The Origins of Party Discipline Evidence from Eastern Germany1

Louise K. Davidson-Schmich Political Science, University of Miami

It has long been observed by students of German and western Euro- pean politics that deputies from the same parliamentary party group (PPG or Fraktion) generally take identical positions when votes are cast in legislatures such as the Bundestag and the British Parliament.2 Although there is widespread consensus that party voting occurs, the question of why it occurs is more controversial. Earlier scholars took a sociological approach and argued that Members of Parliament (MPs) held together for normative reasons including party solidarity, social- ization in proper behavior by caucus leaders, or simply because members of the same party families hold the same ideological convictions.3 In contrast, more recent research has challenged the sociological approach and found that discipline emerges as rational actors dis- cover self-interested reasons to vote en bloc.4 Scholars working in this tradition have identified three key institutional mechanisms thought to promote party voting agreement in legislatures—including the need in a parliamentary system to support the executive branch, the desire for efficiency in legislative decision making, and MPs’ hope of reelection. While all three seem plausible, authors have not attempted to investigate the degree to which each of these institutional incentives influence MPs’ behavior. Are all three mechanisms equally important in creating party discipline or does one outweigh the others? To date we do not know. Perhaps this oversight stems from the fact that the Bundestag and other well-established western European legislatures have such consistently high levels of party voting agreement that there is not enough variance to determine the cause of this behavior. Yet, understanding what causes party discipline is vital if this common practice in long-democratic legislatures is to be replicated

German Politics and Society, Issue 79 Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2006 23 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline in newly democratizing settings. In electoral systems like Germany’s, and elsewhere. Furthermore, such analysis makes an empirical con- where voters select among political parties rather than individual tribution to the study of party discipline in Germany at the state candidates, citizens can only hold their representatives accountable level by focusing on cases that have been understudied until now if their party’s MPs act in concert while in the legislature. If deputies due to the difficulty of obtaining voting data. from the same party vote differently, citizens are unable to use their In this article, I first outline the different institutional mechanisms party vote to reward or punish the stance with which they disagree. hypothesized to promote party voting and discuss how they can be Similarly, in parliamentary systems like Germany’s, a lack of party expected to influence governing and opposition parliamentary party discipline threatens to cause political instability if shifting parliamen- groups over time. Next, I examine quantitatively the rise of party vot- tary majorities lead to cycling executives. Thus, in new democracies ing in eastern German state legislatures to see how the expectations with political institutions akin to eastern Germany’s, party discipline outlined in the first section fare when confronted with empirical evi- is essential to ensure democratic accountability and political stability. dence. Third, I repeat this analysis using qualitative techniques. I con- Those interested in promoting democracy in such settings need to clude that the logic of parliamentary government, more so than understand what causes discipline in order to craft the appropriate efficiency and electoral incentives, created disciplined PPGs in the new institutions to promote the practice. German parliaments. The final section discusses how these findings The creation of five new democratic state legislatures after the fall help explain both the successful transfer of a western German practice of communism in eastern Germany provides a unique opportunity to the new Länder and the persistence of party discipline across Ger- to investigate the origins of party voting agreement. Because the many, despite societal changes that would seem to undermine it. Bundestag is composed mainly of western Germans, unification did not have an impact on the high level of party voting there.5 As a result, it is not a useful legislature to study to gain causal insight into Institutional Incentives for Party Voting Across the question of which institutional incentives shape party voting the Parliamentary Party Groups most.6 Moreover, other newly created legislatures, such as those that emerged in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, make it Three main institutional mechanisms have been hypothesized to difficult to study the effect of institutional rules on party voting cause party voting agreement in established parliaments such as the because such rules emerged gradually as the countries’ parliamen- Bundestag. These include the need in a parliamentary system for tary and electoral systems took shape.7 At the state (Land) level in PPGs to vote together to keep the executive branch in office, the effi- Germany, in contrast, electoral systems and parliamentary structures ciency advantages to party voting, and election-related incentives for proven to create a high level of party voting in western Germany parties to discipline their members and for deputies to submit to this were extended to the new eastern states in 1990. These new state discipline. These three mechanisms affect governing and opposition parliaments (Landtage) were subsequently filled by PPGs composed parties slightly differently. They exerted their logic in eastern Ger- of legislators who had never served in a western style parliament many more clearly at different times during the development of before. Only 4.4 percent of those elected to eastern German state these new state legislatures. Below, I outline these differences across parliaments between 1990 and 2000 were western Germans.8 In this parties and across time in order to generate testable hypotheses. setting, party voting ultimately emerged, albeit at different rates The literature on parliamentary systems clearly agrees that a key across various parliamentary party groups. By disaggregating the institutional incentive for party voting agreement is the fact that in a data and comparing the speed at which discipline emerged across parliamentary system the largest party (or coalition of parties) in the eastern German Fraktionen, it is possible to shed light on exactly legislature must stand behind its chief executive and cabinet or the how institutional incentives for party voting influence MPs in Germany government can fall. Were these legislative parties not coherent,

