Khanfir Stabilization Report

Assessing the Stabilization Challenges and Opportunities in Khanfir District in Abyan Governorate in Yemen

Yemen Communities Stronger Together (YCST) Cooperative Agreement No. 72027918CA00001 May 2019 This report was authored by Ilyas Ibrahim Mohamed, the YCST MEL Director, using the initial findings submitted by Carfax Projects led by Charles Schulze. The report is based on extensive fieldwork and data collection undertaken by Carfax Projects in January and February 2019 as well as by YCST in March 2019.

Table of Contents Acronyms ...... 3 Introduction ...... 4 Purpose of the Assessment ...... 4 Assessment Methodology ...... 4 Structure of the Stabilization Analytical Framework ...... 4 Note on the Scoring Method ...... 5 Assessment Results ...... 6 Concluding Summary ...... 16

2 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org Acronyms AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula CfW Cash for Work CSO Central Statistical Organization CSOs Civil Society Organizations CBOs Community Based Organizations FGD Focus Group Discussion HH Household IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IP Implementing Partners INGO International Non-Governmental Organization KII Key Informant Interview M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation NNGO National Non-Governmental Organization NSC National Security Council PC Popular Committees RoYG Republic of Yemen Government SBF Security Belt Forces TPM Third-Party Monitoring UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government YCST Yemen Communities Stronger Together YPA USAID Yemen Program Approach

3 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org 1 Introduction

Purpose of the Assessment

This report applies the USAID's Stabilization Analytical Framework to identify “green spots” for small-scale, locally relevant, pilot stabilization activities. For the purposes of this report, green spots are defined as areas where USAID can help locally legitimate authorities2 stabilize their communities in ways that are consistent with United States Government (USG) interests and the broader USAID Yemen Program Approach (YPA). This report outlines assessments conducted in targeted communities in Abyan governorate between January and March 2019.

Identifying such green spots in the Yemen context is challenging, due to the fractured nature of political and military control in the country and that – unlike in other contexts where USG has provided stabilization assistance – it is not a country where the US forces have established territorial control. For this reason, this report identifies a set of seven factors and corresponding tools that USAID can use to help classify a geographic area as green, yellow, or red in terms of suitability for stabilization programing.

Finally, the report includes some recommendations on the key challenges to and opportunities for effective stabilization assistance in Yemen that USAID can consider when designing its programs. While not the primary purpose of this report, these considerations are relevant to geographic targeting of stabilization assistance.

Assessment Methodology

In addition to the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) tool, which was based on the Stabilization Analytical Framework, this report also draws on data collected from household surveys and key informant interviews undertaken in targeted areas in Yemen. Discussions were held with local leaders, local authority representatives, and community members. Stabilization-focused questions were embedded throughout the tools with separate analyses carried out of the resulting data. This information was then supplemented by secondary evidence (if available) focusing on the target locations. The achieved sample can be found below:

Total Tool Groups Male Female Participants HH Survey N/A 26 20 46 FGDs 4 10 27 37 KIIs N/A 1 0 1

Structure of the Stabilization Analytical Framework

This framework identifies seven key factors that determine the status of a district as a green, yellow, or red spot: 1) Security, 2) Existence of Reliable Local Authorities, 3) Risk of Doing Harm, 4) Existing Foundation for Stabilization Efforts, 5) Free and Unfettered Access, 6) Presence of

1 The content and wording of this chapter has been drawn largely from project document ‘Yemen Monitoring And Evaluation Program, Phase II - Permissive Stabilization Programing Areas (Green Spots) Assessment’ 2 Local authorities may include elected officials of the local councils, appointed officials, technical staff from the various directorates (water, health, education), or managerial or clerical staff.

4 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org Local Implementing Partners, and 7) Multiplier Potential. The component investigative questions and definitions for each of these areas can be found in the appendices of this report. The subsequent analyses provide summary assessments as well as supporting data and analyses across each of the component themes of analysis.

