National Policing Improvement Agency
PROFESSIONAL PR ACTICE
This PDF file contains interactive links to help you navigate the document quickly.
Clicking on any of the items in the main list of Contents will take you directly to the page listed. Or click on any item in the list of Contents at the start of each section.
To immediately access items cross-referred within this document, and any web links shown, click on those items appearing in colour. To return to the main list of Contents, simply click on the title line at the foot of each page. National Policing Improvement Agency
PROFESSIONAL PR ACTICE
GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
2009 Produced on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers by the National Policing Improvement Agency NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
This guidance contains information to assist policing in the United Kingdom.
It is not protectively marked under the Government Protective Marking Scheme.
GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCY PROCEDURES This document has been produced by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). It will be updated according to legislative and policy changes and re-released as required.
The NPIA was established by the Police and Justice Act 2006. As part of its remit the NPIA is required to develop policing doctrine, including guidance, in consultation with ACPO, the Home Office and the Police Service. Guidance produced by the NPIA should be used by chief officers to shape police responses to ensure that the general public experience consistent levels of service. The implementation of all guidance will require operational choices to be made at local level in order to achieve the appropriate police response.
If you would like to receive this publication in an alternative format, please contact: Specialist Operations Centre Wyboston Lakes, Great North Road, Wyboston, Bedfordshire MK44 3BY Telephone: 0845 000 5463 Email: [email protected] All other enquiries relating to this publication should also be addressed to the Specialist Operations Centre at the above address.
Acknowledgements – ACPO and the NPIA would like to express their thanks to all those involved in the drafting of this document. All of the responses during the consultation phase of this project were appreciated and contributed to the final document. © ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) 2009 © NPIA (National Policing Improvement Agency) 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, modified, amended, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the National Policing Improvement Agency and the Association of Chief Police Officers or their duly authorised representative. For copyright specific enquiries, please telephone the National Police Library on 01256 602650.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
CONTENTS
Foreword ...... 7
Section 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 9 1.1 The Aim of this Guidance ...... 11 1.2 Key Definitions ...... 12 1.2.1 Emergency ...... 12 1.2.2 Major Incident ...... 13 1.2.3 Critical Incident ...... 13 1.2.4 Summary of Definitions of Incidents ...... 14 1.2.5 Sudden Impact Incident ...... 14 1.2.6 Rising Tide Incident ...... 14 1.3 Progression of an Emergency or Major Incident ...... 14 1.4 Response Process ...... 16 1.4.1 Reaction Phase ...... 16 1.4.2 Rescue Phase ...... 17 1.4.3 Retrieval and Investigation Phase ...... 17 1.5 Recovery Process ...... 18 1.5.1 Relief Phase ...... 18 1.5.2 Remediation Phase ...... 18 1.5.3 Regeneration Phase ...... 19 1.6 Business Continuity Management Process ...... 19 1.7 Roles and Responsibilities ...... 19 1.7.1 Overall Principles ...... 19 1.7.2 Common Objectives ...... 20 1.7.3 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 21 1.7.4 Decision Making ...... 22 1.7.5 Information Sharing ...... 22 1.8 Command and Control ...... 23 1.8.1 Regional and National Coordination ...... 24 1.8.2 Gold Commander ...... 25 1.8.3 Strategic Coordinating Group ...... 26 1.8.4 Gold Support (Strategic Coordination Centre) ...... 28 1.8.5 Silver Commander(s) ...... 29 1.8.6 Tactical Coordinating Group ...... 31 1.8.7 Silver Control and Silver Support ...... 31 1.8.8 Bronze Commanders ...... 33 1.8.9 Planning for Specialist Operational Roles ...... 35 1.9 Business Continuity Management ...... 36 1.10 Command Support Functions ...... 36 1.10.1 Planning ...... 37 1.10.2 Information ...... 37 1.10.3 Resources ...... 38 1.10.4 Logistics ...... 39 1.10.5 Finance ...... 39 1.10.6 Legal ...... 40 1.11 Police National Mobilisation Plan ...... 40
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
CONTENTS
Section 2 RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY OR MAJOR INCIDENT ...... 41 2.1 Threshold for Activation ...... 43 2.1.1 Initial Assessment ...... 43 2.1.2 Initial Responders ...... 44 2.2 Scene Management ...... 46 2.2.1 Forward Command Post ...... 46 2.2.2 Cordons ...... 47 2.2.3 Imposing and Enforcing Cordons Legal Issues ...... 48 2.2.4 Inner Cordon ...... 49 2.2.5 Outer Cordon ...... 49 2.2.6 Scene Access Control Point ...... 50 2.2.7 Traffic Management ...... 50 2.2.8 Rendezvous Point(s) ...... 50 2.2.9 Site Traffic Control ...... 51 2.2.10 Marshalling Area and Strategic Holding Areas ...... 51 2.3 Rescue ...... 51 2.3.1 Casualty Rescue ...... 51 2.3.2 Casualty Clearing Station ...... 52 2.3.3 Hospital Documentation Teams ...... 52 2.4 Reception Centres ...... 52 2.4.1 Survivors Reception Centres ...... 54 2.4.2 Family and Friends Reception Centres ...... 55 2.4.3 Rest Centres ...... 56 2.4.4 Humanitarian Assistance Centres ...... 56 2.5 Decontamination ...... 56 2.6 Shelter and Evacuation ...... 57 2.7 Retrieval and Investigation ...... 58 2.7.1 Senior Investigating Officer ...... 60 2.7.2 Scene Evidence Recovery Manager ...... 60 2.7.3 Health and Safety Executive ...... 61 2.7.4 Air Accidents Investigation Branch ...... 61 2.7.5 Rail Accident Investigation Branch ...... 61 2.7.6 Marine Accident Investigation Branch ...... 61 2.8 Dealing with Fatalities ...... 62 2.8.1 Mass Fatalities Incident ...... 62 2.8.2 Senior Identification Manager ...... 63 2.8.3 Casualty Bureau ...... 64 2.8.4 Disaster Victim Identification Teams ...... 64 2.8.5 Victim Audit Area(s) ...... 64 2.8.6 Mortuary Arrangements ...... 65 2.9 Family Liaison ...... 65 2.9.1 Family Liaison Officers ...... 65 2.10 Cultural and Faith Issues ...... 66 2.11 Community Impact Assessment ...... 66
