'Showtime' Embedded News Media During

‘Showtime’

Embedded news media during Operation Iraqi Freedom

Lieutenant Colonel A.J.H. Bouwmeester, Royal Netherlands Army*

Introduction Public Opinion wins wars. howtime’ was the first reaction I have always considered correspondents accredited of General (Ret) Tommy ‘SFranks, the famous commander to my headquarters as quasi-staff officers. of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), when he arrived in theater for leading General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, 19451 the major combat operations of Ope- ration Iraqi Freedom. And showtime it was, not only for the military, but also for the media and the American Colonel Barry Willey, former Deputy the embedded news media program. audience. The embedded news media Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. In all, there were 662 news media program, which was introduced just Army, called Korea the transition and people embedded in Coalition units, before the start of the operation, con- Vietnam the turning point in the mili- while another 2,000 unilaterals, who tributed enormously to the Coalition tary-media relations.2 Today it is un- did not participate in the embedded showtime. thinkable to conduct a war without program, stayed in Kuwait.4 any real time news coverage by the This article concentrates on one of the media. Research journalist Robert The intention of the embedded pro- most crucial, but also one of the most Kaplan supported this statement: gram was to guarantee that the home underestimated features of the current front would see the same as soldiers battlefield: the military-media rela- Be aware, the media is nowadays al- at the front; no lies, no propaganda, tionship. Both the military and the ways in the center of the battlefield.3 no tricks; the camera was to register media try to serve the citizens, but the battlefield. Some believe that the their relationship was not always It is therefore that every soldier and embedded program was a smart move smooth. It started as an almost perfect especially every military leader, from of the U.S. Department of Defense; symbiosis, but that changed over time the strategic corporal to the highest others think that it was an impulsive to an adversary relationship. general, should have a profound un- decision of Rumsfeld and Clarke. derstanding of the media. The purpose of this article is to research one There is not one vision on the embed- * The author is currently serving in The Hague of the latest developments in the mili- ded program. Many questions on the as an instructor in military strategy, opera- tary-media relationship: the embed- embedded program rose. One of these tional art, and ground warfare at the Nether- lands Defense Academy (Instituut Defensie ded news media program. questions forms the main research Leergangen) for the Hogere en Middelbare question of this article: Was the em- Defensie Vorming. Just before the start of Operation Iraqi bedded news media program effective This article is a special edited version of a Freedom, U.S. Secretary of Defense, before and during the major combat Master’s thesis (monograph) for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) of the Donald Rumsfeld, and his Assistant operations of Operation Iraqi Free- U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- Secretary of Defense for Public Af- dom from February through April lege, Fort Leavenworth, KS (USA). fairs, Mrs. Victoria Clarke, introduced 2003?

282 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The issuing of the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media in the beginning of February 2003 is the start of this period. The end is marked by 01 May 2003, the day on which the President of the United States, George W. Bush, aboard the USS Lincoln, officially de- clared that the major combat operations had finished.5 The number of embeds decreased sig- nificantly soon after the fall of Bagh- dad in April 2003. The quantity of embeds dropped to a fewer than 190 during the third week of the operation.6 At the end of April 2003 almost all embedded journalists had left their units.

Army Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command, Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged speaks with reporters outside a hotel in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Dictionary of the English Language on April 27, 2003 (Photo Helene C. Stikkel) explains that the word ‘media’ is not only the plural form of medium, but it The main research question can be di- Some confines has also its own meaning: vided into five subordinate research areas, which also forms the body for Many views on a military operation the means of communication, as this article: are possible. However, this article ad- radio, television, newspaper, maga- dresses the American standpoint with zines, etc. that reach the very large • Embedded Media regard to the military-media relation number of people.7 What is embedded media? What ship just before and during Operation was the media plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom. It will therefore not Today, the media comprises three Iraqi Freedom? touch the legitimacy question of Ope- different forms. The first form is the ration Iraqi Freedom. print media, which includes news- • Analytic Framework papers, magazines, and books. The What determines whether a media The U.S. Department of Defense de- second form is the broadcast media, plan is effective? signed the embedded news media which encompasses radio and tele- program for all four Services, but in vision. The third form is on-line • Effectiveness practice mainly the Army and Marine media, the internet, which is the What happened to the military- Corps, and to a lesser extend the newest version of media. media relations before and during Navy, dealt with the program. That is Most publishers and broadcasting ser- the major combat operations of a logical consequence. The Army and vices have their own website with a Operation Iraqi Freedom? Did it Marine Corps formed the advancing news page. There is also a new move- meet the standards of the media ground forces. They were not only the ment among common people to start plan? What were the different per- largest contributors to Operation Iraqi their own news website. This last ca- spectives on the embedded pro- Freedom, but they were also more tegory does not involve journalists, so gram? suitable to accommodate embedded it is not part of this research. The term journalists. media in this article focuses on pro- • Future This article is in line with the prac- fessional news media. Is embedded news media a useful tical use of the embedded program. It tool for future operations? pays mainly attention to embedded news people in Army and Marine Embedded Media • Relevance Corps units and a few glimpses of What can the Netherlands Armed what happened aboard Navy ships. When Bob Wright, the Chairman of Forces learn from the American ex- NBC, was asked to write a foreword periences with the embedded news The article is limited by time. It focu- to NBC’s book Operation Iraqi Free- media program? ses on the period previous and during dom, he described ‘being embedded’

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 283 action recommended that the military Perspective Criteria leverage the media by a new Public Affairs plan now referred to as the 1. Accurate, timely and honest information embedded news media program.13 Military 2. Violation of OPSEC 3. Good relationship to understand complex operations Secretary Rumsfeld, assisted by Vic- toria Clarke, decided to implement 1. Elements of good journalism the embedded news media program. a. Truth and verification Victoria Clarke told reporters that Media b. Independence and autonomous monitor of power they would get more access than in c. Forum for public criticism and compromise Operations Desert Storm and Endu- d. Comprehension and proportionality ring Freedom. 2. Economic motives It is in our own interest to let people 1. Quality see for themselves through the news Public 2. Objectivity media, the lies and deceptive tactics 3. Combat tiredness Saddam Hussein will use.14

