1 Stability and Change in Visible Minority Responses in Canada: A

Stability and change in visible minority responses in Canada: A study using linked 2006-2011 census data

Carolyn A. Liebler, [email protected] University of Minnesota

Submission to the 2018 meetings of the Population Association of America

Canada’s visible minorities are asked to identify themselves in censuses and related data collection efforts so that social inequalities can be documented and reduced. Reporting something as complicated as an identity in a closed-ended survey question can be a challenge, beyond usual survey response consistency issues. An individual’s response to the visible minority question can change over time, just as responses to similar questions change in other contexts.

In this research, we address three research questions. First, do Canadians change their answers to the visible minority question? If so, how does this vary across response group? Second, does response change have a strong impact on statistics about visible minority groups? Or do the measures give similar results whether or not response change is taken into account? Third, why do some people change their response to the visible minority question while others keep the same response in the two censuses?

To address these questions, we use linked data from the 2006 Canadian census and the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS; the replacement of the mandatory census) to understand stability and change in responses to the visible minority question. We begin by exploring the level of response change in each of 24 response groups over the 5-year period. We show the extent to which Canadians are consistent in their response to the visible minority question, as well as showing variation in response change and variation in which groups they name instead. In this section of the paper, our work parallels and expands on recent research on race, ethnic, and aboriginal response change. We parallel prior work in the US (Liebler et al. 2017) by using inclusive data to study all of Canada’s visible minorities, thus establishing a baseline level of response change in each group across the five years. This is new information that brings Canada’s case into conversation with findings from other parts of the world.

In the second part of the paper, we ask whether this response change has been causing a misunderstanding of the occupational and earnings success of each visible minority group. The more response change in a group, the less valid are comparisons of cross-sectional data. We use the longitudinal (linked) data to show the extent to which response change affects measured change in unemployment and market income across the five years. These results give important insight into how visible minority response change affects policy-relevant statistics. Because we can show change over time in individuals’ unemployment and earning experiences, our statistics are particularly useful for understanding effects and impacts of related policies.

In the third section of our paper, we use multivariate models on separate visible minority groups to test three hypotheses about which individuals will change visible minority responses across the 5 years. The first of our hypotheses, briefly, is that individuals with mixed heritage will be more likely to change responses. Our second is that people with higher education and age have different knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of race/visible minority status that encourages response stability. And our third hypothesis is that a person whose socioeconomic standing rises will be more likely to report White, and a person whose socioeconomic standing decreases will be more likely to report a visible minority. This aspect of the paper gives insight into some of the reasons that people change their response to the visible minority question in Canada.

Background and prior research

On the extent of race, ethnic, and aboriginal response change

Cross-sectional demographic information has shown for decades that population increases among indigenous people must logically include response change. In recent years, federal statistical agencies have started linking individuals’ responses across census years, thus allowing response change to be studied at a national level. Linked data has allowed studies of both in-flow to and out-flow from Aboriginal response categories in Canada (Caron-Malenfant et al. 2014) and American Indian and Alaska Native in the United States (Liebler, Bhaskar, and Porter 2016). The decades of net gains in the size of these indigenous populations – studied more extensively but less effectively with cross-sectional data – made them an obvious first target of study.

Less research has been completed that focuses on response change in other race, ethnic, or visible minority groups because the census to census changes in size do not seem to indicate that the same processes are going on. The newly available linked data has allowed these response groups to be studied anyway in the United States, revealing that an estimated 8% of the US population gave a different race response in 2010 than in 2000 (Liebler et al. 2014 CARRA working paper). This research showed that the a few US response categories were particularly stable: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, non- Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic (disregarding race). The other response groups experienced substantial change across the decade such that cross-time comparisons should be limited when studying American Indians and Alaska Natives, Pacific Islanders, Some Other Race respondents, those who mark multiple races, and the race responses of people who report Hispanic origin (Liebler et al. 2014, 2017).

Our research focuses on all people in Canada who qualify to answer the visible minority question – in other words all non-Aboriginal people. Cross-time changes in the measured population sizes of these groups have been reasonably aligned with demographic projections based on known birth, migration, and mortality statistics. However, the surprisingly high level of response churn – countervailing flows of response change – in the US reveals that linked or longitudinal data are required in order to validate the seemingly rational (but often false) assumption that response change is not a large issue outside of indigenous groups.

On effects of response change

People with different experiences often have different characteristics. Those who change responses may be having different experiences than those who keep the same response in multiple measures. Thus it seems likely that those who join or leave of a particular group through response change would have different characteristics from those who stay in the group (and from each other, perhaps). Liebler, Bhaskar, and Porter (2016) found that people who joined and left the US American Indian population were different in important ways from those who consistently marked American Indian on the race question. Because (as they also found) joiners and leavers were not significantly different from each other, statistics about the American Indian population in 2000 were fairly similar to those for the 2010 population despite large amounts of population churn.

