DOCSLIB.ORG

FIRST SECTION CASE of TAGAYEVA and OTHERS V. RUSSIA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
FIRST SECTION CASE of TAGAYEVA and OTHERS V. RUSSIA FIRST SECTION CASE OF TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Application no. 26562/07 and 6 other applications – see list appended) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 13 April 2017 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 1 Table of Contents PROCEDURE .......................................................................................................... 4 THE FACTS ............................................................................................................. 5 I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ...................................................... 5 A. General information ....................................................................................... 5 B. The events of 1 to 4 September 2004 ............................................................ 6 1. Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004 ................................. 6 2. Hostage-taking ..................................................................................................... 7 3. Events of 1 to 2 September 2004 ......................................................................... 9 4. Storming and rescue operation .......................................................................... 14 5. Events of 4 September 2004, identification of bodies and burials .................... 17 6. Assuming responsibility for the terrorist act ...................................................... 18 C. Criminal investigations ................................................................................ 19 1. Criminal investigation no. 20/849 ..................................................................... 19 2. Criminal investigation in respect of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev ............................... 49 3. Criminal proceedings against police officers ..................................................... 70 D. Civil proceedings brought by the victims .................................................... 72 1. First group of claimants ..................................................................................... 72 2. Second group of claimants ................................................................................. 73 E. Parliamentary inquiries ................................................................................ 73 1. Report prepared by the North Ossetian Parliament ........................................... 73 2. The Federal Assembly report ............................................................................. 80 F. Other relevant developments........................................................................ 86 1. Humanitarian relief ............................................................................................ 86 2. Other important public and media reactions ...................................................... 87 3. Victims’ organisations ....................................................................................... 88 G. Expert reports submitted by the applicants after the admissibility decision ....................................................................................................... 89 1. Expert report on counter-terrorism .................................................................... 89 2. Expert report on medical (forensic) aspects of the operation ............................ 94 II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE .................................... 96 A. Regulation of anti-terrorist operations and the use of force ........................ 96 1. Suppression of Terrorism Act and Criminal Code ............................................ 96 2. Field Manuals .................................................................................................... 98 B. Amnesty Act ................................................................................................. 99 III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ...................... 99 A. Use of force by law-enforcement officials ................................................... 99 B. International humanitarian law .................................................................. 101 2 TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT THE LAW ............................................................................................................ 103 I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES ............................................................................... 103 II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION (ALL APPLICANTS) ....................................................... 104 A. Article 2 - positive obligation to prevent threat to life .............................. 104 1. The parties’ submissions .................................................................................. 104 2. The Court’s assessment ................................................................................... 106 B. Procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention .......................... 110 1. The parties’ submissions .................................................................................. 110 2. The Court’s assessment ................................................................................... 111 III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION (APPLICATIONS Nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11, 37096/11 AND 14755/08) .............................................................. 124 A. Planning and control of the operation ....................................................... 124 1. The parties’ submissions .................................................................................. 124 2. The Court’s assessment ................................................................................... 129 B. Use of lethal force ...................................................................................... 133 1. The parties’ submissions .................................................................................. 133 2. The Court’s assessment ................................................................................... 136 IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION (ALL APPLICANTS) ....................................................... 144 A. The parties’ submissions ........................................................................... 145 1. The applicants .................................................................................................. 145 2. The Government .............................................................................................. 145 B. The Court’s assessment ............................................................................. 146 1. General principles established in the Court’s case-law ................................... 146 2. Application of the above principles in the present case ................................... 148 V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION ............................................................................................. 151 A. Non-monetary measures ............................................................................ 151 B. Damage ...................................................................................................... 154 1. The first group of applicants ............................................................................ 154 2. The second group of applicants ....................................................................... 154 3. The Government .............................................................................................. 154 4. The Court’s assessment ................................................................................... 155 C. Costs and expenses .................................................................................... 155 1. The first group of applicants ............................................................................ 155 2. The second group of applicants ....................................................................... 156 3. The Government .............................................................................................. 157 4. The Court ......................................................................................................... 157 TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 3 D. Default interest .......................................................................................... 158 4 TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT In the case of Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Khanlar Hajiyev, Julia Laffranque, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Erik Møse, Dmitry Dedov, judges, and Abel Campos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2014, 9 January 2017 and on 15 March 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in seven applications (see Appendix for details) lodged between 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011 against the Russian Federation with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 447 Russian nationals. One group of applicants (“the first group of applicants”, applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11) were represented by Mr Kirill Koroteyev, a lawyer of EHRAC/Memorial Human Rights Centre, an NGO with offices in Moscow and London, assisted by