24 25 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline cycling majorities could lead to great political instability as govern- cause of party voting agreement, we would expect to see both opposi- ments rose and fell.9 The need to support the executive branch, tion and governing PPGs vote in a similar manner. Efficiency incen- however, is mainly a concern of the parliamentary party group with tives are less immediately obvious to legislators than the need to a legislative majority or a PPG that is a member of a governing coali- support the executive branch, however, because they only become tion. As Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, and Richard Katz put it, “the apparent as legislative work becomes bogged down over time. fear of losing (a majority or a vote) and the hope of winning” moti- According to this hypothesis, discipline emerges as MPs begin to vate MPs in majority parties to toe a party line.” Whether opposition search for ways to speed up their work.15 As a result, if efficiency PPGs vote en bloc or split down the middle does not affect the status incentives were the primary cause of party voting, this practice would of the government.. As the above authors observe, “if a party has lit- have slowly emerged over the course of the first electoral period as tle or no chance of winning … Then there would seem to be no real eastern German MPs attempted to streamline decision making. point in … trying to impose costly disciplinary measures.”10 As a A third group of institutional mechanisms hypothesized to foster result, if the logic of parliamentary government is the primary insti- party voting agreement are ones that are related to the electoral tutional mechanism causing party voting agreement, we would arena. In the mixed-electoral system used in German federal elec- observe that governing parties have a significantly higher propensity tions and in eastern German state elections, the second, or party to vote together than opposition parties do. Because this institutional vote, is the more important. Because voters select among competing incentive exists from the moment the first government is formed in a parties, political parties need to have a clear profile to communicate new legislature, we would observe this government-opposition to citizens. A German party that splits frequently in parliament will divide in party voting agreement from the start of the first legislative lack such a profile and, as public opinion research has shown, will be period onward in eastern Germany. seen by voters as insecure and untrustworthy.16 For governing par- A second incentive for party voting agreement in democratic leg- ties, voting cohesively and enacting party policies is the best way to islatures has to do with the efficiency of the practice. Even scholars communicate to voters that their wishes will be represented.17 In studying presidential systems where the aforementioned executive contrast, opposition parties need to stand together to provide voters branch instability is not a problem, find that in the absence of disci- with a clear-cut alternative to the governing party. As with efficiency plined legislative parties, new majorities would have to be cobbled incentives, the need for a clear profile to transmit to voters is true together to pass each piece of legislation, a highly inefficient prac- both for parties in government and for those in the opposition. tice.11 Particularly in modern legislatures responsible for law-making Competitive elections provide not only party organizations with in a wide arrange of complex and technical areas, it is difficult for an an incentive to vote en bloc, but also offer incentives for individual individual deputy to master or even understand all the pieces of leg- deputies to go along with the rest of their parliamentary party group, islation on which she is to vote.12 By joining a parliamentary party even if they should disagree with its position. In Germany, political an MP can rely on the expertise of other caucus members or govern- parties control the nominations for their electoral list and for each ment ministers from her party to guide her voting on an array of constituency seat. If a given deputy is to continue his career in the issues.13 Being part of a parliamentary party and deferring to other legislature, he must first be nominated by his party, making his party members in their area of expertise also provides an individual career dependent on the party’s good will.18 Since party organiza- legislator with allies who will support her position on issues that are tions know they fare better in elections with disciplined PPGs, they of importance to her.14 Without coherent legislative parties, then, are likely to nominate candidates who have showed a willingness to parliamentary work would be inefficient and uncertain. toe their parliamentary party group’s line in legislative voting.19 These incentives apply equally to all MPs whether their parties are Once (re)elected, MPs remain dependent on their party to be in or out of government. Thus, if efficiency incentives were the primary selected for additional positions. Parliamentary party groups control

