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Contents List of Figures xiii List of Tables xiv 1. Introduction 1 2. Myopic Portfolio Choice 17 2.1. Short-Term Portfolio Choice 18 2.2. Myopic Long-Term Portfolio Choice 31 2.3. Conclusion 46 3. Who Should Buy Long-Term Bonds? 48 3.1. Long-Term Portfolio Choice in a Model with Constant Variances and RiskPremia 50 3.2. A Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 62 3.3. Conclusion: Bonds, James, Bonds 86 4. Is the Stock Market Safer for Long-Term Investors? 88 4.1. Long-Term Portfolio Choice in a VAR Model 90 4.2. Stockand Bond MarketRiskin Historical US Data 101 4.3. Conclusion 117 5. Strategic Asset Allocation in Continuous Time 120 5.1. The Dynamic Programming Approach 121 5.2. The Martingale Approach 133 5.3. Recursive Utility in Continuous Time 143 5.4. Should Long-Term Investors Hedge Volatility Risk? 147 5.5. Parameter Uncertainty and Portfolio Choice 154 5.6. Conclusion 160 xii Contents 6. Human Wealth and Financial Wealth 162 6.1. Single-Period Models with Labor Income 167 6.2. Labor Income, Precautionary Savings, and Long-Horizon Portfolio Choice 182 6.3. Conclusion 193 7. Investing over the Life Cycle 195 7.1. What Do We Know about Household Asset Allocation? 197 7.2. A Life-Cycle Model of Portfolio Choice 202 7.3. Conclusion 219 References 226 Author Index 241 Subject Index 249 1 Introduction One of the most important decisions many people face is the choice of a portfolio of assets for retirement savings. These assets may be held as a supplement to de®ned-bene®t public or private pension plans; or they may be accumulated in a de®ned- contribution pension plan, as the major source of retirement income. In either case, a dizzying array of assets is available. Consider for example the increasing set of choices offered by TIAA±CREF, the principal pension organization for university employees in the United States. Until 1988, the two available choices were TIAA, a traditional nominal annuity, and CREF, an actively managed equity fund. Funds could readily be moved from CREF to TIAA, but the reverse transfer was dif®cult and could be accomplished only gradually. In 1988 it became possible to move funds between two CREF accounts, a money market fund and an equity fund. Since then other choices have been added: a bond fund and a socially responsible stock fund in 1990, a global equity fund in 1992, equity indexand growth funds in 1994, a real estate fund in 1995, and an in¯ation-indexed bond fund in 1997. Retirement savings can easily be moved among these funds, each of which represents a broad class of assets with a different pro®le of returns. Institutional investors also face complexdecisions. Some institutions invest on behalf of their clients, but others, such as foundations and university endowments, are similar to indivi- duals in that they seek to ®nance a long-term stream of discre- tionary spending. The investment options for these institutions have also expanded enormously since the days when a portfolio of government bonds was the norm. Mean±variance analysis What does ®nancial economics have to say about these invest- ment decisions? Modern ®nance theory is often thought to have started with the mean±variance analysis of Markowitz (1952); this 2 Introduction Expected return Aggressive investor Stocks Moderate Best mix of investor stocks and bonds Conservative Bonds investor Cash Risk Figure 1.1. Mean±standard deviation diagram. makes portfolio choice theory the original subject of modern ®n- ance. Markowitz showed how investors should pick assets if they care only about the mean and varianceÐor equivalently the mean and standard deviationÐof portfolio returns over a single period. The results of his analysis are shown in the classic mean± standard deviation diagram, Figure 1.1. (A much more careful mathematical explanation can be found in the next chapter.) For simplicity the ®gure considers three assets: stocks, bonds, and cash (not literally currency, but a short-term money market fund). The vertical axis shows expected return, and the horizontal axis shows risk as measured by standard deviation. Stocks are shown as offering a high mean return and a high standard deviation, bonds a lower mean and lower standard deviation. Cash has a lower mean return again, but is riskless over one period, so it is plotted on the vertical zero-risk axis. (In the presence of in¯ation risk, nominal money market investments are not literally riskless in real terms, but this short-term in¯ation risk is small enough that it is conventional to ignore it. We follow this convention here and return to the issue in the next chapter.) The curved line in Figure 1.1 shows the set of means and standard deviations that can be achieved by combining stocks Introduction 3 and bonds in a risky portfolio. When cash is added to a portfolio of