Why would some people change their response? Hypotheses and related prior research

Response change and mixed heritage: Some people report multiple heritage in the visible minority question, but others who have mixed heritage may give a single answer to the visible minority question. For someone with mixed heritage who is seen one way by others, sees himself in a different way (perhaps only sometimes), or has links to multiple groups through family members, there can be more than one “correct” answer to the visible minority question. Therefore, we expect that those who acknowledge mixed heritage will be the most likely to change responses.

The experience of being an immigrant might also increase the chance of a changed response because the sending country may have different conceptions of “race” or visible minority than does Canada (see Mary Waters’ 2009 book on West Indian immigrants to the United States). People who immigrated as adults may have a stronger dual understanding than those who immigrated as children, while third and higher generation would be less subject to feelings of dual belonging and experiences of dual understandings that pull them in different directions while answering the visible minority question.

Understanding of and knowledge about the visible minority concept and categories: We expect that people with more education will have more knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of the concept of visible minority and the categories used on the form. Experience at a college or university is likely to have the strongest effect. We think this knowledge, understanding, and acceptance will increase the chances that the person will stay in the same response category in both years.

We also expect that older people will be less likely to change for two reasons. First, they have had a longer lifetime to explore identities and to discern what label fits them best. Second, societies around the world have recently become more nuanced and flexible in interpreting and discussing race and visible minority groups. Older people are more likely to have been socialized to think of race and related categories as simple and straightforward.

Socioeconomic status change and response change: In general, Whites have a higher socioeconomic standing in Canada than do people in visible minority groups and so, all else equal, individuals who have high socioeconomic status may feel more comfortable identifying as White. Visible minorities who do relatively well in terms of socioeconomic status may be treated more like Whites than other visible minorities. They may be assumed to be White if their phenotype is ambiguous, and they may be integrated into predominantly White settings because of their SES. These factors could make visible minorities with higher SES relatively likely to leave a visible minority group and instead report White. The reverse processes may also be true; people who report White but have relatively low socioeconomic status (or experience decline in their SES) may be more likely to change their response to a visible minority group or keep a visible minority response. We expect to find that a person whose socioeconomic standing rises or remains high will be more likely to report White, and a person whose socioeconomic standing decreases or remains low will be more likely to report a visible minority.

Data

Source data

To do this research, we used data from two important datasets collected by, and linked by, Statistics Canada: the 2006 Census long form and the 2011 National Household Survey. Both data sources were designed to gather information from a very large random sample of the Canadian population. In 2006, the census short form was given to everyone in the population and the long form was given to 20% of the population; all people who received the short or long form were legally required to complete it. In 2011, the short form census was mandatory for all people but the long form was voluntary (and renamed to be the 2011 National Household Survey or NHS). Approximately 34% of the households in the country received the NHS questionnaire and the unweighted response rate was 69%. In total, about 21% of the Canadian population participated in the NHS. The main consequence of the voluntary survey and relatively low response rate is the loss of reliable data for small areas. Statistics Canada designed weights based on the short-form census to make the NHS representative to the Canadian population (Statistics Canada 2015).

We use the 2006 long form and 2011 NHS because they include the visible minority question as well as many other questions such as those on ancestry, education, and employment. Statistics Canada provides ample documentation for both data sources on their website.1

Linkage

The Social Survey Methods Division of Statistics Canada completed the data linkages. First, they linked the 2006 and 2011 short-form censuses using deterministic techniques based mostly on first and last name, date of birth, sex and phone number. The global linkage rate was 75%; in other words, over 75% of people in the 2011 population (excluding children less than 5 years old and immigrants who arrived in Canada after 2006) were linked to their own responses in 2006. Over 22 million persons were linked.

A subset of the linkage comprises 1.06 million persons who responded to the long form in 2006 and the NHS in 2011 (Grondin and Grenier 2014). Survey Methodologists at Statistics Canada designed weights to take into account the non-response to the NHS as well as non-linkage between the 2006 and 2011, so the weighted data would be representative to the entire Canadian population in 2006 (about 32.6 million people). We applied these weights when calculating the statistics in this paper.

Sample selection

From the 1.06 million linked sample, we applied further sample selection to improve the chances of a true match. We excluded individuals whose sex response was different in 2011 than in 2006, and those who reportedly aged less than 3 years or more than 8 years during the 5 year period. The remaining sample includes 1,039,726 individuals. We use this sample in our analyses in section 1 of this paper.2

In the socioeconomic comparisons in section 2 and the future multivariate analyses in section 3, we use measures related to market income and unemployment. Therefore, we restrict our sample at that point

1 For information about the 2006 Census, see: http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/index- eng.cfm. For information about the NHS, see http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5178. 2 The current version of the data does not have allocation flags and so allocated responses remain in our sample. When the flags are available, we will remove allocated responses. Statistics Canada reports: "The imputation rates for the NHS Population group variable are similar to those of the 2006 Census…. The NHS imputation rate at the national level for population group is 3.9% while the imputation rate for this variable for the 2006 Census was 2.9%." (Statistics Canada 2013).