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.12 Independent Advisory Groups ...... 68 2.13 Media and Public Information ...... 68 2.13.1 Public Information ...... 68 2.13.2 Coordination of Support to the Media ...... 69 2.13.3 Media Liaison ...... 69 2.13.4 Interactive and Electronic Media ...... 70 2.13.5 Public Meetings ...... 71 2.13.6 Private Meetings ...... 71
Section 3 RECOVERY AND POST INCIDENT ISSUES ...... 73 3.1 Recovery Process ...... 74 3.1.1 Lead Coordinating Authority ...... 74 3.1.2 Role of the Insurance Industry ...... 75 3.1.3 Humanitarian Assistance ...... 75 3.2 Safety, Health and Welfare ...... 76 3.3 Debriefing and Inquiries ...... 77 3.3.1 Structured Debriefing ...... 77 3.3.2 Reports and Recommendations ...... 77 3.3.3 Subsequent Inquiries ...... 78
Section 4 ADDITIONAL RESPONSE ISSUES ...... 79 4.1 Aircraft Incidents ...... 81 4.1.1 Introduction ...... 81 4.1.2 Role of the Police ...... 81 4.1.3 Notifications ...... 83 4.1.4 Role of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch ...... 83 4.1.5 Role of the Ministry of Defence ...... 84 4.1.6 Role of Airlines in an Air Incident ...... 85 4.1.7 Additional Information ...... 86 4.2 Flooding ...... 86 4.2.1 Types of Flooding ...... 87 4.2.2 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 88 4.2.3 Health and Safety ...... 89 4.3 Influenza Pandemic ...... 89 4.3.1 Introduction ...... 89 4.3.2 Command and Control ...... 89 4.3.3 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 90 4.3.4 Business Continuity Management ...... 90 4.3.5 Policing Public Gatherings ...... 90 4.3.6 Health, Safety and Infection Control ...... 91 4.3.7 Dealing with Fatalities ...... 91 4.3.8 Additional Information ...... 91
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
CONTENTS
4.4 Industrial Incidents and Environmental Pollution ...... 91 4.4.1 Introduction ...... 91 4.4.2 Notifications ...... 92 4.4.3 Health and Safety ...... 92 4.4.4 Command and Control ...... 93 4.4.5 Investigation Issues ...... 93 4.5 Maritime Incidents and Search and Rescue ...... 94 4.5.1 Introduction ...... 94 4.5.2 Command and Control ...... 94 4.5.3 Role of the Police – Search and Rescue ...... 95 4.5.4 Role of the Police – Major Incidents at Sea ...... 95 4.5.5 Aviation Incidents at Sea ...... 98 4.5.6 Media Arrangements ...... 98 4.5.7 Counter-Pollution Incidents ...... 98 4.5.8 Additional Information ...... 100 4.6 Ministry of Defence Assistance ...... 100 4.6.1 Introduction ...... 100 4.6.2 Notifications ...... 101 4.6.3 Financial Implications ...... 102 4.6.4 Additional Information ...... 102 4.7 Nuclear Incidents ...... 102 4.7.1 Introduction ...... 102 4.7.2 Incidents at Civil Nuclear Sites ...... 102 4.7.3 Transport Incidents Involving Nuclear Materials ...... 104 4.7.4 Ministry of Defence Fixed Nuclear Sites ...... 104 4.7.5 Ministry of Defence Nuclear Transport Issues ...... 105 4.8 Railway Incidents ...... 106 4.8.1 Introduction ...... 106 4.8.2 Notifications ...... 106 4.8.3 Health and Safety ...... 107 4.8.4 Procedures in Emergencies and Major Incidents ...... 108 4.8.5 Investigation Issues ...... 108 4.9 Road Incidents ...... 109 4.9.1 Introduction ...... 109 4.9.2 Notifications ...... 109 4.9.3 Health and Safety ...... 109 4.9.4 Procedures in Emergencies and Major Incidents ...... 110 4.9.5 Investigation Issues ...... 110 4.9.6 Additional Information ...... 110 4.10 Specialist Advice ...... 110 4.10.1 Scientific and Technical Advice Cell ...... 111 4.10.2 Environmental Monitoring and Response Centre ...... 111
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
4.11 Terrorist Incidents ...... 112 4.11.1 Introduction ...... 112 4.11.2 Notifications ...... 112 4.11.3 Command and Control ...... 112 4.11.4 Considerations at the Scene ...... 112 4.11.5 Investigation Issues ...... 113 4.11.6 Additional Information ...... 113 4.12 Utilities ...... 113 4.12.1 Introduction ...... 113 4.12.2 Loss of Electricity Supply Network ...... 113 4.12.3 Loss of Gas Supply Network ...... 114 4.12.4 Loss of Water Supply Network ...... 114 4.12.5 Disruption to Downstream Fuel Supply ...... 114 4.12.6 Loss of Telecommunications Systems ...... 115
Appendix 1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...... 117
Appendix 2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS ...... 119
Appendix 3 REFERENCES ...... 123
Appendix 4 USEFUL CONTACTS ...... 133
Summary of Figures Figure 1 Key Definitions ...... 14 Figure 2 Phases of Response ...... 15 Figure 3 Response Activity Against Time ...... 15 Figure 4 Overlapping of Phases ...... 16 Figure 5 Specimen SCG Agenda ...... 27 Figure 6 Possible Structure for a Silver Control and Silver Support Location ...... 32 Figure 7 Suggested Bronze Commander Roles ...... 34 Figure 8 STEP 1 2 3 ...... 44 Figure 9 Reception Centres ...... 53 Figure 10 Suggested Structure during Retrieval and Investigation Phase ...... 59 Figure 11 Suggested Command and Control Structure Major Incident at Sea: Search and Rescue Phase ...... 97 Figure 12 Suggested Command and Control Structure Counter-Pollution Incident: No search and rescue operation is underway or search and rescue operations are concluded ...... 99
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
FOREWORD
The previous version of the ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual was published in 2002, but much has changed since then in the world of civil emergency planning. Most significantly, we have seen the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act, which received royal assent in 2004. This has provided, for the first time ever in the UK, a statutory framework for the area of emergency planning, further supported by the provision of both statutory and non-statutory government guidance.