Note on the Scoring Method

This scoring method considers each of the key factors as a dimension of the framework. Since there is no scientific way to decide which dimension carries more weight, each dimension should ideally weigh the number of its sub-dimensions. Thus, the dimensions with more sub-dimensions weigh more than those with a smaller number of sub-dimensions. However, this might be misleading and not useful for the purpose of programming.

In other words, there are sub-dimensions that are within the control and can be reversed, mitigated, and influenced by the stabilization interventions supported by the program as well as sub- dimensions that do not have detrimental effect. While, on the other hand, there are other severe sub-dimensions that the stabilization program cannot change their conditions. Thus, the latter sub- dimensions should carry more weight than the former ones. Therefore, sub-dimension #1.4 has a maximum score of 2 compared to sub-dimension #4.1 with a maximum score of 13.

Moreover, the sub-dimensions scores will be added up to feed into the overall score of their respective dimensions, which will be assessed against the maximum weight for the dimension. For example, the security dimension carries a maximum weight of 17, which is assessed as below:

• Green = ]11, 17] or 11 < $%&&' ≤ 17

• Yellow = ]5, 11] or 5 < +&,,-. ≤ 11

• Red = [0, 5] or 0 = 1&2 ≤ 5

Similarly, the scores of all dimensions will also be summed up to inform the overall decision towards intervening in certain areas. The anticipated maximum weight is 56, which is divided into three intervals as below4:

• Green = ]36, 56] or 36 < $%&&' ≤ 56

• Yellow = ]18, 36] or 18 < +&,,-. ≤ 36

• Red = [0, 18] or 0 = 1&2 ≤ 18

3 The scores will be given to each subdimension based on the subjective interpretation of the findings 4 The frame of each interval is rounded to 18, except the top interval, which is larger than the lower and the middle intervals.

5 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org Assessment Results Khanfir is the largest district of Abyan governorate in terms of population and area. The projection from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) for 2017 for Khanfir’s population was 143,865. Over half of these populations live in Juar, which is the largest town in Khanfir and overall Abyan. Most people use the name Khanfir when referring to Juar. The stabilization interventions of YCST are implemented in Juar.

Juar, as in other areas of Abyan, witnessed armed conflicts and changes of power and control for several years. The city was once the stronghold of and under the control of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who entered the city in May 2011. This was due to the disappearance of the local authority government in 2007 and the lack of law and order. AQAP has presented itself as the service provider for the area.

AQAP was later removed by the Yemeni government in mid-2012. However, Juar remained threatened by fighters of AQAP, who retreated to other areas in Abyan governorate. The city continued to be controlled by the Yemeni government until early 2015 when the Houthis took over districts of Abyan, including Lawdar and parts of Khanfir.

Local resistance fighters as well as pro-AQAP individuals started fighting the Houthis in Abyan governorate, including Juar. The situation became further complicated as the fighting against the Houthis was later on joined by the pro-government Popular Committees (PC). Houthis withdrew from Juar and Zenjubar to Lawdar areas in Abyan governorate in mid-2016.

AQAP, as the most organized group, has filled in the gap left by the Houthis and stayed in control until 2017. While Juar is currently controlled by the Yemeni government with an existing local council, there are skirmishes between AQAP and government forces in the neighboring areas, including Al Mahfad and Mudiyah. Nevertheless, Juar and Khanfir, in general, is relatively safe.

The below table illustrates the findings of the Juar assessment using the USAID stabilization analytical framework:

6 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org USAID Stabilization Analytical Framework: Juar Assessment 5 Factor Weight Score Findings (Max)

1. Security 1.1 – Relative security in the area 2 2 Juar has been relatively safe with no active armed confrontations since 2017. There were two main security actors in Juar, the Popular Committees (PC) and the UAE- backed Security Belt Forces (SBF), until the PC joined SBF in 2018.

