THE COCO RIVER PATROL

AND

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the degree Master of Arts in the

Graduate School of the Ohio State University

by

Captain Jon T. Hoffman, USMC

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1 989

Master's Examination Committee: Approved by

Ailan R. Millett ~,6(.~ Hao Chang Adviser Department of History Williamson Murray Copyright by

Jon Thomas Hoff man

1 989 VITA

September 23, 1955 . Born - Fremont, Ohio

1 9 7 8 • • • • • • • • B.A., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

1979-1981 School of Law and Graduate School, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

1981-1982 The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course, Quantico, Virginia

1982-1988 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, U.S. Marine Corps

FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: U.S. Military History

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

VITA ii

LIST OF FIGURES iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER PAGE

I. BLAZING THE TRAIL ••••• 5

II. CLEARING THE EASTERN AREA • 1 5

III. INTO THE LION'S DEN .• 38

IV. CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN • 64

V. THE SMALL WARS MANUAL • 90

CONCLUSIONS • • • • . • • • 99

NOTES • • • • 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY 11 3

iii LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE

1 • Nicaragua 3

2. The Coco River Area • 4

3. The Battle of Ililiquas • . 50

4. The Poteca Area • • • • 63

iv INTRODUCTION

The Marine Corps published the first Small Wars Manual in 1935 as a compilation of its experience and doctrine in what is now called "low-intensity conflict." The Marines revised and reprinted the Manual in 1940, but the World

War II emphasis on large-scale amphibious assaults soon shunted the work out of mount-out boxes and into museums.

In recent years, policy-makers, defense analysts, and military leaders have renewed their interest in the field of low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency warfare.

As a result, the Corps has rescued the Small Wars Manual from the dustbin. The Commandant has praised it, and other officers have described it in glowing terms. According to one writer, the Manual "is considered by many to be the most definitive official military document around today. 111

In their rush to learn from this "rich heritage," many analysts have failed to evaluate the Manual's background and origins.

In an introduction to a recent reprint of the Manual,

Ronald Schaffer identified Major Harold Utley as a primary 2 force behind the original edition. In fact, the Marine officer developed much of the document himself, adapting

1 2 drafts of his earlier manuscripts on the subject. His experience in small wars included service in the Haitian gendarmerie in the period following the First World War, and duty as the commanding officer of the Eastern Area of Nicaragua during the American intervention there in the late 1920's and early 1930's. In the course of the latter campaign, he developed a close relationship with a subordinate, Captain Merritt A. Edson. This officer's operations in the Coco River basin constituted the bulk of all combat actions in Utley's Nicaraguan domain.

This study will recount the story of Edson's three patrols up the Coco River and then detail the links between those operations and the Small Wars Manual. Edson's small­ scale activities, minor skirmishes, and demanding field experiences played a major role in the development of Marine

Corps policy regarding small wars. An evaluation of that process will thus yield some valuable insights into the applicability of the Manual to modern counterinsurgency campaigns. .3

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Figure 2. The Coco River area. Adapted from Marine Corps Gazette (August 1936)p.19.

.{::" CHAPTER I

BLAZING THE TRAIL

The United States Marine Corps had considerable expe­ rience in Nicaragua by the late 1920's. The first ship's detachment had landed in that unstable country in 1853, and subsequent missions to protect American lives and prop­ erty became routine. The largest interventions occurred in 1910 and 1912, spearheaded by Major Smedley Butler's battalion from Panama. A substantial legation guard served as a permanent presence from that time forward. These efforts brought some measure of political stability to

Nicaragua, but did nothing to alleviate the underlying hostility between the Liberal and Conservative camps.

Diplomatic negotiations in 1924 seemed to break the cycle of instability. The opposing parties formed a coali­ tion government and an American-supervised constabulary.

In turn, the U.S. withdrew the embassy force, which had become a hated symbol to Nicaraguan nationalists. But, the situation soon deteriorated; a Conservative element turned its erstwhile partners out of the government, and the Liberals began a revolt with the support of Mexican arms and money. In May 1927, the U.S brokered a peace 5 6 agreement, backed by a Marine regiment and an air squadron.

Most of the revolutionaries turned in their arms and awaited the elections scheduled for the following year.

One Liberal leader refused to endorse the Tipitapa accord. Augusto Cesar Sandino had "imbibed a heady draught of Central American nationalism along with the aperatif of 3 soc1a. 1 re f orm II d ur1ng . a 1 eng th y s t ay in . Mex1co. . He took his small band of armed men into the difficult country-side of Nueva Segovia, pillaged a mine and a town, and gathered recruits with nationalistic propaganda and promises of loot.

In July he led a force of several hundred men against the

Marine and constabulary garrison at Ocotal. The defenders and their aerial reinforcements inflicted numerous casual- ties and drove Sandino out of town. Thereafter, the rebel leader learned to avoid conventional confrontations with his better-armed opponents: "Our army is well prepared and convinced at the same time that our victory does not consist in staying at such and such position but to keep latent our armed protest against the invaders. 114

Marine forces, increased to brigade strength, pushed into Nueva Segovia and drove the rebel band out of its stronghold. Rumors and intelligence assessments indicated 5 that Sandino would move into eastern Nicaragua. This sparsely populated region comprised two-thirds of the nation, from the central highlands to the Caribbean coast.

It contained the bulk of foreign investment in the country, 7 mainly lumbering, mining, and plantation operations. A small railroad and nine rivers carried products to the handful of tiny coastal towns which served as commercial centers. One of the major transportation arteries was the Coco River, which had its headwaters in the highlands and flowed hundreds of miles eastward into the Caribbean.

Roads did not exist; overland traffic moved by foot or mule on rough jungle trails. Much of the population con- sisted of Miskita Indians and other tribes. The few

Nicaraguans of Spanish and mestizo descent were strongly

Liberal and had supported earlier rebellions against

Conservative rule. Here, Sandino hoped to garner support, strike at lucrative economic targets, and avoid the govern- men t ' s main . f orces. 6

Brigade headquarters reacted by reinforcing the single company that garrisoned the coastal towns. Major Utley assumed command of the newly-formed Eastern Area on 22

January 1928. He had no maps, no orders, few troops, and an area of responsibility loosely defined as "the east coast of Nicaragua and such territory inland as can be controlled by troops supplied from the east coast of

Nicaragua. 117 He established his headquarters, which con- sisted of himself and a bugler, at Puerto Cabezas on 24

February. Utley quickly formulated a strategy:

My plan is to deny the bandits free territory to the limit of my ability to supply posts, to protect American interests, and to guard the line of the [Coco] as far up as Bocay • . • By keeping up patrolling 8 (aerial and ground), between posts, and in the areas covered, it is believed that the mission can be accomplished, and territory, supplies, and re-enforce­ ments denied to the bandits. 8

The head of naval forces in Nicaragua, known as

Commander Special Service Squadron (COMSPERON), contributed his ship's detachments to the reinforcement of the Eastern

Area. Among the first to land was Edson, a newly-promoted captain in charge of the USS Denver's Marines. He and his 56 men went ashore at Puerto Cabezas on 19 February.

Writing years after the campaign was over, Edson claimed that he realized the strategic importance of the Coco River when he looked at a map while still on the Denver. The waterway served as a supply channel running into the rebel- dominated interior, as well as an escape route if government forces from the west coast pursued the guerrilla bands into their lair. The Marine officer devised a three-part operation to reconnoiter the river, garrison it in order to deny it to the bandits, and send a combat patrol into the heart of Sandino's territory. He discussed these possibilities with Major Utley as the two sailed north 9 from Panama in January.

The Area commander ordered Edson to begin reconnaisance patrols in late February. Two small mounted detachments went into the interior that week. On 7 March, Edson and five of his men sailed north to Cape Gracias, where they hired a boat, a guide, and three native crewmen for a trip up the Coco River. Muller, an American contractor who 9 lived along the river, volunteered to join the effort as an extra guide. They hoped to gather information on the terrain, the enemy, and the local Indian population.

Another patrol went overland to Sacklin to serve as a message relay station between headquarters and the water­ borne team. The junior captain belittled the hazards of the upcoming operation in a letter to his wife: "Outside of the discomfort of living in the bush there will be no more to it than any other camping trip. 1110

Preparations for the patrol foreshadowed the logistic problems which would plague all future operations in this remote region. Since there were no quartermaster funds,

Edson had only his own last pay available for expenses.

Moreover, the natives had limited use for money, so he converted his dollars into silver coins and leaf tobacco.

The patrol's motor launch was a small, open craft powered by a converted Ford Model 1 T 1 engine (a conveyance familiar to modern Marines who have been to the Philippines and other tropical locales). Its top speed of ten miles per hour was often less than the river's current. The boat had barely enough room for the Marines and the crew; a native dug-out, lashed alongside, carried the provisions and fuel.

The patrol departed Cape Gracias the morning of 8

March. It moved well in the navigable lower river and made sixty miles before the motor broke down with a burned 10 out bearing. While they waited for parts to be brought up from the Cape, the Marines fought with the local insects and picked up their first lessons on life along the Coco:

Two men of the patrol made their first attempt at navigating a native dugout with a pole and paddle as they had seen the Indians do. They pushed out into the river, both paddling frantically, first on one side, then the other. The boat went round and round in circles until finally the current washed it ashore a mile or so down stream and the two men gave up the attempt and walked back. It was ludicrous enough but it was a fair example of what might be expected from men whose only experience with water cr~ft hf~ been as passengers in a ship's motor sailer.

Three days later, the engine repaired, the patrol moved another fifty miles up the river to Sacklin.

At this village, Edson met the overland patrol commanded by Sergeant Melvin Mosier. The Marine reported that his arrival had come as a surprise to the natives, while news of the boat unit had proceeded their landing.

Edson noted that the natives closely watched the river, the route of most traffic into the region. Their trails cut across the narrow neck of the numerous river bends, which allowed them to carry word of water traffic much faster than the speed of boats taking the long route against the current. "This lesson, too, was later used to good advantage." 1 2 The local government representative also informed them that Sandino had forty men in Sang Sang and more than one hundred and fifty soldiers further up river at Bocay. Edson discounted this report and determined to push his reconnaissance to the latter location. 11 It took one and a half days for the patrol to complete the next leg of the journey. It arrived at Waspuc around midday on 14 March after portaging a number of large rapids.

In addition to these delays, the men had to frequently wade next to the boats and pull them through the shallows created by the dry season. The continued soaking began to take its toll on shoes and feet alike.

The village, largest settlement in the area, consisted of seven frame houses and a store. The patrol halted there for a day while the natives overhauled the motor again.

Meanwhile, the Marines reconnoitered ten miles of the Waspuc

River, which branched south into the Pis Pis mining dis- trict. On succeeding days Edson advanced to Sang Sang,

Asang, and Awasbila, reaching the latter on 18 March.

Directly ahead lay the Kiplapine Rapids, a half mile of white water dropping along a forty degree gradient. This point marked the head of navigation for motor boats. Only native dug-outs could negotiate the difficult stretches of water upriver.

Edson and two men proceeded overland to Awawas and attempted to contact a Honduran army patrol in the vicinity

They found only a note from the colonel, who had already departed the area with his seven-man detachment. The

Hondurans occasionally operated along the north bank of the Coco, which they claimed as their southern boundary.

The Nicaraguans considered the territory reaching north 12 to the Patuca River to be theirs. The Marines returned to Awasbila and then dropped down the river to waspuc on

20 March. This short trip, which had taken three days corning up river, demonstrated the effect of the current on waterborne traffic.

Once at Waspuc, the Marine captain sent the motor launch and crew back to Cape Gracias. He ordered three men to remain at the village and hired a local crew and boat to take himself and the two remaining men back up the river. Edson was determined to scout the Bocay area and find out more about Sandino's activities. But, he never reached his destination. On 23 March the patrol met a resident of Bocay corning downriver with his family.

The Nicaraguan acknowledged that rebels frequented his village, but claimed that there were presently no forces in that location. Edson, who had travelled only a few miles beyond Awawas, now decided to go no further. In his published account of the patrol, he merely stated that the "story seemed straight enough and my opinion of it was confirmed by a Cuban living near-by whom I knew to be distinctly unfriendly with the bandit elernent. 1113 Muller must have influenced this decision, since Edson could hardly have judged with any surety the trustworthiness of the local inhabitants. The patrol moved rapidly downriver and covered the distance to Cape Gracias in just three days.

From there they took a coastal schooner to Puerto Cabezas. 13 The patrol leader considered the operation a success.

He and his men had penetrated 260 miles into the Nicaraguan interior, to a place where no Marines and few native sol- diers had ever been before. They had gathered a wealth of information on the waterway, the surrounding terrain, the transportation assets available, the state of rebel activity, and the situation of the local population. Edson counted this last element as the most important outcome of his venture; "It was my belief that, if we were to succeed in our mission of eradicating the bandit element in Nicaragua, we should make every effort to gain the 1 4 f r1en• dl iness• an d coopera t ion• o f th e peace f u 1 c1• t izenry.• II

In particular, he hoped to use the Indians, who predominated in the area, as a tool against the guerrillas:

They were inculcated from the time of their birth with a hatred of the Nicaraguans whom they called 'Spaniards' and so were potential allies if properly approached and handled • • • By learning enough native words to make my wants known to them; by showing an interest in them and their mode of living; and by always treating them fairly I believe that I succeeded 15 in that part of my mission.

He also recommended that the command establish a garrison at Waspuc, press regular patrols up to Awawas, and procure outboard motors and waterproofing materials for future operations.

Edson wrote home and described his 950 mile trip and the beards that he and his men had grown. In his eagerness to explore, he had not wanted to waste any daylight on

shaving. 16 He promised to send along a photo taken by 14 Major Utley as proof of the bushy growth. The letter also revealed the energy that must have sustained him during the long patrol. His first night in Puerto Cabezas, he stayed up till 0400 briefing the commander and reading mail, then got up one and a half hours later. At 2300 that night he was still awake, drafting the letter to his wife. The rigors of the expedition took their toll, however, and the determined captain went on the sick list with malaria. The photo shows a thin, bearded officer 17 leaning heavily on a cane. Though Edson's account makes no reference to the illness until he returned to the base camp, it is possible that sickness and the hardships of the field played a part in his decision to turn back prior to reaching Bocay. CHAPTER II

CLEARING THE EASTERN AREA

The reconnaissance patrol had uncovered some infor­ mation on Sandino's activities and intentions, much of it false. Among the worthless leads was a report that the insurrectionists had already seized gold mines in the Pis

Pis district. Another persistent rumor concerned a looming rebel raid down the Coco River. Both tales accurately forecast guerrilla activities in the following month. In early April, the former Liberal chieftain of Cape Gracias,

Marcos Aguerro, moved down the river and took control of

Sang Sang. Another Sandinista lieutenant, Manuel Giron, attacked the Pis Pis area a few days later. He seized the

La Luz and Los Angeles mines on 12 April and the Bonanza works shortly thereafter. The rebels destroyed the facil­ ities, carried off gold and supplies, and kidnapped an

American manager.

No reliable account of Sandino's plans has survived, though there were many possible motives for his sudden thrust into the Eastern Area. Neill Macaulay suggested two theories in his book on the Nicaraguan leader. First, the increasing Marine pressure in the west, capped by the 15 16 19 March aerial bombardment of the guerrilla stronghold at Murra, may have driven the rebels to less threatening territory. Alternatively, Sandino saw the foreign invest- rnents in the region as the strategic key to the conflict.

Since the ostensible purpose of the American intervention was to protect lives and property, the rebels could destroy the assets and chase off the aliens and thereby bring an end to the U.S. presence. One Sandinista officer explicit- ly stated such a policy; "I have instructions from General

Sandino to turn the property of all North Americans into ashes, so that the Marines will not have the excuse of corning to Nicaragua to protect American property." 1 8

A Mexico City newspaper published its own version of the Sandinista objective:

Persons who are connected with the rebel Sandino, of Nicaragua, say that the plan of the guerrilla is to divert Marine patrols in all directions with the ob­ ject of beginning an advance toward towns of greater importance. Sandino awaits the rainy season in order to commence these operations. The guerrilla thinks that in such circumstances the movements of the Marines wifg be slow and unfruitful in the offering of combat.

