Institute for Palestine Studies University of California Press The Reaction in Israel to the Sadat Initiative Author(s): Elias Shoufani Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 3-25 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536436 Accessed: 05-10-2015 19:59 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Institute for Palestine Studies and University of California Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Reaction in Israel to the Sadat Initiative ELIAS SHOUFANI* i thelast three weeks of November1977, the Israeli politicians and public were completelypreoccupied with the visit of PresidentAnwar Sadat to Jerusalemand the subsequentdevelopments which led to the conveningof theCairo Conference. The Israelipress, whose headlines in thefirst days of the monthhad been devotedto the internaldiscontent and striferesulting from thedrastic economic measures of MenahemBegin's right-winggovernment, now concerneditself almost entirely with the Middle East conflict.Political interestand commentariesstarted with some doubts as to whetherthe visit would takeplace at all, reacheda peak duringSadat's visitto Jerusalem,and thensubsided somewhat until the announcementof the forthcomingCairo Conferencerevived hopes of a peace settlementthat would satisfyIsrael's minimumterms. 1. SURPRISE AT THE VISIT When, on the evening of November 9, Sadat announced before the Egyptianparliament that he was readyto go beforethe Israeli Knesset to addressit on theMiddle East conflict,the Israeli press expressed surprise and disbelief. High officialscracked jokes about the matter,and considered Sadat'soffer to be purelyrhetorical. (Preparations for the visit did not,in fact, startseriously until one or two daysbefore it occurred.) The mostinfluential and respectedIsraeli newspaper, the independent Haaretz, referred to thevisit as somethinglike the"coming of the Messiah" in its editorialof November 11, butwarned about the danger of Israelbeing outmanccuvredby Sadat in a public relationsgame of statementsaimed at convincing the American * Elias Shoufaniis head of the section for Israeli Studies of the Institutefor Palestine Studies. This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES governmentto put pressureon Israel to make substantiveconcessions on basic issues: "It is impossibleto ignorethese statements [of Sadat]; it will eithermake Sadat the most dangerousadversary or the man withwhom we can bringthe problemto an end." Sadatrepeated his offeron November12 beforea visitingdelegation of US Membersof Congress,the same day on which Begin made a responseto Sadat's statementsin a televisedaddress to the Egyptianpeople (Jerusalem Post,November 13), in whichhe affirmedIsrael's desire for peace betweenthe two countries,stating that, "In ancienttimes Egypt and Eretz Israel were allies, real friendsand allies, against a common enemyfrom the North." Begin's announcementwas interpretedby some quarters as an attemptto substitutefor Sadat's visit,and Haaretqin itseditorial of November13 urged thegovernment to issue an invitationto Sadat,to seriouslyattempt to bring aboutthe visit. The newspaperwarned that Israel would appearin a verybad light beforeworld opinion if it failedto respond appropriatelyto Sadat's offers. Caution,if not doubt and suspicion,still prevailed in governmentcircles. Foreign MinisterMoshe Dayan was reportedas sayingin a session of the Israelicabinet that, although the idea of a summitmeeting between Sadat and Begin was a positiveone, thiscould not be a substitutefor comprehensive negotiationsat Geneva (Haaretq,November 14). The Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Defence Forces, Mordechai Gur, in a strangeinterview with YediotAharonot (November 15), introducedhints of forthcoming war into the discussionof Sadat's visit,by suggestingthat it mightbe a coverfor military preparations,an unauthorizedinterview for which Gur was reprimandedbut not dismissedby the Ministerof Defence,Weizmann. An invitationwas, however,made to PresidentSadat to visitJerusalem and addressthe Knesset. An Israelijournalist, Y. Tira, describedthe mood of theKnesset as it ratited theinvitation on November15 (HaaretZ,November 16): For the firsttime in the Ninth Knesset, national unitywas pronounced. This was around the issue of the invitationto