26 27 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline promotion to the frontbenches (for example, the positions of caucus second electoral period (after dissenting deputies had been weeded head, whip, etc.) and they also choose which committee assignments out by their parties). deputies will receive.20 If parliamentarians harbor any ambitions In sum, each of the three mechanisms through which political beyond the back bench, then, they must continue to remain in their institutions are thought to contribute to party voting agreement have party leadership’s good graces and voting the party line is a minimal different combinations of temporal and cross-party effects: requirement in this regard. These incentives apply equally to MPs from governing and opposition parliamentary party groups, as all • If the logic of the parliamentary system were the primary motivator of are likely to desire reelection and career advancement. party voting agreement, we would see higher levels of discipline In contrast to the logic of parliamentary government, however, among governing than opposition PPGs. This difference should be the logic of Germany’s electoral system may not have been initially marked from the very inception of the new Landtage. apparent to eastern German MPs and their PPGs. In the first eastern • If efficiency incentives were the primary motivator of party voting Landtag elections, most parties were quite new and the legislatures agreement, we would see no difference between the party voting for which they campaigned had never existed before, so it was not agreement in governing and opposition PPGs. Furthermore, feasible for parties to run on their legislative records. The rewards discipline would only slowly emerge during the first legislative for campaigning with a clear parliamentary record, or the punish- period as MPs sought to correct the inefficiencies brought about ment for failure in this regard, most likely only became apparent to by low levels of party voting. eastern states’ party leaders as they sought to differentiate themselves from their rivals in the campaigns for second round elections • If electoral incentives were the primary motivator we would also in 1994/1995. Thus, if electoral incentives were the primary motiva- see no difference between the party voting agreement in tor of disciplined legislative voting, we would not observe the rise of governing and opposition PPGs. Additionally, discipline would party voting in the new Länder until late in the first electoral period emerge only at the end of the first legislative period or in the when campaigning got underway. second, as parties learned that voters punished divided parties Similarly, individual deputies may have also been slow to recog- and as MPs realized that failing to toe their party’s line would be nize the importance of party support for their future careers. When disadvantageous to their careers. elections were first held following German unification, most eastern party organizations were quite new and rather weak. Candi- These hypotheses are tested empirically in the following two sec- dates for the first round of elections were chosen in a haphazard tions. The next section relies on quantitative evidence to compare manner, often on the basis of a single speech made at a nominating governing and opposition Fraktionen’s voting patterns between 1990 meeting prior to the 1990 election. Moreover, party group leaders, and 2000. A finding of initial significant differences in these PPGs’ committee members, and ministers were initially chosen on the rates of disciplined voting would suggest that the logic of parliamen- basis of their perceived ability to fill a given role rather than on the tary government is the primary cause of party voting. If no sig- basis of long-term party loyalty.21 Thus, the importance of party nificant opposition-governing differences in voting were found, leaders in developing candidate lists only emerged as candidates however, further evidence would be needed to adjudicate between were chosen for the second set of elections in 1994/1995. As a the efficiency and electoral incentives for party voting. For this rea- result, if such electoral incentives play a primary role in promoting son, part three utilizes quantitative evidence derived from interviews MPs’ willingness to toe their party’s line, we would only observe the with MPs themselves to further assess individual deputies’ motiva- emergence of party voting late in the first electoral period (as can- tions for voting with their PPGs or not. didate selection for the second elections approached) or in the

28 29 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

Quantitative Empirical Evidence Table One: Rice Index of Cohesion in Roll Call Votes 1991-2000 1991 1996 2000 Studies of legislative voting often rely on the use of roll call votes. CDU .94 .97 .98 However, roll call votes are generally not taken in German legisla- PDS .92 .94 .94 22 SPD .90 .92 .96 tures, except on very controversial, high profile issues. In 1991, less Greens .91 .96 NR than 2 percent of the votes taken in the state parliaments under FDP .87 NR NR examination were roll call votes: such votes can only occur if a mini- DVU NR NR .84 mum number of deputies request one. Thus, while I examine roll call NR = Party not represented in this legislative period. votes below, I also draw on additional evidence from the transcripts Source: roll call votes recorded in parliamentary transcripts. of eastern plenary sessions from the second year of each of the elec- All of the parties elected to the eastern German Landtage, except toral periods since unification: 1991, 1996, and 2000.23 Most legisla- one, scored above 0.87 in 1991. These parties’ scores increased tive votes were prefaced with a statement from each PPG, declaring its slightly in the ninety-eight and sixty-eight roll call votes taken in the position on the issue at hand. When votes were taken, the stenogra- second and third electoral periods, respectively, and approached the pher noted the outcome of the vote and/or how each caucus voted. 1.0 mark. These scores are similar to the voting patterns observed in Sometimes MPs also gave statements justifying their votes. This infor- the Bundestag.26 The German People’s Union (DVU) entered parlia- mation allowed 61.1 percent of the 8,737 votes taken to be classified.24 ment for the first time in 1998/1999 and had a slightly lower Rice Each vote was categorized first according to how each parliamentary Index than the veteran parties. In sum, starting three months after party group voted—en bloc or with one or more deputies diverging the creation of the eastern Landtage, parliamentary party groups from the other MPs; and second, to whether the majority of the PPG there had, on average, a very high level of voting agreement on key voted to accept, reject, or send a given measure to a committee. This roll call votes, This finding is consistent with the logic of the parlia- method, while time consuming, clearly provides a much more repre- mentary system and possibly with efficiency incentives. sentative sample and increases the number of cases examined than Table Two compares the Rice Indices of opposition parliamentary would only studying roll-call votes. party groups to those of PPGs involved in a governing coalition.27 Roll Call Vote Data Table Two: Rice Index of Cohesion andPPG Status in Roll Call Votes The first elections to the new German legislatures took place in the 1991-2000 fall of 1990. In the subsequent year, sixty-eight roll call votes were taken in these five parliaments. Table One shows the average Rice 1991 1996 2000 Index of cohesion score for all party families throughout the follow- Opposition .87 .91 .91 Governing .94 .95 .97 ing decade. This index runs from 0.0 to 1.0—the former would indi- Difference of means between the two groups significant at t.025 level for 1996 and cate that a parliamentary party group split down the middle on 2000; at t.05 level for 1991 every single vote under consideration, whereas a 1.0 score repre- Source: roll call votes recorded in parliamentary transcripts. sents a PPG whose members all voted in exactly the same way in every single vote under consideration.25 Opposition caucuses had an average score of 0.87, significantly lower than governing party groups whose mean Rice Index was 0.94. These significant government-opposition differences remained throughout the decade. Further, as Table Three indicates, coalition discipline was high from the creation of these new parliaments as well.