International views Standpoints from countries outside the United States Former TV Reporter Michael Burton presented a more critical view on the Framework with criteria from different view points to evaluate embedded concept. the embedded news media program The idea originated with the Pen- in plain terms: ‘journalists eating, when journalists were provided ac- tagon, where military and political sleeping, and moving in concert with cess, the accurate story was told, but strategists pitched the idea to editors their assigned combat units’.8 Bill when they got information, the result last year as a compromise. The Pen- Katovsky went more in detail in the was speculation, misinformation, and tagon strategists, already planning book Embedded, which he wrote inaccuracy.11 for the Iraqi war, wanted proud, po- together with Timothy Carlson: sitive, and patriotic coverage over On 30 October 2002, Secretary Rums- national airwaves. If editors agreed Embedded reporters ate, lived, tra- feld unexpectedly attended a meeting to all their provisions for security veled, and slept with the troops. of Washington bureau chiefs of major reviews, flagging of sensitive infor- They choked on the same sandstorm media companies. He promised them mation, limitations on filming dead grit, and carried the same manda- a public relations strategy of embed- bodies, and other restrictions, then tory gas mask and chem. suits. They ded media with warriors. If there were journalists would be welcome. The dined on the same MREs (Meals to be a war with Iraq, journalists editors not only went along – they Ready to Eat), and bounced along would be with the troops. accepted the ground rules without the same rutted desert tracks. They fight.15 faced the same enemy fire.9 His main argument was that in Afgha- nistan both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Se- These two descriptions reflect the showed great skills in news manage- cretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Joint practical side felt by the media. The ment. The best way to counter it was Chiefs of Staff issued a directive in other side of the story derives from to have accurate, professional journa- which they emphasized that the goal the U.S. Department of Defense. lists on the ground. They could see of the Department of Defense was to Colonel Melanie Reeder, a former the truth of the ongoing operation.12 get it right from the start of the opera- U.S. Army Public Affairs Officer in tion. Afghanistan, pointed out that it was Rumsfeld was faced with three cour- The main purpose was to facilitate the sometimes difficult to get the media ses of action. The first course of ac- press with firsthand impressions. The out in front with the troops during tion was a continuation of Operation U.S. Department of Defense would Operation Enduring Freedom, which Enduring Freedom’s policy: limited assign news crews, journalists, and started in 2001 in Afghanistan. Eight media access to the battlefield and photographers to specific combat embedded reporters in Operation press briefings at the Pentagon and units for a longer period: days, weeks Anaconda10, which was part of Opera- the military operational headquarters. or even months.16 The directive was tion Enduring Freedom, helped blaze The second course of action envi- the Secretary of Defense’s Public the path for a large-scale, embedded sioned the return of the media pools Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding news media program in Operation as had been done during Operation Media, which was issued on 10 Fe- Iraqi Freedom. Reeder inferred that Desert Storm. The third course of bruary 2003.

284 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 Analytic Framework negative implications. This is the so- provide reporters with accurate, time- called media boomerang effect. ly and honest information. The conse- The nucleus of this article is to eluci- The second reason is that opposing quence of providing false information date the effectiveness of the embed- perspectives might encourage a dia- is severe. Judson Conner described it ded news media program during the lectic approach of ‘thesis, antithesis, as an aspect of the mentioned media combat phase of Operation Iraqi Free- synthesis,’ which will contribute to boomerang effect. dom. This article uses a framework the quality of the discussion on mili- with criteria to evaluate the effective- tary and media. It is usually very easy to lie to a re- ness seen from three different per- porter. But there is a catch to it spectives: the military, the media and Military criteria once... The truth will come out even- the public. The reason for three dif- Let’s start with the military perspec- tually, and when it does, that repor- ferent perspectives in stead of only a tive. Today, U.S. Joint Publication ter will never again believe anything military point of view is that different 3-61 Doctrine for Public Affairs you have to say, whether it is true views might lead to new conclusions (Joint Pub 3-61) gives the basis for or not. And no other reporters will and overlooked effects. Sometimes, how the U.S. military considers the either, for the word gets around the military think that what is ‘good’ military-media relation. The military news circles very rapidly whenever for the military, e.g. certain decisions, must make a free flow of general and an official lied to the press.18 may be ‘bad’ for the media and the military information available with- public, but that is short-term thinking. out censorship or propaganda. Accu- It means that soldiers must be honest rate and timely information is essen- with the press. Likewise, Joint Pub The long-term effect is that some- tial in times of crisis.17 3-61 states: ‘information will not be thing worse for the media and the Incorrect military terminology can classified or otherwise to protect the public will become worse for the mi- lead to confusion in the public debate. government from criticism or embar- litary as well, frequently with more It is the military’s responsibility to rassment’.19

US Marine Corps (USMC) Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Special Operations Capable (SOC) advance on an enemy position at Az Zubayr, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 (Photo B.L. Wickliffe; collection NIMH)

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 285 The Secretary of Defense‘s Public Af- The journalist has to understand the Learning to nurture that mutual fairs Guidance on Embedding Media entire operation with all its details and enmity – building on similarities and was the only instruction for dealing all its implications. The understan- mutual interests and recognizing dif- with media during Operation Iraqi ding is therefore a shared responsi- ferences – can create a trust and Freedom and additional to Joint Pub bility of journalists and the military. confidence between the two that 3-61. It became therefore the most Consequently, it is essential for the results in fairer media coverage of important military document on how military and the media to have a rela- the military and greater access by the U.S. Department of Defense saw tionship of mutual respect. Colonel the media.23 the cooperation between the military Barry Willey recommended: and the press. The most significant instruction in the guidance was:

To tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortion, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell our story – only commanders can ensure the media get to the story.20

This instruction supports the importance of giving accurate, timely and honest information to the press. How- ever, there is military information that the military must not show openly. It is vital for success of the mission. Operations security, OPSEC, is a pro- tection measure that identifies critical information and subsequently analy- zes friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.21 Military personnel may not give away vital and classified information.

Although the military has to offer the media accurate information, it is still not a guarantee that journalists are able enough to convert this information into precise reports and news coverage. The military must build a better relationship with the media to help the media creating a clearer picture of military operations. William Kennedy, professional journalist since 1945 and retired Army Public Affairs Officer of the Pentagon doub- ted whether journalism is able to oversee the complexity of military operations. He disputed that in cases like the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm, all essential facts were available and accessible in the public domain, but the press fell short to re- Mr. M. Green, working for ABC News London, gives a gesture 22 port matters of crucial importance. of support while embedded with US Marine Corps (USMC). On patrol along Thus, providing the press with accu- the border in Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 rate information is not enough. (Photo A.P. Roufs; collection NIMH)