Although this article did not appear until May, it may have accurately assessed the Nicaraguan's strategy in

April. If he drew his opponents into the jungle at the end of the dry season, they might not be able to counter his other moves once the rains fell and limited mobility.

Given the nature of the targets, one might also sur- rnise that Sandino only sought loot. The money and food 17 acquired in the mining region could support his campaign, or perhaps simply keep his army together in the face of the hardships endured in the rough interior of the country.

There is one other possible explanation for his return to the area in which he had successfully begun his revo­ lutionary activities prior to the Peace of Tipitapa. He may have hoped to revive the sagging fortunes of his war effort, which had so far achieved little in the west.

No matter what his motives were, Sandino's actions galvanized the Eastern Area command, which had heretofore been content to make small reconnaissance patrols while it built up its forces. Report of the Sang Sang raid arrived at the headquarters in Puerto Cabezas on 6 April.

Within a few hours, Edson, Lieutenant Jesse Cook, thirty­ seven Marines, and one sailor had embarked on a navy ship for movement to Cape Gracias. Their mission was "to ad­ vance to Waspuc, establish a base in such a position as to close the Waspuc and Coco Rivers at their junction and to operate up either at discretion. 1120

Logistic support had improved only slightly since the earlier patrol. The unit brought along a new American outboard motor, but Edson again had to rely on his own funds. The troops were also still wearing their garrison shoes, as appropriate field boots were unavailable. Com­ munications would depend solely on messages carried by runners and boatmen. At least the Marines had plenty 18 of ammunition and thirty days of rations on hand.

Edson organized his patrol into a headquarters group and two sections of two squads each. A squad contained seven riflemen and one man armed with the Browning

Automatic Rifle (BAR). The detachment had two Lewis machineguns, but no grenades or other fragmentation weapons. Each man carried a poncho, shelter half, mos­ quito net, an extra uniform, and four spare sets of socks.

The unit debarked at Cape Gracias on 7 April and re­ ceived a lukewarm welcome from citizens fearing imminent occupation by Sandinista forces. Reports indicated that a force of more than 200 men intended to raid as far as the Cape. The residents had no confidence in the puny

American group and refused to aid the Marines. They ex­ pected the rebels to win and dreaded the prospect of future reprisals.

The patrol commandeered a motley collection of vessels and proceeded upriver without the benefit of native crew­ men. Mechanical breakdowns soon plagued the advance; a leaking water jacket and a burned out bearing stranded two of the boats. The Marines appropriated another craft coming downriver, but it malfunctioned too. The men rigged the new outboard to one native vessel, while another party went back to the Cape and brought up an additional boat.

Edson made up for lost time by travelling all the next night and stopping only for breakfast in the morning. 19 The Marines encountered further difficulties in navi- gating the river. Water levels had dropped in the past month as the dry season progressed. Sandbars and rocks damaged the outboard propellers, and portages grew longer.

The current remained strong in many areas, though, and

Edson and other Marines almost drowned on several occa­ sions. Despite these problems, the patrol reached Sacklin on 10 April and Waspuc four days later. The journey took no longer than it had in March with native boatmen.

At Waspuc, Edson learned that Aguerro had retreated up the river to Bocay with his loot, which included the three largest boats in the region. The Marine captain established his main post at the village and placed a five man message relay station at Sacklin. He arranged for an enterprising resident of Cape Gracias to bring supplies up the Coco, and then moved on and set up an outpost at

Sang Sang on 17 April. That same day he proceeded west with seven men, with the intention of placing an ambush at the rapids near Awasbila.

The ambush patrol had hardly got beyond Sang Sang when the boat overturned in rough water. The men lost nearly everything they had, including two rifles and a

BAR. Edson reorganized the squad and moved out overland the next day. They reached the Kiplapine Rapids on 18

April and picked out a suitable concealed position. The enemy did not appear, though, and Edson returned to his 20 camp at Waspuc. He left the small patrol in place and put Lieutenant Cook in charge of it.

Clearly, the maintenance of outposts and patrols would take more men than the tiny outfit could muster.

In a message to Major Utley, Edson recommended that the command reinforce him with the remainder of the Denver

Marines. Concerned about the weakness of his far-flung detachments, he shuttled back and forth between his posts and never spent more than two consecutive nights in the same location. The Coco Patrol did receive one important attachment at this time. Arthur Kittle, a nineteen year old resident of the area, half American and half Miskita, joined the group as a guide and interpreter. His knowledge of languages and the backwoods would serve the Marines well in the next several months.

On April 15 a large Sandinista band attacked the

Neptune Mine. Two workers brought the news to Waspuc and Edson immediately dispatched a patrol up that river.

That unit found no sign of the enemy, but did gather some information about the raiding force. It consisted of seventy-five well-armed, mounted troops and fifty men equipped only with machetes and shotguns. The latter probably were local levies impressed into service or en­ ticed by the prospect of loot. According to reports, they broke into small groups after the action and did not accompany the mounted soldiers to their next destination. 21 The Coco Patrol received its first air support near the end of April. Two Marine biplanes landed on a sand bar in the river and delivered a message from the squadron commander. He passed on the results of recent aerial reconnaissance missions and noted other important events in the region. These planes operated out of the Norhtern

Area facility at Ocotal, which significantly limited their operational capability in the distant Eastern sector.

Marine amphibian planes would arrive at Puerto Cabezas within the week and provide direct support to that remote command.

The main purpose of this particular air mission had been to determine if Edson was still alive. Major Utley described the incident in his first manuscript on the topic of small wars:

Area Headquarters received four reports through four different channels of a fight in which Edson and nine men had been killed. These reports differed slightly in detail but the gist was the same. Coming, as they did, four ways and with Edson's intentions known, it was feared at Area Headquarters that Edson and his patrol had been wiped out. Reinforcements were promptly rushed to Waspuc and aerial reconnaissance requested. • • Subsequently it developed that one man, a native, travelling down the [Coco] River, had told the story of the mythical fight to a paid agent of ours, to a missionary, to a native civil ~fficial and to a party led by an American civilian. 2

The Major used this story to illustrate potential problems in the areas of intelligence gathering and communications.

The reinforcements which he mentioned consisted of

Lieutenant Carroll, twenty Marines, and a navy corpsman. 22 They departed Puerto Cabezas on 27 April and arrived at

Waspuc on 1 May. They brought with them a "portable" radio, built on the Denver out of spare parts and an old wooden cabinet. It weighed 125 pounds. The second Coco

Patrol now had a total strength of three officers, fifty- seven Marines, and two sailors.

Before he had become concerned with Edson's possible demise, Major Utley had already begun to plan an operation against Sandino. He outlined his intentions in a 24 April message to Brigade. The Coco Patrol would block the north­ ern exit to the mining area by holding Waspuc, while three other units moved westward by separate routes. He hoped that Northern Area would occupy the trails and rivers to 22 the west and close the trap on the guerrilla army.

While Brigade mulled over this proposal, they took time out to question the wisdom of Major Utley's disposi- tions; "experience here shows it is not repeat not desir- able to divide small isolated detachments into widely separated groups. 1123 The furor over the false intelligence on Edson probably prompted that 28 April admonition.

Finally, on the last day of the month, Brigade responded to the Eastern Area request for support; "Much easier to block river and trails at Bocay at your area if you have sufficient men. 1124 The only troops which could reach that sector, of course, were the handful of men on the

Coco, and headquarters had already told Eastern Area not 23 to stretch them so thin.

Major Utley, faced with a shortage of assets and no prospect of outside aid, decided to alter his plan and put together a smaller encirclement operation. On 2 May he sent a coded radio message to Edson and instructed him to move up the Waspuc and Pis Pis Rivers and close off avenues of escape to the west. Both officers realized the need to act fast in order to spring the trap door before the rebels recrossed the rivers, which were in the imme­ diate rear of the guerrilla operating area. Edson decided to obtain Indian boatmen for the move, as his troops were unfamiliar with the upper reaches of the Waspuc and not yet skilled in the use of the poling boats (the only craft that could navigate this rough waterway). He had no more money, and knew that the natives would be unwilling to join in an expedition with a high risk of combat, so he lured them into his camp with promises of good wages for local work. Only when the patrol was ready to depart did he inform them of their true destination. The Marines had to guard their boatmen as well as look out for the enemy during the ensuing operation.

Edson concentrated his forces in order to meet the twin missions of keeping the Coco basin secure and attack­ ing up the Waspuc. He withdrew the outpost from Sang Sang, placed Carroll in charge of twelve men at Awasbila, left

Cook with thirteen men in the base camp at Waspuc, and 24 formed a combat patrol of himself and thirty-one Marines.

At the same time, he pleaded for more men in order to guard against a possible attack down the Coco. "If avail­ able recommend an additional fifty repeat fifty men this area. Unconfirmed rumors persist bandits expected via

Tilba. 1125

The Marine force left Waspuc early on 4 May. A small boat carried five men acting as the point element. The rest of the patrol followed at a distance, with an appro­ priate interval between craft. They brought rations for eight days and the makeshift radio. As the unit progressed upriver the advance guard boat pulled farther and farther away from the main body. In the early evening the lead vessel approached the tiny village of Marobila, located about one-third of the way to the objective. The point intended to pull in there and wait for the rest of the patrol, but as they did so a group of men in the two huts fired on them. The native crew immediately dived over the side and the Marines returned fire as best they could while they helplessly drifted downstream. Eventually the current carried them to shore. Meanwhile, the rest of the patrol had made camp further down the river, where they were blissfully unaware of the action.

The next morning the main force reached Marobila and collected the advance guard. Investigation of the vicinity indicated that the guerrillas had entered and departed the 25 village by boat. The patrol continued upstream to the junction with the Pis Pis River. A resident of that area informed them that their contact had been with a poorly armed band of about seventy men under the command of

Aguerro. Having retreated up the Coco the previous month, they had then come cross country into the mining district and collected spoils remaining from the earlier raids.

They were in the process of moving down the Waspuc when they collided with the Marines coming upriver. These men, with poor equipment, no intelligence network, and no apparent political objective, fit closer to the mold of bandits rather than guerrillas.

The informant also told the Marines that the outlaws had recently passed up the Waspuc, "poling as fast as possible. 1126 Edson faced the choice of pursuing this group or proceeding as ordered to his blocking position at Kuabul. A combination of reasons led him to choose the latter course. Aguerro's men were in small native dugouts, which could go farther up the river than his slightly larger craft. The natives also said that the bandits would have to return to the Pis Pis area in order to reach a suitable trail heading west. So the patrol turned off the Waspuc and on to the Pis Pis River. Dark­ ness caught them in the middle of a rapids set in a deep canyon and they spent the night huddled on a flat boulder projecting from the turbulent water. 26 The Marines reached Kuabul early the next day, 7 May.

Edson left a small guard with the boats and moved inland to set up an ambush on the main trail in the area. He then returned to the boats to await a scheduled message drop from the squadron. With that accomplished, he went back to the ambush site, collected the men, and moved overland to the Waspuc River. They found no sign of Aguerro's group and he surmised that the bandits had continued west over some trail to safety. He marked the incident off as a lesson on the reliability of native information.

The patrol also quickly learned something about night operations in the jungle. As the unit proceeded back the trail to Kaubul, they lost their way in the total blackness.

Edson finally called a halt about 0330. When the Marines awoke the next morning they discovered they were only a few hundred yards from their destination, but on a different path from the one they had taken to Waspuc. In his account of the operation, Edson stressed this lesson on night operations:

From the experience of this march and from several made later, I am thoroughly convinced that night movements in bush warfare should be confined to exceptional circumstances, where the objectives to be gained are clearly defined and can be gotten in no other way, and that such movements will be successful only by the greatest of luck in new and strange territory ••• In my opinion the supposed advantages of night marches in bush ~arf are can not begin to equal their disadvantages. 2

Major Utley's shoestring counteroffensive had now reached an impasse. One bandit group, whose presence in 27 the area had come as a complete surprise, had already escaped the net. Nor was there any hard information on the current position of Sandino and his units. One report placed them at Casa Vieja, which was not much help, since it was not on Marine maps. But, the Eastern Area commander was determined to continue the pursuit. He outlined further moves in a letter to Brigadier General Logan Feland, the

Brigade commander:

My general plan briefly is in conformity with my previous mission to deny territory to the bandits • . • Then I propose to push into the area between the Waspuc and [Coco] as far as my means of supplying my patrols permit. The great difficulty is lack of transportation and slowness with which movements can be made due to time required to move ~ rivers. Except in very few cases all travel is by boat, trails are only use~ when low water, during dry season, so compels. 8

Plans were one thing, execution quite another.

In answer to Edson's earlier pleas for reinforcements, the major rushed the USS Galveston's Marine detachment up the Coco River. Other than that he could do little. His other patrols continued to move slowly westward, into an area which the guerrillas had probably already vacated.

And, contrary to Utley's perception of the situation, Edson prepared to shift from the waterways to trails. He had reached the navigable limits of the interior rivers and now wanted to renew the chase cross country.

The Coco Patrol did not wait idly for new instructions.

Edson took one squad and reconnoitered toward the Neptune

Mine. There he found a European prospector who provided 28 him with an account of recent rebel activities and detailed descriptions of local terrain. Sandino had apparently split his forces in two, with each band moving west to the Bocay area by a separate route. Edson quickly decided to shift his location to Musawas. There he could control key avenues into and out of the mining region and find better forage. The patrol had somehow managed to use up their eight day supply of rations by the fifth day in the field, and the tiny village of Kuabul yielded little in the way of provisions. He ordered the majority of the patrol to travel by water, while he set out with five men by an overland route.

The detachment's trek to Musawas revealed many of the problems of jungle operations. The trail ran cross­ compartment over numerous ridgelines and through the streams at the bottom of each draw. The frequent soakings deterio­ rated feet, while the steep climbs and descents exhausted men who were already weak from illnesses and poor diet. The captain carried the pack of one man suffering from malaria.

Finally, the Marine refused to go further. When blandish­ ments failed, Edson led the rest of the patrol away. "Real­ izing then that I was not bluffing, he decided that perhaps he, too, could manage to go along. But the rate of march was slowed down for the rest of the day. 1129 The next day the trail ended and the Marines had to cut their way through the jungle growth. Eventually they reached the river and 29 constructed a makeshift raft. Later, they came upon two rotting native dugouts, which they patched with bark. The detachment pulled into Musawas at noon on the third day.

Undeterred by the experience, Edson prepared for his next move against the rebels. In an 11 May message to

Area Headquarters, he requested permission to hire more 30 na t 1ves. as gu1'd es an d no t e d h'is nee d f or pac k an1ma . l s.

He ordered a patrol out to look for mules in the vicinity, established his men in the missionary compound at Musawas, and sent three sick Marines to the rear. The patrol sub- sisted on the local fare of beans, bananas, a few beef cattle, and an occasional monkey.

Other than the small religious compound, Musawas consisted of squalid native huts. The residents were Suma

Indians, who feared and hated the Miskitas. They did not return to their homes until Edson had paid off the other natives and sent them home. This inter-tribal dispute was only part of the problem, however. According to one

Marine captain, Sandino had "instilled in the minds of the natives that the Marines if they came would rape, murder and steal. 1131

Edson faced yet another quandary, illuminated by his previous difficulty in obtaining native boatmen. He needed local help, but could not always get it willingly. He had impressed the necessary crewmen then, and now he appropriat- ed pack animals. A message informed Major Utley of one JO such requisition, since the owner wanted too much money;

"Had to use slight pressure ••• Will probably complain to you. 1132 Edson held strong views on the value of local labor; too much pay would soon satisfy the Indian's simple wants, and they would then cease to work. At the same time, he hoped to avoid measures which would certainly turn the populace against U.S. forces. Concerned about the increasing aerial effort, he counselled caution on

8 May. "Do not repeat not bomb towns Waspuc River, only source information, guides, boatmen. Indians here neutral. 1133

Major Utley communicated new orders by radio to the

Coco Patrol on 15 May. The Galveston detachment would relieve the Denver Marines at Waspuc, who would then rein­ force the unit at Musawas with rations and manpower. One of the patrols corning from the coast would garrison the mining district. Edson and another officer would lead their respective contingents to the west over separate trails in pursuit of Sandino. Their objective was the suspected rebel concentration at Bocay. Since the Coco

Patrol possessed the only radio in the field, it had to send out runners to inform the other units of their fresh assignments.

