Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in and Beyond

Ferme, Mariane C. (Mariane Conchita), 1959- Hoffman, Danny, 1972-

Africa Today, Volume 50, Number 4, Summer 2004, pp. 73-95 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/at/summary/v050/50.4ferme.html

Access Provided by University of California @ Berkeley at 09/23/11 10:22PM GMT Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond Mariane C. Ferme and Danny Hoff man

In this article, we examine how irregular combatants in the “hunter” militias in Sierra Leone defi ned themselves and their objectives in dialogue with the human-rights discourse of international humanitarian organizations that intervened in the confl ict and the peace initiatives that punctuated it, particularly from the mid-1990s onwards. We suggest that the moral subject envisioned by international doctrines of humanitarianism overlapped with codes of conduct pre- scribed in the course of initiations into hunting militias, especially in areas where these militias remained account- able and loyal to local political hierarchies. This under- mines any simple notion of a total moral breakdown and disregard for civilian lives and rights. However, we also suggest that once militias left their local functions of grass- roots civil defense units and moved beyond the territories where they were recruited, they made strategic decisions in combat based on a selective interpretation of humanitarian discourse and practices. This transformation shows how changing perceptions of the terms of engagement produced sometimes diverging, other times parallel interpretations of the moral dilemmas at stake, as the confl ict (and its con- tainment) shifted in scale to broader national, regional, and international arenas.

Introduction

During the 1990s, the confl ict zone that moved across the border regions of , Sierra Leone, and brought international initiatives to help put an end to violence, and eventually work toward reconstruction in its aftermath. Sierra Leone became the centerpiece of pacifi cation efforts in the region, as the international community poured in some US$2 billion to shore up the peace process in the country. By April 2002, the United 1 2 icts. In particular, and Civil later, Defense Forces held before the war held in different parts Kamajors, kamajor themselvesne and their goals. Far from arguing for a ghting from Sierra Leone, where in January 2002 the war s is generally translated in Sierra Leone and in the interna- s are a predominantly militia, Mende the largest and most In this article, we are especially interested in the contributions this this contributions the in interested especially are we article, this In kamajor Kamajor Kamajor ghters’ awareness of international responses to different kinds of con- codes of conduct in organized hunting associations. Furthermore, the The The powerful of a heterogeneous group of ethnic paramilitaries loosely allied under the umbrella of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) in Sierra Leone. The term the increasing engagement of international actors, especially after and 1996, with the shift in fi tional media as a translation “traditional hunter,” that fails to capture the variable social a roles history—overlapped remarkablyinternational doctrines of humanitarian combat. This interpretation with under- the kind of subjectivitymines that the notion irregular do combatants we disregard more have for civiliananalysis our in though envisioned armies—even regular than rights and bylives point to evidence that irregulars did commit atrocities during But the war. our emphasis is here on the strategicdecisions in combat that a selec- show engagementtive with humanitarian discourse and practices as a result of the fi confl in different experience gained they as in war, duct ethnographic evidence suggests that in this regard attitudes changed with declaredwas formally to areas over, across the border in Liberia. of the country, and importantly, more the variable nature of his life and top-down change instigated by the introduction discourse of a new and of all the premises is predicated universalizing on which it (e.g., claims of equal worth of any human life, etc.), subjectivity, instead show we autonomous the “practiceshow of the self” and ethical codes developed within the hunt- ing militias—which in were part inherited from regional political and social and aftermath its through training programs in cooperation with the armed forces, had a 2002 million budget US$14.5 of about for Sierra Leone. Nations peacekeepingNations force (UNAMSIL) accounted thanfor more 18,000 local and police, civilian observers, military personnel, military among US$717.6 of budget annual an with staff, support civilian international and in world, the in anywhere deployment U.N. largest the was This million. smalla relatively country, which has only 4.5 about millioninhabitants. interventionsThe other of humanitarian organizations been have equally impressive: for example, the International Committee of the Cross Red (ICRC), of the major one actors in promoting humanitarian conduct in war massive intervention made by the Non-GovernmentalUnited Nations, Organizations (NGOs)and otherentities to the spread of a human-rights discourse that shaped in the ways which irregular combatants—in par- ticular those known as hunters, (CDF)—came to defi to (CDF)—came

africaTODAY 74 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 75 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN s in organized kamajor ghting force force ghting was supposed supposed was gbethi from the Koranko- the from 5 with Koranko eth- Koranko with with the Kono. All All Kono. the with kamajor donsos ed geographically with the the with geographically ed The The 4 achieved. tamaboros tamaboros tamaboros The small The number of 3 kamajors as a kind premodern of archetype is contradicted by fromeld the territories they recruited where were as with the Temne, and the the and Temne, the with eventually emerged as the largest group. The kamajors gbethis historical heritage, participants in the and war, analysts too, downplay crucial events in which hunting societies became the with alliances, sinister sometimes through implicated, government of the day on both local and national arenas, perfor- cultural of as much as politics of domains the in and mances (Ferme 2001a: 131). In invoking Mande hunting folklore and ancient more a much Conventional wisdom associated the the wisdom associated Conventional In the early 1990s, local hunters’ familiarity with the rural terrain kamajors considered to be the domain of the OBHS, or “Organized Body of Hunting Hunting of Body “Organized or OBHS, the of domain the be to considered around and including on the Atlantic coast least at officially, was, ing the degree of attention that the dominated areas of the North. These and other militias intervened in the Mende-speaking southeastern part of the country, the where early phases of the civil war unfolded, and among the militias organizing in this region the andlater, their own leaders recognized that they succeeded never in captur- that the “original” hunter-militiamen were were hunter-militiamen “original” the that surprisingly, the origin stories that describe the early days of the movement are highly politicized and variable; nevertheless, there is general agreement grassroot militias. wit: To cal dealings in urban settings during (where thetwenty years preceding the civil war urban hunting societies composed primarily often of youth the of unfolding the with and, thuggery), partisan in embroiled became as accountability of codes local to link their lost also inevitably they war, afi farther moved they to command secret knowledge and protective medicines relating to hunting activities in the forest, these but could easily be coopted secretive for politi- their historical association withmodern technology and weaponry (Ferme 2001a; Griaule 1965; Legassick 1966). portrayal of three ethnic and linguistic groups are identifi north of the country. In addition, toward the the of the end peninsula war, nicity, the nicity, led to theirled by the military employment as trackers and guides in the bush war against the Revolutionary United (RUF) Front in Sierra Leone. Not the southeastern chiefdoms Mende they where emerged asa fi numbered perhaps or two one to a village or collection of villages, and were responsible for hunting game, also but for protecting the community from human and animal dangers with their weapons. For this reason, in histori- cal narratives and folktales of the Upper Guinea Africa region West of (an area roughly overlapping with the three countries comprising the : Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), the distinction between hunters and warriors sometimes blurred. was came to to came kamajor s (and their counterparts ghting declared factions them- kamajor leader Chief Sam Hinga Norman as When President Kabbah and the Sierra 6 militias, this time pushing them beyond kamajor kamajor xed identity predating of these role the The war. duringict which the hunter groups emerged as grassroots swelled again as irregulars called were reinstall upon to help of Southict African mercenaries working secu- for the private in formalizedcombat was with in the 1995, crucial intervention