30 31 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

Table Three: Rice Index of Cohesion for Governing Coalitions As with the roll call votes, governing parties were significantly less 1991-2000 likely to split than opposition PPGs.29 In 1991, governing parties voted 1991 1996 2000 en bloc in 66.3 percent of the votes whereas the figure for opposition .89 .96 .95 parties was only 53.1 percent. In the remaining votes, PPGs either overtly split or their behavior was unclear in the parliamentary tran- Source: roll call votes recorded in parliamentary transcripts. scripts. As Table Five indicates, when in government in 1991, the Social Democrats (SPD) voted together slightly more often than the The Rice Index for governing coalitions in 1991 was 0.89.28 The governing Christian Democrats (CDU), but the difference was not sta- scores in 1996 and 2000 were similar to that of governing PPGs vot- tistically significant, nor were significant differences among various ing on their own—0.96 and 0.95 respectively. In contrast, opposition opposition PPGs’ rates of disciplined voting found that year. PPGs had the luxury of splitting more often as they did not have a government to keep in office. Similarly, opposition MPs were almost Table Five: Non-Roll Call Disciplined Voting, By Party, 1991-2000 twice as likely as deputies belonging to governing PPGs to miss a roll call vote. Members of the majority clearly recognized the need to Governing PPGs have their deputies present and accounted for when critical votes Year CDU SPD PDS 1991 64.8 % 68.8 % NA were taken. 1996 82.3 % 86.6 % NA Thus, the roll call data provide convincing evidence that the logic 2000 89.4 % 92.0 % 79.1 % of parliamentary government quickly became apparent to parlia- Percent of votes in which the governing PPGs under study voted en bloc; in other mentarians in the new eastern German state legislatures, especially votes governing PPGs were either divided or their actions unclear. ANOVA analysis finds no significant differences among party families’ voting patterns in 1991 and to those in governing PPGs who could have seen their executive fall 1996; in 2000 differences are significant (F.15) from power had they not held together in critical roll call votes.

Because these votes were only a small percentage of those cast in Opposition PPGs these parliaments, however, it is important to examine the evidence Year CDU SPD PDS from the non-roll call votes as well. 1991 54.1 % 59.7 % 55.3 % 1996 60.8 % 57.8 % 66.1 % Parliamentary Transcript Data 2000 86.0 % 76.2 % 79.5 % The majority of non-roll call votes taken in the parliaments under Percent of votes in which the opposition PPGs under study voted en bloc; in other votes opposition PPGs were either divided or their actions unclear. ANOVA analysis study, even in 1991, featured disciplined PPGs as well (see Table Four). ﬁnds no signiﬁcant differences among party families’ voting patterns in any year Source: analysis of parliamentary transcripts. Table Four: Non-Roll Call Party Voting andPPG Status 1991-2000

Governing PPGs Opposition PPGs As with the roll call vote data, the second and third electoral periods 1991 66.3 % 53.1 % featured an increase from an already very high level of party voting 1996 84.5 % 66.2 % agreement to an even higher level, while the government-opposition 2000 86.6 % 79.9 % division remained. In 1996, in 84.5 percent of the votes taken, gov- Percent of votes in which all members of a PPG under study voted together. In other erning parties voted en bloc compared to 66.2 percent of the time for votes, PPGs split or their behavior was unclear. ANOVA analysis reveals significant differences between government and opposition PPGs’ voting patterns in 1991 (F.05) and the opposition. Discipline rose in 2000, but significant government- 2000 (F.10). The differences in 1996 were less significant (F.25). opposition differences remained—the former voted en bloc 86.6 per- Source: analysis of parliamentary transcripts. cent of the time compared to only 79.9 percent for opposition PPGs.

