Institute for Palestine Studies University of California Press

The Reaction in to the Sadat Initiative Author(s): Elias Shoufani Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 3-25 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536436 Accessed: 05-10-2015 19:59 UTC

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This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Reaction in Israel to the Sadat Initiative

ELIAS SHOUFANI*

i thelast three weeks of November1977, the Israeli politicians and public were completelypreoccupied with the visit of PresidentAnwar Sadat to Jerusalemand the subsequentdevelopments which led to the conveningof theCairo Conference. The Israelipress, whose headlines in thefirst days of the monthhad been devotedto the internaldiscontent and striferesulting from thedrastic economic measures of MenahemBegin's right-winggovernment, now concerneditself almost entirely with the Middle East conflict.Political interestand commentariesstarted with some doubts as to whetherthe visit would takeplace at all, reacheda peak duringSadat's visitto Jerusalem,and thensubsided somewhat until the announcementof the forthcomingCairo Conferencerevived hopes of a peace settlementthat would satisfyIsrael's minimumterms.

1. SURPRISE AT THE VISIT When, on the evening of November 9, Sadat announced before the Egyptianparliament that he was readyto go beforethe Israeli to addressit on theMiddle East conflict,the Israeli press expressed surprise and disbelief. High officialscracked jokes about the matter,and considered Sadat'soffer to be purelyrhetorical. (Preparations for the visit did not,in fact, startseriously until one or two daysbefore it occurred.) The mostinfluential and respectedIsraeli newspaper, the independent Haaretz, referred to thevisit as somethinglike the"coming of the Messiah" in its editorialof November 11, butwarned about the danger of Israelbeing outmanccuvred by Sadat in a public relationsgame of statementsaimed at convincing the American

* Elias Shoufaniis head of the section for Israeli Studies of the Institutefor Palestine Studies.

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES governmentto put pressureon Israel to make substantiveconcessions on basic issues: "It is impossibleto ignorethese statements [of Sadat]; it will eithermake Sadat themost dangerousadversary or the man withwhom we can bringthe problemto an end." Sadatrepeated his offeron November12 beforea visitingdelegation of US Membersof Congress,the same day on which Begin made a responseto Sadat's statementsin a televisedaddress to the Egyptianpeople (Jerusalem Post,November 13), in whichhe affirmedIsrael's desire for peace betweenthe two countries,stating that, "In ancienttimes Egypt and Eretz Israel were allies, real friendsand allies, against a common enemyfrom the North." Begin's announcementwas interpretedby some quarters as an attemptto substitutefor Sadat's visit,and Haaretqin itseditorial of November13 urged thegovernment to issue an invitationto Sadat,to seriouslyattempt to bring aboutthe visit. The newspaperwarned that Israel would appearin a verybad lightbefore world opinion if it failedto respond appropriatelyto Sadat's offers. Caution,if not doubt and suspicion,still prevailed in governmentcircles. Foreign MinisterMoshe Dayan was reportedas sayingin a session of the Israelicabinet that, although the idea of a summitmeeting between Sadat and Begin was a positiveone, thiscould not be a substitutefor comprehensive negotiationsat Geneva (Haaretq,November 14). The Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Defence Forces, , in a strangeinterview with YediotAharonot (November 15), introducedhints of forthcoming war into the discussionof Sadat's visit,by suggestingthat it mightbe a coverfor military preparations,an unauthorizedinterview for which Gur was reprimandedbut not dismissedby the Ministerof Defence,Weizmann. An invitationwas, however,made to PresidentSadat to visitJerusalem and addressthe Knesset. An Israelijournalist, Y. Tira, describedthe mood of theKnesset as it ratited theinvitation on November15 (HaaretZ,November 16): For the firsttime in the Ninth Knesset, national unitywas pronounced. This was around the issue of the invitationto the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, to visit Jerusalem and conduct negotiations about peace .... There was a sense of a special atmosphere of hope mingled with scepticism vis-a-vis the expected visit. Because of the vague sense of historic opportunity,or at least the beginning of a turningpoint in our country,the debate in the Knesset was conductedin a seemlymanner. All thespeakers, regardless of party affiliation, spoke aboutthe positivedevelopments in a serioustone and elated spirit.The only exception was Rakah [theCommunist Party], which made severalinterjections during the deliveryof the PrimeMinister's speech.

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Even afterthis, some Membersof the Knesset expressedsomething less than eager receptivityto Sadat's initiative.Yigal Allon, a formerCabinet Ministerin the Labour Governmentsaid that when Sadat came, "if he comes,"he would have to explainwhy just a fewyears ago he had said thathe would sacrificea million Egyptian soldiers to regain conquered Arab territories(Jerusalem Post, November 16). The newspaperDavar (November 18) askeda numberof Membersof theKnesset what they wished to sayto the EgyptianPresident. The answersincluded: AbrahamMelamed (Mifdal, the National Religious Party): "Welcome. I want to be convincedthat Sadat reallywants peace." Amos Hadar (Maarakh): ". . . I have no illusions about his visit suddenly leadingto peace-things do not happen in thatway. It maybe a successful propagandamanceuvre. But for all the dangersit is somethingpositive." CharlieBeton (a Black Panther,of the Hadash Party): "I shall tell Sadat thathe should not have come hereand made himselfa laughing-stock.The governmentis in no way preparedto relinquishthe occupied areas. In any case, I do not thinkthat he will come." Much discussion centered around the motives for Sadat's initiative: whetherit would embarrassIsrael and open her to furtherpressure from internationalopinion, or whetherit indicateda greaterwillingness to accept Israeli terms. Accordingto Moshe Jacques (Maariv,November 11, 1977), Sadat's decisionwas motivatedby a "hidden desireto freehimself from the shackles of a Geneva Conferenceconvened on the basis of the Israeli- Americanworking paper. From the public relationspoint of view, he does not want to reject the Americanproposals on procedureat the Geneva Conference." (These proposals, of course, excluded the PLO from participation.)Jacques added: "He tried at firstto avoid [the American proposal]by a counter-proposalcalling for the formation of a workinggroup to pave theway for the Geneva Conference.When he failedin his manceuvre he saidthat he was readyto come to Geneva withoutany consideration for the proceduralissues and thathe is willingto come to Jerusalem.The moment Israel falls into the trap and declares the replacementof the Geneva Conferenceby direct negotiations, the working paper will have beenrendered invalidand everythingis back to square one." Othersargued that Sadat had come froma position of weakness. Yoel Marcus(HaaretZ, November 18) maintainedthat "if thisstep was notplanned in detailfrom the beginning,there is no doubt thatit is part of a gradual changein Sadat's mind,particularly after the Yom Kippur War." According to Marcus,the Israeli penetration into Egypt in theOctober 1973 war had left