The advent to power of the advent ArmedThe Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)− rmExecutive Outcomes. This force brought was in by theNational kamajors the SLPP government-in-exile—a recruitment that extended into Liberia and Guinea and included Liberian mercenaries AFRC-RUF and Sierra Leoneans the living during exile in refugeein the region’s camps. government In particular, the location in Guinea of Presi- Leonean Sierra Kabbah’s dent “interregnum” of May 1997−February contributed 1998 to the regional- ization of CDF operations, to the even as the election of Charles Taylor national boundaries and giving them a regional scope ranks of action. The of the RUF allianceRUF in the coup May marked 1997 another turning point in the the of transformation elected president appointed the Deputy Minister of Defense. These sonnel and in their food subsidies, factors, the to led alienation of sectors within 1999:152). the along (Zack-Williams 1997 with May in coup a cutsorganized in which militarymilitary, per- thatThus even at time the logic of clientelism that had characterized the “corrupt APC times” against which the fi selves still was albeit work, at in of different favor military The elements. beingwere accountable held for their earlier complicities with rebels in confl of phase the local defense militias. By the elections, 1996 disgruntled military cadres perceived themselves from excluded the dividends of “democratization” efforts—political and economic access favors, to training and employment, ministerial posts—which the at time were supported by the international communityKandeh (Ferme 2004) 1999: 160–191; joined in preying on rural communities. In Sierra Leone, Leone, Sierra In communities. rural on preying in joined defend themselves when the national army failed to do so, and in some cases PartyLeone People’s (SLPP) came to power in these 1996, militias played an increasingly important security in role the country, especially after the departure of Executive Outcomes mercenaries later that year. newly- The alliances as of any fi any of as alliances militias Societies,” composedSocieties,” of Kriosand young other of men ethnic groups, whose primary residence the was capital. as earlier, But, mentioned these ethnic markers as an were much artifact of the unfolding political and military confl the in fi rity Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the military junta that ruled Sierra Leone between combat the rebels. 1992 RUF and Indeed, to help 1996, Executive systematic Outcomes’s and deployment training of hunters and CDF forces may account least at in part for their military successes where the earlier of Nepalese deployment Gurkha mercenaries had failed.By the middle of the decade, then, the number of from other ethnicgroups) grew substantially as communities mobilized to refer to any man initiated into the militia, had whether previously he been (anda hunter not or had most not).

africaTODAY 76 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 77 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN , was restricted, was militias became became militias occurred these as kamajor kamajor kamajors rearms or not, and on which which on and not, or rearms cation: issued the was oldest in a at 1998, ‘mere hunters.’ This hunters.’ ‘mere included the period of operating in Sierra Leone found themselves s. . Ironically, the word, Mende kamajor Kamajors ed himself through the vernacularized version of the —the medicine, secret society—which made him and his as the fearful most for hunters. In this particular rural area

hunter ) 7 halei honta gbama gbama gbama honta Thus, the Thus, shift from hunters mere to 8 That this emphasis on large, centralized initiations and theirconcur- The languageThe shifts are important here: haphazard, for the more rearms they had been trained to use. Additionally, during this period, the to describing his status had once undergone he the expensive initiation in duringBo, the “junta time” paying mentioned (he 50,000 leones to be ini- tiated). parallel with the government(in exile during the “junta time”), army, and initiated en masse in large headed towns. by a DeputyIndeed, the Minister man carried two CDF picture-identity cards in addition to his of Defense NPRC-era identifi “combatant” English word stage in which hunter militias had already undergone the transformation into Civil Defense Forces. (Mende) “indigenization” The and exoticization locally organized militia activities had he engaged in beginning in this 1994, manMende identifi rent esotericrent prescriptions in were many the product of the ways transfor- mation of the hunter militias during the course and of the war, particularly laterits stages, is underscored by a conversation with demobilized one former ground commander in April 2002. man The described the “junta time” (the May 1997−February period, 1998 in which the AFRC-RUF junta inwas power Presidency in Liberia appeared to put an end to widespread hostilities on on hostilities widespread to end an put to appeared Liberia in Presidency the Liberian front. among the main targets of the brutal AFRC-RUF regime—a fact that pushed the CDF leadership to accelerate the process of professionalizing thehunt- ers through training, whichin turn marked distinctions among the cadres, depending they on whether couldhandle fi fi esoteric ritual aspects induction of into the CDF- importantmore (and the cost of initiation expensive), more and centrally controlled by a handful of initiators. of Southeastern Sierra Leone, said, he the local militia until that time had been service under the military NPRC junta, which relinquished in power the early months a time of 1996, the when organization of the hunter militias had already achieved degree a considerable of formalization. demobi- The lized hunterfading a showed yellow ID card bearing the and NPRC logo identifying him Though the card as a “combatant.” bore issue no date, saidhe had he acquired after it joining the hunters and he in when 1994, of themost villagers from the chiefdom inhabited he escaped rebels occu- pying the area and refuge took in several U.N.-sponsored camps near the provincial headquarter he town of Bo. Already that this at time portrayed was he 1997 in was it said, he but, in photographs wearing amulets and exotic bodily hunting, decorations said to be “traditional” with associated joined the fellow recruits into forces became institutionalized the national at trained level, and armed in was used was to hunters cation underscored by ethnic no longer have a recognized status in that that in status recognized a have longer no

s 9 kamajor ghting with of the factions one in the earlier Liberian civil war. With the formal declaration of an to the end war in Sierra Leone in The militiaThe came to be known everywherename, Mende its by despite cation for many combatants, and demobilization resources allocated to and linguistic allegiances that official map do not onto state boundaries. largelyThe unmet expectations of peacetime and employment education opportunities through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs (DDR), as well as pressure from patrons with a vested interest in mobile highly this within many led have regime, Taylor the overthrowing demographic toward participation in the next phase long- of the now running Mano River War. of young expressed who men degree some personal of connection to commu- identifi borders—an national the across nities militias may have been closer to the domain of “tradition,” and yet were were yet and “tradition,” of domain the to characterize an earlier period, closer in which the status and practices of hunters’ been have may militias on an English-language-dominated international media, humanitarian, and circuit. diplomatic January 2002, the already inextricablyenmeshed in feedback loops,with their representations the fact that some of the earliestthe non-Mende-speaking North. This underscores the ascentduring hunter the militias activewar—beginning with the election 1996 of President Kabbah’s SLPP—of in a the war were from political establishment power base whose in was the largely South- Mende east, despite the nine-month interruption to this process brought by about the inclusive English AFRC-RUF more The coup. term of the hunters’ status coincided with the increasedcentralization and incorporation their structures—and organizational their of urbanization within the state apparatus. By then, segments too, of the hunter militias had already operated acrossthe borders with Guinea and Liberia, and in the process hadacquired international experience and networks. country, though participation remains in the movement a point of identi- fi former members are an important factor in shaping forms new of social distinction in postwar communities: the formal however, end to combat in Sierra Leone brought a deeper about division between the demobilizing of andelements the sides professionalized segments of the CDF; many of the latter both on ties family acrossmoved the Liberian and Guinean with borders to support the Liberians combatants be to United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) against Charles tended Taylor’s These regime. or thosethe had border, previously who spent time in Liberia working fi and/or Given the extensive networks of trade and migration (voluntary and forced) throughout the Mano River region, this amounted to a substantial number