The main purpose of ACPO 2009 Guidance on Emergency Procedures is not to duplicate or replace the statutory framework, or other emergency planning guidance that is available, but to provide strategic guidance that is specific to the Police Service. This will assist police forces to develop robust, yet flexible, emergency planning arrangements which meet the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act and facilitate a professional, structured response to any emergency, regardless of the cause.
This guidance must be seen as a ‘living document’. It will be subject to an ongoing review process which incorporates the lessons of incidents as they occur, together with any new changes to legislation or policy that impact on this area of business. The world of policing is continually changing and the Police Service’s contribution to the civil resilience of this country is no exception – we must continue to develop and improve our capability in this important protective service in order to keep our communities safe and protect them from harm.
The government’s publication of the National Risk Register in November 2008 has increased the public’s awareness of the threats and challenges that we now face in this country from a wide range of hazards, both malicious and naturally occurring. As the impetus builds for the 2012 Olympic Games (and beyond), the public are looking to the responding agencies to reassure them that effective plans are being developed, implemented and exercised in a coordinated and consistent way. The public do not expect civil emergencies to ever directly affect them, but if they do, then they expect the Police Service to respond in the most professional manner, using tried and tested plans.
I commend this guidance to all forces as an effective framework to enable the Police Service to deliver such a response, ensuring that we continue to play a leading role in protecting the communities we serve. Only by doing that will we maintain public trust and confidence at times when people are experiencing massive disruption to all that is familiar to them. ‘At the very worst time of their lives, the very least we can do is our very best.’
Alan Goodwin Deputy Chief Constable
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 7 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
8 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED S E C
Section 1 T I O INTRODU CTION N 1
This section sets out the aim of the guidance; it also provides definitions of the key terms and identifies and lists the police priorities in responding to emergencies .
CONTENTS
1.1 The Aim of this Guidance ...... 11 1.2 Key Definitions ...... 12 1.2.1 Emergency ...... 12 1.2.2 Major Incident ...... 13 1.2.3 Critical Incident ...... 13 1.2.4 Summary of Definitions of Incidents ...... 14 1.2.5 Sudden Impact Incident ...... 14 1.2.6 Rising Tide Incident ...... 14 1.3 Progression of an Emergency or Major Incident ...... 14 1.4 Response Process ...... 16 1.4.1 Reaction Phase ...... 16 1.4.2 Rescue Phase ...... 17 1.4.3 Retrieval and Investigation Phase ...... 17 1.5 Recovery Process ...... 18 1.5.1 Relief Phase ...... 18 1.5.2 Remediation Phase ...... 18 1.5.3 Regeneration Phase ...... 19 1.6 Business Continuity Management Process ...... 19 1.7 Roles and Responsibilities ...... 19 1.7.1 Overall Principles ...... 19 1.7.2 Common Objectives ...... 20 1.7.3 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 21 1.7.4 Decision Making ...... 22 1.7.5 Information Sharing ...... 22
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 9 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.8 Command and Control ...... 23 1.8.1 Regional and National Coordination ...... 24 1.8.2 Gold Commander ...... 25 1.8.3 Strategic Coordinating Group ...... 26 1.8.4 Gold Support (Strategic Coordination Centre) ...... 28 1.8.5 Silver Commander(s) ...... 29 1.8.6 Tactical Coordinating Group ...... 31 1.8.7 Silver Control and Silver Support ...... 31 1.8.8 Bronze Commanders ...... 33 1.8.9 Planning for Specialist Operational Roles ...... 35 1.9 Business Continuity Management ...... 36 1.10 Command Support Functions ...... 36 1.10.1 Planning ...... 37 1.10.2 Information ...... 37 1.10.3 Resources ...... 38 1.10.4 Logistics ...... 39 1.10.5 Finance ...... 39 1.10.6 Legal ...... 40 1.11 Police National Mobilisation Plan ...... 40
10 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
1.1 THE AIM OF THIS GUIDANCE D U
This guidance is for police officers and staff involved in the response to an emergency or C T
major incident. Its aim is to: I O
• Provide police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland with a framework for N responding to an emergency or major incident; • Assist police officers and police staff in the development of contingency plans and local emergency plans; • Assist police officers and staff involved, in any capacity, in the response to an emergency or major incident.
