Project Carlton – Initial Research for Public Circulation
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07939 132341 [email protected] www.lyddonconsulting.com 28th January 2019 PROJECT CARLTON – INITIAL RESEARCH FOR PUBLIC CIRCULATION Version 7 – Sponsor approved version of 12th August 2018 A BALANCE SHEET OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAYMENT SYSTEMS REGULATOR AND THE PAYMENT STRATEGY FORUM 2014-2018… …AND OF THEIR ASSISTANTS IN THEIR ENTERPRISE TO REFORM PAYMENTS IN THE UK: HMTREASURY, THE BANK OF ENGLAND, PAYMENT SYSTEM OPERATORS DELIVERY GROUP, OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEM OPERATOR/PAY.UK, AND PAYMENTS UK/UK FINANCE NO ASSETS OF VALUE CREATED © Lyddon Consulting A PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES & REGISTERED IN ENGLAND & WALES COMPANY NUMBER 4428435 (FORMERLY BARNRIDGE LIMITED) 14 PORTSMOUTH AVENUE, THAMES DITTON, SURREY, KT7 0RT Registered for VAT in the UK under registration number 838 5410 17 Project Carlton – initial research August 2018 Preface The re-vamping of UK payments is well on the way towards repeating the experience of other notable UK projects – smart meters, NHS Connecting for Health, the DVLA’s abolition of paper tax discs and many, many more. Expensive, multi-year fiascos costing many millions of pounds. The question is not whether the direction of travel portends disaster, the direction having been set by the combined ministrations of HMTreasury, the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Payment Systems Regulator, the Payment System Operators Delivery Group, Payments UK and their successors New Payment System Operator and UK Finance, not forgetting the cast of thousands who acted as unpaid extras within the Payment Strategy Forum. The question is what to do. About the author Bob Lyddon is an experienced management consultant both privately and with PwC in the fields of international banking, payments and cash management. Between 2003 and 2017 he was engaged as General Secretary of the IBOS international banking club. With PwC between 1997 and 2000 Bob managed several programmes at the time of the initial introduction of the Euro, and while at BankBoston between 1994 and 1997 Bob designed and brought to market the Connector international banking club. Bob’s earlier career was spent at Chemical Bank/Manufacturers Hanover and Lloyds Bank International in international capital markets, big-ticket export finance, and aircraft finance. Bob has written a series of online courses on Cash Management, Trade Finance and Corporate Treasury, as well as delivering such courses in person. Bob has acted an expert witness in connection with cross-border payments, and is a retained consultant to trade bodies in this same field. Bob Lyddon holds a First Class degree in Modern Languages from the University of Cambridge. © Lyddon Consulting Ltd 2014 Page 2 of 162 Project Carlton – initial research August 2018 Table of Contents Section Page Preface 2 Author biography 2 Executive Summary 4 Rationale and Set-up of the Payment Systems Regulator (“PSR”) 5 The Bank of England and its account and payment services 7 The Bank of England’s antiquated policy framework and IT complex 10 CHAPS outage in 2014 and lessons (not) learned 13 Direct Access to Payment Systems 16 PSR Market Review on Indirect Access to Payment Systems: substance 20 PSR methodology as exemplified by the Market Review on Indirect Access 26 PSR Market Review on Infrastructure Provision 29 Status of remedies under PSR’s Market Reviews 31 The PSR’s Payment Strategy Forum: establishment and strategic context 32 Payment Strategy Forum – the venue in which market detriments should have been remedied 38 Payment Strategy Forum Design & Implementation Phase 43 Not paying well? Take ISO20022 XML – it cures all known payment ailments 50 Status of payments market detriments in 2018 59 The PSR and the Interchange Fee Regulation 61 The PSR and LINK 65 The PSR and Authorised Push Payment Fraud 68 Payments Fraud in the UK 75 PSR response to Payments Fraud figures 80 Foundation and initial phases of New Payment System Operator (“NPSO”) 85 Proceedings of NPSO Board of Directors and make-up of NPSO Advisory Councils 90 NPSO’s ineffective governance and lack of expertise 94 NPSO workplan and interaction with other bodies 95 NPA status, timing and deliverables 98 More components in the NPSO monolith 100 Open Banking – another still-born child 102 Open Banking and the EU’s Access to Accounts, or XS2A 106 Open Banking and the “Simplifying Access to Markets” working group of the PSF 110 The “Simplifying Access to Markets” working group of the PSF 111 Balance Sheet of “Simplifying Access to Markets” stream of the PSF 116 Failing resilience of the UK’s payment systems 119 NPA’s threat to the resilience of the UK’s payment systems 123 Financial vulnerability of the NPA’s layered model 124 Flawed financial business models of New Entrants and Challenger Banks 128 Credit-free world is one without consumer protections 133 