africaTODAY 78 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 79 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN

c kamajor emerged from emerged mentioned earlier), kamajors sobel In other words, they are aware 10 Still,ict. the heart the of accusation gure of the the of gure s are conversant in the letter of inter- s committed serious abuses during the s “have little regard for the norms of interna- kamajor kamajor Summarizingict. report U.N. on the use1997 a and kamajor No armed force, conventional or irregular, is able to reg- 11 The UNThe panel pointed that out irregular forces have little regard for the norms of international law and do distin- not guish between combatants and non-combatants, with women and children, the most vulnerable groups in often society, victims. main the being There is doubt that no thereict, moral were aporia posed by the blurred distinctions between ected both standing ideas the about moral responsibilities of manhood enemy factionsenemy (as indicated by thefi engagement in war, as prescribed by the various treaties. However, in the the in However, treaties. various the of the international by pressure to act in accordance with the rules of ethical prescribed as war, in engagement context of a civil war of this duration, the very distinction between foe and civilian, and outsider insider, adult and child becomes blurred. In this confl and political citizenship, and recent more political histories. a social context with conceptions of right behavior and moral conduct that remained despite (in relevant fact, because of) the war—a social context that refl served to limit abuses: like many irregular militias, militias, irregular many like abuses: limit to served mention the factmention that such thinking gives too credit much to those combat- ants happen who to wear the insignia of the state). On the contrary, identity is largely built around exactly those norms of right conduct that thelie heart at of international regulations and the discourse of human rights promoted by global NGOs. To a point, it is an ethical foundation that Court of Chief Sam Hinga Norman war for crimes committed after Novem- theber fact But of being 1996. irregular combatants the is determining not factor the United and Nations the popular imaginary suppose to to be (not it course of the war. the of course which jeopardized the very possibility of applying consistently the demands of international laws regarding conduct in war. ulate the behavior completely of all members. its This especially was true by the late stages as of the war, evidenced by the indictment in the Special It is certainly true that few few that true certainly is It national law governing peace and confl the like groups that “Kamajor, Baa Woteh” “Kamajor, Conventional wisdom thatholds the use of young as men irregular combat- ants the outside purview of the state security apparatus has to horrifi led human-rights violations and an abandonment of international regulations regulations international of abandonment an and violations human-rights governing armed confl proliferation of light weapons, Andre Stemmet (2001:92) relates has what become the standard interpretation of unconventional combat troops: don’t they that but letter, the to it follow don’t they that not is law” tional subscribe spirit—a to its presumably self-evident moral code of decent behavior, applicable even in times of war.

sobels were 12 kamajor He began list- 13 kamajors units and their home eet motorbikes of from illustratesict, aspects of the kamajor kamajor ” occurs repeatedly in war songs, (thoughle with the more end of the war, rm the the war about worst in Sierra Leone; , then, is partly an injunction against preying s than their counterparts in other factions, kamajor Kamajor, baa woteh baa Kamajor, invasion confi invasion th , do not turn, do not than is more back” mantra a against retreat from Kamajor, woteh baa elds—ostensibly a contribution to the war effort. The account inThe role CDF the member’s of one infamous January 1999 It is against this backdrop that the majority of of majority the that backdrop this against is It The phraseThe “ largelyned in the are negative: we do the do soldiers what not ones who Kamajor communities elsewhere by deployment in broken was the country). on the noncombatant populace. result incidence The of abuses a lower was recruited, and against which their identity forged. was a conception was It defi do—namely, turn against the civilians, a military whom force is created to protect. committed by the despite a similar demographic profi CDF abuses than originally suspected are being uncovered, particularly in cases the where link between individual impersonated them or used their presence as an excuse to solicit protec- solicit to excuse an as presence their used or (soldier-rebels), in who cases some collaborated with the and RUF frequently them impersonated or stagetion money ambushes of their own (Abdullah 1997). Abdullah 1997; and Zack-Williams 1996; Richards 1998; Reno 2001b; Ferme 1998; Muana thehighway between now, Even Bo and Kenema is littered with the burnt of vehicles—theskeletons result of a fairly common ruse, in which Sierra Leone Army (SLA) soldiers insisted that travelers join military convoys for protection from rebel attacks only to stage such attacks themselves. SLA troops set up checkpoints around both Bo and Kenema, and villagers from the surrounding communities had been who shelteringin the towns nightat for security “taxed” were by soldiers as they came and from went their fi however, his account also suggests an awareness of boundaries between boundaries of awareness an suggests also account his however, rebel attack on Freetown, thousands where of casualties resulted from atrocities perpetrated by all parties to the confl ethical codes governing this conduct. Interviewed force’s in 2002 in a Bo, CDF commanding officer made an important distinction between goods that legitimate were versus illegitimate targets for looting. legitimate and illegitimate appropriations, and these of where to be were ing goods and he his looted, men starting with a fl UNICEF. Next came computers from another office, U.N. then bottles of beer and packets of rum from the national truckloads were “There brewery. fromof fowl Grafton,” said, he referring to a village in the greater Freetown area known chicken for its farms. well ate then. “We In eat very you war, this In ways, some Commandingwell.” Officer (CO)’s recollections of the January 6 in many ways, it encapsulates the movement’s understanding of itself. itself. of understanding movement’s the encapsulates it praise-poems, and conversations with ex-combatants recounting ways, the war; many in “ the front. is meant It to suggest moral a foundation the heart at of identity. Althoughidentity. parts of the Mende-dominated Southeast of Sierra Leone subjectwere to attacks and occasional the greatest occupation by the RUF, threat of the for much duration of the war came from the so-called

africaTODAY 80 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 81 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN was U.N.