The latter situation demonstrated one of the greatest difficulties which the Marines faced in the Eastern Area.

Major Utley complained to Brigade concerning his 31 communication deficiencies and offered to build two radios, if headquarters would only send him trained operators.

The Denver detachment prepared its "portable" set for the trail by cutting it in half, so that mules could handle the load. Batteries proved to be another limitation. In order to conserve the meager quantity available in the field, the patrol employed its radio for short periods 34 at fixed intervals each day. Air-dropped messages supplemented electronic assets, but planes were equally scarce and also frequently grounded by weather.

Captain Wesley W. Walker brought his patrol into

Musawas on 20 May. He gave his thirty-six mules to the

Coco Patrol and departed for Waspuc by boat the next day.

Edson, scheduled to commence his operation on the 21st, remained in place as he waited for the reinforcements and supplies corning from the Coco. In the meantime, a sergeant from Texas conducted joint training sessions with the mules and Marines. He found his new additions in poor condition; worn out from their long trek, underfed, and covered with sores due to improper handling. The Jamaican rnuleros hired on the coast had failed to use saddle blankets. In the short time available the new masters remedied the defects as best they could.

The rainy season began while the Coco Patrol rested at Musawas. The continual downpours first coated the trails with slippery surface mud, and then turned them into deep 32 quagmires. On 21 May Edson contacted Area Headquarters

and recommended that it resupply his unit when it reached

the Coco River at Bocay; the overland logistic route would

simply be too long and much too difficult. The next day

Edson reiterated his current urgent need of shoes, uniforms,

and rations. He also fretted over the delay of the detach-

ment coming from Waspuc. Not only were they bringing the

"badly needed" items, but with each passing day the trails

grew worse. The seemingly aimless pursuit of an unseen

enemy, the shortages, and the weather must have begun to

take their toll on the men. In one message their captain

noted; "Motto for June necessary for morale of field

troops. 1135

The rest of the Denver Marines finally arrived on

24 May. That gave the Coco Patrol a total strength of

two officers, forty-four Marines, and one corpsman. The

unit prepared to move out the next morning, but a message

received that night indicated that the operation might

be called off. Edson shut the radio down and proceeded with the original plans:

I later learned that my guess was correct and that if I had not acted as I did, we would have received orders which would have kept us at Musawas indefinitely to "block the rivers and trails in that vicinity." Once under way we were not 03gered back there, and I never saw the place again.

The movement to Bocay proved to be another battle

against hardships rather than the enemy. Rations remained

a scarce commodity, a situation exacerbated by the JJ difficulties of transport and weather. Edson later recounted how kerosene oil saturated a sack of rice when a mule fell and broke open its load. The men wolfed down the spoiled food that night because the alternative was no meal at all. The constant rain rendered some foodstuffs inedible and soaked firewood. The patrol subsisted on a cold or lukewarm meal in the early morning and another late at night. The radio temporarily succumbed to a mule accident as well, after the animal involved landed on its back in a creek.

Edson employed simple tactics on the move. Three squads rotated daily between the advance guard, main body, and rear security. A fourth squad took permanent charge of the pack train, which travelled with the main body.

Half of the advance guard unit served as the point element

The patrol advanced in a file and maintained dispersion throughout the length of the column. When the trail vanished or closed up, Suma Indians proceeded the point and cut a new one.

The Coco Patrol made Casa Vieja on 28 May, where

Captain Henry D. Linscott's unit joined it. That officer had faced a tougher situation than Edson's. His 60th

Company consisted largely of young Marines straight from boot camp at Parris Island. Worse still, most of these inexperienced privates had enlisted as field musicians.

Linscott, the senior officer, took charge of the combined 34 units, which departed for Bocay on the 30th. Two days later the patrol reached Kalasanoki. An old native in that village stated that the rebels had moved south three weeks before, on the only trail leading out of the area.

He also indicated that other guerrillas would gather in

Bocay on 3 June.

The officers conferred over the alternatives. Their landbound patrol could follow a cold trail south or cut a time-consuming new path north to Bocay. They decided to leave the majority of the unit in place and head for their original objective by water. The two captains and ten men commandeered the three available native dugouts and a few Indian boatmen, and set out on 2 June. Edson and another Marine crewed their own pitpan and nearly drowned when they capsized it in rapids on the Bocay River.

They reached their destination the same day, which turned out to be a rather large community of fifty thatched huts and a single building used as a store and house by the local English patron. The owner's nephew arrived the next day and provided the Marines with information that the guerrillas had passed through the town on 1 June.

Edson immediately planned a new operation against the rebels. He expected the Galveston detachment to arrive in Bocay with a ration resupply on 4 June. He would ferry the stores up the Bocay River and Kuli Creek to his patrol at Kalasanoki and then move overland to Poteca, where he 35 expected to find the guerrilla main body. A message to

Area Headquarters outlined the project. Two problems developed immediately. Walker arrived in Bocay later the same day with his patrol and had no spare supplies with him. Then Major Utley withheld approval from the scheme.

Later, Edson maintained that he could have dealt a severe blow to Sandino if this plan had been implemented.

According to his account, the men "were full of ambition and keyed up to the highest morale. 1137 That statement contradicted his 21 May message, noted earlier, which raised the issue of flagging enthusiasm. Two weeks of intervening hardships could hardly have improved the situation, particu- larly when the men had nothing to show for their efforts.

Even if the patrol had mustered the necessary rations and will to go forward, there was little likelihood of a spec- tacular success. Edson more nearly captured reality in a subsequent paragraph of his story:

It was so difficult to obtain decisive results from any single contact. An engagement was a signal for them to disperse the forces and to move on to new territory. The harder they were hit, the quicker they disappeared and the smaller and more numero~§ the groups into which the main body was divided.

A move against Poteca in early June would have driven the guerrillas from that place, but it would not have seriously altered the course of the war.

Major Utley decided to hold a conference in the field with his officers in order to determine "future movements," which left open the possibility of an operation against J6 39 Poteca. But, by the time he arrived in Bocay by amphibian plane on 8 June, Brigade had already issued orders to stabilize the current line of outposts. One unit would garrison the Coco River as far as Bocay, another the mining 40 district, and a third the eastern coast. The Denver detachment would withdraw to Puerto Cabezas for a refit period, so that the Area could establish a rotation policy for frontline units.

These arrangements recognized the logistic crisis which affected the far-flung Eastern Area. The operations report for 10 - 16 June noted that Marines in the field subsisted on just one-half to one-third of their authorized ration allowance. The rainy season made overland supply routes impracticable, while the rising rivers became danger- ous. A substantial quantity of the provisions and equipment 41 sen t b y b oa t s1mp' 1 y d'isappeare d in ' th e rap1'd s. It wou ld take time to build up sufficient stocks in the forward areas to support further operations into the interior.

The same weekly report summed up the tactical situa- tion. "Although we have had little contact with hostile forces, we have secured a large area for our forces, have denied a comparatively rich mining section to the enemy, and are in a position to advance rapidly into the area now controlled by the bandits. .. 42 Of course, the rapid advances had to await logistic improvements, but the Marine position was much better than it had been in the middle 37 of April. However, a later memorandum by Major Utley, which outlined the history of this period, qualified that rosy view: "but it does not drive them out [of the country] or destroy them. 1143 Sandino still occupied the central strip of the nation, beyond the reach of the four geographic commands. As long as he held this sanctuary he could build his forces and threaten the stability of Nicaragua.

Edson, the most aggressive leader in the east, returned to Puerto Cabezas by plane on 15 June. There he awaited arrival of the USS Rochester, so that he could execute orders to become the new commander of its Marine detachment. CHAPTER III

INTO THE LION'S DEN

General Feland outlined his initial anti-Sandino strat­

egy to the Brigade staff in June 1927; "My plan is to occupy

successively the towns which he is now controlling, forcing him to the North and East. 1144 At that point, the Marine

commander in Nicaragua was most concerned with pushing the

rebel leader out of the politically important population centers of the west coast. One year later the situation

had changed. The American government now wanted to bring

the conflict to a swift, successful conclusion and thereby

end the rising chorus of domestic and international opposi­

tion to the intervention. As a result, the Marines now

needed to destroy Sandino's forces, so that they could pro­

tect the elections scheduled for November 1928 and conduct

a speedy withdrawal thereafter.

General Feland and Admiral David F. Sellers (COMSPERON)

came to Puerto Cabezas on 28 June. Edson later provided

an account of his first meeting with the Brigade commander.

As the junior captain saluted, the general asked him if

it was possible to get a patrol to Poteca from the east

coast. He replied in the affirmative. Without hesitation, J8 39 the senior Marine answered, "Well, I am going to give you the Chance to do 1. t. 1145 Ed son o ff'ic1a . 11 y repor t e d t o th e

Rochester that day and detached immediately for duty with the Eastern Area.

The general had little choice, since the Northern Area had indicated that it had no usable avenues of approach into the Poteca sector. The Sandinistas were concentrated there and had already made their presence felt. On 12 June they raided a lumber camp near Poteca and three days later they seized the village itself. The intelligence section esti- mated that the rebel force totaled 400 men. Edson alone seemed prepared to chase the guerrillas right into their lair.

Major Utley issued an order specifying the new mission:

"To proceed up the Coco River, to drive the bandits from the river valley, destroying such groups as it might encounter, to take and hold Poteca, and to continue the move southwest from that place to form a junction with patrols from the

Northern Area in the vicinity of Santa Cruz. 1146 In a mes- sage to Brigade, the Eastern Area commander made it plain 47 that he again hoped to encircle the guerrilla forces.

Northern Area units, operating along the Jicaro River, would seal off the west, while Edson closed the escape routes to

Honduras and pursued Sandino into the trap.

Area Headquarters assigned the Denver Marines, now corn- rnanded by Lieutenant Ralph B. DeWitt, and the Galveston 40 detachment, under Lieutenant Cook, to the third Coco Patrol.

This gave Edson a force of two officers, eighty-seven enlisted men, and two corpsmen. Half of Dewitt's troops were already on their way to Waspuc, in order to relieve

Cook's force at that outpost. Major Utley allocated part of his coastal garrison force to take over the mission at Waspuc, and ordered the two lieutenants to move their units forward to Bocay as soon as possible. The remainder of the Denver detachment departed Puerto Cabezas for the

Coco River on 2 July, and Edson followed on the 10th.

He hoped to have the patrol assembled at Bocay and ready to move out by 23 July.

The rainy season dictated the means of transportation.

Heavy rains made the rivers dangerous, but completely sub­ merged the trails or turned them into impassable mires. If they were to make any progress at all, troops and supplies had to move on the waterways. Edson noted the changed character of the river as he moved up the Coco in the middle of July. Motor craft could travel more freely due to the increased depth. Poling boats, on the other hand, were limited to shallow water. Since the river had overflowed its banks, the native pitpans had to make their way through a tangle of trees and jungle growth. Each time these small boats crossed the river to avoid obstacles or deep water the current swept them downstream, since paddling could do little against the strong flow. A considerable amount 41 of debris also hurtled downriver with the current and made navigation hazardous. The rapids were even more dangerous than usual.

Use of the rivers presented other problems. Edson had enough experience in Nicaragua to realize that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve surprise. Fur­ thermore, once the patrol left Bocay, it would be completely reliant on the waterways for tactical movement and logistic support. The former situation presented no great difficulty at the moment, since no force could move very well on land.

But, without pack animals, any operation ashore would be limited by the requirement to transport everything on the backs of the troops. If the guerrillas retreated overland the Coco Patrol would not be able to follow very far.

A shortage of boats made the logistic factor loom large. The Eastern Area could gather barely enough craft on the Coco to transport all of Edson's patrol at once.

Obviously, these same boats were the only ones available for the transportation of supplies. The patrol leader had to choose between tactical lift and logistics; the more troops he transported, the faster his supply situation would deteriorate. Edson planned to supplement his stores with airdrops and local provisions, but neither constituted a reliable source of supply. The rainy season limited aerial capabilities, while the bandits might opt for a scorched earth policy. The largely uninhabited Coco basin 42 also constituted a poor source for forage. The shortage of water transportation posed equally disturbing questions about the movement of reinforcements.

Other facets of the logistic situation had not appre­ ciably improved either since the last patrol. A few new outboard motors had arrived, but the lack of space for fuel and spare parts made their employment impractical.

The Eastern Area still had only one radio in the field, the set built by the Denver. Edson decided to leave it in Bocay, since the radio and its bulky batteries took up too much room in the boats. (Given his actions at

Musawas in May, he may have also wanted to avoid anymore

"interference" from higher headquarters.) The patrol left behind shelter halves, mosquito nets, and machineguns as well. Many of the Marines, fed up with the unsuitable issue shoes, bought rugged civilian footwear for the field.

The Corps possessed considerable experience in bush warfare, but consistently failed to meet basic needs like boots and boats.

Edson arrived at Bocay on 24 July, one day after the scheduled start of the operation. Due to transportation shortages, Lieutenant Cook and twenty-five men were still at Waspuc. The same problem had delayed the buildup of supplies in the assembly area. In fact, Captain Walker's garrison at Bocay possessed only a week's worth of rations for themselves and none for the Coco Patrol. Area 4J Headquarters had also recalled Lieutenant DeWitt for duty elsewhere. Edson reluctantly dispatched his largest boat downriver to Cape Gracias to pick up supplies and evacuate two sick men, but he determined to start the operation on the 26th with whatever assets were available

In the meantime, the Marine captain prepared for his mission. His men appropriated every native boat in the area, as well as the crewmen. These draconian tactics netted him enough transport for the 65 members of the patrol present in Bocay. The local patron, an Englishman, supplied information on the upper reaches of the river and the reb­ els, but he balked at the use of his Indians for offensive action, as he would be subject to reprisals in return.

Edson brushed aside these objections and placed a guard on the boats and boatmen, though he anticipated ''nothing serious. 1148 He positioned another outpost upriver in the hope of preventing the passage of any native with infor­ mation on the patrol.

On the night of the 25th it rained much heavier than usual. In spite of Edson's precautions, the rising current swept away two of his boats, while several of the natives slipped away into the jungle. When morning came, the

Marines had to delay their departure while they reorganized to fit the available transportation. The third Coco Patrol finally got underway later in the day with just one officer, forty-six enlisted men, and one corpsman, all loaded in 44 seven boats. The unit left nearly half its strength either at Bocay or on the way there from Waspuc.

As a result of the late start and high water, the patrol made only five miles on the first day. That evening,

Edson sent a boat back to Bocay to pick up mail and supplies air-dropped that day, and to impress any natives and boats that may have appeared at the base camp. The detachment found four Indians and brought them back to the patrol.

The sun appeared briefly the next morning, but then the rains resumed again and continued steadily for the next five days.

A boat capsized on 28 July. The occupants survived and recovered their craft, but they lost two BAR's, a rifle, and more than one hundred pounds of rations. That night the patrol moved its bivouac site three times as rising water successively drove them out of each new position.

The river rose over twenty feet in twelve hours, to the highest flood stage in the recent memory of the natives.

The conditions rendered travel impossible the next day, but the patrol had to move a short distance upstream in order to find a suitable camp for the night. The Marines remained there for two days, until the waters receded enough to permit movement. While there, Edson killed a water moccasin under his bamboo bunk and a tree fell onto a boat.

