Lyndon Johnson's Refusal to Activate the Guard and Reserve Lit the Fuze

Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to activate the Guard and Reserve lit the fuze on big changes in force structure policy. Origins of the Total Force n 1965, the United States entered scenes to the Chinese or the Russians by do what Asian boys ought to be doing the Vietnam War in strength, with calling up reserves in large numbers.” for themselves.” large-scale deployments of air and In truth, he was working a political Mobilization would have been em- ground combat units to Southeast problem. Campaigning for re-election barrassing for Johnson. Even though Asia. President Lyndon B. Johnson the previous October, he had said he he deployed 44 combat battalions to rejected the advice of his Secretary of would not “send American boys nine or Vietnam in 1965, the President said IDefense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ten thousand miles away from home to he would not be provoked into what that he request Congress for approval to call up the National Guard and Reserves. Johnson stuck to his stand for three USAF photo years as US troop levels in Vietnam rose steadily toward 500,000. He was determined to meet the need with active duty forces, increased recruiting, and larger draft calls. In that, he was bucking almost 200 years of precedent. In every war since the American Revolution, the militia— which evolved into the National Guard and Reserves—was mobilized to fight. They were mobilized in both the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Guard and Reserve, already smarting under their image as havens for draft dodgers, disagreed with the President’s policy. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve volunteers on training tours flew missions in Vietnam from 1965 on, but Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserve components in wartime undercut their fundamental purpose and mission. An F-100 from the New Mexico Air National Guard soars over Tuy Hoa AB, South Johnson said in his memoirs that Vietnam, in 1968. Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserve forces for the Vietnam War he did not want to “make threatening smarted. 94 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 Two Air Force Reserve F-105s fly a and Air National Guard, with dual state mission over the Pacific Ocean in 1978. and federal status, and the all-federal Lack of political muscle often left the Air Force and Army Reserve. Neither Reserve with second-rate equipment. the Navy or the Marine Corps had a Guard component. he called a “major war.” Activating The National Guard was designated the reserves would have had political in 1903 as the nation’s militia force and USN photo Pfrang byJ. PH3 (AC)T. repercussions. Johnson drew support reconfirmed in 1946 as the Army’s first- from members of Congress who reported line reserve component. The Air Force “heavy flak” from the families of young inherited its reserve force structure men who had joined to avoid the draft from the Army. The Air Guard and Air and who did not want to be activated. Force Reserve were designated equal components of the new Air Force in The Guard’s Political Muscle 1947, but the pre-eminence of the Guard Old line Guardsmen and Reservists was difficult to overcome. were disgusted by draft evaders. The Leaders of the independent Air Force Reserve Forces Act of 1955 provided were not enamored of the reserves, for enlistment in the reserve components especially the state-dominated Guard, of non-prior-service men, creating a but deep budget cuts by the Truman legal opportunity for them to discharge Administration left them with a smaller their military obligation without active force than anticipated, and reserve service. For many if not most of these components helped to fill the gap. short-term recruits, the motivation was Postwar, the Guard’s political clout different from that of the professionals forced the War Department to retain it and veterans who took pride in their as the primary reserve force, and the Air service. Force accepted this as political expedi- Origins of the Total Force The Air Force and Army had two ency. “Its political muscle had insured By John T. Correll reserve components each: the Army that the Air Guard received priority over the strictly federal Air Force Re- serve in the distribution of aircraft and equipment,” said Air Guard historian Charles J. Gross. “Consequently, Air Guard flying units have usually been equipped with more advanced and more glamorous tactical aircraft than the Air Force Reserve.” In 1948, a board convened by the Secretary of Defense proposed eliminat- ing redundancy by merging the Guard and Reserve into a federally controlled force called the National Guard of the United States. Among those supporting the proposal was Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., former president of the Air Force Association and the senior air officer of the Idaho ANG. Lanphier’s article, “48 Air Forces Too Many,” in the Janu- ary 1949 issue of Air Force Magazine, drew angry rebuttal. The National Guard lobby had little difficulty in blocking the merger in Congress. In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed the exact op- posite, a merger of the Army Reserve into the National Guard. About the same time, the Air Force floated an “eventual” merger of the Air Guard TSgt. Archie Sims (l) and TSgt. Stephen Rogers, Air National Guard maintain- ers, work on the leading edge of an F-100 wing at Tuy Hoa AB, South Viet- nam. Some officials wanted to merge the Guard and Reserve into a single reserve component. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2011 95 misunderstood, but public opinion to increase air reserve participation was aroused. Opposition to the draft, in all major mission areas except for already rampant, intensified. nuclear weapons delivery, and reserve Tet was the beginning of the end for flying units would cost about half as Johnson, who announced a curtailment much as active duty units if similarly of the war and that he would not run for manned and equipped. re-election. In April, the new Secretary When Marrs moved up to be deputy of Defense, Clark M. Clifford, initiated assistant secretary of defense for reserve a limited call-up of the reserves, some affairs in 1970, he took with him a “Total 25,000 men and 88 units from all ser- Force model in being.” With the help vices for 24 months or less. The Army of a few like-minded officials, he said, units were not combat ready and only “I planned to convert the Air Force’s a few of them were sent to Vietnam. Total Force concept to defense policy. The mobilization was further hampered “A draft of the letter for the Secretary by lawsuits challenging the call-ups. of Defense to sign was leaked to the By contrast, the activated Air Guard services. The Air Force was silent. The and Reserve forces, including fighter Navy Secretary said this looked good, squadrons and tactical airlift groups, but the admirals circled the ships. There Theodore Marrs, the “architect of the performed with distinction in Vietnam. were two reactions in the Army. First, Total Force.” Gen. George S. Brown, 7th Air Force there was the idea that Total Force was commander, said the five Guard F-100 innocuous and could be ignored—a not and Reserve, but was defeated again squadrons were the best in the field. unusual reaction to ‘civilian control.’ in 1965. “McNamara then created a “The aircrews were a little older, but Second, there was a strong feeling that ‘selected reserve’ force in each of the they were more experienced, and the Total Force was some sort of camou- military services,” said Gross. “They maintenance people were also more flaged assault against the citadel on had priority access to equipment, could experienced than the regular units,” the Hudson.” recruit to full wartime strength, and Brown said. “They had done the same The Army and Navy lost their cam- were allowed to conduct additional work on the same weapon system for paigns to block the Total Force, Marrs training each year.” years, and they had [personnel] stability later recalled. Laird signed the paper The active services were lukewarm that a regular unit doesn’t have.” making Total Force into policy. The at best toward the Guard and Reserve, basic argument was that it had worked but there was strong Congressional Circling the Ships in the Air Force. If “fly-boy generals” support for reserve forces, especially The Nixon Administration came to would make it work, then certainly the the Guard. The Navy stood out among office in 1969 committed to ending the “brilliant admirals,” the “mature Army the services in its resistance to the use draft. The change agent was Secretary generals,” and Marine generals could of reserves, holding that most of its of Defense Melvin R. Laird, formerly a do the same, Marrs noted. operations required active forces. The nine-term Congressman from Wiscon- Laird declared the “Total Force Air Force was considerably ahead of sin. While an appointed commission concept” in an Aug. 21, 1970, memo- the others in its support and use of the studied the termination of the draft, randum to military departments, the Guard and Reserve. Laird moved to “Vietnamization” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and defense Failure to mobilize for Vietnam was war, reducing the American presence agencies. Reduced expenditures would damaging for the Army, which got most and shifting the combat burden to the require reductions in overall strengths of the draftees. Its end strength, driven Vietnamese. and capabilities of active forces and by war demands, rose from 965,000 in The President’s Commission on 1964 to 1,527,000 in 1968.

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