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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 117Th Congress
Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 117th Congress March 31, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46750 SUMMARY R46750 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues March 31, 2021 for the 117th Congress Thomas Lum U.S. concern over human rights in China has been a central issue in U.S.-China relations, Specialist in Asian Affairs particularly since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. In recent years, human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have deteriorated, while bilateral tensions related to trade Michael A. Weber and security have increased, possibly creating both constraints and opportunities for U.S. policy Analyst in Foreign Affairs on human rights. After consolidating power in 2013, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping intensified and expanded the reassertion of party control over society that began toward the end of the term of his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Since 2017, the government has enacted new laws that place further restrictions on civil society in the name of national security, authorize greater controls over minority and religious groups, and further constrain the freedoms of PRC citizens. Government methods of social and political control are evolving to include the widespread use of sophisticated surveillance and big data technologies. Arrests of human rights advocates and lawyers intensified in 2015, followed by party efforts to instill ideological conformity across various spheres of society. In 2016, President Xi launched a policy known as “Sinicization,” under which the government has taken additional measures to compel China’s religious practitioners and ethnic minorities to conform to Han Chinese culture, support China’s socialist system as defined by the Communist Party, abide by Communist Party policies, and reduce ethnic differences and foreign influences. -
Fiche Veille « Environnement » Chine Avril 2020 SCAC – Secteur De Coopération Technique
AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN CHINE Fiche Veille « environnement » Chine Avril 2020 SCAC – secteur de coopération technique 1 AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN CHINE A) Synthèse Présentation sous forme synthétique des informations à retenir. Contenu détaillé des articles au point B. Articles complets en partie C. Temps forts politiques Chine M. HUANG Runqiu, jusqu’à maintenant premier des vice-ministres du ministère de l’Ecologie et de l’Environnement (MEE), vient d’être nommé Ministre de ce ministère, en remplacement de M. LI Ganjie, qui avait quitté ses fonctions le 9 avril. M. HUANG Runqiu, âgé de 56 ans, est docteur en géologie de l’Université de technologie de Chengdu, où il a effectué l’essentiel de sa carrière technique et politique avant d’être nommé vice-ministre en 2016. Au MEE, il était chargé des questions de biodiversité et d’écologie et, à ce titre, de l’ensemble des négociations multilatérales relatives à la biodiversité et de la préparation de la CoP 15 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur la diversité biologique. HUANG n’étant pas membre du Parti communiste chinois, le MEE sera co-piloté par M. SUN Jinlong, nommé Secrétaire du Parti pour le MEE dès le 9 avril. 2 AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN CHINE Actualités en Chine Evolutions politiques et réglementaires - Annonce par le Ministre de l’Ecologie et de l’Environnement Li Ganjie de l’inscription du crime de « falsification de données environnementales » au code pénal en 2020 (p.6) - Publication par le MEE du rapport 2018 d’évaluation à mi-parcours du 13e Plan Quinquennal pour la protection -
The Environment and Climate Change
THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE Findings • During the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, top Chinese Communist Party and government officials continued to high- light the importance of protecting the environment, yet envi- ronmental pollution remained a major challenge in China. Pol- lution remained a challenge due in part to authorities’ top- down approach to environmental problems, uneven enforce- ment, transparency shortcomings, and the suppression and de- tention of environmental researchers and advocates. • The Party continued to control environmental protection ef- forts, and in April 2020, Sun Jinlong was appointed Party Sec- retary and Vice Minister of Ecology and the Environment. Pre- viously, Sun had been Party Secretary of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Despite wide- spread international criticism, reports emerged in November 2019 and March 2020 that Chinese authorities were reportedly planning to execute environmental researcher and former Xinjiang University President Tashpolat Teyip. • In 2019, although an estimated 71 percent of China’s power plants were more expensive to run than building new renew- ables, coal-fired power plant capacity increased by around 40 gigawatts (GW) (a 4-percent increase). Analysis of officially re- ported Chinese government data indicated that carbon dioxide emissions in China increased by approximately 2 percent. Do- mestic and international environmental organizations raised concerns that China’s planned economic stimulus measures may promote the use of coal and investment in heavily pol- luting industries, resulting in significant additional environ- mental pollution. • Although Chinese and international concern focused on the zoonotic origin of the novel coronavirus, the Chinese govern- ment continued to permit wildlife trade for traditional Chinese medicine. -
2020 International Religious Freedom Report
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2020 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary Reports on Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang are appended at the end of this report. The constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” without defining “normal.” CCP members and members of the armed forces are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices. National law prohibits organizations or individuals from interfering with the state educational system for minors younger than the age of 18, effectively barring them from participating in most religious activities or receiving religious education. Some provinces have additional laws on minors’ participation in religious activities. The government continued to assert control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents that it perceived as threatening state or CCP interests, according to religious groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international media reports. The government recognizes five official religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and officially permitted to hold worship services. There continued to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, subjected to forced indoctrination in CCP ideology, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices. -
