Currie Paper 1-08 Navy League.Pub
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Conference of Defence Associations Institute General Sir Arthur Currie Paper 1-08 November 19, 2008 Military/Naval Procurement in Canada: A Flawed Process By Commander (Ret’d) Ken Bowering Currie Paper 1/08 Introduction Commissioned as a Militia Officer in Vic- Armed with the Canada First Defence toria in 5th Regiment Canadian Garrison Artil- Strategy, insofar as funding and equipment lery, General Sir Arthur William Currie, GCMG , replacement are concerned, life should be KCB commanded 2nd Canadian Brigade which rosy for the Canadian Forces for the next 20 held the line during the first poison gas attack years (i.e., out to 2028). But cancellation of at Ypres, 1st Canadian Division at the capture of Vimy Ridge, and became the Commander of the navy’s Joint Support Ship (JSS) the Canadian Corps in June, 1917. procurement, the fact that two (of three) His greatest victory was at the Battle of qualified bidders for the Halifax Class Amiens, which German Field Marshall von Modernization (HCM) project opted out of Ludendorff described as the ”blackest day of that procurement, and the concurrent (with the German Army in the history of the war,” JSS) cancellation of the Coast Guard’s Mid- and which Field Marshall Lord Byng of Vimy de- Shore Patrol Vessel procurement, leads one to scribed as “the finest operation of the war.” believe that such may not be the case.1 The General Sir Arthur Currie Papers are Although the reasons may be selected from those presented at events organ- different for each of these setbacks, in their ized by the Conference of Defence Association own ways they each point to a procurement Institute or as “standalone” submissions to the process that does not serve the best interests CDA Institute on defence related topics, as best of the nation. There are other examples representing the innovative heritage of Sir Ar- where this process has been shown to be less thur Currie and the Canadian Corps. than satisfactory, and they’re not just with Commander Bowering’s 21 year naval ca- navy procurements as both the army and air reer included service in HMCS FRASER, NIPI- force have had their setbacks too2 - perhaps GON, YUKON, SUSSEXVALE and GATINEAU, and the most glaring being the delayed ashore in a variety of training, engineering, and acquisition of Search and Rescue Fixed Wing management postings followed by 25 years in Aircraft. Announced formally in Budget 2004, Canada’s Defence and Technology Industry sec- tors. A graduate of the University of British Co- this project has gone nowhere under two lumbia (MAS Electrical Engineering), he is a Di- separate governments. rector and National Vice-President for Maritime Given the complexity of their design Affairs of the Navy League of Canada. and construction, warship procurement is arguably the most complex procurement The General Sir Arthur Currie Papers may activity our government undertakes and, in be freely reproduced in their entirety for academic this article, we examine the process that has research or instructional or journalistic purposes been followed by the navy over the past 60 provided that the author’s and the Institute’s copy- years in acquiring most of its ships.3 In doing so, we’ll point out the flaws in the current The views expressed are those of the authors process and, hopefully, identify some steps and do not necessarily represent the views that can be taken to remedy the present of the Institute or its members. The Conference of Defence Associations Institute General Sir Arthur Currie Paper 1-08 November 19, 2008 situation. approximately 200 people in its project management offices to oversee the project. Background The following table summarizes this 4 period of shipbuilding activity in Canada. In 1949, the Royal Canadian Navy – Still with prime/design agent as it was at the time – embarked on an responsibility, in the early/mid-1960s the aggressive program to replace many of its navy modernized the seven St. Laurent Class fighting ships that had been the mainstay of destroyer escorts to become helicopter- the navy during World War II. In all, from carrying destroyers and, in the mid/late- 1950 until 1965, a total of 20 modern 1960s/early-1970s, also modernized the destroyer escorts were designed, weapon systems aboard four of the constructed by a number of shipyards Restigouche Class destroyers. In the early- across the country, and commissioned into 1990s, with the first phase of the Halifax the navy in four batches, or classes. These Class (also known as the “Canadian Patrol were followed in the late-60s/early-70s with Frigate” or “CPF”) project in progress, the navy modernized the weapons and main machinery four new destroyers and, in the late-80s/ 7 mid-90s with twelve new frigates – three in the four DDH-280 Class destroyers shipbuilding projects over a span of about though, as with the CPF project, industry (but 50 years. in this instance not the shipyard) took total Table 1: Destroyer