The men managed to salvage the pitpan (itself a hollowed out log), but they lost more rations in the process. 45 Lieutenant Cook fared little better in his attempts to catch up with the rest of the Coco Patrol. He departed

Waspuc on 22 July, with what he thought was four boats and twenty-four men. However, the lieutenant commanding that outpost ordered the fourth craft to remain after Cook disappeared to the west in the third boat. Cook did not know what had happened to the seven men until days later.

The detachment lost another Marine on the 23rd when a boat capsized and one of the men drowned. The severe rains of late July also held up progress. The young officer did not arrive at Bocay until 1 August, and then only with that part of the detachment which accompanied him in the motor boat. The remainder of the force did not reach the outpost in their poling boats until the 5th.

The main patrol resumed its advance on 31 July.

Further up the river the Marines discovered an abandoned guerrilla camp and indications that a small party had used it within the past few days. That night five Indian boatmen deserted. Edson was certain that the rebels knew of his approach and he became concerned that they might attempt an ambush in the Callejon Canyon.

The next morning he advanced a section overland to the head of the canyon in order to secure the passage of his small fleet through the rapids. The obstacle spelled trouble, but not of the guerrilla variety. Two boats capsized in the turbulent waters, including the largest 46 craft carrying most of the rations. The patrol lost the

majority of its food, cooking utensils, and medical

supplies, as well as another BAR and a case of ammunition.

At the end of the day one section remained camped at the

head of the rapids, while the other salvaged what it could

at the foot of the canyon. The lost rations must have

particularly galled the men, who had subsisted on just

two small meals a day in order to stretch out their meager

stocks. Edson himself became especially indignant when

the next mail drop brought a monthly bill from the

quartermaster for officer rations. "I covered the thing with all the remarks I could think of, most of them not

very complementary as I recall, and sent it back to Puerto

Cabezas. Of course, I eventually had to pay the bill. 1149

The next day another boat capsized, but without any

significant loss. The Marine captain suspected that the

Indians purposely engineered the accidents in order to

sabotage the patrol, since they feared for their lives

in any encounter with the guerrillas. He had evidently

been aware of their apprehensions before departing Bocay;

Area Headquarters noted the trepidation of the Indians in

a report to Brigade as confirmation of a large rebel 50 presence up the Coco. One author provided a version

of Edson's response to this problem: "That night, one [of

the boatmen] was allowed to overhear Edson's rather grisly

notions about 'accident' prevention; thereafter, the boats 47 were steadier. 1151

On 3 August, the patrol sent one boat and its native crew back to Bocay. They carried a report of events, a request for resupply, and one Marine too sick to continue.

The detachment used his weapon to replace one of those lost in the rapids. In his account of the patrol, Edson stated that the loss of cargo and his adoption of new tactics made the boat unnecessary. The patrol's fresh formation consisted of a small detachment on each river bank, with the object of increasing flank security ahead of the vulnerable advance guard boat. Pitpans ferried these units ahead when they reached impassable areas, but at least one had to remain on shore at all times.

Sergeant Mosier later recalled a different reason for the new tactic; "There was so little boat room that we kept at least two, and sometimes four, squads patrolling on foot along the banks of the river. 1152 However, Edson had anticipated the use of "guards along the beach where practicable" before the patrol left Bocay. 53 Possibly the lack of boats contributed to the size of the flanking units. In any case, the tactic proved valuable in the later course of events.

The Coco Patrol pulled into shore below Mastawas on the afternoon of 4 August. A detachment proceeded overland to the village and surprised two men on the edge of the settle­ ment. The Marines fired and missed, and the guerrillas 48 escaped. The patrol captured a rifle, pistol, two shotguns,

explosives, and papers signed by the rebel leaders. Failure

to capture the lookouts ended any hope of surprising

Sandino. But, the Marines consoled themselves with the

large quantity of supplies in the vicinity, which included

cattle, pigs, chickens, and produce. Edson decided to

remain there the next day in order to allow the men to

recuperate from their recent hardships. Many of them had

sore feet, and all were hungry and exhausted. He later

defended the delay with a lengthy description of the trials

endured. 54 In a message to Area Headquarters, he requested

replacements for the lost weapons and medical supplies,

p 1 us 150 pairs· o f soc k s "t o com b a t sore f ee t ep1·d em1c.· 1155

The patrol moved out again on 6 August. About two miles upriver they met a small craft coming toward them

and fired at it. The occupants paddled rapidly to shore

and escaped, though blood found on the trail indicated

that the Marines had hit at least one of the guerrillas.

As the patrol continued it encountered increasing signs

of recent enemy activity in the area, to include abandoned

equipment, pack animals, and camp sites. This information

confirmed the results of aerial reconnaissance missions

in that region. On 21 July guerrillas fired on a plane

dropping leaflets around Gulke's Camp on the Poteca River.

Five planes returned on the 25th; they bombed and strafed

the area and took return fire from rifles and machineguns. 49 Three craft received hits. Another mission made contact 56 two days later. On 6 August, airplanes dropped 300 pounds of rations and mail to the patrol and then reconnoitered 57 to the west. This time the pilots saw nothing.

Edson advanced to Yamales and Ililiquas the next morn- ing. His men uncovered another arms cache in the former village and some of the items taken from the mining region in the latter. Ililiquas was not really a settlement, just a single house set in a large clearing at the confluence of the Coco and a creek of that name. Two planes returned at 58 noon that day and dropped 600 pounds of rations. While one attempted to make a message pickup, the other flew

upstream on patrol. The pilot spotted several "suspicious" men, released his two bombs, and then strafed the area.

On his way back to base he had his observer drop a report of the encounter to the Coco Patrol. Regrettably, his companion summarized the event in the simple phrase,

"Dropped two bombs. 1159

The Marines ate a lunch of corned beef and salmon from

the ration cans which had broken open in the drop. Then the

patrol resumed its advance up the river. One squad moved on each bank as flank security. Sergeant Mosier commanded

the unit on the west bank, while Corporal Charles Porter headed its counterpart. Sergeant Russell Schoneberger

remained "concealed in the village to pick up any natives

that might return after [the patrol's] departure. 1160 The 50

0 'l't ~ miles

Soo /00(1 " !:f 4rdtJ

Figure J. The Battle of Ililiquas. Adapted from Marine Corps Gazette (February 19J7)p.60. 51 rest of the detachment followed in boats along the east shore.

Within a half mile of the settlement, the terrain grew steeper and began to form a small gorge, with sandy shelves at the bottom along the waterline. When they reached that area both flank patrols requested boat transportation around obstacles; heavy brush and bamboo on the east bank (A), a cliff topped by another bamboo thicket on the opposite shore (B). [See Figure 3]. Porter and his men had just gotten into a pitpan when a guerrilla broke from his concealed position (C) and ran. Marines in the advance guard boat fired at him. Edson immediately began to deploy his force on the west bank. He landed the men in the first three boats, which included Porter, formed them into a line, and yelled for Mosier to cut his way through the brush and join them.

When the captain came ashore he literally stumbled on to the first rebel position. Edson's pistol misfired, but the guerrilla's rifle shot went wide as the officer fell to the ground, his foot caught in a vine. Private

First Class Yelanich, a runner, killed the man. By this time the firefight had become general. Two enemy machine­ guns at (D) and (E) opened up, and rifle fire seemed to come from all points of the hillside on the western bank.

The remaining men of the patrol, still in their boats, took to the water to avoid the fusillade. They clung to 52 the sides and drifted downstream out of the line of fire.

The firing died down after about forty-five minutes.

Edson had stabilized a line of three squads running uphill from the river bank. The Marines in the boats had gathered in the clearing at Ililiquas, while the eastern flank unit had disappeared from sight. The captain sent Sergeant

Mosier to the rear with orders. The men at the settlement would drive upriver and clear the eastern shore while the other squads performed the same mission on the opposite bank. Mosier would bring up the boats, but keep to a safe distance in the rear. Presumably the vessels might be necessary if the enemy suddenly retreated to their own flotilla.

The Marine attack began at 1500, about one hour after

Edson had issued the order. The patrol met little resist­ ance initially, until a force at (F) opened fire with a machinegun and rifles. Fire from the opposite bank quickly silenced the guerrilla activity. As the rebels withdrew, they came under fire from the west bank squads, which had topped the hill. These Marines continued to advance until they reached (G) at 1630. In the meantime, Edson had lost contact with the unit to the east, so he decided to return to Ililiquas and attempt to regroup his forces there.

Along the way his men skirmished briefly with a few guerrillas coming into the area from the northwest. 53 Edson found the remainder of the patrol at the settle- ment. Mosier, Schoneberger, and Drummer Thomas Paine had been wounded when their boat came under fire as it moved upriver in support of the attack. In contrast to the Indian reputation of fearfulness, Mosier's boat captain had remain- ed with the craft, aided the sergeant in driving off the rebel force, and then shepherded the men to safety. 61 The only other casualty was Private Meyer Stengel, killed in the late afternoon attack on the east bank. Edson later recommended Stengel, Mosier, Schoneberger, and Yelanich for the Navy Cross. 62

The Marines counted ten guerrilla bodies and believed they had wounded at least three others. They also captured twelve rifles and a small quantity of ammunition. More importantly, the patrol gained considerable knowledge about their enemy. Captured documents indicated that Sandino had concentrated his entire force in the vicinity. Rebel actions also revealed that they were not mere "bandits," as the Americans persisted in calling them. They wore a uniform of blue denim, with red and black armbands and hatbands. For the most part the guerrillas fought with courage and did not hesitate to engage the Marines at close quarters. Their positions consisted of individual holes and slit trenches, all well-placed to enfilade the river and provide mutual support. The rebel leader had carefully chosen and thoroughly camouflaged the ambush site. "Except 54 for [the] shore patrols, it would undoubtedly have succeeded. 1163

The Sandinistas, of course, provided a different version of the battle. Within days Sandino spread the word that his men had killed twenty-five Marines and lost 64 only three of their own number. One guerrilla described the battle in a 12 August letter to his family. "We gave the 'machos' a big thrashing in Lillieras. We sunk various boats and we killed plenty men. There remained in their camp sixty dead. 1165 As the Sandino legend grew in later years, so did the battle. A 1959 account of the Nicaraguan conflict changed the American pitpans into barges, each one loaded with one hundred Marines. Of the 500 Americans 66 engaged, more than half supposedly died. The Marines had proved again that they could handily defeat the rebels in open combat, but an effective guerrilla propaganda campaign softened the blow to revolutionary morale.

The Coco Patrol spent the night of 7 August recovering from the fight. The corpsman treated the wounded with makeshift dressings, since the lost medical supplies still had not been replaced. Edson sent the casualties downriver to Bocay, along with one private unfit for duty due to sore feet. The patrol now had just forty-one enlisted Marines and five boats. The unit had gone through a substantial portion of its ammunition stocks as well. Each man had carried a full cartridge belt and two bandoliers into the 55 engagement, the latter distributed when several ammunition cases disappeared in boat accidents. The men fired only about twenty rounds apiece, but a much larger quantity fell out of the bandoliers. Edson changed his policy again and gathered the excess ammunition into a central reserve stock. Captured rifles, and those belonging to the casualties, replaced the weapons lost earlier. During the evening, the captain issued orders for an advance the next day and wrote up a report to Area Headquarters.

About 0300 on the 8th an outpost saw guerrillas moving on a trail upriver from its position. Edson, roused from sleep by the news, reevaluated his situation. He knew that Cook had reached the foot of the Callejon Rapids, approximately four days of upriver travel from Ililiquas.

He now became concerned that the much larger rebel force might defeat in detail his divided units. At dawn, the

Marines got in their boats and drifted down to Mastawas.

Later that day planes arrived in the area. They bombed and strafed a suspected rebel position ten miles upstream

(a man hiding in bushes near a house) and picked up messages from Edson. One note explained his move to Mastawas.

"Outflanked by bandits at about 0330. Withdrew to protect

Cook and effect a junction with him. Will remain here for him. 1167

The lieutenant arrived with his detachment late in the afternoon of 9 August. That brought the Coco Patrol 56 up to a strength of two officers, sixty-one enlisted men, and a corpsman. That same day planes dropped 250 pounds of rations and medical supplies, and then attacked 68 "suspicious areas" up the river. By this point the guerrillas had become "plane wise." They avoided movement during the midday hours when planes commonly operated in this remote region, and they made good use of concealment and camouflage. 69 The air corps found it increasingly difficult to obtain targets. "Pilots fly around houses at altitudes that permit the observers to look into windows and doors. Bursts of gun fire and occasionally bombs are employed • to attempt to draw hostile fire. 1170 As

in later wars, anyone that ran or hid assumed the status of an enemy.

That night Edson wrote a personal letter to Major Utley and poured out some of his frustrations: troops debilitated by sore feet, an epidemic of malaria, a desperate need

for shoes and socks, not enough boats or crewmen, and too

few Marines. Then he turned to his tactical situation:

I have a territory some 200 miles long by 50 miles wide to cover with a force of 60 men. There are no supporting troops within 100 miles in any direction. The territory to be covered is that in which it is certain Sandino has concentrated his entire force. I would like a definition of my mission. At present my mission, as assigned, is to proceed to Santa Cruz, establishing outposts at contact points. With the force at my disposal, I cannot reach Santa Cruz and adequately garrison my lines of supplies ••• If, however, my primary mission is to destroy the bandits, it seems to me best to keep my entire force intact, at least to Poteca, and depend upon mobility, rather than outposts ••• If you can supply me with food 57 and clothing by air, I believe that my command can make it decidedly uncomfortable for the outlaws. There will be several casualties, probably, but we hope the results will justify them. If this is approved, I shall cut loose from 9oats, and using 7 captured animals, move by trail.

The next day the patrol resumed its advance upriver.

Edson solved part of his boat shortage by employing pack mules which the rebels had abandoned in the area. On the

13th, the unit came to Espanolita, just a few miles beyond

Ililiquas. The Marines remained there the next day and

Edson ordered out small patrols in all directions. Two detachments retraced their steps downriver, and one came across a rebel supply boat. The Americans killed four 72 men, wounded another, and captured five more. The prisoners included a Sandinista chieftain named Abram

Rivera. An upriver patrol made contact with a guerrilla unit, but without result. The officers and men made use of the captured clothing, since their's had deteriorated completely after several weeks in the bush. Edson noted their shabby appearance in his later account; "Add to that the fact that no one had shaved in over a month and one can imagine what a fine looking outfit we were. 1173

The patrol moved forward again on 15 August, but without the mules. The rebels had abandoned them earlier due to their poor condition and now the Marines followed

SUl't • 74 The next day the Americans captured an Indian boatman, who claimed to have been with Sandino. He 58 indicated that the rebel force had split up and scattered to the north, west, and south. Aerial reconnaissance seemed

to confirm this, though planes made numerous small contacts during this period. They attacked observed or suspected

targets every day between 11 and 18 August. On the 12th planes strafed six men running into a building just four miles from the patrol. The next day they hit a group of

ten guerrillas camped on a sandbar and received accurate return fire. The following day they struck at several boats along the river and took two hits in turn. The

aviators came back that evening (an uncharacteristically

late hour for them) and surprised a rebel group gathered

around a cooking fire. Throughout this period the air

coprs also delivered supplies and maintained communications 75 Cargo runs included a drop of shoes on the 12th.

The Coco Patrol pulled into Poteca early on 17 August.

The airmen greeted the infantrymen with an unprecedented 76 drop of 2,200 pounds of rations. The Marines on the

ground were also surprised by the size of their long-sought

objective. Despite prominent display on the maps, the

settlement consisted of just one house. The building had

taken a direct hit from a thirty pound aerial bomb, which

inflicted little more damage than a hole in the roof where

it had come through. That discovery testified to the

efficacy of dive-bombing, an infant art which relied on

equally undeveloped ordnance. 59 Edson's original orders had envisioned an advance beyond Poteca. But, a flurry of messages modified that goal several times during the final drive up the river.