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Chechen Mobilization in Violent Conflict
    Master’s Thesis 2016 30 ECTS Norwegian University of Life Sciences Faculty Social Sciences Department of International Environment and Development Studies The Chechen Mobilization in Violent Conflict Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich Master of Science in International Relations THESIS CREDIT The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments. The Noragric Master thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”, “International Development Studies” and “International Relations”. The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric. © Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich, May 2016 [email protected] Noragric Department of International Environment and Development Studies P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00 Internet: https://www.nmbu.no/om/fakulteter/samvit/institutter/noragric i DECLARATION I, Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. targeted organizations and senior leadership both Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these institutionally and politically. agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the Russian Law Enforcement and Internal government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Security Agencies and Heads now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in (as of September 2020) the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the x Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition x Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. x Interior Troops (VV) sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. x Kadyrovtsy Overview and Context Federal Security Service (FSB): Alexander Bortnikov
    [Show full text]
  • War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: a Case for Distinction
    The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction SVANTE E. CORNELL More than any other conflict, Chechnya epitomizes the old saying that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Since the first Chechen war began in 1994, the Russian government has portrayed the war as one against ban- dits and Islamic fundamentalists. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the label changed-now Chechens are referred to simply as "terrorists." Western states have for the most part thus far refrained from accepting the Russian position at face value, seeing the conflict primarily as an ethnic war. While recognizing Russia's territorial integrity, Western and Islamic states see the Chechen rebels as more or less legitimate representatives of the Chechen people, considering that the current Chechen president, Asian Maskhadov, was elected in elections deemed free and fair by international observers in 1997. Moreover, the international commu- nity has condemned the Russian military's massive human rights violations in the prosecution of the war. That said, during the course of the second war, which began in October 1999 and rages to this day, there has been an increasing concern with regard to the radicalization of parts of the Chechen resistance movement and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East. The attacks of September 11 introduced a new paradigm into world politics, and Chechnya has since been one of the regions most affected by the increased focus on terrorism. Indeed, it did not take long after 9/11 for the Russian government to draw comparisons between the terrorist attacks on the United States and the situa- tion in Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Shifting Faces of Terror After 9/11: Framing the Terrorist Threat
    SHIFTING FACES OF TERROR AFTER 9/11: FRAMING THE TERRORIST THREAT A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Elena Pokalova Dissertation written by Elena Pokalova B.A., Ural State Pedagogical University, 2002 M.A., Kent State University, 2010 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2011 Approved by Andrew Barnes, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Landon Hancock, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Steven Hook, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Karl C. Kaltenthaler, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Accepted by Steven Hook, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Political Science John R.D. Stalvey, Ph.D., Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................iii LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ v LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................ vii Note on Transliteration ....................................................................................................viii List of Frequently Used Abbreviations.............................................................................. ix 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Radical Islam in Chechnya
    RADICAL ISLAM IN CHECHNYA Mr. Artem Kroupenev (Researcher, ICT) 23/1/2009 ABSTRACT The permeation of radical Islam in Chechnya has served a multi-faceted function. It has been the vehicle of separatist resistance, a platform of political strife and conflict, a source of funding and external support and a unifying ideological principle that, in its various interpretations, has brought both hope and destruction for the Chechen society. More often than not, Islam served as a political-ideological tool that brought the promise of legitimacy and was the main source of contention between the Chechen political factions. For 21st century Russia, radical Islam in Chechnya provided a different type of challenge – one that turned into an opportunity for justifying its counter-terrorist operations in the Caucasus. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 Radical Islam in Chechnya Modern Origins of Chechen Islamization Since 1989, radical Islam has gradually permeated the fabric of Chechnya’s socio-political environment. This process was aided by internal changes in the Soviet Union – the disintegration of the communist ideology and its supporting governmental structure; and the course of Perestroika, which allowed various factions to freely propagate their moral and religious values. The resulting ideological and political vacuum in Chechnya was rapidly filled by radical Islam. From the onset of its post-Soviet attempts to achieve independence, the new secular government in Chechnya took steps that indicated an aspiration to restore Islamic traditions. In this regard, during his initiation as Chechen president on November 9, 1991, retired Lieutenant-General of Soviet Air-Forces, Djohar Dudayev was sworn in holding a Koran in front of numerous representatives of Islamic religious institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Security Service (Russia) from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Jump To: Navigation, Search This Article May Need to Be
    Federal Security Service (Russia) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article may need to be rewritten entirely to comply with Wikipedia's quality standards. You can help. The discussion page may contain suggestions. (February 2013) The neutrality of this article is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (February 2013) Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation 'Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации' Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii Common name Federal Security Service Abbreviation FSB (ФСБ) Emblem of the Federal Security Service Agency overview Formed 12 April, 1995 Preceding agency KGB Employees around 200,000–300,000[1] Legal personality Governmental: Government agency Jurisdictional structure Federal agency Russia General nature Federal law enforcement Civilian agency Operational structure Headquarters Lubyanka Square, Moscow, Russia Website www.fsb.ru The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) (Russian: ФСБ, Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации; Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) is the main domestic security agency of the Russian Federation and the main successor agency of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). Its main responsibilities are counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism, and surveillance. Its headquarters are on Lubyanka Square, downtown Moscow. The direct predecessor of the FSB was the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). On 12 April 1995, President Boris Yeltsin signed a law ordering a reorganisation of the FSK, which resulted in the creation of the FSB. In 2003, the FSB's responsibilities were widened with the integration of the Border Guard Service and a major part of the abolished Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI).