risky assets, the set of means and standard deviations that can be achieved is a straight line on the diagram connecting cash to the risky portfolio. An investor who cares only about the mean and standard deviation of his portfolio will choose a point on the straight line illustrated in the ®gure, that is tangent to the curved line. This straight line, the mean±variance ef®cient frontier, offers the highest mean return for any given standard deviation. The point where the straight line touches the curved line is a `tangency portfolio' of risky assets, marked in the ®gure as `Best mixof stocks and bonds'. The striking conclusion of this analysis is that all investors who care only about mean and standard deviation will hold the same portfolio of risky assets, the unique best mixof stocks and bonds. Conservative investors will combine this portfolio with cash to achieve a point on the mean±variance ef®cient frontier that is low down and to the left; moderate investors will reduce their cash holdings, moving up and to the right; aggressive investors may even borrow to leverage their holdings of the tangency portfolio, reaching a point on the straight line that is even riskier than the tangency portfolio. But none of these investors should alter the relative proportions of risky assets in the tangency portfolio. This result is the mutual fund theorem of Tobin (1958). Financial planning advice Financial planners have traditionally resisted the simple invest- ment advice embodied in Figure 1.1. This resistance may to some extent be self-serving; as Peter Bernstein points out in his 1992 book Capital Ideas, many ®nancial planners and advisors justify their fees by emphasizing the need for each investor to build a portfolio re¯ecting his or her unique personal situation. Bernstein calls this the `interior decorator fallacy', the view that portfolios should re¯ect personal characteristics in the same way that interior decor re¯ects personal taste. There are however many legitimate reasons why different portfolios of risky assets might be appropriate for different investors. The complexity of the tax code creates many differ- ences across investors, not only in their taxbrackets but also in their opportunities for sheltering income from taxation. Beyond this, investors differ in their investment horizons: some may have 4 Introduction relatively short-term objectives, others may be saving to make college tuition payments in the medium term, yet others may be saving for retirement or to ensure the well-being of their heirs. Investors also differ in the characteristics of their labor income: young investors may expect many years of income, which may be relatively safe for some and risky for others, while older investors may need to ®nance the bulk of their consumption from accumulated ®nancial wealth. Investors often have illiquid assets such as family businesses, restricted stock options granted by their employer, or real estate.1 We shall argue in this book that the traditional academic analysis of portfolio choice needs to be modi®ed to handle long investment horizons, labor income, and illiquid assets. The modi®ed theory explains several of the patterns that we see in conventional ®nancial planning advice. One strong pattern is that ®nancial planners typically encou- rage young investors, with a long investment horizon, to take more risk than older investors. The single-period mean±variance analysis illustrated in Figure 1.1 assumes a short investment horizon. In this book we shall explore the conditions under which a long investment horizon does indeed justify greater risk-taking. A second pattern in ®nancial planning advice is that con- servative investors are typically encouraged to hold more bonds, relative to stocks, than aggressive investors, contrary to the constant bond±stock ratio illustrated in Figure 1.1. Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997) call this the asset allocation puzzle. Table 1.1, which reproduces Table 1 from Canner et al.'s article, illustrates the puzzle. The table summarizes model portfolios recommended by four different investment advisors in the early 1990s: Fidelity, Merrill Lynch, the ®nancial journalist Jane Bryant Quinn, and the New York Times. While the portfolios differ in their details, in every case the recommended ratio of bonds to stocks is 1 Perhaps some of these differences underlie the PaineWebber advertisement that ran in the New Yorker and other magazines in 1998: `If our clients were all the same, their portfolios would be too. They say the research has been sifted. The numbers have been crunched. The analysts have spoken: Behold! The ideal portfolio. We say building a portfolio is not ``one size ®ts all''. It begins with knowing youÐhow you feel about money, how much risk you can tolerate, your hopes for your family, and for your future.