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a deep impressionon theEgyptian President: " Kissingeronce describedit to Rabin,saying that [Sadat] was chilledto thebones, and ceased to believethat therewould be a militarysolution to theproblem. " Sadathad thenembarked upon a path of no return,jettisoning Soviet supportand tryingto obtain a politicalsettlement through America, hoping that Saudi Arabiawould induce the US to put strongpressure on Israel. But once Sadat realizedthat this path had led to a dead-end, he sought anothermeans of unfreezingthe situation"through takinga new decision similarto that which led to the October War." Haaret. (November 18) quoted the Ministerof Health, EliezerShostak, as implyingan Americanrole in theinitiative; Shostak stated thatSadat had delayedhis replyto the Israeli invitationuntil he receiveda messagefrom the US Presidentgiving his blessingsto the visit. All sides paid tributeto Sadat's personal courage in undertakingthe mission.But bothbefore and afterthe visit, there was a generalfeeling that he had come because he had been forcedto do so, withthe rulingLikud Party and formergoverning Labour Alignmentdisputing exactly whose toughness had renderedthe visit inevitable. supportersargued that the visit showedthe correctness of their belief that a firm,clear and decisiveright-wing nationaliststance would finallybe acceptedby the Arabs,while the Labour Partymaintained that Begin was reapingthe fruits of itsown formerpolicies. Accordingto Likud Memberof the Knesset Geula Cohen,it was her Party leader'shard line thatwas responsible:"The factthat Sadat came to Israel whenBegin is PrimeMinister proves it doesn't pay to be moderate"(Jerusalem Post, November 23). Shlomo Nakdimon also attributedthe visit to the achievementsof Begin,by arguing that, with the suggestions presented by the PrimeMinister to the Americanadministration in July1977, and Dayan's successfulproposal for a joint Israeli-Americanworking paper Israel had becomethe side in theMiddle East conflictthat was takingthe initiative ."It is possible thatSadat's dramaticstep, expressed in his readinessto destroyall givensand come to Jerusalem,was sanctifiedin orderto retrievethe halo that accompaniedhis actions as a man of initiativesand politicalmoves." On the other hand, the formerLabour Ministerof Informationand Directorof Intelligence,General Aharon Yariv, attributed the "first seed" of thevisit to theOctober War, when "Arab stateswent to war againstIsrael in ideal circumstancesand failed to achieve a militaryvictory. Thus, they graduallyreached the conclusion that it would be betterfor them to followthe politicalpath." Yariv arguedthat Sadat was motivatedon thepersonal level by a combinationof "interest,inspiration and courage." Politically,the Egyptianpresident was concernedabove all withsolving the "real problems

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 7 of Egypt," which the conflict with Israel was rendering very difficultto tackle. Economic problems were also cited by formerPrime Minister (Yediot Aharonot,November 25) as an important motive for Sadat's visit: Egypt was bogged down by internal problems, and the oil-producing stateshad not been able to provide it with sufficienthelp to solve these. Sadat had been guided, too, Rabin argued, by a mixture of frustrationat the deadlock in peace negotiations caused by procedural issues,' the fear of the possibility of a new war, and irritationat the fact that the United States had seemed to be shiftingto a position where it no longer regarded Egypt, but Syria instead, as the Arab cornerstone of a peace settlementin the Middle East.

2. THE VISIT President Sadat arrived in Israel to a ceremonial welcome. An Israeli militaryband played the national anthemsof both countries at the airport,and Sadat reviewed a militaryguard of honour before being introduced to the leading Israeli political personalities, with whom he exchanged pleasantries beforedriving to Jerusalemwhere he had his firstdiscussions with Begin. He was guarded throughout his visit by 10,000 soldiers, police and security personnel. Israeli politicians and newspapers made every effortto show goodwill to their guest and the watching Egyptian public. The morningafter Sadat's arrivalin Israel, Haaret. published its editorial in Arabic, under the headline: "A Word to the Egyptian People." The leading article said:

The Knesset and our Prime Ministerunreservedly welcome the courageous initiativeof your President,and thisis certainlyan expressionof the friendly feelingsof all classesof theIsraeli people. Your President,Muhammad Anwar Sadat,has beenreceived among us withevery sign of welcome and respect,as is the custom between states that have peaceful relations with each other, althoughin facta stateof war existsbetween the two countries.As an example of this,the guard of honour of the Israel Defence Armyaccorded a military salute to the Egyptian President,who is the Commander-in-Chiefof the EgyptianArmy, which the Israel DefenceArmy has been obliged to confront on thefield of battleon severaloccasions. This is excellentand incontrovertible evidenceof Israel's desirefor peace, forthis salute also was directed,through PresidentSadat, to the Egyptian Army,from whose ranks the President emerged. The public highlightof the visit was provided by the speeches of Sadat and Begin to the Knesset. Sadat spoke first,and reiterated what is both the

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES predominantArab and internationalposition on a peace settlement.Israel, he said, would have to withdrawto the 1967 borders and agree to the establishmentof a Palestinianstate, otherwise there could be no peace in the areaand renewedwar was likely.However, his speechwas newlyconciliatory to the Israelison certainpoints. On the Palestinianissue, he omittedany referenceto the PLO: Maariv (November23) explainedthat had "suggested" to ActingEgyptian Foreign Minister Butros Ghali on the road fromLod Airportto Jerusalemthat Sadat shouldnot mentionthe PLO in the Knesset. Secondlya numberof referenceswere clearlyintended to assurethe Israelis that Egypt would accordthem full recognition: "You want to live withus in this part of the world. In all sincerityI tell you thatwe welcome you among us, with full securityand safety. This in itselfis a tremendousturning point, one of the landmarksof a decisive historical change " JerusalemPost, November21, 1977). Beginin his replydefended the principles of Zionism,and put forwardthe Israeliclaim to Palestine: It is myduty to tellour guestsand all thenations who arewatching us and listeningto ourwords about the contacts between the Jewish people and this country. The Presidentmentioned the Balfour Declaration. No sir,we did nottake a foreigncountry. We came back to our homeland.The contactbetween ourselvesand this country is eternal.It wascreated in the dawn of humanity; it wasnever disconnected, never disrupted. We developedour civilization here, wehad our prophets here. This is wherethe kings of Judea kneeled before their God... Begin made no specificconcession on any issue (apart froman offerto allow Egyptiantourists to enterIsrael), but invitedKing Hussein and the Presidentsof Syriaand Lebanon to followin Sadat's path. His onlyreference to thePalestinians was as the"Arabs of theLand of Israel." Manyreferences were made to the Nazi Holocaust. MostIsraelis considered both speeches to be equallyhardline, with the only way to peace lyingsomewhere between the two positions. As opposition leader Shimon Peres put it, in his Knesset speech, addressingSadat: "I listenedcarefully, with great care, to what you said. I could not agree with whatyou said,not in regardto peace. We have a differentopinion, and notin regardto settlement...We shall listento whatyou have to say and you will listento us. We willfind a compromise,or a thirdway we did notthink about, neitheryou nor we" JerusalemPost, November21). Haaret. (November 21, 1977) publisheda selectionof reactionsto the

