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Communication 0 DOCUMENT RESUME ED 114 877. CS 501 163 AUTHOR Berger, Charles R. TITLE The Covering Law Model in CoLemunication PUB DATE 75 NOTE 31p..; Paper prese.nted at the 4nnual Meeting of the Speech Commlinicati3On Association '(61St, Houstoh, December'7-30, 1975) EDRS PRICE MF-50.76.HC-$1.95.Plus Postage DESCRIPTOPS Behavior Theories; *Communication (Thought Tfansfer);' Educational Research; Educational Theories; *Models; *Speech; *TheOrieS IDENTIFIERS Communication Theories; *Covering Law Modelt I ABSTRACT The first Section of thii paper defines -covering law explanation as a theory which maintains that explanation may be achieved, and'may be achieved, by subsuming what is to beexplained under a general law. The modelis examined in light of the deductive-nomological explanation, the deductive-statistical explanation, and the inductive-st'atistical explanation. The second section of the paper examines the'feasibility of.covering law models and examines some criticism of the covering-law approach,'including Paws versus rules, cultural variation, and temporal,variation. Thee third section of the paper-examines potential barriers to theory construction and discusses irrelevant variety,, irrelevant change, realism versus nominalism, 'insensitivity to,embeddedness, and overemphasis on statistical techniques. It is concluded that, a ' defense Oof the covering law approach does not deny the_usefulness of the rule governed approach or the systems approach, and that the covering law approach probably does provide the most complete explanation of a phenomenon when the explanans are,true.- (TS) I ******************************************************************'*** DOcuments acquired.by,ERIC include many informal' unpublished * * materials.not available from other sources; ERIC makes every effort * ,* to obtain the best- copy available. Nevrtheles's; items of marginal * * reproddcibility, are ften encountered and this .affects the quality .* * of the,microfiche in# hardcopy reproductions EPIC makes available * pia the ERIC Docment ReprodqdtiOn Service (EDRS) .EDRS' is not 4 responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions * supplied by EDRS are the best that can 'be made from the original. 4 *****************14*******************)y******************************** U S OEPARTmENTOFHELi," EOOCATION t WELFARE NATIONAL 4NSTITLITEOF EOLICATiOre, : eFE% t,k^ 0, (EC 4E-E .E:, wFPE PSC'. Z.:. PC ,,Y.Fe. OPS ;;;S, l'ATED D'..) ..E:Es- L.e k,,,E sEyr oc; E0,.,CA' 04 0k P7 V THE- COVERING LAW MODEL IN COMMUNICATION INQUIRY* *By Charles R. Berger I Department of Communication Studies. Northwestern University 1822 Sheridan Road Evanston, Illinois '60201 I .. 4 1j ` e. fi; , Irl *The author would like to e?tpresshis deep appreciation to Paul H. Arntson, Glen W..Clatterbuck and Gerald R.Miller for their helpful criticisms of an .\ 0 earlic4T draft\ of the present paper. .10 ,,: * , r;. .i .... - 4. V ry. NNW J THE COVERING LAW MODEL IN CMIUNICATION INQUIRY Charles R. Berger NorthWestern University During tliT 1950's and 1960's,, persons interested in behavioral scientific approaches to the study of human communication concentrated most of their efforts on the task of acquiring and tiring various methodological and statistical tech-: niques. In part, this was a healthy trend at the tithe; however, it turned many _good researchers in our field into well trained hypothesis testers for theory builders' in, such disciplines as social psychology, sociology, psycholinquistics, sociolinguistics and political science. The role models for communication researchers in terms of'theory construction were found in these and related disciplinds. In the past few years, there has be an increase'in the number of papers, . ji-/' journal articles, and bookS concerned with either issues related to the process of theory, construction in gen J/,or the presentation of substantive theories .., or models withincon nunicati j #Fger and Calabrese,'1975; Cappella, 1974; , / '111/ Cushman and Whiting, lani 41975;.14onge, 1973.; Parks, 1974; andPerce, /1 ! a , 1973). It is probably fa do say that only thrOUgh the development of a unique . 10 ,... 7 / body of theory will commpidation achieve a disciplinary status equal to the . 1,54.-N,'' . , . ..1,1 ,. statuses of the other beha ioral sciences. Obviously, methodology and statisticalt . r.7 ... ..