Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?].

BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. by Gen. Pope In order that we may arrive at a clear understanding of the conduct for which Fitz John Porter was tried, convicted and cashiered, I shall proceed to give a brief statement of the facts, stripped of the clouds of witnesses and words in which such cases are always enveloped when tried by military or civil courts

The only testimony I shall refer to as to Porter's guilt in this brief review, is his own; the only testimony as to the consequences of that guilt to the and to the country will be the written testimony of the three rebel officers highest in rank and command in front of us on the day of that battle.

If Porter's guilt and its consequences cannot be made clear to any impartial mind by this testimony, I am perfectly willing that he shall have the benefit of all the doubts that he or his friends may be able to keep alive in the public mind.

To begin then. On the 29th of August, 1862, a severe battle was fought on the old field of Bull Run, known as the first day of the second battle of that name. In order that sufficient acquaintance with the localities may be had, I append a rough sketch of the roads in the vicinity of the field of battle.

About two-thirds of the Army under my immediate eye, were drawn up in line of battle perpendicular to and on both sides of the Warrenton Turnpike, the road from Bethlehem Church to Sudley Springs intersecting our line of battle diagonally near its centre.

At about nine o' on the morning of the 29th of August 1862, Porter then at Manassas Junction, received an order from me to move forward to Gainsville on the direct road.

In compliance with that order he reached the forks of the road at Bethlehem Church, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the day, and moved forward on the direct road to Gainsville, until the rear of his column rested near the forks of the road. His Corps was the Fifth Corps of the Army, and having been reinforced by Piatt's Brigade of Sturgis' Division numbered quite twelve thousand men, very nearly a third of the whole Army within the field of battle. It contained the entire Regular Army of the , with the exception of the few regiments serving in the West, and was provided with eight batteries of light artillery, many of them batteries of the Regular Army. It was the most efficient and best disciplined Corps of the entire Army, and having marched but three or four miles that day, and not much farther the day previous, was by very far the freshest Corps on

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 the ground. McDowell had marched in Porter's rear from Manassas Junction with his Corps, but hearing, on reaching the forks of the road at Bethelem Church, the sounds of a severe battle being fought at Groveton, passed the rear of Porter's Corps, and following the road to Sudley Springs, brought his Corps in upon the left of our line and immediately pushed forward into action. This brief statement of facts which can be verified by reference to any of the official reports, or to the testimony in Porter's case, is necessary to a clear understanding of the situation when Porter's crime was committed. Between three and four o'clock in the day, when the battle had been raging not less than four hours in his hearing, (his Corps remaining with stacked arms where McDowell left it) he wrote the following letter to General McDowell, addressed to McDowell and King who, as before stated, had some hours before, urged by the sounds of the battle, marched up the Sudley Springs road to take part in the engagement. 2 “ Generals McDowell and King :

“I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the roads to Groveton. The enemy are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery, and cavalry, and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. Had you not better send your train back.

(Signed,) F. J. PORTER, General.”

In other words, Porter writes deliberately that believing our army on his right, and within less than four miles of him, was being defeated by the enemy and driven from the field, he intends to do what?—attack the enemy in his front so as to aid and relieve that portion of the army he pretended to think was being defeated? or, if he deemed that impracticable, march with his Corps on the road previously taken by McDowell, (and which was open all day, orderlies and messengers passing up and down constantly,) and reinforce and strivet o preserve from defeat the army which he pretended to believe was being driven from the field! Was there, in the mind of any honest man, citizen or soldier, any honorable course open to him except one of these two? Not so thought Porter, With his efficient Corps, equal in numbers to nearly one-third of the whole army—superior in freshness and in efficiency to any Corps in the field—he deliberately states that he intends to march off under these appalling circumstances to Manassas Junction, precisely in the opposite direction from the army, and to abandon them to the disaster which he says he believes they were suffering. Can any words add force to this simple statement?

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 Meantime, hearing nothing from Porter, the sound of whose guns on the enemy's right I had been anxiously listening for since twelve o'clock in the day, I sent him, at 4.30 p. m., the following order:

Headquarters in the Field, August 29 th, 1862—4.30 P. M.

“ Major General Porter :

“Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage his flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

(Signed,) JOHN POPE, Major General Commanding.”

The delivery of this order to Porter at five o'clock, at least one-and-a-half hours before sunset, and full two hours before the battle closed for the night, was proved on his trial; but the order was in no respect obeyed, and seems to have produced no effect upon Porter, except that instead of retreating to Manassas according to his first intention he only retreated part of the way; far enough to be out of sight of the enemy and out of danger. What now is the charge upon which Porter was tried and cashiered? Leaving out of consideration the first charge and specification, which related to transactions of two days previous, the truth of which he admitted before the Court, and which, although grave enough and criminal enough, are by far the least serious—these are the charges and specifications which contain the infamous conduct for which he was dismissed.