    [Show full text]
  • Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare
    November 2019 Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare Candace Rondeaux Last edited on November 05, 2019 at 11:41 a.m. EST Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Peter Bergen and It is worth noting that some of the best research Daniel Rothenberg, co-directors of the New America/ produced about the Wagner Group and Russian Arizona State University Future of War project for private military security contractors has been their support throughout the production of this paper. produced by anonymous open source intelligence A deep debt of gratitude is owed to David Sterman researchers, human rights activists and investigative for applying his sharp editorial eye to the text and journalists in Ukraine, Russia, Syria, and elsewhere. sharing his analytical intuition throughout the This paper would not be what it is without their brave research for this report. I also benefited greatly efforts to hold power to account and the extensive Sergey Sukhankin’s research on Russian military advice and help of so many people, many of whom affairs and the Wagner Group and his direct could not be named here due to security concerns. contributions to the historical sections of this report All errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, the covering Moscow’s Cold War strategy in the Middle author’s alone. East elevated the analysis greatly. Navvar Saban’s research on private security contractors and pro- Assad militias likewise helped answer critical questions about Russia’s influence over local proxy forces in Syria. Christopher Miller, Mike Eckel, and many other long-time Russia hands who have spent time living and covering the Kremlin and the conflict in Ukraine were essential sounding boards and critical pillars of support throughout.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Analytical Digest No 5
    No. 5 29 August 2006 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.russlandanalysen.de BESLAN – TWO YEARS AFTER ■ ANALYSIS Looking Back at Beslan. Alexander Cherkasov, Moscow 2 ■ ANALYSIS Th e North Caucasus: Taking stock two years after Beslan. Jeronim Perovic, Zurich 4 ■ TABLES AND DIAGRAMS Th e North Caucasus and the Southern Federal District: Statistics and Facts 9 ■ OPINION SURVEY Th e North Caucasus in Russian Eyes 13 ■ CHRONOLOGY Terror-related incidents in the North Caucasus September 2004 – August 2006 14 Research Centre for East CSS Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen An ETH Center Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 05/06 ddigestigest Analysis Looking Back at Beslan Alexander Cherkasov, Moscow Summary Two years after the Beslan tragedy, the authorities have yet to publish a fi nal report on what took place there. Most importantly, they have refused to examine the terrorist attack within the larger context of the Chechen war. Th ey have also blamed all the deaths on the terrorists, preventing a thorough investigation examining the role of the Russian security forces and the responsibilities of the authorities. Such a study would make possible a more nuanced understanding of what happened at Beslan. Hostage-taking tragedies: Moscow’s terrorists prepare and carry out their plans? Which questionable approach administrative and law enforcement offi cials were uring the course of the Chechen wars over the responsible for this?” Th ose questions are suitable for Dlast 12 years, Beslan was the fourth large-scale prosecutors. In the wider sense, we need to address terrorist act with the taking of hostages in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Violence and Poverty in Chechnya: a Mini Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative
    Armed violence and poverty in Chechnya: a mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Item Type Report Authors Peimani, Hooman Citation Peimani, H. (2004). Armed violence and poverty in Chechnya: a mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative. Bradford, Centre of International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. AVPI CAse Studies. Rights © 2004 University of Bradford. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/uk). Download date 24/09/2021 19:55:07 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/993 Armed violence and poverty in Chechnya A mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative November 2004 Hooman Peimani Centre for International Cooperation and Security Department of Peace Studies Armed violence and poverty in Chechnya, Peimani, November 2004 The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government agencies.