kamajor as an organized organized an as had previously been s, thes, picture offered by ghting unit (again, often kamajors kamajors In some instances, the moral moral the instances, some In re. Some of these of re. Some restrictions 14 was required was to pass through a kamajor claimed that his battle namehad identity were made manifest in a a in manifest made were identity kamajor kamajor kamajor s are their battle names, which often expressed ght because for God,” “God will for reward me ciaries by corrupt he middlemen). know,” you “But eld monikers.eld And while the story relatedthe by cally stressed a military discipline: a , “To fi , “To kamajor Althoughthe genealogy is a contested of the movement and polar- Other examples of commitment to a moral code of conduct in war- in conduct of code moral a to commitment of examples Other The moralThe resonances of Ko go Ngewova Ko go . I seekghting. earthly no . . reward.” my fi rectitude expressed in battle names draws from the presumption of politi- cal legitimacy, as evidenced all by thepopularity of names such by as “Democ- not racy” and “Justice” as fi least at or CDF commander earlier suggests that in practice earthly rewards not were disdained, always izing issue, is clear it that the precursors to the Poro secret society, the bush secretPoro training-school society, that imparts to young Mende themen expectations of manhood, including the moral conduct of war and the relationship of a man to his community. restrictions the was of the loss occult protections—a seriouspenalty indeed for an combatant. active most more, What’s instructed in the accepted standards of moral conduct by initiation into the prohibited from lootingvillages, committing rape, and even having contact with woman a while in battle dress. penalty The for failure by these to abide initiation into the militia. Every Every militia. the into initiation been been of series expected of taboos behavior of and rules restrictions the instill to designed imposed (Ferme on instructions individual of series combatants mortars rice bytheir an initiate, and importantly most to provide them with the medicine that overturned on makes their bodies impervious fi to enemy sitting or generalwere and coincided with taboos demarcating gendered space and foods, the practices of everyday life predating the for instance, war; particular prohibitions eating on specifi Others 2001b). body mobilizations were which (to of Poro the majority adult of the region’s male population belongs). early The mobilization in of men Kenema were similar former values. one Thus fare on the part the fare of on said, “I’m proud that we never looted the center of the city. We could have We said, that proud looted thenever center “I’m we of thecity. destroyed Freetown, a thing.” touched one no in but the center of the city, on to explainHe went that targeting the businesses would people” of “the beenhave both morally and reprehensible politically indefensible for a military purpose whose the was protection of the civilian populace. bureaucrats the on ground). products The of the national brewery both were legitimate spoils and necessary provisions for a fi denied the rightful benefi respected in this particular combat setting. material, U.N. The said, he beenshould have the legitimate property of the of Sierra people Leone as the designated by recipients of resources U.N. assistance those of (assistance that appropriation many illicit combatants the by them denied is feel these accounts is hardly of random one looting and attacks or revelry in violence. wanton ned identity is an ethical ethical an is identity the United Nations, NGOs, NGOs, Nations, United the

s overestimated the extent to kamajor kamajor Through direct contact with combatants, 15 ‘man man,’ the words with which members Poro 16 cant impetusbehind the taboos that was defi it relationship to those international norms, and the hindo hindo hindo nds himself serving, and has In it. a duty that to uphold ghting force. ghting kamajors’ One of our ultimate desires that in taking obligatory arms was to restore therefore is It country. this of LAW of RULE as peace and tranquility gain momentum in the country, every CDF personnel is subject to the Civil Law wherever he fi respect, CDF personnel are different not from other citizens, and therefore shall be punished for all civil and criminal offences as stipulated in the constitution of this country. . . . In addition, have resolved we in our Restructuring process behavior asagainst thebehavior of those posed who the greatest The The Thus a 1999Thus report by the CDF-restructuring committee entitled ect perceived was what to be the international standards that marked a ghting force needed to be conversant in the laws of war. Although the the Although war. of laws the in conversant be to needed force ghting made an issue in the training of combatants. CDF training manuals further further manuals training CDF combatants. of training the in issue an made refl legitimate fi on Africa” reports), these bodies expressed opinions” the about war, “world how it was, and how it should be conducted, which werebatants accessible in the bush. If anything, the to com- which recognized militaries educate their soldiers in human-rights issues, the resultbut that was the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war was discourse human of rights through which they are promulgated, go further still. Inaddition to reading aloud to their from men military manuals, commanders or their literate secretaries sometimes read from reportsand as part of their training programs—forthe pro- express reason that faith fi a legitimate this “work” of kind slowness with which the international the community (as well as the Freetown precisely here elite) acknowledged the war in Sierra Leone has become now an signal article of to want we faith, that misrecognition active the namely duces, which irregular combatants are assumed to ignore, as well as the discourse of international rights propagated through agencies and the NGOs. U.N. guidelines by Amnesty International and other human-rights organizations and monitoring organizations an were important and enduring presence country. the of warscape the in ties and punishments for nonparticipation that characterize would We Poro. signifi a that suggest also kamajor appara- security state sanctioned officially community—the the to threat of foundation the then, sense, this In tus. andone, in one keeping with the spiritthose of international accords of war referred to as are called and together, drew on the same tenets of masculine responsibili- “Recommended and Standards” Values states, after and “values a list of 17 standards,” that: the circulation of published reports (particularly among the CDF leader- ship), and international media (such as the monitored BBC widely “Focus

africaTODAY 82 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 83 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN condone asict ict (RSLCDF 2000).(RSLCDF ict everywhere routinely and their counterparts of operation—thec sites kamajors kamajors andict to the laws of the locality in which leadership careful was to frame cause its in an interna- cation violence. for A similar logic governed the discus- medicine society” during the war are still at work in the the in work at still are war the during society” medicine themselvesnd deployed. (RSLCDF 1999) kamajor le of the movement who returned who of the movement le to rural areas they inhabited they fi they that when deployed on operations, CDFare subjected to the confl armed of laws kamajor There is evidence that the ethical constraints linked to initiation Inaddition to the regulations on individual the conduct, movement into a “ before the outbreak In of the war. January 2002, with of the completion “true” state military when the national forces revealed themselves to be be to referred to their activities, and indeed to their very reason for being, as “the themselves revealed defense of life suggesting and property,” of standardized forces a level inculcation national the In in work Sierra the when movement. at Leone, they considered themselves the military state “true” anothersimply armed faction cloaked in the stateseal, and steps took to organize and indoctrinate their members with training and a philosophy role. that with concomitant reverse process of demobilization with the ending, war’s least at for the rank-and-fi in which certain members of the CDF command played an important role. Of numerous militant-sounding alternatives, Liberians United for Recon- ciliation and Democracy eventually was selected as the name that conveyed an appropriate of commitmentlevel to an ideal thought to be palatable to an international audience. more, What’s threat—an action that international norms governing confl thesions over name that of the emerged movement as the LURD in Liberia, tionally recognized discourse of the defense of a free society under military a legitimate justifi as a whole was cast was as in a whole terms largely derived from a global political context. In the when coup, the of the wake 1997 As the passage suggests, above the increasing awareness of international and national laws does notlocal come ethical and legal codes in at operation in specifi the expense of “the lawsattention to which from was the inceptionthe of one distinctive features of of locality,” the hunter militias, in contrast with other parties to the war. The reportThe makes clear that values and “the standards laid down herein be read and explained in the simplest language andform, to all CDF person- A second document recordingnel.” the proceedings of a national consulta- conferencetive in 2000 places the CDF within a history of “legitimate” civil-defense including movements, government’s creation the U.S. of vol- unteer forces during II War and the Korean World confl joined with ECOMOG, the Nigeria-led African West peacekeeping force, to reinstall the SLPP government, Fight “We for Democracy” became the officialgroup’s slogan, that linked a move cause its to the defense of a universal principle of rightful self-governance. In contrast War to the Cold mantras and “militariat” of revolution governance, adopted by armed fac- tions throughout the continent (including the rebels RUF and the AFRC junta), the - in this respect. respect. this in sameness s in Sierra Leone discussing the 17 kamajor aspect of these rights—on the fact that, the for individual were thisnot during way the APC time [the All Peoples’ Con- gress single-party government, which had been in power in when the war began,1991, and had dominated politics during of themost previous two decades]. We have democracy now, we didn’t we before, have democracy becauseWe now, we now have rights. Right here, I now, have rights; that man too— said,he pointing to the friend walking alongside him—has rights. . . . All of us, every single of us one has rights. Things This stance went beyond the rhetorical domain to changedpractices, cation process—for which they praised Kabbah’s SLPP regime that at rst time, this young man authorized felt to speak as an individual distinct for instance resources whenever intended for collectivities (local teachers, rural villages, professional associations, members of political bodies) were distributed. Where in prewar years a corporativist logic have gov- would erned such distributions, which would have been handed to a senior over member of the group for allocation within associations, rural extended and there sohouseholds, on, now an was insistence that this be an on done individual basis, no matter how time-consumingthe amount that ended up in the hands of each woman or man, young or the process, or Thus the discourseold. how of rights small affected broader a much segment of the He emphasized the importance of this by turning once again to the elder and repeating his formula, thus implicitlystressing the changed situation with respect male-dominated, times”: the old to the “APC gerontocratic, hierarchical sway—or longer order no least held at being was challenged. the time seeking was reelection—had this to sayon the matter: fi senior man, pointed, and more a to he from his whom to there, friend over had they that them of each for repeating In group. the of part also was who their stressing was he words, same the in rights pacifi During this conversation, of thethe novelty the emphasis in spoken and body language was on cation of human-rights initiatives at all levels, including in training combat combat had paradoxically training in taken during hold the thick including with of the war, the intensifi levels, all at initiatives human-rights of cation forces in international human-rights law and war conventions. In the post- war phase, this discourse linked was to the electoral process and governance demobilized Two generally. more the disarmament phase of the campaign, DDR the war in Sierra Leone was declared officially and the demobilization over, and reintegration programs proceeded apace. that At point, weapons no and hunting regalia (clothes, headdresses, protective amulets) could be displayed, andthe reason given thatwas this themedicine” “spoil would and visit disasteron the culprit. During the weeks leading up to the May 2002 elections, this prohibition may contributed have to the relativeabsence whichof violence, had char- acterized pre-electoral campaigning in rural areas in previous elections. Another factor the was spread of a discourse of rights and democracy that