It should be read in conjunction with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA), the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, the statutory guidance HM Government (2004) Emergency Preparedness – Guidance on Part I of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and non-statutory guidance HM Government (2005) Emergency Response and Recovery – Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness.
This guidance replaces ACPO (2002) Emergency Procedures Manual.
Emergency plans must be relevant to local circumstances. This guidance is, therefore, not prescriptive in order to accommodate local and regional variations as appropriate. Similarly, emergency plans need to be flexible to allow capability and capacity to respond to a wide range of potential emergencies and major incidents.
Chief officers of police forces in England and Wales, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the British Transport Police are category 1 responders as defined by the CCA. Other category 1 responders are the Fire and Rescue Service, ambulance NHS trusts, local authorities, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Environment Agency, elements of the NHS (eg, primary care trusts, acute hospital trusts and foundation trusts), the Health Protection Agency and port health authorities.
As a category 1 responder, a chief officer of police has the legal duty to:
• Assess the risk of emergencies occurring; • Maintain emergency plans; • Develop business continuity management arrangements; • Establish arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters, and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency; • Share information with other local responders to enhance the coordination of the response; • Cooperate with other local responders to enhance the coordination and efficiency of the response.
The term Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) is used to describe the entire process of contingency and emergency planning. IEM comprises six related activities:
• Anticipation; • Assessment; • Prevention; • Preparation; • Response; • Recovery.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 11 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The first four of these activities can be described as the pre-emergency elements of IEM. It is important that police forces adequately address these four activities, which also form part of the Protective Services portfolio applicable to all forces. The latter two activities form the two processes referred to in 1.4 Response Process and 1.5 Recovery Process.
For further information relating to category 1 responders and their duties under the CCA see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx
1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS
The following key definitions are used throughout this guidance.
1.2.1 EMERGENCY
Section 1 of the CCA defines an emergency as:
• An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom; • An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom; • War or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.
Damage to human welfare involves, causes or may cause one or more of the following:
• Loss of human life; • Human illness or injury; • Homelessness; • Damage to property; • Disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; • Disruption of a system of communication; • Disruption of facilities for transport; • Disruption of services relating to health.
Damage to the environment involves, causes or may cause:
• Contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter; • Disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life.
A Minister of the Crown may order that a specified event or situation is to be treated as an emergency. This definition is deliberately widely cast to encompass a range of events and situations, some of which may not directly involve the police.
HM Government (2005) Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency – Concept of Operations provides a scale of emergencies. These are in descending order of magnitude:
• Catastrophic Emergency (Level 3); • Serious Emergency (Level 2); • Significant Emergency (Level 1).
12 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
The two higher magnitude emergencies require HM Government to provide central direction D or coordination, and may lead to the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) opening. A U Significant Emergency (Level 1) will require HM Government support and the identification C T
of a lead government department. I O
HM Government (2005) Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an N Emergency – Concept of Operations also describes local emergencies, which are routinely handled by the emergency services (such as road collisions, localised flooding, or industrial accidents). It acknowledges that there is some overlap between the term local emergency and the term major incident, see 1.2.2 Major Incident.
The police will normally take the lead in coordinating the local response to an emergency where a crime may have been committed or there is a threat to public safety.
1.2.2 MAJOR INCIDENT
A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, and generally includes the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people.
A major incident may also involve other agencies and organisations including the National Health Service, local authorities, the Environment Agency, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, utility companies, transport companies, private companies and the voluntary sector.
A major incident may require the:
• Initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties; • Handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated from both the public and news media; • Large-scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services; • Mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and partner organisations, for example, a local authority, to cater for threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.
1.2.3 CRITICAL INCIDENT
A critical incident is any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community.
Some examples of events that may be deemed critical incidents are homicides, serious sexual offences, firearms incidents, hate crimes and police pursuits. For further information see ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 13 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.2.4 SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS OF INCIDENTS
The key definitions can be summarised in a descending order of magnitude as follows:
Figure 1 Key Definitions
Emergency A term defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Generally has multi-agency implications, potentially across a police force area, a region or nationally.
Major Incident A term in common usage by the emergency services. Generally, a major incident has multi-agency implications locally, or significant implications for one or more of the emergency services, local authorities or health trusts.
Critical Incident A term defined in ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management. A critical incident principally affects a police force in a localised area, but can have wider implications and may involve other agencies.
These terms are not mutually exclusive. A major incident is generally also a critical incident, but not all critical incidents are necessarily major incidents. The term emergency as defined in the CCA and described in HM Government (2005) Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency – Concept of Operations (see 1.2.1 Emergency ) does encompass the term major incident, but the latter term is in such general usage by the emergency services that it has been retained in this guidance.
1.2.5 SUDDEN IMPACT INCIDENT
Sudden impact incidents occur with a minimum of warning. The impact of these types of incidents on the police is immediate and increases rapidly. Examples of this type of incident could include terrorist attacks, aircraft incidents and rail incidents.
1.2.6 RISING TIDE INCIDENT
Rising tide incidents develop from a ‘steady state’ or ‘business as usual’, to become an emergency or major incident over a period of time, which may range from hours to days or weeks. Examples of this type of incident include severe weather events or disease epidemics.
