteristics of the populist parties themselves. This is called the demand and supply side of populism. The demand side is what voters want, and demand-side factors of populism are for example immigration control while the supply side is what politicians have to offer, such as the party ideology (Pauwels, 2014). In general, the demand side of politics are the attitudes of voters (Spruyt, Keppens, & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016) while the supply side of populism consists of “the populist ideology and the populist rhetoric” (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014, p. 1).

1.2.1.1 Demand side of populism In the literature, there is no consensus on whether populist voters have a lower or higher socio- economic position. Coffé et al. (2007) found for example that the VB was more supported in wealthy communities because of the fact that they do not want to share their wealth (Coffé et al., 2007). However, this study only focuses on the extreme right populist party VB. On the other hand, studies that investigated only populist attitudes suggest that people with weak economic positions are more likely to have a declinist view on society and are therefore more prone to vote for populist parties (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016). Because of the fact that there is no conclusion upon this variable that can be found in the literature, this will be investigated: Sub-question 1: Are the socio-economic positions (i.e. to have lower incomes, to have more inhabitants with a living wage and to have a higher poverty- or social disadvantage-index) of inhabitants lower in municipalities where the share of populist votes is higher than the Flemish average?

Then, research also shows that a lack of political efficacy (Spruyt et al., 2016) and dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy are important reasons for voting for a populist party (Pauwels, 2014). Next to that, there is a link between political distrust and voting for populist parties (Rooduijn, 2018). A preference for more direct democracy is a factor that can also be linked to

populist voting, but according to Pauwels (2014), more research is necessary to test this suggested link between direct democracy and populist voting. This brings us to sub-question 2: Sub-question 2: Are inhabitants of municipalities with a higher populist vote than the Flemish average less satisfied with democracy (i.e. do they have less trust in governments and do they have a higher will for more direct democracy)?

The study of Coffé et al. (2007) found that “the presence of Turkish or Maghrebian citizens has a positive effect on the VB’s popularity” but do not find a general effect for the numbers of immigrants. They suggest that it is more the fear of the Islamic way of living that is leading to extreme right voting (Coffé et al., 2007). Moreover, the rise of populist movements in Europe could also be caused by an anti-immigrant rhetoric (Ristov, 2017). Sub-question 3: Are inhabitants of municipalities where the share of populist votes is higher (then the Flemish average), more hostile or have a more hostile attitude towards immigration?

Furthermore, also on the link between crime rates and populist voting, the literature is diverse. While Coffé et al. (2007) state that the level of crime does not determine the party’s electoral success, Mudde (2007) says that some authors do find a positive relationship between crime and populist voting but also nuances his conclusion and mentions that it only plays a marginal role (Mudde, 2007). However, what has not been the subject of previous research is the sense of insecurity: Sub-question 4: Is there a higher sense of insecurity in municipalities where the populist vote is higher than the Flemish average?

1.2.1.2 Supply side of populism The study of Van Kessel (2011) on the explanation of the performance of populist parties in the Netherlands found that the supply of credible populist challengers is a vital factor for the performance of populist parties, that are the skills of the party leadership (Van Kessel, 2011). Next to that, it is found that a crucial factor of the electoral success of LDD was its charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Dedecker (Pauwels, 2010). It is said that a leader always plays a strong role in political phenomena, and populism is no exception to that. The dependency of strong leaders is typical for populism, and the charismatic leader is a bit the prototype of a populist leader. But,

what all populist leaders have in common, is that they present themselves as the voice of the people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). This leads us to sub-question 5: what effect do local populist leaders have on the populist votes? Sub-question 5: What is the impact of a charismatic leader on the populist votes?

These research questions will be answered using case study research.

1.2.2 Case selection The cases will be selected based on the results of the 2018 local elections. Since the research questions indicate that the populist vote should be higher than the Flemish average, cases will be selected based on this criterion. Next to that, Rooduijn (2018) says that it is important when research is done on populism in general, that there is sufficient variation in terms of ideologies and that not only radical parties are the subject of the research. Pauwels (2014) mentions that much research has been done on the populist radical right but that it is an open question what explains the rise of neoliberal and social populist parties (Pauwels, 2014, p. 3). This gap in the literature is also taken into account with the selection of the cases. In sum, these criteria are kept in mind when the results of the 2018 local elections are observed.

On the 14th of October 2018, municipal elections were held in Belgium. In 300 municipalities in Flanders there were elections that day (Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.). There are a lot of local political parties who participate, that is why it is always difficult to point a political party as a clear ‘winner’ of these elections. But according to a Flemish news provider (VRT), the winners are VB and Groen (Lefevere, 2018). Another article that describes the most surprising results of the elections, says that Forza Ninove has exceeded all expectations: they gained 40% of the votes. The average vote for VB in Flanders is 10,50% what means that the score in Ninove is four times as high. The score of Lijst Dedecker (LDD) in Middelkerke is also very high: 44,13% (Wauters, 2018). Surprisingly, it does not mention PVDA in Zelzate, where it obtained there their biggest result in Flanders: 22,8% (Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.).

As a result, the cases that will be investigated in this dissertation are Lijst Dedecker (List Dedecker, LDD) in Middelkerke, Forza Ninove in Ninove and PVDA (Workers’ Party of Belgium)

in Zelzate. Forza Ninove is an extreme right party, that is closely connected to VB while PVDA is an extreme left-wing party. LDD is suggested to be a populist party, but not an extreme party (Rooduijn et al., 2019) and rather a neo-liberal populist party (Pauwels, 2010). This makes that the selection of the parties meet the criteria that were put upfront and definitely the ones of Rooduijn (2018).

1.2.3 Additional research questions that strengthen the main research question Another objective of this research is to develop a clear conceptualisation of populism. While doing research on what the concept of populism really is, many sources had to be consulted in order to fully understand it. That is why the first part of this research is devoted to the explanation of the concept of populism and to the explanation of the process in which a clear and generally accepted definition of populism has been developed.

Because of the fact that no research has been done on populist parties on a local level in Flanders, evidence should be provided first in order to be able to say, or at least suggest, that the three parties that will be used in this case study research are populist parties. However, sufficient research has been done on investigating whether LDD and VB are populist on a national level, and many studies conclude that they are (Pauwels, 2010, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn et al., 2019) but can it therefore also be concluded that they are populist on a local level? On PVDA, some research has been done but the conclusions are diverse: for some, PVDA is a populist party (Pauwels, 2011b; Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016) while for others they are not populist (Rooduijn et al., 2019). This brings us to additional research question 1: Are Forza Ninove, PVDA in Zelzate and LDD in Middelkerke populist parties?

As already said, the focus will lay on the main research question, but in order to be able to answer that question, this research question should be answered first or at least some evidence should be provided upon the fact that these parties are (possibly) populist.

1.2.4 Methodology In order to answer additional research question 1, the ‘minimal definition’-method will be used. In the next part of this thesis (2: theoretical framework), a clear and generally accepted definition

of populism will be given and explained. Based upon that definition, evidence will be provided to respond to the question whether these parties are populist or not. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the methodology section (2) of part 1 of this dissertation.

The second part of this research will be explorative and in order to be able to answer the main research question, a mixed method or method of triangulation will be used, which means that more than one method will be used in order to improve the validity of this research project (Van Thiel, 2015). First, information will be used that is provided in a Flemish monitor on municipalities, called Gemeentemonitor (Municipal monitor) in order to get a first general overview of the municipality. This data will also be used to provide a general overview of the variables that are investigated in each municipality. To check the data of the Municipal Monitor and to look beyond the numbers, interviews have been carried with mostly journalists and one mayor - people that have some expertise and knowledge regarding their community. In sum, a qualitative method by means of interviews is used to check the quantitative findings (of the Municipal Monitor). This will be discussed more thoroughly in the methodology section (2) of part 2 of this dissertation.

1.3 Relevance of the research The research presented in this thesis contributes both to societal debates and to academic research, as will be explained in the following paragraphs.

1.3.1 Contribution to society First of all, this is an explorative research since not much research has been done on populism on a local level in Flanders. But if it could be understood why these populist parties were able to gain such a high number of votes, maybe their rise and success could be countered. Perhaps, if it could be identified why people would vote for a populist party on a local level, it could also provide more clues about why they vote for it on a regional of federal level. If the grievances or dissatisfactions of the public could be discovered, then governments could respond with adequate policy that are a response to these grievances and that can make sure that there is again satisfaction with the political system.

1.3.2 Contribution to the literature In Flanders, a lot of research has been done about populist parties and populism on a national level, but to my knowledge no research has been done on populist parties and populism on a local level. This in contrast to The Netherlands, where a thesis has been written on populism on a local level (Gevers, 2016). This thesis only identifies populist parties on a local level and does not investigate the underlying motives of voting for these parties. A clear research gap has been identified here and it seemed interesting to vary out related research in Flanders, especially given the results of the 2018 local elections. Moreover, much of the literature on populism in Belgium focuses on Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB). As a consequence, populism in Belgium is strongly associated with this Flemish radical-right party. Next to that, also the ‘Workers’ party of Belgium’ (Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA)) is sometimes called populist, which is interesting because it is situated at the extreme-left side of the political spectrum, contrary to Vlaams Belang (Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016).

1.4 Structure of the remaining part of this work In the next part, the theoretical framework will be explained: the concept of populism will be defined. The search for a clear definition starts there, goes around three waves of populism and different meanings of populism to finally end with the definition of Mudde. But it ain’t over till the fat lady sings so three types of populist parties are also discussed. In part 1, an answer is sought for additional research question 1: are Forza Ninove, PVDA in Zelzate and LDD in Middelkerke populist parties? This will be done using the minimal definition method and evidence of mostly party programmes but also interviews with local experts will be given. In part 2, evidence will be provided on order to answer the main research question of this dissertation, i.e. to find explanations for the electoral success of populist parties in the 2018 local elections in Flanders. The sub-questions will be used as a guide throughout this part. The methodology that is used here, are mixed methods, so data of the Municipal Monitor will be checked with data of interviews of local experts.

2 Theoretical framework: definition of populism

In this part, first the concept of populism is being introduced and a definition of populism is given. Populism is a political buzzword and it is sometimes used in an inappropriate way (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). As will become clear, the search for a clear definition is not easy. It is only recently that there has been found more or less a consensus among the definition. Researchers agree upon the fact that populists always create (and exploit) an (alleged) division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Next to that, they also claim to be presenting the voice (or the ‘general will’ as Mudde (2004) calls it of ‘the people’. This distinction can also be used to identify populist actors (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2014). Although there is no clear consensus upon a definition, the debate was somewhat settled when Cas Mudde developed in 2004 a definition that has been widely accepted: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). This definition will also be used in this work as a main guide in this work and is therefore put upfront but will be discussed more in detail throughout this part.

2.1 The search for a clear definition... First, it is important that a clear definition of populism is given so there is no confusion around the conceptualisation. When the concept of populism is well defined, the problem of misunderstanding will be reduced to a minimal level. Unfortunately, the term is used rather loosely and this made it even more difficult to define the real meaning (Pauwels, 2014). Bale, Van Kessel and Taggart (2011) examined the use of the term ‘populism’ in British print media and found that the word is frequently used, but rarely defined nor central to the content of the articles. Additionally, they found that the words ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ are used for many individuals and political parties from all sorts of different ideological backgrounds and that have little in common. It is used for both left- and right-wing parties and issues and besides that, it is used even across continents, from Hugo Chavez to Barack Obama to the Scottish National Party (SNP). Furthermore, populism is often used in a negative way, as a negative label that is pinned

on one’s political enemies. In sum, the term ‘populism’ is ‘thrown around with abandon’ in the British print media (Bale, van Kessel, & Taggart, 2011).

Therefore, a clear conceptualisation and classification will be the starting point of this research. First, insight will be given into the history of the search for a clear definition. Second, three waves of populism will be identified and one of them will be discussed more in detail. Third, different meanings of populism will be discussed, using the work of Jagers (2006), who reduced the meanings of populism to three categories: populism as an organizational form, populism as a political style and populism as an ideology. These meanings need to be discussed in order to understand the final definition of populism that will be used in this research. The general accepted definition of Mudde will be then again presented and will be more thoroughly explained.

2.2 ... starts here ... The first studies on the definition of populism were made in the 1960s, and a conference around the topic was held on the London School of Economics in 1967. Experts debated there on the questions whether populism was an ideology, a political psychology or an anti-phenomenon (anti-capitalist, anti-urban...). The most important decision was that there was no consensus and there were no unambiguous conclusions that could be made (Jagers, 2006). Another important work on populism is the book of Taggart, named ‘Populism’ and published in 2000. Taggart made use of six central themes to approach populism, these themes are independent from each other but can interact: hostility towards representative politics, identification with an idealised ‘heartland’ (ideal world), the lack of core values, a reaction to a sense of extreme crisis, self- limiting quality and populism as a highly chameleonic phenomenon (Taggart, 2000). By means of these six themes, he made a generalist definition of populism: “populism as an episodic, anti-political, empty-hearted, chameleonic celebration of the heartland in the face of crisis” (Taggart, 2000). This definition has been very important in the development of a definition where all scholars can agree upon. So, the whole definition is not accepted but there are important parts of the definition, that go together with the six central themes, where scholars do can agree upon. Especially the fact that Taggart (2000) identified populism as a highly chameleonic phenomenon

has been accepted in the literature, by which he means that populism can take the colour of the ideology where it connects itself to (such as nationalism or socialism). Rooduijn (2018) agrees and adds that therefore, populism can be attached to different ideologies, ranging from left-wing to right-wing and from progressive to conservative. He also agrees upon the fact that Taggart (2000) associates populism with direct democracy (Rooduijn, 2018). In sum, the work of Taggart has been of an importance that cannot be underestimated, and for that reason, a short insight has been given into his research.

In this paragraph, the history of the research on populism has been given to demonstrate that scholars have been looking for a clear definition of populism for a couple of decades. The definition of Taggart is not widely accepted, but certain themes that he uses are, such as the fact that populist parties are chameleonic. In sum, Taggart has made a large contribution to the literature and has also been used by Mudde (2004) to set his definition. In the next paragraph, three waves of populism will be discussed in order that the reader of this work understands that populism is not a recent phenomenon.

2.3 ... goes around three waves of populism ... The fact that populism can be found in many continents in different shapes and in different decades, makes it hard to develop a definition that is not contextual. That is why some scholars (Jagers, 2006; Pauwels, 2014) discuss three different waves of populism: populism in the nineteenth-century in the USA and in Russia, populism in Latin America in the twentieth century and ‘new populism’ that emerged in the late twentieth century in Europe. Most scholars also agree upon the fact that there exist three waves of populism (Pauwels, 2014) although, sometimes different names are given to the waves. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) define the first wave as agrarian populism, the second wave as Latin American populism and the third wave as new-right populism. The discussion of these three waves of populism would lead us too far, therefore only the last wave will be discussed more in detail, since this wave will be the focus of this research (for more information see: Jagers, 2006; Pauwels, 2014) (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

The third wave of populism, called ‘new populism’, is the wave that emerged at the end of the twentieth century. Parties such as the Front National (FN) in France and Vlaams Belang (VB) have

emerged then and became a part of the party systems in Europe. The main claim of these parties is focused on ethnic nationalism and the belief that states should be inhabited by members that belong to the nation only, nonnational elements are therefore a threat (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2010, 2014). This wave of populism has been extremely successful, certainly for right-wing populist parties (Pauwels, 2014). These parties are sometimes seen as a consequence of a (perceived) new cleavage between the winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008). Moreover, research has shown that most of them attract less-educated voters who are dissatisfied with solutions of mainstream parties and worried about immigration (Pauwels, 2014). In sum, new-right populism focuses on issues such as immigration, taxes, crime and nationalism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

In the next paragraph, the different meanings of populism will be discussed. Some would argue that populism is a communication style, others say that it is an organisation with a charismatic leader and it is also said that it is an ideology (Pauwels, 2014). However, the central theme in all of these meanings is always the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. There are more meanings than the following three, but these are the most important that Jagers (2006) has identified.

2.4 ... and different meanings of populism ... Jagers (2006) has identified three meanings of populism: populism as a type of organisation, populism as a style (to do politics) and populism as an ideology. The three meanings will be discussed here but the latter will be discussed more thoroughly because this is the meaning used in the definition of Mudde (2004) that will be used in this research and that mentions that populism is an ideology (for more information on the first two see: Jagers (2006)).

The first meaning of populism is populism as a type of organisation, that is hierarchically organised, with a strong and charismatic leader at the top. Populist parties often pretend to be loosely organised to demonstrate that they are close to the people but actually, they are organised hierarchically with a charismatic leader at the top (Jagers, 2006). A critique against this particular meaning of populism is that these are characteristics that do not only belong to populist parties (Pauwels, 2014). Strong leaders are also important for mainstream parties and

there are examples of populist parties without an authoritarian leader, such as the American People’s Party at the end of the nineteenth century (Pauwels, 2011b). The latter was a populist party and can be located in the first wave of populism. The other two waves of populism are characterized by charismatic leadership, but as already said, also mainstream parties can have strong and authoritarian leaders. The conclusion is that there does not exist a populist type of organisation (Jagers, 2006).