“ Charge 2.—Violation of the Fifty-Second Article of War.

“ Specification 1.—In this; that the said Major General Fitz John Porter, during the battle of Manassas, on Friday the 29th of “August, 1862, while within sight of the field and in full hearing of its artillery, did recieve from Major General John Pope, his “superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy in the following figures and letters, to wit:

“ Headquarters in the Field, August 29 th, 1862—4.30 P. M.

“ Major General Porter :

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 “Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible “on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out “as soon as you engage his flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batters, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to “fall back to do so to your right and rear so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

(Signed,) JOHN POPE, Major General Commanding.”

“Which said order the said Major General Porter did then and there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing “forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops that were already fighting greatly superior numbers “and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army, “a result which must have followed from said flank attack, had it been made by the said General Porter, in compliance with the “said order which he so shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August “1862.”

“ Specification 2.—In this; that the said Major General Fitz John Porter, being with his Army Corps, on the 29th of August “1862, between Manassas Station and the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of the “rebels, and within sound of the guns, and in presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action was being fought, and that “the aid of his Corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the “advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces from which he shamefully “retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862.”

“ Specification 3—In this; that the said Major General Fitz John Porter, being with his Army Corps near the field of battle “at Manassas, on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe action was being fought by the troops of Major General Pope's command, “and being in the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did “shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and General, and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his army to “the Manassas Junction and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army, and did fail by any attempt to attack the “enemy to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety of the Capital of the country. This “at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862.”

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 A comparison of these specifications with the letter of Porter to McDowell and King heretofore referred to, will show that they are almost a literal quotation from that letter, the word “shameful” only being introduced, an adjective which few men will consider too strong to apply to such transactions. 3 That Porter did precisely what he wrote McDowell and King he intended to do was perfectly well known, of course, to every man in his Army Corps, and easily proved before the Court Martial. It is impossible to believe that any man in this country, possessed of the facts, can be found so prejudiced as to justify such a transaction, or to ask a modification of the sentence against Porter. It is Porter himself who wrote the charges against himself, and whose own written testimony establishes his crimes. It is impossible for any man, especially any military man, to image any excuse for, or any satisfactory explanation of, such conduct, It will, however be proper to examine Porter's lame excuses, and to show that insufficient and unsatisfactory an explanation as they are of what cannot be explained, they are nevertheless utterly disproved by the written testimony of the Rebel Generals who commanded in front of us that day.

His first reason for retreating to Manassas Junction without firing a gun is that he believed that portion of the Army on his right was being defeated and driven from the field.

I will venture to say that of all courses which would have occurred to any honorable soldier under such circumstances, that is the last that would have been thought of. Indeed, it would not have entered the head of any officer fit to hold a commission to do such a thing. The reason given by Porter for running away is precisely the very strongest reason why he should not have done so. Every dictate of patriotism and honor, every feeling and instinct of a soldier, every suggestion of common humanity, protest against such shameful desertion of the comrades who needed and aid he was so abundantly able to give.

It so happens, however that this reason was without foundation. The Army on his right was neither worsted nor likely to be. Its forward movement en masse against the enemy was only delayed until his guns could be heard.

His second reason is that he believed the enemy to be in heavy force in front of him, and “that the advancing masses of dust indicate the enemy coming in force.” Even if this belief of Porter's had been well founded, it only could have decided him not to attack where he was, but to join the main body of the Army without delay, or some such course as this. But after the receipt of the order directing him to attack at once in his front, no alternative was left him. It mattered not whether there were five thousand or twenty-five thousand men in his front, his duty was clear and unmistakable.

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 How could he know for what purpose he was ordered to attack the enemy? How could he know that the General-in-Chief expected his attack to be successful? How could he know that his attack was not ordered that he might prevent the enemy from re-enforcing by troops from his front other parts of their line which were being too hard pressed? How could he know that his attack was not intended to draw forces from other parts of the enemy's line of battle so that an attack elsewhere could be pressed with success? In fact, the order sent him contemplated and provided for his repulse in its last paragraph. Suppose Sherman, at the battle of Chattanooga, had failed to attack the enemy's right on the ground that they were in superior force and he would be repulsed, (as was the fact,) what would have become of that battle? In truth, I feel ashamed to offer an argument on such a subject to any military man. Whoever does not know all such arguments by heart is unacquainted with the first rudiments of the military profession. Whatever, then, was the force in front of Porter he was bound by every dictate of honor, of duty, and of military law, to attack in compliance with the order he received. But it happens, unfortunately for him, that his belief and his apprehensions about the heavy forces of the enemy in his front were as groundless as his opinion that the army on his right was being driven from the field.