1.3 PROGRESSION OF AN EMERGENCY OR MAJOR INCIDENT
While each emergency or major incident is unique, the response by the police and other emergency services can be split into phases to aid understanding of the differing priorities throughout the duration of an emergency or major incident.
The statutory guidance HM Government (2005) Emergency Preparedness – Guidance on Part I of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides two activities or processes during an emergency or major incident: the Response Process, when the police generally act as the lead coordinating authority, and the Recovery Process when the coordination is often led by a local authority. Examples of major incidents when the police may not take the lead during the Response Process are animal disease epidemic (led by Animal Health (AH), flu epidemic (led by the Department of Health) and maritime incidents (led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency).
14 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
There are several models to illustrate the progression of an emergency or major incident. The D model shown in Figure 2 divides each of the two processes (Response and Recovery) into U three phases. For an alternative model see London Emergency Services Liaison Panel C T
(2007) Major Incident Procedure Manual, Seventh Edition . I O N Figure 2 Phases of Response
PROCESS PHASE e n i E l S e Reaction N m i O T
P Response Rescue S E
R Retrieval (and Investigation) L L
A Relief R E
V Recovery Remediation O Regeneration
The two processes and six phases can be shown in general terms of activity against time, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Response Activity Against Time
= Police/Fire and Rescue/Ambulance = Local Authority/NHS/other agencies
Response Process Recovery Process Reaction Rescue Retrieval Relief Remediation Regeneration
Activity
Handover from police to Time local authority.
Progression onto the next phase is not conditional on completion of the previous phase. Some phases may overlap and run concurrently with other phases. Figure 4 illustrates how the differing phases may overlap in reality against a developing timescale.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 15 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Figure 4 Overlapping of Phases
Regeneration Remediation Relief Retrieval (Investigation)
Rescue Reaction
Time Hours Days Years
The timescales are shown for illustration only, and do not imply that compliance with them is required.
1.4 RESPONSE PROCESS
The Response Process is the term given to the overall response to an emergency or major incident by the emergency services. This includes the activity to assess, contain and reduce the impact of the incident on people, animals and the environment. The actions described in each phase relate to all emergency responders, during all phases of the response. Generally, the lead coordinating authority for the Response Process is the police.
1.4.1 REACTION PHASE
The first phase of an emergency or major incident commences with the initial notification that an incident is about to occur, is occurring or has recently occurred.
The priority at this phase is to assess the scale and nature of the incident and determine the appropriate response. It is essential that as much information as possible about the incident is collected, assimilated and disseminated to relevant individuals and organisations.
A command, control and coordination structure appropriate to the incident should be established. For more information on command and control, see 1.8 Command and Control.
People who are directly affected by the incident should be identified. Immediate measures to save life and alleviate suffering should be taken at this time, including shelter, evacuation and/or decontamination.
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Consideration of STEP 1 2 3 (see 2.1.1 Initial Assessment and Figure 7 ); • Collation of initial reports (using CHALETS mnemonic, see 2.1.2 Initial Responders ); • Activation of notification cascades to relevant people; • Activation of relevant contingency plans; • Early establishment of a command and control structure for the incident (see 1.8 Command and Control ); • Identification and deployment of resources potentially required; • Identification of safe and suitable rendezvous points for responding personnel;
16 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
• Initial health and safety guidance for responding personnel; D • Establishment of command support functions (see 1.10 Command Support U Functions ); C T
• Consideration of declaring a mobilisation event in line with the Police National I Mobilisation Plan (see 1.11 Police National Mobilisation Plan ); O • Containment measures to prevent escalation of the incident; N • Implementation of business continuity management plans, if required; • Consideration of public health advice and establishment of a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) (see 4.10.1 Scientific and Technical Advice Cell ).
1.4.2 RESCUE PHASE
The priority during this phase is for the emergency services to rescue casualties and survivors, and to ensure that appropriate medical attention is given to those requiring it as soon as possible. This may involve decontamination of survivors at or near the scene, or at a receiving hospital.
During this phase, the Fire and Rescue Service may assume responsibility for operations within an inner cordon. In respect of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN), or counter-terrorism incidents, the police will retain responsibility for operations within the inner cordon. Cordon access control and maintenance of an inner cordon should be a joint responsibility between the Police Service and Fire and Rescue Service.
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Rescue of all casualties and survivors; • Decontamination of casualties and survivors (if required); • Implementation of cordon control arrangements; • Triage, treatment, stabilisation and appropriate transportation of casualties to receiving hospitals; • Identification and congregation of survivors at survivors rendezvous points (RVPs); • Establishment of a Survivors Reception Centre (SRC); • Establishment of a Media Reception Point; • Facilitation of access for responding partner agencies.
1.4.3 RETRIEVAL AND INVESTIGATION PHASE
When the Rescue Phase has been concluded and the scene is deemed safe, the area within an inner cordon will become the responsibility of the police (if not already so) and the focus moves from rescue-led by the Fire and Rescue Service and Ambulance Service, to evidence- led by the police. During this phase, the retrieval of any deceased, property and evidence will take place.
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Recovery of any deceased and human remains in accordance with Lord Justice Clarke’s recommendations and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) principles; • Establishment of a victim audit area (if required); • Retrieval of personal effects; • Retrieval of evidence from scene; • Compilation of an ongoing community impact assessment; • Preparation for handover of lead coordinating agency responsibility.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 17 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.5 RECOVERY PROCESS
The focus of the Recovery Process is to restore and rebuild the community (either directly or indirectly affected) in the aftermath of an emergency or major incident. The Recovery Process should be seen as an integral part of the Response Process, as actions taken during the early stages of the response can affect or influence the Recovery Process.