32 33 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

With the exception of slight decrease in opposition SPD party PPGs became more disciplined between 1990 and 2000. In the sum- groups’ discipline between 1991 and 1996, Table Five reveals that mer of 2001 I interviewed the whip (parlamentarische(r) Geschäfts- these increases took place across PPGs from all party families, with führerIn), or other leading representative, of all PPGs in four of the no statistically significant differences among opposition party fami- five eastern German state parliaments.30 lies in the years examined. No significant partisan differences in These interviews show that eastern German legislators clearly rec- coalition discipline were observed in 1991 and 1996. In 2000, the ognize the logic of a parliamentary form of government. When Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) entered government for the first asked to explain his role as a whip, one MP said his first and most time in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Its PPG was signifi- important job was to ensure party discipline, because otherwise his cantly less disciplined than the veteran governing parties, the CDU party “could just pack up and leave” government.31 His counterpart and the SPD. However, the PDS’s rate of discipline was higher than in his party’s coalition partner agreed, stressing “we can’t govern if that of the CDU and SPD when they first entered government a we are divided.”32 A decade following the creation of eastern Ger- decade earlier. many’s state parliaments, interviewees did not recall efficiency The level of party voting was clearly lower on a day to day basis incentives for adopting party discipline. Although plenary sessions than in crucial roll call votes, again underscoring the important influ- in 1990 often lasted from 10:00 AM to 11:00 PM, rather than the ence of the logic of the parliamentary system. In order to support much briefer sessions common today, in interviews deputies attrib- their executive, governing PPGs must hold together on critical roll uted these lengthy sessions to the high volume of legislation in the call votes—defections on mundane day-to-day votes pose less of a first electoral period.33 danger to the government and may be more likely to be tolerated by Finally, some interviewees did give electoral reasons for becom- Fraktion leadership. Furthermore, this difference in discipline ing more disciplined in the mid- to latter-1990s. The Social Democ- between routine and roll-call votes is not consistent with efficiency ratic whip in Saxony observed that her party realized after its poor incentives. If efficiency concerns drove discipline, one would expect showing in the 1994 elections that it had to develop a more disci- routine decision making to be particularly disciplined, as a lack of plined profile in the opposition if it were to attract voters. Another party voting could bog down everyday parliamentary work; on the whip also expressed his desire to avoid giving a “chaotic impression” rare occasion of a roll-call vote, parliament could better tolerate a to voters after constituents complained about his PPG’s low level of break from discipline. In addition, both efficiency and electoral discipline in the first electoral period.34 The Social Democratic whip incentives would apply equally to members of governing and oppo- in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern justified his current role in keeping his sition PPGs. But, here again, we see consistent differences between party group disciplined by saying this was a “concession” to voters the two types of parliamentary party groups—a finding consistent because “people … want parties to be unified.” To achieve such with the logic of parliamentary government. unity, whips also mentioned that the second round of elections had presented their parties with the opportunity to rid their PPGs of deputies who had perpetually dissented in the first electoral period.35 Qualitative Empirical Evidence However, while PPG leaders recognized the need for discipline to succeed in competitive elections as well as their ability to use such Discipline did consistently rise over the course of a decade, how- elections to weed out undisciplined MPs, interviewees whose cau- ever, so it is possible that efficiency or electoral incentives did exert cuses were in the opposition did not strive to create a disciplined an additional influence on legislative voting over time, serving to PPG to the extent that whips of governing caucuses did. One whip drive an initially high level of party voting even higher. One way to observed the difference in his PPG’s attitude toward party discipline assess this possibility is to ask parliamentarians themselves why their between the time it was in the opposition and when it supported a

34 35 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline minority government. He attributed his caucus’s initial low disci- MPs at election time, and the need to do so in order to present a dis- pline to the fact that he knew it “didn’t make much of a difference” tinct image to voters, had secondary effects on party voting. the way his PPG voted whereas the “difficult process” he had to go These findings not only make empirical and theoretical contribu- through to get his caucus to toe the line was “nerve wracking.” In tions to the study of German politics and political science more gen- next electoral period, however, when his party supported a minor- erally, they also help solve two important puzzles. The data ity government “it did make a difference” the way his PPG voted and presented here bring to light new empirical evidence about the they had “a pistol at [their] breast” to unite around a party posi- evolution of party discipline in German state legislatures following tion.36 Similarly, another whip described a “process” whereby his German unification, processes hitherto rarely measured given the PPG learned to be disciplined when it entered government after time-consuming nature of data collection. The results clearly docu- serving one term in the opposition.37 Finally, a third whip whose ment the emergence of this established western European practice in PPG entered government after eight years in the opposition men- a postcommunist context. The findings provide additional empirical tioned that his “MPs now must learn to hold back” because as mem- evidence to support the rational choice explanation of the origins of bers of a governing coalition “they can’t just say whatever comes to party voting and help adjudicate among three competing hypotheses mind.”38 Parliamentarians’ different experiences with party voting within this tradition. In contrast to previous rational choice work, as members of the opposition and members of the parliamentary this study allows for an assessment of the causal influence of three majority clearly underscore the logic of parliamentary government’s different institutional explanations for the origins of party discipline primary influence over the emergence of party discipline in the in parliamentary systems. Of the need to support the executive eastern Landtage. branch, the need for efficiency, and the need to win competitive elections, the former exerted the most influence over party voting in this study. Conclusions This finding helps explain the puzzle of why the western German practice of discipline was so successfully transferred to the new Län- Experts on the Bundestag and other established western European der. After decades of rule by a communist party practicing iron dis- parliaments have hypothesized that three different institutional cipline, many eastern Germans and eastern Europeans were mechanisms are responsible for the high level of party voting distrustful of political parties and skeptical of party discipline at the observed in these legislatures. The mechanisms include the logic of time of democratization.39 Furthermore, many of the new MPs had parliamentary government as well as efficiency and electoral incen- been professionals including doctors, teachers, veterinarians, and tives. The creation of new legislatures in eastern Germany following engineers prior to 1989.40 They were trained to seek pragmatic, tech- the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the rise of party voting within these nical solutions to problems rather than to engage in partisan debates. legislatures, offers an experimental setting in which to observe the Interviews in the early 1990s found deputies in the eastern Landtage causes of disciplined voting. The evidence presented here shows that favoring consensus decision-making rather than partisan competi- a high level of party voting appeared almost instantly after the cre- tion.41 As a result, many authors expected eastern German and ation of these parliaments. Nevertheless, governing PPGs were more European political elites to be “less likely to be motivated by organi- often disciplined than their opponents. Although the level of disci- zational loyalties and commitments, and … correspondingly more pline continued to rise over time, differences between governing and likely to resolve conflicts … by engaging in short-term mergers and opposition PPGs remained. This suggests that the need to keep an alliances with other parties” rather practicing party discipline.42 executive in office was the primary motivator of party voting. Effi- The results presented here make clear that this outcome did not ciency concerns, the opportunity for parties to weed out dissenting occur in eastern Germany. Evidence from the Russian Parliament