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 9 speeches of Sadat and Begin. Eilan Shihoriwrote: "Yesterday the public were divided in theirviews on the speeches... manydid not conceal their disappointmentat both of them, saying: 'We expected more.' Others regardedthe speechesas an extensionof the miraclethat had taken place before theireyes, seeing the inflexibleattitudes of the speakers as being intendedfor the Arab world and the world in general." The dailyalso publishedthe reactionsof certainmembers of the Knesset: BenjaminHalevy: "Sadat's speech was disappointingbecause of its inflexibility.Begin's speechexpressed his attitudes,but thereshould be more thinkingabout both speeches." Yehoshua Rabinovitz:" Sadat's speechwas inflexibleand hardline.It is truethat he was expressinghis point of view, but he could have expressedit in more conciliatoryterms. Begin's speech was Beginishas usual." AbrahamMelamed: "Sadat talked about peace, and that is what is important.Begin should have come closer." Moshe Shamir:" Sadat's addresswas notlike his action thatis, itwas notlike the fact of his coming here. Sadatdisappointed us becausehe repeated all theArabs' extremist demands. Begin's speechwas fine,because he stressed continuedpeace negotiations,thus indicating that the important thing is talks betxeen the two parties." AmnonRubinstein: " Sadat did one good thing- he did not mention the PLO, and one bad thing the threatsin his speech. Begin also did not mentionthe PLO and stressedcontinued negotiations, which is the most importantthing." Abba Eban: "In factBegin opened no doors,nor did he close any. In spite of theirextremism, the speeches of Begin and Sadat constitutedan importantbasis for continuednegotiations. Yisrael Kirgman: "Sadat's speech was very inflexible:he uttered threatsfor half an hour. Begin's speech was extremist.Peres' speech was betterthan both." Althoughthere was disappointmentat Sadat's speech,there was an even moremarked feeling that Begin himselfhad not risento theoccasion. As the commentatorZeev Shitanhilput it (Haaret.,November 25); "When he came to Jerusalem,Anwar Sadat did not expectmiracles and he does not seem to have had anyclearly defined demands. The leaderof Likud occupiedthe seat of the PrimeMinister of Israel,but in spiteof his admirableresponse to the EgyptianPresident's initiative, at the momentof truth,when the President appeared in the Knesset he proved incapable of risingto the level of the historicdebate. The Presidentof Egyptshowed himself as veryinflexible, but

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES the IsraeliPrime Minister's speech was worse than that it was banal. It showedno imaginationor elan and it failedto recognizethe greatness of the moment..." According to Yitzhak Smilanski (Davar, November25), PresidentSadat should be informedthat his speech fellon attentiveears, althoughit did not meetwith full acceptance. "This," he said, "was not the case withBegin's speech. The mostviolent thing in it was thetone. Whether he intendedit or not,the tone of his speechwas violent,not onlyobstinate. The aim was to make the antagonist/guesta Zionist at once, and then to establishthe priority of our rights,to hold thehead highin thepresence of this senior 'stranger'and to speakto himon thebasis of 'Jewishpride.' The time forsuch a tone is past and no one listensto it, to the extentthat, but forthe seriousnessof thesubject and themoment, Begin's speechwould have been heard here and elsewhereas a message of aggression,if not an outworn melodrama. His exploitationof the holocaust as a pretextis a case in point.. . " YediotAharonot (November 21, 1977) published its own selection of reactionsof membersof the Knesset to the speechesof Sadat and Begin. - ShimonPeres: " Thereare threeaspects to the speech: theplace the Knesset. The manner- Sadat is a good oratorand speaks in a mannerthat commandsrespect. The content- it containedvery effective and moving anti-war passages and thetone was tolerantof Israel. Therewas nothingnew in thepolitical part. We are facedwith a largelyinflexible Egyptian attitude and we have to face up to it. On thewhole it was a hardlinespeech. " - YitzhakRabin: "The problemis not what view is to be takenof the speech- thespeech was partof a process. If it is impossibleto knowwhat is happening,and I do not knowmyself, I saythat there was nothingunexpected in thespeech. I did notexpect a publicspeech in theKnesset to adoptattitudes out of keepingwith known attitudes." Liova Eliav: "I am not disappointed. The threespeakers stuck to knownattitudes. The mostimportant thing in Sadat's speechwas theforce of its full,unamnbiguous and major recognitionof Israel,her existenceand her frontiers- the 1967 frontiers,of course - and of full peace." - Tawfiq Toubi. "PresidentSadat proposed to Israel a permanent,just and securepeace, and a commonlife within the frontiers of June4, 1967. The Prime Ministerrejected this historic opportunitywhen he replied: No Palestinianstate." Despite disappointmentwith Begin's speech,there was a generalfeeling thathe had handled the ceremoniesattending Sadat's visit very well, and conductedhimself with great courtesyand politenessbefore his Egyptian

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 1 1 guest. Boaz Evron wrote(Yediot Aharonot, November 20, 1977): "I did not [at first]believe, in the bottomof my heart,that [the visit] was about to materialize.In spiteof everythingit seemedremote and incredible.The first idea thatcame to me (and I stillfind difficulty in admittingit) was thatit was luckythat Begin was Prime Minister. One thinks: what would previous Prime Ministershave done in such a situation?They would have utterly ignoredSadat's statement.They would have imagined,on the basis of the commientsof the'experts,' that it was no morethan a' propagandaballoon' for consumptionby the Western information media. Theywould have answered correspondents'questions that, as Sadathad notprovided any real proof of his desirefor peace, there was absolutelyno needto answerhim, and whilesaying thisthey would have looked askance and nervouslyat Begin." The writer praisedBegin's senseof historybecause he knewhow to pick up theball that had been throwninto his court and to deal with it astutely. One mnoreirreverent commentator was formerdeputy Uri Avnery,writing in his magazineHaolam Hazeh (November23, 1977). Begin, Avnerysaid, "did not thinkfor long. He pickedup theball and ranaway withit. He did thiswith the astuteness of thefirst-class politician. Every word was in place, everymovement was in harmony,every formula was right.He did everything to facilitatethe visit and to ensure that everythingtook place in ordered sequenceuntil the very last moment. And whynot? For him,this visit was a giftfrom Heaven. It was handedto himfree, on a silverplatter. It was Sadat who initiatedit and paid the full price for it, endangeringhis life and his regime,and gave Israelan invaluableprize- fullrecognition of herexistence and herlegitimacy. What did Begin pay? Nothingat all, not even a piastre witha hole in it. He did not riskanything and did not give anything.Sadat gave him much support and enhanced his national prestige and his internationalstatus, while Begin did not give Sadat the slightestthing. I thereforecannot understand the congratulations that showered on Begin like rainin thefirst wave of enthusiasm... What Begin did by welcomingSadat bears witnessto his politicalwisdom, and nothingmore." On theday following the speeches, Sadat metwith the different factions of the Knesset,who expressedto him theirideas on a Middle East peace, and wound his trip up with a joint press conferencewith Begin. All Zionist factionsof the Knessetwho met Sadat reiteratedtheir refusal to envisagea returnto the 1967 bordersor the creationof a Palestinianstate, but most expressedtheir hope for a "compromise peace." At the press conference, Sadat statedthat Egypt and Israelhad agreedthat there should be "no more war." betweenthe two countries.Begin also referredto the Palestiniansfor