The second meaning is populism as a political style, as in a way to do politics. This meaning has also been used in the literature, for example in the research of Jagers and Walgrave (2007), populism is defined there as “a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). These political actors can be politicians, ranging from the left to the right, but can also be journalists and movement leaders. They all try to appeal to the people, by speaking about them as if they know what the people want (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). When populism is defined like that, the concept would fit the empirical reality, more specifically that populism is compatible with different ideologies, economic programmes, different social bases (urban or rural area), different types of regimes and different internal structures (charismatic leadership or loosely organised). In sum, populism as a political style is a broadly applicable concept (Jagers, 2006). But, there are also clear limitations on the definition that has been given by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), as almost all political actors refer to ‘the people’ at a certain point in time (Pauwels, 2014). Next to that, the difference between style and content is hard to make. A populist discourse is recognized by what is said, the way it has been said is less important. Populism as a political style underexposes the fact that populism also has a well- defined content, because with ‘real’ populists, a real vision or content can always be found behind the style in which they communicate (Jagers, 2006).

The third meaning is populism as an ideology, which will be used in this research. Among political scientists, there is growing consensus that populism should be considered as an ideology (Jagers, 2006; Lucardie, 2010; Mudde, 2004; Pauwels, 2014). Populism is not an ideology because of its limited substance, it is not as broad as socialism or nationalism, but should be studied as an ideology (Jagers, 2006). More specifically, it is a thin centred ideology that can be easily attached to other (full) ideologies such as liberalism and socialism (Pauwels, 2014). Here, we can make a connection between the first definition of Taggart (2000) that has been given in this research.

He already stated that populism was chameleonic and empty-hearted, and that it can be attached to different other kinds of ideologies (Taggart, 2000). Moreover, Mudde (2004) also agrees upon the fact that populism is a thin-centred ideology and his definition will be more discussed in the next paragraph.

2.5 ... to finally end here? There will always be at least one expert who has arguments for not accepting a definition of populism. This because populism is an essentially contested concept (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). As stated in the previous paragraph, scholars do not even agree upon the meaning of populism. However, there is one definition that is accepted by most experts (Pauwels, 2014).

There was no consensus on the definition before the one that was put forward by Cas Mudde in 2004. After the development of this widely accepted definition, the conceptual debate around the phenomenon ‘populism’ was somewhat settled (Pauwels, 2011b; Pauwels, 2014; Gevers, 2016; Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Mudde (2004) defines populism as: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). By defining populism as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology, he agrees with Taggart (2000), who stated that populism was chameleonic. Populism almost always appears attached to other (full or thin) ideologies such as communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In sum, several scholars agree upon the fact that populism is not an ideology as such, on the contrary, it is a set of ideas. Therefore, it can be attached to different ideologies, from left to right and from conservative to progressive (Rooduijn, van der Brug, & de Lange, 2016).

What scholars do upon agree on, is the core concept of populism: ‘the people’, and its opposite: ‘the elite’, who they always reject. As these are terms that are equally vague as populism, therefore they will be briefly discussed. Next to ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, also the ‘general will’

will be discussed (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). On the contrary, Elchardus & Spruyt (2014), for example, add as a third element the following: the idea of a leader who incarnates the people and speaks common sense (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014).

2.5.1 The people As mentioned in the definition of Mudde (2004), populists consider society as two homogeneous blocks, the people and the elite. Populists think they know the issues and the will of the people and that they can speak for them. ‘The people’ is a construction and populists do not consider outsiders (e.g. immigrants, bureaucrats, politicians or intellectuals) as part of the people (Pauwels, 2014). However, ‘the people’ is a vague construction and, as a consequence, some scholars think that it is a useless concept. Others went searching for an alternative, Taggart (2000) for example, defined the ‘heartland’ of a country, and he defines this as an ideal world or the ‘heart’ of a country. The fact that ‘the people’ is a vague construction, makes it also flexible. According to Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), ‘the people’ is often used in a combination of the following three meanings: the people as a sovereign, the people as the common people and the people as the nation. The idea of the people as a sovereign was usually present in the first wave of populism. ‘The people’ is used as ‘the common people’: populists often praise then a certain group in society that have been excluded because of their sociocultural or socio- economic status. A tactic that is often used by populists, is to appeal to the interests of the common people. The third meaning, the people as a nation, is reductive even though populists often refer to the indigenous population when they use ‘the people as a nation’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

2.5.2 The elite Most populists not only detest the political establishment, but also criticize the economic, cultural and media-elite. They are all lumped up and depicted as corrupt, immoral, incompetent and opportunistic. Moreover, they oppose the ‘general will’ of the people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Next to that, populists worship the people, and the elite or the politicians are not interested in the will of the people because they only care about their own career. They also claim that politicians live in their own world while looking down to the average man. On the contrary, nonpopulist appeals in this case would be to distance themselves from the ordinary

people and arguing that elites are better equipped to govern because of their expertise and competence (Pauwels, 2014).

2.5.3 The general will While there exists among experts consensus upon the fact that the core concepts of populism are ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, there is no consensus upon the fact that the general will is also a core concept. According to Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), this is a core concept but other scholars, such as Pauwels (2014) also mention the ‘general will’ but describe this as the ‘people’s will’ or ‘common sense’. By using the concept of the general will, populists criticize the representative government. According to them, citizens are passively treated and only mobilized during elections, where they only choose their representatives. Because of that, it is not surprising that populists are often in favour of direct democracy (referendums...) (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

In the next section, the different configurations of populism will be explored: neoliberal populism, social populism and national populism (Pauwels, 2014).

2.6 It ain’t over till the fat lady sings Last but not least, Pauwels (2014), in line with Mudde (2007), identified three types of populist parties: neoliberal populist parties, social populist parties and national populist parties.

Mudde (2007) defines neoliberal populism as a core ideology of neoliberalism (primarily in terms of economy) and populism (Mudde, 2007). Pauwels (2014) has a narrower definition and defines neoliberal populism as ‘the people’ who are hardworking taxpayers and entrepreneurs whose efforts are stifled by the political and bureaucratic ‘elites’. Neoliberal populists want to reverse the trend towards big governments and state intervention, and next to that, they also defend ‘the people’ against ‘the corrupt elite’.

The second type of populism, social populist parties, associate the ‘pure people’ with the working class and ‘the elite’ with the bourgeois class while also rejecting the capitalist system, consumerism and neoliberalism. The latter should be, according to democratic socialists,

replaced by state welfarism, public ownership, equality and redistribution. The difference between democratic socialists and populist socialist, is that the latter attach an appeal to ‘the people’ (the working class) against the economic and political elites (that have neoliberal and capitalist ideas) (Pauwels, 2014).

Finally, the last and most successful type of populism in Western-Europe at the moment: national populism. Mudde (2007) defines this type as the ‘populist radical right’. By ‘radical’, he means the opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy and by ‘right’, the belief in natural order with inequalities is meant (Mudde, 2007). The definition of Pauwels (2014) is clearer: ethnic nationalism, combined with xenophobia and combined with the argument that certain groups are unable to assimilate because they differ to much from the native population. Ethnic nationalism means that all non-national ideas, persons and elements are a threat for the homogenous state. Besides that, also authoritarianism is often to be found in their ideologies, what means that a strictly ordered society is wanted, where obedience should rule. Next to that, crime is frequently linked to rising immigration and because of that, they argue that measures should be taken to stop the latter. Populism and nationalism are a good fit because ‘the people as a homogeneous group’ and ‘the homogenous nation state’ are similar. National populists fuel the fear of citizens to lose their national identity, which is relatively easy in times of globalization (Pauwels, 2014).

PART 1: A case study research into the concept of ‘populism’ on a local level in Flanders.

As explained in the part that deals with the ‘case selection’, the cases that will be investigated here are Forza Ninove (Ninove), PVDA Zelzate (Zelzate) and Lijst Dedecker (Middelkerke). There are concrete arguments to suspect that these parties are populist, as this is mentioned in certain newspaper articles and in studies that focused (mostly on VB and LDD) on a national level (Pauwels, 2010, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn et al., 2019). But, as already mentioned in the part on the definition of populism, the concept is often used inappropriately and in a negative way. Because of that, this part is essential in this dissertation. Is it possible to confirm these assumptions or is populism also ‘thrown around with abandon’ in Belgian media (Bale et al., 2011)? This will be investigated and evidence will be presented in order to be able to answer additional research question 1: Are Forza Ninove, PVDA in Zelzate and LDD populist parties?

1 Literature study

First of all, it should be mentioned that the literature on populism in Belgium and Flanders only deals with the national and regional level and as a consequence, only this kind of literature can and will be discussed here. But these studies are also used in order to be able to tell whether or not these parties are also populist on a local level.

Before being able to start the literature study on these parties, a note should be made for the case of Forza Ninove. In this part, the literature study, Forza Ninove will be equated with Vlaams Belang (VB). The reason for the equation is that some evidence can then be presented on the fact that VB is a textbook case of a right-wing populist party (Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2014). No studies have been done on whether or not Forza Ninove is a populist party, but scholars did research on whether or not the VB is a populist party. These studies are very interesting and can also be used while doing research on Forza Ninove, because the local party Forza Ninove has been connected for a long time to VB (on a national level). They also share the same nationalist, extreme right ideology. In sum, not presenting the research that has been done on VB would mean that a lot of research on populism in Flanders would not be presented. Since the purpose of this paper is also to present and compare the

studies that have been done on populism in Flanders, excluding those of VB would mean a gap in the literature that is presented in this paper.

Next to that, the party has always been linked with VB, for instance, the party leader of Forza Ninove, Guy D’haeseleer, was also the party leader of VB in the 2014 elections for the Flemish Parliament. However, in 2015, Forza Ninove announced that it has cut all ties with their national counterpart, the VB. They stated that Forza Ninove would, from then on, be an independent and autonomous party and that it would have its own structure, by-laws and that it would also be financially independent. But nevertheless, the party leader, Guy D’haeseleer, still has a seat in the Flemish Parliament for VB, while there was also an option to sit there as an independent Member of Parliament (Van Den Houte, 2015). Furthermore, Guy D’haeseleer, is again the party leader for VB in the upcoming elections for the Flemish Parliament on May 26, 2019 in East- Flanders. Next to that, also in newspaper articles, Forza Ninove is equated with VB (Renson, 2018).

There have been a lot of studies on populism in Flanders, mostly on the radical right populist party VB. The most important ones will be discussed in the next section. After the discussion on VB, the studies on the Workers’ Party of Belgium (PVDA) will be discussed in order to provide an overview of how populism appears in social populist parties. The last party that will be discussed in this literature study, is Lijst Dedecker (List Dedecker, LDD). In comparison to the electoral success the party has known, a lot of studies have been done when it comes to the populist factor of LDD.

1.1 Vlaams Belang (VB) Jagers (2006) did research on populism in Flanders and was one of the first experts to (do an attempt to) measure populism. The aim of his study was to make populism an empirically useful concept, within the Flemish context, and to test the usability of the concept. For the first time, a qualitative analysis was performed on populist parties in Flanders. Later, Jagers & Walgrave (2007) and also Pauwels (2011b, 2014) did a more systematic content analysis (a quantitative analysis) which will be discussed later in this part. Jagers (2006) investigated three Flemish political parties: CD&V, SP.a and Vlaams Belang. The conclusion of his research on Vlaams

Belang, that was under investigation between 2003-2004, is that the party meets the necessary conditions of a populist ideology. As opposed to SP.a and CD&V, who were not classified as populist parties (Jagers, 2006). A variant of the definition of Mudde (2004) was used, but that definition also includes the three main terms discussed above: the people, the elite and the general will. Jagers (2006) could conclude that Vlaams Belang is using these three main concepts in its populist meaning, and that it is applying them as in the definition of Mudde. Next to that, the discourse of Vlaams Belang is strongly depending on dichotomies: the people vs. the elite/establishment, and many variants are also common: common sense vs. otherworldliness, democracy vs. dictatorship, altruistic vs. a lust for power... (Jagers, 2006).

These results are in line with what Jagers & Walgrave (2007), Pauwels (2011b, 2014) concluded, although they used another, quantitative, method. Pauwels (2014) not only used a quantitative method to identify populist parties, but also a ‘classification through minimal definition (of populism)’. The result of both the quantitative and the qualitative study was that Vlaams Belang is indeed a national populist party (Pauwels, 2014). Pauwels (2014) also agrees with Jagers (2006) with regard to the fact that the central argument in their rhetoric is that the elite or establishment uses political correctness as a moral coercion on society, and it imposes it on the VB and on the man in the street in order to silence the problems of multiculturalism (Jagers, 2006; Pauwels, 2014). According to the VB, there is a conspiracy by the traditional parties against the VB, which is, according to them, the only party that defends the silent majority, the general will and democracy (Jagers, 2006).

Furthermore, in its rhetoric, VB showcases a fundamental trust with respect to the representation and places the ultimate right to decide in a ‘real’ democracy, with (a part of) the sovereign people (Jagers, 2006). The VB seeks to restore the voice of the people by introducing direct democracy. The party is considered to be a textbook example of a national populist party (Hooghe et al., 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2014). Hooghe et al. (2011) also add that VB sees ‘the Flemish people’ as a homogenous group who have common sense, work hard and pay taxes while being betrayed by an elite that is corrupt. Also these authors say that the solution of VB to this problem is to install direct democracy (Hooghe et al., 2011).

However, the most cited study on populism in Belgium is, according to Van Aelst & De Cleen (2016), the one of Jagers & Walgrave (2007). The latter investigated populism as a political communication style in Belgium. This study also has been discussed in the part on the theoretical framework, as one of the three meanings of populism. They compared the communication style of Vlaams Belang with the style of other parties, in order to be able to test whether or not Vlaams Belang is using an external communication that is full-blown populist. By means of a quantitative text analysis, and a ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ definition of populism, they could conclude that Vlaams Belang has a totally different communication style compared to other Belgian parties, as it is an example of full-blown populism. They used another conceptualization of populism, which is also interesting to mention: they made the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ populism. With ‘thin’ populism, they understand that political actors refer to ‘the people’. With ‘thick’ populism, also an explicit anti-establishment position and an exclusion strategy of certain populations is meant (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). However, it should be noted that populism is in this study seen as an ideology and not as a type of communication, but since the study of Jagers & Walgrave (2007) has made a big contribution to the literature,

As already mentioned, Pauwels (2011b) did a quantitative text analysis to measure the degree of populism and therefore, a dictionary has been made. This dictionary is also based on the definition of Mudde (2004), where populism is considered to be a thin ideology containing three core concepts: the people, the elite and the general will. The empirical analysis showed that the VB and LDD were the most populist parties among the sample (that included Groen!, SP.a, CD&V, N-VA, Open VLD, LDD and VB). Moreover, also a classification could be made in terms of varieties of populism and as a result, it was confirmed that Vlaams Belang is a populist radical right party while the LDD was labelled as a neoliberal populist party (Pauwels, 2011b).

In sum, most scholars agree upon the fact that Vlaams Belang is a nationalist populist party, even when other measuring methods are used (de Lange & Akkerman, 2012; Jagers, 2006; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Lucardie, 2010; Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011b, 2014; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2016; Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016; Van Haute et al., 2018). The studies that were the most important and the most relevant for this dissertation were discussed in this part.

1.2 Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA) Most of the studies on populism in Belgium and Flanders have focused on Vlaams Belang, because this party has had the most electoral success. On the contrary, the Workers’ Party of Belgium, or Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA) under which name the party is known in Flanders, has not known much success, as already stated in the introduction of this work. The party is the only national organised party in Belgium and the name under which it operates is called Parti du Travail (PTB) in Wallonia, where it has known more electoral success than in Flanders. As a result of this moderate/low success, not many studies have been done on this party (Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016).

However, some scholars such as Pauwels (2014) and Delwit (2012) did research on the fact whether PVDA/PTB is a populist party in Belgium or not. Pauwels (2014) considers the PTB/PVDA as a social populist party, based on a classification through a minimal definition of populism. His arguments are based on the fact that they wrote in their party programme that ‘big parties knock on your door when there are elections but turn their back on you afterwards’. Moreover, they also wrote ‘that they (the big parties) live on another planet, far away from our daily problems’. The parliament urgently needs a party that lives among the people: the PTB’ (Pauwels, 2014). Unfortunately, the PVDA/PTB was not included in the (quantitative) computerized content analysis to measure the degree of populism in political parties in Belgium. However, Pauwels (2014) was able to conclude that PVDA/PTB is a populist party based on his ‘minimal definition’- method (Pauwels, 2014). Delwit (2012) agrees with Pauwels (2014) upon the fact that he considers the PVDA/PTB also a social populist party. Delwit wrote that, for the Belgian case, Front National (in Wallonia) and Vlaams Belang are definitely national populist parties and that PVDA/PTB is a social populist party. Actually, Delwit only mentions the PTB in his study, but since this party is (the only) national party in Belgium, this also applies for PVDA (Delwit, 2012)

Next to that, also Van Aelst & De Cleen (2016, p. 7) stated that ‘the Workers Party (PVDA) has clear populist elements’. This is based on the argument that the distinction between the people and the elite plays an important role in their communication (only translated in economic terms). The PVDA/PTB uses slogans that, according to Van Aelst & De Cleen, confirm this matter: “It is their crisis – make them pay” and “First the people, not profit” (Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016).

