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Ad Hoc Hurricane Review Committee Final Report and Recommendations December 31, 2018

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Ad Hoc Hurricane Review Committee Final Report and Recommendations December 31, 2018 City of Marco Island Florida Ad Hoc Hurricane Review Committee Final Report and Recommendations December 31, 2018 Table of Contents Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………. 3 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Preparedness………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 Response………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8 Recovery……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13 Mitigation…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15 Conclusions ………………………………………………………..………………………………… 17 References……………………………………………………………………………………………. 18 Committee Preliminary Report (Preparedness)……………………………………. Appendix A City of Marco Island Declaration of Emergency (Irma)………………………… Appendix B City of Marco Island Response Time‐line…………………………………………….. Appendix C City of Marco Island Resolution 18‐08 creating the Ad‐Hoc Committee... Appendix D Emergency Support Function (ESF) Listing……………………………………………. Appendix E City of Marco Island After Action Report………………………………………………. Appendix F MICA Hurricane Irma Survey………………………………………………………………... Appendix G City of Marco Island Comprehensive Plan Extract, December 2009……… Appendix H MICA Hurricane Preparedness Guide 2015………………………………………….. Appendix I Marco Island Mitigation Briefing, September 2018……………………………… Appendix J City of Marco Island CEMP………………………………………………………………….. Appendix K Collier County Hurricane Irma After Action Report……………………………… Appendix L City of Marco Island NFIP Community Rating System (CRS)………………… Appendix M Committee Member Bios…………………………………………………………………….. Appendix N FY19 Emergency Management Budget Presentation…………………………… Appendix O ‐ 2 ‐ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In December 2017 the Marco Island City Council requested the establishment of an Ad Hoc Citizen Committee for the purpose of examining the city’s response and recovery efforts relating to Hurricane Irma. The committee was tasked to review how the city government’s emergency preparedness program functioned and to make actionable recommendations to the City Council in both a Preliminary Report within 90 days of the committee’s formation, and a Final Report to be provided at the sunset of the committee, which was established as the end of 2018. The Preliminary Report was produced and presented to the City Council at its regular meeting June 4, 2018, and is included in this Final Report at Appendix A. The Hurricane Irma Ad Hoc Review Committee was made up of five residents of the City of Marco Island who were considered by the City Council to have relevant experience in managing hurricane emergencies, and who were residing in the city during and after the hurricane and its recovery efforts. The committee members bios are provided at Appendix N. The committee has met more than fifteen times and spent many hours interviewing key personnel, city officials and volunteers, and doing independent research to prepare this report. The nature of the council’s request for the committee and the committee’s actions were to determine how the City of Marco Island could organizationally improve prior to the next disaster. What is contained in this report is not meant to take away from the sacrifices and outstanding work done during and following Hurricane Irma by city staff, residents and volunteers. Findings: ‐ City leadership consisting of council, interim city manager and many new directors, were not as familiar with the city’s emergency preparedness program and their roles as they should have been, however preparedness began ahead of the storm and was led by the interim city manager and directors. ‐ Lack of leadership consistency due to high turnover in the city manager role since 2007 led to a deterioration of the emergency preparedness program. ‐ Essential preparedness and response supplies and activities had not been procured or coordinated for. ‐ Key functions such as public information, volunteer resources and coordination with county, state and federal agencies were coordinated, but due to above may not have been to the optimum level. ‐ There has been insufficient training and planning being conducted for non‐first responder staff and volunteer assets; however, the interim city manager conducted several emergency planning meetings to review with staff how to prepare and respond. ‐ The city’s budget does not adequately address disaster preparedness. ‐ 3 ‐ Recommendation: ‐ With a renewed sense of urgency hire a permanent city manager prior to the 2019 hurricane season, who has as one of their priorities the re‐establishment of a comprehensive emergency preparedness program for Marco Island. ‐ Reestablish a full‐time public information officer position on the city staff to coordinate all facets of the communications/public information/education and outreach issues. ‐ Establish a full‐time emergency management position to direct and coordinate all emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. ‐ Establish an annual pre‐hurricane season workshop for the city councilors that reviews their roles and responsibilities and the city’s preparedness status with the city manager. ‐ Include both short‐term and long‐term emergency preparedness needs as an identifiable part of the budget. ‐ Update the city’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan to include the After‐ Action Report findings as a result of Hurricane Irma (last partially updated in 2013). ‐ Improve the coordination of needs and partnerships with the county, state and federal agencies that the city is reliant on for support. ‐ Plan and provide a resource framework and comprehensive training for the community’s volunteers. Conclusions: While city government can be thankful that there we no deaths, serious injuries or major human‐ related environmental impacts due to Hurricane Irma, the city’s preparedness was less coordinated and effective due to the 13 years that had passed since the last major storm. Our observation as a committee was that the adjustments made after Hurricane Wilma were allowed to lose priority due to the passage of time. City staff and the community at large can be proud of the outstanding effort and team‐work displayed during the emergency and throughout the recovery. However, overall response and recovery efforts were hampered throughout due to a lack of equipment to handle a Category 3 Hurricane. Clear direction by the city council for an atmosphere and philosophy of year‐round disaster preparedness and ownership of this responsibility by a permanent city manager is imperative to improving the city’s disaster resiliency. ‐ 4 ‐ INTRODUCTION Hurricane Irma struck the City of Marco Island on Sunday September 10, 2017, as a Category 3 hurricane, with peak sustained winds of 112 ‐ 115 mph (gusts up to 130 ‐ 150 mph) and a storm surge measured at 2 – 7 feet above normal tide height at certain points on the island. Imbedded within the storm as it passed over the Island were suspected tornadoes and micro burst wind events, which caused additional damage. As early as Monday, September 4, Hurricane Irma was measured as a stronger Category 5 hurricane with a potential for much greater wind speeds and storm surge, which threatened not only South Florida, but a large portion of the state of Florida as well. Appropriately, on Wednesday, September 6, the Marco Island City Council met and declared a Local State of Emergency (See Appendix B), directed staff to prepare the city for the landfall of a major hurricane and to coordinate with local, state and federal partners. From then to approximately Friday, September 8, the city government worked around the clock to prepare for and manage the resulting emergency and to restore a basic level of normalcy for residents and businesses following the storm. Recovery and mitigation actions continue as of the date of this report – a timeline of the critical events is attached at Appendix C. As a result of a desire by city officials and residents for a thorough understanding of how a future disaster event might be better prepared for and managed, in December 2017 the city council proposed the creation of an ad hoc citizen committee to review the city’s actions relating to Hurricane Irma by Resolution (See Appendix D). In March 2018 the composition of the committee was finalized and approved with the requirements to produce a Preliminary Report within 90 days and a final report prior to the committee sunset date of December 31, 2018. The committee met for the first time on April 2, 2018, and jointly decided to proceed with the review using the four standard phases of emergency management (Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Mitigation) as its framework for review and further looking at each phase by Emergency Support Function (ESF) (see Appendix E). Further, it was decided by the committee not to supplant the city staff’s Hurricane Irma After Action Report, which was prepared directly after the major response and recovery activities and completed in fall 2017 (see Appendix F). The report was reviewed by the committee as a starting point to its review and considered to be valid and immediately actionable. To provide feedback to the city council prior to the onset of the 2018 hurricane season, and in accordance with its direction, a Preliminary Report that covered the city’s preparedness activities leading up to Irma’s impact on the community was provided at City Council’s June 4, 2018, meeting (see Appendix A). The majority of what is contained in this report is a discussion of problems discovered, or improvements needed to what was in‐place before and during Hurricane Irma. This report is not meant to detract or ignore the herculean
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