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES the firsttime duringSadat's visit in English, explainingthat the Hebrew words for "Palestinians"were "the Arabs of Eretz Israel." Sadat himself however,had not showngreat enthusiasm for pursuing the Palestinianissue, apart fromhis speech. Moshe Dayan later disclosed to a meetingin the Knessetof the Likud groupingthat when the issue of meetingPalestinians fromthe occupied territories arose, Sadat had simplytold Begin "I am your guest and you should decide with whom I shall meet" (YediotAharonot, November23). In theend a group of conservative,pro-Jordanian notables accompaniedby Israeli General AbrahamOrly, military coordinator of the occupied territories,was invitedto meet the EgyptianPresident.

3. THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE The subsequentannouncement of the conveningof a conferencein Cairo showed thatEgypt and Israel were determinedto continueon the path of directnegotiations. It was no longerpossible to avoid issuesof substance,and theIsraeli politicians and pressdevoted a greatdeal of attentionto thefuture possibilitiesof peace negotiations.It was generallyagreed that the Egyptian frontwas the one on which there were fewestproblems; the prevailing attitude,however, was to attemptto bringabout a comprehensivesettlement, even thougha separatesettlement with Egypt would be acceptable. There was unanimousagreement that a turningpoint in the conflicthad now been reached. FormerIsraeli Foreign MinisterAbba Eban had once written(in 1965) thatthe aim of Israel's foreignpolicy was "to createdoubt and eventuallyresignation and despairabout the dreamof eliminatingIsrael fromthe world's map. " With Sadat's visit therewas a sense thatthis final pointhad been attained.The balancewas now shiftingin Israel's favour, and themain problem was how to attaina settlementthat would securefor Israel its long-standingdemands and yet be acceptableto the Arabs. It was widelyfelt that Sadat's visit, by establishing direct negotiations as the meansfor discussing outstanding issues, had supersededthe procedural issues that had previouslyarisen in discussionsin which the United States was mediator,and in connectionwith the Geneva Conference.In the jointpress conferenceon November 21, Begin cited as the principalachievement of Sadat's visitthe fact that direct negotiations had begun and would continue, althoughhe emphasizeda commitmentto a comprehensiverather than a separateEgyptian-Israeli settlement. Press commentarynoted the factthat the Soviet Union had now effectivelybeen excluded by Sadat fromany effectiverole in the Middle East peace negotiations,and urged the United

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Statesto play a more active role in backingthe Egyptian-Israelitalks. As Haaret, put it in its editorialof November21, maintainingthat the US had shownan initialreserve towards the idea of Sadat's visitto Jerusalembecause of its divisiveeffect in the Arab world,

PresidentCarter's prayers for the success of President Sadat's mission and his supportfor him came only after the US hadwithdrawn its reservations, having receivedexplanations to theeffect that Sadat and his hosts had no intentionof makinga separate settlement, which could greatly diminish America's role. But in spiteof this, the direct dialogue that is todaybeing built up betweenEgypt andIsrael, one of the immediate causes of which may have been the two states' commondisapproval of theAmerican-Soviet document [of October1977], willoblige Washington to excludethe Middle East fromthe number of those problemsit uses as a basisfor reviving detente with the USSR. Theera of new diplomacy,which we hopehas started in ourarea, will dwarf the ambitions of intermediariesfrom outside who havetoo oftentried to fishin thetroubled watersof theArab-Israeli conflict.

In view of theopposition of muchof the Arab worldto Sadat's initiative, the issue of a possible separate settlementwith Egypt was inevitablya commontopic of Israelipolitical discussion. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, afterstating initially that Sadat's visit could not replace the Geneva Con- ference,subsequently stated that "if therewere the slightesthope of the EgyptianPresident being ready for a separatepeace withIsrael, I would then recommendresponding with an open heartimmediately. We would not wait forGeneva" (HaaretZ,November 18, 1977). But as Dayan pointedout at a press conferencein the Foreign Ministryafter the visit: "Egypt has main- taineda firmline on the idea of a comprehensivesettlement. Even if Egypt was the onlyArab stateto take partin Geneva [Sadat had said], she would negotiatea comprehensivesettlement covering Judea and theGolan Heights; she would not negotiatea separateagreement with Israel" (HaaretZ,Novem- ber 24, 1977). Inevitably,however, the question arose as to what Israel would do if a comprehensivesettlement proved unattainable.Aharon Yariv explainedin an interviewthat "on principleit is betterfor us to achieve a generaland comprehensiveagreement because that would lead us along theshortest road to peace. " To tryto drivea wedge betweenEgypt and theArab world,Yariv argued, would make Sadat appear as a traitor to the Arab people. Nevertheless,the idea of a partialsettlement should not be excluded. "I think thatthis is the momentto speak of a numberof steps: (A) A generaland comprehensivesettlement, which can be explainedas meaningfull peace with