36 37 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

(Duma) in the 1990s, in contrast, confirms these expectations. Con- a majority of German citizens would prefer to see parliamentary siderable “political tourism” was observed there—legislators jumped deputies vote their own opinion rather than the party line and calls from party group to party group or joined several caucuses simulta- for the use of referenda have increased in recent years.50 Despite neously.43 Even PPG leaders whose deputies were elected using the mounting opposition to party discipline in western Germany society, party label had difficulty holding their MPs to a party line.44 In fact, however, parliamentary parties remain highly disciplined as they do Russian MPs were not always obligated to follow a party line or were in the legislatures under study here.51 Again, the findings presented not usually punished if they defected from it.45 As a result, legislators here can explain why. While discipline is not necessary for legislative in the Duma reported little consultation with their parliamentary fac- efficiency, and should there be widespread voter opposition to the tion before votes were taken46 and even the most disciplined cau- practice, it may not be necessary for winning elections. But, there is cuses still contained members whose votes “diametrically diverged” no alternative to discipline in terms of supporting the executive from the rest of their faction.47 branch in a parliamentary system. Why did discipline emerge in post-communist eastern German Landtage and not in the post-communist Russian Duma? The data LOUISE K. DAVIDSON-SCHMICH is Assistant Professor of Political Sci- presented here easily explain these divergent outcomes. In contrast ence at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida. She is the to the German Länder, Russia adopted a semi-presidential system author of Becoming Party Politicians: Eastern German State Legislators in with a very strong president. A lack of discipline in the Duma does the Decade Following Democratization (Notre Dame, 2006) as well as not cause executive branch instability the way it would in Germany. articles which have appeared in Party Politics, The Journal of Legislative Thus, although both countries use similar mixed electoral systems, Studies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, and Democratization. only German MPs seem highly motivated to practice party voting. Both Russian and eastern German MPs experienced a need for legislative efficiency, but in semi-presidential Russia this was achieved by strong committees rather than PPGs.48 Finally, the importance of party discipline to maintaining the executive branch in a parliamentary system also helps explain the puzzle Notes of the persistence of party voting in contemporary Germany. As indicated above, eastern MPs did not initially seem attitudinally predis- posed to voting with their PPGs. In western Germany as well, citizens 1. Thanks to Karin Hummel, Jason Niggley, Markus Thiel, and Ralf Winterbauer and politicians alike appear increasingly opposed to party discipline. for research assistance. Thanks to Ben Bishin and to anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. In 1984 over 150 members of the Bundestag called for reforms giving 2. Werner J Patzelt, “Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments,” individual members of the legislature more independence from their Journal of Legislative Studies 9, no. 4 (2003): 102-15; Thomas Saalfeld, “Profession- parties.49 Outside of the federal legislature, the rise in postmaterialist alization of Parliamentary Roles in Germany: An Aggregate Level Analysis: values and education among western Germans in recent decades has 1949-94,” The Journal of Legislative Studies 3 , no. 1 (1997): 50; David P. Conradt, The German Polity, 8th ed. (New York, 2005), 191. led to the widely-documented phenomenon of Parteiverdrossenheit or 3. For a review of this literature see Christopher Kam, “Institutional and sociologi- dissatisfaction with political parties. The electoral success of the cal perspectives on backbench dissent and intra-party politics in Westminster Greens, who promised to make deputies independent from the par- parliamentary systems,” paper presented at the 73rd annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta (2001); Shaun Bowler, David M. ty’s leadership, to hold public party caucus meetings, and not to prac- Farrell, and Richard S. Katz. 1999. Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government tice party discipline, illustrates attempts even in western Germany to (Columbus, 1999), 6-7. See also Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, Political Parties move away from powerful legislative parties. Opinion polls show that in the European Union (New York, 1997), 142, 143; and Malcolm E. Jewell,