$ techniques do not define a discipline. Biology and. sociology employed path , 1 analysis long before it'wap, .introduced to communication (Dqncan, 1966,and Wright,..1934, 1954). The employment of. ,arious techniques in communication , research, no matter how eSoteric the methodology, will not serve to define us as a unique discipline. If the primary ta4Lof prese'nt day communication researchers is to develop and test communicatidnAeeries, it is imperative than they know what theory 41000!". V' -2- generating options 5-Fe available to them and what these various options have to offer. The alternative discussed in the present paper is one which has served as the dothinant model in both the physical and social sciences: the covering - law model. In the first section of the paper, the basic structure of the cover- . ing law model will be sketched. We will then examine some criticisms of the covering law approach. Finally, we will look at some issues surrounding the realization of covering law theories in communication inquiry. a. -THE COVERING LAW MODEL The basic aim of scientific theory is to provide explanations for observed phenomena. Some might argue that theories also aim to predict; however, explana- tion tak7sprecedence over prediction., If a theory can provide a complete explanation for a phenomenon, it can predict the phenomenon. By contrast, it is possible to have accufate prediction without explanation. In the case of scientific explanation, the paramount question for which the theoretical structure ti must provide an answer is the 'question."why?". Why do certain groups of persons have higher rates Of interpersonal conflict than others.?Why did a particular kind of message induce a large amount of attitude change? Why do persons engage in more self-disclosure in certain circumstances? These are some questions .cornunication researchers might wish to answer. The only way.that they can provide an answer for them is to build a theory. For we might -be able to predict and cli,:,monstrate with 100% success the rule that the person who answers the tel;phone always says "hello".before the caller says "hello", but after observing the phenomenon 1,000 times, we would still not be able to answer yr the question "Why,is it so?". Uncovering a regularity of behavior either in a "natural-setting"or in a laboratory does not explain it. This issue will .be explored in greater depth later in the present paper. , -a- The term "covering law model" was introduced by Dray (1957) in his dis- . cussion of historical explanation. Dray defined the notion of covering law explanation as follows: To put it in a summary way, what the theory maintains is that explanation is achieved, and only achieved,jaysubsuming what is to be explained under a Reneral law. Such an account of basic structure bf explanation is sometimes'referred toas. 40* 'the regularity analysis'; but because it makes use'of the notion of bringing case under a law, i.e. (covering'-it with a law I shall often speak of it hereafter as 'the covering law model.'" (p. 1). .. Dray cites Braithwaite (1953) and Gardiner (1952) as sources for his definition- of the covering law model of explanation. For a number of reasons which will not, be dealt with in the present paper, Dray rejects the position that covering 'law explanations are possible in historical inquiry. He argues that such explana- tions are likely td be misleading when One attempts .to employ them in,historical 9 research. A more detailed explication bf the covering law approach tips presented by Hempel (1965). Hempel distinguished among the following three kinds'of explana- tions: DeductivelNomological (D-N), Deductive Statistical (D-S), and Inductive '1 Statistical (I-S). Of the three, the D-N explanation is considered to bethe pure case of the covering law model. However, Hempel asserts that both and I-S forms of explanation contain elements ofthepure covering law model. H considers both D-S and I-S paradigms of explanation to be at leastpartially subvumed under the general of covering law model. In the remainder of ' this section we will focus our attention on the characteristics of D-N explana- tion and show how it differs from the other two types of explanations. r. Deductive-Numological Explanation A 11-N ex planation is divided 'ntothe'following two general parts: (1) that Which is to be explainedor tie explanandum, and (2) that which does.the; expi fining, the explanans. The .exp1an.aii3s, in turn, is, dividedinto-two groups . of tatements. The first type of statement contains particularfacts or initial o conditions under which the explanandum-phOnomenonwill occur. The second kind statement expres.ses a trtfl)ormity by means of general law. Taken together, t e initial conditions and the generallaws give rise` to-the explanandum. In other words, the explanandumcan he deduced fr6M the combination of the initial conditions and the general laws. Most theories contain a number ofinitial 'conditions as well as general laws. It is also assumed that the explanandum- sentence itself is true. Finally, when we refer to the fact that theexplanandum. is deduced from the explanans,we do not mean Co imply' that only syllogifstic
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