The PC was led by Abdullatif Al Sayyid, who was once one of the most influential AQAP members until late 2011, when he defected. He subsequently established the PC and survived several assassinations attempts by AQAP. After fleeing from the Houthis to Aden, Abdullatif moved back to Abyan to fight against AQAP, who took over from the Houthis. Abdullatif had the support of the RoYG.

Currently the main two security actors in Juar are the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG), supported security forces, and SBF.

PC was the largest group in number and had the largest support base. PC consequently merged into SBF, which is more organized, and gained full control of Juar consequently. Abdullatif Al Sayyid is currently the commander of SBF in Abyan.

The Abyan SBF is one of the strongest SBF units in the country. The unit operates cross-borders at times. There are reports that the unit has carried out raids and manhunts in Aden.

Household (HH) surveys reported that there are assaults on women with a daily- monthly average of 5% for violence or abuse against women. This was confirmed by FGDs. It was revealed that mainly women from marginalized groups and those who are IDPs face these assaults.

Three per cent of the HHs interviewed also reported that there are kidnappings of adolescents. This was confirmed by the FGDs as children disappeared to join unknown crime groups that are involved in organized crime.

Moreover, the FGDs also reported that land disputes between clans in Juar sometimes develop into armed violence and are solved by clan elders.

5Scoring is weighed as Green = 1 or 2; Yellow = 0.5 for sub-dimensions weighing 1, or 1 for sub-dimensions weighing 2; Red = 0

7 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

1.2 – Relative security of neighboring 2 2 The surrounding areas have few reports of clashes between armed gangs or clans areas over land, or between the government and AQAP in the past three months, with a daily-monthly average of 3% for violence or revenge among members.

Airstrikes targeting AQAP have also been reported in the surrounding areas but not in proximate areas including areas in Al Mahfad and Mudiyah districts.

On the other hand, AQAP once used Haroor Road as an escape route, which connects Khanfir to Al Milah in Lahj governorate. This route is no longer considered unsafe, and it is cleared by the government. 1.3 – Level of inter- and intra-communal 1 0.5 From KIIs and FGDs, there is evidence of inter-tribal tensions over land with violence corresponding violence. Tensions and violence look unlikely to subside and may escalate. In FGDs, tribal prejudices have been described as the biggest security challenge. However, calculated from the HH Survey, respondents indicated that the daily-monthly average of violence or revenge amongst community members is 0%. Yet, this does not mean tribal violence is unlikely, only that it has not occurred on a frequent basis. 1.4 – Alignment of local security 2 2 The local security providers reported on sub-dimension #1.1 are aligned with the provider with USG interests RoYG and can be considered to be aligned with USG interests as defined through the NSC country strategy process. KIIs with local council member and FGDs with community members, respondents do not indicate any alignment or sympathy with terrorist groups or the Houthis. Nevertheless, in FGDs with the elderly and the middle-aged, participants described their days during the socialist Yemen era as the golden time. It should be noted though some respondents suggested grassroots reconciliation with residents in areas with a Houthi or terrorist presence was needed. 1.5 – Relationship between the local 2 2 In KIIs conducted with local council member and FGDs with community members, authority and local security provider respondents noted that the local authority6 generally maintains control of local security for the three months that preceded to the survey. The council works in coordination with other local powerbrokers, mainly clan elders (a.k.a. Sheikhs).

The local authority is supported by RoYG forces. Even though the SBF have differences with the local authority, the social bonds and tribal relationships override these differences. The situation is not as severe as it is in Aden and in other areas between RoYG-backed authorities and SBF. Additionally, the relationship of the local

6 The local authority in the case of Juar is the local council, which includes the 2014-elected but powerless council members, the District Commissioner, the Deputy Governor/Secretary of the Council, the Police Chief, the Security Chief, Directors of Executive Offices, namely MoPIC, Education, Social Affairs etc. It is worth noting that there is tension between the District Commissioner and the Directors of Executive Offices in Juar due to both sides wanting their own interests served, and the Commissioner's interference with the work of Executive Offices. This is also reported in several other districts across southern Yemen.

