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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): Overview Practical Law Litigation with David J

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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): Overview Practical Law Litigation with David J Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): Overview Practical Law Litigation with David J. Lender, Jared R. Friedmann and Jodi Barrow, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and Jason B. Bonk, Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff & Cohen, P.C. This Practice Note discusses the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which significantly expanded federal diversity jurisdiction over class and mass actions. Specifically this Note reviews CAFA's requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction over class and mass actions, the enumerated exceptions to federal jurisdiction, removal and class action settlements. This is just one example of the many online resources Practical Law Company offers. To access this resource and others, visit practicallaw.com. Increased the amount in controversy requirement from On February 18, 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action $75,000 to $5 million, but relaxed the threshold standard by Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), significantly expanding federal requiring the $5 million to represent the aggregate sum of each diversity jurisdiction over most class actions and mass actions (28 individual plaintiff's claims (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6); see U.S.C. § 1332(d)). CAFA also enacted new rules and procedures Amount in Controversy in Class Actions). related to removal (28 U.S.C. § 1453) and to settling class actions (28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715). Relaxed the requirement that all plaintiffs be diverse from all defendants to allow jurisdiction where at least one plaintiff This Note outlines CAFA's provisions concerning: is diverse from at least one defendant (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2); see Minimal Geographic Diversity between Plaintiffs and Expanded federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions. Defendants). Certain enumerated exceptions to federal jurisdiction. For a full comparison between CAFA and traditional diversity Expanded federal diversity jurisdiction over mass actions. rules, see CAFA Jurisdiction Comparison Chart (http:// Removal. us.practicallaw.com/8-532-3326). Class action settlements. Amount in Controversy in Class Actions This Note is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of all class action requirements, but rather outlines the procedural CAFA changed the amount in controversy requirement for requirements effectuated through CAFA. determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists over class actions. This section explains what rule changes were made and the CLASS ACTION DEFINED UNDER CAFA practical implications of those changes, including: CAFA defines a class action as "any civil action filed under rule The amount in controversy requirement (see Amount in 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute Controversy Must Exceed $5 Million Aggregated). or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought Relief that can be considered in calculating the amount in by 1 or more representative persons as a class action" (28 U.S.C. controversy (see Calculating the Amount in Controversy). § 1332(d)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (definition includes a Plaintiffs' attempts to disaggregate claims to limit the amount in removed action)). controversy (see Plaintiffs' Attempts to Avoid CAFA's Monetary A class need not be certified before a court may assert federal Threshold). jurisdiction over the action under CAFA (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8)). Amount in Controversy Must Exceed $5 Million Aggregated To qualify as a class action under CAFA, the amount in FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OVER CLASS ACTIONS controversy must exceed the sum or value of $5 million, exclusive CAFA's hallmark feature is its expansion of federal courts' of interest and costs (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). Importantly, discretion to exercise diversity jurisdiction over class actions. the claims of individual class members are aggregated when CAFA notably: determining whether CAFA's $5 million jurisdictional threshold is met (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6)). Learn more about Practical Law Company | practicallaw.com © 2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): Overview This represents a significant departure from how the amount in S. Ct. 1345, 1348 (2013); Legal Update, Supreme Court: CAFA controversy was traditionally calculated for class actions started Jurisdiction Not Defeated by Named Plaintiff's Stipulation to Seek in or removed to federal court on diversity grounds. Before CAFA, Less than $5 Million (http://us.practicallaw.com/1-525-2884)). at least one plaintiff class member had to assert a claim equaling For a discussion of the ways in which plaintiffs have attempted or exceeding $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs (see Exxon to avoid CAFA jurisdiction, see Article, CAFA Mass Actions: Will Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566 (2005)). Courts Continue to Permit Plaintiffs to Game the System? (http:// Courts could then exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any us.practicallaw.com/8-537-7705) other diverse plaintiff seeking less than the $75,000 monetary threshold (Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 566). By contrast, under CAFA, the sum of all individual plaintiff class members' Minimal Geographic Diversity between Plaintiffs and claims must total more than $5 million, but no individual claim Defendants must total a threshold sum (see, for example, Cappuccitti v. CAFA also changed the geographic diversity requirements needed DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2010); Blockbuster, to support diversity jurisdiction, extending jurisdiction over class Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2006)). actions where there is "minimal diversity" between any class member and any defendant. This section outlines the key points Calculating the Amount in Controversy to consider in determining whether minimal diversity exists under The court may consider the following types of relief when CAFA. calculating the amount in controversy: Determining Whether Minimal Diversity Exists: General Rule Compensatory damages (see, for example, Frederick v. Under CAFA, geographic minimal diversity is met when any Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir. member of a class of plaintiffs is: 2012)). A citizen of a state different from any defendant. Statutory damages (see, for example, Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 55). A foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a state. Punitive damages (see, for example, Frederick, 683 F.3d at 1245, 1248). A citizen of a state and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. Attorneys' fees, where authorized by statute (see, for example, Kerbs v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, No. 11–cv-1642, 2011 WL (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C).) In other words, if any class 6012497, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011)). member is diverse from any defendant, minimal diversity is met (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d Equitable relief sought by the plaintiff class (see, for example, 1184, 1194 n.24 (11th Cir. 2007)). Keeling v. Esurance Ins. Co., 660 F.3d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 2011)). Named and Unnamed Class Members Are Included Plaintiffs' Attempts to Avoid CAFA's Monetary Threshold To determine whether minimal diversity exists or whether a To avoid triggering removal under CAFA, plaintiffs sometimes geography-based exception to CAFA applies, the citizenship of all may try to divide an action into separate lawsuits and limit the class members (including putative), both named and unnamed, amount in controversy for each suit to less than CAFA's $5 million is considered (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(D); see Exceptions Based threshold. Courts may not support attempts to disaggregate on Geography). This represents a change from traditional diversity claims to subvert removal under CAFA (compare Freeman v. Blue requirements in class actions in which diversity between class Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2008) representatives and defendants was examined for complete (denying disaggregation between separate class actions because diversity (see Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969)). "there was no colorable reason for breaking up the lawsuit in As a result of this change, the citizenship of absent class this fashion, other than to avoid federal jurisdiction") with Marple members, whose specific whereabouts may be unknown, may be v. T-Mobile Cent. LLC, 639 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011) subject to dispute between the parties and ultimate determination (allowing disaggregation between lawsuits "where there is no by the court (see, for example, Handforth v. Stenotype Inst. of indication that Marple artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid the Jacksonville, Inc., No. 09-cv-361, 2010 WL 55578, at *2-3 CAFA")). (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2010) (permitting limited discovery and finding Using another mechanism to avoid removal under CAFA, some insufficient evidence to conclude that there were any diverse class plaintiffs have sought to enter into pre-certification stipulations members); and see Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 on behalf of the entire class agreeing not to seek more than $5 F.3d 564, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (looking at census data and million in damages. The Supreme Court, however, has held that other statistics to determine whether a geography-based exception these pre-certification stipulations are not binding on absent applied)). class members and therefore do not serve as an impediment to CAFA jurisdiction (see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 © 2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. 2 Relevant Dates for Determining Citizenship is also considered a citizen of that state, regardless of any dual CAFA has specific provisions for the point in time when plaintiff citizenship it holds (Johnson, 549 F.3d at 936; Marroquin v. Wells class members' citizenship is determined: Fargo, LLC, No. 11-cv-163, 2011 WL 476540, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) ("Plaintiff and the class members are alleged to be Citizenship is first considered as of the filing date of the California citizens.
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