Another interesting study is the PopuList, this is a list that is made by academics and journalists and initiated by The Guardian (Rooduijn et al., 2019). The list classifies populist, far right/far left and/or Eurosceptic political parties in Europe that obtained at least 2% of the votes in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998. The list classifies PVDA-PTB (that is called the ‘Workers Party of Belgium’) as a far-left, Eurosceptic party but not as a populist party. The research was also done by a sort of ‘classification through minimal definition’, and also here, the definition of Mudde (2004) has been used. The list is frequently updated, and the results are peer-reviewed but they also admit that the list is not perfect, ‘in particular with respect to borderline case’, where PVDA is situated. Unfortunately, no information has been given on how they did the classification, only the used definitions (among which the definition of Mudde (2004)) are given. As a consequence, it is impossible to refute the arguments they used in order not to classify PVDA-PTB as a populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

While the PopuList says that PVDA is not a populist party, international research with data of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey states that there are two parties in Flanders: both VB and PVDA (LDD was not included in the research) (Reynebeau, 2016). When researchers connected authoritarian values with populist rhetoric, only VB scored high (together with the Parti Populaire in Wallonia). But when socio-economic points of view were taken into account, on a right-left axis, PVDA was placed on the far-left side of the axis. Additionally, PVDA scored also very high on populist rhetoric, with a score just above 70%, and this in line with VB (Kooyman, 2017). Contrary to what would be expected of the radical right party, the VB scored very moderate on the right-left axis when it comes to socio-economic points of view. It had a moderate score of around 50%, which lies in the middle of the axe, while PVDA is positioned on the extreme left side (Reynebeau, 2016).

On the contrary, in the work of Hooghe et al. (2011, p. 257) it is mentioned that ‘the extreme left Party of Belgain Workers tends to use some populist anti-capitalist rhetoric’. Nothing more is mentioned further, because the party obtained less than 1% of the votes in the 2009 Federal elections (Hooghe et al., 2011). Furthermore, also Lucardie (2010) classifies PVDA within the social populist political parties, although it is mentioned that the party never fully embraced populism and that it rather remained a dogmatic and extreme left-wing party (Lucardie, 2010). This study confirms more or less with what the PopuList mentions, namely that PVDA-PTB is a

far-left, Eurosceptic party but not a populist party. Another observation by Lucardie (2010), is that the communication of PVDA has softened over the years. While PVDA stated in 2002 that it rejected the current parliamentary democracy, where the people have nothing to say, and that it wants a council democracy that is led by a communist party. In 2009, PVDA moderated its tone and emphasized socio-economic problems, the financial crisis and the maintenance of the unity of Belgium (Lucardie, 2010).

To summarise, not many studies have focused on the matter whether the Workers’ Party of Belgium is populist or not. Some of the studies that have been found suggest that the party is a social populist party or has at least clear populist elements (Delwit, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2011; Pauwels, 2014; Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016), while other authors say that PVDA only is a far-left, (Eurosceptic) party (Lucardie, 2010; Rooduijn et al., 2019)

1.3 Lijst Dedecker/Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (LDD) Research on populism in Flanders focuses mostly on two parties: mainly on Vlaams Belang and after that, much research has been done on Lijst Dedecker (List Dedecker, LDD). The reason for this is obvious, since these parties have known their success in Flanders and are also most of the time assumed to be populist.

Lijst Dedecker (List Dedecker, LDD) was founded in January 2007 by Jean-Marie Dedecker, after being expelled from first the Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish Liberals and Democrats, VLD) and a couple of days later also from the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N- VA). Following the example of his Dutch counterpart, Pim Fortuyn, Dedecker chose the name ‘Lijst Dedecker’ for his own, brand new party. Because of the fact that Dedecker was already well-known in Flanders, the party got also well known in a short period of time. The slogan he used was gezond verstand (common sense) and his aim was to fill in the gap on the right, between VLD and VB (Pauwels, 2010, 2014). The party obtained, contrary to all expectations, 6,4% and 7,6% of the votes in the 2007 and 2009 elections. Then, as a result of a series of scandals and internal tensions, LDD obtained only 3,7% of the votes in 2010, resulting in only one candidate that was elected into parliament. In 2011, the name of the party changed from Lijst Dedecker to Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (Libertarian, Direct, Democratic, LDD), but the

change was undone for the 2012 local elections (Pauwels, 2010, 2014). Currently, the party has no representatives in any parliament, nor in Flanders nor in Belgium (Delvaux, 2014).

The most important study that has been done (until now) on LDD is probably the one of Pauwels (2010), in which he explained the success of LDD in Belgium. He describes the party as a liberal populist party, since the ‘thin-centred’ populist ideology is attached to a neo-liberal ideology. The latter is the ‘thicker’ ideology because it provides more elaborate information on how the world should be structured. LDD follows the neo-liberal’s tradition and says that the government should only provide the most essential services and that the individual should be left unrestrained as much as possible (Pauwels, 2010).

LDD is also populist since the party is very critical of the Belgian political elite and more specifically of the ‘particracy’, which is said to function only by means of compromises between party leaders of the traditional political parties and where citizens have any say (Pauwels, 2010). The Belgian political system is presented by Jean-Marie Dedecker as ‘clientelistic and corrupt’, while Dedecker himself sees him as the representative of the common citizens (Pauwels, 2014). The party declaration of LDD often refers to ‘the people’, when it says that it pursues a ‘policy of common sense’ and that it ‘stands up for all the people in Flanders’. Next to that, LDD also pleads for more direct democracy, which states that LDD wants politics to be the expression of the general will of the people (Pauwels, 2010). As a result, he wants to restore the voice of the people, and citizens should be able to decide upon all subjects by referendum, even upon community issues (Pauwels, 2014).

The previous methods that were used to investigate whether or not Lijst Dedecker is a populist party, were all classifications through the minimal definition (of populism). But Pauwels (2014) examined the degree of populism also by means of a computerized content analysis. However, the results remain the same, concluding that Lijst Dedecker is indeed a populist party. The results of the test showed that both LDD and VB scored relatively high on populism (Pauwels, 2014).

Another quantitative method to measure populism is used by Pauwels (2011b), more specifically, a quantitative text analysis. The results of his research show that, in the internally oriented party literature, LDD is even more populist than VB, with a percentage of 16% of the LDDs ideology

that is being devoted to populism whereas this is only 12% for the VB. Another finding in this study is that the degree of populism in internally oriented literature is higher for all political parties in Flanders, than the degree of externally oriented party literature. Next to that, in line with Pauwels (2010, 2014), also this study classifies LDD as a neo-liberal populist party (Pauwels, 2011b). Moreover, Lucardie (2010) and also Hooghe et al. (2011) categorise LDD within the liberal-populist parties, for more or less the same reasons that Pauwels (2010, 2014) already mentioned, like the ‘common sense’ slogan and the fact that they want to make the voice of the people heard and that they want to defend their interests (Hooghe et al., 2011; Lucardie, 2010).

To conclude, most scholars agree upon the fact that LDD is a neo-liberal populist party (Hooghe et al., 2011; Lucardie, 2010; Pauwels, 2010, 2011b, 2014). This is again confirmed by Rooduijn et al. (2019) because the PopuList categorises LDD as a populist party and additionally, also Rooduijn (2018) mentions in his case selection that LDD is a populist, but not a radical right nor radical left party.

2 Methodology

The conclusion of the literature study is that VB and LDD are definitely populist parties, while mixed evidence was found on PVDA. These studies have been done on a national level, so in the next part it will be investigated whether these parties are also populist on a local level. In other words, additional research question 1 will be investigated: Are Forza Ninove, PVDA in Zelzate and LDD in Middelkerke populist parties? In this part, the methodology will be explained; more specifically the method, data and validity and reliability and the limits. Then, in the next part evidence will be prevented in order to answer additional research question 1.

There are a couple of methods to measure populism. The methods that are mostly used are: content analysis, computerized content analysis and the minimal definition (Pauwels, 2014). In order to be able to use the content analysis or computerized content analysis method, a populist codebook should be used. That codebook is a dictionary with all populist words in so that, for example a computer can check by means of a quantitative method which parties are populist and which are not (Pauwels, 2014). Since no populist codebook exists to measure populism on a

local level in Flanders, this is a recommendation for future research. This can be done following the example of Gevers (2016), who made it for the Netherlands (Gevers, 2016). The focus of this research is the explanatory part of the electoral success of populist parties (part 2) so the development of such codebook falls outside the main scope of this research.

The minimal definition method will be used here and it will be based on the definition of Mudde (2004) that was given in part 2 (theoretical framework) and also the core concepts of populism will be used: the people, the elite and the general will (as explained in 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). The definition of Mudde is specific enough to be able to substantiate the answer on additional research question 1. The data that will be used are party manifestos and newspaper articles. But also some quotes of the interviews that were done with local experts will be given when they provide more information or when certain findings are confirmed by the interviewees. The list with questions per interviewee can be found in the attachments. This data will be used to be able to analyse whether a party matches all minimal criteria to be labelled as a populist party, and these minimal criteria are the core concepts of populism (Pauwels, 2014).

The limitations of this method are that there will be mainly relied on party manifesto’s that have a limited number of pages and according to Pauwels (2011b), “in survey language, these are too small an n to be reliable” (Pauwels, 2011b). The party manifesto of Forza Ninove is 48 pages long, the one on LDD is 6 pages long and the one of PVDA Zelzate is around 16 pages long. Next to that, another limit is that it is assumed that the party presents a stronger opinion in communication that is meant to be seen internally (such as magazines) than in communication that is for external use (such as manifestos) (Van Haute et al., 2018). In other words, it could be that in internally oriented communication more use is made of populist language than in externally oriented communication. Another weakness is that this method also leaves room for discussion, but at the same time that is also a strength because populism is a broad concept and by using this method, there is also room for interpretation (Pauwels, 2014). For example, sp.a was considered a populist party according to the computerized content analysis of Pauwels (2014). But according to Pauwels, “a careful qualitative analysis has demonstrated that sp.a is not a populist party (see Jagers, 2006) and the results of a computerized content analysis might lack validity due to the lack of interpretation, it seems that this result is flawed” (Pauwels, 2014, p. 44).

In sum, to assess whether or not these parties are populist, I will use election manifestos, newspaper articles and I will also present the opinion of the interviewees of each municipality, in order to double check the findings. Moreover, as can be seen in the previous part, sufficient research is done on identifying populist parties on a national level, and in the discussion on the results the findings will also be compared with the research that has been done on a national level. Next to that, this is also an explorative thesis and much more research has to be done in order to draw real conclusions. In the next part, evidence will be presented in order to be able to answer additional research question 1.

3 Results

In this part, the results of the investigation on additional research question one will be presented. First, evidence of populist elements will be provided on Forza Ninove. The next party is PVDA Zelzate and lastly, LDD in Middelkerke will be discussed.

3.1 Forza Ninove In what follows, evidence will be provided in order to be able to answer additional research question 1. This will be done using the core concepts of populism: the people, the elite and the general will.

3.1.1 The people Forza Ninove sees ‘the people’ as the real Ninovieters or ‘real inhabitants’ and they do not see immigrants or people with another skin colour as ‘the people’, but as outsiders. Evidence on this claim will be provided by giving this (translated) piece of their election folder (the original one can be found in attachment 1): “The gradual Frenchification of our city is happening at a rapid pace. This evolution is encouraged by the city council through, among other things, their cowardly attitude regarding the mosque-file and their pampering policy around OCMW issues. This has a ‘pull effect’ to our city. The figures are clear: more than half of the new inhabitants in our city are foreigners who mainly speak French.

The pamper policy no longer has anything to do with solidarity but is a pure attack on our social system. It is neither socially nor financially sustainable and justified. While more and more Ninovieters can no longer pay the bills at the end of the month, the money taps are turned on for the "newcomers".”(D’haeseleer, 2018, p. 3) This last sentence can be place in the definition of Mudde, ‘the people’ are here more specifically the Ninovieters (inhabitants of Ninove) and the outsiders here are the ‘newcomers’. They try to drive a wedge between the, according to them, ‘real inhabitants’ or ‘the real Ninovieters’ and the immigrants. Next to that, in Ninove, every criminal matter that happens is linked to rising immigration by Forza Ninove on social media. Every criminal matter that is possible to link with immigrants, will be linked. In this way, they are fuelling the anxiety that already exists among the in habitants (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019).

3.1.2 The elite Forza Ninove also criticises the then (in 2018) local government, and is going so far that it even accuses them of favouritism and a culture of ‘political self-service’ and also here, evidence is provided by giving a translated piece of their election folder (the original one can be found in attachment 2): “Ninove has been governed by the same parties for decades. This not only leads to a total lack of new ideas, but unfortunately also to a culture of favouritism and political self- service. Moreover, the operation of the municipality was paralyzed for 6 years by internal arguments and political contradictions within the coalition of VLD, CD&V, SP.a and Groen. It could not be different since the only aim of this coalition was: putting the biggest party offside, namely Forza Ninove! While the current coalition was mainly concerned with itself and political friends, they did not have an eye for the ever-increasing social problems in our city.” (D’haeseleer, 2018, p. 3). Additional evidence on this issue can be found in attachment 3 (in Dutch).

3.1.3 The general will According to a local journalist of Ninove, the party leader of Forza Ninove, Guy D’haeseleer wants people to think that he says what ‘the people’ think and what ‘the people’ feel. According to the journalist, Guy D’haeseleer has said during an interview that for him, “being called a populist, is

an honourable title” (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019). Next to that, in their election folder, Forza Ninove writes that the then (in 2018) local government “has done everything to distract the ‘Ninovieter’ with parties and receptions, so that he or she did not see the real problems”(D’haeseleer, 2018).

3.2 PVDA Zelzate In what follows, evidence will be provided in order to be able to answer additional research question 1. This will be done using the core concepts of populism: the people, the elite and the general will.

3.2.1 The people As already mentioned in the literature study, the slogan of PVDA is ‘first the people, then the profit’ (Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016) and this is also the case for PVDA Zelzate (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). Next to that, they mention in their party programme that “Europe and the Flemish government is keeping the municipalities in a financial stranglehold.” and that “the then (in 2018) local government cooperated well with that”. Moreover, “because of that financial stranglehold, the costs for the ‘common Zelzatenaar (inhabitant of Zelzate)’ cannot be lowered” (PVDA Zelzate, n.d.). A translation of these quotes can be found in attachment 6.

3.2.2 The elite PVDA in Zelzate tries to create a perception of a higher middle-class elite, who do not belong to the ‘working class’, as can be found in their party programme (PVDA Zelzate, n.d.): “Zelzate is a typical workers' municipality with an outdated population. Some parties are striving for a municipality that we can call ‘the Sint-Martens-Latem on the Channel’ with some exaggeration, with a shift from the average working-class municipality to the well- to-do middle class. Ultimately this means repression of the common people. Our municipality has its own characteristics and needs that do not need elite lofts.”(PVDA Zelzate, n.d.).

Again, also here, a Dutch translation of this piece of the party programme can be found in attachment 7. ‘The elite’ is here not only the political opponent, but also the higher middle-class citizen.

3.2.3 The general will In the preface of the party programme of PVDA, they mention that “the starting point of their programme are the results of the survey they conducted. They only describe the problems that were mentioned in that survey” (PVDA Zelzate, n.d.). Next to that, they mention that their party programme is a “work in progress, because our campaign is the continuation of the constant dialogue with the people” (PVDA Zelzate, n.d.).

3.3 LDD Middelkerke In what follows, evidence will be provided in order to be able to answer additional research question 1. This will be done using the core concepts of populism: the people, the elite and the general will.

3.3.1 The people Jean-Marie Dedecker, the party leader of LDD in Middelkerke, likes to be around the ‘common people’ and will never behave as an ‘elite’. According to a local journalist, Dedecker tries to express this by not wearing a suit but just a shirt for example. Next to that, he always uses ‘easy’ and understandable words and the journalist even compares him with Trump (and Theo Francken), by which he means that they also do not use difficult words to explain things (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). Next to that, the journalist also mentioned that lately and also before the elections, when there is a town council the room is always full of people that come to listen to what Dedecker has to say. Important to mention is that this is because the then (in 2018) local government has made a couple of mistakes in the case of the new casino in Middelkerke (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). Some even speak of corruption, but that will be further discussed in the next paragraph and in part 2 of this research).

3.3.2 The elite In order to be able to understand what is illustrated on the cartoon that can be find bellow (illustration 1), a short history about the new casino of Middelkerke must be given. Probably, there have been made some mistakes in the process of the giving the contract to a construction firm. And with ‘probably’, it is meant here that the legal investigation is still going on. But probably, some favouritism is playing here. This was of course a gift for Jean-Marie Dedecker, who attacked the local government again and again during the town councils, which could also explain why the rooms were so full (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). LDD also spread a cartoon around this matter in 2017, and can be found below:

Illustration 1: Cartoon that was spread all over Middelkerke by LDD in 2017

Source: Van Assche, 2017

Illustration 1 is a cartoon that was spread by LDD in Middelkerke before the municipal elections of 2018. Municipal secretary Pierre Ryckewaert is pictured as Napoleon and aldermen Michel Landuyt and Lilianne Pylyser-Dewulf and mayor Janna Rommel-Opstaele as money-seeking birds

(Van Assche, 2017). This illustration speaks for itself; it is also very accessible and everyone (who knows the case) can understand what LDD means with this. This is the perfect illustration of what Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) mean with that populist depict the political establishment as corrupt, incompetent and opportunistic.

3.3.3 The general will LDD stated in their party programme that they want to organise binding referendums so that citizens have a say in what happens in the municipality. According to their party programme, there are also more scandals than only the casino-file, and they want to stand for an honest, transparent and open government (Lijst Dedecker, n.d.). The original, Dutch version of this part in the party programme of LDD can be found in attachment 8. According to Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), populists are often in favour of direct democracy, and this is an example of that.

4 Discussion

The empirical results can only be compared with the research that is done on a national level and that is elaborated upon in the part on the literature study. Next to that, since the minimal definition method was used, also some references to the definition of Mudde (2004) and to the core concepts of populism will be made.