Northern Area initiated the turmoil when it planned its 77 own operation down the Coco. (This was the same command which had considered that mission impossible only one month earlier.) Since that Area possessed no boats suitable

for riverine work, the Brigade operations officer ordered

Edson to take his flotilla upriver to Santa Cruz. There he was to turn it over to a Northern patrol which would then go downriver. That message left Brigade on 7 August.

Edson received it within a few days, quickly endorsed it, and sent it on to Eastern Area Headquarters. He noted the obvious stupidity of the request and summed up his

feelings on the matter; "You may answer Brig. - I haven't

the nerve to do it. 1178 Major Utley added his own thoughts and then filed the message; "What the Hell's the use

answering them?1179

Two days later the same operations officer forwarded

some helpful advice to the patrol in the wake of its

encounter at Ililiquas. Among the information was an

admonition; "Press operations up Coco River with all due

caution. 1180 Edson must have received this missive about

the same time that he drafted his letter to Utley at

Mastawas, since he used similar language when he endorsed

the latest message. "Why not press down Coco River a bit? 60 I have a force of 60 men to cover an area 200x50 miles, with no supporting troops of any kind within a weeks travel

No kick to make but this is rubbing it in. 1181

Shortly thereafter Brigade asked the Eastern Area

to salvage a plane which had crashed on the lower Coco.

Utley refused the request. "Until additional planes arrive here for duty the supply of Edson's patrol depends solely on the very few boats now available. Ration situation above Waspuc found unsatisfactory and believe that every available resource should be devoted to supplying arms and provisions to outposts and patrols. 1182 The major's reply brought an immediate response from higher headquart­ ers. On 12 August planes dropped a copy of that message to the Coco detachment. "The Commanding General does not require that the patrol under Captain Edson now advancing up the Coco River advance up that stream beyond the vicinity of Poteca for the present time. This is because of the difficulty of the supply problem. 1183 This latest exchange

culminated in the diversion of Fokker cargo planes to the

Coco operation and the massive drop of the 17th.

The Eastern Area commander wrote a personal letter

to Edson on 14 August. He clearly hoped to cheer up his hard-pressed subordinate: "I am glad to note that you have not yet lost your sense of humor, for I must admit that

the communications which you annotated had already driven me to extreme and unpun[c]tuated profanity. 1184 The 61 remainder of the letter lauded the captain and his men, and detailed Area's efforts to increase support for the

Coco Patrol. He summed up the difficulty of the latter endeavor in a single sentence: "Lord knows, there seems to be little we can do. 1185

Many senior officers believed that Edson's foray into the hinterlands had broken the back of the revolutionary movement. During that summer more than 1600 "self-confessed bandits" had taken advantage of a generous amnesty pro- 86 gram. Several of the air missions to the Poteca region now dropped leaflets to induce the "demoralized" rebel 87 remnants to surrender. Edson even received a newspaper clipping from the States, in which Marine leaders located there described the "final phase" of the Nicaraguan campaign. He sent it on to Utley with his own comments.

"Major - How about this? Is any part of it correct?1188

In the rear areas the conflict did seem to be almost over. The Eastern Area commander took time out to pass

Edson's award recommendations up the chain of command.

Along with them, he sent a Navy Cross citation for the patrol leader. The Secretary of the Navy approved it in

December of that year:

On 7 August 1928, while in command of a marine patrol on the Coco River, en route to Poteca, Captain Edson upon encountering a force of bandits entrenched upon both sides of the river, personally led his advance guard against the enemy, engaging in hand to hand conflict with them, and by his exhibition of coolness, intrepidity, and dash, so inspired his men that the 62 superior force of bandits were driven from their prepa89d position , and severe losses inflicted upon them.

Edson's account of the patrol ended with his seizure of

Poteca, though he left the reader with the feeling that he would finish the story someday. He never wrote that

final instalment, but there remained an extraordinary tale of hardship and heroism. t P[urra.

• Santa, Cruz

Figure 4. The Poteca area. Adapted from Ham map, Weir MCHC. Personal Papers, VJ°" CHAPTER IV

CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN

Edson wasted no time in strengthening his hold on 1190 Pto eca, wh ic• h h e consi'd ere d a II s t ra t egica• 1 posi't' ion. On his first full day there he instituted a vigorous program

of patrolling in all directions, sent two of his boats down

to Bocay to bring up supplies, and scribbled messages on a host of topics. He detailed his recent activities, listed

the capabilities of his transportation assets, suggested

tactics for future riverine operations, requested additional

items of supply, and described the health problems affecting

his unit. Despite the many difficulties, he believed the 91 morale of his troops was "excellent."

Northern Area pushed an overland patrol into Poteca

on 21 August. Over the next few days Edson "compared notes" with the commander, Lieutenant Ridderhof, and found his

counterparts wanting. "The impression I received is that

patrols are sent out for a few days only and if no contact

is made it is taken for granted no bandits are in that

area. 1192 The captain covered this and other matters in

a long letter to Major Utley. He felt that Northern Area

had been lax and failed to seal off Sandino's escape routes

64 from Poteca. He requested wall tents to replace the tent flies which Brigade had recently dropped, as well as film for a captured camera. And, he noted that the local inhabitants had begun to return to their homes along the river. Most of these he considered to be spies or deserters. Despite his earlier assertion of high morale, he mentioned that the men are "anxious to go back at any time and believe any rumors to that effect. 1193 The indomitable captain told them to have their Christmas presents mailed to Poteca.

Edson correctly forecast the need for a long stay.

On the morning of 30 August one of his patrols discovered a fresh rebel camp just a few miles downriver near Wamblan.

A good security system apparently saved the guerrillas from harm. The Marines made no contact, but found breakfast cooking on the fires. The camp had sheltered about thirty rebels and the detachment came away with thirteen rifles 94 and a quan t i·t y o f exp 1 os1ves. . Ed son es t a bl'is h e d an outpost of seventeen men at the junction of the river and

Wamblan Creek.

Three days later, another patrol went upriver to

Yacalwas to investigate a reported rebel outpost of five men. The detachment of six Marines and Arthur Kittle walked into an early morning ambush of about twenty guerrillas.

The Americans killed one man, but suffered a much greater loss themselves; the invaluable Nicaraguan guide died in 66 the crossfire. The patrol broke contact and returned to base. Lieutenant Ridderhof led out a much larger group the next day (Edson was down with malaria). This time the Marines surprised two men guarding an encampment near the site of the ambush. They killed one rebel and captured three weapons, a small amount of ammunition, and "enormous quantities of clothing. 1195

The Coco Patrol submitted its first of many Weekly

Patrol Reports on 8 September. The last of the force's scattered detachments had finally joined the main body on 22 August, which brought unit strength to two officers, seventy-six men, and one corpsman. These numbers did not count the Northern Area Marines, who had remained at Poteca through the first part of the month, but did include the outpost at Wamblan. Edson stressed several themes which would recur throughout subsequent reports.

The isolated commander again brought up the subject of health problems. At that point, eight of the troops were on the sick list, and the number had been as high as fourteen. In the following two weeks, three men required evacuation. But, illness not only reduced manpower, it often had a more direct effect on operations:

Stamina of men considerably effected by malaria and - to some extent - unsatisfactory rations. Several men unfit for patrols being retained for garrison duty only. Men cannot stand up under arduous patrol duty as they did last May - every long patrol being handi­ capped before its completion by some one 09 two men 6 succumbing to fever or intestinal trouble. 67 The resulting slow rate of march made it even more difficult to make contact with guerrilla forces.

Logistics occupied a prominent place in these early reports. During the first week of the month the level of provisions fell to a four day supply. But, rations were only part of the problem. After months in the jungle much equipment and clothing required replacement. In addition, the patrol needed an endless number of items in order to turn Poteca into a permanent base camp. Supply requests included heavy machineguns, hand grenades, signal rockets, shovels, slings, ammo belts, cartridge belts, targets, toilet paper, tents, and barbed wire.

The constricted availability of aircraft, their minimal cargo capacity, weather, and the method of delivery all limited the usefulness of aerial resupply. The last factor proved most conspicuous, since the amphibians could not land near Poteca. Other types delivered cargo by dropping it, without parachutes. The ensuing impact damaged most 97 items, particularly canned rations. Boats were only slightly more effective. The long trip upriver took more than a week, and a significant portion of the goods never 98 reached their destination due to accidents. Useful river craft, primitive and inexpensive, also mysteriously remained as scarce as planes. A shortage of skilled native boatmen may have contributed to that problem. Overland movement never played a role. Mules were slower than boats even 68 during the dry season, and a typical animal would eat more forage over the course of the long trip than he could possibly carry. The Coco Patrol was a logistician's nightmare.

Despite the problems, the Eastern Area and Brigade met most of Edson's requests. He quickly turned Poteca into a fortified camp. During September the.Marines constructed a single apron fence and kneeling trenches around the entire perimeter. As other assets trickled in, they three added Browning heavy machineguns, a mortar, and further wire entanglements. The captain might have been influenced by his Great War background, but he mainly hoped to deter a guerrilla assault and free up men for patrol duty. The unit regularly practiced defensive drills 99 and often left just two squads to guard the camp.

Morale became a constant refrain in Edson's correspond­ ence. He frequently stressed the positive impact of supply deliveries on unit attitudes. "God is great. Supplies from heaven yesterday to feed the starving and clothe the naked. Visit from our own planes raised morale 500%. 11100

His concern proved well-founded. On 28 September four privates deserted their outpost at Wamblan, stole a boat, and went downriver. They surrendered the next day at Bocay, after their boat overturned in the rapids, but their foray revealed the level of desperation among at least some of the men. The captain ascribed their actions to "lack of 69 adequate rations," which did not deter him from recommending 101 a court martial for the offenders.

Adoption of a stable base did improve communications.

Early in September, Major Utley finally received the two radiomen which he had requested in May. However, he com­ plained to Brigade that they were only operators, not the radio electricians that he really required. Headquarters gave his plea short shrift; "Please establish a radio at 11102 Poteca as early as possible and report when done.

One of the men and a set arrived at the base camp on the

10th. Prior to then, the patrol had to send messages by boat to Bocay, or have them picked up by plane. Often the aircraft came from Managua, in which case information passed directly to Brigade and then eventually down to

Area Headquarters. But, the advent of radio communications did not cut the general's command post out of the loop, since it could still listen in on message traffic. That fact may have influenced Edson's habit of writing frequent and lengthy personal letters to Utley, many of them honest appraisals of his own situation, or critical of policies originated outside the Eastern domain.

September brought on a lengthy debate over tactical priorities and dispositions. At the beginning of the month,

Brigade policy dictated that the Coco Patrol remain at

Poteca and conduct small operations in the surrounding area. However, headquarters did not spell out the specific 70 objective of these activities. The operations officer pro- vided only a confusing and unfocused letter on the subject.

Major Utley prodded the general's staff for adoption of a more offensive approach along the lines suggested by Edson on 10 August. Roving patrols, supplied wholly by air, would pursue the guerrillas and give them no respite. But, higher headquarters rejected the concept. "Because of indefinite outlaw intelligence •.• Brigade now requires no special operations by your troops. Continue patrolling at discretion of yourself and local commanders. 11103

The general finally established a tangible operational objective in a 25 September Letter of Instruction; Area commanders were to prevent interference with upcoming elections through active local patrols. But, this defensive policy applied only to the Northern and Southern commands, since they included all the nation's significant population centers. The Eastern Area received only an information copy and remained without any distinct operational gu1.d ance. 104

Edson, the leading proponent of offensive roving patrols, faced the task of implementing a static, defensive policy. One of his first priorities became the security of his waterborne line of supply, which was extremely vulnerable to rebel interruption. At the same time, he wanted to keep a significant force available at Poteca for limited offensive patrols against the guerrillas. 71 As a consequence, he requested reinforcements for the specific purpose of garrisoning key points down the Coco

River. Major Utley, still wedded to an offensive posture, initially opposed his subordinate's proposal; "I do not feel like wasting those outfits on garrison duty if there are any bandits within chaseable distance. 11105 But,

Brigade's policy of holding Poteca and withholding increases in aerial supply flights made Edson's project inevitable.

On 27 September, the Eastern Area commander ordered a detachment of Tulsa Marines to garrison Ililiquas, which raised the number of outposts along the Coco River to ten 106 (excluding Poteca).

While Edson and his men transformed Poteca, the

Northern Area put together its first riverine patrol down the Coco. The detachment consisted of three officers, forty-three men, and four boats specifically constructed for the expedition. It got under way from Ocotal on 4

September, with orders to proceed to Santa Cruz. Captain

Peter C. Geyer, the patrol leader, closely followed Edson's tactical advice and placed flank security units on each bank. However, he powered his fleet with motors and Marine crewmen, rather than paddles, poles, and native boatmen.

The expedition encountered trouble from the beginning.

Two boats capsized in the first rapids and only the use of kapok jackets prevented loss of life. Difficulties mounted thereafter. The radio and some of the motors 72 failed. Boats regularly capsized or swamped. One Marine

drowned and another nearly died after being struck by an

air-dropped sack of rice. Injuries and illnesses affected

37 of the 46 men in the unit. On 27 September a relief

column came overland and met the patrol just beyond

Telpaneca. The fresh Marines evacuated those who could

not continue and resupplied the detachment. Captain Geyer

burned the boats and returned to Ocotal by trail. This

Coco Patrol never made contact with the enemy and only

served to prove that the upper river truly was impassable.

The Northern Area commander later recommended six members

of the unit for the Navy Cross for courage in this battle

aga1ns. t na t ure. 107

Brigade policies may have prevented Edson from forming

a roving patrol, but that did not completely tie him to

a static position at Poteca. He conducted small patrols

in his area as ordered, but never abandoned the idea of bigger operations against the rebels. Transportation

remained one of the major limiting factors. The Coco

Marines had no pack train and an insufficient number of boats. The captain summarized his view of matters in a

formal "Estimate of Situation" submitted to Major Utley on 3 October. He guessed that Sandino had between 150 and 250 men concentrated in the area northeast of Murra.

Many of these were probably "forced recruits" and all

suffered from shortages of food and ammunition. However, 73 their position gave them some strength. They could readily detect any moves in the vicinity because of the limited avenues of approach, and they could easily slip across 108 the border into Honduras if hard-pressed.

The commander at Poteca first recommended that Eastern

Area establish outposts at Cua (up the Coco) and Garrobo

(near the headwaters of the Bocay) to further limit guerrilla freedom of action. Next, he briefly stated the operational choices available: "(1) To sit still and await bandit actions, (2) To attempt to keep bandits moving and unable [to] formulate or carry out definite plans. 11109

Edson, of course, favored the latter approach. Despite his meager assets, he proposed an immediate operation against the guerrilla stronghold. He would take most of his force up the Poteca River, with the troops moving on land and boats bringing up supplies and equipment. He hoped that

Northern Area patrols would move east in support, "in line

[with the] Brigade policy [of] September twenty-fifth," which had called for "coordinated patrolling within any affected districts. 11110

The earnest captain did not wait for his superiors to formulate an alternative. On 4 October he and forty-six men moved out for Gulke Camp on the Poteca. Two days later they made contact at the mouth of Arenal Creek, just a short distance from their initial objective. The patrol captured clothing, food, and a small quantity of ammunition, 74 but the four man rebel outpost escaped unharmed. Edson pressed forward in pursuit, but higher headquarters inter- vened and brought the chase to an early end. Brigade had adopted his idea for joint action, but the staff redesigned the scheme of maneuver to their own satisfaction. On 7

October a plane dropped a message to the detachment which halted its operation and placed it under the tactical 111 control of Northern Area.

That same day Edson notified Major Utley of the situation and expressed his dismay regarding the change.

"Success [of] my operations depended largely on rapidity of movement and surprise by following unexpected route.

Both these elements now lost.'' 1 1 2 The Coco Patrol's temporary superior issued Field Order #8 the next day, which directed the detachment to remain in place until

12 October and then proceed southwest to the headwaters of the Tamis River near Murra "for the purpose of clearing 11113 that area of reported bandit forces. Edson chafed at the delay, not only for tactical reasons, but also due 114 to the adverse effect on health and morale.

