The Il Khans' Wars and Mongol Cilician
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the il-khans’ wars 143 CHAPTER SIX THE ILKHANS’ WARS AND MONGOLCILICIAN ARMENIAN COLLABORATION: STAGE II 12601265 Mongol-Armenian cooperation proved itself in practice to be a suc- cessful venture that overthrew the Muslim supremacies. The elimina- tion of the Ismā‘īlī and ‘Abbasid powers, the invasion of Aleppo and Damascus by the forces commanded by Hűlegű and Het‘um I did not stop the latter’s ambitions. Their advance further into Syria signi- fied a new development in the history of the Near East , establishing an exclusive triangle of relationships between the Mongols , Mamluks and the Cilician Armenians that carried on for more than 60 years. This section of book examines the wars of the Il-Khans against the Mamluk sultans and against the Golden Horde in 1260–1265. Both wars involved the Armenians . The Il-Khans’ confrontation with the Mamluks was implemented with the help of the Cilician Armenians and the efforts to resist the Golden Horde took place in the territories of Greater Armenia . If participation of the Cilician Armenians in the Il-Khanid war resulted in a gain, the Greater Armenian lords’ activity was limited to observing their land being devastated by the Chinggisids ’ wars. Joint Ventures of Hűlegű and Het‘um I in Syria As one can see from the previous chapter, the pairing of Hűlegű and Het‘um I had a glorious start. However, after 1260, Hűlegű was mostly busy with affairs within the Mongol Empire , so Het‘um dealt mainly with Hűlegű’s representatives. When messengers brought news to Hűlegű of Great Khan Möngke ’s death (11 August 1259), it was already the early Summer of 1260. Hűlegű left Syria and arrived in Akhlāt on 6 June 1260 and then he withdrew to Tabriz .1 As Jackson notes, there is a striking 1 Rashīd al-Dīn , 1954:720. The apparent delay in news arriving undeniably reflected in the rivalry between members of the Chinggisid clan to succeed to the Mongol throne. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc License.Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog - 9789004192119 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 04:36:25AM via free access 144 chapter six parallel between Hűlegű’s retreat from his advance into Egypt and Batu Khan’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe following Ögodei Khan’s death (1241), which saved Europe from Mongol conquest. 2 According to Armenian sources, Hűlegű ’s withdrawal from Syria was possibly connected with his intention of wintering in the Hamadān plain, which seems to be a plausible suggestion.3 He left his victorious general Ket-Buqa in command of a small army, less than two tumans (20,000 men), in Syria. As a potential Great Khan, Hűlegű took the vast majority of his army with him.4 Amitai-Preiss attributes the act of leaving Ket-Buqa with such a small army to faulty intelligence and underestimation of the size of the Egyptian forces.5 The Egyptian army was under the command of al-Muaffar Sayf al-Dīn Quuz (1259–1260), the atabeg and ruler of Egypt. In the same year 1260, before his withdrawal, Hűlegű had sent envoys to Cairo demanding Quuz’s surrender making conflict more or less inevi- table. Having called his commanders to a council, Quuz decided to respond to Hűlegű by killing the envoys.6 He resisted the Mongols as justification for his own accession to the throne (16 November 1259) for he claimed to be a descendant of Khwārazm-Shāh ʿAlā’ al-Dīn Mu ammad. He pursued an anti-Mongol policy as his per- sonal revenge.7 The Persian source recounts that many of the fugi- tives and stragglers of Khwārazm-Shāh Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn had fled to Egypt after hearing about the advance of Hűlegű on Upper Mesopotamia .8 However, having found refuge with Quuz, they formed the substantial part of his army.9 When Hűlegű retreated home, Quuz prepared for war with the Mongols. Quuz allied with his former opponent, a fellow Mamluk, Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, who had fled Syria after the Mongols captured Damascus .10 The Mongols attempted to ally with the remnants of the 2 Jackson, 2005a:116. 3 Ibid., 230. It is the plain of Hemian (Հեմիանայ) in Kirakos Gandzakets‘i , 1961:388; Grigor Aknerts‘i , 1974:50; Smbat Sparapet in Galstyan, 1962:53. 4 Vardan Arevelts‘i , 1991:152; Kirakos Gandzakets‘i, 1961:388. 5 Amitai-Preiss, 2004:29. 6 Rashīd al-Dīn , 1954:721–722. 7 Amitai-Preiss, 2004:35. 8 Rashīd al-Dīn , 1954:721. 9 Ibid., 721. 