Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution
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Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 32 Issue 1 Issue 1 - Symposia: The Legal History of Article 2 the South 1-1979 Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution A. E. Keir Nash Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Legal History Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation A. E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 Vanderbilt Law Review 7 (1979) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/2 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institutiont A. E. Keir Nash* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................. ..... 8 PART ONE: REFLECTIONS ON VARYING INTERPRETATIONS 13 A. Four Reasons for Examining the Interpretive Differ- ences ........................................ 13 B. Tushnet's View of the State of Scholarly Affairs .... 18 C. "Black Justice" Below the Appellate Court Level, and Four Whiggeries ............................... 26 D. Hindus' South Carolina, Howington's Tennessee, and "Black Justice" in the Western Penal Tradition ..... .36 E. Understanding Appellate Decisionmaking: Flanigan, Nash, and Cover .................................. 70 PART Two: FINDING THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE OF KING COTTON: A THREE-STATE COMPARISON OF AP- PELLATE SUITS FOR FREEDOM . ........... 93 A. Posing the Critical Questions: Were There Significant Differences Among JudicialAttitudes? ......... .... 93 B. Major Issues in Suits for Freedom ............... 98 C. Ardent Pro-Slavery and the Georgia Supreme Court ... 104 D. "A Vexed and Perplexing Question": Manumission Be- fore the Tennessee and Virginia Courts ............. 123 (1) Politics, Pro-Slavery, and the Bench - Two Ex- amples .................................. 123 I am indebted to numerous persons for assistance and encouragement in the writing of this Article. The contributions of four have been so helpful as to warrant particular men- tion. Iam especially grateful to: Thomas S. Schrock (Political Science, University of Califor- nia, Santa Barbara) for blending just the right amounts of vigorous criticism of a draft of this Article and encouragement to complete it; Carl N. Degler (History, Stanford University) and Carl V. Harris (History, University of California, Santa Barbara) for reading an earlier manu- script on the subject, and causing me to rethink though not entirely to abjure my approach to the law of slavery; and Mark Tushnet (Law, University of Wisconsin, Madison) for a fruitful exchange of correspondence concerning the differences between his views of the law of slavery and my own. * Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Cali- fornia. A.B., Harvard College, 1958; M.A., University of North Carolina, 1961; Ph.D., Har- vard University. 1968. 7 8 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:7 (2) Precedent and the Make-Up of the Virginia Court in 1830-1831 .............................. 127 (3) Liberal Gropings of the 1830's? - The Maria Tangle ..... ............................. 146 (4) North Carolina's and Tennessee's Alternate Solu- tions to Maria ............................. 156 (5) The Distribution of Virginia Judicial Behavior and Attitudes, 1831-1849 ..................... ... 158 (6) Precedent and the Tennessee Court to 1835 ...... 164 (7) The Tennessee Court and Manumission, 1835-1860 172 (8) Populism and the Virginia Switch of 1858 ....... .179 PART THREE: SHAPE, CHANGE, AND INTENT IN THE LAW OF SLAVERY 184 A. Unity and Diversity in the Law of Slavery ........... 186 (1) Scope, Penetration and Severity in Statutory Law 186 (2) Unity and Diversity in Judge-Made Law ........ 190 B. The Law's Intent and Function: Using and Abusing the English Language in Order To Generalize ........... 205 INTRODUCTION During the first century of the American republic, the South, besides losing the Civil War, fared poorly with respect to the aveng- ing role of historiography.' Not merely did the inadequacies of Jef- ferson Davis,2 southern industrial backwardness, noncompatible railroad gauges,3 and illusions about King Cotton's capacity to com- pel European support for the beleaguered Confederacy, produce de- feat for the cause of complete legal subjugation of black to white. In addition, despite claims that may strike later generations as ex- cessive,5 southern belles-lettres ran a poor second to the writings of New England authors. It was not simply that-in the words of that rara avis, a Unionist South Carolina politician-the South, having miscalculated, had to endure sufferings "as no civilized people ever did in this Christian age [because] . [u]nder the . cruel 1. See H. BurrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931). "It has been said that the historian is the avenger, and that standing as a judge between the parties and rivalries and causes of bygone generations he can lift up the fallen and beat down the proud .... ." Id. at 1. 