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THE COCO RIVER PATROL AND THE SMALL WARS MANUAL A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University by Captain Jon T. Hoffman, USMC * * * * * The Ohio State University 1 989 Master's Examination Committee: Approved by Ailan R. Millett ~,6(.~ Hao Chang Adviser Department of History Williamson Murray Copyright by Jon Thomas Hoff man 1 989 VITA September 23, 1955 . Born - Fremont, Ohio 1 9 7 8 • • • • • • • • B.A., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 1979-1981 School of Law and Graduate School, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 1981-1982 The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course, Quantico, Virginia 1982-1988 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, U.S. Marine Corps FIELD OF STUDY Major Field: U.S. Military History ii TABLE OF CONTENTS VITA ii LIST OF FIGURES iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER PAGE I. BLAZING THE TRAIL ••••• 5 II. CLEARING THE EASTERN AREA • 1 5 III. INTO THE LION'S DEN .• 38 IV. CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN • 64 V. THE SMALL WARS MANUAL • 90 CONCLUSIONS • • • • . • • • 99 NOTES • • • • 103 BIBLIOGRAPHY 11 3 iii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES PAGE 1 • Nicaragua 3 2. The Coco River Area • 4 3. The Battle of Ililiquas • . 50 4. The Poteca Area • • • • 63 iv INTRODUCTION The Marine Corps published the first Small Wars Manual in 1935 as a compilation of its experience and doctrine in what is now called "low-intensity conflict." The Marines revised and reprinted the Manual in 1940, but the World War II emphasis on large-scale amphibious assaults soon shunted the work out of mount-out boxes and into museums. In recent years, policy-makers, defense analysts, and military leaders have renewed their interest in the field of low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency warfare. As a result, the Corps has rescued the Small Wars Manual from the dustbin. The Commandant has praised it, and other officers have described it in glowing terms. According to one writer, the Manual "is considered by many to be the most definitive official military document around today. 111 In their rush to learn from this "rich heritage," many analysts have failed to evaluate the Manual's background and origins. In an introduction to a recent reprint of the Manual, Ronald Schaffer identified Major Harold Utley as a primary 2 force behind the original edition. In fact, the Marine officer developed much of the document himself, adapting 1 2 drafts of his earlier manuscripts on the subject. His experience in small wars included service in the Haitian gendarmerie in the period following the First World War, and duty as the commanding officer of the Eastern Area of Nicaragua during the American intervention there in the late 1920's and early 1930's. In the course of the latter campaign, he developed a close relationship with a subordinate, Captain Merritt A. Edson. This officer's operations in the Coco River basin constituted the bulk of all combat actions in Utley's Nicaraguan domain. This study will recount the story of Edson's three patrols up the Coco River and then detail the links between those operations and the Small Wars Manual. Edson's small­ scale activities, minor skirmishes, and demanding field experiences played a major role in the development of Marine Corps policy regarding small wars. An evaluation of that process will thus yield some valuable insights into the applicability of the Manual to modern counterinsurgency campaigns. .3 /"'\ I .. ., __ ,_ .. _/J ' f • Ocota,Z '\ I ,- ...' } iYlnote~"'• l.a<e.!f4J'l~u.t(, ~/Ydlld_fZl<t- Nortli faciflc (}ctan ' ,,,- .......... ... __ ,. - ... \ I ........ , _.,, Figure 1. Nicaragua ~Jo f ~fU'A D~v le-RR1roRY CA!£ G~lfCiAS 7/, ~""' ~jO 1'-¥'°1p41 "..;..~ 'J ~,l'··t- or ...,\l-;{ •~,rt-: t.:"-v«: '1~.,&S' ..."-· 1'111sr,.,,.,-t5 • .... \\~ ~ ;,<.. eK UA8UL 'to~ • io"' •"Bo,e@,, t-.J. ; ~ ...~ I ~ • GA111<080 Figure 2. The Coco River area. Adapted from Marine Corps Gazette (August 1936)p.19. .{::" CHAPTER I BLAZING THE TRAIL The United States Marine Corps had considerable expe­ rience in Nicaragua by the late 1920's. The first ship's detachment had landed in that unstable country in 1853, and subsequent missions to protect American lives and prop­ erty became routine. The largest interventions occurred in 1910 and 1912, spearheaded by Major Smedley Butler's battalion from Panama. A substantial legation guard served as a permanent presence from that time forward. These efforts brought some measure of political stability to Nicaragua, but did nothing to alleviate the underlying hostility between the Liberal and Conservative camps. Diplomatic negotiations in 1924 seemed to break the cycle of instability. The opposing parties formed a coali­ tion government and an American-supervised constabulary. In turn, the U.S. withdrew