Prospects for investment in Cheque clearing and BACS Direct Debit 135 Cheques and BACS Direct Debits will have to conform to NPA rules, reducing competition 136 NPA as an enabler for payment fraud 138 Genesis of Faster Payments and the name check 139 NPA new services and tie-in with Faster Payments 144 Balance Sheet of “End User Needs” stream of the PSF 147 New facilities and measures to combat Financial Crime 148 Indirect Access Liability Models 151 Balance Sheet of Financial Crime, Data and Security Stream of the PSF 154 Conclusions on the PSF as a whole 156 Overall conclusions 157 Next steps 158 Appendices Page List of source documents 159 Full list of members of CHAPS, Faster Payments, BACS and Cheque&Credit on 31/7/18 161 © Lyddon Consulting Ltd 2014 Page 3 of 162 Project Carlton – initial research August 2018 Executive Summary The ministrations over the past 5 years of HMTreasury, the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Payment Systems Regulator, the Payment System Operators Delivery Group, Payments UK and their successors New Payment System Operator and UK Finance, and of the many people within the Payment Strategy Forum add up to a huge weight of effort. The results have been on the very low side of expectations, out of all proportion to the investment so far, but worse is to come. In the name of innovation, choice and competition we have an agglomeration of market power into two actors – New Payment System Operator and Mastercard. We also have a roadmap under New Payment System Operator to make all “retail” payment types interdependent within the New Payments Architecture (“NPA”) project, and to elevate the Faster Payments system in importance over the other payment systems, Faster Payments being the seedbed for the most rapidly increasing type of payment fraud – Authorised Push Payment Fraud enacted on the back of eBanking channels, be that mobile banking, remote banking or the new Open Banking. The direction of travel is towards “push payments” (like BACS Credit, CHAPS and Faster Payments) and away from “pull payments” (like BACS Direct Debit, cheque and card), the latter having better consumer protection measures around them. “Pull payments” are likely to be starved of investment going forward, and made to conform to the NPA model, hindering their ability to develop new feature and function, even were there investment funds available. A core mechanism for bringing all of this about is the adoption of the ISO20022 XML data standard, despite its questionable track record in the Single Euro Payments Area as a platform for enabling innovation and spurring competition – on any other measure than price. Without revenues there can be no re-investment in resilience, or in new measures to combat emerging fraud threats. This is the direction of travel, though, and it does not bode well for the UK economy or for the achievements of the benefits that these changes are supposed to bring about. The projects have built up a head of steam and have strong support from the authorities. It is highly questionable whether the supertanker can be turned from within, which leaves two options – firstly to do nothing, which seems quite irresponsible. Secondly to build something either separately on a greenfield basis, or to try and wrest control of the UK’s “pull payment” systems away from NPSO and to develop those as a competitor to NPA. © Lyddon Consulting Ltd 2014 Page 4 of 162 Project Carlton – initial research August 2018 Rationale and Set-up of the Payment Systems Regulator (“PSR”) The PSR has ambitious objectives but in its first four years it has cost far more than expected, done much busywork, caused a huge amount of work for others, but achieved very little • PSR established to resolve innovation and competition issues • Its scope was “payment systems”: CHAPS, Faster Payments, BACS, Cheque&Credit Clearing, LINK, Visa and Mastercard • Supposed to cost £2.5 million per annum: actually costing over £10 million • Has issued a series of “Directions” • Has taken on two roles as “competent authority” pursuant to EU legislation • Has carried out two Market Reviews • Has become involved in ATM charges and payments fraud • But to what avail? The PSR was established in 2014 pursuant to an “HM Treasury Impact Assessment – The Regulation of Payment Networks” of 20/8/2103, authored by a Mr Dan Turnbull. The salient issues were that the then-current arrangements were deemed not conducive to competition and innovation: What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary? The regulation and governance of payment networks does not enable them to respond to current and future challenges in the most effective way. Given the fundamental importance of the money transmission system to the economy, any inefficiency has a significant impact on economic welfare. The Government has accepted the recommendations of the Treasury Select Committee to extend regulation in this area, in order to tackle the multiple competition issues inherent in the payments market.