Forza Ninove tries to drive a wedge between ‘the people’, by which they mean the ‘Ninovieter’ and the ‘immigrants’ or the new inhabitants of Ninove that speak French. Another wedge is driven between ‘the people’ and the previous local government, because they would have encouraged the ‘Frenchification’ in the city. Jagers (2006) also found in his study that VB is relying much on dichotomies and this can be observed here, with Forza Ninove as well. Next to that, a reference can also be made to the definition of Mudde and more specifically, the core concept ‘the people’. The latter is a construction and populist do not consider outsiders as part of ‘the people’ (Pauwels, 2014), and this can be observed here too. Next to that, also ‘the establishment’ or ‘the elite’ do not belong to the concept of ‘the people’. The previous local government was criticised by Forza Ninove and accused them of favouritism and political self-service. This quote can be linked to what is said in 2.5.2 about ‘the elite’, i.e. that populist detest the elite and that

the elite is depicted as corrupt and incompetent (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). While for some politicians being called a populist is something ‘dirty’ and do not want to be associated with populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2003), for Guy D’haeseleer this is not the case. He wants people to think that he says what ‘the people’ think and what ‘the people’ feel. Lastly, when Forza Ninove should be placed in a type of populist party (as discussed in 2.6 in the previous part), it would be a national populist party.

The slogan of PVDA is, according to Van Aelst & De Cleen (2016) a populist element so this can also be seen as the first populist element of PVDA Zelzate, since they have the same slogan: First the people, then the profit. Next to that, also here some groups do not belong to ‘the people’ because as PVDA Zelzate sees it, ‘the people’ are the common ‘Zelzatenaar’, who is part of the working class. The higher middle class is not seen as ‘the people’ because critique was given on the previous government for willing to build “elite lofts” for the higher middle class (PVDA Zelzate, n.d.). This can be seen as a confirmation of what Hooghe et al. (2011) wrote about PVDA, namely that PVDA tends to use some populist anti-capitalist rhetoric. Moreover, a certain group in society is excluded based on their socio-economic status (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Next to that, other outsiders of the construct ‘the people’ are the previous local, Flemish and European government, and are seen as an ‘elite’ that keep the municipality of Zelzate in a financial stranglehold (Pauwels, 2014; PVDA Zelzate, n.d.). Lastly, PVDA Zelzate is in favour of more direct democracy, which is a characteristic of the third core concept of populism, i.e. ‘the general will’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Lastly, when PVDA Zelzate should be placed in a type of populist party (as discussed in 2.6 in the previous part), it would be a socialist populist party.

Pauwels (2014) wrote about Dedecker that he likes to be seen as the representative of the common people, and in Middelkerke, he embodies this by not wearing a suit but a shirt. Next to that, the political system is perceived corrupt and clientelistic by Dedecker (Pauwels, 2014) and with the casino case in Middelkerke, Dedecker’s opinion was confirmed. Next to that, as the cartoon (illustration 1) shows, members of the previous government are depicted as ‘elites’ and that is the perfect illustration of what Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) mean with that populist depict the political establishment as corrupt, incompetent and opportunistic. In research that studied LDD on a national level, already stated that LDD is in favour of more direct democracy

and this is also the case in Middelkerke, so also there, LDD wants politics to be an expression of the general will of the people (Pauwels, 2010). Lastly, when LDD should be placed in a type of populist party (as discussed in 2.6 in the previous part), it would be a neoliberal populist party.

For now, additional research question 1 can be confirmed because some clear populist elements are found for every political party, but more research needs to be done on this issue in order to be 100% sure. Moreover, a weakness of the use of the minimal definition method is that it does not allow for a reliability check, and definitely not when it is applied by a single researcher, as is the case here (Pauwels, 2014). But, since this part is not the main focus nor the main research question of this dissertation, it is sufficient that populist elements are found. Next to that, the findings also need to be nuanced because it could be that other, perceived mainstream parties in these municipalities also have some populist features (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2010). Future research could explore to what extend mainstream parties differ from populist parties on a local level. Another recommendation for future research is the role of social media, as this is becoming more and more important, also in local elections. In the next part, the electoral success of these parties in the 2018 local elections will be explained.

PART 2: What can explain the populist vote? Analysis of the results of the local elections of 2018.

In the previous part, it has been investigated whether Forza Ninove, PVDA Zelzate and Lijst Dedecker in Middelkerke are populist parties or not. Now the most important part of this study will come, that is to try to give an explanation for the populist votes and to investigate whether it is possible to find common characteristics in the context of these three municipalities. In order to fully understand the municipal context and contrary to what the general title of this part indicates, it is also necessary to analyse (a part of) the political history. But the central question here is to understand the reason why these populist parties were able to get such a high number of votes in the 2018 local elections. Is the only reason that can be identified a charismatic leader that uses populist language to attract voters? Or are there other reasons that serve as an explanation? Is it possible to identify common characteristics that can be an explanation for the populist vote and that are found across the three municipalities? Moreover, since this is a dissertation to obtain the degree of Master of Public Administration and Management, some policy recommendations will be given in the afterthoughts of this dissertation. A lot of questions are asked here, but there is only one main research question: What can explain the electoral success of populist political parties in the 2018 local elections in Flanders?

First, the literature on this topic will be analysed and the specific variables and sub-research questions will be provided. Then, the methodology will be explained and after that, the results will be presented. This is followed by a discussion of the results.

1 Literature study

First, the problem of ecological fallacy will be discussed. Then, some information on the difference between municipal and national elections will be given since much of the literature investigates populism on a national level. Then, as already mentioned in the introduction, the difference between the supply and demand side of populism will be discussed. It is only then that the variables on the demand side will be discussed and after that, the same will be done with the variable on the supply side.

1.1 Ecological fallacy First of all, it is necessary to mention that also for this part, that is to explain the populist votes, most of the studies have been focusing on a national or regional level (so on Belgium or on Flanders). Because of this, caution is necessary when these studies are used to explain the populist votes on a local level. They will be primarily used in order to provide a general overview of the studies that have been done on explaining the populist votes in Flanders. Next to that, also by means of these existing studies, it will be explained why the variables that will be used in this study were chosen. Caution is necessary when the result of national studies will be discussed, because of the problem that Mudde (2007) calls ‘ecological fallacy’. Mudde (2007, p. 201) mentions in his study on populist radical right parties in Europe that “often (micro) individual behaviour is explained on the basis of (macro) state-level variables”, and the other way around (Mudde, 2007, p. 201). An example of ‘ecological fallacy’ is when a study on populism in Belgium concludes that the average voter for VB is male, white and old; that this becomes a stereotype of the VB-voter. But it is not because a study on the average voter on a national level finds average characteristics, that these can be applied to VB-voters on an individual level. When ‘ecological fallacy’ is applied to this study, it will be important to keep in mind that the goal of this study is not to explain (micro) individual behaviour or to find the ‘average’ populist voter in these municipalities or to find correlations between individual attitudes and voting behaviour. The aim is to find general characteristics (on a macro- and meso- level) of these municipalities that (possibly) can explain the high share of populist votes. With macro-level explanations broad economic, social and historical processes are meant that take place on a national level, and examples are crises and the perceived threat of non-European immigrants. The meso-level is, according to Mudde (2007), the local organisations of which people are a member, the school where they went to and the values and norms they have and learned in school or their family. Mudde also mentions that the meso-level could impact the voting behaviour more than the macro-level, because there is a closer link between the social context and the individual, so it is more likely that socioeconomic or demographic characteristics of a neighbourhood impact the voting behaviour. Lastly, micro-level explanations are for example populist radical right attitudes and insecurity (Mudde, 2007).

1.2 Municipal vs. national elections Municipal elections differ from national elections and since most studies on populism are done on a national level, it is useful to provide some explanations on the difference between both levels. In some countries, research has shown that elections on a local level are not as important as national elections and more specifically, that the local ones would be of a second-order. When elections are of second-order, this means that the votes that people cast, are based on an evaluation of another political level or arena (Marien, Dassonneville, & Hooghe, 2015, p. 899). For this specific case, that would mean that when there are local elections in Belgium, that people vote based on the evaluation of the state of the national (or regional) level and not take into account specific local factors that should guide their voting behaviour when local elections were of first order. Marien et al. (2015) prove that this is not the case for Belgium and that local elections are indeed first order elections, which means that people vote based on the evaluation they make of their local governments and policies (Marien et al., 2015). They have tested this by asking people for their voting motives, and the majority responded that they take local events into account and more specifically, most of the time candidates were the most important motive but also policy issues and evaluations of the current governing parties. In sum, people do take into account what is going on in their municipality (Marien et al., 2015, p. 911). If this would have not been the case, and voters in Flanders decide on which party they vote based on the evaluation of for example the federal level when they vote for the local level, then the policy of local parties in their municipalities would have a less significant impact on the results of the elections. If voters do base their decision on local issues and considerations, then which issues and considerations do they take into account? According to Marien et al. (2015), local politics in Belgium are still, to a large extent, “a matter of friends, neighbours and local personal contacts” but also evaluations on local politics are made (Marien et al., 2015, p. 910). According to a Dutch study of Boogers (2013), citizens assess their municipality based on how the latter treat their problems and takes their wishes into account, while the quality of services are not that important. In other words, municipalities should invest in local democracy, because if there are then cuts made in the quality of the services it would “not endanger the perceives quality of the local government” (Boogers, 2013, p. 35).

1.3 Supply of vs. demand side of populism In order to be able to give a complete answer to the research question of this part, it is necessary to make a distinction between the supply and demand side of populism (Mudde, 2007). The demand side is what voters want, and demand-side factors of populism are for example immigration control while the supply side is what politicians have to offer, such as the party ideology (Pauwels, 2014). In general, the demand side of populism are the attitudes of voters (Spruyt et al., 2016) while the supply side of populism consists of “the populist ideology and the populist rhetoric” (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014, p. 1). Moreover, according to Van Kessel (2013), Rooduijn (2018) and other experts, it is important to investigate both the demand and supply side in order to be able to make a judgement about the electoral performance of populist parties and to fully understand their success (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Van Kessel, 2013). In Wallonia for example, the levels of trust in politics is lower in comparison to the levels in Flanders. Since low levels of trust are often to be found a ‘breeding ground’ of populism; according to the demand side should be able to thrive there. But this is not the case in Wallonia, no serious populist party has known real success (until now) and it is suggested that this is due to the fact that no serious populist party has presented itself (Hooghe et al., 2011; Pauwels, 2014). In the next part, the variables on the demand side of populism will be explained. After that, the variable on the supply side of populism will be explained.

1.4 Variables on the demand side of populism The variables are: the socio-economic position, the levels of trust in the governments, cultural differences and the sense of insecurity. They will be discussed following the same order.

1.4.1 Impact of socio-economic position on the populist vote A study on the explanation of the success of Vlaams Blok (the previous name of Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interest) analysed the economic conditions and found that in general, VB is more supported in “prosperous municipalities with a low level of unemployment and low income inequality” (Coffé et al., 2007, p. 152). The explanation for this finding is that people that live in good economic conditions do not want to share with people that are poorer (Coffé et al., 2007). The study of Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers (2002) confirms this explanation and states that the level of unemployment has a negative effect on support for extreme right-wing parties. But these

studies only investigated extreme right-wing parties and not populist parties. Another study that focussed exclusively on populism suggests that in the support for populism, “feelings of economic, cultural and political vulnerability come together” and that it is able to unite different grievances (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 344). Next to that, that same study also found that it is not vulnerability as such that matters, but subjectively experienced vulnerability (such as relative deprivation), what is somewhat in line with the explanation of Coffé et al. (2007) that is given above. Elchardus and Spruyt (2014) add to this reasoning that a weak economic position makes it more likely that people develop feelings of relative deprivation. They argue that these people are also more likely to have a declinist view on society, blame the political elite for this and as a consequence, are more likely to support populism. This in contrast with Rooduijn (2018), who hypothesized that people with a low socioeconomic position would be more likely to vote for a populist party because of mediating factors such as being Eurosceptic, have less trust in politics and are more in favour of direct democracy. This reasoning was based on the work of Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) who stated that the populist right is able to attract the “losers of globalisation” (by which they mean the lower educated working in traditional sectors) (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). But the results of the empirical research of Rooduijn (2018) show the opposite: he found no proof that the voter bases of populist parties “consist of individuals who are more likely to be unemployed, have lower incomes, come from lower classes, or hold a lower education” (Rooduijn, 2018, p. 14). In sum, there is no conclusion or main finding that is accepted on this variable in the literature which makes it an interesting variable to include in this research.

Sub-question 1: Are the socio-economic positions (i.e. to have lower incomes, to have more inhabitants with a living wage and to have a higher poverty- or social disadvantage-index) of inhabitants lower in municipalities where the share of populist votes is higher than the Flemish average?

1.4.2 Impact of the (dis)satisfaction with democracy Dissatisfaction with democracy is generally to be found a predictor for the support of populist parties (de Lange & Akkerman, 2012; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016; Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016). Dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy together with a support for more direct democracy have been found to be important motivations of many

populist voters. Pauwels (2014) found that this was not only an important driver to vote for the VB but also for the LDD. Next to that, also Van Aelst & De Cleen (2016) indicate that there is a higher degree of political distrust among the VB electorate. Spruyt et al. (2016) even found that of all the indicators they used in their model, “a lack of external political efficiency was by far the single most important predictor for the support of populism” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 344). With external political efficiency they mean the belief that institutions and politicians are unresponsive to citizen’s demand (Spruyt et al., 2016). Moreover, also Rooduijn (2018) finds that political distrust has a positive and statistically significant effect on populist voting. In sum, only positive evidence regarding the link between the dissatisfaction with democracy and populist voting can be found. However, Pauwels (2014) makes this more specific by mentioning that corruption and the feeling that elites are self-serving and untrustworthy can also provide a “fertile breeding ground for populist mobilization”, but that further research to the variable of corruption needs to be done (Pauwels, 2014, p. 190). Moreover, also Mudde & Kaltwasser (2017) mention corruption as a breeding ground for populism and Pauwels (2010) gives a concrete example of Antwerp, where scandals (that happened before the 2000s) created a breeding ground for VB (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Pauwels, 2010). These scandals were all linked to clientelism, a system that rewarded the voters for their electoral support, and was a dominant phenomenon until the 2000s in Belgium because it could not survive in a fast changing and globalised economy and also undermined the legitimacy of the established parties (Pauwels, 2010). Another factor that can be linked with populist voting, is support for more direct democracy. This factor is even the second most important one to be linked with populist voting in general, next to the dissatisfaction with democracy. However, more research should be done. In the same way as with the dissatisfaction with democracy, support for more direct democracy is a factor that is found among VB and LDD voters (Pauwels, 2014). Therefore, the two variables that will be investigated are trust in the governments and a will or support for more direct democracy. The latter will be measured based on the satisfaction with the level of direct democracy in their municipality.

Sub-question 2: Are inhabitants of municipalities with a higher populist vote than the Flemish average less satisfied with democracy (i.e. do they have less trust in governments and are they satisfied with the level of direct democracy in their municipality)?

1.4.3 Impact of immigrants and cultural differences There is a considerable amount of studies that claim that the rise of immigrants and a culture of anti-immigrant feelings are related to populist voting. It is the study of Coffé et al. (2007) that shows that the presence of Turkish and Maghrebian citizens has a positive effect on the voting for VB but that it is “the fear of the Islamic way of living that leads to the extreme right voting” (Coffé et al., 2007, p. 153). Research on extreme-right wing voting in Europe also shows that there is a strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and the support for extreme right (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). These studies are all describing only extreme right wing (populist) parties so this indicator would be expected to be only found in Ninove, because this relates to voting for VB (and also Forza Ninove). But according to the research of Pauwels (2014), also anti-immigrant attitudes were important in the prediction to vote for LDD, although this was not expected. Ristov (2017) even claims that the rise of populist movements is caused by an anti-immigration rhetoric, what suggests that there should also be looked at the supply side of populism (Ristov, 2017). This in contrast to Rooduijn (2018), who did research to populism in general and states that those with a negative attitude towards immigration are more prone to vote for the populist radical right. In sum, it can be concluded that research on this variable suggests that the impact will be the biggest in Ninove, and perhaps also in Middelkerke (LDD). Since no research has been done on the link between anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme left-wing voting, results of the municipality of Zelzate will have to be awaited. Specifically for Ninove, research has found that the arrival or presence of immigrants in the 1990s were the levers of the VB campaign (De Decker et al., 2005), but this analysis was done in 2005 so also here, the results have to be awaited.

Sub-question 3: Are inhabitants of municipalities where the share of populist votes is higher (then the Flemish average), more hostile or have a more hostile attitude towards immigration?

1.4.4 Sense of insecurity As already mentioned in the introduction, the literature on the relationship between populism and insecurity or a sense of insecurity is diverse. First of all, most of the literature only explores the link between insecurity and nationalist or radical right populist parties (Mudde, 2007; Coffé et al., 2007; Pauwels, 2014). For that reason, it seemed interesting to investigate here, where all

three forms of populism are investigated although it will be most likely that this factor will be present in Ninove, where Forza Ninove is a populist radical right party. Pauwels (2014) for example, mentions that national populist parties want more law and order and because of the fact that they often link crime to rising immigration, they believe that both should be stopped. Mudde (2007) mentions that insecurity can be a micro-level explanation on why people would vote for populist radical right parties. Research in the Czech Republic on the regional level has found a positive relationship between crime rates and voting for populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, research in Flanders on a municipal level has found no correlation (Coffé et al., 2007) which suggests that it only plays a marginal role in explaining why people vote on populist parties (Mudde, 2007). However, the real numbers of crime can be moderate or like the average, but it is possible that the sense of insecurity deviates from these real numbers. This sense of insecurity has not been the subject of previous research and therefore, this will be investigated based on sub-research question 4:

Sub-question 4: Is there a higher sense of insecurity in municipalities where the populist vote is higher than the Flemish average?