The Recovery Process is generally coordinated by a designated local authority. There should be a formal handover from the police to the relevant local authority to clearly mark the change of responsibility. This will occur at a time agreed by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), when mutually convenient to all agencies represented at the SCG.
For further information on the recovery process applicable to the Police Service, see 3.1 Recovery Process.
1.5.1 RELIEF PHASE
The priority of the Relief Phase is to provide initial relief to those people directly affected by the emergency or major incident. This phase commences early during the incident, and can run concurrently with the Rescue Phase during the Response Process. While the overall coordination of the incident is led by the police, the responsibility of this phase lies with the relevant local authority and supporting agencies.
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Assessment of the needs of survivors and evacuees; • Provision of rest centres; • Immediate provision of water, food, clothing and shelter; • Establishment of Family and Friends Reception Centre(s) (FFRC); • Provision of public health advice; • Provision of information to the public and businesses via websites, telephone helplines, the media and by other means. • Assessment of community cohesion issues.
1.5.2 REMEDIATION PHASE
Remediation is the task of providing medium and long-term support to survivors and evacuees, and of making good the area affected.
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Establishment of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC); • Development of an action plan for handing back buildings or areas within an inner and outer cordon to the appropriate owners, insurers or individuals; • Site clearance; • Restoration of public services; • Public meetings with private individuals and businesses affected by the incident; • Coordinated action by insurers to facilitate recovery.
18 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
1.5.3 REGENERATION PHASE D U
The goal of this phase is to address the long-term consequences of the emergency or major C T
incident. Measures to prevent or reduce the likelihood or impact of such an event occurring I again should be considered, with a view to improving the area affected beyond a level that O existed prior to the incident. N
Key actions for this phase may include:
• Wide consultation on regeneration matters; • Identification of measures to promote economic regeneration; • Long-term health monitoring; • Rebuilding affected areas where required; • Consideration of memorials.
1.6 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The Response and Recovery Processes are both outward-facing, involving the police working with other emergency services and agencies. Business continuity management is inward- facing, focused on the police organisation itself. In an emergency or major incident, it may be necessary for a Gold Commander to consider the business continuity management aspects affecting that police force.
A business continuity management process will run parallel to the Response and Recovery Processes. Business continuity management does not form part of the Gold, Silver and Bronze command and control structure, but will have its own structure.
For further information see 1.9 Business Continuity Management.
1.7 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
This subsection sets out the overall principles by which the response to any emergency or major incident is managed.
1.7.1 OVERALL PRINCIPLES
The response to any emergency or major incident needs to be managed flexibly and should reflect the circumstances at the time. Each incident is unique, and while it is advisable to take notice of the response to similar incidents, the response to an incident needs to be assessed according to objective criteria applicable to the nature and scale of that incident.
HM Government (2005) Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency – Concept of Operations lists eight guiding principles which underpin the response to all incidents.
Preparedness – all those individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies should be properly prepared, including having clarity of roles and responsibilities.
Continuity – response to emergencies should be grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit delivered at a greater tempo, on a larger scale and in more testing circumstances.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 19 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Subsidiarity – decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination taking place at the highest level necessary. Local responders should be the building block of response on any scale.
Direction – clarity of purpose should be delivered through a strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed and understood by all involved to prioritise and focus the response.
Integration – effective coordination should be exercised between and within organisations and tiers of response as well as timely access to appropriate guidance and appropriate support for the local or regional level.
Communication – good two-way communication is critical to an effective response. Reliable information must be passed correctly and without delay between those who need to know, including the public.
Cooperation – positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding will facilitate information sharing and deliver effective solutions to issues arising.
Anticipation – risk identification and analysis is needed of potential direct and indirect developments to anticipate and thus manage the consequences.
1.7.2 COMMON OBJECTIVES
There are some common objectives which apply to all emergency services and other organisations responding to an emergency or major incident.
The first priority for the police is to work with the emergency services to save life and to prevent further loss of life.
The primary objectives for the police and other emergency services in respect of an emergency or major incident are:
• Saving and protecting human life; • Relieving suffering; • Containing the emergency, limiting its escalation or spread; • Providing the public and businesses with warnings, advice and information; • Protecting the health and safety of responding personnel; • Safeguarding the environment; • As far as is reasonably practicable, protecting property; • Maintaining or restoring critical activities; • Maintaining normal services at an appropriate level; • Promoting and facilitating self-help in the community; • Facilitating investigations and inquiries (eg, by preserving the scene, and effective records management); • Facilitating the recovery of the community (including humanitarian assistance, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts); • Evaluating the response and recovery effort; • Identifying and taking action to implement lessons learned.
20 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
In addition to the above objectives for the responding agencies, the police have a duty to: D U
• Maintain public order and the rule of law. C T I
Home Office (2007) Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning Guidance identifies O four strategic intentions, namely to ensure coordinated, effective multi-agency activity in N order to:
• Save, preserve and protect life and minimise further harm; • Inform and advise the public and maintain public confidence; • Prevent, deter and detect crime; • Assist in the return to a new normality.
The Gold Commander will determine the overall aim and objectives or strategic intentions appropriate to that incident, and record them in a policy book or similar document. Where a multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is established, the SCG must ratify the overall aim and objectives or strategic intention. The overall aim and objectives should be reviewed throughout an emergency or major incident and amended by the Gold Commander and SCG as necessary.