8 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

authority and SBF is brokered by Abdulrahman Al Shinaini, the SBF head in Khanfir, who is closer to the RoYG-backed local authority. The local council members and the council premises, however, are secured by a military unit from the Yemen army. This unit takes orders from the Governor, who belongs to the same military institution. 1.6 – Relationship between local 2 2 In KIIs conducted with local council member and FGDs with community members, security provider and neighboring respondents noted that the local security provider is largely unified and generally groups cooperates as needed with other neighboring security forces. Moreover, the relationship between neighboring groups and the local security providers depends on the local security forces in the area, which sometimes ally with RoYG forces or SBF. 1.7 – Relationship between local 2 1.5 The HH Survey reported that the trust of local security provider is low in Juar at 34%. security and the population It was slightly lower for male respondents (32%) compared to female respondents (accountability) (37%). Nevertheless, there appears to be some level of accountability in this arrangement with the local population, with 69% of the interviewed community members indicating the level of security in their community as ‘Good,’ or ‘Very Good.’ This suggests that the security forces are largely perceived as accountable by the local population and serve a substantial portion of the population.

Moreover, the majority of both RoYG forces and SBF forces are locals, particularly the commanders. This has positively affected the security level but not translated into high levels of trust. The SBF, on the other side, are backed by UAE and RoYG has less control and accountability over them.

Nevertheless, all the issues or violations committed by their members are resolved through the clan customary law. 1.8 – Security implications for partner 2 1.5 International NGOs face difficulties accessing real-time reliable information to organizations monitor the context as well as working with locals, particularly for humanitarian assistance efforts such as distributions.

GOAL, UNICEF, CARE, and other INGOs have noted the difficulties of obtaining reliable local security information. YCST has employed a resourceful security manager, who previously worked in law enforcement, to coordinate with all institutions, stay informed about the situation, and build local acceptance.

One of the main issues that can be faced by the organizations according to security experts is the security providers, who are not trained on the legal aspect of their work. There are reports that members of SBF are involved in violations against the public. These practices might affect the field-based team such the mobilizers.

9 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

1.9 – Level of risk the activity may pose 2 2 According to INGOs and the local communities, there appears to be potentially no to beneficiaries and low-security risk in endangering the beneficiaries as a result of the intervention in the given area. Any potential risks might be mainly related to conflict over the interventions of the program as resources, which can be avoided by communicating the program’s clear selection criteria. Otherwise there is no indicator signifying that the locals might be targeted by AQAP due to their involvement in a US-funded program. 2. Existence of Reliable Local Partners 2.1 – Presence of an active local 2 2 From interviews with the local council KIIs and FGDs, the local authority–as authority described under sub-dimension #1.5–appears to be active and plays a role in some governance priorities such as law and order, dispute adjudication, security, and service delivery. 2.2 – Population view of the legitimacy 2 1 The population appears to be divided as to whether the local authority is legitimate, of the local authority with a minority of 18% of HH respondents indicating that their interests were ‘sometimes’ or ‘frequently’ represented in local authority decision making. Of the respondents, 20% indicated that they did not know whether their interest was represented. Fifteen percent of respondents to the HH Survey felt that they could only trust local government or governance structures to ‘a little’ extent, with 30% indicating ‘not at all.’ 2.3 – Alignment of local authority (or 2 2 Local authorities appear to be mostly sympathetic/aligned with USG interests. community leaders, if dominant) with While the security providers include members, who were previously active with USG interests groups against USG interests and gained power as a result of their contribution to the fight against the Houthis, the situation is different for members of the local authority. They are nominated by the RoYG and are from the military institution, civil servants, and Sheikhs–clan elders.

YCST plans to address these legitimacy issues through authority-community dialogue and authority-community identified interventions. For example, in discussions with local authority members they identified repairs to the local radio station as an opportunity to share governance information with community members but also as a way to channel community concerns/grievances with local authorities.