1.5 Variable on the supply side of populism The variable on the supply side that will be discussed is the impact of a charismatic party leader.

1.5.1 Impact of a charismatic party leader Politics and definitely local politics are still a matter of persons and knowing candidates, certainly in Belgium (Marien et al., 2015). Moreover, the importance of leadership and more specific, a charismatic leader cannot be underestimated when it comes to explaining the electoral success of (populist) political parties. It is hard to measure who is a charismatic leader but Pauwels (2010) provides some criteria, such as having a special mission to save the people. Another criterion is the use of their qualities to convince the people that they can change the direction of how politics is done. The third criterion is to create a ‘leader-follower identity’, populists will be claiming that they belong the ordinary people but they are also being dominant, so they create devoted followers (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Pauwels, 2010). Next to that, they try to create a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and ‘them’ is most of the time immigrants or other established

parties (Pauwels, 2010; Spruyt et al., 2016). And lastly, personal presence is also important such as a talent for public speaking and showing good on television (Pauwels, 2010, p. 1024). Jean- Marie Dedecker, the party leader of LDD, possesses all of these criteria so he is perceived as a charismatic leader. However, the organization of the party is also important, because research has shown that trust in democracy can be as low as it could get, but if a party is badly organised, people would still not vote for that party (Spruyt et al., 2016). Moreover, a charismatic leader shows again to be important because parties who possess one are much more successful (Lubbers et al., 2002). In sum, the supply side of populist parties cannot be underestimated in explaining their success. The link to the demand side can easily be made, because often these charismatic leaders are able to attract ‘vulnerable people’ (i.e. mostly people who hold a vulnerable economic position) and are able to translate their daily experiences into support for populism (Spruyt et al., 2016). This suggests that there is an interplay between the demand and supply side of populism and populist parties.

Sub-question 5: What is the impact of a charismatic leader on the populist votes?

2 Methodology

As already mentioned, this will be a case study research. The fact that only 3 cases are under investigation, makes that there are some problems concerning the reliability and validity of this research. Since this is an explorative research, it will be difficult to draw real conclusions (Van Thiel, 2015). For this part, the method of triangulation or mixed methods will be used, which means I will use more than one method in order to improve the validity of this research (Van Thiel, 2015, p. 65). First, information that will be used that is provided in a Flemish monitor on municipalities, called Gemeentemonitor (Municipal Monitor) in order to get a first general overview of the municipality. This data will also be used to provide a general overview of the variables that are investigated in each municipality. To check the data of the Municipal Monitor and to look beyond the numbers, interviews have been done with mostly journalists and one mayor - people that have some expertise and knowledge regarding their community. In sum, elements of qualitative and quantitative research will be used in order to establish an objective understanding of the situation in the municipalities (Mortelmans, 2013).

The data of the Municipal Monitor dates from 2016, but since this is the most recent (publicly available) information, this will be used. The survey was carried out on a representative sample of inhabitants (from the age of 17). In table 1, the sample numbers and net response of the survey can be found (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, n.d.)

Table 1: Sample of the Municipal Monitor

Net response Sample numbers Net response (%) Ninove 347 990 35,1% Zelzate 355 940 37,8% Middelkerke 363 950 38,2% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, n.d.

The numbers and figures that are used from the Municipal Monitor will be discussed in the next part (3: results). To check the numbers of the Municipal Monitor and in order to be able to look beyond the numbers, four interviews were done: two in Ninove, one in Zelzate and one in Middelkerke. The respondents were selected based on the expertise they have regarding their community. That is the reason why most interviews are done with journalists. These interviews can be called elite-interviews, because they have a lot of expertise on what is going on in their municipality (because they write and report about it) (Van Thiel, 2015). Two interviews were done in Ninove, with the mayor and with a journalist. Afterwards, it was noticed that the journalist was a bit more objective and could tell me more about what lives in the community. However, the second interview did not give much more information (Grounded Theory (Van Thiel, 2015, p.165)). The main things were already told in the first interview with the mayor. Therefore, for Zelzate and Middelkerke one interview was done in each municipality, with journalists. The journalist of Zelzate also wrote a book about Zelzate (that I read) and he gave me a very clear view of what lives there and what the feelings were on the 16th of October 2018 (election day). For the interviews, the method ‘semi-structured interview’ was used and a topic list was used. But because I find it hard to formulate questions ‘on the spot’, most of the time, I prepared all my questions and they can be found in the attachments (Mortelmans, 2013). The interviews were analysed using the transcriptions, and this was done on paper. Nvivo was not used because in the book of Mortelmans (2011), it is mentioned that “qualitative software is especially needed

if you are no longer able to make the analyses on paper and in your head because of the size of your basic material”. Because of the fact that only four interviews had to be analysed, it was still possible to analyse the interviews on paper (Mortelmans, 2011). The limitation of this method is that the cases are limited, and it will not be possible to find any statistical correlation nor will it be possible to draw conclusions that are generalizable for the whole of Flanders. But that is also not the intention of this research, since this is explorative research (Van Thiel, 2015).

3 Results

In this part, the results will be presented, and the sub-questions are used as a guidance. The municipalities that are discussed here are Ninove, Zelzate and Middelkerke. Before the actual results are discussed, a small introduction will be given on each municipality and also the results of the 2012 and 2018 local elections will be provided in order to have a first general overview of the local politics in the municipalities.

3.1 Ninove Ninove is a (small) city in the valley of the Dender, to the west of Brussels and has around 38 000 inhabitants (Stad Ninove, 2018). As can be seen in table 2, Forza Ninove has gained 40% of the votes during the 2018 local elections in Ninove (Wauters, 2018). If this result is compared to the 2012 local elections, a big win can be noted because then, Forza Ninove gained 26,5% of the votes (Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.). After the 2018 local elections, a local government was formed between Open VLD, SAMEN and Joost Arents of N-VA (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019). In order to have a complete overview of the results of the 2018 local elections for the municipality of Ninove, a table with the results will be provided here (table 2):

Table 2: Result 2018 local elections Ninove

List % Seats Forza Ninove 40% 15 Open VLD 26,9% 9 SAMEN 22,4% 7 N-VA 8,4% 2 UW ALTERNATIEF 1,4% 0 ANDERS (+PVG) 0,8% 0 Source: Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.

In the next paragraphs, the different variables will be discussed that can possibly explain the electoral success of Forza Ninove. First, the variables on the demand side will be discussed and afterwards, the supply side will also be discussed.

3.1.1 Demand side of populism In this part, the variables on the demand side of populism will be discussed in the same order as the sub-research questions were presented.

3.1.1.1 Impact of the socio-economic position on the populist vote The first variable that is discussed here, is the socio-economic position and this variable is measured by means of the following proxies: the average income and the living wage of the inhabitants of Ninove.

Table 3: Average income per inhabitant in Ninove

2015 Average income per inhabitant (in €) Ninove 18 749 Flemish Region 18 970 Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b

As can be seen in table 3, in Ninove the average income per inhabitant is €18 749. That is only a bit lower than the average of the Flemish Region, which is €18 970. No real big differences can be identified here, so another economic variable, the number of persons with a living wage, will be checked. This number is even lower in Ninove compared to the Flemish average: 5,0 per 1

000 people have a living wage in 2017 compared to 6,0 in the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b). The poverty- or social disadvantage-index is on the rise in this municipality and in 2016, it rose to 13,4%, compared to 12,8% for the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b). A difference can be noted here, although it is only a small difference and there are no signs that indicate that the majority of the inhabitants of this city are living in poverty although it is generally a bit poorer than the average municipality in the Flemish Region.

In sum, these numbers do not deviate much from the Flemish average. This can be confirmed by the interviews with the local expert (i.e. the mayor of Ninove and a local journalist) because they both mentioned that the economic factors are not the most important ones that can explain the populist vote (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019; T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). Next to that, Forza Ninove gained 40% of the votes and it is dangerous to say that they all have lower socio-economic positions (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

3.1.1.2 Impact of the (dis)satisfaction with democracy In order to be able to measure the dissatisfaction with democracy, certain proxies of this variable will be used (that are measured in the Municipal Monitor). These proxies are the share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in their local government and the share of inhabitants (in %) who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in the municipality. First, the numbers of the level of trust in the local government will be presented:

Table 4: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Ninove

2017 Little trust Neutral A lot of trust Ninove 28% 47% 25% Flemish Region 20% 45% 35% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b

As can be seen in table 4, the results do deviate from the numbers of the Flemish Region: 28% of the inhabitants in Ninove have little trust in their local government while this is only 20% in

the Flemish Region. Moreover, only 25% of the inhabitants have a lot of trust in their local government, while this number is 35% in the Flemish Region. When this is compared to the levels of trust in the federal and Flemish government, the numbers are much closer to the average of the Flemish Region: 35% of the inhabitants have little trust in the Flemish government, which is exactly the same number as in the Flemish Region. 20% of the inhabitants have a lot of trust in the Flemish government, while this is 22% in the Flemish Region. So, the level of trust in the Flemish government is more or less the same in Ninove as in the Flemish Region. Additionally, trust in the federal government is a bit lower in Ninove when compared to the average of the Flemish Region. In Ninove, 45% of the inhabitants have little trust in the federal government while the average of the Flemish Region is 39%. Next to that, 13% of the inhabitants of Ninove have a lot of trust in the federal government while the average in the Flemish Region is 16% (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b). In sum, it seems that the inhabitants have less trust in their local government in comparison with the average of the Flemish Region. The difference in trust in the Flemish and federal government is generally lower than the average in the Flemish Region, but to a lesser extent.

The local journalist of Ninove confirmed that the inhabitants are in general not satisfied with the current local government, but she also nuanced this by saying that this is also because of the rapid increase of the numbers of immigrants who came to Ninove (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019). Moreover, the mayor mentioned that the service of the municipal administration is still a bit rigid and bureaucratic and that sometimes, people have to come back because the civil servant does not know it either (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). But this means that it is assumed that these factors influence the level of trust that inhabitants have in their government, it could also be that these factors have no impact on the level of trust that inhabitants have. Next to that, in 2012, Forza Ninove was already the biggest party, but because of the cordon sanitaire, it was put aside and could not govern. And according to the journalist, this is something that people do not understand, and that people do not find fair. Moreover, this also gives people a feeling of sympathy with Forza Ninove but can also be a cause of the lower levels of trust (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

The other indicator that is being used here, is serving as a proxy to measure the demand or support for more direct democracy, and measures the satisfaction that inhabitants have when it comes to involvement when there are changes in their municipality (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b).

Table 5: Share of inhabitants (in %) who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Ninove 39% 26% 36% Flemish Region 26% 27% 47% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b

As can be seen in table 5, 39% of the inhabitants disagree with this statement, meaning that they do not think that their municipal council does enough effort to involve their inhabitants when changes are happening in the municipality. In the Flemish Region, it is only 26% of the inhabitants that disagree with this statement (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b). These numbers can be confirmed by the mayor, who said that some attempts to involve the inhabitants did not succeed. For example, they conducted a survey in which was asked what the municipality should do with a site that was empty until then (make a skatepark, a playground, regular park...). 80% of the people who filled in the survey answered that they wanted a skatepark there. But a decision was already made in the municipal council that the main destination of the site should be economic trade (shops), so it was impossible to build a skatepark there. And Guy D’haeseleer used this to criticise the municipal government, saying that the local government does not listen to its inhabitants, while D’haeseleer himself also knew that it was impossible to build a skatepark there (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). Next to that, people have the feeling not being heard by politicians and they also want more transparency (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

3.1.1.3 Impact of immigrants and cultural differences The third variable here is a hostile attitude towards immigration and is measured in the Municipal Monitor by asking inhabitants of Ninove the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Ninove (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b).

Table 6: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Ninove

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Ninove 39% 29% 31% Flemish Region 17% 29% 54% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b

As can be seen in table 6, there is a big difference between the municipality of Ninove and the Flemish Region when it comes to this variable. While 31% of the inhabitants of Ninove agree with the statement that the different cultures live well together in their municipality, this is 54% in the Flemish Region. Moreover, 39% of the inhabitants of Ninove disagree with the statement, while this is only 17% in the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b). During the interviews, it also became clear that the recent rise of immigrants who came to live in the city have a large share in the explanation of the electoral success of Forza Ninove. Next to that, a lot of inhabitants are annoyed by the fact that a lot of these immigrants speak French. But, according to the mayor of Ninove, it is Guy D’haeseleer that is fueling this discontent, because he created an ‘us-them’ story and did everything he could to create or paint a negative image of people with a migration background. For example, when he visited the neighbourhood of Okegem (in Ninove) during the campaign, he has put a Facebookpost saying that that neighbourhood was just like the Matongé neighbourhood (in Brussels, where many people with Congelse roots are living). People reacted on that post, saying that they should leave and that, when Guy would be in power, that that would disappear. Moreover, every criminal matter in Ninove that is committed by someone with an immigration background, is amplified enormously on social media by Forza Ninove and Guy D’haeseleer (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). Next to that, people from different cultures are not in contact with each other and do not know each other (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

3.1.1.4 Sense of insecurity The last variable that is measured in the discussion on the demand side of populism, is sense of insecurity in Ninove:

Table 7: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Ninove

2017 Never or seldom Occasionally Often or always Ninove 58% 31% 11% Flemish Region 75% 20% 5% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018b

As can be seen in table 7, 11% of the inhabitants in Ninove feel often or always unsafe in Ninove. This can also be confirmed by the interviewees, namely that there is a feeling of insecurity in the municipality. The real safety figures have decreased during the last year, but the sense of insecurity has not followed that trend, so it has not decreased. The mayor also thinks that this is because of the fact that Guy D’haeseleer takes every opportunity to say that Ninove is an insecure city: sometimes he calls Ninove the ‘second Molenbeek’ (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). The journalist of Ninove also said that it is because of the high sense of insecurity that people have, that they are not satisfied with the local government (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

3.1.2 Supply side of populism In this part, the variable on the supply side of populism will be discussed.

3.1.2.1 Impact of a charismatic party leader This variable is not measurable in numbers or graphs, so here the only material that is used are the two interviews that have been done with people from the municipality. According to the interviewees, the person of Guy D’haeseleer has played a huge role in the results of the local elections. Guy D’haeseleer, the party leader of Forza Ninove, is very charismatic, a good communicator and almost constantly ‘between the people of Ninove’ (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). Definitely during the campaign, he was constantly present in the streets of Ninove. Next to that, he communicates a lot, in a very simple and understandable way and he does the same on social media. Moreover, he presents simple solutions and he says what the people think (C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

3.1.3 Ranking of variables At the end of every interview, it was asked to score the variables that were being discussed during the interview. The score of 1 is given for the most important cause and 6 for the least important cause.

Table 8: Scoring of the variables in Ninove

T. De Jonge C. Van den Houte Cultural differences 1 2 Less trust in governments 4 6 Economic factors 6 5 Sense of (in)security 3 1 Person of Guy D’haeseleer (party 2 3 leader of Forza Ninove) Inhabitants less satisfied with 5 4 direct democracy Source: C. Van den Houte, personal communication, April 12, 2019; T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019.

As can be seen in table 8, the three most important factors are according to both of the interviewees the cultural differences, the sense of insecurity and the person of Guy D’haeseleer. The numbers of the Municipal Monitor can confirm this fact, so it is highly possible that these three factors can indeed explain the electoral success of the populist party Forza Ninove. In the next part, it will be investigated what the explanations are for the electoral success of populist party PVDA Zelzate.

3.2 Zelzate Zelzate is a municipality close to the border of the Netherlands with around 13 000 inhabitants. Zelzate lies in the middle of the Port of Gent and is split by the channel Gent-Terneuzen (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). As can be seen in table 9, PVDA has gained 22,8% of the votes in the 2018 local elections and in the 2012 local elections, the party (then called PVDA+) gained 22% of the votes (Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.). After the elections of 2018, a local government was formed including the parties: PVDA and sp.a (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). Additionally, in order to have a complete overview of the results

of the 2018 local elections for the municipality of Zelzate, a table with the results will be provided here:

Table 9: Results of the 2018 local elections in Zelzate

List % Seats VLD-SD 26,3% 7 Sp.a 24,9% 7 PVDA 22,8% 6 Vlaams Belang 7,3% 1 Zelzate Positief 7,1% 1 N-VA 6,7% 1 TeZamen Zelzate 4,9% 0 Source: Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.

In the next paragraphs, the different variables will be discussed that can possibly explain the electoral success of PVDA. First, the variables on the demand side will be discussed and afterwards, the supply side will also be discussed.

3.2.1 Demand side of populism In this part, the variables on the demand side of populism will be discussed in the same order as the sub-research questions were presented.

3.2.1.1 Impact of the socio-economic position on the populist vote The first variable that is discussed for Zelzate is the socio-economic position and this is measured by means of the following proxy: the average income per inhabitant. Afterwards, the figures on the living wages will be discussed.