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all theconfrontation countries. This, of course,is thebest choice. (B) If this is impossible,we shall seek a general settlementwith some of the Arab countries,or even with Egypt alone. It seems to me thatif we succeed in reachinga general settlementwith Egypt alone, that would be a very importantstep along to road to peace. (C) If we are unableto reacha general settlement,with even one of theArab countries,we mustnot refusea partial settlementwith one or two of them" (YediotAharonot, November 23, 1977). The extentto which Sadat had isolatedhimself from the Arab world was notedby formerPrime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who pointedout thatSadat "did not consultelements outside Egypt when making his decision." Rabin observedthat Sadat was stillcommitted to a comprehensivesettlement. But the idea of a separatesettlement was an issue on which Israeli politicians, whose statementsare alwaysliable to be reportedin the Arab world,were muchmore cautious than some presscommentators. From the momentthe visitwas announced,the possibilityof cuttingEgypt offfrom other Arab countrieswas explicitlyaffirmed. Arieh Tzimaki, writing in YediotAharonot (November18, 1977) quoted "American governmentofficials" as having said that"they had formedthe impression from what Sadat's menhave said, thatif there is no progresstowards the Geneva Conference,Sadat may explore the possibilityof makinga separateagreement with Israel on the basis of endingthe state of war. Theybelieve that Sadat knowsthat Israel is prepared to returnall the territorytaken from him in the Six Day War, and all Sadat needsis the approvalof King Khalid of Saudi Arabia,for him to be able to continuehis courageous steps,without coordination with al-Assad." One strongundercurrent of Israeliopinion was reflectedin an analysisby ShmuelSchnitzer (Davar, November25), who stated: "Israeli leadershave repeatedlystressed, before and duringPresident Sadat's visit,that they are not tryingto drive a wedge into the Arab world. Similarly,the Egyptian President has explained that he did not come to negotiate separate agreements.Everyone is avoiding the words 'separate peace' as if it was somethingshocking... For myself,with all respectfor the politicianswho took part in this, I disagree with them. A separatepeace is a legitimate expression,not a dirtyword: the wedge we have promisednot to driveinto the Arab world exists,and it would be stupidto ignoreits existence..." Schnitzerargued that the violent reaction of an appreciablepart of the Arab world to Sadat's initiativehad negated Sadat's claim to speak on behalfof otherArabs, "so thatthe value of thecommitment he took on his shoulders has diminished."Sadat could no longerclaim on behalfof all the Arabs that no morewars would be fought,or commitSyria, Iraq, Libya or the PLO to

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 15 peace with Israel. Furthermore,"the concessions he is asking from Israel cover all the frontiers,whereas all that can be offeredhim in returnconcerns the frontiersof Egypt only." It was not in Israel's interest "that Arabist tendencies should grow in Egypt," Schnitzer said. "On the contraryit is in our interestto drive the wedge even furtherinto the Arab world until it splits altogether."

It is a regrettablefact [he continued] that the historyof acceptanceof the existenceof Israel has only just started,and only a minorityof the Arab countriesare reallyprepared to make a peace thatis not the preludeto our annihilation.In these circumstancesalleged Arab unitybecomes an obstacle that enables the extremistArab leaders to impose their view on the moderates.... As long as thereis in the Arab world no unifiedand coordinatedadvance towards acceptingthe existenceof Israel, unityis a lie and division is the situationwhich we muststrive for, not only because it reflectsthe facts, but also because it is the sole basis of hopes for peace.

It was recognized that the territorialproblem between Egypt and Israel could be solved relativelyeasily. Although Moshe Dayan denied an al- Ahram report that Israel had offeredEgypt full withdrawal from Sinai, there was a widespread sense that, as Aharon Yariv argued in Yediot Aharonot (November 23), a distinction could be made between "sovereignty and a militarypresence." Yariv hinted at an arrangement by which Egypt's legal right to Sinai would be acknowledged, but Israel "could lease areas for specific periods.... We should distinguish between security lines and frontiers.When we talk of the possible courses open to us, we can also think of demilitarized zones, under mutual control and with mutual guarantees." According to Yosef Harev, writing in Maariv (November 20), a highly significantIsraeli withdrawal fromSinai was planned, possibly with American troops being stationed at Sharm al-Sheikh.

On theterritorial question Israel will show greatflexibility so as to come closer to Egypt. Israelwill not ask fora presencein Sinaiexcept as regardswhat can be interpretedas securityconsiderations and safeguardingfreedom of navigation. This appliesto Sharmal-Sheikh, where Israel is readyto discusswith President Sadatarrangements satisfactory to bothparties... Observersbelieve that what is being consideredis the possibilityof a joint Israeli-Egyptianpresence in Sharmal-Sheikh by agreement,and with Egyptiansovereignty over the area beingassured. There is also anotherpossibility: that Israel should acquirethe place on a long lease underan arrangementagreed on in thenegotiations. Some timeago the possibilitywas examinedof an Americanpresence there, in the

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formof a warningstation in UmmKhushaiba. But it is fearedthat this might lead to complicationsbecause the USSR would also wantto geta foothold there,so thatthe trend is towardsa settlementbased on theapproval and the freewill of thetwo states, Israel and Egypt. Ambitiousplans forfuture Israeli-Egyptian economic and technological cooperationwere also put forward.One commentator,Haggai Eshed, even urgedthe establishment of a "Cairo-Jerusalemaxis" (Davar,November 24). The Ministerof Finance statedjust beforeSadat's arrivalthat ideas being consideredby his Ministryincluded "a regionaleconomic aid project,a free trade area like the European Common Market,the joint exploitationof energy,irrigation and agriculture,and the jointexploitation of mineralsand jointindustries. The aim is also to recruitcompanies for joint establishments and,among other things, to setup a publiccompany in all thecountries of the Diaspora, with Jewishand othershareholders, for such establishments." The Ministerof Finance and his deputyalso proposed the exchangeof economic and banking informationbetween the two countries. During Sadat's meetingwith the differentIsraeli parliamentary factions, the Deputy Ministerof Finance advocated economic cooperation between the two countries,"even without peace being made," notably throughtourism, customsagreements and mutualinvestments. In Maariv (November 24, 1977) Member of the Knesset Yosef Rom reviewedthe economic possibilitiesthat could result from a settlement. following President Sadat's initiative and urged the planning and implementationof "joint nationalprojects between Israel and Egyptin Sinai, such as nuclearenergy plants, and a sea water distillationplant, for the developmentof industryand agriculturein Sinai.'" Israel should stressits desireto becomean integralpart of theMiddle East. "There can be no doubt that only directcontacts, such as the Egyptian Presidentand the Prime Ministerhave initiated,can make progresstowards this goal possible." On areasother than Sinai, an impassioneddebate arose, with both "doves" and "hawks" puttingtheir views clearly. All groups of any significance rejected a withdrawalto the 1967 borders and the establishmentof a Palestinianstate in exchangefor peace, butwithin these general limitations of perspective,differences did emerge,especially on the futureof partsof the West Bank and Gaza. The moredovish commentators expressed anxiety,that Begin mightmake an inadequateresponse to Sadat. Uzi Benzimanin Haaretq (November 18) notedthat the moment of decision had now arrived,and it remainedto be seen whetherthe government would maintainits claim to theWest Bank as partof