10 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org 2.4 – Presence of informal institutions 1 1 Half of the HH Survey respondents (50%) indicated membership in CSOs and that provide governance functions community groups. The most common groups for membership were charities and civic groups, as well as religious groups. Nevertheless, the only side that provides governance functions outside of the formal system as identified by FGDs are the clan elders. The clan elders are the justice providers in Juar and some of them are also religious leaders. Some FGDs have pointed to the presence of influential Sheikhs as religious leaders and mosque preachers as social figures and a governance body. The name of one of the Soufi Imams, who is a preacher of one the mosques in Abyan, Abu Anwar Saleem, has been identified as one of the most influential persons in Juar.

There are also neighborhood 'Aqils' who are elected by the National Security Council. The transfer of power from one Aqil to another is usually through inheritance, where the successor (mainly the son) collects votes from the neighborhood’s influential people to formalize their position. Unlike clan elders, Aqils are replaced by the RoYG if they come against the RoYG interest. Aqils became less powerful in Juar and are mostly involved in resolving social issues and small intra-community neighborhood issues. Issues within the community still go to the clan elders to be resolved through the clan customary laws, if the issue has clan dimensions. Clan issues are not resolved in any of the formal institutions.

Considering their position and proximity to the community, Aqils can be important catalysts for promoting social cohesion at community level.

11 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

2.5 – Population view of the legitimacy 1 1 The majority of people involved in the FGDs considered the informal institutions as of informal institutions representative of the community, as these institutions are constituted by their immediate family, relatives, and/or neighbors constitute members. 2.6 – Alignment of informal actors who 2 1 Informal actors, as detailed in #2.4, are mainly the clan elders who are involved in exercise governance functions with governance provision. As with other areas in Abyan, Clan elders have a grip over USG interests the governance and justice provision. There is no evidence that clan elders are against USG interests. Clan elders have, in fact, hold positions in RoYG institutions. It is worth mentioning that the District Commissioner, Sheikh Nasir Al-Mansari, is one of the most influential clan elders in Abyan.

Juar and areas in Abyan governorate in general are considered to be one of the most complex contexts to operate. Outsiders of Abyan, who YCST approached informally, perceive Juar and Abyan governorates as areas of hibernated AQAP cells, considering how easy is for AQAP to take control. Nevertheless, FGD participants described themselves and the population of Abyan governorate as desperate people, not sympathizers of AQAP but pragmatists in their search for a break from violence.

Participants in one of the FGDs unanimously responded that they do not oppose Juar being governed by the Houthis if that would result in peace and prosperity. YCST plans to use contextual data to regular monitor changing attitudes of informal actors including changes in attitudes which may be counter to USG interest. YCST will use vetting procedures to monitor participants in this program so as to ensure activities are not co-opted by individuals or groups, such as the Houthis or AQAP. 2.7 – Presence of systems to resolve 1 0.5 Formal systems have returned, such as the local authorities and judiciary, but are dispute and injustice, promote not effective in resolving disputes, and/or are only respected by a portion of the reconciliation using nonviolent community, with 31% of respondents indicating they had no trust in local government mechanisms, and responding to local at all. Sixteen percent responded they distrust local security forces. However, the grievances daily-monthly average reported by community respondents of inter-community violence is 0%.

Informal systems receive more trust and respect as detailed above. 3. Risk of Doing Harm 3.1 – Potential for negative actors to 2 1.5 Negative actors such as AQAP are unlikely to benefit materially from stabilization materially benefit from stabilization investments, which will be mainly projects identified and prioritized by the community. investments It is also unlikely as long as checks are strictly applied to all program participants, local partners, beneficiaries, and vendors.

12 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

3.2 – Potential for negative actors to 1 0.5 Negative actors could gain legitimacy from stabilization investments if strong gain legitimacy due to association with mitigation measures, including vetting of program participants and stakeholders, stabilization investments are not established by mainly local partners and CBOs. To this end, 17% of respondents were concerned with abuse or exploitation from NGO activity or investments. Nevertheless, since the stabilization interventions will be implemented in Juar, where there is no presence of AQAP, and it is very unlikely that they will present themselves as the service providers. 3.3 – Potential for stabilization activities 2 1.5 Since YCST employs a mix of the bottom- up and top-down approaches to respond to undermine positive local actors to citizen needs, this might undermine the legitimacy of the local authority to serve as service providers. Thus, YCST will ensure the local authority leads the processes/delivery of interventions.