Table 10: Average income per inhabitant in Zelzate

2015 Average income per inhabitant (in €) Zelzate 17 629 Flemish Region 18 970 Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c

As can be seen in table 10, the average income per inhabitant is €17 629, which is more than €1000 less than the average income per inhabitant in the Flemish Region. Next to that, the number of people with a living wage in Zelzate is also higher than the Flemish average: 8,0 per 1 000 people have a living wage in 2017 compared to 6,0 in the Flemish Region. Moreover, this trend can also be identified when the poverty- or social disadvantage-index is observed. This index is also high in this municipality: in 2016, 18,4% of the children that were born in this municipality, were born in disadvantaged families. This number is much lower in the Flemish Region: 12,8% (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). These figures can be confirmed by the interviewee, a local journalist of Zelzate. According to him, these figures can be explained by the fact that there has been a socialist local government for more than 80 years in Zelzate (with the exception of the last legislature). The social government focused a lot on social housing and because of that, a certain ‘type’ of people is attracted. As from the 1990s, the unemployment figures increased and now, as can be seen in the figures, there is a lot of child poverty. According to the journalist, people with a lower socio-economic situation would be more prone to vote for PVDA, but also for sp.a. Next to that, some people had the feeling that only PVDA was really listening to them and that say that they want to do something about the child poverty-rates. This is a problem that the traditional parties could not fix and that could be a motivation to vote for PVDA. Next to that, it is also necessary to mention that the party leader of PVDA, Geert Asman, is also a doctor in the medical practice ‘Geneeskunde voor het Volk’ (Medicine for the people), where people can consult a doctor for free. So, a lot of people know Geert Asman, mostly as their doctor, so he has some credibility that could maybe also attract people to vote for him (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This last issue will be further discussed in paragraph 3.2.2.1. But the socio-economic problem can also be connected with the dissatisfaction with the democracy, what will be explained in the next paragraph.

3.2.1.2 Impact of the (dis)satisfaction with democracy The first proxy to measure the satisfaction with the democracy, is the share of inhabitants that have trust in the local governments in Zelzate. The other proxy is about the satisfaction with the direct democracy in the municipality.

Table 11: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Zelzate

2017 Little trust Neutral A lot of trust Zelzate 48% 38% 14% Flemish Region 20% 45% 35% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c

As can be seen in table 11, trust in the local government is a lot lower in Zelzate compared to the average of the Flemish Region. This means that almost 50% of the inhabitants in Zelzate have only little trust in their local government, while the average in the Flemish region is only 20%. And only 14% of the inhabitants have a lot of trust, compared to the average of the Flemish Region: 35% (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). These figures can be confirmed by the interviewee, mentioning that the traditional parties of the last 3 legislatures have failed in their policy. For 18 years long, they have been arguing and fighting with each other, but they did not handle the problems the municipality was struggling with. People got tired of it and PVDA is a party that has been in the opposition for more than 20 years now and probably, people wanted to give them a chance (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). The numbers on trust in the Flemish and federal government lie closer to the average of the Flemish Region. In Zelzate, 40% has little trust in the Flemish government, compared to 20% that has a lot of trust. These figures are a bit lower than the average of the Flemish Region: 33% has little trust in the Flemish government, while 22% has a lot of trust. However, the figures on trust in the federal government are more in line with the average (compared to the level of trust in their local government). In Zelzate, 44% has little trust in the federal government and 16% has a lot of trust. The average in the Flemish Region is 39% for those that have little trust and 16% that have a lot of trust (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). In general, these figures are all just a bit under the average of the Flemish Region. This can also be confirmed by the interviewee, because there were some problems with the neighbourhood of ‘Klein Rusland’. The Flemish government wants to reconstruct the highway that crosses in Zelzate, and because of that, the neighbourhood ‘Klein Rusland’ would have to disappear. However, this neighbourhood has a lot of history and the people of Zelzate were not happy with that plan. Now, the Flemish government says that they are going to reconstruct that

highway for more than twenty years, but nothing has happened yet. As a result, people become dissatisfied with the governments (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). The next proxy that will be discussed here is about the satisfaction with direct democracy, measured in the Municipal Monitor by asking inhabitants of Zelzate if they are satisfied with the involvement they have in the municipality:

Table 12: Share of inhabitants (in %) who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Zelzate 48% 26% 26% Flemish Region 26% 27% 47% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c

As can be seen in table 12, 48% of the people disagree and think that their municipality is not doing enough efforts to involve them. This number is also higher than the average of the Flemish Region, which is 26% (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). This can also be confirmed by the interviewee, because there is no ‘information paper’ of the municipal government that is distributed in Zelzate, so inhabitants have only little information on what is going on in their municipality (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This also explains the low numbers of trust in their local government. The next variable that is discussed, is the impact of immigrants and cultural differences.

3.2.1.3 Impact of immigrants and cultural differences The third variable that is discussed here is a hostile attitude towards immigration and is measured in the Municipal Monitor by asking inhabitants of Zelzate the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Zelzate (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c).

Table 13: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Zelzate

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Zelzate 27% 38% 35% Flemish Region 17% 29% 54% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c

As can be seen in table 13, only 35% of the inhabitants of Zelzate agree with the statement that the different cultures live well together in their municipality. This is 20% lower than the average in the Flemish Region, what is 54% (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). Moreover, the interviewee confirms that there is a problem in Zelzate. There is a street with a mosque and when there are prayers there, sometimes there are some problems. But PVDA had also a very multicultural list and it could be that they attracted those voters because of that. But the cultural problem is probably not the best variable that can explain the high support for PVDA, it can probably explain the votes for VB better (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019).

3.2.1.4 Sense of insecurity The last variable that is measured in the discussion on the demand side of populism, is sense of insecurity in Zelzate:

Table 14: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Zelzate

2017 Never or seldom Occasionally Often or always Zelzate 53% 36% 11% Flemish Region 75% 20% 5% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c

As can be seen in table 14, also here in Zelzate 11% of the people feel often or always unsafe, which is twice as high as the average of the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018c). When these numbers were presented to the interviewee, he could not immediately find an explanation. According to him, there have been some criminal matters that have been recently committed, but that is happening in every municipality. This number can be probably better explained on of the fact that the municipality can be found in the middle of the Port of Gent and that it is split by the channel Gent-Terneuzen. Because of that, there is a drug problem in the municipality, which can also cause a feeling of insecurity (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). In the next paragraph, the supply side will be explained.

3.2.2 Supply side of populism In this part, the variable on the supply side of populism will be discussed.

3.2.2.1 Impact of a charismatic party leader Geert Asman is the party leader of PVDA in Zelzate, and as already mentioned, he is also a doctor in the medical practice ‘Geneeskunde voor het Volk’ (Medicine for the people), where people can consult a doctor for free. But Geert Asman cannot be categorised as the traditional charismatic person, rather as a very accessible person that also stands close to the people. But the fact that he is doctor for Geneeskunde voor het Volk, has made sure that he is not seen as a person with extreme-left ideas, but as a normal person with the credibility of a doctor (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This can also be an explanation why people voted on PVDA.

3.2.3 Ranking of variables At the end of the interview, it was asked to score the variables that were being discussed during the interview. The score of 1 is given for the most important cause and 6 for the least important cause. Table 15: Scoring of the variables in Zelzate

K. Vereecke Cultural differences 5 Less trust in governments 1 Economic factors 6 Sense of (in)security 4 Person of Geert Asman (party 2 leader of PVDA) Inhabitants less satisfied with 3 direct democracy

As can be seen in table 15, the most important explanatory variable is the (low) level of trust in the governments, followed by the person of Geert Asman. These variables are identified by the interviewee as the most important in explaining the electoral success of PVDA Zelzate (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). What is attracting attention, is that the economic factors are placed on the last place, which means they are according to the interviewee the least important cause.

3.3 Middelkerke Middelkerke is a coastal municipality with around 15 000 inhabitants (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). As can be seen in table 16, Lijst Dedecker (LDD) received 44,1% of the votes during the 2018 local elections. If this result is compared to the 2012 local elections, a big win can be noted because in then, because LDD received 24,9% of the votes (Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.). After the elections, a local government was formed between LDD and CD&V (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). In order to have a complete overview of the results of the 2018 local elections for the municipality of Ninove, a table with the results will be provided here:

Table 16: Result 2018 local elections Middelkerke

List % Seats Lijst Dedecker 44,1% 14 Open Vld 22,8% 6 CD&V 13,6% 3 N-VA 6,2% 1 Groen 6,1% 1 Vlaams Belang 3,7% 0 Project M 3,3% 0 Source: Vlaamse Overheid, n.d.

In the next paragraphs, the different variables will be discussed that can possibly explain the electoral success of LDD. First, the variables on the demand side will be discussed and afterwards, the supply side will also be discussed.

3.3.1 Demand side of populism In this part, the variables on the demand side of populism will be discussed in the same order as the sub-research questions were presented.

3.3.1.1 Impact of the socio-economic position on the populist vote The first variable that is discussed for Middelkerke is the socio-economic position and this is measured by means of the following proxy: the average income per inhabitant. Afterwards, the figures on the living wages will be discussed.

Table 17: Average income per inhabitant in Middelkerke

2015 Average income per inhabitant (in €) Middelkerke 18 176 Flemish Region 18 970 Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a

As can be seen in table 17, the living wage in Middelkerke is a bit lower than the average of the Flemish Region. Next to that, 6,9 per 1 000 people in Middelkerke have a living wage, compared to 6,0 persons in the Flemish Region. The poverty- or social disadvantage-index is 16%, compared to 12,8% in the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a). But the interviewee of Middelkerke, a local journalist, could not confirm that this would have something to do with the high votes for LDD. The reason for this is that the party does not even have a social programme (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). The next variable that is discussed, is the dissatisfaction with democracy.

3.3.1.2 Impact of the (dis)satisfaction with democracy The variable that is measured here, is the dissatisfaction with the democracy. The first proxy to measure that, is the share of inhabitants that have trust in the local governments in Middelkerke. The other proxy is about the satisfaction with the direct democracy in the municipality.

Table 18: Share of inhabitants (in %) that have trust in the local government in Middelkerke

2017 Little trust Neutral A lot of trust Middelkerke 29% 40% 32% Flemish Region 20% 45% 35% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a

As can be seen in table 18, the numbers on trust in the local government do not differ so much from those in the Flemish Region, although they are generally lower than the average in the Flemish Region. The percentage of the inhabitants that have little trust in their local government is 9% (29%) higher compared to the average of the Flemish Region (20%). Next to that, the numbers that measure trust in the Flemish and federal government do not differ that much from the average in the Flemish Region. 24% of the inhabitants of Middelkerke have a lot of trust in the Flemish government, while this is 22% in the Flemish Region. 34% of the inhabitants of

Middelkerke have only little trust in the Flemish government, while this is 33% in the Flemish Region. Moreover, the figures that measure trust in the federal government are average: 16% of the inhabitants have a lot of trust in the federal government, and this number is exactly the same as the average of the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a). But these figures cannot be confirmed by the interviewee, because as already mentioned in the previous part of this research (in 3.3: LDD Middelkerke), some scandals have happened during the legislature of the previous local government. The casino file definitely had an impact on the results of the elections, and certainly with a populist figure as Jean-Marie Dedecker, who attacked the previous government again and again during town councils. That government could not respond in a convincing way to the accusations of LDD and Jean-Marie Dedecker. When there was a search done by the police in the town hall, the previous government and the mayor could only respond that the investigation was still going on. But that is not a convincing answer for the people when there may be corruption or favoritism (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). Because of the fact that these numbers date from 2017, it remains to be seen whether these figures in trust will decrease or not.

The next proxy that will be discussed here is about the satisfaction with direct democracy, measured in the Municipal Monitor by asking inhabitants of Middelkerke if they are satisfied with the involvement they have in the municipality:

Table 19: Share of inhabitants who think that their municipal council is making sufficient efforts to involve inhabitants in changes in their municipality

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Middelkerke 32% 18% 50% Flemish Region 26% 27% 47% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a

As can be seen in table 19, these figures are also almost the same as the average in the Flemish region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a). However, these figures do not provide enough information on the explanation of the electoral success and it remains to be seen whether these figures will also decrease or not (as a result of the casino case).

3.3.1.3 Impact of immigrants and cultural differences The third variable that is discussed here is a hostile attitude towards immigration and is measured in the Municipal Monitor by asking inhabitants of Middelkerke the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Middelkerke (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a).

Table 20: Share of inhabitants (in %) that agree with the following statement: the different cultures live well together in Middelkerke

2017 Disagree Neutral Agree Middelkerke 14% 31% 55% Flemish Region 17% 29% 54% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a

As can be seen in table 20, these figures are more or less the same as the figures of the Flemish Region. Moreover, the interviewee could confirm that there is no issue with the cultures that are living in the municipality, because of the fact that there are not so much immigrants or different cultures (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019). It can be concluded that cultural differences had no impact on voting for LDD.

3.3.1.4 Sense of insecurity The last variable that is measured in the discussion on the demand side of populism, is sense of insecurity in Middelkerke:

Table 21: Share of inhabitants (in %) who feel often or always unsafe in Middelkerke

2017 Never or seldom Occasionally Often or always Middelkerke 83% 15% 2% Flemish Region 75% 20% 5% Source: Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a

As can be seen in table 21, most of the inhabitants (83%) are feeling themselves never or seldom unsafe in Middelkerke, and this is 75% in the Flemish Region (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018a). The conclusion on this variable can be very short: because of the fact that this figure is even better than the Flemish Region it has had no impact on the results of the elections and also

the local journalist of Middelkerke could confirm this (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019).

3.3.2 Supply side of populism In this part, the variable on the supply side of populism will be discussed.

3.3.2.1 Impact of a charismatic party leader Jean-Marie Dedecker, the party leader of LDD, has played a big role in the electoral success of LDD, this has also been partially discussed in the previous part of this dissertation (3.3: Lijst Dedecker) where it is being argued if LDD is a populist party. Dedecker always uses easy words and he explained the casino case in a very easy, accessible way and this can also be seen in illustration 1 (the cartoon). Next to that, the previous government was not able to defend themselves and to respond adequately to the (verbal) attacks of Dedecker. Moreover, the fact that the room of the town council was always full will also have to do something with the fact that Dedecker is verbally very skilled and uses sometimes language that can be associated with Trump. Next to that, Dedecker is always among the people and this also appeals to the people, knowing that he is ‘one of us’. In sum, party leader Jean-Marie Dedecker has a major impact in explaining the electoral success of LDD (T. Van Assche, personal communication, April 17, 2019).

3.3.3 Comparison Middelkerke can be seen as an exception, because a particular case that happened before the elections seems to have had a major impact on the results of the elections (i.e. the casino case). Although this can be linked to the dissatisfaction with democracy, this is not visible in the associated numbers in the Municipal Monitor (that date from 2017). Because of the fact that Middelkerke is an exception, the interviewee was only able to identify two causes of the populist vote, the casino file and the charismatic person of Jean-Marie Dedecker (as can be seen in table 22).

Table 22: Scoring of the variables in Middelkerke

T. Van Assche Cultural differences 0 Less trust in governments 2 Economic factors 0 Sense of (in)security 0 Person of Jean-Marie Dedecker 1 Inhabitants less satisfied with 0 direct democracy

Now that the results of all three cases have been presented, they will be discussed in the next section.

4 Discussion

The main goal of this dissertation was to find explanations for the electoral success of populist political parties in the 2018 local elections. Literature mainly deals with the voter bases of VB, and it was the intent of this dissertation to focus on voter bases of different kinds of populist parties. Moreover, an explanation is sought for the electoral successes of Forza Ninove, PVDA Zelzate and LDD in Middelkerke. While every case has its own particularities, there is a certain pattern that returns: in Ninove, Zelzate and Middelkerke one of the most important causes of the populist votes are the low levels of trust in the local government. Next to that, in the three municipalities a charismatic party leader also had an impact on the electoral success of the investigated parties. In the next paragraphs, first the variables on the demand side of populism will be discussed and afterwards, the variable on the supply side will be discussed.

When only the numbers of the Municipal Monitor are taken into account, sub-question 1 can be answered positively for each of the three municipalities. The socio-economic positions of these municipalities are lower than the Flemish average and this is definitely the case for Zelzate. However, when the variables were scored by the interviewees, economic factors were always scored as the least important, even in Zelzate. This could be evidence that confirms the research of Rooduijn (2018), who says that there is no proof for the assumption that populist voter bases

consist of people with lower incomes or come from lower classes. Another striking finding is that the wealthiest municipality of the three is Ninove, what can confirm the finding of Coffé et al. (2007) that VB is supported more in prosperous municipalities. However, this finding needs to be checked in order to draw real conclusions, which means Ninove should be compared with all municipalities where VB emerged as a political party. Next to that, more research should be done to test the link between a lower socio-economic position of inhabitants in a municipality (than the Flemish average) and voting for PVDA.

Sub-question 2 can be answered positively for all of the cases, both based on data of the Municipal Monitor and the interviews. The numbers of the Municipal Monitor that measured the levels of trust in the local government are lower in these three municipalities than the average of the Flemish Region. However, the numbers of Middelkerke do not differ as much from the average in the Flemish Region as the numbers of Zelzate and Ninove do. However, in the interview with the local journalist of Middelkerke it became clear that a case of possible corruption or favouritism could be identified as one of the main causes for the electoral success of LDD. This confirms the research of Pauwels (2010), who stated that scandals linked to clientelism in Antwerp created a breeding ground for VB. This also seemed to happen in Middelkerke, but also the impact of the charismatic leader Jean-Marie Dedecker may not be underestimated. Pauwels (2014) even specifically mentions corruption and says that it is a “fertile breeding ground for populist mobilization” (Pauwels, 2014, p. 190). In Middelkerke, LDD gained in the 2012 local elections 24,9% of the votes and in the 2018 elections 44,1%. It is highly possible that the casino case has had some impact on that and that the finding of Pauwels (2014) can be confirmed here. In sum, it is possible to answer sub-question 2 positively, i.e. that the inhabitants are indeed less satisfied with the democracy, because the average level of trust is higher in the Flemish Region. Dissatisfaction of democracy can thus be confirmed as an important driver to vote for populist parties (de Lange & Akkerman, 2012; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016; Van Aelst & De Cleen, 2016). The variable that was chosen to measure the support for more direct democracy, did not really measure that but acted more as a confirmation of what was measured by means of the previous variable, i.e. the level of trust in the local government. This is a weakness of this research, because it only measures the satisfaction that citizens have with regards to the involvement they have in their municipality. It is thus not possible to say whether the support for direct democracy

is higher based on this variable. However, because of the fact that the results of this variable are much lower in Ninove and Zelzate, meaning that the inhabitants are in general not satisfied with the level of direct democracy, it could be that they are in favour of more direct democracy. Pauwels (2014) found for example that voters of LDD and VB are more in favour of direct democracy, but this seems then not the case for LDD in this research. However, it is not possible to conclude anything based on this variable.

