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A Study of Intra-Muslim Prejudice Among Singaporean Muslims

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A Study of Intra-Muslim Prejudice Among Singaporean Muslims View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ScholarBank@NUS FEARING THE ENEMY WITHIN: A STUDY OF INTRA-MUSLIM PREJUDICE AMONG SINGAPOREAN MUSLIMS NURUL FADIAH JOHARI (B.A. (Hons.), NUS) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF MALAY STUDIES NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2016 Supervisor: Professor Syed Farid Alatas Examiners: Associate Professor Noor Aisha Bte Abdul Rahman Dr Mohd Faizal Bin Musa ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS All Praises to Allah for His Bounties of Blessings and Mercies, without which this would not have been possible. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to people without whom I would not have been inspired and motivated to pursue my academic ambitions. The process would have been so much more arduous if not for the enduring love and support from my parents, siblings and closest friends. Thank you for believing that I could actually see this process through, especially in my darkest days. To my supervisor, Professor Syed Farid Alatas, thank you for all your constructive advice and pointers, and for taking the time to address the pressing questions I had on my mind, many of which were not even related to my studies. These are often times the bigger takeaways that I have received from you. Thank you for being my mentor for the past five years, for your knowledge and your unwavering support of me. I would not have been able to finish this without your support and guidance. To the lecturers in my department, thank you for stretching my intellectual capabilities and for sincerely encouraging to us fulfill our goals and to stand up for what we believe in. Special mentions go out to A/P Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, Dr Suriani Suratman, A/P Maznah Mohamad and Dr Azhar Ibrahim for the fruitful discussions we had in class, and the many conversations that we have outside. It is indeed a privilege to be in your presence, and to have established such a rapport with you. My heartfelt gratitude also goes out to the Malay Studies Department for their support throughout these four years. It has been wonderful. To my friends from NUS, The Reading Group, GEC and Penawar, your friendship and support beyond my academic endeavours have been immensely valuable in nurturing my growth as a human being. I cannot thank all of you enough. Our work is only about to begin. And finally, to my peers from the Shiite and progressive Muslim circles – it is through your acquaintance that I affirm the value of intra-Muslim dialogue, and more importantly, seeing the human in the ‘heretical’ Other. It is only by seeing the Other as an equal in humanity (as said by Sayyidina Ali) that we can stand against the forces of bigotry, hatred and fear. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Declaration page ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents iv Abbreviations and Acronyms vi Notes on spelling vi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Background of study 1 Thesis statement 3 Scope of study 4 Theoretical approach adopted in the study 6 Setting the backdrop: Context of intra-Muslim prejudices among the Malays 9 The construction of religious deviance and heresy 9 Context of sectarianism in the Malay world 11 Regional connections and the spread of sectarian sentiments 14 Dakwah phenomenon and the rise of fundamentalism 22 The context of Shiism in Singapore 23 The context of liberal Islam in Singapore 28 Research methods 36 Structure of the thesis 37 Chapter 2: Literature review 40 Approaches to the study of intra-Muslim prejudice 40 Literature review of works on religious orientation among Muslims in Singapore 43 iv Literature review of theoretical works relevant to this study 47 Chapter 3: Drawing the link between prejudice and fundamentalism 51 The mechanisms of prejudice 51 The fundamentalist psychosocial worldview 53 The correlation between fundamentalism and prejudice 65 Chapter 4: Expressions of anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments in Singapore 67 Expressions of anti-Shiism 67 Expressions of anti-liberal Islam 75 Chapter 5: Analysis: The manifestations of the prejudiced personality and its correlation to religious fundamentalism 91 Manifestations of the prejudiced personality 91 Authoritarianism 91 Institutionalism and the need for definiteness 100 Insecurity and the turn towards fundamentalism 103 Malay insecurities in Malaysia and its effects on Singaporean Muslims 108 Chapter 6: Conclusion 114 Summary of key points 114 Contributions of this study 118 Further research 120 Bibliography 121 Appendix 144 v ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASWJ Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Otherwise known as Sunni Islam) AWARE Association of Women for Action and Research HAKIM Himpunan Keilmuan Muda HBI Himpunan Belia Islam IIUM International Islamic University Malaysia IKIM Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia ISA Internal Security Act ISMA Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia JAKIM Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) JIL Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) MUIS Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) NGO Non-Governmental Organization PAS Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia) Pergas Persatuan Ulama dan Guru Agama Islam (Singapura) (Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers Association) SIS Sisters in Islam (Malaysia) UMNO United Malays National Organization NOTES ON SPELLING The terms “Shiism” and “Shiites” will be spelled as such, without the apostrophe as in “Shi’ism”. However, various spelling of Shiism and Shiites will be tolerated if they are in the quotation. vi Chapter 1 Introduction Background of study Over the past 10 years or so, there has been a notable increase in the sentiments which are intolerant or overtly demonizing Muslims who are perceived as not belonging to the mainstream in Singapore. This follows a common trend noted among Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia as well, who are Sunni and follow the Shafii school of jurisprudence. The notable groups which are on the receiving end of such demonizing sentiments include the Shiites, the so-called “liberal” Muslims and also the Ahmadiyyah.1 The language of epidemic and threat is constantly employed to delegitimize and demonize these so-called Other Muslims. Also, with the growth of social media, these sentiments have become diffused and are reproduced by laypeople, and not simply a top-down dissemination by the religious elite. It is common now to see, especially in the social media in Singapore, this idea of how those aforementioned groups of Muslims, however they are to be defined, as a “threat to one’s aqidah”, loosely and commonly understood as “faith”. Rhetoric and sentiments expressed on social media are reflections of sentiments existing in material reality, and such ideas do pervade public discourse through religious courses and sermons, views of the religious elite and popular reading predominating local religious bookstores and libraries. We also see other manifestations of this rhetoric such as “threat to Islam”, or “threat to Islamic tradition”, or a 1 For a better understanding of the discrimination and violence against the Ahmadiyyah community in Indonesia, see, for example, Budiwanti (2009) and Burhani (2013; 2014). 1 “threat to the religious authorities/ulama” in social media, and sometimes echoed in religious classes and public sermons. More examples will be discussed in latter chapters of this study. These sentiments echo those found in Malaysia and Indonesia. While the demonizing sentiments and hate speech are virulent across the Internet, what is more worrying is that such trends have been used to legitimize persecution and violence against such groups. In Malaysia, the Shiites are persecuted and arrested for their beliefs, practices and owning publications by Shiite scholars. (Alatas, 2014; Mohd Faizal, 2013a; 2013b) The demonization is also legitimized by the state through the official TV and radio stations, and in Friday sermons in mosques. In Indonesia, hate crimes have been committed against the Shiite minority, with the number of reported incidents escalating since 2006. (Formichi, 2014: 1) Violence by Islamist vigilante groups under the guise of protecting or defending Islam is also known to have been acted out against scholars and activists who are labelled as “liberal” or “Western” in their outlook.2 In 2005, a controversial fatwa was given out against “Sipilis” (Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism) by the Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) in Indonesia, which has been used to justify hate crimes against liberal Muslims.3 This thus brings us to the question of why there are prejudices within the Malay-Muslim community towards Muslims of different orientations. If diversity can be accepted as inherent within any community, including Muslims (Hirji, 2010: 8), why is there this notable phenomenon of prejudice towards Muslims of differing views and orientations? Specific to this study, I will be looking at the antagonizing and demonizing sentiments against the Shiite 2 For instance, during the Monas incident in 2008, where activists from the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion (AKKBB) were attacked by members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). See “Hardliners ambush Monas rally,” The Jakarta Post, 6 February 2008. Also see Kersten, “Religious Pluralism versus Intolerance: Sectarian Violence in Indonesia” (2014) 3 See the fatwa here: https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/tahukah-anda/fatwa-mui-tentang-pluralisme- liberalisme-dan-sekulerisme-agama.htm#.WPrVaNKGM2w accessed on 22 April 2017. The fatwa is not available on the MUI official page. 2 and liberal Muslims in Singapore. Although similar sentiments are also expressed towards the Ahmadiyyah community in Singapore, I will only be focusing on the two abovementioned groups because they are generally still seen as Muslims, albeit deviant or suspect in terms of their legitimacy as Muslims. The Ahmadiyyah, on the other hand, are officially seen as being out of the fold of Islam.4 There are also existing tensions between certain Sufi groups and their Salafi counterparts, each accusing the other of heresy, but this will not be discussed in this study.
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