the embassy force, which had become a hated symbol to Nicaraguan nationalists. But, the situation soon deteriorated; a Conservative element turned its erstwhile partners out of the government, and the Liberals began a revolt with the support of Mexican arms and money. In May 1927, the U.S brokered a peace 5 6 agreement, backed by a Marine regiment and an air squadron. Most of the revolutionaries turned in their arms and awaited the elections scheduled for the following year. One Liberal leader refused to endorse the Tipitapa accord. Augusto Cesar Sandino had "imbibed a heady draught of Central American nationalism along with the aperatif of 3 soc1a. 1 re f orm II d ur1ng. a 1 eng th y s t ay in. Mex1co. He took his small band of armed men into the difficult country-side of Nueva Segovia, pillaged a mine and a town, and gathered recruits with nationalistic propaganda and promises of loot. In July he led a force of several hundred men against the Marine and constabulary garrison at Ocotal. The defenders and their aerial reinforcements inflicted numerous casual- ties and drove Sandino out of town. Thereafter, the rebel leader learned to avoid conventional confrontations with his better-armed opponents: "Our army is well prepared and convinced at the same time that our victory does not consist in staying at such and such position but to keep latent our armed protest against the invaders. 114 Marine forces, increased to brigade strength, pushed into Nueva Segovia and drove the rebel band out of its stronghold. Rumors and intelligence assessments indicated 5 that Sandino would move into eastern Nicaragua. This sparsely populated region comprised two-thirds of the nation, from the central highlands to the Caribbean coast. It contained the bulk of foreign investment in the country, 7 mainly lumbering, mining, and plantation operations. A small railroad and nine rivers carried products to the handful of tiny coastal towns which served as commercial centers. One of the major transportation arteries was the Coco River, which had its headwaters in the highlands and flowed hundreds of miles eastward into the Caribbean. Roads did not exist; overland traffic moved by foot or mule on rough jungle trails. Much of the population con- sisted of Miskita Indians and other tribes. The few Nicaraguans of Spanish and mestizo descent were strongly Liberal and had supported earlier rebellions against Conservative rule. Here, Sandino hoped to garner support, strike at lucrative economic targets, and avoid the govern- men t ' s main. f orces. 6 Brigade headquarters reacted by reinforcing the single company that garrisoned the coastal towns. Major Utley assumed command of the newly-formed Eastern Area on 22 January 1928. He had no maps, no orders, few troops, and an area of responsibility loosely defined as "the east coast of Nicaragua and such territory inland as can be controlled by troops supplied from the east coast of Nicaragua. 117 He established his headquarters, which con- sisted of himself and a bugler, at Puerto Cabezas on 24 February. Utley quickly formulated a strategy: My plan is to deny the bandits free territory to the limit of my ability to supply posts, to protect American interests, and to guard the line of the [Coco] as far up as Bocay • . • By keeping up patrolling 8 (aerial and ground), between posts, and in the areas covered, it is believed that the mission can be accomplished, and territory, supplies, and re-enforce­ ments denied to the bandits. 8 The head of naval forces in Nicaragua, known as Commander Special Service Squadron (COMSPERON), contributed his ship's detachments to the reinforcement of the Eastern Area. Among the first to land was Edson, a newly-promoted captain in charge of the USS Denver's Marines. He and his 56 men went ashore at Puerto Cabezas on 19 February. Writing years after the campaign was over, Edson claimed that he realized the strategic importance of the Coco River when he looked at a map while still on the Denver. The waterway served as a supply channel running into the rebel- dominated interior, as well as an escape route if government forces from the west coast pursued the guerrilla bands into their lair. The Marine officer devised a three-part operation to reconnoiter the river, garrison it in order to deny it to the bandits, and send a combat patrol into the heart of Sandino's territory. He discussed these possibilities with Major Utley as the two sailed north 9 from Panama in January. The Area commander ordered Edson to begin reconnaisance patrols in late February. Two small mounted detachments went into the interior that week. On 7 March, Edson and five of his men sailed north to Cape Gracias, where they hired a boat, a guide, and three native crewmen for a trip up the Coco River. Muller, an American contractor who 9 lived along the river, volunteered to join the effort as an extra guide.

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