286 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 There is still another measure that de- what is important and filters out what Media expert Dr. Carl Jensen stated rives from the military. Mrs. Victoria is not. In journalistic terms, verifi- that corporate media executives per- Clarke made clear that one of the mo- cation is a process of testing and ceive their primary, and often sole, tivations to create the embedded pro- checking a story. responsibility to be the need to maxi- gram was to show people around the mize profits for the next quarterly whole world how the U.S. forces con- • Journalists must maintain indepen- statement and not, as some observers ducted their operations in a very real dence from those they cover and they would have it, to inform the public.26 and compelling way.24 must serve as an autonomous monitor Clarke’s statement seems to be fair of power. Independency does not Eric Alterman is also convinced that and innocent, but it leads to critical mean being neutral or impartial. Most the profit motive determines the con- questions that needs an answer. Did journalists find facts and draw content of the news. Factual news on po- the networks and publics from coun- clusions. Kovach and Rosenstiel litics is boring and does not sell very tries other than the United States wel- realized that having an opinion is not well. Today the public is more inte- come the reports of embedded media? only allowable, it is important to the rested in glamorous and electrifying And, were the American and British natural scepticism with which any news leading to competition between reporters favored above reporters good reporter approaches a story. The the news networks, which will have from other countries? These questions autonomous monitor of power refers the most exciting coverage of a news justify a better look on the interna- to the watchdog principle. It implies item.27 The economic motive is there- tional views. The article will use the that the press should recognize where fore also a media criterion to judge international standpoints as a separate powerful institutions are working the embedded program. criterion. effectively, as well as where they are not. Public criteria Summarized, the military criteria for The public is an important party for assessing the embedded news media • Journalism must provide a forum for judging the effectiveness of the em- program are accurate, timely and fair criticism and compromise to con- bedded media, because they have to information, no violation of the OPSEC tribute to the forming of people’s digest all presented information. The rules, building a good relationship opinion. Kovach and Rosenstiel ex- public’s criteria are oriented towards with the media to guarantee a better pounded: ‘the natural curiosity of the way the people perceive and ap- appreciation of complex military ope- humankind means that by reporting preciate the embedded program. Re- rations. The international perspective details of scheduled events, disclosing nowned research institutes like The is a different standpoint. wrongdoing, or outlining a develop- Pew Research Center, The Columbia ing trend, journalism sets people to Journalist Review and the Project for Media criteria wonder’. Excellence in Journalism distinguish The best way to start the media per- three different audience aspects du- spective is using the approach of how • Journalism must keep the news ring war coverage, which are mea- journalists see themselves in the ideal comprehensive and proportional. Ko- ningful measures to evaluate the em- situation. Bill Kovach and Tom Ro- vach and Rosenstiel made a compa- bedded program. senstiel clarified that the purpose of rison with cartography: ‘A journalist journalism is to provide people with that leaves out so much of the other - Quality the information they need to be free news in the process is like the map Quality is a broad and hard to define and self-governing. They distilled a that fails to tell the traveler of all the term, but the explanation of the term pattern of elements of good jour- other roads along the way’.25 quality in this article is whether the nalism to fulfill that task. These ele- Proportion and comprehensiveness is public appreciates the way they get ments of good journalism form useful the key to accuracy. A news story can their information through the embed- criteria to judge the embedded pro- only be accurate if a reporter places it ded reporters. The question belonging gram. in the right way in a larger context. to this criterion reads: Did the public esteem the real time coverage of ad- • Journalism’s first obligation is to the Kovach and Rosenstiel’s elements of vancing Coalition units? truth in order to serve the citizens. A good journalism are useful criteria to way of getting at the truth is verifica- asses the embedded program, but they - Objectivity tion, which is a process of stripping are idealistic. It is utopian to believe The audience like to receive the news information of any attached mis- that the press always endeavors to use as objective as can be to form their information, disinformation, or self- these elements. News media is boom- own opinion. Although they realize promoting information. As citizens ing business. Media companies and that all media have their own target encounter a growing flow of informa- networks are commercial institutions audiences, they prefer to have their tion, they have more need for some- and their first concern is making news without major biases. But are one, e.g. a reporter, who highlights money. embedded journalists able to cover

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 287 the news without any biases of the The military involved in the media units to which they were embedded? coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom were very satisfied with the quality of - Combat fatigue information shown in the media. It Embedded journalists, especially met their standards of accuracy, time those at the very front, did not have and honesty. Secretary Rumsfeld also any time to edit coverage and reports strongly approved the reports that on the war in Iraq. The result was that came from the hundreds of journa- television newscasts in the United lists: ‘They could see accurate presen- States daily broadcasted the war in tations and representations and writ- Iraq for a very long period. Did the ten accounts of what the men and American people appreciate these women in uniform were doing’.29 lasting reports? Did the coverage lead to an overload of emotional infor- The military had, during the begin- mation? Were the reports overvalued? ning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, In other words: was there too much, some difficulties in providing com- enough, or too little coverage of the plete information of the war. While war? the embedded TV journalists already showed snapshots of the war, CENT- COM omitted to give a broader view Assessment at operational level during the first days of the war. General Tommy The next step in the research is using Franks, Commander CENTCOM, did the framework with criteria to find out not like to deal with media, he told what the military, media and public Secretary Rumsfeld.30 For the first effectiveness of the embedded pro- several days CENTCOM did not organi- gram were during Operation Iraqi ze any briefings, leading reporters to Freedom. It will also take a look at the wonder why they were invited. international viewpoints. The assessment starts with the military effective- Once the daily briefings began, the major case, the U.S. Armed Forces ness. first CENTCOM briefers were evasive sent away a journalist. Cox added that and defensive. This start cost the mili- the program worked, stating: ‘Journa- Military Effectiveness tary some credibility of the press and lists are professionals, and inclined to • Accurate, timely and honest the public. As the war continued, Bri- give due regard to their own safety information gadier General Vincent Brooks, CENT- and the safety of the unit they’re Broadcast media, especially televi- COM’s spokesman, cultivated a more with’.32 sion, had a unique opportunity with balanced and phlegmatic demeanor the embedded program to show real and the briefings became more effec- Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, time coverage of front scenes. The tive.31 deputy commander of CENTCOM du- public could directly see front ac- ring Operation Iraqi Freedom, decla- tions. There was no time for the edi- • Violations of OPSEC red that CENTCOM was not so worried ting of images. That made it easy for Lieutenant Colonel Larry Cox, chief about embeds giving away secrets. the military to provide timely and of the press desk during Operation Their biggest concern was the group honest information. The print media Iraqi Freedom, interpreted that fewer of retired generals turned commenta- sometimes had, due to the operational than half a dozen embedded news tor that offered opinions and often tempo, problems with typing a story people were expelled. Out of a popu- false predictions on the operation in and sending it to their home base. lation of 662, that is less than 1 per many news shows.33 On accuracy, Colonel Glenn Starnes, cent. Part of the decision to dis-embed Battalion Commander within the Ma- journalists was that the reporter said The public was satisfied that journa- rines during Operation Iraqi Freedom, something over-the-line as far as lists minded out the OPSEC rules. Con- explained that embeds had access to ground rules go. Another part of the sequently, it did not give the journalist the original plans and were aware of decision was a reflection of how in- extra incentives to violate the OPSEC the commander’s intent. Instead of tentional it was and how likely it was rules. ABC news conducted a news criticizing the tactical situation as to happen again. poll before Operation Iraqi Freedom plans changed, embeds knew the with reference to OPSEC. The poll whole story and reported about the Most journalists did not realize that showed that almost 70 per cent of the modifications.28 they passed the line. In only one U.S. public said that the military

288 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 US Army Soldiers assigned to the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) watch a news briefing using the Product Distribution System equipment at an undisclosed location in Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 (Photo A. Ansarov; collection NIMH)

still not understand the meaning be- hind the action.37

Where journalists complain about the poor quality, it is however not due to the embedded program. In most cases, journalists had full access to all the plans and intentions, but war is very complex and not easy to understand. The Prussian military philoso- pher Carl von Clausewitz already remarked: ‘Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult’.38