africaTODAY 84 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 85 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN eld thateld is suggest that 18 ghting forces do not not do forces ghting , then, the distinction war song that claims by theirned strict adherence kamajor kamajors ghting forces. Onhand, the one it cation of combatants and noncomba- eld participant—connotationseld often exible and highly contingent, and does drew on both the rhetoric employed by the rm line between combatants and noncom- s,though in many settings these were among kamajors equation of noncombatants with “victims.” adherencecodes to of moral responsibility also had and conventional fi kamajor (and asict them of now some participate with the LURD a priori ict as domainict the exclusive on the of men battlefi kamajors kamajors’ ideals of legitimate conduct at war, that discourse was nevertheless The American rules have only the appearanceand attending to the combatant/non-combatant distinction. of recognizing In fact, they set distinction: up a new between loyal and dis- loyal, or friendly and hostile non-combatants. (1977:193) ction: As mentioned earlier, the charge that irregular fi That the category connotations holds “combatant” the con- outside assumes that professional militaries are defi to the civilian-soldier distinction. As Michael Walzer has demonstrated inevi- is distinction that however, Vietnam, in experience U.S. the through a fi tably warfare, least at in contemporary its manifestations, undermines clear cat- distinguish between combatants and noncombatants as asserted in the report U.N. earlier mentioned 1997 rests on assumptions that are untrue the both of others and Walzer Instead, was. it ever if relevant, longer no community—is demonstrated by a popular strategically employed socially and in dealings with the international international the with dealings in and socially employed strategically tants is both strategic and political. For the is hardly irrelevant—but restnot on the it is highly fl egories; and implicitly, that the identifi the that implicitly, and egories; Those who claimThose who to draw a fi batants primarily rely on a “Clausewitzian” a conception view of war, of confl armed international community and lessons learned from of the implementation crisis-response programs in that ways often run counter to the intentions of the international agencies. faction in Liberia), the selectively andselectively strategically applied by the militia. Particularly in the later confl the of stages If the international human-rights discourse promoted the by United andNations NGOs operating in Sierra Leone articulates with certain kamajor Combatants and NoncombatantsCombatants population than the the than population ventional sense of an active battlefi strong roots in particular localities,and thus underwent transformation a with the shift and reduction of their activities under the LURD umbrella in Guinea andLiberia. the main agents for the introduction of this discourse. as shall But we see the below, s. When , an older ict bodily ict ghting ghting largely who ict kamajor kamajors demobilized hunters

t in with gruesome the more ve combatants delivering nancial or material assistance they they assistance material or nancial , many more kamajors were among the parties in this confl this in parties the among were could people ve claim combatant status by presenting c individuals and whether their nonparticipation an was ghting in the defense of a community—of being a “com- cate issued military by U.N. observers to those had who and . . . having delivered least at personal one weapon 20 themselves, depending on the kinds of weapons they used. kamajors Inother to be words, man a Mende is in a sense to accept the 19 at the CDF office in Bo in August 2000 replied that if such a person or belonging to a group most fi of at demonstrated to the observer’s satisfaction that he/she has has he/she that satisfaction observer’s the to demonstrated participated as an active combatant of one of the fi forces in Sierra Leone the at time of the Lome Peace Agree- ment; leastat group one weapon. ght and defeat the rebels is the very essence of manhood. When ned only as anyone who: The deployment of the deployment termThe became “combatant” highly politically Distinctions among different categories of combatants drawn were by kamajors responsibility of fi of responsibility a single weapon, these regulations in fact produce helped the situation that By specifyingBy fi that harm. is only not Thus it the distinction between combatant and noncom- batant also to which need to attend, but we that among different categories of combatant and different in moments the life of combatant-farmers. charged in the context of the U.N.-sponsored disarmament process. Accord- ing to the certifi been registered the disarmament at centers, a legitimate “ex-combatant” defi was impressions left in the international audience by media images of bodily mutilations, cutlass-toting combatants suggest that their often was to frighten role more withthe enemy their numbers and demeanor than to actually infl the the alongsideThus gun-toting claimed fought to have with cutlasses—a working man’s in tool ordinary this with instrument fought “hunters” Many more agricultural activities. than with guns, and while this detail may fi indication there inevitably that were extenuating “real they not men,” were circumstances that explained the individual why did participate not in the movement—usually that had he a job in town, a student was and therefore busy with education, pursuing or was a religious vocation. Nevertheless, by virtue of their which dominates initiation society, Poro in male the men’s sociality in this region, by giving fi what could, by providing or skilled laborin cases some (preparing official CDF documents,for example) such men were considered “combatants” in the sense that their status called as not was men Mende into question. kamajor kamajor could be found “bewould (and better doubted he no it), he thanor women children.” every not male Mende Clearly, batant.” actually joined the specifiasked about that to fi to that asked if join not would there the who men Mende were abstained from this form of injury. Instead, accounts of the activities of