In terms of other positive actors, CSOs are identified as well in the HH Survey as Charities, Civic Groups, and Religious Groups. YCST has to work with them to establish community structures that participate in the prioritization and the consensus-building dialogue with the authority. 3.4 – Potential for stabilization 1 1 For Juar across the FGDs, KIIs, and HH Survey, there was no indication of violence investment to contribute to increased nor cases of violence related to the delivery of benefits or to competition over benefits violence provided by donor assistance in the past year. 3.5 – Ability of the area to absorb 1 1 In KIIs and FGDs, local leaders and CSOs express openness to stabilization stabilization investment without investment, though they expressed the need for investment to be informed by local undermining local initiatives realities. In KIIs with local council members, respondents noted that the council is currently funded by the government, and thus stabilization investment is unlikely to undermine local initiatives. It is noted that while local actors and initiatives may appear to have the capacity to absorb stabilization investment, regular and careful monitoring is required to prevent overutilization. 4. Existing Foundation for Stabilization Efforts 4.1 – Existence of inclusive conflict 1 0.5 In KIIs and FGDs, the community appears to have few conflict mitigation and social mitigation and social cohesion cohesion mechanisms through the local authority and tribal elders. However, these mechanisms groups are not perceived to be entirely inclusive of residents. In the HH Survey, 42% felt that ordinary people are never represented in local authority decision making processes in general. While these conflict-resolution systems might be dormant or exclusive, they could be revived through careful stabilization programing, with YCST working with incorporating both the interests of local authorities and clan elders. 2 1 The local economy has been substantially damaged by conflict, which has led to the 4.2 – Strength of the local economy and difficulty of procuring goods throughout the country and the limited availability of local independence from illicit activities markets. There is proliferation of firearms and their sales in the markets, which is

13 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

illegal in Juar but largely overlooked by the local authority. There is no indication that Juar’s economy involves trading in illicit economic activities, including money laundry and drug trade. But reports indicate that Khanfir’s coastal areas are used as a route to traffic drugs into other parts of the Gulf region. On the other hand, it is hard to conclude whether or not Khanfir economy is free from other illicit activities such as money laundry. 5. Free and Unfettered Access 5.1 – Administrative requirements for 1 1 In Juar, it is possible to obtain permission and travel permits from national programing in the area authorities (MoPIC) and/or governorate-level authorities. However, implementing partners (IPs) may face delays in obtaining these documents. The possibility of such delays should be factored into administrative requirements for programing in Juar, as well as other areas in Abyan governorate and the south. There are no incidents of rejected programs and revoking approvals from organizations operating in the southern areas by MoPIC. 5.2 – Implementing partners’ freedom 2 2 In Juar, it can be reported that international IPs require travel authorizations of movement (particularly expat staff), but local partners are able to move freely. That being said, any movements, whether by local partners or international IPs, have to be approved by local authorities. Delays in receiving approval can last up to two to three weeks in some cases. Programing efforts by YCST should take into account the different accessibilities between local and international implementing partners in order to maximize coverage. 5.3 – Level of infrastructure necessary 2 1.5 In Juar, the coastal road leading to Aden from Abyan can become blocked by the for access and its relative safety sand dunes encroaching from the sea, which narrows the lane and causes accidents. This can occur throughout the year and gets more severe during summer. Any travels during this time from Aden to Abyan targeted areas is considered unsafe or, at best, requires more time for travel than usual. 5.4 – Implementing partners’ ability to 1 1 The FGD participants did not resist any future plans for sitting and discussing engage with all segments of the common interests with marginalized groups (Muhamasheen/Al-Akhdam) and other population groups living in abject poverty, known in Juar as Al-Ma'adoomeen.

