ATR/95:1 The Person and Work of Christ Revisited: In Conversation with Karl Barth Christopher R. J. Holmes* The person of Christ is often equated with his saving work. The problem in immediately identifying Christ’s person with his work, I argue, is that it shortchanges what the biblical testimony de- mands: an account of Jesus Christ as the underlying basis of his benefits. Rather than leading us to seek after a “Christ in himself,” however, the immanent perfect being of Jesus Christ renders his salvation effective. Accordingly, what is at stake is the honoring of Christ’s person not as something removed from his work but rather as what grounds his work as the revealer of God to human- ity and the reconciler of humanity to God. I The basic theological issue at stake in this essay, namely a right accounting of the relationship between Christ’s person and work, be- tween who he is and what he does, can be best accessed by compar- ing two statements, one by Colin Gunton and the other by Donald MacKinnon. The former writes, “The person of Christ is his saving work, so that an adequately articulated Christology will also be a the- ology of salvation.”1 The latter states, “He [Jesus Christ] remains not simply the logical subject of this proposition: ‘He was incarnate’; but ontologically he is the author of the act.”2 The thrust of this essay is to inhabit the latter as what enables a modified and more chastened af- firmation of the former. Indeed, it is MacKinnon who identifies Jesus * Christopher R. J. Holmes is Senior Lecturer in Theology in the Department of Theology and Religion, the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, and an Anglican priest. 1 Colin Gunton, “Salvation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 144. 2 Donald M. MacKinnon, “Prolegomena to Christology,” in Themes in Theology: The Three-fold Cord: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, and Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 173. 37 38 Anglican Theological Review Christ, specifically the very being of the person of Jesus Christ, as that which grounds—or better, underwrites—what he does: namely, become incarnate. MacKinnon’s intuition is salutary. Distinguishing the person and work of Christ is an important thing to do, MacKin- non reminds us, if each is to be given its proper due. But it is diffi- cult to give each its due, as it might suggest that Christ’s person can be separated from his work. This would lead us to pursue a Christ in himself, a Christ who can be contemplated apart from who he is for us. Indeed, to champion such a vision of Christ’s person would be to supply, to use Karl Barth’s language, “an abstract doctrine of his ‘person.’”3 More specifically, it would suggest that an ontological gap lies between who Christ is and what Christ does. Accordingly, the “ontological co-inherence” of Christ’s person and work would no longer be “a fairly concise affair.”4 The unsettling development in all this—it is supposed—is that Christology involves description of One who transcends his history rather than a Christ whose very being is identified with his history. It is the contention of this essay that the basic issues of Christol- ogy as Barth identifies them—for example, Jesus Christ’s Godhead and humanity, his work, and his state of humiliation and exaltation— can only be taken up well to the extent one gives “a proper place” to both Christ’s person and work.5 In other words, the task of this essay is to inhabit Barth’s aversion to the doctrine of Christ’s person being “absorbed and dissolved in that of his work, or vice versa,” so as “to give a proper place to them both,” especially with respect to his per- son, by which I mean his being as the anterior condition of his atoning work.6 Expressed exegetically, the essay asks who is the “he” “who became to us wisdom from God, righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (1 Cor. 1:30)?7 I will unfold this contention with three points. As regards the first point, I will offer a reading of §58 (“The Doctrine of Reconciliation [Survey]”) of Church Dogmatics IV/1 with 3 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957–1975), IV/1, 127. “Person” in the orig- inal is set within quotation marks. Note that I follow the original with respect to emphases. I have thus added them to the English translation which, unfortunately, excludes most of them. Where I alter the English translation, I indicate that I have done so by using the citation “rev.” 4 This is Paul D. Jones’s language. See The Humanity of Christ: Christology in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 90. 5 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, 128. 6 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, 128. 7 Scripture passages are from the English Standard Version. The Person and Work of Christ Revisited 39 the intention of indicating how for Barth articulation of a doctrine of Christ’s person that is not “abstract” does not mean the positing of a Christ in himself—Gunton’s fear—but rather a Christ who, even as he “exists in the totality of his mediating being and mediating work,” even as he has his being in history, cannot be said to be one whose being dissolved into his history.8 To say that Jesus has his being—his person—in history is not to affirm that he has his being with history.9 To argue so would be to make his identity dependent on what he does. This cannot be, as it shortchanges the sense in which the economy of salvation is revelatory of his being. Indeed, the task in this first section is to consider how Barth seeks to give a proper place to both the person and the work of Christ, and to do so in a way that is sensi- tive to strengths and weaknesses of one recent reading of the same. As regards the second point: given the way in which Barth orders an account of the person and the work of Jesus Christ, might there be a place for a qualified affirmation of the extra calvinisticum, for endorsement of the notion that the Godhead—the divinity—of Jesus Christ is not exhausted by his flesh? Expressed otherwise, does Barth encourage us to say that the babe born in Bethlehem has the whole world in his hands? Might Jesus Christ in being for us remain free in relationship to us, and so negate our sinful attempts to reduce him to our possession? Pastorally speaking, the extra calvinisticum points to an important truth: Jesus Christ stands against our attempts—indi- vidual and corporate—to make him over in our image. It is because of who Jesus is that he forever graciously eludes our sinful attempts to domesticate him. As regards the third and last point, why does an ac- count which gives a “proper place to them both” promote an account of salvation that “secures the fulfillment of creaturely being against self-destruction”?10 Why must the person of Christ be said to be the anterior condition of salvation? II Barth’s description of Jesus Christ is one tethered to the economy of salvation. This is his way of avoiding an “abstract” Christ. To be 8 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, 123 (rev.). 9 Compare Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, Volume 1: The Triune God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 59. 10 John Webster, “‘It was the Will of the Lord to Bruise Him’: Soteriology and the Doctrine of God,” in God of Salvation: Soteriology in Theological Perspective, ed. Ivor J. Davidson and Murray A. Rae (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 19. 40 Anglican Theological Review sure, there is a place for an account of “the metaphysics of Christ’s person.” However, the content, for Barth, of such an account must be oriented to Christ’s history. The creedal homoousios is a gloss on the gospel narratives—who is the One who acts thus? Hence, when Barth describes the atonement as “the middle point, the one thing from which neither the God who turns to man nor man converted to God can be abstracted, in which and by which both are what they are,” he is not suggesting that Jesus Christ has his being—his person—as a result of the economy of salvation.11 Rather, Barth’s point is that Jesus Christ exists only in relationship to “the men of Israel and His disciples and the world, from what He is on their behalf.”12 He cannot be conceived otherwise. But to say that he only ever exists in this relationship is not to say that he is because of this relationship. Jesus Christ does not “need” us in order to be who he is. Rather, he freely comes among us in a saving way because of who he is. Christology is indeed a doctrine about the being and work of Christ—and in that order. Were one to say that Christology is merely about his being, one would be shortchanging the very real sense in which “He exists in the totality of his mediating being and mediating work—He alone as the Mediator, but living and active in His mediatorial office.”13 The subtle point that needs to be honored in all of this is the significance of the “He,” meaning that “what is said about Jesus Christ Himself, the christological propositions as such, are constitutive, essential, necessary and central in the Christian doctrine of reconciliation.”14 Reconciliation’s reality is undergirded by One who is God in se, One who is, in other words, homoousios with the Father and the Spirit.