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Final Supplement Analysis for the Final DOE/EIS-0225-SA-06 June 2018 FINAL SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Production Office SA for the Pantex Plant SWEIS June 2018 SUMMARY The Pantex Plant (Pantex or Plant) is located in the Texas Panhandle, approximately 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas. Pantex is the primary site for the assembly of nuclear weapons for the nation’s stockpile and disassembly of nuclear weapons being retired from the stockpile. Pantex also evaluates, repairs, and retrofits nuclear weapons in the stockpile; provides interim storage for nuclear material; develops, fabricates, and tests chemical explosives and explosive components for nuclear weapons; and supports the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiatives. In November 1996, DOE issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225; DOE 1996a) (referred to as the Pantex Site-Wide EIS [or SWEIS]). The SWEIS assessed impacts on areas of the human and natural environment potentially affected by operations performed at Pantex. The SWEIS evaluated activities associated with ongoing operations, including onsite nuclear material storage, transportation of nuclear material to an alternate site for interim storage, and transportation of classified components between Pantex and other sites occurring over a period of approximately 10 years, from 1996 through 2006. DOE published its Record of Decision (ROD) for the SWEIS in the Federal Register (FR) on January 27, 1997 (62 FR 3880), announcing its decision to implement the Preferred Alternative as follows: “(1) continuing nuclear weapon operations involving assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons at the Pantex Plant; (2) implementing facility projects, including upgrades and construction consistent with conducting these operations; and (3) continuing to provide interim pit storage at the Pantex Plant and increasing the storage level from 12,000 to 20,000 pits.” DOE’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) implementing regulations at Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1021.330(d) require evaluation of a SWEIS at least every five years through preparation of a Supplement Analysis (SA) as provided in 10 CFR 1021.314. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, has prepared this SA in accordance with these requirements. This SA compares the information presented in the SWEIS with continued operations at Pantex, including any changes in programs/operations/impacts that would occur through approximately 2023. The purpose of this SA is to determine whether continued operations at Pantex (including any changes) constitute a substantial change that is relevant to environmental concerns, or if there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on continued operations at Pantex that were analyzed in the SWEIS. Based on this SA, NNSA will determine whether the existing SWEIS remains adequate, if a new SWEIS is warranted, or if the existing SWEIS should be supplemented. The analysis in this SA indicates that continued operations at Pantex, including changes that are expected to occur through approximately 2023, would be similar in nature and would not be expected to differ significantly from those NNSA identified and analyzed in the SWEIS. After comparing the analysis of impacts associated with the changes identified in this SA with the impacts analyzed in the SWEIS, NNSA has determined that there are no significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns that warrant preparation of a supplemental or new environmental impact statement (EIS). Based on the analysis in this SA, continued operations at Pantex are adequately supported by the existing SWEIS and other existing NEPA documentation, and no further supplementing documentation is required. Stand- alone NEPA documents for any future projects would be prepared as needed and tiered to the SWEIS. S-1 SA for the Pantex Plant SWEIS June 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background .................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Purpose of and Need for the Supplemental Analysis ..................................................................... 4 1.3 Scope of the SA .............................................................................................................................. 4 1.4 Relevant National Environmental Policy Act Documents ............................................................. 5 2. CHANGES SINCE PREPARATION OF THE SWEIS AND THE 2013 SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Pantex Site Mission and Facility Changes ................................................................................... 12 2.1.1 Weapon Assembly/Disassembly ............................................................................................. 14 2.1.2 Nuclear Materials Management .............................................................................................. 16 2.1.3 High Explosives ...................................................................................................................... 17 2.1.4 Enabling Infrastructure ............................................................................................................ 19 2.2 Operating Basis and Operational Changes ................................................................................... 20 2.3 Environmental Changes ............................................................................................................... 22 2.3.1 Land Resources ....................................................................................................................... 21 2.3.2 Visual Resources ..................................................................................................................... 23 2.3.3 Geology and Soils ................................................................................................................... 23 2.3.4 Water Resources ...................................................................................................................... 25 2.3.5 Air Quality ............................................................................................................................... 28 2.3.6 Acoustics ................................................................................................................................. 30 2.3.7 Biotic Resources ...................................................................................................................... 31 2.3.8 Cultural Resources .................................................................................................................. 36 2.3.9 Socioeconomics and Environmental Justice ........................................................................... 37 2.3.10 Infrastructure ........................................................................................................................... 40 2.3.11 Transportation ......................................................................................................................... 45 2.3.12 Waste Management ................................................................................................................. 45 2.3.13 Human Health and Safety ........................................................................................................ 48 2.3.14 Accidents ................................................................................................................................. 48 2.3.15 Intentional Destructive Acts .................................................................................................... 49 2.4 Changes in NNSA’s Approach to NEPA Analyses ..................................................................... 50 3. COMPARISON OF IMPACTS ..................................................................................................... 51 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 51 4. CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ............................................................................................................ 63 4.1 Cumulative Actions Previously Considered in the SWEIS .......................................................... 63 4.2 New Activities Considered for Cumulative Impacts in this SA ................................................... 63 4.3 Potential Cumulative Impacts ...................................................................................................... 64 5. CONCLUSION AND DETERMINATION .................................................................................. 66 6. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 67 APPENDIX A: NEPA Actions Considered in this SA ........................................................................ A-1 i SA for the Pantex Plant
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