Escort/Destroyer/Frigate Shipbuilding Projects 1950-1998 Prime/Design Project Time-frame Shipyard(s) Agent Responsibility St. Laurent Halifax Shipyard (4) 1950-1957 Class (7) Davie Shipbuilding (2) Restigouche 1953-1959 MIL (Sorel) (3) Class (7) Destroyer Canadian Vickers (4) Navy Escorts Mackenzie 1958-1963 Class (4 Burrard Drydock (4) Annapolis Victoria Machinery Depot (2) 1960-1964 Class (2) Yarrows (1)5 Destroyers Iroquois Class MIL (Sorel) (3) 1969-1973 Navy (4) Davie (1) Frigates Halifax Class St. John Shipbuilding (9) 1987-1996 Industry (12)6 MIL Davie (Lauzon) (3) system responsibility while the navy oversaw For two of these projects, the navy 8 relied upon its in-house design capabilities the project. as well as those of its contracted-out Naval With the CPF ships nearly complete Central Drawing Office, and managed what and the DDH-280s being modernized, the were, in effect, “build-to-print” construction navy embarked on another shipbuilding contracts with the shipyards. For the third project, though this time for a much smaller ship for the naval reserves – the twelve project, the entire responsibility - total 9 system responsibility - was undertaken by Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs). industry though the navy still had a staff of For this project SNC-Lavalin was the prime The Conference of Defence Associations Institute General Sir Arthur Currie Paper 1-08 November 19, 2008 contractor and these ships were built by The Current Situation Halifax-Dartmouth Industries which, during the MCDV project, became part of the Irving So, what has happened since then (i.e., Shipbuilding group. Once again, total since the 1950s/60s/70s) and can we now system responsibility was undertaken by recover such that we can build on past industry as the design agent and prime successes? Hopefully, the answer to the contractor.10 second part of this question is a resounding While the 20 ship St. Laurent and “yes”, but change will be needed. follow-on classes experienced the normal Notwithstanding that government-industry challenges of complex projects, they were relationships have changed since the CPF ultimately completed successfully. Being in project, some of the factors that today impact control of the project, the navy was able to directly and/or indirectly, and/or exacerbate incorporate design changes/improvements – the shipbuilding situation are listed below: structural as well as basic features - as the ships in the different classes were built. For • The threat/capability deficiency is more example, the superstructure and the forward complex today than it was 20-30-40-50- gun and sonar equipment were changed on 60 years ago, thus forcing a more the Restigouche and Mackenzie Classes, and demanding operational requirement the Annapolis Class (the final two ships of statement that ultimately is transposed the overall project) were built with a into a technical statement of helicopter hangar deck and variable depth requirements against which the industry sonar (these two features were added to the must bid. In doing so, the navy seven St. Laurent class ships when they were sometimes defines the requirement modernized in the early/mid-60s). down to the finest detail as opposed to That said, the DDH-280, CPF, and asking for the industry’s solutions to a MCDV new construction projects were also broader capability-based requirement. successful, though the DDH-280 project was the subject of an examination of the • The navy has gone through a period government’s decision-making process,11 where its personnel, though suitably and it ultimately impacted the CPF educated and trained, are fewer in procurement. However, the fact remains numbers and, in some cases, particular that today the navy has a modern frigate/ classifications and trades have all but destroyer fleet that is as good as, or better, disappeared. For example, within than similar warships in any of the allied Maritime Engineering there are today far navies. fewer people trained as naval architects We have good ships with well-trained and constructors than there were up to crews and that fact is often reflected as the 1980s, and these are the people NATO and coalition responsibilities are who once led the conceptual studies and regularly assigned to the Canadian navy. design trade-offs. They are also the And, with the recently-announced Halifax people who once were able to Class Modernization contracts, these ships completely design our warships and will be appropriately outfitted for the manage and oversee their construction. remainder of their operational life (i.e., till A similar situation has occurred with about 2030(+/-)). civilian personnel within both the What remains as urgent are projects Department of National Defence and to replace the support ships (AORs) and the Public Works and Government Services Iroquois Class destroyers as all of these as downsizing led to early retirement of ships (three AORs and four DDHs) have now highly experienced engineers in the surpassed their design lifetime.