Sub-question 3 can only be confirmed for Ninove and Zelzate because there is no cultural problem in Middelkerke, based on numbers of the Municipal Monitor. The fact that there is a cultural problem in Ninove, confirms the fact that Coffé et al. (2007) found, namely that people fear another way of living and that it is therefore that they vote for an extreme right party, here Forza Ninove. As expected, it can be confirmed that there is a link between anti-immigrants feelings and the voting for national populist parties (Lubbers et al., 2002). It is remarkable that the finding of Pauwels (2014), i.e. that national populist parties link crime to rising immigration, that this is confirmed in Ninove - because Forza Ninove is linking crime to rising immigration (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019). However, also in Zelzate, there is a cultural problem, and this was not expected because no research has been done on the link between social populist parties and cultural differences or immigration problems. But the interviewee mentioned that these problems were not the main explanation of the electoral success of PVDA, this was confirmed by the scoring of this variable: it was given a 5 (out of 6). Moreover, this is also not a ‘theme’ of PVDA Zelzate, who is a socialist populist party, but more of a nationalist populist party. Although it is notable that in a municipality with, according to the numbers, a serious cultural problem, that VB only gains 7,3% of the votes (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). But it cannot be said that the populist vote is higher in Zelzate (than the Flemish average) because of the fact that there is a more hostile attitude towards immigration.

Moreover, the variable that was measured in order to answer sub-question 4, also focused mainly on national populist parties. It was also assumed in the literature study that this variable was most likely to be present in Ninove. As a consequence, this question can be answered positively for Ninove, meaning that it is highly possible that the populist vote is higher in this municipality because of a higher sense of insecurity. The study of Coffé et al. (2007) found no

correlation between the actual crime rates and populist voting. But in Ninove, the actual crime rates are not much higher than the Flemish average (T. De Jonge, personal communication, April 6, 2019), however, it is the sense of insecurity that is much higher in Ninove. As a result, investigating the link between the sense of insecurity and populist voting can be a recommendation for future research. Next to that, based on the results of the Municipal Monitor, this sub-question can also be confirmed for Zelzate. The sense of insecurity is there also very high. However, it is not seen as a major cause for the populist vote (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). More research is necessary to test the link between the sense of insecurity and voting for populist parties. In Middelkerke, the sense of insecurity is even lower than the Flemish average and also the interviewee could confirm that this variable cannot explain the electoral success of LDD. Sub-questions 3 and 4 are variables that are most often used in research on national populist parties. However, it seems that in this research, these issues are also present in a municipality where a socialist populist party has known electoral success. It could be that the fact that there is a cultural problem and that the sense of insecurity is also high in these municipalities, that this leads to less trust in the local governments or to a general dissatisfaction with democracy. More research needs to be done to test this link but if there is a link, it could be that trust in the local government is a main explanatory variable and that sense of insecurity and cultural differences are mediators that have an impact on the level of trust. This is of course only a recommendation for future research.

The last sub-question, belonging to the part of the supply side of populism, can be confirmed for all three cases. This means that the impact of a charismatic leader is very high. Pauwels (2010) also mentioned that it is essential to investigate his role in the success of his party, and it can be confirmed in this research that Dedecker plays a very important role. However, it must be mentioned that in Zelzate, this is more because of the fact that the party leader is also doctor in the medical practice ‘Geneeskunde voor het volk’. The fact that a lot of inhabitants know him and that he is seen as a credible person can also explain why 22,8% of the inhabitants voted for PVDA (K. Vereecke, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This means that locally anchored organisations that are somewhat politically related can have an impact on the electoral success of parties. Further research can also be done to test this link, so that is another recommendation for future research. What is also important here, is the link between the demand and supply side

because it has been shown that, even if there is a demand for populist parties, if the supply side (i.e. organisation of the party or the fact that there is a charismatic leader) is not adequate, people would not vote for populist parties (Lubbers et al., 2002). The parties that were investigated here were, all seemed credible political parties, which means that the research of Lubbers et al. (2002) can be confirmed here.

Conclusion

The starting point of this dissertation was the explanation of the development of a generally accepted definition of populism. A key finding on populism is that it is highly complex and that it is ‘thrown around with abandon’ in the media (Bale et al., 2011). But as could be read in that part, there are three different meanings of populism, i.e. populism as an organizational form, populism as a political style and populism as an ideology. In this research and following the definition of Mudde, populism is seen as an ideology. Moreover, there are also three core concepts of populism: the people, the elite and the general will. These were used in order to be able to classify the investigated parties and brings us to another objective of this study: investigating whether Forza Ninove, PVDA Zelzate and LDD in Middelkerke are populist parties. In the part that deals with this investigation (part 1), elements to support the claim that these parties are populist, were presented. Moreover, a gap in the literature is filled by this research because populism on a local level in Flanders has not yet been investigated. However, caution is necessary when it comes to making real conclusions, because there are some weaknesses in the method that was used. Because the minimal definition method has been applied by only one researcher, it does not allow for a reliability check (Pauwels, 2014). That is why additional research question 1 can be confirmed for now, but it is highly recommended to do more research on this matter.

The main goal of this research was to find an explanation for the electoral success of populist parties in the 2018 local elections. But there were also two supportive goals, i.e. to provide a clear definition on what populism is and to classify the investigated parties as populist or not populist. A key finding of this research is that dissatisfaction with democracy is an important driver to vote for populist parties, also on a local level in Flanders. With this finding, earlier literature that focused most of the time on the national level, could be confirmed. As already mentioned in the introduction, it was also the objective of this study to make a contribution to the society. If low levels of trust in the local government and clientelism are the main drivers to vote for a populist party, is it then not the task of the Flemish government to provide more support to these municipalities or control them more? Since this was not within the scope of this study, this is a recommendation for future research. Then, as mentioned in the introduction of

part 2, also some policy recommendations will be given on this matter but that will be done in the afterthoughts on this thesis, since these are my own opinions. Next to that, another key finding is that also a charismatic party leader or a locally anchored organisation that has political ties also have a high impact on the electoral success. In sum, sub-question 2 and sub-question 5 seemed to provide the most explanatory value in answering the main research question. It can be concluded that the explanations for the electoral success of the cases are low levels of trust in the local government and a charismatic party leader. Moreover, future research could investigate what the role of media is in this matter. According to Pauwels (2010), media tend to focus more on personalisation and emotions, and it could be that because of that, charismatic party leaders are becoming more and more important. The role of social media should also be investigated then.

There are also some weaknesses of this research, for example the variables that were investigated in research question 3 and 4 belonged mostly to national populist parties. More research should be done on social populist and neo-liberal populist variables. But as already mentioned, the pattern that returns in the three cases are the low levels of trust with the local government. Next to that, also the number of interviewees that were interviewed was limited. However, the second interview that was done in Ninove did not give much more information. It is recommended for future research to do either more interviews with local inhabitants or to carry out a survey that delivers representative results for the municipalities. Moreover, it could also be interesting to take neighbourhoods into account but then also the results of the election should be available on the level of the neighbourhoods (which is not the case now).

Afterthoughts on this master’s dissertation

Because of the fact that this is a dissertation to obtain the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration and Management, some policy recommendations will be mentioned here. It must be mentioned that these are my own opinions and therefore, no in-text citations or whatsoever are used. The knowledge that is presented here was gained throughout my education. First of all, there is a debate going on about the direct election of the mayor. These competencies have been recently transferred to Wallonia and Flanders so they can decide upon this. Right now, this is not the case in Flanders, but it is in Wallonia: the largest party in the coalition should deliver the function of mayor. But Flanders has the autonomy to deviate from that and some say that the laws should be adapted so that the mayor is elected directly (by means of preference votes). However, if this is implemented, then the policy makers have to take into account that the cordon sanitaire would brake if Forza Ninove obtains the absolute majority in the next local elections. This topic was being discussed during the courses of Prof. dr. B. Wauters. Secondly, as already mentioned in the conclusion, I think that the Flemish government should provide more support to some municipalities. The local government is the closest to the citizens and it is highly possible that their opinions about politics are shaped because of what is going on in their municipality. Moreover, the mayor of Ninove told me that they did not have enough resources to tackle social problems. This means that the Flemish government should reconsider the grants that are given to certain municipalities by means of the Gemeentefonds (municipal fund). Right now, the Flemish government is encouraging amalgamations in order to ensure and improve the quality of the service in municipalities. However, to my opinion, this is not always a good thing. Some say for example that Zelzate should merge with the city of Ghent. This seems a good thing for the quality of the service because Ghent has more resources than Zelzate. However, the distance between representatives and the citizens will also become bigger, and it is then the question whether this is desirable or not (and what impact that will have on the levels of trust).

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Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. European Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 921–956. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2006.00644.x Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lefevere, F. (2018, November 15). So who won the election? Retrieved 28 March 2019, from vrtnws.be website: https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2018/10/15/so-who-won-the-election/ Lessebski, M., Kavrakova, A., Long, E., Longton, H., & Weber, L. (2019). Societies outside Metropolises: the role of civil society organisations in facing populism (p. 261) [Study]. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Lijst Dedecker. (n.d.). Partijprogramma LIJST DEDECKER MIDDELKERKE. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from http://www.lddmiddelkerke.be/ Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 41(3), 345–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475- 6765.00015 Lucardie, P. (2010). Tussen establishment en extremisme: populistische partijen in Nederland en Vlaanderen. RES PUBLICA, 24. Marien, S., Dassonneville, R., & Hooghe, M. (2015). How Second Order Are Local Elections? Voting Motives and Party Preferences in Belgian Municipal Elections. Local Government Studies, 41(6), 898–916. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2015.1048230 Mortelmans, D. (2011). Kwalitatieve analyse met Nvivo. Leuven: Acco. Mortelmans, D. (2013). Handboek kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden. Leuven: Acco. Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populisme. Amsterdam: AUP. Norris, P. (2016, March 11). It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just- trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres- why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4bbe9db362b Pauwels, T. (2010). Explaining the Success of Neo-Liberal Populist Parties: The Case of Lijst

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Dedecker in Belgium. Political Studies, 58(5), 1009–1029. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00815.x Pauwels, T. (2011a). Explaining the strange decline of the populist radical right Vlaams Belang in Belgium: The impact of permanent opposition. Acta Politica, 46(1), 60–82. https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2010.17 Pauwels, T. (2011b). Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 21(1), 97–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2011.539483 Pauwels, T. (2014). Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. New York: Routledge. PVDA Zelzate. (n.d.). Programma PVDA Zelzate. Retrieved May 8, 2019, from Zelzate website: https://zelzate.pvda.be/programma Renson, I. (2018, October 20). Ninove, verdeeld tot op het bot: ‘Dit staat heel Vlaanderen misschien wel te wachten’. De Standaard. Retrieved from http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20181019_03858574 Reynebeau, M. (2016, December 29). Het volk spreekt uit vele monden. Retrieved 10 May 2019, from De Standaard website: http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20161228_02649594 Ristov, M. (2017). Populism in Europe – A threat or corrective to the liberal democratic order of the EU? 21. Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. European Political Science Review, 10(3), 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773917000145 Rooduijn, M., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis. West European Politics, 34(6), 1272–1283. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.616665 Rooduijn, M., van der Brug, W., & de Lange, S. L. (2016). Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent. Electoral Studies, 43, 32– 40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.04.006 Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., de Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., … Taggart, P. (2019). The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. Retrieved 6 May 2019, from The PopuList website: http://www.populist.org/ Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., & Van Droogenbroeck, F. (2016). Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It? Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 335–346.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639138 Stad Ninove. (2018). BEVOLKING OP 31/12/2018 PER DEELGEMEENTE. Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. Van Aelst, P., & De Cleen, B. (2016). Belgium: The Rise and Fall of Populism Research. In T. Aalberg, Populist Political Communication in Europe (1st ed., pp. 109–120). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623016-16 Van Assche, T. (2017, September 1). Nu wordt het spel écht hard gespeeld. Retrieved May 30, 2019, from hln.be website: https://www.hln.be/in-de-buurt/middelkerke/nu-wordt-het- spel-echt-hard-gespeeld~ac6463fe/ Van Den Houte, C. (2015, January 25). Forza kapt met Vlaams Belang. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from hln.be website: https://www.hln.be/in-de-buurt/ninove/forza-kapt-met-vlaams- belang~a22d528c/ Van Haute, E., Pauwels, T., & Sinardet, D. (2018). Sub-state nationalism and populism: the cases of Vlaams Belang, New Flemish Alliance and DéFI in Belgium. Comparative European Politics, 16(6), 954–975. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0144-z Van Kessel, S. (2011). Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Netherlands as a Case Study. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12(1), 68–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2011.546148 Van Kessel, S. (2013). A Matter of Supply and Demand: The Electoral Performance of Populist Parties in Three European Countries. Government and Opposition, 48(2), 175–199. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2012.14 Van Thiel, S. (2015). Bestuurskundig onderzoek. Bussum: Coutinho. Vlaamse Overheid. (n.d.). Vlaanderenkiest.be. Retrieved March 28, 2019, from https://www.vlaanderenkiest.be/ Wauters, R. (2018, October 18). 14 oktober in cijfers: Open Vld is de ‘verborgen winnaar’ van de verkiezingen. Retrieved March 28, 2019, from https://www.demorgen.be/politiek/14- oktober-in-cijfers-open-vld-is-de-verborgen-winnaar-van-de-verkiezingen-b94b8bc5/

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Attachments

Attachment 1: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove

Source: D’haeseleer, 2018 (http://forzaninove.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Forza-Ninove- programmaboekje_A5_LR-2.pdf) Attachment 2: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove

Source: D’haeseleer, 2018 (http://forzaninove.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Forza-Ninove- programmaboekje_A5_LR-2.pdf)

Attachment 3: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove

Source: D’haeseleer, 2018 (http://forzaninove.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Forza-Ninove- programmaboekje_A5_LR-2.pdf)

Attachment 4: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Forza Ninove

Source: D’haeseleer, 2018 (http://forzaninove.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Forza-Ninove- programmaboekje_A5_LR-2.pdf)

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Attachment 5: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate

Source: PVDA Zelzate, n.d. (https://zelzate.pvda.be/programma) Attachment 6: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate

Source: PVDA Zelzate, n.d. (https://zelzate.pvda.be/programma)

Attachment 7: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of PVDA Zelzate

Source: PVDA Zelzate, n.d. (https://zelzate.pvda.be/programma)

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Attachment 8: Screenshot of a part of the party programme of Lijst Dedecker

Source: Lijst Dedecker, n.d. (http://www.lddmiddelkerke.be/p/partijprogramma- gemeenteraadsverkiezing.html)

Attachment 9: Questions of the interview with T. De Jonge and C. Van den Houte Interview with Tania De Jonge Function: mayor of the city Ninove Interview took place on April 6, 2019 in Ninove Approximate duration of the interview: 1 hour 13 minutes

Interview with Claudia Van den Houte Function: local journalist in Ninove Interview took place on April 12, 2019 in Ninove Approximate duration of the interview: 59 minutes

The same questions were asked to both of them.

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In het eerste deel van mijn masterproef ga ik onderzoeken of Forza Ninove een populistische partij is. Vraag 1: In het nieuws wordt Forza Ninove vaak afgeschilderd als een Vlaams Belang-partij of een zusterpartij van Vlaams Belang. Het kopstuk, Guy D’Haeseleer, zetelt ook voor Vlaams Belang in het Vlaams Parlement en doet dit dus niet als onafhankelijke. Vindt u ook dat we Forza Ninove volledig gelijk kunnen stellen aan Vlaams Belang? Vraag 2: Kent u de eventueel achterliggende reden van Forza Ninove om niet op te komen onder de Vlaams Belang-vlag? Was dit bijvoorbeeld om het cordon sanitair te omzeilen? Of om zich gematigder voor te doen dan Vlaams Belang zelf? Vraag 3: Ik weet niet of u bekend bent met het concept van populisme, maar zou u ermee akkoord gaan moest ik zeggen dat Forza Ninove een populistische partij is? (Indien u twijfels hebt over wat populisme juist is, geef ik hier nog even de definitie mee: “Een dunne ideologie volgens welke de maatschappij uiteindelijk verdeeld wordt in twee homogene en vijandige kampen – ‘het zuivere volk’ versus ‘de corrupte elite’ – en die stelt dat de politiek een uitdrukking zou moeten zijn van de volonté générale (algemene wil) van het volk.” (Mudde, 2004). Terwijl Forza Ninove het probleem van diversiteit en cultuurverschillen in de stad al beschrijft op de 3e pagina in hun verkiezingsfolder, beschrijft de lijst SAMEN het probleem van diversiteit pas op pagina 15 (van de 43 pagina’s tellende folder). Vraag 4: Dan vraag ik mij ook wel af of deze partij het probleem ziet? Zien de andere partijen de problemen dan wel? In de kleinere folder van SAMEN is er zelfs niks te vinden over dit diversiteitsprobleem. Ik vraag mij af of Forza Ninove de problemen benoemt of ze volgens u, door ze zo nadrukkelijk telkens weer naar voor te schuiven, ze zelf een (diversiteits)probleem creëren? Oorzaken van de extreemrechtse, (populistische) stem in Ninove Vraag 5: Ik zou u eerst willen vragen wat u denkt dat de oorzaken zijn van die extreme stemmen? (Zonder dat u mijn mogelijke oorzaken gehoord of gelezen hebt.) Aandeel (%) inwoners dat tevreden is over de buurt: - Ninove: 72% tevreden - 15% neutraal - 14% ontevreden - Vlaams Gewest: 79% tevreden - 11% neutraal – 10% ontevreden Als we het percentage van Ninove ook vergelijken met de buurgemeenten, blijkt dat het percentage in Ninove toch wat lager ligt, alleen in Denderleeuw ligt het even ‘laag’.

