Question 1. on What Basis, If Any Would a Federal District Court Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuit by Plaintiff Against Defendant

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Question 1. on What Basis, If Any Would a Federal District Court Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuit by Plaintiff Against Defendant STUDENT ANSWER 1: Question 1. On what basis, if any would a federal district court have subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit by plaintiff against defendant. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have subject matter jurisdiction over federal question causes of action and diversity of jurisdiction causes of action. A federal question claim arises when the cause of action arises under an act of Congress, the US Constitution or a US Treaty. A diversity claim is a state based claim between citizens of different states where the damages exceed 75,000. In addition the federal court has the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear a state claim that is related to a valid pending claim in the federal court even though independently that claim could not enter the federal court house so long as the state claim against a D derives from a common nucleus of operative facts. To determine whether or not a court has jurisdiction over a federal question claim, the court relies on the well pleaded complaint rule. Under the WELL PLEADED COMAPLAINT RULE, federal courts look exclusively to the plaintiff’s complaint and will not consider that a defendant may raise a federal statute as a defense or that the D will assert a related counterclaim involving federal issues. To determine whether or not jurisdiction exists under a diversity of jurisdiction claim, both plaintiff and defendant must be completely diverse and the cause of action must exceed 75,000.00. Citizenship of the parties is based upon where the parties are domiciled. A party’s domicile is where they reside and where they intend to stay. 1.a. Whether or Not the Federal Court Has Federal Question subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim Federal question jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff’s claim arises under an act of Congress, the US Constitution, or a US Treaty. Since the claims do not arise out of an act of Congress or a US Treaty an analysis of whether the claim arises out of the US Constitution is required. Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant defamed her pursuant to State A law. She further asserts that the defendant cannot be shielded by a defense arising under the First Amendment. Under the well pleaded complaint rule as noted above, the court looks to the face of the complaint and any defenses asserted will not consider that a federal statute raised as a defense. Since the plaintiff’s claim does not arise out of an act of Congress, the US Constitution, or a US treaty the federal court will not have federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. 1.b. Whether or not the federal court has diversity of jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Diversity of jurisdiction exists as noted above when a plaintiff’s state based claim is against a citizen from a different state and the controversy exceeds 75,000.00 in damages. The damages may include punitive damages, attorney fees and interest on a contract but not statutory interest. Here, plaintiff is domiciled in state A and defendant currently resides in State B. A domicile is determined to be where an individual resides and where he intends to stay. Defendant moved from State A to State B three years ago and has told his family and friends that he still considers State A his home and intends to return their someday. However, He also states that he is happy in State B and votes, pays his taxes, and owns property in State B. Although defendant might argue that State A is really his home, which would break diversity jurisdiction, it is likely that the court will find that he is a domicile of State B. If the court finds him to be domiciled in State B diversity of jurisdiction will exist and if not the court will not have subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, the claim asserted must be for more than 75K in damages. Here, plaintiff’s claim exceeds the threshold as she is claiming 200,000 in damages and 1,000,000 in punitive damages so the threshold is met. Since both elements of diversity jurisdiction are met the federal district court would have diversity jurisdiction so long as defendant is determined to be domiciled in State B. In conclusion, the federal district court would not have federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim but would have diversity of jurisdiction subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Question 2: Would the US District Court for the District of State A have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant? Issue 1: Whether or not the federal district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and if so, would the exercise of jurisdiction comport with fair play and substantial justice. All federal courts apply the rules of civil procedure of the state where it is sitting as well as the rules for the 3 types of procedural jurisdictions: personal jurisdiction over a defendant, in rem jurisdiction and quasi in rem jurisdiction. When a party starts a lawsuit and enlists the state or federal court, enlists the state or federal court then “state action” is involved which requires that the due process clause be satisfied. The court uses a 2 step inquiry: first it looks at the state law to determine if there exists procedural jurisdiction and if so, it then considers whether the exercise of that jurisdiction complies with due process. The state process is considered fair if the defendant has minimum contacts with the state of a nature and quality that exercising jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Shoe). The court has to determine whether it is fair to subject an out of state D to a lawsuit in that state – subject a non-domicile to a lawsuit in that state. In addition, the D must have a full and fair opportunity to be heard and must have been properly served with process. 2.a Whether or not the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to establish jurisdiction A defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state when he either consents to jurisdiction, is at home in the forum state (or is where a corporation has its principal place of business), in cases of corporations – is incorporated in the forum state, is a non-domiciliary but the court has long-arm jurisdiction or is a non-domiciliary and is served in-state. State A’s long arm statute provides that the courts of State A may exercise jurisdiction over absent defendants to the full extent permitted by the due process clause of the Constitution. Long Arm Jurisdiction arises when” 1- a defendant owns, uses possesses realty in a forum state; 2 if the defendant’s tortious act occurs in that state causing personal injury property damage or economic injury in that state; 3- the defendant’s tortious conduct occurred outside the state causing injury in the state where the plaintiff’s claim was commenced but he defendant must have targeted that state and; 4- the defendant transacted business in that state. Here, defendant is a domiciliary of State B but is alleged to have committed a tortious act (defamation) outside of that state (State B) that defamed plaintiff pursuant to State A’s law. Since defendant did not consent to jurisdiction and is not at home in State A, the State A long arm statute will be invoked to acquire jurisdiction over him. Although defendant’s central computer is located in State B and he posts to his website in State B, his political commentary focuses on people and events in State A where he is best known in his career as a political commentator. In fact, defendant’s website receives so many hits from State A that most of his advertisers on his site are State A firms seeking to attract customers from State A, purposefully availing himself to the benefits of State A. Because defendant specifically targets State A and accepts advertising revenue from advertisers seeking to target State A customers, the State A long arm statute can be appropriately invoked to obtain specific jurisdiction over him, establishing the minimum contacts element needed for personal jurisdiction. 2.b. Whether or not exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In determining whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended, a court generally balances: 1- The closeness of the relationship between the claim and the contact; 2- whether it is convenient to call the defendant into the forum state and; the state's interest in protecting its citizens. Here, since defendant’s minimum contacts sufficiently satisfy the exercise of personal jurisdiction using State A’s long arm statute, and since defendant purposefully avails himself to the benefits of State A, the there is a closeness of relationship between the claim and the contact. In addition, since defendant is well known in State A because it is his old “stomping ground” and recently relocated to State B from State A, it is likely that the court will not fins the State A forum inconvenient. Lastly, State A will have an interest in protecting it’s citizens when out of state defendant’s commit tortious acts outside of their state which cause personal injury within their state. Since, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended by exercising long arm jurisdiction over the defendant, due process is afforded to the defendant.
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