5 to people who were working age in both censuses: only those ages 25 to 64 in 2006. We show unweighted sample sizes in Table 4, below. In future analyses, we intend to restrict the working age population to 25 to 59 in 2006 as well as create alternative measures of SES so that we can model response change for people of all ages.

Measures

Canada’s Visible Minorities

Canada has a number of concepts related to ethnicity, minority group membership, and aboriginal group membership. We focus here on the “visible minority” concept and question, which is relatively similar to the US question on race. Both the visible minority question and the race question include a mix of categories based on color/race group (e.g., white or black), specific country of origin (e.g., Chinese or Korean) and region (e.g., Arab, Latin American, or Pacific Islander). We show the 2006 and 2011 visible minority question in Figure 1.

The Canadian federal government defined visible minority in the 1995 Employment Equity Act as “persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Statistics Canada 2010, p 116).3 The Employment Equity Technical Reference Papers, prepared by Employment and Immigration Canada in 1987, specified the following visible minority groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Japanese, Korean and other visible minority groups, such as Pacific Islanders (Statistics Canada 2010: 116). In both 2006 and 2011, the ten named groups each had a mark-in box and there was also a “White” category.4 The “White” category is similar to the “non-Hispanic White” group in recent US censuses, except that the US concept includes Arab and West Asian people in the White group while Canada’s Arabs and West Asians have their own category.

Multiple responses to this question were allowed and recorded in the data. Both the 2006 and the 2011 NHS questionnaire further provided the following instructions: (1) population group should not be confused with citizenship and nationality; (2) For persons who belong to more than one population group, mark all the groups that apply. In both the 2006 census and the 2011 NHS questionnaire, three regional area groups were shown with examples: South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.); Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, Laotian, etc.); West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan, etc.). To learn more about the visible minority question, see Statistics Canada’s “Visible Minority Population and Population Group Reference Guide.”5

3 Statistics Canada precedes the visible minority question with a question on Aboriginal heritage; those people who indicate that they have Aboriginal heritage are not asked the visible minority question. Because the population group question was not intended for the estimation of Aboriginal identity, we do not include the Aboriginal category in the tables presented in this paper. 4 The 2006 and 2011 questions are identical except that the order of groups was changed in 2011 based on the ranking of group population sizes, as counted in the 2006 census. 5 2006 Census Catalogue no. 97-562-GWE2006003. http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/rp- guides/visible_minority-minorites_visibles-eng.cfm

In our study, we group the responses to the visible minority question into 24 categories. We use the 11 single-response categories listed on the form and a 12th single-response category that includes all other visible minority responses not included elsewhere.6 Because the visible minority population is not a large proportion of the total Canadian population, most multiple-response groups are small and we combine all of them into 12 groups. We show results for 10 dual responses of White and a visible minority. We have two aggregated multiple-response categories: one for those that include a White response and one for those that do not.

Measures of mixed heritage or dual belongings

All people in these data were asked an open-ended ethnicity question and given four fill-in-the-blank areas to respond. We have grouped these responses into general world regions aligning with the categories in the visible minority question (see Appendix for coding details). If a person reported any specific world region that does not align with their visible minority response, we considered them to have mixed heritage on a 0/1 variable.

We code immigrant generation as: (1) immigrated as an adult or teen (aged 13 or older at the time of immigration), (2) immigrated as a child (aged 12 or younger), or (3) not an immigrant.

Measures of knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of visible minority concept and categories

We measure education in three categories: (1) high school diploma or less education, (2) some higher education but no degree, and (3) a degree from a college or university.

We measure age by dividing the population (already restricted in age to 25-59 in 2006 because of employment variables) into two groups: ages 25 to 44, and ages 45-59.

Measures of high, low, increased, and decreased socioeconomic status

We use unemployment status and market income to measure socioeconomic status in each year. “Unemployed” means that the person was not working but was looking for work or available to work. To include direction of change, we measure unemployment as (a) not unemployed in both years (an indicator of relatively high SES), (b) unemployed in both years (low), (c) unemployed only in 2006 (increased), and (d) unemployed only in 2011 (decreased).

Market income is income from employment earnings and investment. We measure change in market income with four categories: (a) market income above the national average in both years (an indicator of relatively high SES); (b) market income below the national average in both years (low); (c) from below the national average to above it OR an increase of 15% or more; and (d) from above the national average to below it OR a decrease of 15% or more.

6 Data on other visible minority groups that were not among the 10 specifically named groups are collected in the ‘other - specify” category. Typical responses to this residual categories include ‘Pacific Islanders’, 'Guyanese,' 'West Indian,' 'Kurd,' 'Tibetan,' 'Polynesian,' etc.