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Israel,"thereby losing the chance of reachingpeace," or whetherit would abandon the dreamof maintainingEretz Israel intact. "And the moment whenit willbe Dayan's dutyto decidewhether he preferspeace or Sharmal- Sheikhis also approaching." YoramBrovski, in thesame newspaper five days later,emphasized the necessity of a quickresponse to Sadaton theWest Bank: "If Begin does not say 'yes,' he will in factbe saying'no,' and he knowsthis as well as the rest of us." Brovski criticizedthe prevailinggovernment formulathat "everything is negotiable"as a formof evasiveness."If Begin does not expressreadiness to withdraw,it will be clearthat he intendsnot to relinquishJudea and Samaria,but to hold on to themand to maintaincontrol over themillion Arabs living in them,for no logical reasonexcept ideology, thatis, the questionof the 'eternalrights.'" Amongpoliticians, there was a returnto manyold positions.In theLabour ,some membersrevived the position of the formerFinance MinisterPinhas Sapir, to theeffect that the population of theWest Bank and Gaza posed a seriousdemographic threat to Israel, and a withdrawalfrom theseareas sufficiently large to interestKing Husseinin a peace agreementwas essential.Former Prime Minister Golda Meirexpressed her viewpoint, on the otherhand, when she met PresidentSadat on November21: "We are ready fora compromisesolution on all fronts,"on conditionthat Israeli security was guaranteed.But no solutioninvolving the creationof a Palestinianstate on theWest Bank and Gaza would be acceptable,even though"we certainlydo not wantthe Palestinians to be in difficultcircumstances forever. We believe in a solutionthat is good forthem and reliablefor us. Our rejectionof the establishmentof a thirdstate has nothingto do withour wish to solve the problemof the Palestinians[although this solution would be] withinthe frameworkof a peace agreementwith Jordan" (HaaretZ,November22). FormerPrime Minister Yitzhak Rabin told Sadaton thesame occasion that as Chiefof Staffof Israel's armedforces in 1967,he could not accepta solution whichwould requireany future Israeli Chief of Staffto drawup defenceplans fromwithin the same borders.

The presentleader of the oppositionin Israel,Shimon Peres, expanded in more detail upon his outlook in an interview with Yediot Aharonot (November25). Althoughhe pointedout thatthe easiest solution would be a separateagreement with Egypt, it would be difficultfor Egypt to acceptsuch an agreementunless another Arab country- Jordan or Syria (or the Palestinians)- joined it. He discussedthe West Bank issue at some length, statinghis beliefthat even theLikud governmentmight accept some formof

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES partitionof the area if the Arabs showed interestin it. Peres cited four possibilitiesfor the futureof the West Bank. 1. OutrightAnnexation. "The most extreme,[meaning] that our historic rightmeans the enforcement of Israelilaw there.I believethat such an action would eliminateall possibilityof dialogue." 2. Coexistence,or "some form of modusvivendi between us and the inhabitantsof Judeaand Samaria.I shouldnot object to this,but it is doubtful if the otherside will accept it." 3. Confederation(an old Peres idea). "A federalunion, either between us andthe inhabitants of Judeaand Samariaand Gaza, or betweenus and Jordan, coveringJudea and Samaria." 4. A compromiseterritorial solution "in Judea and Samaria,which the Maarakhprogramme does not reject." The idea of a "compromiseterritorial solution" -in effect,the returnof partof the West Bank to Jordan- also featuredin the programmeof the DemocraticMovement for Change ("Dash"), led byYigael Yadin, and one of the partiesin the Israeli coalitiongovernment. Aftera bloc meetingin theKnesset, Dash proposedthat, in thecontext of a "real peace," Israel "should show that it is in principleprepared for a compromiseterritorial solution with all the neighbouringcountries... therebypromoting the peace process.' The partypointed out thata majority of the Israelipopulation would supportsuch a compromise. Theway should now be opento peacesettlements in all sectors,so thatEgypt can concentrateon dealingwith her domestic problems, without feeling the needto devotea hugepart of herrevenues to strengtheningthe army and preparingfor a new war. The governmentof Israel,in the formit was constitutedafter the electionsto the NinthKnesset, is strongenough to participatein establishingpeace- thatis, pursuinga policyof a territorial settlementvis-a-vis parts of the country that are, from many points of view, the mostsensitive. Even the most violent opponents of the idea of partitioning the countryconcede that, at the end of the day, Mr. Beginwill have to distinguish betweenan idealhistorico-religious principle and thenecessity imposed by regionaland internationalpolitical realities. The leadersof the opposition parties,who in theirtime claimed that their governments did not have a wide enoughmass and parliamentary base, cannot but agree to a courageousdecision bythe government when two thirds of the members of the Knesset support it. We mustnot miss the chance. When its enemies reach a settlementwith it, it befitsthe State of Israel, as a democraticJewish state, to paythe price involved in anyrelinquishment of the principle of theindivisibility of theland. The main problemwith such proposals,however, was thatthey still fell shortof theminimum declared conditions for a peace settlementof all Arab

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 19 states,and thereforewere unrealizable.No Arab leader,for instance, could accept the Israeli annexationof Jerusalem,which all major Israeli parties insistedupon, as wellas theannexation of at leasta portionof the West Bank. The Israeli Right thus offeredits own counter-proposals,from common premisesthat it sharedwith the otherparties: no Palestinianstate, and no recognitionof the PLO underany circumstances. Sinceno territorialdivision of theWest Bank and Gaza proposedby Israel was acceptableto theArabs, the main aim shouldbe to thinkin termsof new concepts. Earlier in the year,Moshe Dayan had proposed a "functional solution"to theproblem of the West Bank, in whichcertain administrative tasks would be undertakenby the Jordaniangovernment, while military controlover the area would be maintainedby Israel, who would,in effect,also incorporateit economicallyby simplyhaving no economicfrontiers, taxes or restrictionsbetween Israel and the marketsand cheap labour of the West Bank. On theprecise nature of theArab administration, there remained some dispute. Begin,at one timebefore Sadat's visit, informed a Britishtelevision teamthat he did notconsider King Husseinspecially competent to discussthe futureof theWest Bank, sincehe had acceptedthe Rabat Summitresolutions of 1974 recognizingthe PLO as sole legitimaterepresentative of the Palestiniansand therebypresumably excluded himself from negotiations on the subject(Maariv, November 17). Begin's speech of November20 to the Knesset,on theother hand, did implya willingnessto deal withJordan on the West Bank issue. But one idea comingincreasingly to the forewas thatof "autonomy"for the inhabitants of theWest Bank and theGaza Strip(an idea notincompatible with the confederation option suggested by ShimonPeres). The main problem facing right-wingstrategists was how to devise a formulathat would enable a situationvery like the currentstatus quo to continuein the West Bank, but would be able to be presentedto the Arab worldin a differentlight. The keyrequirements for such a policywould be to maintaina situationon the groundthat included: - The maintenanceof Israelimilitary bases. Israelwould thushave a line of defenceagainst any attackfrom the Arab East. - The retentionby Israel of overt or covertcontrol over the"security" of thearea, i.e., thepower to denyentry to personslikely to mobilizethe local populationagainst Israel, to deportpersons actually doing so and to imprison, or have put into prison,Palestinians linked to the resistancemovement. - The rightof Jewsto settlein the West Bank. No existingsettlement would be removedand landfor further settlements would be purchased,when possible, fromabsentee landowners. Some quartershinted that a similar

