Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to activate the Guard and Reserve lit the fuze on big changes in force structure policy. Origins of the Total Force

n 1965, the entered scenes to the Chinese or the Russians by do what Asian boys ought to be doing the in strength, with calling up reserves in large numbers.” for themselves.” large-scale deployments of air and In truth, he was working a political Mobilization would have been em- ground combat units to Southeast problem. Campaigning for re-election barrassing for Johnson. Even though Asia. President Lyndon B. Johnson the previous October, he had said he he deployed 44 combat battalions to rejected the advice of his Secretary of would not “send American boys nine or Vietnam in 1965, the President said IDefense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ten thousand miles away from home to he would not be provoked into what that he request Congress for approval to call up the National Guard and Reserves.

Johnson stuck to his stand for three USAF photo years as US troop levels in Vietnam rose steadily toward 500,000. He was determined to meet the need with active duty forces, increased recruiting, and larger draft calls. In that, he was bucking almost 200 years of precedent. In every war since the American Revolution, the militia— which evolved into the National Guard and Reserves—was mobilized to fight. They were mobilized in both the and the in 1962. The Guard and Reserve, already smarting under their image as havens for draft dodgers, disagreed with the President’s policy. and Air Force Reserve volunteers on training tours flew missions in Vietnam from 1965 on, but Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserve components in wartime undercut their fundamental purpose and mission. An F-100 from the New Mexico Air National Guard soars over Tuy Hoa AB, South Johnson said in his memoirs that Vietnam, in 1968. Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserve forces for the Vietnam War he did not want to “make threatening smarted. 94 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 Two Air Force Reserve F-105s fly a and Air National Guard, with dual state mission over the Pacific Ocean in 1978. and federal status, and the all-federal Lack of political muscle often left the Air Force and Army Reserve. Neither Reserve with second-rate equipment. the Navy or the Marine Corps had a Guard component. he called a “major war.” Activating The National Guard was designated the reserves would have had political in 1903 as the nation’s militia force and USN photo Pfrang byJ. PH3 (AC)T. repercussions. Johnson drew support reconfirmed in 1946 as the Army’s first- from members of Congress who reported line reserve component. The Air Force “heavy flak” from the families of young inherited its reserve force structure men who had joined to avoid the draft from the Army. The Air Guard and Air and who did not want to be activated. Force Reserve were designated equal components of the new Air Force in The Guard’s Political Muscle 1947, but the pre-eminence of the Guard Old line Guardsmen and Reservists was difficult to overcome. were disgusted by draft evaders. The Leaders of the independent Air Force Reserve Forces Act of 1955 provided were not enamored of the reserves, for enlistment in the reserve components especially the state-dominated Guard, of non-prior-service men, creating a but deep budget cuts by the Truman legal opportunity for them to discharge Administration left them with a smaller their military obligation without active force than anticipated, and reserve service. For many if not most of these components helped to fill the gap. short-term recruits, the motivation was Postwar, the Guard’s political clout different from that of the professionals forced the War Department to retain it and veterans who took pride in their as the primary reserve force, and the Air service. Force accepted this as political expedi- Origins of the Total Force The Air Force and Army had two ency. “Its political muscle had insured By John T. Correll reserve components each: the Army that the Air Guard received priority over the strictly federal Air Force Re- serve in the distribution of aircraft and equipment,” said Air Guard historian Charles J. Gross. “Consequently, Air Guard flying units have usually been equipped with more advanced and more glamorous tactical aircraft than the Air Force Reserve.” In 1948, a board convened by the Secretary of Defense proposed eliminat- ing redundancy by merging the Guard and Reserve into a federally controlled force called the National Guard of the United States. Among those supporting the proposal was Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., former president of the Air Force Association and the senior air officer of the Idaho ANG. Lanphier’s article, “48 Air Forces Too Many,” in the Janu- ary 1949 issue of Air Force Magazine, drew angry rebuttal. The National Guard lobby had little difficulty in blocking the merger in Congress. In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed the exact op- posite, a merger of the Army Reserve into the National Guard. About the same time, the Air Force floated an “eventual” merger of the Air Guard