Methods

The first two sections of this paper are descriptive. We show the extent of response change, by visible minority/White group, as well as information about which response they gave in each year. Then we show average market income and unemployment rate by response stability and change type.

For the third section of the paper, we are addressing three hypotheses about why responses change. To do this, we conduct multinomial logistic regressions, separately by response group, for ten response groups with sufficient cases in each of the dependent variable categories – seven of the single response groups (six visible minority groups and White) and three multiple-response groups. In each of the ten models, the analytic subsample is the set of people who gave that response in 2006 or 2011 or both.

The dependent variable for the White response group has three categories: (a) White in 2006 and 2011 (i.e., stayed in the category), (b) White in 2006 only (left), and (c) White in 2011 only (joined). Note that those who left and joined (by definition) were reported as a visible minority in the non-White year.

The dependent variable for the other nine models has five categories: (a) the same group in 2006 and 2011 (stayer), (b) left to another visible minority group, (c) left to White, (d) joined from White, and (e) joined from another visible minority group.

In all models, the “stayer” group is the comparison group. Table 4 shows the unweighted sample size for each category of the dependent variable.

Please note: we have not yet completed the multivariate analyses but will be doing so over the coming months.

Results

We begin by showing the extent to which visible minority response categories have stability or churn. Those groups with high levels of response change out of the group (leaving) and response change into the group (joining) have substantial population “churn” due to response change. In Table 1 we show the extent to which each visible minority group and the White group experienced population churn. Each row represents all people with that response in either 2006 or 2011 or both. The percent who stayed in the response category for both measures represents the category’s stability.

The most stable response group in Canada between 2006 and 2011 was White, with 97% stability (97% of people who reported it in either year reported it in both years). Most categories with general names (Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, and West Asian) had lower levels of stability than categories with specific names (e.g., Chinese, Filipino, or Korean). Dual responses had extensive churn, with only 6% to 55% response stability. In other words, people who reported dual responses in 2011 are usually not the same individuals as those who reported dual responses in 2006, so cross-time comparisons that assume they are the same people are not valid.

[Table 1 here]

Next, we show in Figure 2 a visual cross-tabulation or “heat map” of response in 2006 by response in 2011. This allows a closer look at the types of response changes that are most common. We see three primary patterns in Figure 2. First, many people change responses from White to a visible minority group (row 1), or the reverse (column 1). Second, many others change from a dual response to just one of the two responses (or the reverse) (row 13, column 13, and the diagonals of the top right and bottom left quadrants). Third, it is relatively common to change from one single response to another (the top left quadrant is more shaded than the other quadrants). These patterns are similar to those found in the US across the 2000 to 2010 period (Liebler et al. 2017).

[Figure 2 here]

How do response groups differ, and how might this affect statistics on the groups? In Table 2, we show the median market income of group members in 2006 and 2011, by their response change pattern. In Table 3, we do the same for unemployment rate. In both Table 2 and Table 3, columns (A) and (B) show the value in the cross-sectional data with our case selection.

The unweighted sample sizes for the statistics in Tables 2 and 3 are shown in Table 4. To assure that we are focused on results based on sufficient sample size, we focus this discussion on the groups with at least 100 cases in each column – the same 10 groups which we will use for our multivariate analysis. These are: White, Chinese, South Asian, Black, Latin American, Arab, West Asian, White and Black, White and Latin American, and White and Arab. We caution the reader against interpreting results for other groups.

[Tables 2, 3, and 4 here]

The median market income for those who stayed in the White group (Table 2, column E) is very similar to the overall median for Whites in the same year. However, those who reported White in 2006 and changed to a Visible Minority response in 2011 (Table 2, column D) had a 2006 income that was much lower than other Whites -- $24,400 as compared to $32,400. Other groups show a pattern of higher income coinciding with a change from visible minority to White, but is not consistent. It is important that we study response groups separately both in tabulations and multivariate models.

Tables 2 and 3 provide an important opportunity to compare income and unemployment rates of the same people over the five-year period (by comparing the 2005/6 number with the 2010/11 number in the same column, columns (C), (E), and (F)). For example, the cross-sectional data for Chinese median market income shows an increase from $21,800 in 2005 to $24,500 in 2010 (Table 2). Those who left the Chinese category for the White category had a very large drop in income over the period, from $34,300 in 2005 (when they reported Chinese) to $14,600 in 2010 (when they reported White) (Table 2).

In future versions of this paper, we will substantially expand our analyses to include multinomial logistic regression analyses for ten of the 24 response groups, as described above. We have highlighted the ten groups in Table 4. We will use these models to predict response stability versus particular types of response change using variables that address our three hypotheses. The results of these models will give

9 important new insight into the types of social processes that set the stage for response change and response stability across a wide range of people in contemporary Canada.