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"right"to settlein Israelcould be givento Arabsliving in theWest Bank and Gaza Strip. The pointhere is that,in practice,much of the land of Israel is controlledby Zionistorganizations like the Keren Kayemet who are bound by covenantonly to lease it to Jews,so thateven if thegovernmenton paper awardedthe West Bank and Gaza StripArabs the rightto settlein Israel,in practicein almostall cases theywould notfind it possible to acquireland. The mutual right of settlementwould thus be significantfor Israel, but insignificantfor the Arabs. - Anypeace treatywould structurethe economy of the West Bank in such a way as to favour Israeli economic development. This would be accomplishedthrough the guaranteeof "open borders" betweenthe two areas. As historyhas shown,it is extremelydifficult for an area,in thiscase the WestBank, to developindustrially with limited resources and capital,without the rightto economic protectionagainst the productsof more developed neighbours(Israel). Open borderswould thusconsolidate Israeli industry in the Palestinearea, throughproviding it withthe West Bank market,while local and less competitiveArab industrywould findit difficultto get offthe ground. Such borders would, furthermore,guarantee Israel a permanent supplyof cheap labour fromthe West Bank population. - Palestinianrefugees outside the West Bank and Gaza areas would not be permittedinto the new entityexcept in very limitednumbers. These refugeeshave been thepopular base of thePLO, and theiradmission into the WestBank and Gaza would have seriouspolitical implications for the ability of Israelto controlthe area. It could veryeasily, some quartersargued, open the road to a PalestinianWest Bank state. Administrativepowers that could not encroachon thesituation mentioned above, such as the appointmentand election of local officials,and the organizationon a small scale of the local economy, education and the gendarmerie,would be accorded to the local inhabitants, as their "'autonomy,"or "self-rule." Despitethe Bantustan character of thenew entity,Israeli hardliners hoped thatthe Arab Right,and Egyptin particular,was so desperatefor peace and stabilityin the area that declarationsthat the West Bank and Gaza would enjoy"self-rule" might sugar the pill of Israelioccupation and controlbehind the scenes,and receivea favourablehearing among some sectionsof Arab public opinion. One of the principalfactors underpinning the various Israeliattitudes on the West Bank issue was a common agreementthat no independent Palestinianstate should be created there. As the JerusalemPost reported

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(November20), theleader of "Dash," Yigael Yadin, "noted thatthere was full Cabinet consensus on opposition to a separate Palestinian state, oppositionto PLO participationat Geneva,and oppositionto a returnto the 1967 borders,"although "on issues beyondthis consensus,"his partywas preparedto take its own distinctiveand assertivelycompromising stand. Apartfrom a veryfew minority groups, there was a generalfeeling that the idea of a Palestinianstate and PLO representationat Geneva had been bypassed. A few days before Sadat arrived in Jerusalemformer Israeli ForeignMinister Abba Eban had explicitlydescribed the forthcoming visit as "a slap in theface for the ideology of thePLO. " Addressinga meetingof the Maarakhbloc in the Knesset,Eban continued:"Sadat's move is in Egypt's interests.He knows thathe can recoverthe greaterpart or all of Sinai, and thatsolidarity with the PLO is theobstacle to that" (Haarett,November 15). As a commentator of Yediot Aharonot,Aharon Ben-Ami, put it (November20): "Why deny it? Sadat's Egypt is today making a huge diplomaticconcession to Israel,if not as regardssubstance, at leastas regards form.Israel asked fornegotiations without the PLO, and Egypthas in fact acceptedthis demand. " Israelicommentators were soon demandinga change in Americanpolicy to the PLO as well (Haggai Eshed, Davar,November 29). Followingthe visit,Davar commented on Sadat's approachesto Arabs fromthe West Bank and Gaza (November25): The Egyptianpolitical drive is destroyingprinciples that are held sacredin the Arab world,one afteranother. President Sadat's visitto Israel has buriedthe Khartoum"Noes," and Egypt's invitationyesterday to the Arab notablesof Israeland theoccupied areas to attendthe Cairo Conference puts an end in both word and deed to the Rabat resolutionsthat, in 1974, made the PLO the sole representativeofthe Palestinian people. The Egyptian invitation is a long-term attemptby Egyptto separatethe Palestineproblem from the PLO, Sadat havingrealized that its distinctiveattitude is an insurmountableobstacle to reachingan agreementwith Israel. The persistentrefusal of Israeli governmentsto make contactwith the PLO as it is at present,and the Organization'srefusal to amendits Charterin sucha wayas to makeitself acceptableto theUS andIsrael, have turned the scale. Egyptis nowtrying to workout some other form for Palestinian representation, and if she succeeds in herefforts to producean alternativeto the PLO, or at leastto weakenits positionwithin the Palestinian arena, there will be betterhopes of a settlement and bothIsrael and Egyptwill be satisfied. Preciselyhow thePalestine issue could be "separated" fromthe PLO was never made completelyclear in Israel. In the municipalelections in the occupied West Bank in 1976, pro-PLO candidateshad won convincing majorities.Moreover, in the eyes of almost the entire Arab world, the

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Palestine problem concerns in large part the Palestinian refugeesof 1948, who have been the popular base forthe PLO. Any Palestinian entitywould have to provide them with a "right of return" to obtain widespread Arab acceptance; yet precisely because their rightto returnwould mean the introduction of a population sympatheticto the PLO, this solution of the Palestine problem was opposed by Israel. Menahem Begin's preferredalternative to the PLO, "the inhabitantsof Judea and Samaria," (Maariv, November 17, 1977), could aftertheir pro -PLO election votes in 1976 only yield him an unrepresentative minority,if the condition thatthe "representatives" reallybe an "alternative" to the PLO were maintained. No easy solution to this dilemma could be found. Some commentators hoped that Egypt could think of a solution, even if Israel could not. Haggai Eshed wrote (Davar, November 24, 1977): "Sadat came to Jerusalem to reach an agreement with Israel to the effectthat Egypt shall decide how the Palestinians are to be represented,on condition that such representationis acceptable to Israel. From now on Egypt and Israel will be able to exercise a veto (at least) on the choice of Palestinian representatives. These representativeswill be the firstto know about this,and to adjust themselves to its consequences. " In case other Middle East countries should feel themselves left out of the process of selecting "Palestinian representatives,"Eshed adjudicated that "Syria and Jordan are also entitled to obtain this right of veto, but not to monopolize it." The suggested alternativesto the PLO usually led in one way or another to Jordan or pro-Jordanian right-wingfactions and figures in the West Bank, such as Burhan Jaabari of Hebron, and Abdul-Raouf Faris, a former Jordaniandeputy from Nablus. In its importanteditorial on the day of Sadat's Knesset speech, HaaretZ wrote: We are entitledto expect that [Sadat] will expressreadiness to discuss all problemsin thelight of an understandingof theproblems of theIsraelis. To be moreprecise, he should understandthat we shallnever accept the PLO as our neighbour,for our vital securityinterests cannot be safeguardedthrough the establishmentof a thirdstate in EretzIsrael [theHashemite Kingdom of Jordan beingthe second state established in " EretzIsrael" in theeyes of the writer].. . Moreover,the time has come forour governmentto takesteps in thedirection to make it possible forthe EgyptianPresident to returnto his countryas an Arab leader qualifiedto solve thePalestine problem. The EgyptianPresident, who has come to Jerusalem,spoken in the Knesset and prayedin the Aqsa Mosque, therebyignoring the propagandaagainst the unificationof the city underIsraeli sovereignty - suchan Arab leadershould be told,unequivocally, thatwe do not want to go on rulingmore than a million Arabs in Judea,

