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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ THE HEROIC MANAGER An Assessment of Sir Douglas Haig’s Role as a Military Manager on the Western Front Vines, Anthony John Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 THE HEROIC MANAGER: An Assessment of Sir Douglas Haig’s Role as a Military Manager on the Western Front Anthony John Hinton Vines Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2015 King’s College London Abstract Sir Michael Howard has observed that Douglas Haig was a military manager in the mould of Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower rather than one of the “Great Captains” of military legend. Unfortunately, Howard did not elaborate. To date, this crucial aspect of Haig’s role on the Western Front has not been explored. The contention of this thesis is that Haig was an exceptional military manager who pursued the organising principle of unity-of-effort within the BEF on the Western Front to facilitate the defeat of the German Army in concert with the Allies. In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of war organization in FSR-II.1 Haig did not define the precept possibly in the belief that it was a commonplace. However, a study to establish the contemporary understanding has revealed that unity-of-effort was, and is, the raison d’être of all forms of human organization including the military. It was regarded as a tangible and effective principle and not a mere rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. Its nature was immutable, and uniquely coordinative. Unity-of-effort found expression in its compound character, which had distinct mental, physical and moral components, specific to each organization. The principle was considered to be a normative ideal, and not an absolute standard. Haig strove to optimise unity-of-effort by developing operational, organizational and administrative doctrine in pursuit of unity-of-mental-effort; by inculcating the teachings of doctrine through progressive training methods to achieve unity-of-physical-effort; and by promoting the will to fight through sustained morale and discipline to attain unity-of-moral-effort. Haig managed the process to attain unity-of-effort through the coordinative function of the General Staff. 1 Field Service Regulations Part II (Organization and Administration), (London: HMSO, 1909). 1 Table of Contents List of Figures 3 Abbreviations 5 1. Introduction 9 2. The Anatomy of the BEF on the Western Front 41 3. The Principle of Unity-of-Effort 97 4. Achieving Unity-of-Mental-Effort 148 5. Achieving Unity-of-Physical-Effort 189 6. Achieving Unity-of-Moral-Effort 229 7. The Management of Unity-of-Effort in the BEF 274 8. Conclusions 308 Appendices 326 Bibliography 331 2 List of Figures Figure 1: The BEF Theatre of Operations 42 Figure 2: Estimated Ration Strength of BEF in France (1914-1918) 43 Figure 3: Estimated Ration Strength of the BEF’s British, Dominion and Indian Forces (01/11/1918) 45 Figure 4: British Regimental Strength of the BEF including TF (1914-1918) 48 Figure 5: Comparing Combat to Non-Combat Strength of BEF in France (1914-1918) 49 Figure 6: Distribution of Men and Material in and to British Theatres 50 Figure 7: Vital Economic and Financial Statistics of the British War Effort 52 Figure 8: Increase in Regimental Strength of BEF including TF in France (1914-1918) 53 Figure 9: BEF’s Expenditure of Gun & Howitzer Ammunition in France (1916-1918) 54 Figure 10: Distribution of Ammunition Expended by Guns & Howitzers (1914-1918) 55 Figure 11: BEF’s Quarterly Expenditure of Artillery Ammunition (1914-1918) 56 Figure 12: Comparison of British Firepower in Evidence at Periods of Intensive Fighting 57 Figure 13: Fourth Army Order of Battle for the 8th August 1918 62 Figure 14: GHQ Organization (Late Summer 1915) 67 Figure 15: GHQ Organization (Summer and Autumn 1918 ) 68 Figure 16: Methods Haig Employed to Establish and Enhance the BEF's Sphere of Influence (January to July 1917) 71 Figure 17: Methods that Haig Employed to Establish and Enhance the BEF’s Sphere of Influence by Location and Type of Stakeholder (January to July 1917) 72 Figure 18: Incidence of Haig's Visitors by Month (January to July 1917) 75 Figure 19: Newspaper Coverage (1st January to 31 July 1917) 76 Figure 20: Analysis of BEF Casualties in France and Flanders (1914-1918) 80 Figure 21: Impact of Logistics During Hundred Days Campaign (August to November 1918) 94 Figure 