Conclusion

We have documented that Canada is not immune to instability in responses to its visible minority question. This is not such a surprising result because response instability has been found in race and ethnicity measures in a variety of data sources in the United States and elsewhere. But it is new information that contradicts assumptions of generations of Canadian individuals, policy makers, and researchers. Like their international peers, social scientists and analysts using Canadian data need to take response instability into account in their assumptions about and models of the social world. Statistics Canada has chosen to do this for Aboriginal population projections (Morency, Caron- Malenfant, Coulombe, and Langlois 2015) and now it is time to do the same for whites and visible minority groups as well.

References

Caron-Malenfant, Éric, Simon Coulombe, Eric Guimond, Chantal Grondin, André Lebel. 2014. “Ethnic Mobility of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada between the 2001 and 2006 Censuses.” Population (English edition) 69(1):29-53.

Grondin, Chantal and Dominic Grenier. 2014. Weighting of the 2006 2B to 2011 NHS micromatch file. Internal technical report, Statistics Canada, Social Survey Methods Division

Liebler, Carolyn A., Sonya R. Porter, Leticia E. Fernandez, James M. Noon, and Sharon R. Ennis. 2017. “America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes between Census 2000 and the 2010 Census.” Demography. 54(1):259-284.

Liebler, Carolyn A., Sonya R. Porter, Leticia E. Fernandez, James M. Noon, and Sharon R. Ennis. 2014. “America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes between Census 2000 and the 2010 Census.” Center for Administrative Records Research and Applications (Census Bureau) Working Paper 2014-09.

Liebler, Carolyn A., Renuka Bhaskar, and Sonya R. Porter. 2016. “Joining, Leaving, and Staying in the American Indian/Alaska Native Race Category between 2000 and 2010.” Demography 53(2):507-540.

Morency, Jean-Dominique, Éric Caron-Malenfant, Simon Coulombe, and Stéphanie Langlois. 2015. Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 to 2036. By the Demosim team. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 91-552-X.

Statistics Canada. 2010. 2006 Census Dictionary – Census Year 2006. Ottawa. Catalogue no. 92-566-X. http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/dict/pdf/92-566-eng.pdf

Statistics Canada. 2013. Visible Minority and Population Group Reference Guide National Household Survey, 2011. Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011009. http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs- enm/2011/ref/guides/99-010-x/99-010-x2011009-eng.pdf

Statistics Canada. 2015. Sampling and Weighting Technical Report: National Household Survey 2011. Ottawa. Catalogue no. 99-002-X2011001. http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/ref/reports- rapports/sw-ep/99-002-x2011001-eng.pdf

Waters, Mary C. 2009. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Figure 1: Visible Minority Questions in 2006 and 2011