And here I shall produce testimony to establish this fact that cannot be disputed, and which is clear and precise in every particular. And first the testimony of General J. E. B. Stuart, of the Rebel Army, who commanded the cavalry with , and was this day on Jackson's right.

“ Extracts from reports of the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia,—(Rebel Army,)—Summer Campaign of 1862—[ Operations on the 29 th of August ]—( Second Bull Run. )— Report of Major General Stuart of operations immediately preceding, and including the Battle of Groveton.

Headquarters Stuart's Cavalry Division, Army of Northern Virginia, February 28, 1863.

“ Brigadier General R. H. Chilton, A. A. G. :

* * * * *

“The next morning (29th,) in pursuance of General Jackson's wishes, I set out again to endeavor to establish communication with Longstreet, from whom he had received a favorable report the night before.

* * * * *

“I met with the head of General Longstreet's column between Haymarket and Gainsville, and there communicated to the Commanding General Jackson's position and the enemy's. I then passed

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 the cavalry through the column so as to place it on Longstreet's right flank, and advanced directly towards Manassas, while the column kept directly down the pike to join General Jackson's right. I selected a fine position for a battery on the right, and one having been sent to me I fired a few shots at the enemy's supposed position, which induced him to shift his position. General Robertson, who, with his command, was sent to reconnoitre further down the road towards Manassas, reported the enemy in his front. Upon repairing to the front, I found that Rosser's regiment was engaged with the enemy to the left of the road, and Robertson's videttes had found the enemy approaching from the direction of Bristoe Station towards Sudley. The prolongation of his line of march would have passed through my position, which was a very fine one for artillery as well as observation, and struck Longstreet in flank. I waited his approach long enough to ascertain that there was at least an army corps, * at the same time keeping detachments of cavalry dragging brush down the road from the direction of Gainsville, so as to deceive the enemy, (a ruse which Porter's report shows was successful,) † and notified the commanding General, then opposite me on the turnpike, that Longstreet's flank and rear were seriously threatened, and of the importance to us of the ridge I then held. Immediately upon receipt of that intelligence, Jenkins', Kemper's and D. R. Jones' brigades, and several pieces of artillery, were ordered to me by General Longstreet, and being placed in position fronting Bristoe, awaited the enemy's advance. After exchanging a few shots with rifle pieces, this corps withdrew towards Manassas , † leaving artillery and supports to hold the position till night. * * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. B. STUART, Major General Commanding Cavalry.

It is thus seen that when Porter reached his most advanced position, where he saw and fancied so much, there was realy nothing in front of him except a few cavalry regiments and one battery. That the “advancing masses of dust indicating that the enemy was coming in force,” of which he writes in his letter, was more than the dust raised by a few cavalry soldiers dragging brush up and down the Warrenton Turnpike. It will be noticed, too, that Stuart says distinctly, (what was attempted to be disproved 4 before the Court,) that Porter's line of march led him directly upon the flank of the enemy, and that both flank and rear were seriously threatened by his advance. It will be observed also, that when Longstreet was duly notified of his danger, and asked to send troops to resist Porter's advance, he sent only three brigades, viz; Jenkin,'s Kemper's and D. R. Jones', (all he could spare, as will appear from Jackson's report) and this was positively all the force ever in front of Fitz John Porter, from first to last; placed there with no purpose whatever to attack, but if possible to prevent his advance.

Let us see what General Longstreet has to say on the subject:

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 REPORT OF GENERAL LONGSTREET.

Headquarters near Winchester, Va., October 10, 1862.

“ Brigadier General R. H. Chilton, Adjutant and Inspector General :

* * * * *

* * * At a late hour in the day, Major General Stuart reported the approach of the enemy in heavy † columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, with his three brigades, from the left , and placed his command in position to support Jones in case of an attack against my right. After † some few shots the enemy withdrew his forces , moving them around towards his front, and about four o'clock in the afternoon, began to press forward against General Jackson's position. Wilcox's † brigades were moved back to there former position , and Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, were quickly pressd forward to the attack. At the same time Wilcox's three brigades made a like advance, as also Hunton's brigade, of Kemper's command.

* Fitz John Porter's

† Note.—The original not italicized.

* * * * *

I remain, sir, with respect, your obedient servant, J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant General Commanding.

It seems then that as soon as Porter retreated towards Manassas, from this overwhelming force, Longstreet immediately withdrew these brigades, and joining Jackson's right, immediately pressed forward with them against that portion of our army concerning whose defeat Porter expressed such doleful apprehensions in his letter to McDowell. It is quite manifest from this report that he did not fail to do his part to prove himself a prophet.

Let us see now what was the condition of the rest of the Rebel Army whilst these remarkable transactions were going on. And here we shall recite the testimony of Stonewall Jackson, who was the General commanding-in-chief on that day.

REPORT OF GENERAL JACKSON OF OPERATIONS FROM 15 th AUGUST TO 5 th SEPTEMBER , 1862.