africaTODAY 86 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 87 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN ed of of ed le; neverthe- le; nancial inducements inducements nancial is himself not always exible and contingent, it is also it articulated in the kamajor kamajors icts throughout Africa. Fearless and dog- and Fearless Africa. throughout icts experienceeld are fl ed combat experience who were shut out of of out shut were who experience combat ed eld experience, but on the willingness to pass on on pass to willingness the on but experience, eld This practice of in essence “selling” spots in the 21 with verifi with ed as a combatant became the prerogative of a few highly rearms. How exactly the observer meant was be to satisfi kamajors 22 eld credentialseld maintained that commander no give would a spot At theAt same time, even a man is a who The sameThe can be said of children. widespread The usechild of soldiers uential in people the organization. In many cases, these determinations the disarmament processthe by patronage system in with of men favor no battlefi innot was sense some who to someone a combatant (though this does not meanthat the they system felt particularly was fair). a combatant, in the sense that is always the he not person is he in combat. prohibitions on contact with while women in battle dress. If generally not combatants in the literal sense of armed nevertheless agents, women defy tinue to serve, quite effectively in frontline combat units. This willingness willingness This units. combat frontline in effectively quite serve, to tinue has been of the one hallmarks of confl gedly determined to follow orders, children and adolescents served, and con- any easy categorizationof war. as passive, nonthreatening bystanders in the drama (Moran 1995). Among the manywartime context through was ways persistent rumors that prostitutes smug- this were manifestedgling itself weapons into Freetown and that with women for the babies RUF, on in Sierra Leone’s their backs likely were to be ferrying concealed ammunition or small arms through security checkpoints. For the distinction that rests on the powerless passivity of the in latter, opposition to the aggressive as in power of the in former. But much cosmology, Mende Africa,of West a different calculus are necessarily not Women is in play. regarded as the agents but weaker, that of a power is wild and dangerous explicitly equates and women children with noncombatants and victims—a One of the key elements inOne of the elements key the effectiveness of the hunting regalia and other protective materials is that transforms it the wearer, heating his heart the to with imbued human, than other something becomes he that point the forces of chaos and, in the hunting tradition, of the dangerous forest: he becomes something than more himself. If the links between masculinity, status,“combatant” and battlefi less, even to a CDF patron a percentage of the commodities and fi ex-combatants. to given disarmament process condemned widely was by the rank and fi infl basedwere on actual not fi characterized many rural demobilized villages in April-May 2002 in Sierra Leone, the where majoritythe of adult male population could claim to have been enrolled among the CDF (andhad the IDs by turning it), to prove in only a few fi the connection between weapons and combatants made not clear, was and in the CDF areas, actual where weaponsfrequently were in the held posses- various of sion commanders and handed only as out needed, the determina- qualifi who of tion the equation of female or child with noncombatant is even more open to to open more even is noncombatant with child or female of equation the highly localized and report strategic U.N. above deployment. The cited ghting ghting ghting ghting In the fi 25 . Instead, children are inict Sierra Leone, and a priori icts in the region, and character- rearm or not. That this was, however, There were therefore, he maintained, two cru- 24 ghters be must understood within a context that The result has become an international cliché—the ghting in the Mano River Union countries, namely 23 throughned practices, as evidenced of the more by one ghting back into Liberia, these acts taken have on a more ts package given to adults, and could therefore not provide ghters had been disproportionately for their “rewarded” atrocities by To leaveTo it at that is to ignore some important philosophical and stra- Thus, theThus, distinction between combatant and noncombatant becomes nancialbenefi a percentage to their patrons (Hoffman 2003). cial strategic advantages to attacking unarmed civilians. First, such tactics served to convince villagers that the government powerless was to protect them, reinforcing a common local understanding that politicians and politi- cal factions which openly display their capacity also for violence possess the strength to protect those accept who them as patrons. with the shift of fi directly material dimension. A CDF commander affiliated now with the LURD militia in Liberia explained in April 2002 that the CDF had learned lessonsits from the international community’s response Like to the RUF. many combatants in the CDF and the SierraLeone Army to mention (not civilians did participate who not in any of the factions), his feeling that was fi RUF them keep to anything them give to willing community international an bush. the to returning from tegic underpinnings to the apparently senseless As violence. Paul Richards has(1996) demonstrated, for example, the tactical use of amputations has a symbolic dimension. By the later stages of the confl ized wars that their despite length featured hand on the one surprisingly few encounters between armed factions, and on the other hand disproportionate civilian casualty rates. more purpose no and killing wanton by marked war, “uncivil” African sophisticated than indiscriminate marauding. meaningful and defi and meaningful disturbing aspects of fi attacks on undefended villages and the mutilation of unarmed civilians. Such attacks became emblematic of confl conceptual equation of children with victimhood and lack of agency to to agency of lack and by nature—and in many cases fully not socialized having for not undergone victimhood the rites and educational processes with that make adults a person in theeyes children of the community (Ferme 2001b;Goodwin-Gill of and Cohn so, 1994). Even U.N.’s the employed frequently equation during commanders disarmament, CDF the conceptual take advantage of a provision in thedisarmament protocols that allowed any or for the enrollment automatic in the program minor, DDR of any person“being an unaccompanied minor, accompanying combatant, underage other participant presenting under the age of 18, with any of the fi to mobilize children as fi as children mobilize to often considered as chaotic in works process, threatening and mischievous factions” whether they possesseda fi a calculated framework evident the was of the deployment Bo at U.N. disar- mament center commanders when in 2001, November initially attempted to pass underage combatants as adults because minors did receive the not fi does assume not the innocence of children

africaTODAY 88 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 89 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN 27 rst began began rst cally Sierra In short, the the short, In ict fi ict 26 cation efforts in the of the “regional” enti- key one ict c military Second, value. and most cation efforts once again moved have into Liberia and thatict across moved the border zones of Liberia, Sierra andict, this area in the as discourse a “region” media, and of policy, in 1990. In this sense, the too, fact that the CDF has a specifi even beyond, ineven beyond, Côte d’Ivoire—the very region the where confl Mano River region, adopted offered nor it Rather, wholesale. a sometimes sometimes familiarnew, vocabulary for articulating ideals that could chal- lenge oppressive social relations of interdependence, or reproduce them. also it But violenceopened in to more theaters thenew way of combat, in order to secure the material resources that accompanied the interna- tional incommunity’s successive pacifi involvement scholarly communities—but also as an organizing framework for strategic alliances among combatants on the ground. What since formation its in untilthe 1970s the outbreak inactive of war a relatively was customs and economic entity became during the confl ignored by the largest faction of irregular combatants in the civilwar in the region. produced This articulations new involvement of ethical and legal principles as well, for the war and dynamics the violent engendered it were themselves productive of linkages amongscales. Indeed, part local, of the evidence for this history-in-the-making regional, is the and international of “Mano notion River aswhole the Union” organizing framework for this confl ties in an unfolding history and space of warfare, as where of this writing, international pacifi In this piece, we have analyzed some of the ways in which the global global the which in ways the of some analyzed have we piece, this In discourse of human rights engaged selectively was and changed, the over confl the of course Conclusion Leone, and Guinea. This discourse and legal its entailments neither was the killing, stop the shooting,’ and all that bullshit,” and thereby devote devote thereby and bullshit,” that all and shooting,’ the stop killing, the resources to provision ex-combatants and rebuild the nation. hit thecity dramatically enough to intercede, to force the U.N. “saying ‘stop in Liberia, this specifi logic helped explain the occurrence no attacks of on targets have to that(villages could be held not deep in seem government territory, example) for that those or important, such attacks and the dramatic demonstration of bodily violence against unarmed civilians in were, best to be the “the way words the of CO, taken seriously” by the United and Nations other international (wealthy) Another practices. such ending to resources contribute to willing agencies commander, also now with the bluntly: when time LURD, even more it put comewould to attack Monrovia, said, he the important thing be would to networks of information—the international media, representatives of the NGOsU.N., operating in the region—which conveyed a language of rights that became a part of the discourse of combatants simultaneously ensured that this discourse and often in be would applied only ways selectively, antithetical the to purported mission of those same organizations. kama- ghters had had ghters moved into moved inned many kamajors a large number of