10 Enmity existed between Quuz and Baybars because of the murder of the Ba riyya regiment’s former leader, sanctioned by Quuz, followed by numerous Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog - 9789004192119 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 04:36:25AM via free access the il-khans’ wars 145 Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem , now centred in Acre , but Pope Alexander IV (1254–1261) forbade this.11 This action was reasonable, since a ten-year peace had been concluded between the Franks of Palestine and Damascus in 1254, and Egypt in 1255,12 and the neutral position of the Franks towards the Mamluks was renewed at Acre in 1260.13 In September 1260, the Mediterranean Latin states allowed Mamluk troops to march through Latin Palestine against a joint force of Armenians and Mongols.14 The reason why the Franks remained resistant towards Mongol assistance was very simple, for as Jackson states, this was the only rational assessment in those circumstances.15 As the Franks believed that one day the Mongols would wipe them out as well, they were not in favour of helping them.16 Secondly, they did not want Quuz to turn against them, so they agreed that the Egyptian army could cross their territories although they ended up delivering supplies for the Sultan ’s troops.17 It was a perfect moment for Quuz, who decided to march north on Syria and confront the occupying army left under the command of Ket-Buqa Noyan, con- fident that even in defeat he could still withdraw to Egypt for rein- forcements. In addition, he was sure that, as the Mongol troops had just finished their exhausting ride through the desert, there was no hope that Hűlegű would return with his full army.18 He believed that defeating this force would not only protect the holy places, such as Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina, but also would drive the Muslims into raids and attempts to invade Egypt from Ayyubid Syria under Baybars’ leadership. However, the threat caused by the Mongols brought these two into temporary alli- ance (Amitai-Preiss, 2004:35). 11 Jackson, 2005a:119. 12 Thorau, 1987:142. 13 Jackson, 2005a:121. 14 The notion that Ket-Buqa , disobeying the instructions of Hűlegű to remain in the newly-conquered region, waged war with Egypt having a reinforcement of 500 soldiers from Cilicia, is found only in Smbat Sparapet ’s Chronicle in Der Nersessian, 1973:370. By such a statement, Smbat possibly tried to justify the defeat. 15 Jackson, 2005a:121. 16 Rashīd al-Dīn mentions a certain Amir Baydar, a subordinate of Ket-Buqa , who was informed about the advance of Egyptian troops via the Latin coast (Rashīd al-Dīn, 1954:722). According to the scholars quoting the Mamluk sources, Baydar was a commander of the Mongol force dispatched to Gaza in order to prevent the Egyptians from sending assistance to the Franks on the coast (Amitai-Preiss, 2004:33; Jackson, 1980:496). 17 Under the Mamluks , the principality of Antioch fell in 1268, the county of Tripoli in 1289, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291 (Jackson, 2005a:118–119). 18 Amitai-Preiss, 2004:38. Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog - 9789004192119 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 04:36:25AM via free access 146 chapter six a rage against the resolute Mongols. Essentially, he accomplished all these goals. As Amitai-Preiss noted, the war between the Mongol Il-Khans and the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria lasted until 1320 in various forms of confrontation, commencing with the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt in 1260.19 This battle had very important consequences for all its participants, Mongols , Mamluks and Armenians . The Mamluk and Mongol armies encamped in Palestine in July 1260,20 finally met atʿ Ayn Jālūt near Zarʿīn on 3 September of the same year, with both sides numbering about 20,000 men.21 Armenian sources name the place of the battle as the plain of Mount T‘abor (Թաբորական)22 or the locality called Prr (Պրր).23 According to Rashīd al-Dīn , the Mamluks drew out the Mongol mounted archers with a feigned retreat. The Mongols were almost unable to withstand the assault from the Egyptian ambush, and Quuz rallied his troops for a successful counter-attack, using cavalry reserves hidden in the nearby valleys. The Mongols were forced to retreat and Ket-Buqa was left alone. His horse fell and he found refuge in a thicket of rushes where a small number of Mongols were hidden. When Quuz set the rushes on fire, Ket-Buqa was captured and executed.24 Many Armenians and Georgians were killed with Ket-Buqa.25 The Armenian source attributes the failure of the Mongols to the excessive heat and the sickness among their horses.26 In a letter to the French King Louis IX dated 1262, Hűlegű himself explained his withdrawal from Syria as being due to the exhaustion of grazing land and provisions, and the discomfort of heat in Summer.27 Also, the timely desertion of al-Ashraf Mūsā, the governor of "om! who previously had been 19 Ibid., 1999:57. 20 Quuz had at first agreed to wait for Ket-Buqa at āli iyya to get theamir s to mobilise; however, knowing that a prolonged wait would not be in his favour, he convinced the amirs to follow him speedily (Amitai-Preiss, 2004:37).