However, it is very important to recruit staff from southern areas for any activity in Abyan in general to ensure achieving the maximum potential for engagement of all segments. International NGOs reported a lack of collaboration from Abyan locals when the activity is led by staff from northern areas.

Moreover, the FGDs' participants confirmed that they are not willing to deal with the local council since they are thought to be involved in nepotism and cronyism. They are skeptical about any work led by the local council. YCST will have to invest more time in bringing the local council–as the local authority–and community members together. 14 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

5.5 – Ability for IPs to implement M&E 1 1 In Juar, it can be reported that the TPM mechanisms are able to collect data. New activities directly. Ability for third-party TPM programs generally face delays of up to several weeks (particularly at the monitoring (TPM) mechanisms to launch of a TPM activity), though once approvals are secured, subsequent delays collect data are uncommon. Data collection may be subject to scrutiny and vetting by authorities to a lesser extent. 6. Presence of Local Implementing Partners 6.1 – Presence of International IPs 1 1 It is noted from HH Survey, KIIs, and FGDs that International IPs have existing programing in Juar or have worked there previously and are willing to return. In Juar the following organizations have previous or ongoing experience: CARE, UNICEF, UNDP, IOM, among others. 6.2 – Presence of local groups active 1 1 It is noted from HH Survey, KIIs, and FGDs that local groups, such as the Mental in the area and the degree of their Health Association, Mbadron Youth Foundation, Khanfir Association, and Yemen capacity and reach within the Women’s Union have existing programing, demonstrate some capacity, and have community limited reach in accessing all segments of the community. The Juar local council member, interviewed through a KII, indicated that local groups have some capacity to absorb funding, provided that sufficient support (such as anti-corruption measures) are established. 6.3 – Local partner absorption rates 1 0.5 In Juar, it can be reported that local partners are able to manage a small increase in funds from one or two donors and able to deliver sufficient results with external support. While local partners have most of their experience in humanitarian assistance/food distribution, from KIIs, FGDs, and the HH Survey, respondents indicated that these partners require assistance with managing distribution and coordination. Therefore, while there appears to be little existing activity of humanitarian assistance/food distribution, local capacity is likely to be limited, and YCST will have to take such considerations into account to prevent waste or inefficiencies in programing and implementation. 6.4 – IP ability to comply with 1 0.5 In Juar, local IPs are mostly able to comply with operational standards while operational standards in the area of programing in the area. Some delays and challenges will be faced, which YCST will intervention have to respond to as the program progresses, such as the exercise of control by local authorities. In KIIs and FGDs, leaders and members of communities mentioned the need for strong anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability systems in aid interventions. 7. Multiplier Potential 7.1 – Relationship between local 1 1 There are some or minimal collaboration between Juar authorities and others in authorities in this area and other local surrounding areas, including Zenjubar–also targeted by YCST stabilization. There is authorities slight tension between the local authorities in Zenjubar and Juar, due to the fact that most of the assistance goes to Zenjubar as concluded from the FGDs and the KIIs.

15 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org

7.2 – Relationship between local 2 2 The District Commissioner of Juar, Sheikh Nasir Al-Mansari, is also one of the most government authorities and local influential and powerful tribal leaders in Abyan governorate. He holds both forms of community leaders (religious, tribal) power, the formal and the informal. This contributes to building a relationship between the local authorities as well as local community leaders. But, on the other hand, Sheikh Nasir is also described as untouchable by many people, who were approached by YCST informally for discussion. 7.3 – Presence of development 1 1 Development assistance projects exist in Juar, and possible opportunities for synergy assistance projects exist in the area, with stabilization activities exist. CARE and IOM implement Cash for Work (CfW) and opportunities for synergy with projects. UNDP implements stabilization project with livelihoods and protection stabilization activities components. Moreover, UNDP is planning to launch a Rule of Law program in Abyan by mid-2019, and the target areas are yet to be confirmed. 1 1 Groups within the community and their leaders appear to be open to social cohesion- focused initiatives, with 54% of household survey respondents indicating that they 7.4 – Intra-communal perceptions of contributed (and not just participated) to a communal event, such as a community- social cohesion initiatives based initiative to improve the area (e.g., infrastructure, sanitation, waste disposal, education, or health services). 7.5 – Presence of social, economic, 1 1 Juar used to rely on local agricultural produce and supplying the surrounding areas, political ties between the area under including Zenjubar. Currently Juar relies on civil servant and security forces income. consideration and other nearby areas Other parts of Khanfir and Zenjubar rely on artisanal fishery and supplies Juar. Additionally, Juar also depends on economic migrants' remittances.