for ourict, point is precisely that if in not ghting forces. ghting While there shifts were time over in tacti- the CDF’s

interviewed in Freetown and in northern Liberia in April 2002 2002 April in Liberia northern in and Freetown in interviewed As Sierra Leone proceeds with Special its Court for war crimes with 28 Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between the above, as mentioned Finally, and international human-rights discourse is of more than simply his- simply than more of is discourse human-rights international and the cultural politics of hunting and warrior in lore this region. those linking atrocities to external intervention, material rewards, and dis- armament. also it has However, pointed in to the ways which human-rights discourse becomes locally meaningful, and unfolds against the backdrop of Leone. the support of the United and Nations International is NGOs, impera- it in ways the of understanding an with unfold process postwar the that tive which the universal aspirations of the human-rights discourse relates to practices. Our analysis has shown that combatants are keen observers of the discoursehow correlates with practices on the ground—for instance, establishing and a SOP moral code of conduct in keeping with international expectations and in contrast to the perceived lawlessness of the Liberian armedforces and associated its militias. On the other hand, of the some kamajors argued that the restrictions under which they operated in Sierra Leone did across apply not maintaining the border, thattheir status as mercenar- ies freed them from the constraints during that held their time in Sierra Leonean origin does obviate not our use as the of it militia key through which to examine a regional confl inceptionits (though our evidence says otherwise), then in history its this organization has certainly become regional in scope, its and international engagements. its in cal use atrocities of committed against civilians, these shifts never were the discourseoutside rights of and responsibilities too often assumed to be fi irregular in lacking jors torical interest. As indicatedthe campaign above, DDR and other efforts to rebuild following the declared of the end war are being defi local communities by the wartime experiences demobilized fi with international agencies andthe conceptual frameworks under which they operate. And while the CDF has been officially dismantled, there have been efforts on the part of some in thetain a network of civil militias government known as the Territorial Defense Forces, of Sierra Leone to main-essentially institutionalizing within the state structure a force that was previously characterized ambiguous by a more relation to the state. Liberia and joined the ranks of the LURD faction, which helped overthrow President in August Charles Taylor 2003 and continues to operate in the countryside the time at of this writing. As indicated members its above, takenhave with them the lessons of wartime Sierra Leone. On the one hand, this to a careful led attention on the part of the LURD leadership to

africaTODAY 90 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 91 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN or or 88:27–48), 88:27–48), kamajesia the strategic “mende- Musa Wo as gures, such An earlier version of this this of version earlier An Politique Africaine , for reasons discussed later in kamajors , and in the plural as Africa Today. Africa kamajors a settlement” (Muana 1997:86); see also kamajo eldwork in Sierra Leone was generously , or s’ own literature, which we examine here. man’s fi man’s kamajoi , s in the Sierra Leone civil The see war, alsoMuana 1997. kamajor kamajoh kamajor man in July−August 2000 and September 2001−April 2002. M.C. gure of modernity in relation to natural conservation in Guinea, see see Guinea, in conservation natural to relation modernity in of gure gures are John Prendergast, International Crisis Group, Testimony to is an anglicized form with various Mende pronunciations. Frequently, the term term the Frequently, pronunciations. Mende various with form anglicized an is . We use. We the anglicized form here because it is the most common in media reports, militias by D. Hoff D. by militias rst began working on hunting and hunters in Sierra Leone in December 1984–86, kamajor zation” of a much more heterogeneous range of militias, as the outcome of developments during the see war, Ferme 2001a. this article. Many young men, and a smaller number of women, joined the militia for only a of the broader political context for understanding in the government documents, and the the and documents, government (Cosentino and 1989) in the myths around the foundation of Mende settlements by a hunter starts and off nature or man either “conquers who, Ferme 2001b:26−30 ch. 1). and Little 1967, term appears in written form as kamasesia kamajor the American Congress, 2002 (http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport. 2002 Congress, May By American the http://www.icrc.org. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/; cfm?reportid=657); 2003, the U.N. force troops; was reduced it is scheduled to 13,100 for total withdrawal by 2004. December Ferme fi as part of a project on gendered spheres ofproduction and material cultura in the everyday life of agrarian communities in the rural southeast (see Ferme and 1992), on broader issues relating to migration, politics and religion in Sierra 2002) Leone and 1993, among (1990, the 2002–03). 1997, (1993, diaspora Leonean Sierra Leach 2000. On the role of 5. Susan Shepler, personal communication with M.C. Ferme, October 21 2002. For a discussion 1. Sources for these fi NOTES supported by the Social Science Research Council through an International Dissertation Research Fellowship and a Global Security and Cooperation Fellowship, with funding provided by the John andD. Catherine MacArthur T. Foundation. M. C. Ferme thanks for support for a variety of research projects in Sierra Leone and among the Sierra Leonean diaspora during the period covered by this article, the Harvard Academy for International the University and Area Studies of Cali- (1991–1993), fornia, Berkeley and 1997), the Smuts (1993, Fund at the University of Cambridge (2002, 2003). with material drawn from Ferme (2001a). D. Hoff D. joint work was published as “Combattants irréguliers et discours international des droits de l’homme (2001a). Ferme dans lesfrom guerres civilesAfricaines: le cas des ‘chasseurs’ sierra-léonais” drawn ( material with ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors thank the editors and anonymous referees from 6. of number the accurately gauge to impossible is It 4. This isevidenced most clearly in narratives of violent and volatile fi 2. The research on which this article is based was carried out in Sierra Leone and Liberia on 3. On the hunter as a fi gures gures not is gure cally to cases to cally ed themselves as as themselves ed terror producing cacy in ict. This points to another ce, violent actions that no no that actions violent ce, ict, including the irregular irregular the ict, including important an role ict played ict are largely the articulation of ce of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah— Tejan Ahmed President of ce ghters under its command. Disarmament fi Disarmament command. its under ghters man, Bo town, Sierra Leone 4 April 2002. of ICRC employees rebels diamond- by ICRC the occupying of