The Coco Marines finally moved out again on the 12th.

Their new orders required them to cut ties to their boats and move over land, for which they were ill-equipped. They had no pack animals to transport rations or equipment, so the men had to carry everything on their backs. A series of particularly difficult trails complicated the task; 75 one path crossed waterways seventy-two seperate times.

Two men became sick and further slowed the rate of march.

On the 14th the patrol discovered an abandoned rebel camp, but seized only a typewriter and a few papers. The next day the detachment reached its objective and linked up with Captain Holmes of the Northern Area. Edson later described the reception to Major Utley:

Both Stephenson and I got the impression that we were not particularly desired over there in the NA play­ ground • • • no one from the Colonel on down ever ex­ pected us to get thru. Holmes was quite surprised to meet us on the 15th. Bets were current around the area that here was one thing we could not do - and that we would never arrive in the Murra area ..• They all seem glad to extend us a fine welcome at home - but not to run around in their back yard stirring up or digging out something they havT15hus far failed to find. Do I make myself clear?

Edson sent out a small patrol on the 16th to look for pack animals. The unit stumbled on to a guerrilla band and killed a single rebel. The Marines retrieved a rifle and twelve rounds from the body, but found only a few mules. The entire force moved out the next day, headed in the general direction of the Poteca River. This time the detachment followed even worse trails in hope of increasing the probability of contact. The tactic turned up only another abandoned camp, more papers, and seventy-two rifle rounds. At one point the path became so steep and narrow that two of the four mules fell and had to be destroyed. The patrol reached the river on 22 October.

Edson and the main body boated down to Poteca that day, 76 while Stephenson and a small detail followed on land with th e remaining. . pac k anima . 1 s. 11 6

The captain discussed the patrol at length in another long letter to Major Utley. He registered his "disappoint- ment" over the results three seperate times, and stressed the harsh conditions as well, "It was by far the hardest 11117 pa t ro 1 ye t ma d e b y me. Bu th'is spiri. 't remaine. d re 1 a- tively high. He noted the positive aspects of the opera- tion, particularly that the Marines had again demonstrated their ability to penetrate any guerrilla lair, no matter how inhospitable the terrain.

Despite his lack of success making contact on the difficult trails, he still recommended the technique.

However, based on his new knowledge of the area to the northwest, he expected little or no rebel activity in that vicinity for the foreseeable future. The "bandits" would most likely operate further to the west in districts belonging solely to the Northern Area. "It looks to me as tho the period of active and long patrols for this organization is about over. That does not mean we will not continue putting feelers out in all directions, for patrols will continue to go south, east and west, - but

I doubt if anything will be encountered. 11118 He briefly summed up his present policy; "We are now in process of transition from field to garrison duty with patrols of one - two - four days duration, in line with the opinions 77 expressed above." 11 9

The next day, 26 October, Edson again wrote to Utley, but this time he concentrated on his new policy. He requested more items to improve the camp, noted the reintroduction of daily shaves and inspections, stressed the importance of recreational facilities, mentioned the camp's volley ball court, and detailed plans for a complete

Thanksgiving dinner. The latter encompassed construction of an oven, air-dropped turkeys and trimmings, and eight kegs of beer. Most of these steps constituted an attempt to boost morale, but the captain sought to maintain a high level of military skill as well. When not on patrol, squads participated in classroom and field training, which included subjects outside the realm of guerrilla warfare. The troops dug model trenches and constructed sample wire obstacles.

They competed for various camp privileges, such as the limited supply of cigarettes and first place in the chow line. Edson clearly took a deep interest in the welfare of his men. Major Utley apparently took equally good care of his officers. The letter mentioned receipt of ''three canteens of sperm oil, castor oil and clear varnish," which 120 Edson and his lieutenants quickly emptied.

The Marines had little opportunity to settle into the new routine. On 27 October Eastern Area received a report of Sandino and forty men at Pitita, midway between

Cua and Santa Cruz on the upper Coco. The commander ordered 78 the detachments at Poteca and Garrobo to investigate.

Edson took the change of plans in stride, but found it difficult to logisitcally support the operation. Most of his boats had departed the area on supply runs and his provisions were severely depleted. Even the small amount of rations on hand were unsuited for field use. He reques t e d an emergency resupp 1 y o f nee d e d i't ems. 121

Due to the logistic problems, a patrol did not depart

Poteca until early November. As the men passed south of

Yacalwas, they noted that the inhabitants had deserted their homes. One native indicated that the Sandinistas had declared their intention to occupy the valley in the near future. The Coco Marines reached Santa Cruz on the

4th and linked up with a Northern Area unit. The combined patrol conducted further searches in the area without any result. The experience only confirmed Edson's doubts about his compatriots to the west, since they did not share his predilection for pre-dawn departures to avoid native observation. The two units parted company at Santa Cruz on the 14th and the Coco detachment reached home two days 122 later.

Edson's next letter broached the idea of a mounted patrol, which he saw as a necessity during the upcoming dry season. He expected to outfit it with the horses and mules observed in the upper Coco valley on the recent patrol.

The irrepressible captain could not long endure the quiet 79 garrison life; "My feet are getting nervous again and I desire to see more of Nicaragua a la cavalry mounted on mules. 11123 In a companion piece, Edson coupled this mobile unit with an expanded version of his earlier tactical ideas:

Somewhere in my letter I mentioned a pair of itching feet. What I particularly had in mind was not so much the extension of our present line - altho that is quite desirable - as the formation of a roving patrol • • • My idea is the organization of a patrol of about 40-50 men, with no fixed limits of patrolling, free to move in this [outlaw] territory as outlined, follow­ ing such clues as it can pick-up and reporting in at the nearest post in any one of the three areas for rations about once every fifteen days. Such a patrol would not supplant the combined manouvers now being carried on, but would be in addition to them - a con­ tinuous roving patrol. The idea would be an outfit as near like bandits as possible - using the side trails they use - becoming bush men like them - and living like them. This patrol would have no regular base to return to every ten to twenty days - but would probably reach its original supply base once a month or every six weeks • . • This would be damned strenuous work - it would require an outfit of 100 men, for this kind of patrolling would wear out half the command a month, and it might not bring any better results than we have had already. But I would certainly like to give it a try. Even tho it by itself gets no contact with the outlaws, I believe that a roving band of this kind would be quite likely to chase them into the ha¥2~ of some other patrol with equally as good results.

Edson believed that this free-lance Coco Patrol would end guerrilla occupation of the "no mans land" along the boundaries of the geographic commands.

The Poteca commander also renewed an invitation for the major to visit that remote outpost, an offer which

Edson had made half-jokingly twice before. He described the quickest itinerary available and noted the benefits 80 of the trip: the commander could compare Poteca with his other posts and those of the Northern Area, he would become familiar with the terrain, and the visit would buoy the spirits of the troops. "The main idea is that I crave to see and talk with you personally. There are numerous questions of policy which should be considered and decided in the very near future . • I believe these things can be talked over and decision reached much better in person than by letter. 11125

While Edson pondered new tactical approaches, Brigade mounted another combined operation beginning 17 November.

The Coco detachment again went under Northern Area juris­ diction, but this time the patrols were small in size and close to home. Edson let Lieutenants Cook and Pollock lead their own expeditions. Neither patrol made contact and they brought back only a small quantity of ammunition and a typewriter, but the cost was comparatively high. One of Pollock's boats capsized, with the death of a Marine and the loss of five weapons. The young officer learned from this experience. In later patrols his men kept their cartridge belts loose, so they could shed them rapidly, and used long strings to tie corks to their weapons, so 126 they could find them in the water.

Over the course of the next few months, the Coco

Marines maintained an active patrolling program throughout their area. On several occasions each officer led a 81 detachment on a seperate route, with only a sergeant and two squads left in the base camp. But, evidence of guerrilla activity grew increasingly scarce. Edson and others first thought that the enemy had broken into small bands with the express purpose of avoiding battle with the Marine patrols. An Eastern Area intelligence report later speculated that Honduran nationals and other elements of the rebel forces had given up the fight and crossed 127 the northern border.

Pollock made the only contact during this period on

17 December. While following the tracks of two men near

Yacalwas, the unit stumbled on a rebel group which surren­ dered without a fight. The band consisted of a Sandinista

"colonel" named Ruperto Hernandez, four other men, eight women, and eighteen children. They had in their possession a sword, two shotguns, a small amount of explosives and ammunition, two rebel flags, and some correspondence. A late December intelligence summary noted that there had been no bandit activity east of the Poteca - Garrobo outpost line since its establishment in the Fall. Edson's belief that he had "badly ••• hurt the bandit morale and 128 organization" seemed fully justified.

Further evidence of success came from the local inhab- itants. Reports from September onward painted an increas­ ingly positive picture of Marine - native relations.

Several factors probably contributed to this process. 82

Aerial propaganda leaf lets and American actions dispelled some of the fear instilled in the Indians by Sandinista agitators. Major Utley also enlisted the help of the influential Moravian missionaries in this task. Employment as boatmen, guides, and informers provided a new and substantial source of income. Lastly, the extended Marine presence promised an indefinite reprieve from rebel exactions and disruptions. In January twenty families requested and received permission to settle near the base at Poteca. Edson's policy of concern for the Indians had begun to generate longterm results. 129

The Coco Patrol continued to improve Camp Stengel.

The base defenses evolved into a thorough plan and a well- built perimeter. In addition to the fixed obstacles and trench system, Edson placed sentinels at key posts along the trails and the river, sent patrols out day and night to scour the vicinity, and employed a network of native agents 130 to warn of an attack. He also continued to improve the quality of life in the camp. The facility eventually boasted a shower fed by a bamboo pipeline, cots, screened buildings, gravel walks, and other garrison amenities.

Requests for recreation equipment multiplied and touched everything from boxing gloves to chessmen. At one point

Edson even asked for a shipment of records, as the unit 131 had somehow come into possession of a phonograph.

Bureaucracy inevitably followed. Requisitions included 8J file folders and forms, while eighteen pages of typed regulations governed camp life and guard responsibilities.

The typewriters were apparently those captured from the rebels, which perked the interest of the overburdened staff officers at Area Headquarters. An intelligence report commented on the contraband; "Note for tacticians and strategists: not even bandits in the bush can fight a war without typewriters! 11132

Morale remained a problem despite command interest in improving conditions in the camp. One private deserted on 14 February and stole a native dugout, but he made it no farther than Bocay, where a ration boat corning upriver intercepted him. Other disciplinary infractions occurred from time to time, to include temporary absences to avoid patrol duty. But, similar incidents happened in other remote outposts. On the same day that Private Fried departed Poteca, another Marine left his Northern Area 133 uni. t in . s an t a c ruz. Conditions were hard in the field and some men simply could not stand up to them. After a personal inspection of Poteca in January, Major Utley had pronounced both the morale of the men and the state of the camp acceptable. 1 34

Operations continued at a hectic pace throughout the winter months. Edson led a patrol of forty-one men into the upper Coco valley on 14 January and thoroughly searched the region through 4 February. Another detachment of 84 sixteen men scoured a nearby area at the same time. The

Marines followed tracks and discovered several abandoned 135 camps, but they returned to base empty-handed. The next day Edson launched a new patrol into the district northwest of Cua. The unit included the captain, Cook, twenty-five men, eight mules, and six native guides.

Around midday on the 8th the point heard the voices of several men on the trail ahead. Two squads followed the guerrillas at a distance. Half an hour later, as the trail ascended through a ravine, a rebel group sprung an ambush on the Marines. Intense fire, including automatic weapons and dynamite bombs, lasted for fifteen minutes, and then the guerrillas broke off contact and melted away.

The patrol surprisingly suffered only a single casualty, an Indian wounded in the leg. The Marines found no indication of enemy casualties, but they noted their opponents' carefully crafted, V-shaped position, with the trail leading into the mouth of the v. Edson estimated twenty-five men had conducted the ambush. The patrol later turned up three recently-used camps, but it could not pursue 136 effectively with one man being carried on a stretcher.

The Coco detachment returned to base on 15 February.

There Edson answered an earlier letter from the Brigade operations officer, who was searching for new methods against the rebels. The B-3 had suggested offering a one thousand dollar reward for information leading to the demise 85 of Pedron Altamirano, the most active of the guerrilla chiefs. Edson first recounted the Nicaraguan's tactics, which relied heavily on night movements and the maintenance of outposts around his camps. The Marine captain thought it unlikely that any native would volunteer for the risky assignment of killing Altamirano or leading an American unit to his base. He then resurrected his earlier proposal for a roving patrol, one which would relentlessly pursue this particular enemy band. With support from normal combat patrols working planned routes, one might expect to eventu- ally flush the guerrilla group into open battle. "If the infected area is kept constantly filled with patrols moving, 11137 Pedron fleeing from one may e.asil~ run into another. A few days after the operation, Edson travelled to

Puerto Cabezas, probably via boat to Bocay and then by amphibian plane. From there he flew on to Managua, where he received Confidential Brigade Special Orders #11, along with verbal instructions supplementing the written text.

The captain paraphrased his mission statement in a letter

II to Major Utley. Go where you please, do what you please and return when you feel like it. If then you feel like going into the wilds again, it is alright with us, for the rest of the time here you will be foot loose and fancy .. 138 f ree. Edson finally had his roving patrol. However, one restriction promised to limit his effectiveness; he must return to Poteca in time to execute orders to return 86 to the States around 1 April.

The general granted a short meeting to his visitor, but he provided little additional information to the junior officer. Edson gathered most of his "intelligence" in conversations with the staff after hours. They indicated that troop cuts might soon take place in the Eastern Area, with the tiny aviation detachment being the first to depart

The successful conclusion of elections the previous November had further fueled political and economic demands for troop withdrawals. The Eastern command was already the smallest in Nicaragua, with just 600 men out of the Brigade total of 5,000 Marines. When Edson questioned how a reduced force would cover the immense territory, the staff officers had no reply. The Poteca commander summarized his findings for Major Utley; "It is the same old stuff of no definite policy to look to or work on. 11139

The axe fell a few days later. On 2 March Brigade informed Area Headquarters that COMSPERON wanted his Marines back on the ships by 3 April. Those men made up the whole garrison at Poteca, as well as the bulk of several other forward outposts. The general requested Major Utley's recommendations on how to carry out the transfer. The

Area commander's reply noted Brigade Special Order #8, which directed an increase in both patrolling activity and the number of outposts. He then listed three possible options: (1) reduce the strength of coastal garrisons and 87 send the men forward as replacements, (2) turn over posts to the Northern Area, or (3) "abandon Poteca which is not, 140 repeat not, recommended." Brigade chose the first alternative, but also ordered the major to decrease the size of the forward elements. A supplementary message kept the roving patrol alive. Edson and his men would move through the rebel zone and end their operation in the Northern Area, and then receive air transportation 141 to the east coast.

The last patrol began on 9 March. Edson and twenty-six men departed Poteca by boat and met up with their pack train at Guiguili the next day. They then proceeded overland to the southeast, their eventual objective the headwaters of the Cua River. On the 14th the detachment came across a freshly-cut trail showing signs of heavy traffic. At successive villages along the path they received reports that Altamirano and forty men had passed through the area about three days ahead of the patrol. At each stop the rebel leader had enlisted new men into his ranks, sometimes against their will.

Around noon of the 17th, the point man spotted a guer- rilla on the trail and killed him. The patrol recovered an

American Springfield rifle and four rounds from the body.

Twenty minutes later the detachment walked into a well- concealed ambush. About fifteen rebels opened fire with rifles at point-blank range and then fled five minutes 88 later when the Marines gained fire superiority. Edson led most of the patrol in pursuit, but he could not regain contact on the difficult trail. Signs along the path indicated that the ambush had covered a larger force of more than forty men. The captain broke off the chase after two hours and returned to the site to evacuate his casualties. The initial fusilade had wounded two Marines, one of them the point man, Private Savulich. The young

Marine died that afternoon. The patrol found one rebel body in the brush.