2. See D. PowrER, THE SourH AND TH SECTIONAL CoNIrcr 263-86 (1968). 3. See R. BLACK, THE RAILROADS OF THE CONFEDERACY (1952). 4. See F. OwsLEY, KING COTrON DIPLOMACY (1931). 5. "In fiction Gilmore Simms stands pre-eminent, and ranks with Cooper . .. 'The Works of John C. Calhoun,' in six volumes, are equal in merit to Aristotle's Politics and Ethics. The writings of Hugh S. Legare . are unsurpassed for classical lore, style and interest." B. PERRY, REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN 368 (1889). 1979J1 REASON OF SLAVERY 9 rule of our national government, . former slaves, ignorant and semi-savage, were placed over us, led on by the most unprincipled adventurers, black and white, from the North . ." Equally ap- palling for Benjamin F. Perry, and despite the amazing circum- stance that in the entire history of prewar days so "moral and pa- triotic [a] tone . pervaded"' South Carolina politics that "[n]o charge of bribery or corruption was ever made against any . legislators or public officers," South Carolina and her allies were bested not merely in the rude encounters of sword but also in the future-conditioning interplay of word and pen. Whereas "[i]n Mas- sachusetts, as soon as one of her prominent citizens [was] dead, some literary friend [stepped] forward to write his life,", in the South "scarcely a life of any of her eminent sons" 0 was penned at all. Consequently, education gave to "New England . a control- ling influence over the public sentiment of America. Her literature, her books, her newspapers and magazines, . are at this time . influencing and controlling our opinions and actions."" Making due allowances for anti-Reconstruction and Victorian hyperbole, Benjamin F. Perry had a point-at the time. The literary and historical course of the century since he wrote has largely re- dressed the imbalance-at least in terms of fictional and historical composition in general. But for the specifics of the legal history of these United States, historiography's avenging role has not been quite so equalizing. This is especially true with respect to what is central to any attempt to gain adequately the remembrance of southern legal things past-understanding the relationships be- tween lash and law, comprehending the "reason of slavery."" One of the more intriguing aspects of the historiography of United States slavery is how slow it was to show systematic interest in the peculiar institution's legal history. To be sure, during the early and middle 1800's slavery did not lack legal compilers and commentators.' Nonetheless, until the editorial labors of Helen 6. Id. at 364. Plainly, Perry suffered from not having read the Revisionist views on the matter. See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION (K. Stampp & L. Litwack eds. 1969). 7. B. PERRY, supra note 5, at 366. 8. Id. 9. Id. at 368-69. 10. Id. at 369. 11. Id. at 373. 12. By "reason of slavery" I am analogizing to the idea of "raison d'etat." See F. MEINECKE, DIE IDEE DER STAATSRXSON IN DER NEUEREN GESCeHicHTE (1924). 13. T. CoBB, AN INQUIRy IrO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1858); W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1853); J. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (2 vols.) (1858-1862); G. STRoUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1827); J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY (1837). 10 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:7 Tunnicliffe Catterall during the 1920's and early 1930's" there was no serious effort by post-bellum historians to assemble the case-law data. Even so, with two partial subsequent exceptions" there was little systematic analysis until the 1960's. Catterall's labors initially did no more than cause later historians to make tip-of-the-hat dips into her congeries of data, using a case here and there much as one might employ an antebellum traveller's narrative to lend illustra- tive support to a social or political point. There are two important reasons for this initial limited use. First, the early post-bellum historians fought the "paradigmatic battles" on other territory, where legal structures and case-law de- velopments were pressed into the service of one side or the other in a largely ancillary fashion. Second, case-law data was used spar- ingly because of the rigid boundaries of inquiry set by traditional American legal history, particularly those that, by isolating law from society, polity, and economy, produced a narrow scholarly emphasis upon whatever seemed "autonomous about the legal order-courts, equitable maxims, motions for summary judg- ment,"6 and so forth. This separation of the internal "box"' of the law from everything outside was hardly conducive to emphasizing the legal history of slavery, an area that derives its interest chiefly from the relationships between law and the larger sociopolitical world of antebellum America.