38 39 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

“Attitudinal determinants of legislative behavior: The utility of role analysis,” in in German state parliaments—just as they have not diminished party voting in Legislatures in Developmental Perspective., ed. Allan Kornberg, and Lloyd D. Musolf the Bundestag. (Durham, 1970). Patzelt also makes some use of sociological explanations and 20. David Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago, 1991); Gary asserts that German politicians themselves claim to be motivated by sociological Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the factors. Werner J Patzelt, “Wider das Gerede vom ‘Fraktionszwang!’,” Zeitschrift House (Berkeley, 1993); Saalfeld (see note 2), 49; Patzelt (see note 3), 329). für Parlamentsfragen 29, no. 2 (1998): 326, 337. 21. Davidson-Schmich (see note 8). 4. For a review of the rational approach literature see Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, 22. Patzelt (see note 2). “The Development of Party Discipline in New Parliaments: Eastern German 23. Transcripts are available at http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de. State Legislatures 1990-2000,” Journal of Legislative Studies 9, no. 4 (2003): 88-101; 24. Coding was done by the author and two native German graduate students. Inter- and Kam (see note 3).See also and Bowler, Farrell and Katz (see note 3), 9-13. coder reliability was ensured by each researcher analyzing the first transcript For the German case see Patzelt (see notes 2 and 3). from all five parliaments each year under consideration and meeting to come to 5. Thomas Saalfeld, “Bureaucratization, Coordination, and Competition: Parlia- a consensus about the proper coding of each vote. Questionable votes in subse- mentary Groups in the German Bundestag,” in Parliamentary Party Groups in quent transcripts were similarly discussed before codes were recorded. European Democracies, ed. Knut Heider and Ruud Koole (New York, 2000), 23-38. 25. Scores were calculated by taking the absolute value of the number of yeas minus 6. The same is true of Berlin’s state parliament and it is therefore excluded from the number of nays and abstentions, divided by the total number of yeas, nays, the analysis presented here. and abstentions. Abstentions were counted as defections because interviews with 7. For an example see Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of whips indicated they are so interpreted. Deputies not voting were excluded from Institutional Choice (Princeton, 2001). the analysis because it was not possible to determine if they were missing due to 8. Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians: Eastern German State absence from the legislature on a given day or because they willfully missed a Legislators in the Decade Following Democratization (Notre Dame, 2006). vote rather than toe their party’s line. The latter does not appear to be the case, 9. Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, Representative Government in however. Analysis of the U.S. Congress finds that electoral considerations pro- Modern Europe, 3rd ed. (New York, 2001). See also Patzelt (see note 3), 325. vide certain legislators—for example those with diverse constituencies or mar- 10. Bowler, Farrell and Katz (see note 3), 13-14. ginal seats—with incentives to avoid taking positions in roll call votes. See David 11. John Aldrich, Why Parties? (Chicago, 1995). R. Jones, “Position Taking and Position Avoidance in the U.S. Senate.” Journal of 12. Gary Cox, Gary, The Efficient Secret (Cambridge, 1987), chapter 6; Suzanne S. Politics 65, no. 3 (2003): 851-63. In the German case, MPs with constituency seats Schüttemeyer, “Hierarchy and Efficiency in the Bundestag: The German may have incentives to avoid taking their party’s position on a controversial Answer for Institutionalizing Parliament” in Parliaments in the Modern World: issue if it would negatively impact their districts. This is precisely the kind of Changing Institutions, eds., Gary W. Copeland and Samuel C. Patterson (Ann issue for which German opposition parties call roll call votes. In contrast, Arbor, 1994), 38. deputies elected on a party list do not face voter scrutiny of their individual vot- 13. Patzelt, (see note 3), 327. ing patterns and therefore have fewer incentives to avoid publicizing their posi- 14. Ibid. tion on an issue which might harm a particular region. Conversely, MPs with 15. Party discipline is not the only possible solution to the efficiency problem, how- direct mandates may be more careful to attend roll call votes in order to be later ever. Haspel observed the emergence of strong committees in the Russian Duma able to claim credit for something that benefited their district, whereas deputies as an alternative method of achieving efficiency. Moshe Haspel, “Should party in elected on a party list do not face this incentive either. In either case, if absences parliament be weak or strong? The rules debate in the Russian State Duma,” were indeed the result of deputies’ strategic action, one would expect to find sig- Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 14, nos. 1&2 (1998): 178-200. nificant differences in these two types of MPs’ absence from roll call votes. Analy- 16. Patzelt (see note 3), 325. sis of roll call votes, however, revealed no statistically significant differences in 17. Richard S. Katz, Party Governments: American and European Experiences (Berlin, the absence rates of these two types of deputies in 1991 and 1996. In the year 1987); Patzelt (see note 3), 325. 2000, three states showed no statistically significant differences. In Brandenburg 18. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspec- deputies with direct mandates were twice as likely to miss a vote as their counter- tive (London, 1988); Bowler, Farrell, and Katz (see note 3); Gallagher, Laver, parts from a party list whereas MPs from Thuringia with direct mandates were Mair (see note 9), 288-89; Saalfeld (see note 2), 49; Patzelt (see note 3), 329; Lan- twice as likely to attend a vote than deputies elected from a party list. These dolf Scherzer, Der Letzte (Berlin, 2000), 14-15. inconsistent patterns suggest that absences are not motivated by the desire to 19. German MPs holding a constituency seat are nominated by their local, rather avoid taking a position or to claim credit, but by deputies’ illness, travel, and than state, party organization. As a result, there may be times when local inter- other commitments. For example, in the state of Brandenburg, the deputy who ests clash with the position of a deputy’s PPG. In such cases, an MP may have a consistently missed the most roll call votes in the period examined was Lothar reelection incentive not to toe her party line. Such occurrences are likely to be Bisky, who was simultaneously the national chair of the PDS and likely missed very rare, however, and should not greatly reduce the overall level of discipline votes while attending party-related functions elsewhere in Germany.