the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, to visit Jerusalem and conduct negotiations about peace .... There was a sense of a special atmosphere of hope mingled with scepticism vis-a-vis the expected visit. Because of the vague sense of historic opportunity,or at least the beginning of a turningpoint in our country,the debate in the Knesset was conductedin a seemlymanner. All thespeakers, regardless of party affiliation, spoke aboutthe positivedevelopments in a serioustone and elated spirit.The only exception was Rakah [theCommunist Party], which made severalinterjections during the deliveryof the PrimeMinister's speech. This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE ISRAELI REACTION 5 Even afterthis, some Membersof the Knesset expressedsomething less than eager receptivityto Sadat's initiative.Yigal Allon, a formerCabinet Ministerin the Labour Governmentsaid that when Sadat came, "if he comes,"he would have to explainwhy just a fewyears ago he had said thathe would sacrificea million Egyptian soldiers to regain conquered Arab territories(Jerusalem Post, November 16). The newspaperDavar (November 18) askeda numberof Membersof theKnesset what they wished to sayto the EgyptianPresident. The answersincluded: AbrahamMelamed (Mifdal, the National Religious Party): "Welcome. I want to be convincedthat Sadat reallywants peace." Amos Hadar (Maarakh): ". I have no illusions about his visit suddenly leadingto peace-things do not happen in thatway. It maybe a successful propagandamanceuvre. But for all the dangersit is somethingpositive." CharlieBeton (a Black Panther,of the Hadash Party): "I shall tell Sadat thathe should not have come hereand made himselfa laughing-stock.The governmentis in no way preparedto relinquishthe occupied areas. In any case, I do not thinkthat he will come." Much discussion centered around the motives for Sadat's initiative: whetherit would embarrassIsrael and open her to furtherpressure from internationalopinion, or whetherit indicateda greaterwillingness to accept Israeli terms. Accordingto Moshe Jacques (Maariv,November 11, 1977), Sadat's decisionwas motivatedby a "hidden desireto freehimself from the shackles of a Geneva Conferenceconvened on the basis of the Israeli- Americanworking paper. From the public relationspoint of view, he does not want to reject the Americanproposals on procedureat the Geneva Conference." (These proposals, of course, excluded the PLO from participation.)Jacques added: "He tried at firstto avoid [the American proposal]by a counter-proposalcalling for the formation of a workinggroup to pave theway for the Geneva Conference.When he failedin his manceuvre he saidthat he was readyto come to Geneva withoutany consideration for the proceduralissues and thathe is willingto come to Jerusalem.The moment Israel falls into the trap and declares the replacementof the Geneva Conferenceby direct negotiations, the working paper will have beenrendered invalidand everythingis back to square one." Othersargued that Sadat had come froma position of weakness. Yoel Marcus(HaaretZ, November 18) maintainedthat "if thisstep was notplanned in detailfrom the beginning,there is no doubt thatit is part of a gradual changein Sadat's mind,particularly after the Yom Kippur War." According to Marcus,the Israeli penetration into Egypt in theOctober 1973 war had left This content downloaded from 96.91.243.195 on Mon, 05 Oct 2015 19:59:41 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES a deep impressionon theEgyptian President: " Kissingeronce describedit to Rabin,saying that [Sadat] was chilledto thebones, and ceased to believethat therewould be a militarysolution to theproblem. " Sadathad thenembarked upon a path of no return,jettisoning Soviet supportand tryingto obtain a politicalsettlement through America, hoping that Saudi Arabiawould induce the US to put strongpressure on Israel. But once Sadat realizedthat this path had led to a dead-end, he sought anothermeans of unfreezingthe situation"through takinga new decision similarto that which led to the October War." Haaret. (November 18) quoted the Ministerof Health, EliezerShostak, as implyingan Americanrole in theinitiative; Shostak stated thatSadat had delayedhis replyto the Israeli invitationuntil he receiveda messagefrom the US Presidentgiving his blessingsto the visit. All sides paid tributeto