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 Headquarters Second Corps, A. N. V., April 27, 1863.

“ Brigadier General R. H. Chilton, A. A. General, Headquarters Dep't. A. N. V. :

* * * * *

“After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day, the Federal Infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood, and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our position. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding General for reinforcements, but the timely and gallant advance * of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers , and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scene of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The Infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit. * * * * *

* Note.—The original not italicized.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, T. J. JACKSON, Lieutenant General.”

It seems, then, that Jackson was so hard driven by that army which Porter considered defeated, that he could not hold his ground and sent to General R. E. Lee for reinforcements. But Lee, according to the testimony of the Chief Engineer on his staff, took breakfast next that morning on the opposite side of Thoroughfare Gap, full thirty miles distant, and it was utterly impossible to reinforce Jackson before a very late hour of the night, long before which time the whole affair would have been ended. What then saved Jackson from a disastrous defeat? Why, the very troops taken from in front of Porter when he deserted the field.

Here then is unanswerable testimony as to what troops really were in front of Porter, and of the consequences to the Army and the country of his shameful conduct.

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 Comment seems wholly unnecessary upon this plain statement of facts. It establishes, on Porter's own testimony, one of the most enormous military crimes ever committed in this country, and Porter stands as clearly responsible for every life lost on that field as if he had murdered the man with his own hands. There can be found neither excuse nor palliation for such a crime, and any act of the Government which shall tend to smooth it over or make it appear less atrocious, is a deep wrong to every faithful officer on the field, and to every family in the land which mourns a life lost in that battle, as well as the severest blow ever given by the Government to official discipline or the honor of the Army.

It will be observed that in the above statement I have made no use whatever of the testimony for the prosecution in Porter's case. That testimony simply confirmed the fact that Porter did precisely what he wrote McDowell and King he intended to do, and as this fact was well known to every officer and soldier in his Corps, it was easily proved before the Court Martial, and was never, indeed, denied or attempted to be denied by him. It however gave details or Porter's conduct on the day of that battle and for several days previous, which only added to the shame and indignation of those who were compelled to listen.

It will also be noticed that in this statement no reference is made to the motive of Porter's conduct. It will be admitted, I think, that his conduct can only be explained on one of two theories. 1st. Incompetency and cowardice; or, 2d. Deliberate treachery with a view to bring about the defeat of the rest of the Army. If there be any other alternative, I confess I am unable to see it. As a practical question it has no bearing upon the sentence of the Court Martial, which must have been the same in either case; but as the mass of the witnesses called by Porter for the defence testified to his brave and skillful conduct during the battles on the Peninsula, he has himself narrowed down the question of motive to the second alternative. Unfortunately for him he has put upon record as complete proof of his motive as he did of the conduct for which he was cashiered. On the files of the Court Martial proceedings will 5 be found dispatches from him to Burnside intended for the use of McClellan, who was then at Alexandria. These dispatches were written and sent, in violation of all military propriety, whilst he was under my command. They contain the falsest and most malicious reflections upon me, his then commanding officer, hoping that “‘Mc.’ is at work to get him out of this,“ &c. All these dispatches were written in the face of the enemy, in the midst of severe fighting in which he alone was not engaged, without knowledge of the enemy's forces and position, or our own, and show from first to last an animus and intentions fully carried out in his subsequent shameful desertion from the field of battle. I will venture to say that for personal malevolence, false statement, insulting insinuation and bad manners, these dispatches are without a parallel in military history, and they exhibit a state of mind capable of any act whatever. It is almost impossible to believe that such dispatches could have been written by any sane man under such circumstances, but he himself

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600 admitted their authenticity before the Court Martial, and they furnish the most complete explanation of his conduct that can be given.

All the documents and letters embodied or referred to in this statement are on file in the War Department, and can be easily verified by any one who may choose to question their authenticity.

The above statement is mainly designed to invite the fullest examination of the facts. Being made simply on Porter's own testimony, and that of the three Rebel officers who commanded in front of us on that day, it is of course the mildest and most favorable statement of the case for Porter which the facts will justify.

The very fullest examination of the case is earnestly desired and invited, as it is beyond question doubt that the more the question is looked into, the worse it will prove for Porter.

NOTE:— Fitz John Porter asserts that the above extract from Jackson's report refers to the 30th and not the 29th August, 1862. Printed slips containing these extracts were forwarded to the War Department for verification when the printed statement of which they are a part was finished, and they were returned to the writer certified by the officer in the War Department having charge of the Rebel records as true extracts from the original reports of these rebel officers, for operations of August 29th, 1862. Porter is therefore probably deceived.

The case against him, however, set forth in the extracts from Stuart's and Longstreet's reports, which are not disputed, is complete.

Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter. [n. p. 1871?]. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.23700600