Legal Opinion on XAUR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE AGAINST THE UYGHUR POPULATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION Executive Summary 1. On the basis of the evidence we have seen, this Opinion concludes that there is a very credible case that acts carried out by the Chinese government against the Uyghur people in XUAR amount to crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide. Crimes against humanity 2. There is evidence of crimes against humanity being committed against the Uyghur population, within the meaning of Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 3. First, there is sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a widespread and systematic attack on the Uyghur population of XUAR, within the meaning of Art. 7. 4. Second, there is sufficient evidence to amount to an arguable case that, as part of that attack, the actus reus requirements for the following specific crimes against humanity have been fulfilled: a. Enslavement (Art. 7(1)(c)), by the use of forced labour by former and current inmates of detention facilities. b. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty (Art. 7(1)(e)), constituted by widescale deprivations of liberty of members of the Uyghur population held in detention facilities without charge or trial. c. Torture (Art. 7(1)(f)) in detention facilities, including the use of “tiger chairs” and sexual violence. d. Rape (Art. 7(1)(g)) in detention facilities. 1 e. Enforced sterilisation (Art. 7(1)(g)) of Uyghur women, as part of efforts to reduce the Uyghur population. f. Persecution (Art. -
China's Rulers: the Fifth Generation
CHINA’S RULERS: THE FIFTH GENERATION TAKES POWER (2012–13) Michael Dillon This project is funded by A project implemented by The European Union Steinbeis GmbH & Co. KG für Technologietransfer © Europe China Research and Advice Network, 2012 This publication may be reproduced for personal and educational use only. Commercial copying, hiring or lending of this publication is strictly prohibited. Europe China Research and Advice Network 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE +44 (0) 20 7314 3659 [email protected] www.euecran.eu Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................ 4 ExecutIve Summary ........................................................................................ 6 Key PRC PolItIcal BodIes .................................................................................. 7 Timetable for Leadership Changes .................................................................. 8 Introduction ................................................................................................... 9 1 Change and ContInuity ............................................................................... 11 2 Senior PolItIcal Appointments .................................................................... 14 3 PolItIcal GeneratIons In China .................................................................... 16 4 CCP FactIons and the SuccessIon Process ................................................... 17 5 Key Issues ................................................................................................. -
Mass Internment Camp Implementation, Abuses
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2020 ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION DECEMBER 2020 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China ( Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov 2020 ANNUAL REPORT CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2020 ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION DECEMBER 2020 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China ( Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 40–674 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS House Senate JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts, MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Co-chair Chair JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TOM COTTON, Arkansas THOMAS SUOZZI, New York STEVE DAINES, Montana TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TODD YOUNG, Indiana BEN MCADAMS, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon BRIAN MAST, Florida GARY PETERS, Michigan VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS To Be Appointed JONATHAN STIVERS, Staff Director PETER MATTIS, Deputy Staff Director (II) CONTENTS Page Section I. Executive Summary ................................................................................ 1 a. Statement From the Chairs ......................................................................... 1 b. Overview ....................................................................................................... 3 c. Key -
The Bingtuan
The Bingtuan: China’s Paramilitary Colonizing Force in East Turkestan 1 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2 2. Bingtuan History and Propaganda 4 3. Urbanization and Expansion 10 4. Cracking Down: Prisons, Anti-Terrorism and Stability Maintenance 15 5. Employment Discrimination 21 6. Displacement and Environmental Destruction 26 7. Recommendations 33 8. Appendix 35 9. Acknowledgements 37 10. Endnotes 38 Cover image: A guide gestures to a depiction of early bingtuan migrants to East Turkestan, from a state media report on the Bingtuan Museum in Shihezi. 2 1. Executive Summary The bingtuan (also known as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) or in Mandarin: xinjiang shengchang jianshe bingtuan—(this report will refer to the group as the bingtuan), is a paramilitary organization in East Turkestan that answers directly to the central Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government in Beijing. Its goals are primarily colonial: develop the land in East Turkestan, secure the border, and maintain stability. Its structure reflects its paramilitary organization, with 14 divisions made up of dozens of regiments. Ethnically, the bingtuan is 86% Han, compared to the overall proportion of Han in East Turkestan, which is only 40%. The bingtuan represents one of the foremost institutions of Han dominance, and marginalization of Uyghurs and other indigenous ethnic groups, in East Turkestan. This report details the bingtuan activity with regard to propaganda, urbanization, prisons, militarization, employment discrimination, and rural policies causing displacement and environmental destruction. The report methodology includes translation of Chinese government documents, interviews with Uyghur people living overseas who witnessed bingtuan policies firsthand before fleeing East Turkestan, and research on academic and media reports in Chinese, Uyghur and English, particularly using the Uyghur Human Rights Project’s access to Uighurbiz, the website of Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. -