TSgt. Archie Sims (l) and TSgt. Stephen Rogers, Air National Guard maintain- ers, work on the leading edge of an F-100 wing at Tuy Hoa AB, South Viet- nam. Some officials wanted to merge the Guard and Reserve into a single reserve component. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 95 misunderstood, but public opinion to increase air reserve participation was aroused. Opposition to the draft, in all major mission areas except for already rampant, intensified. nuclear weapons delivery, and reserve Tet was the beginning of the end for flying units would cost about half as Johnson, who announced a curtailment much as active duty units if similarly of the war and that he would not run for manned and equipped. re-election. In April, the new Secretary When Marrs moved up to be deputy of Defense, Clark M. Clifford, initiated assistant secretary of defense for reserve a limited call-up of the reserves, some affairs in 1970, he took with him a “Total 25,000 men and 88 units from all ser- Force model in being.” With the help vices for 24 months or less. The Army of a few like-minded officials, he said, units were not combat ready and only “I planned to convert the Air Force’s a few of them were sent to Vietnam. Total Force concept to defense policy. The mobilization was further hampered “A draft of the letter for the Secretary by lawsuits challenging the call-ups. of Defense to sign was leaked to the By contrast, the activated Air Guard services. The Air Force was silent. The and Reserve forces, including fighter Navy Secretary said this looked good, squadrons and tactical airlift groups, but the admirals circled the ships. There Theodore Marrs, the “architect of the performed with distinction in Vietnam. were two reactions in the Army. First, Total Force.” Gen. George S. Brown, 7th Air Force there was the idea that Total Force was commander, said the five Guard F-100 innocuous and could be ignored—a not and Reserve, but was defeated again squadrons were the best in the field. unusual reaction to ‘civilian control.’ in 1965. “McNamara then created a “The aircrews were a little older, but Second, there was a strong feeling that ‘selected reserve’ force in each of the they were more experienced, and the Total Force was some sort of camou- military services,” said Gross. “They maintenance people were also more flaged assault against the citadel on had priority access to equipment, could experienced than the regular units,” the Hudson.” recruit to full wartime strength, and Brown said. “They had done the same The Army and Navy lost their cam- were allowed to conduct additional work on the same weapon system for paigns to block the Total Force, Marrs training each year.” years, and they had [personnel] stability later recalled. Laird signed the paper The active services were lukewarm that a regular unit doesn’t have.” making Total Force into policy. The at best toward the Guard and Reserve, basic argument was that it had worked but there was strong Congressional Circling the Ships in the Air Force. If “fly-boy generals” support for reserve forces, especially The Nixon Administration came to would make it work, then certainly the the Guard. The Navy stood out among office in 1969 committed to ending the “brilliant admirals,” the “mature Army the services in its resistance to the use draft. The change agent was Secretary generals,” and Marine generals could of reserves, holding that most of its of Defense Melvin R. Laird, formerly a do the same, Marrs noted. operations required active forces. The nine-term Congressman from Wiscon- Laird declared the “Total Force Air Force was considerably ahead of sin. While an appointed commission concept” in an Aug. 21, 1970, memo- the others in its support and use of the studied the termination of the draft, randum to military departments, the Guard and Reserve. Laird moved to “Vietnamization” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and defense Failure to mobilize for Vietnam was war, reducing the American presence agencies. Reduced expenditures would damaging for the Army, which got most and shifting the combat burden to the require reductions in overall strengths of the draftees. Its end strength, driven Vietnamese. and capabilities of active forces and by war demands, rose from 965,000 in The President’s Commission on 1964 to 1,527,000 in 1968. New units the All-Volunteer Armed Force gave were organized from scratch and had considerable attention to the potential little cohesive unity. Experience levels contributions of the Guard and Reserve, fell. Forty percent of officers and 70 which set the stage for what would be percent of the enlisted force had less known as the Total Force concept. than two years of service. Breakdowns The term “Total Force” first ap- in discipline followed. peared in October 1953 when the Air Two events in January 1968 brought Force used it to describe its approach matters to a head. North seized to employing its reserve components. the intelligence ship USS Pueblo and Its foremost advocate was Theodore C. interned the crew. A week later, the Marrs, whom Gross calls “the architect North Vietnamese launched the Tet of Total Force.” Marrs was a former Air Offensive in Vietnam. In February, Guardsman from Alabama. In 1966, Gen. William C. Westmoreland of when he was deputy assistant secretary Military Assistance Command Vietnam of the Air Force for reserve affairs, he requested 206,000 more troops be made convinced the Chief of Staff, Gen. John available for deployment, in addition P. McConnell, to request a RAND study to the 500,000 previously requested. of future roles for air reserve forces. When reported The study, completed in 1967, said Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird this, Westmoreland claimed he was that it would be in the national interest signed Total Force into policy. 