22: Thinkers and Mentors that Influenced Haig’s Military Thought 111 Figure 23: The BEF’s Doctrinal Learning Process (1916-1918) 171 Figure 24: GHQ Divisional-Level Doctrine Publications (1916-1918) 176 3 Figure 25: Broad Comparison of Haig’s Guidance Notes and S.S. 198 181 Figure 26: GHQ Platoon-Level Doctrine Publications (1916-1918) 182 Figure 27: Comparison of FSR-II Editorial Structure (1906 versus 1909) 282 Figure 28: Staff Duties Encapsulated by Henri Fayol’s Elements of Management 292 Figure 29: Schematic of the Principle of Unity-of-Effort 319 4 Abbreviations A&Q Adjutant and Quartermaster AAR After Action Report AG Adjutant General AAG Assistant Adjutant General AP&SS Army Printing And Stationery Services AQMG Assistant Quartermaster-General ASC Army Service Corps BEF British Expeditionary Force BGGS Brigadier-General, General Staff BGRA Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery BOH British Official History Brig.-Gen. Brigadier General Capt. Captain CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CO Commanding Officer Col. Colonel Cpl. Corporal CHA Commander, Heavy Artillery CRA Commander, Royal Artillery CRE Commander, Royal Engineers CGS Chief of the General Staff CS Chief of Staff CSO Chief Staff Officer CSM Company Sergeant-Major DAG Deputy Adjutant General 5 DAAG Deputy Assistant Adjutant General DA&QMG Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General DAAG&QMG Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff DGT Director-General of Transportation DHQ Divisional Headquarters DMT Director of Military Training DSD Director of Staff Duties DSO Distinguished Service Order DWT Dead Weight Tonnage FM Field Marshal FSR-I Field Service Regulations (Operations), 1909 FSR-II Field Service Regulations (Organization & Administration), 1909 GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GOCRA General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery GQG Grand Quartier Général GS General Staff GSO General Staff Officer IGCav Inspector General of Cavalry IGC Inspector General of Communications IGT Inspector General of Training Lieut.-Gen. Lieutenant General IT Inspectorate of Training IWM Imperial War Museum, London KCL King’s College London LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London 6 Maj. Major Maj.-Gen. Major General MC Military Cross MGC Machine Gun Corps MGGS Major General, General Staff MGRA Major General, Royal Artillery MI Mounted Infantry MLR Main Line of Resistance MM Military Medal MT Motor Transport NAM National Army Museum, Chelsea NCO Non-commissioned Officer NLS National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh OC Officer Commanding POW Prisoner of War Pte. Private QMS Quarter Master Sergeant RA Royal Artillery RAF Royal Air Force RASC Royal Army Service Corps RE Royal Engineers RFA Royal Field Artillery RFC Royal Flying Corps RGA Royal Garrison Artillery SDB Staff Duties Branch at GHQ, France Sgt. Sergeant S/Maj. Sergeant Major 7 S/Sgt. Staff Sergeant SO Staff Officer TB Training Branch TC Tank Corps TF Territorial Force TNA The National Archives, Kew VC Victoria Cross 2/Lt. Second Lieutenant 8 1. Introduction Sir Douglas Haig is the single most controversial figure, in the most controversial war in British History.2 The question is, why is it that Haig remains such an enigma?3 Gary Sheffield provided a simple explanation that ‘can be summed up in one word: casualties’.4 This focus feeds directly into a more nuanced rationale from Stephen Heathorn, who was surely right to argue that Haig has become a ‘lieu de mémoire’ for the ‘perceived futility and tragedy of the British effort’.5 Military historians, with some notable exceptions including John Terraine and Gary Sheffield, have largely been responsible for creating this metonym by bearing down, almost exclusively, on Haig’s character and personality, the impact of his agency particularly on casualties, and questions of leadership. They have failed to lift their gaze in any sustained way to consider his role within the context of ‘a host of structural factors – technological, logistical, political, economic, cultural, [and] demographic’. In particular, fixated by the ‘accretions of meaning attached to Haig’s name’ little attempt has been made to consider Haig’s role in what Michael Howard calls ‘Total War Mk 1’6 Here ‘the entire resources of the state were mobilised to sustain armies in the field whose only formula for victory was attrition, and whose commanders were military managers’.