Table of Contents
Last updated: April 1, 2021 Timeline of Executive Actions on China (2017–2021) This document covers executive actions taken by the Administration of President Donald Trump directed at China. Executive actions include (1) executive orders from the president and (2) other significant measures taken by federal agencies relating to U.S.-China policy. Between 2017 and 2021, the Trump Administration issued eight executive orders that primarily involved China. The Trump Administration issued an additional seven executive orders that did not explicitly target China but affected key policy areas relating to the U.S.-China relationship.1 In addition to these 15 executive orders, the Commission identified 116 China-related measures taken by White House and other executive departments and agencies from 2017 to 2021. A list of all currently identified executive actions, including both executive orders and measures taken by executive departments and agencies, can be found in the appendix of this document. This document is based upon press releases by the White House and by executive departments and agencies. Table of Contents Executive Orders Directly Targeting China .................................................................................................. 2 Executive Orders on Issues Critical to the U.S.-China Relationship ............................................................ 6 Appendix: Executive Actions on China (2017–2021) ................................................................................ 10 1 Executive orders in this -
Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF OF OF OF STATE THE TREASURY COMMERCE HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF THE UNITED DEPARTMENT STATES TRADE OF REPRESENTATIVE LABOR Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Updated: July 13, 2021 Title: Risks and Considerations for Businesses and Individuals with Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and other Human Rights Abuses linked to Xinjiang, China1 SUMMARY: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government continues to carry out genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in 1 This advisory is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. It does not supplement or modify statutory authorities, executive orders, or regulations. It is not intended to be, nor should it be interpreted as, comprehensive or as imposing requirements under U.S. law, drawing any legal conclusions about specific fact scenarios regarding particular businesses or entities, or otherwise addressing any particular requirements under applicable law. Its sole intent is to provide information to businesses and individuals that they may consider in assessing their potential exposure to involvement with entities engaged in human rights abuses, as part of a risk-based approach to due diligence. Please see the legally binding provisions cited and other relevant legal authorities. 1 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang), China.2 The PRC’s crimes against humanity include imprisonment, torture, rape, forced sterilization, and persecution, including -
Gr Ande C Hine & Mon Golie
Semaine du 6 avril 2020 BREVES HEBDOMADAIRES CHINE CONTINENTALE CONJONCTURE (ici) Prix : nette contraction de l’Indice des Prix à la Production (IPP) et fléchissement de l’Indice des Prix à la Consommation (IPC) en mars Réserves de change : fort recul des réserves de change en mars, imputable à des effets de valorisation MONGOLIE Crédits et masse monétaire : en mars, la croissance du financement à l’économie (TSF) rebondit à son plus haut niveau depuis 19 mois (+11,5%), celle des nouveaux prêts bancaires s’établit à +12,7% ; M2 atteint sa plus forte croissance depuis 3 ans à +10,1% GRANDE & CHINE GRANDE ECONOMIE (ici) Relance de l’économie : plusieurs économistes rattachés à des think tanks gouvernementaux ont avancé l’hypothèse que les émissions d’obligations spéciales du gouvernement central (« Central Government Bonds » ou « Special CGB») seraient utilisées pour renflouer le capital des banques commerciales ou pour permettre aux institutions financières de racheter des parts du capital d’entreprises en difficulté Fiscalité : le Conseil des affaires d’Etat annonce l’extension jusqu’à 2023 des avantages fiscaux dont bénéficient les établissements de crédit prêtant aux TPE, aux autoentrepreneurs et aux exploitations agricoles privées BANQUE ET FINANCE (ici) Marché obligataire : rebond consécutif aux nouvelles mesures d’assouplissement de la politique monétaire Marché boursier : deux autres sociétés chinoises cotées aux Etats-Unis font l'objet d'un examen financier, moins d'une semaine après la révélation de la fraude comptable de Luckin -
2020 Digest Chapter 16
Contents CHAPTER 16 ................................................................................................................................. 531 Sanctions, Export Controls, and Certain Other Restrictions .................................................... 531 A. IMPOSITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ........................................................................................................................... 531 1. Iran ................................................................................................................................. 531 a. General ....................................................................................................................... 531 b. UN Security Council resolutions .................................................................................. 533 c. U.S. sanctions and other controls ............................................................................... 546 2. Iraq ................................................................................................................................. 561 a. Designations related to providing support to the IRGC-QF, while exploiting Iraq’s economy ............................................................................................................................ 561 b. E.O. 13350 .................................................................................................................. 561 3. Syria and Syria-Related Executive Orders and the Caesar Act