Edson turned the detachment west and arrived at

Jinotega on 20 March. Both he and the wounded man flew to Managua. The patrol leader made a personal report of the operation to the Brigade staff and flew back to Jinotega the next day. Four cargo planes transferred the entire group to Puerto Cabezas that morning. The last Coco Patrol had come to an end.

Edson's written report described the modified rebel tactics which he faced in his last two engagements. The ambush was no longer the opening move of a battle, but a means to harass the patrols, inflict a few casualties, slow the Marine advance, and protect the rebel main body.

American tactics need not drastically change, though. The patrol must be prepared to split in two at the end of an ambush. One element would pursue the guerrillas while the other looked after the pack train and any casualties. There would be a cost in lives, but a roving patrol would eventually run Altamirano into the ground. 142

The rest of the ships detachments departed Poteca on 17 March and arrived at Cape Gracias eight days later.

They left behind at the base camp one officer and forty men of the 59th Company. On the 27th, Brigade revoked those parts of Special Order #8 which had directed increased operations in the Eastern Area, and notified the commander that Camp Stengel's days were almost over. "Present plans contemplate reduction and possible abandoning of several of your western posts. 11143 Poteca reverted to a deserted ranch in less than a month.

Captain Edson and Major Utley left Nicaragua within weeks. Their successful economy-of-force operation had put the rebel army on the defensive and prevented any interference with the elections. But it did not end the revolution. Two years later, with the Marine withdrawal largely complete, Sandinista forces again attacked the resource-rich east, established a stronghold at Bocay, and raided all the way down the Coco River to Cape . 144 Grac1as. CHAPTER V

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL

The search for "lessons learned" in the Nicaraguan campaign began well before the conflict ended. In a memo- randum dated 9 November 1928, the Brigade staff asked every officer in the command to furnish a summary of their experience in that nation. "It is the intention of this off ice to compile a pamphlet covering the important prob- lems, together with their solutions which have confronted this Brigade auring its service in Nicaragua. This pam- phlet will be intended as a guide for future, similar expeditions. 11145 Edson turned in comments on the relative merits of different automatic weapons and on communications equipment. The Eastern Area staff also detailed their 146 probl ems w1·th ra d'10s. u n d ou bt e dl y many o ff·1cers re- sponded, but the records contain no evidence of other letters or the promised pamphlet.

After their respective departures from Nicaragua,

Utley and Edson both assumed duties in Marine Corps train- ing programs. The major headed the correspondence course branch in Quantico, and also taught subjects in the formal schools. Edson went to Philadelphia, where he served as a 90 91 tactics instructor for new lieutenants at the Basic School

(TBS). Not long after his return to the States, Utley began to gather information for his own work on the subject of minor conflicts. He sent letters throughout the Corps to officers who had participated in previous campaigns of this nature. His new and informal version of the 1928

Brigade memorandum received a mixed response. One colonel took nine months to write back, and then sent only a brief no t e on h is. experiences. in . S an t o Domingo. . 147

Utley seems to have begun his letter campaign around

March 1930. One of his first notes went to his former subordinate in Nicaragua. The major apparently complained about the shortcomings of tactical instruction at Quantico, since Edson replied in a similar vein regarding his own program; "The course in "Small Wars" here in Philadelphia is in probably a worse situation than yours. 11148 The former leader of the Coco Patrols placed equal emphasis on the importance of the topic. "I hope to elaborate considerably upon the techniques of "Bush Warf are" and scatter the subject over a considerable period of time.

It will, in fact, be the basis rather than a side issue of the tactical course for these young officers. 11149

Edson's eight pages of single-spaced typescript de- veloped several points. First, he attacked the generally accepted notion that the point man should be armed with an automatic weapon. He noted the frequent use of that 92 practice in the Northern and Southern Areas of Nicaragua, as well as a recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette that advocated it. But, the point man was most likely to become the first casualty, which would deprive the patrol of an important asset when the unit most needed it. Fur- thermore, the demanding nature of point duty required frequent reliefs for that position, which would necessitate a confusing swap of weapons.

The TBS instructor next addressed the practice of reconnaissance by fire, in which units fired mortars, rifle grenades, or automatic weapons at suspicious points ahead of them. He thought this technique had many drawbacks and should be used only in limited circumstances. The major specifically asked for information on movement by boats and the fortification of Poteca. Edson provided details of the methods he employed in Nicaragua, to include a sketch of Camp Stengel's defensive system. The noted patrol leader closed with his opinion of how the Marine

Corps would most likely fight in the next war:

I may have the wrong idea, but it seems to me that here at the Basic School the young officers should be given plenty of instruction in "Small Wars" and "Over-Seas Operations", with less emphasis placed upon instruction as part of larger forces. As a matter of fact, I think this 95bticism applies to our entire system of schools. [emphasis added]

Early in the letter Edson had ref erred to a compila- tion of his ideas on automatic weapons. That document may have been his hand-scrawled response to the original 93 Brigade memorandum. In that work he championed the BAR over the Thompson submachinegun, even though many veterans of the Nicaraguan campaign swore by the latter weapon.

The captain thought jungle warfare required accuracy over firepower, particularly if ammunition was scarce. The

Thompson was less accurate and also used an easily-broken, noisy. d rum magazine.. 1 51

Major Utley responded immediately with more questions on Poteca and with a solicitation for ideas on small wars instruction. He also included a lengthy rough draft of his exposition on the defenses of Camp Stengel. Edson's answer clarified some points raised in the essay and twice 11152 promised more information in a "later letter.

The Quantico instructor conducted extensive research into his subject. His work built upon the earlier efforts of others, including sources outside the Marine Corps.

He adopted the term "small wars" from a turn-of-the-century book written by Colonel C.E. Callwell, a British Army officer. The expression was already in current use in the United States, as well. The Marine Corps Gazette had published "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars" in

1921 and 1922, while the Infantry School at Fort Benning had brought out "Small Wars and Punitive Expeditions" 153 in 1926.

Utley completed a substantial portion of his manu- script by late 1930 and began to press his ideas through various channels. He first presented portions of his work in the Marine Corps Gazette. That journal printed the introduction of "The Tactics and Techniques of Small

Wars" in May 1931, and three subsequent chapters in later issues. The major continued to refine his manuscript during this period. The most current reference in the chapters that survive is to events which occurred in August 154 1932.

Major Utley apparently sent his manuscript to at least one highly-placed individual. He received one response typed on "Office of the Chief of Naval Operations" station­ ery. That letter dwelt at length on his efforts; "I am returning herewith your notes on Minor Operations, and am glad to have had a chance to go through them from beginning to end ••• I hope to have chances to take this up with

General Berkeley, as ~ know the attitude in Operations is decidedly favorable towards some progressive action along these lines. 11155 The letter was signed "Evans," which was likely Brigadier General Frank E. Evans. Brigadier

General Randolph c. Berkeley had just taken charge of

Marine Corps Schools the previous month, September 1930.

He is best known now for his role in development of the

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, which first codified the amphibious doctrine used in World War II.

There is no certain evidence of when the Marine Corps adopted the major's work as an official project. It may 95 have had the blessing of his superiors from the beginning, but the personal nature of his early correspondence on the matter does not support that conclusion. The extant par­ tial copy of the manuscript reveals a reliance on military assets, though. The professional appearance of the maps and illustrations, as well as use of the Schools letter­ head, indicate that the author completed the work as part of his official duties.

Conceivably, General Berkeley had much to do with the progression of the Manual. He had been Chief of Staff of the 2nd Brigade at the time of the 1928 memorandum regarding small wars lessons. He certainly had knowledge of that document and would have had to approve its issuance. Given his acknowledged role in the development of the first amphibious warfare manual, it seems likely that he took an equal interest in formalizing doctrine in another operational area. As head of the Schools in

1931, he was definitely in a position to provide all the support that Utley required.

The Corps published the first Small Wars Manual in

1935. This initial copy closely followed "The Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars." Subsequent editions in

1938 and 1940 contained less of the original material, but even the final printing bore a striking resemblance 156 to Utley's early work. More importantly, the Manual embodied many of the tactical thoughts and experiences of Merritt Edson.

Despite his interest in the subject, Utley had little or no experience at the tactical level of small wars. He served with the Haitian Gendarmerie in 1919 and 1920, but as a major and divisional commander. There is no hint in his papers or the manuscript that he saw any personal action in that conflict. In the Nicaraguan intervention he was even more removed from the scenes of combat. His voluminous correspondence with Edson must have shaped his view of daily operations in that theater. The junior captain and his troops did far more than any other unit in the Eastern region, and he alone communicated all the details to the Area commander. Later, the major submitted his manuscript for Edson's review and comments, which reveals how much he valued that officer's opinions.

The evidence of Edson's influence on the Manual is overwhelming, even in the much-modified 1940 version.

The chapter on river operations recounts all the lessons which the Coco Patrols gained in fourteen months of peri­ lous operations. In fact, the opening paragraphs cite the Coco as an example of river characteristics and con­ ditions (10-2). The section on "A typical ambush" (10-25) describes terrain similar to that at Ililiquas, while another section on "Defensive measures" (10-28) outlines arrangements like those employed at Poteca. The Manual also recommends the use of native boatmen in order to 97 free Marines to fight (10-14), the use of flank security patrols on the river banks (10-23), and even the use of packs as seats in the native dugouts (10-17). All these practices were Edson trademarks.

The chapter on infantry patrols is equally reminiscent of the Coco operations. The Manual agrees with many of

Edson's beliefs: accuracy is more important than the volume of fire (6-23), patrols should rarely employ reconnaissance by fire (6-61 ), roving patrols are particularly effective

(6-12), night operations are difficult and seldom success- ful (6-99), the point man should not carry an automatic weapon (6-67), midday meals waste valuable march time

(6-31 ), troops must carry an emergency ration and eat it only on command (6-37), inexperienced pack trains slow the rate of march (6-40), tobacco and small denominations of money are effective mediums of exchange (6-30 and 5-8), bamboo bunks and lean-to's can replace shelter halves

(6-29 and 6-56), and razors are unessential equipment

(6-29).

The Manual appears to have taken some passages ver- batim from the captain's writings:

If the regulation 50 minute march, 10 minute halt schedule is maintained, even a small patrol [with pack animals] may become so elongated that several miles will separate the head and the tail of the column at the end of the day's march.(6-40)

Had I attampted a regulation march of fifty minutes with a ten minute rest each hour, my patrol, with its inexperienced muleros, would soon hay57been strung out over several miles of territory. 98 Even with a small combat patrol, the extra ammunition should be transported in the train . If the bando­ lier is carried, a considerable quantity of ammunition is lost.(2-41)

More ammunition was lost from bandoliers than was shot through our rifles. That evening, all extra ammunition was collected and placed in boxes to accompany the supply section of the boat train. 158

The leading man of the point should never be armed with an automatic rifle. He, more than any other man in the patrol, is likely to become a casualty in the initial burst of hostile fire from ambush. Point duty is dangerous and fatiguing.(6-67)

The point must be constantly on the alert • • • and should not have the added weight of [an automatic] weapon and the ammunition to tire him ••• the mostsg probable casualty at the initial fire is the point.

There are numerous other examples where the Manual para- phrases Edson's letters or reports.

Other Marines probably picked up similar lessons during the Banana Wars, but the wording employed in the

Manual and the adoption of opinions expressed by Edson are proof that he had great influence on the development of that publication. Of course, there are several parts of the Manual which fell outside his areas of expertise, such as military government, the supervision of elections, and aviation. But, the small unit tactical doctrine espoused in the Manual is largely the thinking of Merritt

Edson. CONCLUSIONS

Most Marines and many other Americans are familiar with 'Red Mike' Edson and his exploits at Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal. The Coco Patrols, on the other hand, are not even well-known in the Corps, let alone among the general population. But, Edson's achievements in the 1920's now far outweigh his heroic deeds of World

War II. Those latter events are important only to history or as an inspiration to future Marine leaders. However, what he accomplished in Nicaragua may help determine U.S. policies in a future conflict. Therefore, any analyst or policy-maker who thinks about the Small Wars Manual must also understand what happened along the Coco River.

There are certainly many similarities between the

Sandinista movement of the 1920's and modern revolutions.

In fact, Neill Macaulay has made a case for Sandino as 160 a progenitor of the doctrine of people's war. The raids against isolated objectives, the efforts to disrupt the economy and elections, and the use of nationalism to stir up hatred against foreign intervention are recognizable in Edson's Nicaragua and in all current insurgencies. 99 100 The tactics employed against revolutionaries have

not always been the same, though. Some are common to

both the Banana Wars and Vietnam: civic action, aggressive

patrolling, aerial support, reconnaissance by fire, cordon

and search, and more. However, the Small Wars Manual details many doctrines that never made it to modern times:

the use of pack trains and native river craft, a near

total reliance on daylight operations, the issuance of mission orders to a roving patrol of indefinite duration.

Those who would champion the Manual as the repository of a lost key to victory need to evaluate that document

in the light of history. There are certainly many factors which might limit its applicability to modern warfare.

An obvious one is the scale of the Nicaraguan campaign.

As its height it involved less than 5,000 American troops and a considerably smaller number of indigenous forces on both sides of the conflict. Total Marine casualties were only 47 killed as a result of enemy action and 85 161 dead from disease, accidents, and other causes. Edson's

force never reached one hundred men and his opponent was not significantly stronger. His biggest engagements

involved even smaller numbers, enemy and friendly combined.

The population of Nicaragua amounted to about 600,000

people, while the Coco basin was nearly uninhabited. The

scale of modern conflicts is substantially greater. 101 A second difference is the international character of present day revolutions. Foreign aid played a miniscule part in Nicaragua. Shortages of weapons, ammunition, and provisions plagued the Sandinistas throughout the campaign. The military poverty of the enemy was a decided factor in Edson's favor. Compare that situation with

Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, or El Salvador, where outside logistic support is a major source of sustenance for the rebels.

The final significant distinction is the character of the military forces. Sandino and a few of his lieutenants demonstrated skill in the art of laying ambushes, but their operational expertise seldom rose to that level in other areas. The poorly prepared guerrillas were often unable to inflict significant casualties on their opponent even when they achieved tactical surprise at point blank range. Numerically inferior regular forces inevitably dispersed or easily defeated the rebels. Modern revolutionaries, on the other hand, are usually thoroughly trained in ideology and military skills. Technology has also altered the equation.

Electronics, helicopters, mines, night vision goggles, and a host of other devices have revolutionized methods of warfare. Edson would have gladly fought at night, if only he could have seen in the dark. 102 These changes have not necessarily rendered the Manual irrelevant. It may yet stimulate debates and ideas critical to the development of new counterinsurgency doctrine. Edson's thoughts on mission orders and roving patrols are certainly as pertinent today as they were sixty years ago. We need only ensure that we look at the Manual in its proper setting. It was not the blueprint of victory in Nicaragua, and it will certainly not be the sole answer to the next guerrilla campaign. NOTES

1 For the Commandant's remarks, see General A.M. Gray, "29th Commandant Speaks to the Corps,, .. Marine Corps Gazette 71 (September 1987)p.18; for the quoted material, see Major Susan J. Flores, "Marine Corps Employment in Low-Intensity Conflict," Marine Corps Gazette 73 (April 1989)p.31.

2According to Schaffer, the Manual was "the work of Major Utley and other Marine small-war specialists." See Ronald Schaffer, introduction to Small Wars Maual by U.S. Marine Corps (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower Press, 1988)p.vi. See also Benjamin R. Beede, Intervention and Counterinsurgency (New York: Garland Publishing, 1985)p.30; "Utley's series [of articles] is important because it grew into a three-volume manuscript that led to the writing of the Small Wars Manual."

3 Bernard C. Nalty, The United States Marines In Nicaragua (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1968)p.16. 4 Augusto c. Sandino to Froylan Turcios, letter, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 22 February 1928, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington.