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Vraag 6: Dus er zou wel echt een gevoel moeten heersen dat de mensen hier meer ontevreden zijn dan in de buurtgemeenten? Of zou het eerder aan het culturele aspect liggen? Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat het eens is met volgende stelling: De verschillende culturen leven goed samen in mijn gemeente. - Ninove: 31% eens - 29% neutraal - 39% oneens - Vlaams Gewest: 54% eens - 29% neutraal - 17% oneens We zien dat het aandeel van mensen die het met deze stelling eens zijn in Ninove veel lager ligt dan in het Vlaams Gewest. Vraag 7: Mensen kennen elkaar niet, er zijn cultuurverschillen; zou dit een verklaring kunnen zijn van het hoge stemmenaantal? Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat het eens is met volgende stelling: Als je mensen uit een andere cultuur beter leert kennen blijken ze best sympathiek te zijn. - Ninove: 57% eens - 29% neutraal - 14% oneens - Vlaams Gewest: 63% eens - 29% neutraal - 8% oneens Het aantal Ninovieters dat hier ‘eens’ antwoordt op deze stelling, ligt al dichter bij het cijfer van het Vlaams Gewest. Vraag 8: Merkt u dit ook in de praktijk? Dat men verdraagzamer is indien men elkaar leert kennen? Maar vindt u dat de inwoners hiervoor open staan? Het vertrouwen in de Federale, Vlaamse en lokale overheid ligt meestal redelijk wat lager dan het gemiddelde van het Vlaams Gewest. - Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de federale overheid: o Ninove: 13% veel – 43% neutraal - 45% weinig o Vlaams Gewest: 16% veel - 44% neutraal - 39% weinig - Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de Vlaamse Overheid: o Ninove: 20% veel – 45% neutraal - 35% weinig o Vlaams Gewest: 22% veel - 45% neutraal - 35% weinig - Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in het gemeentebestuur of stadsbestuur van zijn eigen gemeente/stad: o Ninove: 25% veel – 47% neutraal - 28% weinig o Vlaams Gewest: 35% veel – 45% neutraal - 20 % weinig Vraag 9: Zou dit een oorzaak kunnen zijn denkt u? Of is de oorzaak volgens u eerder economisch?

- Sinds 2016 ligt de kansarmoede-index hoger dan die van het Vlaams gewest: o Ninove: 13,4% - Vlaams Gewest: 12,8% - Aantal leefloners echter niet hoger dan in het Vlaams Gewest Vraag 10: Kan het hoge aantal stemmen voor Forza Ninove eerder verklaard worden door economische factoren? Komt het eerder door het onveiligheidsgevoel? De reële veiligheidscijfers in Ninove liggen in lijn met die van het Vlaams Gewest, het is eerder het onveiligheidsgevoel dat heel wat lager ligt dan in het Vlaams Gewest. Vraag 11: Hoe komt het volgens u dat de cijfers over het onveiligheidsgevoel hoger liggen dan het Vlaams Gewest? En kan dit iets te maken hebben met het stemgedrag op 14 oktober 2018? Volgens de gemeentemonitor is 39% van de inwoners van Ninove het oneens met de stelling ‘of het gemeentebestuur voldoende inspanningen doet om bewoners bij veranderingen in de gemeente te betrekken’. In het Vlaams Gewest is gemiddeld 26% het met deze stelling oneens, in Ninove ligt het dus 13% hoger. Vraag 12: Er is al onderzoek gebeurd naar deze variabele, en er is gemengd bewijs gevonden of een voorkeur voor directe democratie aanleiding geeft tot het stemmen op populistische partijen. Denkt u dat dit er iets mee te maken heeft of kan hebben? Vraag 13: Onderzoek zegt dat ‘de populistische stem’ komt van mensen die lager geschoold zijn en/of werkloos zijn en/of uit lagere sociale milieus komen. Denkt u dat de gemiddelde Forza Ninove-stemmer eerder lager geschoold en/of werkloos zijn? Vraag 14: Of zou de gemiddelde Forza Ninove-stemmer eerder een gevoel van relatieve deprivatie hebben, een gevoel van achtergelaten te worden in de maatschappij? Vraag 15: Of ligt het eerder aan de charismatisch leider die Guy D’haeseleer zelf is, en aan de manier waarop hij communiceert? Vraag 16: Denkt u dat populisme een correctief of bedreigend effect heeft op de democratie en het democratisch systeem? Vraag 17: Hoogstwaarschijnlijk zal het resultaat van 14 oktober 2018 het gevolg zijn van een combinatie van voorgenoemde (eventuele) oorzaken. Als u deze variabelen zou moeten rangschikken, welke denkt u dan dat de belangrijkste oorzaak is? Graag rangschikken: nummer 1 voor de belangrijkste oorzaak en nummer 6 voor de minst belangrijke oorzaak. Indien u denkt dat andere variabelen ook een invloed gehad hebben, mag u die er zeker bijschrijven.

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Cultuurverschillen (vraag 6, 7 en 8) Minder vertrouwen in de overheden (vraag 9) Economische factoren (vraag 10) Veiligheids(gevoel) (vraag 11) Het hogere cijfer van mensen die ontevreden zijn met het feit of het gemeentebestuur de inwoners betrekt bij veranderingen in de gemeente (vraag 12) Persoon van Guy D’haeseleer (vraag 15)

Attachment 10: Questions of the interview with K. Vereecke Interview with Kristof Vereecke Function: local journalist in Zelzate Interview took place on April, 15 2019 in Zelzate Approximate duration of the interview: 1 hour and 9 minutes

In het eerste deel ga ik onderzoeken of PVDA Zelzate en Vlaams Belang hier populistische partijen zijn. 1.We zullen beginnen met PVDA Zelzate. Ik heb vermoedens dat ze populistisch zijn: Uit verkiezingsprogramma: - Zelzate is een typische arbeiders gemeente met een verouderde bevolking. Sommige partijen streven naar een gemeente die we met enige overdrijving ‘het ‘Sint Martens Latem aan het Kanaal’ kunnen noemen, met een shift van modale arbeidersgemeente naar de begoede middenklasse. Uiteindelijk komt dit neer op verdringing van het gewone volk. Onze gemeente heeft zijn eigen karakteristieken en noden die geen behoefte heeft aan elitaire lofts. o De elite = begoede middenklasse? o Maar ook de vorige coalitie? 2.Dan: Vlaams Belang in Zelzate. Tweede deel: Oorzaken van populistische stem Vraag 3: Ik zou u eerst willen vragen wat u denkt dat de oorzaken zijn van het grote aantal populistische stemmen? (Zonder dat u mijn mogelijke oorzaken gehoord of gelezen hebt.) Tevredenheid over buurt: Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat tevreden is over de buurt 2017 Ontevreden Neutraal Tevreden Zelzate 16% 21% 63% Vlaams Gewest 10% 11% 79%

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Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat tevreden is over de gemeente/stad 2017 Ontevreden Neutraal Tevreden Zelzate 23% 34% 44% Vlaams Gewest 9% 14% 76%

Vraag 4: Denkt u dat dit ontevredenheidsgevoel een oorzaak kan zijn? Cultuurverschillen: Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat het eens is met volgende stelling: De verschillende culturen leven goed samen in mijn gemeente. 2017 Oneens Neutraal Eens Zelzate 27% 38% 35% Vlaams Gewest excl. 1317% 29% 54% centrumsteden

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat het eens is met volgende stelling: Als je mensen uit een andere cultuur beter leert kennen blijken ze best sympathiek te zijn. 2017 Oneens Neutraal Eens Zelzate 11% 33% 56% Vlaams Gewest excl. 138% 29% 63% centrumsteden

Vraag 5: Is er sprake van een toename van het aantal mensen met een migratieachtergrond? Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vindt dat het gemeentebestuur of stadsbestuur voldoende inspanningen doet om bewoners bij veranderingen in hun gemeente /stad te betrekken:

2017 Oneens Neutraal Eens Zelzate 48% 26% 26% Vlaams Gewest 26% 27% 47%

In vergelijking met de buurgemeenten zie je dat Zelzate hier toch wel heel slecht op scoort, in de buurgmeenten ligt het percentage (veel) hoger. Ook wel heel fors onder het gemiddelde van het Vlaams Gewest. Vraag 6: Hoe zou u deze cijfers kunnen verklaren? Vertrouwen in de overheid Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de federale overheid: 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Zelzate 44% 41% 16% Vlaams Gewest 39% 44% 16% Dit ligt in de lijn met het Vlaams Gewest, maar het aantal dat ‘weinig vertrouwen’ aangeeft, ligt toch iets hoger dan gemiddeld.

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Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de Vlaamse Overheid: 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Zelzate 40% 40% 20% Vlaams Gewest 33% 45% 22% Hier toch wel opvallend veel minder vertrouwen dan het gemiddelde ih Vlaams Gewest.

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in het gemeentebestuur of stadsbestuur van zijn eigen gemeente/stad: 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Zelzate 48% 38% 14% Vlaams Gewest 20% 45% 35%

Vraag 7: Denkt u dat de vertrouwenscijfers hier een impact hebben gehad? Dat iemand die weinig vertrouwen heeft in de verschillende overheden sneller op een extreme partij zal stemmen? Onveiligheidsgevoel Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat zich vaak of altijd onveilig voelt in de buurt 2017 Nooit of zelden Af en toe Vaak of altijd Zelzate 72% 22% 6% Vlaams Gewest 83% 14% 4%

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat zich vaak of altijd onveilig voelt in de gemeente/stad 2017 Nooit of zelden Af en toe Vaak of altijd Zelzate 53% 36% 11% Vlaams Gewest 75% 20% 5% Vraag 8: Bespreking onveiligheidscijfers Economische factoren: Aantal personen met een (equivalent) leefloon in het kader van het Recht op Maatschappelijke Integratie of Maatschappelijke Hulp per 1.000 inwoners: - Zelzate: 8,0 - Belfius: 5,4 - Vlaams Gewest: 6,0 Kansarmoede-index ligt ook zeer hoog: - Zelzate: 18,4 - Vlaams Gewest: 12,8 Gemiddeld inkomen per inwoner - Zelzate: €17 629 - Vlaams Gewest: €18 970 Ook de werkloosheidsgraad ligt hoger: - Zelzate: 8,8%

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o Vooral bij >50j: 10,3% - Vlaams Gewest: 7,8% o >50j: 7,8% Vraag 9: Denkt u dat deze cijfers een impact gehad hebben op het resultaat van de verkiezingen? Vraag 10: Onderzoek zegt dat ‘de populistische stem’ komt van mensen die lager geschoold zijn en/of werkloos zijn en/of uit lagere sociale milieus komen. Denkt u dat dit ook het geval is in Zelzate? Vraag 11: Of zou de gemiddelde PVDA & Vlaams Belang-stemmer eerder een gevoel van relatieve deprivatie hebben, een gevoel van achtergelaten te worden in de maatschappij? Vraag 12: Of ligt het eerder aan Geert Asman, de leider van PVDA Zelzate, die eventueel charismatisch zou zijn? Vraag 13: Of aan de structuren die PVDA Zelzate hier heeft, dus het Geneeskunde van het Volk? Vraag 14: Denkt u dat populisme een correctief of bedreigend effect heeft op de democratie en het democratisch systeem? Vraag 15: Hoogstwaarschijnlijk zal het resultaat van 14 oktober 2018 het gevolg zijn van een combinatie van voorgenoemde (eventuele) oorzaken. Als u deze variabelen zou moeten rangschikken, welke denkt u dan dat de belangrijkste oorzaak is? Graag rangschikken: nummer 1 voor de belangrijkste oorzaak en nummer 6 voor de minst belangrijke oorzaak. Indien u denkt dat andere variabelen ook een invloed gehad hebben, mag u die er zeker bijschrijven. Cultuurverschillen & migratie Minder vertrouwen in de overheden Economische factoren Veiligheids(gevoel) Voorkeur voor directe democratie Persoon van leider politieke partij

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Attachment 11: Questions of the interview with T. Van Assche Interview with Timmy Van Assche Function: local journalist in Middelkerke Interview took place on April, 17 2019 in Oostende Approximate duration of the interview: 58 minutes Vraag 1: Is LDD populistisch? Oorzaken populistische stem Tevredenheid: Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat tevreden is over de buurt 2017 Ontevreden Neutraal Tevreden Middelkerke 10% 13% 77% Vlaams Gewest 10% 11% 79%

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat tevreden is over de gemeente/stad 2017 Ontevreden Neutraal Tevreden Middelkerke 11% 20% 68% Vlaams Gewest 9% 14% 76% Kuststeden vergeleken: Middelkerke een van de gemeenten waar men het minst tevreden is.

Cultuurverschillen: Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat het eens is met volgende stelling: De verschillende culturen leven goed samen in mijn gemeente. 2017 Oneens Neutraal Eens Middelkerke 14% 31% 55% Vlaams Gewest 17% 29% 54%

Heeft Lijst Dedecker ingespeeld op het migratiethema?

Consultatie bewoners, directe democratie Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vindt dat het gemeentebestuur of stadsbestuur voldoende inspanningen doet om bewoners bij veranderingen in hun gemeente /stad te betrekken

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2017 Oneens Neutraal Eens Middelkerke 32% 18% 50% Vlaams Gewest 26% 27% 47% Ook vrij gemiddeld. In Dedecker zijn programma stond nochtans dat hij ging zorgen voor meer directe democratie – maar blijkbaar is daar geen vraag naar. Vertrouwen in de overheid Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de federale overheid 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Middelkerke 42% 42% 16% Vlaams Gewest 39% 44% 16%

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in de Vlaamse Overheid 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Middelkerke 34% 43% 24% Vlaams Gewest 33% 45% 22%

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat vertrouwen heeft in het gemeentebestuur of stadsbestuur van zijn eigen gemeente/stad 2017 Weinig Neutraal Veel Middelkerke 29% 40% 32% Vlaams Gewest 20% 45% 35% Ligt ook zeer in lijn met het gemiddelde, behalve het vertrouwen in het stadsbestuur dan, dat ligt iets lager, maar ook niet opvallend laag. Onveiligheidsgevoel Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat zich vaak of altijd onveilig voelt in de buurt 2017 Nooit of zelden Af en toe Vaak of altijd Middelkerke 90% 9% 2% Vlaams Gewest 83% 14% 4%

Aandeel (%) van de inwoners dat zich vaak of altijd onveilig voelt in de gemeente/stad 2017 Nooit of zelden Af en toe Vaak of altijd Middelkerke 83% 15% 2% Vlaams Gewest 75% 20% 5%

Economische factoren Aantal personen met een (equivalent) leefloon in het kader van het Recht op Maatschappelijke Integratie of Maatschappelijke Hulp per 1.000 inwoners: - Middelkerke: 6,9 - Belfius: 5,4 - Vlaams Gewest: 6,0

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Kansarmoede-index is de laatste jaren gestegen: - Middelkerke: 16 - Vlaams Gewest: 12,8 Gemiddeld inkomen per inwoner - Zelzate: €18 176 - Vlaams Gewest: €18 970 Ook de werkloosheidsgraad ligt hoger: - Middelkerke: 8,7% Vraag 10: Onderzoek zegt dat ‘de populistische stem’ komt van mensen die lager geschoold zijn en/of werkloos zijn en/of uit lagere sociale milieus komen. Denkt u dat dit ook het geval is in Middelkerke? Vraag 11: Of zou de gemiddelde Lijst dedecker-stemmer eerder een gevoel van relatieve deprivatie hebben, een gevoel van achtergelaten te worden in de maatschappij? Vraag 12: Of ligt het uistluitend aan Jean-Marie Dedecker, die een charismatische leider is? Vraag 14: Denkt u dat populisme een correctief of bedreigend effect heeft op de democratie en het democratisch systeem? Vraag 15: Hoogstwaarschijnlijk zal het resultaat van 14 oktober 2018 het gevolg zijn van een combinatie van voorgenoemde (eventuele) oorzaken. Als u deze variabelen zou moeten rangschikken, welke denkt u dan dat de belangrijkste oorzaak is? Graag rangschikken: nummer 1 voor de belangrijkste oorzaak en nummer 6 voor de minst belangrijke oorzaak. Indien u denkt dat andere variabelen ook een invloed gehad hebben, mag u die er zeker bijschrijven. Cultuurverschillen & migratie Minder vertrouwen in de overheden Economische factoren Veiligheids(gevoel) Voorkeur voor directe democratie Persoon van leider politieke partij

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