2006 Census questionnaire segment 2011 National Household Survey questionnaire segment Table 1: Leaving, Joining, and Staying in Visible Minority and White Groups in Canada between 2006 and 2011 Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. Number in group % left left stayed in joined % % % % stayed numbers in this column indica 2006 2011 category category category left stayed joined % joined Single Response Groups White 24,583,300 24,441,700 500,400 24,082,900 358,800 2 97 1 97 Chinese 1,163,500 1,136,500 67,900 1,095,600 41,000 6 91 3 91 South Asian 1,240,800 1,233,100 94,100 1,146,700 86,400 7 86 7 86 Black 637,900 620,600 68,600 569,300 51,300 10 83 7 83 Filipino 410,100 406,900 26,200 384,000 23,000 6 89 5 89 Latin American 285,300 291,300 49,200 236,100 55,200 14 69 16 69 Southeast Asian 218,900 234,700 46,500 172,400 62,300 17 61 22 61 Arab 260,200 272,000 53,700 206,500 65,500 16 63 20 63 West Asian 166,300 159,800 41,300 125,000 34,800 21 62 17 62 Korean 116,600 111,900 6,000 110,500 1,400 5 94 1 94 Japanese 60,400 60,000 6,700 53,700 6,200 10 81 9 81 Visible minority n.i.e. 71,700 96,400 49,600 22,200 74,300 34 15 51 15 Multiple Response Groups Multiple visible minority 104,200 106,900 68,900 35,300 71,500 39 20 41 20 White & Chinese 48,300 46,100 16,500 31,800 14,400 26 51 23 51 White & South Asian 29,400 33,100 13,800 15,700 17,400 29 33 37 33 White & Black 94,900 91,600 39,000 55,900 35,700 30 43 27 43 White & Filipino 21,100 23,100 7,300 13,700 9,400 24 45 31 45 White & Latin American 53,000 53,500 35,400 17,700 35,800 40 20 40 20 White & Southeast Asian 7,700 21,000 4,700 3,000 18,100 18 12 70 12 White & Arab 54,400 45,300 38,800 15,600 29,700 46 19 35 19 White & West Asian 10,300 13,300 8,900 1,400 11,800 40 6 53 6 White & Korean 6,000 5,000 2,600 3,400 1,600 34 45 21 45 White & Japanese 29,300 26,500 9,500 19,800 6,700 26 55 19 55 White & multi. visible min. 29,200 27,600 23,500 5,700 21,900 46 11 43 11 * Data are a linked sample of over 1 million cases from the 2006 Census and 2011 National Household Survey, both in Canada. Numbers are rounded, weighted estimates of the population who were asked question 19 in the 2006 Census . Figure 2: Most Common Response Changes from 24 Visible Minority and White Groups in 2006 to the Same Groups in 2011 Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. Nationally representative of people who were asked question 19 2006 and 2011 numbers in this column indicate the 2011 Single Response Groups 2011 Multiple Response Groups 2006 Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Single Response Groups 1 White 2 Chinese 3 South Asian 4 Black 5 Filipino 6 Latin American 7 Southeast Asian 8 Arab 9 West Asian 10 Korean 11 Japanese 12 Visible minority n.i.e. Multiple Response Groups 13 Multiple visible minority 14 White & Chinese 15 White & South Asian 16 White & Black 17 White & Filipino 18 White & Latin American 19 White & Southeast Asian 20 White & Arab 21 White & West Asian 22 White & Korean 23 White & Japanese 24 White & mult. visible min. Note: Highlighting indicates the most common off-diagonal responses in the row. Response stability is indicated with an outlined box. Table 2: Median Market Income of Working Age Adults in 2005 and 2010 by Response Group and Response Pattern Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. (A) (B) ( C) (D) ( E) (F) (G) 2006 data 2011 data Left Joined Stayed numbers in this colum(C )+(D)+( E) ( E)+(F)+(G) to W to VM from W from VM Single Response Groups 1 White 2005 $ 32,400 $ 32,400 $ 24,400 $ 32,500 $ 22,400 2010 $ 31,100 $ 31,100 $ 24,900 $ 31,200 $ 25,100 2 Chinese 2005 $ 21,800 $ 21,800 $ 34,300 $ 27,200 $ 21,500 $ 32,200 $ 28,100 2010 $ 24,500 $ 24,500 $ 14,600 $ 27,800 $ 24,500 $ 24,500 $ 24,000 3 South Asian 2005 $ 23,700 $ 23,700 $ 24,000 $ 26,300 $ 23,500 * $ 27,500 2010 $ 26,700 $ 26,600 $ 36,000 $ 25,000 $ 26,700 * $ 25,000 4 Black 2005 $ 25,900 $ 26,000 $ 22,200 $ 22,400 $ 26,100 $ 27,600 $ 20,400 2010 $ 30,000 $ 30,000 $ 25,000 $ 24,600 $ 30,100 $ 19,300 $ 19,700 5 Filipino 2005 $ 29,300 $ 29,400 $ 22,500 $ 30,300 $ 29,200 $ 29,400 $ 30,500 2010 $ 34,100 $ 34,500 $ 8,600 $ 31,100 $ 34,300 $ 72,400 $ 36,400 6 Latin American 2005 $ 21,800 $ 21,100 $ 26,200 $ 28,000 $ 20,700 $ 19,400 $ 24,000 2010 $ 27,400 $ 26,600 $ 30,600 $ 32,500 $ 26,700 $ 25,300 $ 25,700 7 Southeast Asian 2005 $ 22,400 $ 21,900 $ 29,900 $ 23,300 $ 22,100 $ 18,700 $ 21,000 2010 $ 24,100 $ 25,000 $ 21,400 $ 26,000 $ 24,000 $ 29,000 $ 27,700 8 Arab 2005 $ 13,500 $ 13,100 $ 16,300 $ 14,400 $ 13,200 $ 14,200 $ 12,400 2010 $ 20,900 $ 20,500 $ 22,800 $ 21,000 $ 20,700 $ 22,500 $ 19,000 9 West Asian 2005 $ 16,100 $ 15,500 $ 27,600 $ 9,900 $ 16,300 $ 17,200 $ 7,400 2010 $ 20,300 $ 20,000 $ 20,300 $ 10,800 $ 23,000 $ 14,400 $ 13,500 10 Korean 2005 $ 13,400 $ 13,100 * $ 17,300 $ 13,100 * $ 23,100 2010 $ 18,000 $ 18,000 * $ 21,600 $ 18,000 * $ 35,000 11 Japanese 2005 $ 29,400 $ 27,300 * $ 36,500 $ 29,300 * $ 19,400 2010 $ 33,700 $ 33,600 * $ 18,400 $ 35,400 * $ 20,400 12 Visible minority n.i.e. 2005 $ 28,100 $ 26,900 $ 37,900 $ 25,100 $ 32,500 $ 31,900 $ 25,300 2010 $ 29,300 $ 28,600 $ 27,500 $ 24,700 $ 36,100 $ 37,900 $ 24,600 W = White. VM = Visible minority group. * Sample size is very small. continued Notes: Amounts are in 2010 dollars. Nationally representative of people ages 25-64 who were asked question 19 in 2006. Lighter font cautions against overinterpretation (because of sample size issues). Table 2, cont.: Median Market Income of Working Age Adults in 2005 and 2010 by Response Group and Response Pattern Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. (A) (B) ( C) (D) ( E) (F) (G) total in 2006 total in 2011 Left Joined Stayed numbers in this colum(B)+(C )+(D) (D)+( E)+(F) to W to VM from W from VM Multiple Response Groups 13 Multiple visible minority 2005 $ 30,700 $ 29,500 $ 12,700 $ 31,000 $ 31,600 * $ 28,100 2010 $ 31,200 $ 31,200 $ 12,100 $ 29,000 $ 35,800 * $ 28,400 14 White & Chinese 2005 $ 30,000 $ 22,500 $ 38,900 $ 31,600 $ 18,900 $ 28,200 $ 25,200 2010 $ 33,600 $ 28,500 $ 36,200 $ 33,600 $ 28,300 $ 46,900 $ 20,000 15 White & South Asian 2005 $ 29,500 $ 37,700 $ 6,000 $ 34,700 $ 41,500 $ 36,900 $ 31,900 2010 $ 41,300 $ 45,300 $ 22,100 $ 53,100 $ 48,800 $ 53,800 $ 36,000 16 White & Black 2005 $ 23,600 $ 26,200 $ 19,300 $ 21,800 $ 25,100 $ 22,300 $ 27,400 2010 $ 30,900 $ 35,000 $ 26,000 $ 22,700 $ 37,200 $ 28,800 $ 33,800 17 White & Filipino 2005 $ 34,900 $ 35,900 * * $ 37,000 * $ 39,900 2010 $ 39,800 $ 41,000 * * $ 41,900 * $ 40,500 18 White & Latin American 2005 $ 21,900 $ 29,100 $ 19,500 $ 21,800 $ 32,300 $ 22,000 $ 29,200 2010 $ 34,500 $ 33,600 $ 40,400 $ 32,000 $ 35,600 $ 31,000 $ 32,400 19 White & Southeast Asian 2005 $ 36,800 $ 37,100 * * * $ 37,100 * 2010 $ 46,300 $ 40,000 * * * $ 38,400 * 20 White & Arab 2005 $ 19,600 $ 18,400 $ 30,000 $ 14,500 $ 16,300 $ 20,600 $ 15,200 2010 $ 29,100 $ 25,300 $ 38,100 $ 24,900 $ 24,900 $ 26,200 $ 25,300 21 White & West Asian 2005 $ 5,800 $ 19,700 $ 10,800 $ 3,200 * $ 22,900 $ 12,600 2010 $ 19,000 $ 30,900 $ 19,400 $ 17,200 * $ 30,900 $ 28,200 22 White & Korean 2005 $ 40,300 $ 15,200 * * * * * 2010 $ 55,600 $ 36,300 * * * * * 23 White & Japanese 2005 $ 29,800 $ 37,200 * * $ 39,600 * * 2010 $ 41,800 $ 42,600 * * $ 44,000 * * 24 White & multiple visible minority 2005 $ 28,100 $ 28,100 $ 300 $ 30,500 $ 16,400 $ 19,400 $ 28,900 2010 $ 25,000 $ 26,000 $ 25,000 $ 29,400 $ 10,200 $ 12,500 $ 30,400 W = White. VM = Visible minority group. * Sample size is very small. Notes: Amounts are in 2010 dollars. Nationally representative of people ages 25-64 who were asked question 19 in 2006. Lighter font cautions against overinterpretation (because of sample size issues). Table 3: Unemployment Rate of Working Age Adults in 2006 and 2011 by Response Group and Response Pattern Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. (A) (B) ( C) (D) ( E) (F) (G) Total in 2006 Total in 2011 Left Joined Stayed numbers in this col (C )+(D)+( E) ( E)+(F)+(G) to W to VM from W from VM Single Response Groups 1 White 2006 4% 4% 6% 4% 5% 2011 4% 4% 6% 4% 5% 2 Chinese 2006 4% 5% 5% 4% 5% 8% 3% 2011 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3 South Asian 