Unintended effects for the military The Public Affairs Guidance on Em- bedding Media did not only cause foreseen effects, but also two unforeseen effects. The first unexpected ef- should have the right to prohibit said that embeds and troops became fect was that the embedded program media disclosure to sensitive and se- a band of brothers, leading to giddy had an enormous impact on the home cret information.34 For most Ameri- and excited reporting.35 Lai Ling Jew, front of the deployed soldiers. Mem- cans OPSEC was more important than a a NBC News producer embedded with bers of the U.S.1st Marine Division free flow of all information on the 101st Air Assault Division, even spoke were euphoric about the way the operation. at the funeral of one of the killed sol- embedded media contributed to their diers, because soldiers asked her to do internal communication. Concerned • Building a good relationship so. ‘It was a strange responsibility for family members were able to receive The relationship between the military a journalist.’36 daily updates on their loved ones by and the media depended on the unit The embedded program in general the press, the Marines said in their commander. Positive news coverage contributed to a more respectful and evaluation report.39 indicated that commanders were trustful relationship between the mili- open and available to embedded jour- tary and the media. However, this effect also has a nega- nalists. Some of the embedded jour- tive side, told by Mrs. Nancy Cham- nalists had negative experiences. Despite a better relationship, not all berlain. After she received the formal Washington Post’s Lyndsey Layton, of the embedded journalists agreed confirmation that her son, a Marine embedded to the USS Abraham Lin- that they were able to see the essence Captain, was killed in Iraq, she reac- coln, was forced to sign an agreement of the operation. U.S. News & World ted to NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw in that was more restrictive than the Pen- Reporter Mark Mazatti, embedded to his news show. tagon’s Public Affairs Guidance. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s mo- Commander of the USS Abraham bile command, admitted that it will I truly admire what all the network Lincoln lifted the ad hoc constraints take a lifetime to understand all the news and news technologies are when Layton and her colleagues com- implications of a military operation. doing today to bring it into our plained to Navy brass in Bahrain. homes. But for the mothers and The press corps’ poor performance wives who are out there watching, it Most reporters were enthusiastic in reading the Iraq battlefield indi- is murder. It’s heartbreak. We can’t about their treatment. T. Sean Her- cates that you can be embedded all leave television. Every tank, every bert, head of CBS News analyst’s desk, the way up to four-star generals and helicopter, ‘Is that my son?’ And I

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 289 just need you to be aware that tech- Mission command is a mechanism to experts, but reporters themselves did nology is great. But there are moms, direct operations through decentrali- not agree with that opinion. Reporter there are dads, there are wives who zed execution based on leaders at all Sam Howe Verhowek of the Los are suffering because of this.40 levels in the organization that are wil- Angeles Times made clear that the ling to use initiative. It also requires embedded program created an in- Thus, instead of having only a posi- an environment of trust and mutual herent conflict. tive effect on the home front, the understanding.42 embedded program can also lead to Commanders, even at the highest much stress among the home front headquarters, must trust their subordi- and that can become counter-produc- nate commanders on the scene in their tive in the longer term. It might affect decision-making. the fighting soldiers. In short, the military was positive The second unintended effect of the about the embedded news media embedded program is the use of program. It met their standards of embedded information as a tool for providing accurate, timely and fair in- leading troops. Some think it is a po- formation without violating the OPSEC sitive aspect, but usually it becomes a rules. The program also contributed to negative one. This is best described a better relationship between the mi- by Bing West and Major General litary and the media, which added to (Ret) Ray Smith in their book The more complete and positive media March Up: Taking Baghdad with the reports on the military during the war. 1st Marine Division. However, the military must realize that the embedded program had un- They wrote that Lieutenant General intended effects: it can lead to stress James Conway, the senior Marine on the home front, and the use of em- commander, watched in his combat bedded reports as management tool, operations centre live CNN coverage might be risky. of the fighting in East Baghdad. Con- way was so impressed by the wide- Media Effectiveness open friendliness and lack of opposi- The journalistic perspective compri- tion that he immediately approved the ses two measures: the elements of division’s request to let the battalions good journalism and economic moti- roll until they hit a defense. ves. This section starts with the elements of good journalism. The CNN coverage together with other live feeds from embeds encouraged Truth to serve the citizen and Conway to speed the advance and to verification modify his plan. ‘That’s OBE – over- Because of the nature of embedded taken by events,’ Conway said. Em- coverage, networks were not able to bedded coverage enabled Lieutenant transform the coverage into the usual General Conway to make a fast as- smooth fifteen-second shot with a sessment and a change to his plan.41 catchy sound bite. The embedded program gave another dimension to Using opportunities during operations verification, a more implicit one. The is always highly recommended, but public could see directly what hap- there is a high risk in changing the pened at the front. Personal observa- plan because of embedded reports. tion of the fact became the ultimate Embedded journalists are not official verification. The embedded program operational intelligence sources and linked the military performances di- embedded pictures only show a very rectly to the public. narrow view of a combat situation. Moreover, the way Lieutenant Gener- Independence and autonomous al Conway used the embed reports is monitor of power not in line with a mission command The loss of independence because of culture, which accepts the uncertainty the embedded program was one of the of war. main concerns of news producers and

290 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 From the military’s point of view, Some media experts like Professor called it the sanitized view of the when you embed somebody in your Michael Pfau of the University of war.49 unit, they become family. For the Oklahoma, referred to the embedded American media in general followed media side that’s very tricky. You program as producing a variation of the guidance of the Secretary of want to keep objective distance from the Stockholm syndrome.45 Journa- Defense and became patriotic. That your source.43 lists became dependent for their sur- made the press less critical on one of vival on soldiers.44 Thomas Ricks America’s most powerful institutions, from the Washington Post understood the U.S. Armed Forces. Most major the dilemma between affinity for pro- networks added nationalistic sym- tecting soldiers versus objectivity and bols, such as waving Stars and Stri- independence but adds that reporters pes, to embedded pictures of advan- were never forced to participate in the cing Coalition troops. embedded program. ‘They were embeds by choice.’46 Some American news networks did not only show positive embedded Robert Kaplan, embedded with the pictures, but also gave floor to more U.S. military in both Afghanistan and critical voices against the war.50 The Iraq, believed that no journalist is in- general tendency among the major dependent and objective. networks was to show a jingoistic report of the war, which made them less A journalist may seek different critical on the actions of the Armed points of view, but he shapes and Forces. portrays those viewpoints from only one angle of vision: his own.47 There was probably already some existing national sentiment among Nevertheless, the military offered the many media networks, but the embed- press with the embedded program in- ded pictures of advancing U.S. troops side looks. Major Tom Bryant, who made that feeling stronger. For three worked in the Public Affairs cell of weeks in April 2003, the media por- 5th U.S. Corps, described the discus- trayed Coalition Soldiers, Airmen, sion on less objectivity versus partici- Sailors, and Marines as the real her- pation in the embedded program. oes, helping to solve the Global War on Terrorism as seen by the Ameri- Bottom line is yes, they did lose a cans. level of objectivity, and yes, we did use their presence […]. What they Forum for public criticism cannot deny is they enjoyed a level and compromise of access – to classified briefings, The embedded coverage provided a plans, and combat operations – that lot of information for the public, but was unprecedented. It’s media co- the information was only one-sided: caine for them – they need the the Coalition Forces. There were no access, want it more than anything, western embeds with Iraqi units; a and can’t stop themselves from ac- situation that was likely unfeasible. It tually learning to like the soldiers needs more than only one-sided pic- they’re around – and they hate them- tures to structure an opinion. selves for it.48 More balanced information with The watchdog function, or autono- background reports from both sides mous monitor of power, did not work would have laid a much better foun- perfectly. From the start, the Ameri- dation. As CNN reporter Christiane can media showed a clean war with- Amanpour said, when asked about the out causalities. Christopher Bollyn embedded program:

A view of the Ultra High Frequency Yes, you get good pictures, but, no, (UHF) antenna mast operated you don’t get great information. by the US Army, Central Iraq, 2003 No, you don’t get necessarily great 51 (Photo I. Paustovs; collection NIMH) journalism.

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 291 Comprehensive and proportional danger. It shows the need for at least comprising many million viewers.55 news daily press conferences at the opera- They probably lost watchers to the The lack of comprehensive news was tional level, e.g. CENTCOM, to place cable networks. a big issue in the discussion on the the information in a broader and more embedded program. The reality of the balanced perspective. The print media, especially the news- war was much broader and more papers, had a slight increase in their complex than shown in the embedded Economic motive ratings. This was partly due to the in- coverage and stories. CBS News Presi- The economic motive is one of the novative approaches, like the embed- dent, Andrew Heyward, agreed that most important media measures to ded program, that resonated with the one of the immediate and major cri- evaluate the embedded program. audience.56 ticisms of TV embedding was that it Despite all the idealistic measures, provided a soda straw view of the media organizations and networks are In general terms, the media was very war, devoid of context, perspective or still commercial corporations. The pleased with this offer of the U.S.De- a view from the Iraqi side. He retorts main effort of every commercial firm partment of Defense. They took bene- that if this was looking through is to make profit and media organiza- fit of the war, because the embedded straws, then before we had to be tions and networks are no exceptions program provided many opportuni- looking through toothpicks.52 to this rule. ties. It linked the war directly to the public, an innovation in war coverage. Todd Gitlin, professor in journalism Profit making in the media world A great virtue of embedded program at the Columbia University, remarked is related to rating. After all, news was that journalists could see the ac- that he was not concerned about the shows that are watched by a huge tions of Armed Forces from a very coverage and stories of the embeds, audience or newspapers read by a close distance and with their own but more about how the networks pro- large public yield more money and eyes. Most of the journalists were im- cessed all the information: attract companies for advertisement. pressed and used a positive tone in The media took enormous advantage their coverage. I’m hard to remember anything out of the war in Iraq. The ratings of the of the embeds which seemed to me cable networks in the United States, Public Effectiveness particular egregious. I was much such as Fox, CNN and MSNBC, expan- The public perspective is the third more critical of what was going on ded tremendously during Operation perspective to evaluate the embedded with [network] headquarters com- Iraqi Freedom in comparison with the program. The perspective is restricted mentary, which got into the celebra- weeks before the war. The long esta- to the American audience. The inter- tory shock-and-awe thing.53 blished newscasts, such as ABC, NBC national audience will be discussed and CBS saw a slight decrease in their later in this article. The public stand- Another element of proportionality is ratings, but they still had a larger point comprises three measures: quali- that media, especially television, en- audience than the cable networks ty, objectivity and combat fatigue. larges situations. A small incident can become a major issue on television with unforeseen effects. This pheno- menon occurred on 23 March 2003. Reports about a British aircraft shot down by a Patriot missile, five Ameri- can prisoners of war, and intense fighting around the city of Nasiriyah, aggravated a widespread belief that the operation was in danger.54

It means that embedded reports can lead to disproportional news coverage causing unintended effects. Skirmishes become big battles and the home front believes that the entire operation is in

A US Marine Corps (USMC) Marine comes to the aid of displaced Iraqi civilians caught in a firefight north of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003 (Photo M.M. Gratz; collection NIMH)

292 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 • Quality complained that in comparison to were sometimes furious at the BBC for The term quality is translated into ap- other news issues in the spring of their coverage. They saw the BBC as preciation. The Project for Excellence 2003, the war with its embedded too much pro-Iraq and they some- in Journalism, affiliated with Colum- coverage was overemphasized.60 times called the BBC: the Baghdad bia University, conducted a content Broadcasting Company. analysis of the embedded reports on By and large, the American public television during the first days of the was positive about the embedded pro- On the other hand, anti-war demon- war. The researchers concluded that gram. Their collective opinion is that strators accused the BBC of being the American public found the em- it was a good thing that did not lead to biased by the embedded program. Se- bedded coverage largely anecdotal. It biased information about the war. The nior managers of the BBC apologized was exciting and dull, combat focused, embedded pictures scared most Ame- for the use of bias terms such as ‘we’ and most information was live and ricans, probably because it offered the and ‘deliberate’ in their embedded unedited. The public concluded that American public a front seat. coverage.52 The conclusion of the Bri- much of it lacked context but was Embedded coverage did not cause an tish Ministry of Defence was that the usually rich in detail. overload of war reporting, but it was embedded program enabled the pri- not always in balance with other im- mary aim of their media effort: it pro- Researchers of the project also found portant news issues. vided the press and the audience with that the majority of the Americans accurate and timely information.53 said embedded reporters are a good International standpoints thing. Of the 34 per cent who said it It is hard to give one international per- The Nederlands was a bad thing, most were worried spective. Therefore, the international The Coalition Forces did not allow that the embedded program was pro- perspective in this article consists of the Dutch public broadcasting servi- viding too much information that the opinions of the United Kingdom, ce, the Nederlandse Omroep Stichting could help the enemy.57 the Netherlands, Germany and some (NOS), to participate in the embedded Arab countries. The reason for select- program. Dutch correspondent in • Objectivity ing these countries is that it gives a Washington Charles Groenhuijsen Pew Research Center observed that wide range of countries with different was surprised to discover that mainly 30 per cent of the American public interests in Operation Iraqi Freedom. British and Americans were selected indicated that they had a great deal The United Kingdom was United for the embedded program; even re- of confidence in the press accuracy States’ closest coalition partner, while porters of unexpected networks and and 51 per cent said they had a fair The Netherlands was a coalition part- magazines.64 Did the policymakers amount of confidence, while 15 per ner without troops participating in the oversee the international impact of cent said that they did not have much major combat operations of Opera- this decision on the longer term? confidence. Pew Research Center tion Iraqi Freedom. Germany was concludes that only a few people against the war and Arab countries The NOS was able to receive embed- thought the presence of journalists have other cultural and political pat- ded pictures from the front through with Coalition forces would result in terns than the aforementioned Wes- American or British networks, but biased reports.58 That means that the tern democracies. that was not what they wanted. They majority of the American public ac- wanted their own embeds. As an al- cepted the embedded news coverage. The United Kingdom ternative the NOS tasked Dutch repor- The people in the United Kingdom ters to make contrasting docudramas • Combat fatigue appreciated the embedded coverage, in the United States and the Middle Pew Research Center summarized but were not as excited as the people East on subjects related to Operation that there are signs that 24/7 televised in the United States. British Secretary Iraqi Freedom.65 images of war took a toll on the au- of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, After less than a week, the NOS deci- dience. Research showed that most of acknowledged the effect of this way ded to stop the newscast that lasted the American population said the em- of reporting in appearing to reduce the entire day and went to their nor- bedded media coverage was frighte- opposition to the war in the first days: mal pattern of a few small newscasts ning.59 Pew Research Center also de- per day. The rates of the viewing pu- termined that most Americans felt The imagery they broadcast is at blic did not show a peak. that the media gave the right amount least partially responsible for the of coverage on the war. public’s change of mood.61 Germany German media researchers Raimund Those who said there was too much Both pro-war and anti-war sides Mock and Markus Rettich deduced coverage far outnumbered the ones attacked the British Broadcasting that the war was a mega media event who thought that the war was under Company (BBC), the national broad- in Germany. It exceeded that on the covered. By contrast, many people caster. British soldiers fighting in Iraq Kosovo war in 1999 in which the Ger-