    [Show full text]
  • Central Asia-Caucasus
    Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 9 NO. 12 13 JUNE 2007 Searchable Archives with over 1,000 articles at http://www.cacianalyst.org FEATURE ARTICLE FIELD REPORTS: FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE CHECHEN ENDGAME FOR THE CASPIAN STURGEON RESISTANCE: A RE-APPRAISAL Christopher Pala Cerwyn Moore U.S. URGES KYRGYZSTAN TO CONTINUE ANALYTICAL ARTICLES BILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST TER- RORISM PUTIN’S GABALA GAMBIT: MORE THAN Erica Marat MISSILES Stephen Blank NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV OFFERS UP HIS SON-IN-LAW TO JUSTICE, SEEKS THE GABALA GAMBIT AND PUBLIC FAVOR AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICS Farkhad Sharip Richard Weitz REMITTANCES AND TAJIKISTAN’S BERDIMUKHAMMEDOV BASES PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT TURKMEN-KAZAKH RELATIONS ON Sergey Medea ‘PRAGMATISM’ Chemen Durdiyeva NEWS DIGEST Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 9 NO. 12 13 JUNE 2007 Contents Feature Article FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE CHECHEN RESISTANCE: A RE-APPRAISAL 3 Cerwyn Moore Analytical Articles PUTIN’S GABALA GAMBIT: MORE THAN MISSILES 7 Stephen Blank THE GABALA GAMBIT AND AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICS 10 Richard Weitz BERDIMUKHAMMEDOV BASES TURKMEN-KAZAKH RELATIONS ON ‘PRAGMATISM’ 13 Chemen Durdiyeva Field Reports ENDGAME FOR THE CASPIAN STURGEON 16 Christopher Pala U.S. URGES KYRGYZSTAN TO CONTINUE BILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM 17 Erica Marat NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV OFFERS UP HIS SON-IN-LAW TO JUSTICE, SEEKS PUBLIC FAVOR 19 Farkhad Sharip REMITTANCES AND TAJIKISTAN’S PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 20 Sergey Medea News Digest 22 THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST Editor Svante E. Cornell Assistant Editor, News Digest Alima Bissenova Chairman, Editorial Board S. Frederick Starr The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English language global Web journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing the Central Asia-Caucasus region.
    [Show full text]
  • THE LONG SHADOW of ―NORD OST‖ by David Satter
    November 2012 THE LONG SHADOW OF ―NORD OST‖ By David Satter David Satter, an FPRI senior fellow, is the author of It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway (Yale), which will be out in paperback in January and the director of ―Age of Delirium,‖ a documentary film based on his book of the same name. Ten years after the worst terrorist act in Moscow history, the seizure on October 22, 2002 of 979 hostages in the Theatre on Dubrovka during the musical ―Nord-Ost,‖ mystery still shrouds the role of the Russian authorities in the crisis. In the end, 129 hostages are known to have died when Russian forces flooded the theater with gas on the morning of October 26 and then stormed the building. But the real number of dead may have been higher; 75 persons believed to have been in the building were unaccounted for. The organizers of the storm received ―Hero of Russia‖ awards and the day after the theater was ―liberated,‖ Putin invited the commandos from the Alpha and Vympel units that conducted the operation to a reception in the Kremlin. Survivors of the siege and relatives of the victims, however, have long insisted that the Putin regime was culpable in the hostages’ deaths for recklessly mounting a lethal attack without provision for the rescue and medical treatment of the hostages. The theater was seized by 40 terrorists, including 19 female suicide bombers who had bombs strapped around their waists. They quickly attached dozens of other bombs to the building’s main supports.
    [Show full text]
  • Full Report: Russia and Disinformation
    MARCH 2019 RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS FULL REPORT Dr Cerwyn Moore, University of Birmingham How does Russian state disinformation operate in the Caucasus region? This report considers three different cases of disinformation deployment in the Caucasus region to highlight the dynamics of Russian state influence, both domestically in the Russian Federation’s North Caucasus region as well as in Georgia, just across the Russian border in the South Caucasus. This report is part of a series on disinformation to come out of the Actors and Narratives programme. The other three reports in the Russia and Disinformation series: 'The Case of Ukraine', 'Maskirovka' , and 'Institutions and Actors' can be found at www.crestresearch.ac.uk/tag/russia- disinformation/ About CREST The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is a national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating security threats. It is an independent centre, commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and funded in part by the UK security and intelligence agencies (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1). www.crestresearch.ac.uk ©2019 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................4 DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA AND THE RISE OF TECH ..............................................5 BESLAN .......................................................................................................................................................6
    [Show full text]