ce. While it seems likely that the commission of atrocities ghting factions in this war. There is also some cause to be be to cause some also is There war. this in factions ghting across the border has been documentedby international cer), interviewed in Wunde Chiefdom, Sierra Leone, in April April in Leone, Sierra Chiefdom, Wunde interviewed in cer), rst elected term in offi kamajors ghters (see John Prendergast, International Crisis Group, Testimony to the American mining region of Kono was among the earliest acts of aggression targeting employees of of employees targeting aggression of acts earliest the among was Kono of region mining humanitarian organizations in the Sierra Leonean theater of confl a moral stance, rather than a practical guideline for action, see Walzer 1977:152. Human Rights 2002) point out that the overwhelming majority of cases of sexual violence were committed by RUF and AFRC forces. As of this writing, investigators with both the andTruth Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court forwar crimes have found that CDF abuses existed on a larger scale than previously thought, referring specifi of cannibalism and human sacrifi doubt occurred during the war as they did before it, but whose effi operates at the level of rumors too, which amplify the events in space and time well beyond their actual incidence. Red Cross movement was present in Sierra Leone through its national chapter since well before that, the and capture in 1993 register on which awareness of international responses to confl observers such as the International Crisis Group (ICG 2003), as well as by the authors. by the pro government forces was more widespread than acknowledged by apologists for the forces, it seems equally unlikely that the so-called “accountability institutions” will dis- cover so many heretofore unknown cases as to invalidate earlier reports about the relative responsibilities for atrocities of fi cautious regarding accusations of cannibalism and human sacrifi was 2,300 leones. This was a very large amount of money for most rural Sierra Leoneans. along all supplied by the United Nations uponsupplied Nations United completion demobilization the the by of total the put process number of ex-combatants at just over 46,000, of which some identifi37,000 CDF fi (http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=657). 2002 Congress, For reasons having to do with how the disarmament was conducted the latter fi 2002. short period, and existing records of who participated are partial at best. The CDF leadership fi 99,000 some have to claimed frequently particularly reliable, but is more realistic than the former. ceded and followed by the fi who was reelected to a second term in the May 2002 elections. The material analyzed here and in the next paragraph emerged from conversations between M. C. Ferme and Offi (Ground “GO” former JK, a militias, see Human Rights Watch 1998, 1999. 1998, Rights Watch see Human militias, 12. 12. See Human reports Rights Two Watch 1998, 1999. (Human Rights Watch 2003; Physicians for

9. of movement This 11. For accounts of atrocities committed by all parties to the confl 13. Personal communication with Hoff D. 14. MCB in conversation with M. C. Ferme, Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom April 2002. 15. For example, Médéecins Sans Frontières has had a presence in Sierra Leone since The 1986. 10. On the fact that international laws governing armed confl 8. was equivalent US$1 In 1993, roughly to 250 leones, but by April 2002 the conversion rate 7. English-speaking Sierra Leoneans refer to this period as “the interregnum,” since it was pre-

africaTODAY 92 HUNTER MILITIAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND africaTODAY 93 MARIANE C. FERME AND DANNY HOFFMAN nitive nitive kamajors, ghting ghting in ghting unit unit ghting are thought not to did not accurately accurately not did in Liberia felt that the Liberia the in that felt re between the govern- cial” CDF document also kamajor combatant kamajors initiator and the head of a fi ective only in a limited area around the gures for the war in Sierra Leone. One esti- cial U.N. discourse on the disarmament and kamajor kamajor tp://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-sierra3. man. man, Bo town Sierra Leone, 4 April 2002. man, Conakry, Guinea, April 2003. 15 man (forthcoming). man ict in this region has moved across the national boundaries among erent publications appeared which purported to be the defi the be purported to which appeared publications erent casualty fi accurate get to cult re on crowd a of protestors, and resumed again nearly a year later. man. ed a certain importance within the militia. ity. As much as the confl the as As much ity. constraints that applied at home did not travel to a “foreign” place. This may be reinforced by the fact that many of the material protections available to a Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, at least some of the travel: hunting regalia are frequently said to be eff village, and cannot move beyond that sphere. ment, the CDF, and the RUF, and andment, initiated the RUF, the CDF, the DDR campaign—which was suspended in 2000 after the May 8 incident in Freetown in which RUF leader ’s bodyguards fi opened demobilization process, it is clear that U.N. personnel (at least those observers at disarma- ment centers) recognized that their own use of the term Sierra Leone and Liberia, see Hoff mate puts the numbers at roughly 75,000 dead, 2 million displaced, and 20,000 mutilated based in the Bo region known as the Kassela War Council. The early stages of the war also saw the rise to prominence of female initiators in the North. despite having perpetrated atrocities in war. (estimates by the Crimes of War Project, ht War of Crimes the by (estimates html). out of circulation”; who turned them in was largely irrelevant. Personal communication with D. Hoff of famous most the counterparts. Perhaps male their particularly among fearsome as them these is Mama Munda Fortune, the female at the disarmament center in objective Bo, November UNAMSIL’s 2001, was “to get weapons signifi legitimacy within the movement. Access to or possession of an “offi possession or an legitimacy of to movement. the Access within particularly those trained by one of the more professional factions, frequently made refer- history the points in various At (SOP). Procedures Operating Standard interviews to in ence diff movement, the of describe the realities of the process. As an observer with the New Zealand contingent put it statement on the history of the movement and the rules of the society—frequently slanted to support one or another feuding party within the CDF leadership. Indeed, the ability to put out a written handbook on CDF operations seems to have been one way of establishing 16. 16. There does not seem to have been one standard written text for CDF units, though 28. As mentioned earlier, the issue here seems to be less a question of payment than of local- 21. Although it did not become a part of the offi 17. Personal communication with M.C. Ferme, Wunde Chiefdom,Sierra Leone, April 18 2002. 18. See, for example, Lutz 2002. 19. Personal communication with Hoff D. 20. The Lome Peace Accords, signed on 7 July declared 1999, a cease-fi 25. A point made in relation by Ellis (1999) to Charles election Taylor’s to the Liberian presidency

23. It is extremely diffi 26. Personal communication with Hoff D. 27. For more on the transformation in tactics of combatants participating in the fi 24. Personal communication with Hoff D. 22. There was a small number of armed female CDF members; frequently, their gender marked . Berkeley: . Journal of Civil Society Creativity and London: Rout- London: it sierra-léonais. it ict. January Vol. 15, 15, ict. JanuaryVol. Between Democracy Democracy Between . Chicago: University of , edited by Christopher Clapham. Oxford: Oxford: Clapham. Christopher by edited , , edited Arens by W. and Ivan Karp. Washing- . Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Oxford Oxford: . airs. . Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Oxford Oxford: . 6(4):577−595. 22(3/4):45−76. African Aff African , edited by J. and J.L. Comaroff J.L. and J. by edited , , edited by I. Abdullah. Dakar: Council for the Develop- and Samorian Army Organization 1870–1898 Organization Army Samorian and Child Soldiers African Guerrillas African . Unpublished Ph.D., Department of Anthropology, University 6(3):295−308. 82:119−132. . London: Hurst & Co. 7: 95–115. 7: Afrique et Dévéloppement et Afrique The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition. Transition. in People African West A Leone: Sierra of Mende The Conversations with Ogotemmeli with Conversations The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone Sierra in Everyday the and History, Violence, Things: of Underneath

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