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 293 enterprise. It has broadcast the horror of the bombing campaign, the blown-out brains, the blood- spattered pavements, the screaming infants and the corpses. Its team of on-the-ground, unembedded correspondents has provided a corrective to the official line that the campaign is, barring occasional resistance, going to plan.68

Conclusion

The main research question for this article reads: ‘Was the embedded news media program effective before and during the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom from February through April 2003?’ The answer is simply yes. The embedded news media program was effective, because the military, the media and the American public were all happy with it and it also met the standards of the Public Affairs Gui- dance on Embedding Media.

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his assistant Victoria Clarke initiated the US Military personnel assigned to the 4th Psychological Operations embedded news media program. This Group (POG) broadcast television and radio programming from onboard initiative made the military the orga- an ANG EC-130J Hercules ‘Command Solo’ aircraft, in support of nizer of the embedded program with Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 (Photo A. Ansarov; collection NIMH) which the media was eager to coope- rate. The embedded program became man Armed Forces played an active richs Award, annually given in Ger- a new milestone in the military-media role. Private network Radio Television many to courageous journalists with relationship. Luxemburg (RTL) was pleased to have high quality reportages.66 Though Rumsfeld and Clark allowed an embedded journalist with allied journalists to embed with the Coali- troops and a reporter in Baghdad to Arab countries tion troops during Operation Iraqi cover both sides of the war. Arab reactions to the embedded Freedom, there were restrictions in program were mainly negative. Not the guidance in how the journalists The public broadcasters, Zweites many Arab TV channels showed live could report the war. By far most Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) and the embedded coverage. Al-Jazeera, in journalists complied with the restric- Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich- the Western World seen as the voice tions. rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der of the Middle East,67 did not partici- Bundes Republik Deutschland (ARD) pate in the embedded program. They Both relevant joint publications and primarily relied on their correspon- thought that might have given a one- the Public Affairs Guidance on Em- dents in Baghdad, who put their emp- sided biased view of the war. Faisal bedding Media spelt out that the mili- hasis on the suffering of the Iraqi Bodi, a senior editor of Al-Jazeera, tary would benefit from timely, accu- civilians rather than on warfare. Mock explained the official editorial line rate and fair information without and Rettich conclude that the Bagh- during Operation Iraqi Freedom: violating the OPSEC. This formula dad coverage was more proper and worked in nearly all cases. Journalists politically correct in Germany than Of all the major global networks, hardly abused the rules for OPSEC and the embedded coverage since two Al-Jazeera has been alone in pro- accurate and fair stories were told. A German Baghdad reporters received ceeding from the premise that this good relation between embedded the prestigious Hans Joachim Fried- war should be viewed as an illegal journalists and soldiers became an

294 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 important foundation for a successful would have increased the internation- ving military-media relation. embedded program. al attention for embedded coverage. Though the U.S. Department of De- fense never closed the embedded pro- Media experts and news producers Media watcher Danny Schechter does gram officially, they consider revitali- were hesitant to participate in the em- not concur with the conclusion of this zing the initiative. After President bedded program. The embedded pro- article. He considers the embedded Bush announced the end of the major gram would violate the rules of good program as a well-organized propa- combat operations in Iraq, the fight- journalism. It turned out differently. ganda machine. Schechter distinguis- ing did not stop. The Coalition Forces The embedded program enabled jour- hed two different fronts: fought many significant battles since, nalists to keep a tight rein on all mili- most without any media, causing the tary activities. The military gave jour- The Iraqis were targeted by bombs media to start speculating and provi- nalists access to information and that and information warfare while wes- ding the adversary the opportunity to had a fatal fascination for journalists. tern audiences had a well executed tell their propaganda stories. propaganda campaign often posing Above all, the media took enormous as news directed their way.69 These were the information aspects economic advantage of the embedded Mrs. Victoria Clarke tried to prevent program. News people saw in the em- Schechter sees the military and the with the embedded program. Prolon- bedded program a nice opportunity to media as one monolith targeting the gation of the embedded program with sell news. A great virtue of the em- American and international audience. the size it had during the major com- bedded program was that journalists That is far beyond the observations of bat operations of Operation Iraqi could see the actions of Armed Forces this article. Freedom could provide an advantage from a close distance and with their for the military.73 own eyes. The embedded program Brookings Institution70 Senior Fellow, linked the war directly to the Ameri- Stephen Hess, agrees with the conclu- It could also add to a better and a can public. That was unique. sions of this article. He called the more balanced vision of the ongoing embedded program a win-win-win operation. John Walcott, the Washing- The American public was positive situation: ton Bureau Chief of Knight Ridder about the embedded program. It did Newspapers, agreed that he was con- not lead to biased information about It’s clear that journalists, who want vinced that embedded program stop- the war. The embedded TV coverage access more than anything else, ped too early: scared most Americans, maybe be- were given remarkably access. It cause the public could see the front seems to me clear that the military Some of what the Pentagon worried live on television. Most Americans got much favorable coverage than about originally is now starting to felt that the embedded program did they would have had had there not happen, and that is Iraqis descri- not lead to an overload of war cover- been embedding. And it’s clear that bing versions of events where we age; only the amount of coverage was the public saw a type of picture that don’t have any reporters anymore not in balance with other important they had never, never had an oppor- present.74 news issues. tunity to see before.71

In the international environment, the Relevance for the embedded news media program was Future operations Netherlands Armed Forces not as effective as it was in the United States. The international press and One of the last research questions is An important part of this article is to audience were less positive on the whether the embedded news media consider the utility of the research advance of the Coalition troops than program is a useful tool for future results for today’s situation in the their American colleagues. Networks operations. The simple answer is Netherlands. in Europe showed more critical and again: yes. Today, war without media balanced news, while most Arab is unthinkable. Media correspondent Overall, the embedded new media media ignored the embedded pro- of the Public Broadcasting Service, program worked very well in the Uni- gram. Terence Smith, thinks that the embed- ted States previous and during Opera- ded program has set a new standard: tion Iraqi Freedom. It also laid down Overall, the lower interest in the in- ‘I can’t imagine in a future conflict a possible standard for military-media ternational environment did not affect not having this. [...] This will be the relations during future conflicts. the effectiveness of the embedded new model’.72 In fact, if the military But, will embedded media work in program in the United States, but per- stops, the media and the public will the Netherlands and what does it haps more international reporters par- view this as the military hiding infor- mean for the Netherlands Armed For- ticipating in the embedded program mation. That will damage the impro- ces?