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Samaria and Gaza forever.The Israeli governmentcan and should tell the EgyptianPresident that it is preparedthat the 1949 armisticelines should be adjusted,to theextent that our securitypermits, and be replacedby permanent lines,by virtueof whichthe majority of the Palestinianswould be outsidethe Stateof Israelso that,through cooperation with the members of theirpeople in Jordan,they could expresstheir Palestinian Arab identity. Jordan was seen as an attractive negotiating partner because the Israelis believed that its government was basically hostile to independent Palestinian national aspirations; but the problem that seemed to presentitself was thatthe Israelis could not offersufficient concessions to Jordan to bring it effectively into peace negotiations. The "autonomy" or "functional arrangement" suggested by the Israeli Right in factoffered King Hussein farworse termsfor peace than he had already rejected in previous years. The Israeli compromises on issues such as Jerusalem, settlement in the West Bank and territorial withdrawal,that might be required for successful negotiations with Jordan, were not forthcoming. On the Syrian and Lebanese fronts, the interesting aspect of Israeli political and press comment was its relative silence. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin did refer to Syrian-Egyptian rivalry in an analysis of the reasons for Sadat's initiative (YediotAharonot, November 25): AlthoughEgypt is stillthe keystoneof Americanpolicy, [the US] gave Syria the rightto object to the whole process. Egypt was not in favourof a joint delegationto Geneva, but in spite of this the US respondedto the Syrian demand... During Vance's visitin August 1977 Egyptproposed a meetingof Foreign Ministers,including the Foreign Ministerof Israel, in New York, underthe supervisionof the AmericanSecretary of State. But Syriaobjected, and theUS gave in to her. Moreover,when the Working Paper was completed bythe Israeli Foreign Minister and PresidentCarter, and Egyptagreed to accept theIsraeli interpretation of theform of Palestinianrepresentation, the process was interruptedbecause of Syria'sinflexible attitude. On top of all this,in the American-Sovietjoint statement,the US stressed its desire for further cooperationon thepart of the USSR so thatSyria might be persuadedto adopta moreconciliatory attitude and so thatit mightbe possibleto continuealong the course thatAmerican policy had followed. Apart from the evaluation that Sadat had created a situation in which the US could now be less responsive to Syrian demands, very littlewas said about a peace treatywith Syria. Despite Begin's invitation to President Assad to follow in the footstepsof President Sadat, it seemed that Israel could thinkof very little to offer Syria in terms of withdrawal from the land and Israeli settlementson the Golan Heights. Indeed, it appeared that Israel would prefernot to have to think about such subjects at all.

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FollowingSadat's visit,Israel thusfound itself in a dilemma.On the one hand it wantedpeace. As Boaz Evron put it:

I have told some of my friends,jestingly though half seriously,that if this governmentachieves peace, I undertaketo vote forLikud forthe restof my life.Indeed, I shallrun through the streets shouting 'Begin! Begin!' If we look at thingswithout prejudice, we shallsee thateven thoughthis government is rightist,with a cleartrend towards private capitalism (and betweenourselves, theMaarakh government was too) ifpeace is achievedit will lead to immense economicprosperity in all classes... If the defencebudget alone was reduced from40 percentto 20 percentor 15 percent,this would lead in two or three yearsto a greatrelaxation in all economicfields. Huge amountsof oil money seekingsomething to investin would startto flowinto the country, and Israeli contractors,businessmen, technicians and skilledworkers would startworking in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Egypt,Sudan and Jordan.And withthe fearof wareliminated and economicpressure reduced, investments, Jewish and other, would pourin fromEurope and theUS. Then real Jewishimmigration would start,with no need for envoysfrom the JewishAgency to encourageit; re- emigrationwould also stop. Why should Israelisemigrate to New York, in searchof a place securefrom war, and of economicopportunities, if there was no longerany fear of that and ifhuge economic fields were opened up to themin all partsof thearea? As a resultof this,the process of constructionwould resume,and theIsraeli army would be based on voluntaryservice, as is thecase in Britainand America. And we should not be obliged to be constantlyafraid forour sons in the Israeli army. On the otherhand, Israel had no intentionof givingup the territoryand acceptingthe Palestinian rights necessary for a peacefulsettlement. Indeed, it regardedany Arab insistenceon the pre-1967borders and the rightof self- determinationfor thePalestinians as evidence of a "lack of seriousness" among Arabs in the quest forMiddle East peace. As Moshe Nissim of the rulingLikud Partyput it, commenting on theSadat visit, after voicing the old proverb, "Respect him and suspecthim": "Only when the Arab states,or Egypt,agree that Israel cannot put up withthe pre-1967 boundaries... will I believethat there is not onlya wishfor peace but a readinessfor it" (Jerusalem Post,November 22). As far as hopes for a comprehensivepeaceful settlement to the current MiddleEastern situation were concerned, the situation following Sadat's visit seemeddeadlocked. Israel was more determinedthan ever not to accept a Palestinianstate or to deal with the PLO; and the fact that Sadat's visit occurredduring the period of governmentof Begin and the Likud Party, traditionallythe most opposed to Palestinianrights, strengthened this anti- Palestiniantrend by appearingto give it Egyptianbacking. Only a month

This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 25 afterhis government passed drastic, harsh and unpopulareconomic measures, usuallylethal for politicians, Begin was attaininghuge ratingsof approvalin the public opinion polls, as an obvious resultof the visit. The only clear outcome was a continuationof Egyptian-Israelitalks, althoughit was uncertainwhere they would lead: whetherto deadlock,if Sadat stood firmon his public declarationsthat a Palestinianstate must be created,or whetherto the kindof partialor separatesettlement hinted at by Yariv,and clearlyattractive to a numberof Israelipoliticians. "History and theLord have decreedthat Israel and Egyptshall lead thewhole area," former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin told Sadat on November 21 (Haaretq, November22). But on the more mundanelevel of the present-dayworld, wherepeoples seek self-determinationand recognitionof theirties to their land, ratherthan submission to the leadershipof others,no real movement towardsa just peace was visible.

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