40 41 Louise K. Davidson-Schmich The Origins of Party Discipline

26. Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des deutschen Bundestages: 1949-1999 40. Helga A. Welsh, “Parliamentary elites in times of political transition: The case of (Baden Baden, 1999), 1784. eastern Germany,” West European Politics 19, no. 3 (1994): 507-25; Jennifer A. 27. Governing PPGs include single party majorities, participants in a minority gov- Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Postcommunist Elites (Durham, ernment, and parties in governing coalitions. Opposition parties are those that 1999), 116-17. neither govern nor tolerate a minority government. 41. Yoder (see note 39), 130-31. 28. This score was calculated in the same way as the Rice Index for individual par- 42. Mair (see note 38), 16. ties except it took into consideration the voting behavior of all deputies in PPGs 43. Alexander Sobyanin, “Political cleavages among the Russian deputies,” in Par- involved in the coalition as opposed to just one PPG. The average result in 1991 liaments in Transition, ed., Thomas F. Remington (Boulder, 1994); Smith and was driven by the particularly low level of coalition discipline present in Sax- Remington (see note 7), 165. ony-Anhalt that year. When Saxony-Anhalt is removed from the analysis, the 44. Thomas F. Remington, “Political conflict and institutional design: Paths of party average figure rises to 0.95, virtually the same as in other years. development in Russia,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 29. In order to consistently measure developments over the three legislative periods, 14, nos. 1&2 (1998): 214-15. this analysis includes only the three parties present in every electoral period: the 45. Thomas F Remington and Steven S. Smith, “The development of parliamentary Christian Democratic Union, the Party of Democratic Socialism, and the Social parties in Russia,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1995): 472-73; Sobyanin Democratic Party. (see note 42), 191. 30. These states included Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, and 46. Timothy J. Colton, “Professional engagement and role definition among post- Saxony-Anhalt. I also interviewed representatives of parties once represented in Soviet legislators,” in Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the these parliaments but not elected to the Landtage in the third electoral period. A former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed.,Thomas F. Remington (Boulder, 1994), 59. complete list of interviewees is available from the author; interviewees are iden- 47. Sobyanin (see note 42), 194. tified here by their party affiliation and state. The interviews took a semi-struc- 48. Haspel (see note 14). tured format; the section of the interviews relevant here concerned the 49. Schüttemeyer (see note 12), 40. development of party discipline since 1990. Rather than tape recording the 50. Werner J. Patzelt, “Ein latenter Verfassungskonflikt?,“ Politische Vierteljahresschrift interviews, a practice which in previous research distracted some eastern MPs, I 39, no., 4 (1998): 745; Conradt (see note 2), 97. took detailed interview notes. The quotes presented in the text are drawn from 51. Conradt (see note 2), 191; Davidson-Schmich (see note 8); Patzelt (see note 2); these records which are also available from the author upon request. Saalfeld (see note 2), 50. 31. Interview, SPD, Brandenburg. 32. Interview, CDU, Brandenburg. 33. Parliamentary transcripts from the early months of the new legislatures do indi- cate a lack of discipline at times slowed the work of the Landtage and MPs did complain about these inefficiencies at the time. See, for example, the parliamentary transcript from the state of Saxony, the first legislative period, session 17, page 945, the parliamentary transcript from the state of Saxony-Anhalt, the first legislative period, session 24, agenda item 13, and the parliamentary transcript from the state of Brandenburg, the first legislative period, session 6, page 1866. That whips do not recall this a decade later, but remain very well aware of the logic of parliamentary government, however, suggests that the need to maintain an executive in office exerted a stronger impact on their legislative behavior than did efficiency concerns. 34. Interview, CDU, Saxony-Anhalt. 35. Interviews, CDU, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt. 36. Interview, PDS, Saxony-Anhalt. 37. Interview, SPD, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 38. Interview, PDS, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 39. Rainer Linnemann, Die Parteien in den neuen Bundesländern (New York, 1994);Richard Rose and William Mishler, ”Trust, distrust, and skepticism: Popu- lar evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 2(1997): 418-51; Peter Mair, “What’s different about post-communist party systems?,” Studies in Public Policy 259 (1996).

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