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 295 First of all, the Public Affairs Office der what the effect would have been home front committees. As explained of the Netherlands Ministry of Defen- in the Netherlands if some Dutch and in this article, embedded reporting ce must realize that the embedded international journalists had been em- can have a negative impact on the news media program set the trend for bedded to Dutchbat III in Srebrenica home front. The Netherlands Ministry the coverage of future and even on- during the spring and summer of of Defence should consider, when going conflicts. Not all military ope- 1995. participating in an embedded news rations and not all phases of a military media program, how to prevent this operation will be covered by embed- On the other hand, the military is not negative impact on the home front. ded media, but be careful. As men- the only player in the embedded pro- The American military focused only tioned by Colonel Melanie Reeder, if gram. There are still a few important on the positive side, but reality was you provide reporters access to front questions in this case: is the Nether- different. units and headquarters, they probably lands political level prepared to start tell accurate stories. If they receive an embedded news media program? The fourth consideration for the second hand information on opera- And, how willing is the Netherlands Netherlands Armed Forces is a further tions through public affair officers, media to comply with such a pro- analysis of the use of embedded they probably start speculating. gram? pictures as a leadership instrument. Some people see this use as a positive The Public Affairs Office of the Second, embedded news media development. Use all opportunities to Netherlands Ministry of Defence should become an integral part of unit run an operation is their creed. might consider developing a policy training. Media is in most Dutch units for dealing with embedded news already part of their training, but this Others do not agree. They see a tend- media with clear selection criteria for is aimed on the media pool system. ency that the use of embedded pic- reporters. Part of this policy is to Training staffs must realize that units tures for running an operation is too make sure that the Dutch audience will not only be confronted with en- risky and it might lead to micro- will see a comprehensive view of the countering media. Embedded reports, management. ongoing operation and not only loose photographers and camera people snapshots made by embedded repor- will be part of the operation, especial- It is hard to say in general how to deal ters. ly when Dutch units are part of an with this information. It depends on American or British lead operation. the situation, but it is important to Embedded news media during opera- start a discussion on this topic in of- tions can contribute to a better under- Third, the Netherlands Ministry of ficer and non-commissioned officer standing of the Netherlands Armed Defence created a well-organized fa- career courses to get a better Forces conducting operations. Consi- mily support system with all kind of understanding of this effect.

Notes 1 Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources: A Guide to 9 Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, Embedded: The Media at War in Detecting Bias in News Media. New York: Lyle Stuart Book, Carol Iraq. Guilford (USA): The Lyon Press, (2003), p. xi. Publishing Group, (1990), p. 105. 10 Operation Anaconda took place in March 2002 to ‘squeeze’Taliban and 2 Barry Willey, ‘The Military-Media Connection For Better of For Al-Qaeda strongholds in the Shah-i-Kot Mountains, as the Americans Worse,’ in: Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, KS (USA), (December called it. (See also Paul Hastert’s article, ‘Operation Anaconda’, MS 9 1998 – February 1999), p. 15. (2005) (jrg 174)). 3 Robert Kaplan (a research journalist for the Atlantic Monthly) during a 11 Tammy L. Miracle, ‘The Army and Embedded Media,’ in: Military presentation for the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S Army Review. Fort Leavenworth, KS (USA), (September – October 2003), Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth (KS), USA, pp. 41-42. Friday 10 December 2004. 12 Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, p. xiii. 4 U.S Department of Defense and University of Oklahoma, ‘Embedded 13 Glenn Starnes, Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program Journalism: How War Is Viewed Differently From the Frontlines versus in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Carlisle, PA (USA): U.S. Army War Col- the Sidelines’, in: Joint Course In Communication – Introduction. Avai- lege, Center for Strategic Leadership, (2004), p. 2. lable: http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/03D1/INDEX.htm. 14 Howard Kurtz, ‘A Battle Plan for the ’03 Campaign,’ in: Washington Accessed on 12 October 2004 at 1045 hrs. Post (20 January 2003), p. D 1. 5 Hugh Sidey, Portraits of the President: Power and Personality in the 15 Danny Schechter, Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception, How the Oval Office. Special Collector’s Edition. Des Moines: TIME Books, Media Failed to Cover the War on Iraq. New York: Prometheus Books, (2004), p. 93. (2003), p. 19. 6 Joe Strupp, 28 April 2003, ‘Newspapers Pull Reporters From Embed 16 Tammy L. Miracle, p. 42. Slots,’ in: Editor & Publisher. Available: http://editorandpublisher.com/ 17 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1875080. Accessed on Public Affairs in Joint Operations. Washington, DC: Department of 05 August 2004 at 13.09 hrs. Defense, (May 1997), p. II-1. 7 Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Langu- 18 Judson Conner, Meeting the Press: A Media Guide for the Defense age. New Revised Edition. New York: Gramercy Books, (1996), p. 890. Manager. Fort Lesley J. McNair – Washington DC: National Defense 8 Marc Kusnetz (et al.), Operation Iraqi Freedom. Kansas City, MI University, (1993), p.13. (USA): Andrews Mc Meel Publishing, (2003), p. viii. 19 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-61, pp. II-1 – II-2.