Socially, Juar is urban settlement and its dwellers have roots in all surrounding areas, mainly Zenjubar, Lawdar and Mudiyah in Abyan governorate and in as far as Yafi'I and Hadramawt governorate. Politically, Juar and other surrounding areas are controlled by security providers that are aligned with RoYG with pockets of AQAP presence. 7.6 – Inter-communal perceptions of 1 1 While there was some indication of interest in the KIIs, FGDs, and HH Survey social cohesion initiatives responses to further social cohesion between neighboring communities, tensions such as tribal rivalries, the relatively unsafe routes, and poor road infrastructure all suggest that neighboring communities and their leaders express skepticism about social cohesion-focused initiatives.

15 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org Concluding Summary Based on the findings of the USAID Stabilization Analytical Framework, the Juar community appears to be favorable to stabilization interventions by YCST. There are few yellow sub- dimensions, which constitute program risks or implementation opportunities, depending on how YCST plans to approach the solution. Nevertheless, the rating for each dimension/factor and the overall rating for all dimensions is green as shown on the below table.

Factor/Dimension Weight (Max) Score

1. Security 17 15.5

2. Existence of Reliable Local Partners 11 8.5

3. Risk of Doing Harm 7 5.5 4. Existing Foundation for Stabilization Efforts 3 1.5

5. Free and Unfettered Access 7 6.5

6. Presence of Local Implementing Partners 4 3

7. Multiplier Potential 7 7 Overall Rating 56 47.5

Juar demonstrates a relative degree of safety and security, with minimal violence identified that may impact the YCST activities. Local security forces similarly appear to be well engaged with the local population and do not appear to comprise any substantial barrier (beyond bureaucratic requirements) to YCST’s operation in the target areas. While there appears to be some inter-tribal or intra-communal violence, and some unsubstantiated reports of Islamist militant activity in neighboring parts of Abyan, there does not appear to be a high risk of violence that will be directed at YCST.

In Juar, there appears to exist some local CSOs and informal institutions with whom YCST can collaborate. However, many of these may have limited capacity to deliver activities directly and to properly administer resources. There did not appear to exist any substantial INGO presence in Juar; some NNGOs appear to exist in the target area and offer some opportunities for collaboration. This is an encouraging set of findings, indicating there may be some structures YCST can build upon moving ahead.

YCST may have to take care when targeting its programing to minimize dependence on support and to minimize any potential negative impacts on local institutions. However, most respondents have given clear indications of willingness and interest to engage with stabilization activities and potential support from YCST.

Juar is currently administered by government-aligned authorities and security forces, with limited evidence supporting the potential for supporting or providing legitimacy to forces that are not aligned to USG interests. The stabilization investment is unlikely to contribute to illicit economy activities since the economy is also reported to be free from these activities.

Taken together, it does appear that Juar is a location that can be amenable to YCST operation in the target areas. YCST will need to be mindful when choosing modes of implementation and the selection and management of partner relationships. However, substantial barriers that would

16 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org hinder YCST’s operation in the area do not appear, and there are a number of factors supporting successful implementation in the area.

17 Global Communities | 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 300 | Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA T: (+1) 301.587.4700 | F: (+1) 301.587.7315 | www.globalcommunities.org