2006 5% 6% 4% 7% 6% * 6% 2011 6% 5% 3% 7% 5% * 6% 4 Black 2006 6% 7% 6% 7% 7% 4% 8% 2011 7% 6% 7% 8% 6% 12% 4% 5 Filipino 2006 3% 3% 5% 3% 3% 1% 7% 2011 3% 3% 5% 4% 3% 2% 4% 6 Latin American 2006 5% 6% 7% 3% 6% 5% 4% 2011 6% 5% 3% 4% 5% 2% 7% 7 Southeast Asian 2006 7% 6% 2% 7% 6% 2% 7% 2011 6% 7% 2% 4% 7% 2% 5% 8 Arab 2006 7% 10% 5% 15% 10% 11% 13% 2011 10% 7% 7% 6% 8% 6% 6% 9 West Asian 2006 5% 7% 1% 12% 6% 11% 9% 2011 7% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 6% # Korean 2006 5% 5% * 4% 5% * 0% 2011 5% 5% * 2% 5% * 3% # Japanese 2006 3% 3% * 6% 3% * 2% 2011 3% 3% * 4% 4% * 0% # Visible minority n.i.e. 2006 5% 7% 3% 4% 3% 7% 8% 2011 7% 8% 2% 5% 6% 14% 8% W = White. VM = Visible minority group. * Sample size is very small. continued Notes: Nationally representative of people ages 25-64 who were asked question 19 in 2006. Lighter font cautions against overinterpretation (because of sample size issues). Table 3, cont.: Unemployment Rate of Working Age Adults in 2006 and 2011 by Response Group and Response Pattern Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. (A) (B) ( C) (D) ( E) (F) (G) Total in 2006 Total in 2011 Left Joined Stayed numbers in this col (B)+(C )+(D) (D)+( E)+(F) to W to VM from W from VM Multiple Response Groups # Multiple visible minority 2006 4% 4% 7% 7% 2% * 5% 2011 4% 4% 3% 4% 3% * 4% # White & Chinese 2006 3% 1% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2% 2011 1% 5% 1% 1% 4% 5% 9% # White & South Asian 2006 3% 7% 3% 5% 10% 7% 4% 2011 7% 1% 1% 10% 0% 3% 2% # White & Black 2006 5% 6% 9% 7% 3% 15% 5% 2011 6% 4% 4% 6% 5% 7% 1% # White & Filipino 2006 4% 4% ** 4% * 6% 2011 4% 3% ** 2% * 4% # White & Latin American 2006 5% 5% 7% 5% 10% 4% 3% 2011 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 3% # White & Southeast Asian 2006 0% 6% *** 6% * 2011 6% 3% *** 3% * # White & Arab 2006 5% 8% 5% 8% 7% 3% 12% 2011 8% 5% 8% 5% 3% 6% 7% # White & West Asian 2006 3% 4% 7% 15% * 5% 3% 2011 4% 4% 2% 4% * 3% 5% # White & Korean 2006 4% 11% ***** 2011 11% 3% ***** # White & Japanese 2006 3% 6% ** 5% ** 2011 6% 3% ** 4% ** # White & multiple visible minority 2006 2% 6% 8% 5% 0% 8% 7% 2011 6% 5% 3% 2% 3% 11% 4% W = White. VM = Visible minority group. * Sample size is very small. Notes: Nationally representative of people ages 25-64 who were asked question 19 in 2006. Lighter font cautions against overinterpretation (because of sample size issues). Table 4: Sample Size by Response Group and Response Pattern (Ages 25-64 in 2006) Preliminary results. Do not cite or quote. Unweighted, rounded case counts. Not nationally representative. (A) (B) ( C) (D) ( E) (F) (G) Total Total Left Joined in 2006 in 2011 Stayed from from (C )+(D)+( E) ( E)+(F)+(G) to W to VM W VM Single Response Groups 1 White 459,800 457,000 7,700 452,100 4,870 2 Chinese 20,600 20,200 160 920 19,510 70 580 3 South Asian 19,400 19,300 160 1,240 18,040 150 1,060 4 Black 8,100 7,900 170 560 7,340 140 460 5 Filipino 7,100 7,000 50 350 6,750 30 250 6 Latin American 4,300 4,400 290 360 3,660 280 460 7 Southeast Asian 3,300 3,400 60 600 2,610 * 780 8 Arab 3,700 3,900 350 370 2,970 460 470 9 West Asian 2,100 2,100 190 280 1,670 170 230 10 Korean 1,700 1,700 * 40 1,680 * 20 11 Japanese 1,200 1,100 * 60 1,080 * 50 12 Visible minority n.i.e. 1,000 1,300 100 550 360 90 860 Multiple Response Groups 13 Multiple visible minority 1,400 1,500 40 1,020 390 * 1,060 14 White & Chinese 300 300 60 90 160 50 80 15 White & South Asian 200 300 40 70 90 70 110 16 White & Black 600 600 110 190 320 110 210 17 White & Filipino 100 100 ** 40 * 40 18 White & Latin American 700 700 150 240 260 160 260 19 White & Southeast Asian * 300 *** 300 * 20 White & Arab 700 600 170 350 210 170 260 21 White & West Asian 100 200 50 50 * 120 60 22 White & Korean ******* 23 White & Japanese 200 200 ** 130 ** 24 White & multiple visible min. 300 300 40 240 30 60 220 Note: Highlighted groups have sufficient sample size to conduct multinomial logistic regression predicting specific response change. Numbers are unweighted and rounded. W= White. VM = Visible minority. * = Very small sample size.