296 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 20 Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding 47 Robert Kaplan, ‘The Media and the Military: American Reporters Media during Possible Future Operations / Deployments in U.S. Cen- Would Shudder to Think that They Harbor Class Prejudice – But They tral Command’s (CENTCOM )Area of Responsibility. Unclassified. Do,’ in: Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 294, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 38-40. Washington, DC, (10 February 2003). 48 Tom Bryant, Re: Monograph Prospectus briefing on Media in OIF, 21 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for response on a personal electronic mail, Fort Leavenworth, KS (USA): Information Operations. Washington, DC, (October 1998), p. GL-9. Army Knowledge Online, (23 August 2004 at 09.52 hrs.). 22 William Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot 49 Christopher Bollyn, ‘Mainstream Media’s Sanitized War Coverage Be Trusted to Cover a War. Westport (USA): Praeger Publisher, (1993): Helps Mask Carnage.’ In: American Free Press. Available: http//www. p. x. americanfreepress.net. Accessed on 03 November 2004 at 18.45 hrs. 23 Barry Willey, p. 14. 50 The Fact Index Website, 2003 Invasion of Iraq Media Coverage. Avail- 24 Doug Halonen,‘The Pentagon Experiment: Spokesperson Clarke able: http://factindex.com /2/20/2003_invasion_of_iraq_media_cover Documents Embed Process,’ in: Television Week. (19 May 2003), p. 18. age.html. Accessed on 03 November 2004 at 18.45 hrs. 25 Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel. The Elements of Journalism: What 51 Stephen Ives: Reporting America at War. DVD. Washington, DC: News People Should Know and the Public Should Expect. New York: Public Broadcasting Services, Insignia Films, Inc. and WETA Washing- Three River Press, (2001), p. 11-12, 95-96, 114-115, 135, and 164. ton, DC, (2003). 26 Carl Jensen, ‘What Happened to Good Old-Fashioned Muckraking?’ 52 Verne Gay, ‘Back from the Front: A Year Later.’ In: Newsday.com. In: Kristina Borjesson, Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose Available: http://www.newsday.com/features/printedition. Accessed on the Myth of a Free Press. New York: Prometheus Books, (2002), p. 343. 09 August 2004 at 21.15 hrs. 27 Eric Alterman, What Liberal Media? The Truth About Bias and the 53 Ibid. News. New York: Basic Books, (2003), pp. 23-25. 54 Robert Leonard, p. 56. 28 Glenn Starnes, pp. 6-7. 55 Peter Johnston, ‘For Cable News, Iraq War is a Clear Victory,’ in: USA 29 Thomas Ricks, ‘Rumsfeld, Myers Again Criticize War Coverage: Today. Available: http://usatoday.com.life/world/iraq/2003-04-08- Ex-Military Officers Are Singled Out,’ in: Washington Post, (18 April cable-news-main_x.htm. Accessed on 03 November 2003 at 18.25 hrs. 2003), p. 1. 56 Research Institute, U.S Daily Newspaper Readership during the War 30 Tommy Franks, American Soldier. New York: Regan Books / Harper- with Ira. Available: http://readership.org/consumers/data/FINAL_ Collins, (2004), p. 411. war_study.pdf. Accessed on 04 November 2004 at 19.15 hrs. 31 Robert Leonard, ‘Battlefield Leader: Tommy Franks Hyperwar,’ in: 57 Project for Excellence in Journalism, Embedded Reporters: What Are Armchair General. (July 2004), p. 56. Americans Getting? Available: www.journalism.org. Accessed on 11 32 John Laurence, ‘Embedding: A Military View,’ in: Columbia Journa- July 2004 at 21.45 hrs. lism Review. Available: http://archives.cjr.org/year/03/2/webspecial.asp. 58 Pew Research Center for People and the Press, TV Combat Fatigue on Accessed on 05 August 2004 at 13.12 hrs. the Rise, But Embeds Viewed Favorable. Available: http//people-press. 33 Michael DeLong (with Noah Lukeman), Inside Centcom: The Un- org/reports/display.php3. Accessed on 5 August 2004 at 13.26 hrs. varnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington, 59 Ibid. DC: Regnery Publishing, (2004), pp. 104-105. 60 Pew Research Center for People and Press, War Coverage Praised, But 34 Gary Linger, ‘ABC News Poll: War and Media, Americans Favor Mili- Public Hungry for Other News. Available: http://people-press.org. tary Secrecy Over Press Freedom During Wartime,’ in: ABC News.com. Accessed on 05 August 2004 at 12.55 hrs. Available: http://abcnews.com. Accessed on 16 September 2004 at 61 Danny Schechter, p. 85. 16.35 hrs. 62 Ibid., p. 213. 35 Rafe Bartholomew, ‘Being a War Correspondent Isn’t What It Used to 63 U.K. Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: First Impressions. Lon- Be,’ in: Editor & Publisher. Available: http:www.editorandpublisher. don (UK): Director General Corporate Communication, (2003), p. 16. com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu. Accessed on 05 August 2004 64 Charles Groenhuijsen, Oorlog in Irak: Dagboek van Charles Groen- at 13.11 hrs. huijsen. Amsterdam: Balans Press, (2003), p. 92. 36 Verne Gay, ‘Back from the Front: A Year Later, TV’s Embedded 65 Ibid., pp. 106 and 119. Reporters Ponder the Merits of How They Covered the ‘Drive-by 66 Danny Schechter, pp. 273-276. War’,’ in: Newsday.com. Available at: http://newsday.com. Accessed on 67 Al Jazeera is a full Arab television network based in Qatar with an 09 September 2004 at 15.35 hrs. audience larger than 300 million people in more than twenty-two Arab 37 Jack Shafer, ‘Embeds and Unilaterals: The Press Dun Good in Iraq, But countries. Al Jazeera calls itself independent, but not all experts agree They Could Have Dun Better,’ in: Slate MSN. Available: http://slate. with that statement. msn.com/id/2082412. Accessed on 05 August 2004 at 12.59 hrs. 68 Freedom of Information Center, ‘Iraq: Al-Jazeera and Free Expression. 38 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Edited and translated in 1976 by Michael Shooting the messenger,’ in: Index of Censorship. Available: http:// Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University foi.missouri.edu/jourwarcoverage/iraqaljazeera.html. Accessed on 06 Press, (1984): p. 119. October 2004 at 15.00 hrs. 39 U.S. 1st Marine Division Lesson Learned . Available: http:www.global 69 Brookings Institute, Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq: security.org/military/ library/report/2003/1mardiv_brief.doc. Accessed Press Reports, Pentagon Rules, and Lessons for the Future. Available: on 09 August 2004 at 21.15 hrs. http://www.brookings.edu/comm/transcript.htm. Accessed on 16 Sep- 40 Marc Kusnetz (et al.), p. x. tember 2004 at 18.15 hrs. 41 Bing West and Ray Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st 70 Brookings Institution, one of Washington’s oldest think tanks, is an in- Marine Division. New York: Bantam Dell, (2003), pp. 226-227. dependent, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, analysis, and 42 Department of the Army, Headquarters, Field Manual 6-0: Command public education with an emphasis on economics, foreign policy, and Control. DRAG. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, governance, and metropolitan policy. (March 2001), pp. 1-15 and 1-16. 71 Brookings Institute. 43 Jack Shafer, ‘Embeds and Unilaterals.’ 72 Ibid. 44 Stockholm Syndrome describes the behavior of kidnap victims, who 73 However, it can also lead to a more negative image of the U.S. Armed become sympathetic to their captors because of a mechanism to deal Forces referring to the Fallujah incident in which the embedded NBC with fear and violence. reporter Kevin Sites filmed the shooting of a wounded insurgent by a 45 Michael Pfau (et al), ‘Embedding Journalists in Military Combat Units: U.S. Marine mid November 2004. Impact on Newspaper Story Frames and Tones,’ in: Journalism & Mass 74 Brookings Institute. Communication Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 1, (2004), p. 76. 46 Jack Shafer, ‘Embeds and Unilaterals.’

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 297