5captain Merritt A. Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part I, Marine Corps Gazette 20 (August 1936)p.20. Much of the material for the first three chapters of this work is drawn from Edson's three part article in the Gazette, since this is the primary source now available on the subject. Many of the documents which Edson quoted in that article are no longer available. Possibly they disappeared along with the manuscript, which is not in his extensive personal papers at the Library of Congress. The most valuable source would have been the Record of Events which Edson kept for each of his patrols. Edson's Gazette article will only be foot­ noted hereafter when a direct quote is taken.

6Ibid. p.19; see also Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis (New York: Macmillan, 1980)pp.237-39.

711 Brigade Order #24," 18 February 1928, Major Harold H. Utley collection, Personal Papers Section, MCHC. 10.3 104 8 Major Utley, undated memorandum, Utley Papers, MCHC. 9 Edson, 11 The Coco Patrol," Part I, p.18. 10 captain Merritt A. Edson to Ethel R. Edson, letter, 5 March 1928, Box 2, Edson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington. 1 1 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part I, p.38. 12 Ibid. p. 39. 13 rbid. p.40. 14 Ibid. 15 rbid. p.41. 16 Edson to wife, letter, 29 March 1928, Box 2, Edson Papers. Edson picked up the nickname "Red Mike" during these shaveless days in Nicaragua. 17 original photograph signed by Edson, Utley Papers. 18 Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967)p.120. 19 Quoted in "B-2 Report," 20-26 May 1928, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 20 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part I, p.41. 21 rbid. p.44. 22 utley to ~rigade, message, 24 April 1928, Utley Papers. 23 Brigade to Utley, message, 28 April 1928, Utley Papers. 24 Brigade to Utley, message, 30 April 1928, Utley Papers. 25 Edson to Utley, message, 3 May 1928, Utley Papers. 26 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part I, p.46. 27 rbid. p.47. 28 utley to General Feland, letter, 9 May 1928, Utley Papers. 105

29 captain Merritt A. Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part II, Marine Corps Gazette 20 (November 1936)p.40. 30 Edson to Utley, message, 11 May 1928, Utley Papers. 31 captain Rose to Utley, message, 21 May 1928; and Utley to Brigade, message, 4 June 1928, Utley Papers. 32 Edson to Utley, message, 16 May 1928, Utley Papers. 33 Edson to Utley, message, 8 May 1928, Utley Papers. 34 utley to Brigade, message, 17 May 1928, Utley Papers; Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part II, p.41. 35 Edson to Utley, messages, 21 and 22 May 1928, Utley Papers. 36 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part II, p.62. 37 Ibid. p.69. 38 Ibid. p. 71.

39utley to Commanding Officer of the Northern Area, message, 6 June 1928, Utley Papers.

4011 Field Order #2," Eastern Area, 8 June 1928, Reel 12, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC.

4111 operations Report," Eastern Area, 10-16 June 1928, Reel 12, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 42 Ibid. 43 utley, memorandum, 26 December 1928, Utley Papers. 44 General Feland to Brigade Staff, 30 June 1927, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC.

45Major Merritt A. Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, Marine Corps Gazette 21 (February 1937)p.35. 46 Ibid. p.36. 47 utley to Brigade, message, 5 July 1928, Utley Papers. 48 Edson to Utley, letter, 25 July 1928, Utley Papers. 49 Edson, "The Coco Patrol, " Part III, p.43. 106 50 Utley to Brigade, messages, 26 and 27 July 1928, Utley Papers. 51 Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff, "Coco Patrol," Marine Corps Gazette 41 (February 1957)p.17. 5211 Document Evaluation," undated[1959?], unsigned, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. This document describes the Battle of Ililiquas. It apparently was created when an author sent a copy of his book on Sandino to Major Melvin Mosier, USMC(ret), and asked him for his reaction. The document gives the book's version of the battle, the major's reply, and then a third-party critique. The book is The Looting of Nicaragua by Raphael Nogales y Menendez. 53 Edson to Utley, letter, 25 July 1928, Utley Papers. 54 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, p.58. 55 Edson to Utley, letter, 5 August 1928, Utley Papers.

5611 Log of Engagements of V0-7M in Nicaragua," and "Daily Record of Events, 2nd Brigade," Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 5711 Reports of Air Missions," Box 19, Edson Papers. 58 Ibid. 59 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, p.59.

6011 oocument Evaluation." Mosier claimed that Sergeant Hickethier headed the east bank squad. However, I have largely followed Edson's description of the battle, since he wrote much closer to the time of the actual event and relied on contemporary documents to refresh his memory. Mosier's description of Schoneberger's mission, which Edson left out of his account, is supported by a summary of Schoneberger's activities in his Navy Cross citation. See General Feland to Secretary of the Navy, letter, 18 October 1928, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 6111 oocument Evaluation." 62 Edson to Utley, letter, 22 September 1928, Box 18, Edson Papers. 63 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, p.61. 64 Major A. DeCarre to Utley, letter, 21 August 1928, Utley Papers. 107 65 Translated copy of letter from Nicaraguan rebel to family, 12 August 1928, Box 19, Edson Papers.

6611 oocument Evaluation." See note 52. 6711 Reports of Air Missions." 68 "Log of Engagements of V0-7M in Nicaragua." 69 Major A. DeCarre to Utley, letter, 21 August 1928, Utley Papers; Major Ross E. Rowell, "Annual Report of Aircraft Squadrons, 2nd Brigade," 1 July 1927 to 20 June 1928, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 70 Rowell, "Annual Report." 71 Edson to Utley, letter, 10 August 1928, Utley Papers.

7211 weekly Patrol Report,," Coco Patrol, 8 September 1928, Utley Papers. 73 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, p.63. 7411 weekly Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 8 September 1928, Utley Papers. 7511 Reports of Air Missions;" "Log of Engagements;" "B-2 Report," 12-18 August 1928, Box 19, Edson Papers.

7611 Reports of Air Missions." 77 Brigade to Utley, message, 30 July 1928, Utley Papers. 7811 Brigade Field Message #27," B-3 to Edson, 7 August 1928, Utley Papers. 79 Ibid.

80Brigade to Utley, message, 9 August 1928, Utley Papers. 81 B-3 to Edson, message, 8 August 1928, Utley Papers. 82 utley to Brigade, message, 11 August 1928, Utley Papers.

8311 Reports of Air Missions." 108 84 utley to Edson, letter, 14 August 1928, Utley Papers. 85 rbid. 86 Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Putnam, 1939) p.437. 8711 Reports of Air Missions." 88 Newspaper c l'1pp1ng ' o f AP wire' repor t , un d a t e d , "July-August 1928" File, Box 3, Utley Papers. 89 Secretary of the Navy to Edson, award citation for the Navy Cross, 3 December 1928, Edson File, Reference Section, MCHC.

9011 Reports of Air Missions."

91 rbid.; Edson to Utley, message, 18 August 1928, Utley Papers. 92 Edson to Utley, letter, 27 August 1928, Utley Papers. 93 rbid. 94 Edson to Utley, message, 31 August 1928, Utley Papers.

9511 operations Report," Eastern Area, 9-15 September 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers; "Weekly Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 8 September 1928, Utley Papers; "Daily Record of Events, 2nd Brigade." 96 "Weekly Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 8, 14, 22, and 29 September 1928, Utley Papers. 97 General Edwin A. Pollock, Session I, Tape 2, Side 1, Oral History Section, MCHC. 98 utley to Brigade, letter, 27 August 1928, and Edson to Utley, message, 13 November 1928, Utley Papers. 99 "Weekly Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 8, 14, and 29 September, Utley Papers. 100 Edson to Utley, message, 21 September 1928, and "Weekly Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 14 and 22 September 1928, Utley Papers. 109 1 01 Edson to Utley, message, 28 September 1928, and letter, 26 October 1928, Utley Papers. 102 utley to Brigade, message, 3 September 1928; Brigade to Utley, message, 3 September 1928; Edson to Utley, message, 10 September 1928, Utley Papers. 103 Brigade to Utley, message, 8 September 1928; see also Utley to Brigade, message, 5 September 1928; B-3 to Edson, letter, 30 August 1928; Utley Papers. 10411 Letter of Instruction," Brigade to Commanding Officers of Northern and Southern Areas, 25 September 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 105 Utley to Edson, letter, 12 September 1928, Box 18, Edson Papers; Edson to Utley, message, 7 September 1928, Utley Papers. 106 Utley to Commander of Bocay, message, 27 September 1928, Utley Papers; "Operations Report," Eastern Area, 9-15 September 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 107 Major Edwin N. McClellan, "The Saga of the Coco," Marine Corps Gazette 15 (November 1930)pp.14-17, 71-79; Colonel R.H. Dunlap to Brigade, letter, 30 June 1929, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC.

108Ed son to Utley, message, 2 October 1928, Utley Papers; Edson to Utley, letter, 3 October 1928, Box 19, Edson Papers.

109Ed son to Utley, letter, 3 October 1928, Box 19, Edson Papers. 11 Oibid.; "Lett.er of Instruction;" Edson to Utley, message,~ctober 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 11111 operations Report," Eastern Area, 7-13 October 1928, Box 20, Edson P~pers. 112 Edson to Utley, message,.7 October 1928, Utley Papers. 11311 Field Order #8," Northern Area, 8 October 1928, Nicaragua Files, Reference Section, MCHC. 114 Edson to Utley, letter, 25 October 1928, Utley Papers. 115 Ibid. 110 11 6 "Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 23 October 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 117 Edson to Utley, letter, 25 October 1928, Utley Papers. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Edson to Utley, letter, 26 October 1928, Utley Papers; Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 12111 operations Report," Eastern Area, 28 October 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers; Edson to Utley, letter, 28 October 1928; Edson to Utley, messages, 30 October 1928 and 1 November 1928, Utley Papers.

12211 operations Report," Eastern Area, 18 November 1~28~ Edson to Brigade, messages, 5 and 14 November 1928; Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 1 23 Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 124 Edson to Utley, letter, 22 November 1928, Utley Papers. 125 Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers; Edson to Utley, letters, 26 and 28 October 1928, Utley Papers. 126 Pollock, Oral Histroy Section, MCHC; Edson to Utley, letter, 29 November 1928, Utley Papers; "Operations Report," Eastern Area, 25 November-1 December 1928; "Brigade Field Order #7, 11 11 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 127 "Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 23 October 1928; "Eastern Area Intelligence Report," 9 December 1928; "Operations Report," Eastern Area, covering period 9 December 1928 - 26 January 1929, Box 20, Edson Papers. 12811 operations Report," Eastern Area, 30 December 1928 - 5 January 1929; "Intelligence Report," 26 December 1928; Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers. 129 For a thorough discussion of Edson's policy, see David c. Brooks, "U.S. Marines, Miskitos and the Hunt 111 for Sandino: the Rio Coco Patrol in 1928," manuscript to be published in The Journal of Latin American Studies; Captain Linscott to Utley, message, 18 September 1928; Edson to Utley, message, 1 February 1929; Moravian missionary to Utley, letter, 19 October 1928; "Patrol Report," Coco Patrol, 29 September 1928, Utley Papers; File 2.9, Box 20, Edson Papers. 130 Pollock, Oral History Section, MCHC; Edson to Utley, letter, 23 April 1930, Box 20, Edson Papers. 131 Pollock, Oral History Section, MCHC; Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928, Box 20; File 8, and Edson to Utley, letter, 29 December 1928, Box 18, Edson Papers. 132 Edson to Utley, letter, 19 November 1928; and "Intelligence Report," Eastern Area, 9 December 1928, Box 20, Edson Papers; File 10, Box 18, Edson Papers. 133 Edson to Utley, messages, 14 and 16 February 1929, Utley Papers; File 5, Box 18, Edson Papers. 134 utley to General Feland, letter, 11 January 1929, Box 18, Edson Papers. 13511 operations Report," Eastern Area, 10 February 1929, Box 20, Edson Papers. 13611 operations Report," Eastern Area, 24 February 1929, Box 20, Edson Papers. 137 B-3 to Edson, letter, 6 February 1929, Box 18; Edson to B-3, letter, 18 February 1929, Box 19, Edson Papers. 138 Edson to Utley, letter, 25 February 1929, Utley Papers. 139 rbid. 14011 Brigade Special Order #8," 9 February 1929; Brigade to Utley, message, 2 March 1929; Utley to Brigade, message, 3 March 1929, Utley Papers. 141 Brigade to Utley, message, 5 March 1929, Utley Papers.

14211 Report of Patrol to La Pavona Area," Edson, 28 March 1929, Box 20, Edson Papers. 143 utley to Brigade, messages, 17 and 25 March 1929; Brigade to Utley, message, 27 March 1929, Utley Papers. 112

144 Millett, p.259; Metcalf, p.444. 14511 Brigade Memorandum #28," 9 November 1928, Utley Papers. 146 Eastern Area Staff to Brigade, 25 March 1929, Utley Papers; Edson to Eastern Area Communications Officer, undated; "Automatic Weapons," undated, Box 18, Edson Papers. 147 colonel J.C. Breckenridge to Utley, letter, 15 January 1931, Utley Papers. 148 Edson to Utley, letter, 8 April 1930, Box 20, Edson Papers. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 15111 Automatic Weapons." 152 Edson to Utley, letter, 23 April 1930, Box 20, Edson Papers. 153 Lieutenant Colonel Harol H. Utley, "Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," partial manuscript located in Utley Papers; portions published Marine Corps Gazette 16 (May 1931) and 18 (August 1933)pp.44-48, and 18 (November 1933)pp.43-46; Major S.A. Harrington, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette 6 (December 1921 )pp.474-491, and 7 (March 1922)pp.84-93. 154 utley, "Tactics and Techniques." 1 55 Evans to Utley, letter, 22 October 1930, Utley Papers. 1 56 Brooks, "U.S. Marines," p.29. 157 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part II, p.66. 158 Edson, "The Coco Patrol," Part III, p.61. 159 Edson to Utley, letter, 8 April 1930, Box 20, Edson Papers. 160 Macaulay, pp.260-67. 1 61 Metcalf, p.446. BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Personal Papers and Oral Histories

Edson, Merritt A., Major General, U.S. Marine Corps. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Pollock, Edwin A., General, U.S. Marine Corps. Interview. Oral History Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Utley, Harold H., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps. Papers. Personal Papers Section, Marine Corps His­ torical Center, Washington, D.C.

Official Files

Edson, Merritt A., Major General, U.S. Marine Corps. File. Reference Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Nicaragua. File. Reference Section, Marine Corps His­ torical Center, Washington, D.C.

Published Works

Edson, Merritt A., Captain, U.S. Marine Corps. "The Coco Patrol." Marine Corps Gazette 20 (August 1936): 18.

"The Coco Patrol." Marine Corps Gazette 20 (November 1936): 40.

"The Coco Patrol." Marine Corps Gazette 21 (February 1937): 35.

U.S. Marine Corps. The Small Wars Manual. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower Press, 1988.

11J 114

SECONDARY SOURCES

Beede, Benjamin, R. Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars of the United States, 1898-1984. New York: Garland Publishers, 1985. Brooks, David c. "U.S. Marines, Miskitos and the Hunt for Sandino: the Rio Coco Patrol in 1928." To be published in The Journal of Latin American Studies. Copy provided by the author.

Flores, Susan J., Major, U.S. Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Employment in Low-Intensity Conflict." Marine Corps Gazette 73 (April 1989): 30-34.

Gray, A.M., General, U.S. Marine Corps. "29th Commandant Speaks to the Corps." Marine Corps Gazette 71 (September 1987): 18.

Macaulay, Neill. The Sandino Affair. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967.

McClellan, Edwin N., Major, U.S. Marine Corps. "The Saga of the Coco." Marine Corps Gazette 15 (November 1930): 14.

Metcalf, Clyde H., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: Putnam, 1939.

Millett, Allan R., Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Semper Fidelis. New York: Macmillan, 1980. Nalty, Bernard c. The United States Marines in Nicaragua. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1968.

Schaffer, Ronald. "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History." Military Affairs 36 (April 1972): 46-51.

Stiff, Houston, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps. "Coco Patrol." Marine Corps Gazette 41 (February 1957): 17.