1.7.3 POLICE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The police will normally coordinate the activities of the emergency services and other responding agencies at and around the scene of a sudden impact emergency or major incident.
The police have a duty to investigate any potential breaches of the criminal law. This includes the collection of evidence under conditions to provide legal integrity of that evidence. The responsibility for protecting and preserving the scene until all evidence has been retrieved also lies with the police. Other agencies, namely the Health and Safety Executive, Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Rail Accident Investigation Branch and Marine Accident Investigation Branch, have legal responsibilities to investigate the circumstances of relevant incidents. Their legal responsibility may conflict with the aims and objectives of a senior investigating officer (SIO), therefore, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of all investigating agencies are clarified at an early stage of any investigation. For further information see 2.7 Retrieval and Investigation.
The police have a duty to support the role of HM Coroner in the investigation of the cause and circumstances of unexplained or sudden deaths. This duty extends to the retrieval of the deceased, their personal property, the positive identification of the deceased and their return to their family or friends for burial or cremation.
The police are responsible for designating and maintaining any cordons required. In respect of an inner cordon during the Rescue Phase, this responsibility must be undertaken in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service. The implementation of traffic management arrangements in response to an emergency or major incident also lies with the police.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 21 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.7.4 DECISION MAKING
All police commanders and representatives from other emergency services or organisations involved in the strategic, tactical or operational tiers of command need to ensure that they have clear and accountable decision-making processes. Decision making must be recorded in a way that makes it auditable. Individual decision makers must be identified and accountable for decisions they make. Wherever possible, the rationale supporting a decision should be recorded along with the decision itself.
All decisions must be seen as:
• Proportionate; • Necessary; • Legal.
It may be appropriate for the police to ensure that commanders appointed to assume responsibility in an emergency or major incident, at all three tiers of command, have proven ability to make decisions in the challenging environment such an incident is likely to create. Commanders may be faced with difficult decisions that need to be taken urgently, based on conflicting or uncertain information. Decisions may need to be taken under intense pressure, and subject to close scrutiny, both at the time and later. Relevant training and previous experience may be relevant criteria to determine which individuals should be appointed to specific command roles.
In order for objective decision making to be made at all tiers of command, it is essential that all key individuals are provided with clear, accurate, and timely information on which to base their decisions. It is important, therefore, that the staff supporting the commanders at each tier focus on the provision of information with accuracy, brevity and consistency.
There are several models to assist with decision making. One in common usage is STEEPLE (which is a development of another model, PESTEL). The STEEPLE mnemonic lists seven factors to be taken into account when determining strategic or tactical decisions. These are:
• Social; • Technological; • Economic; • Ethical; • Political; • Legal; • Environmental.
If time allows, an assessment of the potential consequences arising from a particular decision should be assessed against the STEEPLE headings and included in the rationale within a written policy or decision log or in the audit trail of the incident.
1.7.5 INFORMATION SHARING
Information-sharing agreements or protocols between the police, other emergency services and responding organisations can greatly assist in facilitating the flow of information during an incident. It is preferable that such agreements or protocols are agreed in advance of any emergency or major incident.
22 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
Consideration should be given throughout to the security classification of information. Only D those people with the appropriate level of clearance should be able to access restricted, U confidential or secret information. Information security should not be sacrificed during an C T
incident, and documents, both hard copy and electronic, should be stored and disposed of I carefully and in line with relevant force policies. O N
It is also necessary to consider the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) grading of information produced during an incident. Prior to any strategic or tactical meeting, the chair should clarify the FOIA status of the meeting and subsequent minutes, ie, open or closed. If a document or part of it is closed, the relevant criteria for that determination should be cited.
For further information see HM Government (2007) Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders – Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery and ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Management of Police Information.
1.8 COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Gold (strategic), Silver (tactical) and Bronze (operational) tiered command structure used by the police and other emergency services is nationally recognised and accepted. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the terms Gold, Silver and Bronze are used in preference to the terms strategic, tactical and operational although, in practice, they are interchangeable.
The command structure is role, not rank, specific.
While the police generally coordinate the Response Process of an emergency or major incident, each emergency service and organisation retains responsibility for the command and control of their own personnel. These principles of integrity of command apply in that a commander from one emergency service has jurisdiction over their personnel only, and cannot order personnel from another emergency service to undertake tasks. The principle of a duty of care, however, applies across all emergency services and responding agencies, so a member of one emergency service has a responsibility to a member of another service or agency if they are placing, or have placed, themselves or others at imminent risk of serious injury or death.
The issues of span of command, span of control and command resilience must be considered when developing a command and control structure for an emergency or major incident.
Span of command relates to ensuring clarity in the command structure. This includes:
• Who reports to whom? • Who is accountable for what? • Which individual is responsible for specific functions or tasks?
All personnel should be aware on deployment at an emergency or major incident to whom they report, and the span of command applicable to them in the function or task allocated to them.