96 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 until the draft was zeroed out in June founding fathers, Marrs said, one which 1973. Unless the draft was reinstated could not enter a full-scale conflict by Congress, there was no alternative to without public consensus. In fact, it mobilization of the reserves to expand was considerably more than that. In the armed forces in wartime. ensuing years, the Guard and Reserve Cuts and adjustments proceeded achieved stature and capabilities they apace. “By FY 1973, defense spending never had before. The air reserve forces was at its lowest level in dollars of con- took on large portions of the Air Force stant buying power since 1951,” Laird mission. In both the Army and the Air said. “Manpower—military, civilian, and Force, the distinction between active industry—was at its lowest level since and reserve forces faded almost to the 1950.” Meanwhile, the budgets of the point of disappearance. In the limited National Guard and Reserves almost conflicts and expeditionary operations doubled from their 1968 levels. to come, the Guard and Reserve pro- In August 1973, Secretary of Defense vided an extraordinary share of the James R. Schlesinger declared that “Total forces deployed. Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now There were problems. As force the Total Force Policy which integrates reductions and base realignments Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger the active, Guard, and Reserve forces into and closures bit deeper, Air Force supported the Total Force concept. a homogeneous whole.” His statement leaders clashed with state governors was essentially an expression of support and adjutants general on the transfer increased reliance on combat and rather than a change of substance. and consolidation of flying units. At combat support units of the Guard The “initial and primary” provision a different level of concern, Secre- and Reserves. of Laird’s Total Force memo was nailed tary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld “In many instances the lower peace- down in 1974 by the “Abrams Doctrine.” complained at a press conference in time sustaining costs of reserve forces Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, who fol- December 2002 the Total Force policy units, compared to similar active units, lowed Westmoreland at MACV in 1968, was hampering his ability to deploy can result in a larger total force for a became Army Chief of Staff in 1972. He combat units to war because he had given budget or the same size force had experienced the devastating effect of to concurrently activate Guard and for a lesser budget,” he said. Johnson’s failure to mobilize and said Reserve elements, without which the Laird’s declaration had two main often the US should never again go to war active components could not conduct provisions. First, “emphasis will be without calling up the Guard and Reserve. operations. given to the concurrent consideration Laird rejected Rumsfeld’s critique. of the total forces, active and reserve, to More Than Ever “Some have argued that the Total Force determine the most advantageous mix Abrams wanted to increase the Army concept no longer ‘fits’ our nation’s to support national strategy and meet from 13 divisions to 16. The bad news from military strategy,” Laird said in Febru- the threat. A total force concept will the Army staff was there were resources ary 2006. “Reflecting on all the reasons be applied to all aspects of planning, for only 10 good divisions rather than the that the country adopted this concept programming, manning, equipping, 13 in nominal existence, and 16 divisions in the 1970s, one must conclude that, and employing Guard and Reserve were out of the question. Abrams solved to the contrary, it fits now more than forces,” he stated. Second, “Guard the problem by two actions. He created ever. We shouldn’t forget that the Total and Reserve units and individuals of “roundout” brigades and battalions in the Force concept was based on the hard the Selected Reserves will be prepared reserve forces, and made them affiliates lessons of the Vietnam War and fiscal to be the initial and primary source of active divisions, to be mobilized and realities. The Guard and Reserve were of augmentation of the active forces deployed along with them in the event not mobilized during that conflict in any future emergency requiring a of war. He also transferred some combat because President Lyndon B. Johnson rapid and substantial expansion of the support functions in their entirety to the preferred to use the draft rather than active forces.” Guard and Reserve. risk the political fallout of activating The Total Force concept was offi- In August 1974, Abrams announced units in America’s heartland.” cial policy, but was not prescribed by the Army force structure would increase When Guard or Reserve units are statute and did not have the force of to 16 combat-ready divisions by Fiscal called, you call out America, he noted. law. Laird could and did move out on 1978. The catch was integral brigades and “Governors and members of Congress the integration of all available forces, battalions of those divisions and essential are stakeholders in the defense of including better-trained and -equipped combat support would be in the Guard and America. The Defense Department Guard and Reserve forces, to achieve Reserve. As a practical matter, it would be would be wise to work with them.” He “the most advantageous mix.” impossible to send the Army into anything concluded that “the National Guard and However, the second provision— more than a limited contingency without Reserves are—along with a properly relying on the reserve components calling up the reserves. configured regular force—the cost- instead of the draft as the “initial and The Total Force policy was a return effective solution for an uncertain primary source of augmentation” in to a standing military envisioned by the future.” n wars and emergencies—was not bind- ing on a President who chose to do John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a otherwise. This part of Total Force contributing editor. His most recent article, “The Real 12 O’Clock High,” appeared remained a matter of DOD opinion in the January issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 97