Span of control refers to the number of lines of communication that can realistically be maintained by one individual. Commanders may be able to receive, assimilate and action only certain amounts of information. The danger of information overload should be managed, so that commanders are able to perform their key role of making well-informed, clear and decisive decisions at their allotted tier of command.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 23 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Command resilience is the ability of the command and control structure to function effectively over extended periods of time. Emergencies and major incidents may last for several days or even weeks. Continuity is important in a command and control structure, but so is the requirement for commanders not to become overtired or exhausted. Planning should start at the commencement of an emergency or major incident for the potential handover of command functions from one individual to another at an appropriate time. Personnel should not generally be on active duty in excess of twelve hours in any one continuous period. Consideration should be given to the number of consecutive days an individual person is on duty. Each case should be judged on its merits and the circumstances applicable at that time. Any handover of a command function must be conducted formally and recorded in writing in the relevant policy or tactical log. Personnel must be informed when there is a change of a commander which is relevant to them and their role.
For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Command and Control.
1.8.1 REGIONAL AND NATIONAL COORDINATION
In addition to the Gold, Silver and Bronze tiers of command and control which apply at a force level, there are regional and national levels of coordination which can apply during an emergency or major incident.
In England there are government offices for the regions; in Wales and Northern Ireland there are devolved administrations. The English government offices provide a link for local responders to central government departments. The government offices also have a particular focus on consequence management issues.
Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) in England are multi-agency groups, chaired by a director from the government office, with responsibility for improving the coordination of the response to an emergency across a region. In Wales, the Welsh Assembly Government may convene the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC), chaired by a lead official of the Welsh Assembly Government. An RCCC or the WCCC may be constituted where a rising tide region-wide emergency is anticipated or occurring, examples being widespread flooding or a flu pandemic. RCCCs or the WCCC will not supersede the local Gold, Silver and Bronze command and control structure, but will provide regional coordination of the response and recovery to an emergency.
Emergency powers allow the government to make special temporary legislation (emergency regulations) in extreme circumstances where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way. The framework for emergency powers is contained in Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Emergency regulations may extend to the entire UK, or to one or more English regions or the devolved administrations. If emergency powers are invoked, a Regional Nominated Coordinator (RNC) will be appointed to coordinate the handling of the emergency. In the devolved administrations, an RNC will be known as an Emergency Coordinator. The role of the RNC or Emergency Coordinator is to facilitate coordination of activities under the emergency regulations in line with the response strategy and objectives set by central government. The RNC or Emergency Coordinator will chair the RCCCs or the WCCC, and will observe the principle of subsidiarity to allow the Gold, Silver and Bronze command and control structure to continue to function effectively within a police force area or across force areas, where that has been agreed by the respective chief constables.
24 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
Where an emergency has implications nationally, or the business of a number of D government departments is affected, a lead government department (LGD) will be U appointed to provide a collective response. In the event of a major national emergency, C T
HM Government’s dedicated crisis management facility, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms I (COBR) may be activated. COBR will oversee the strategic aspects of the Response and O Recovery Processes, ensuring the Prime Minister and ministers are properly briefed. N
If a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) has been established by the lead coordinating authority, a government liaison team (GLT), led by a government liaison officer (GLO), may be dispatched to become the main liaison channel between the Gold tier of command locally and COBR.
For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Command and Control; HM Government (2005) Emergency Response and Recovery – Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness and http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx
1.8.2 GOLD COMMANDER
Where the police respond to an emergency or major incident, a Gold Commander will assume overall command and have ultimate responsibility and accountability for the response to that incident. The Gold Commander chairs the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), which is the multi-agency forum operating at the Gold tier of command (see 1.8.3 Strategic Coordinating Group ).
The key responsibilities of a Gold Commander are to:
• Assume overall command of the incident; • Establish the command and control structure; • Determine the composition of the SCG, agree attendance, formulate agenda and chair meetings; • Set, review and update strategy using the overall principles (see 1.7.1 Overall Principles ) and common objectives (see 1.7.2 Common Objectives ); • Communicate strategy to Silver Commander(s); • Ratify and review progress of Silver Commanders’ tactical plan; • Ensure adequate audit trails are in place for the recording of strategy, objectives and decisions; • Assess resource implications and consider mobilisation issues; • Ensure appropriate financial controls are in place; • Agree a media strategy; • Liaise with national and regional organisations; • Commission a community impact assessment, determine a community reassurance strategy and consider forming an Independent Advisory Group; • Consider business continuity management issues; • Consider health and safety issues, including the formation of a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC); • Consider staff welfare issues; • In conjunction with the relevant local authority, consider establishing a Recovery Working Group.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 25 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.8.3 STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP
The Gold Commander should establish and then chair a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) in order to coordinate the emergency or major incident. The primary purpose of the SCG is to review the situation from a strategic perspective and to deliver strategic leadership throughout the course of an emergency or major incident. It is required to remain focused on the overall picture, and must not become concerned with detailed tactical or operational decisions.
The key issues for consideration by the SCG are to:
• Agree strategic aims and objectives in responding to the incident; • Determine policy for implementation by Silver Commander(s); • Assess and arrange for adequate resources; • Prioritise allocation of resources to Silver Commander(s); • Implement adequate financial controls; • Act as an interface with national government; • Liaise with neighbouring police forces or regional partner agencies; • Coordinate communications internally and to the public; • Provide liaison with the media at a strategic level.
The membership of an SCG will vary according to the scale and nature of the incident, but it will generally be a multi-agency forum. If constituted as a multi-agency forum, its membership should be drawn from across the category 1 and 2 responders and include defence representatives. The membership may be similar to a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) (except in London), but, while the focus of an LRF is on anticipation and planning, the focus of an SCG must be on response.
Careful consideration should be given to the number and role of people who attend the SCG. It must remain a strategic decision-making body, and the people who attend must have executive level decision-making authority on behalf of their organisation. The SCG should be of a manageable size, with attendance restricted to those whose presence is necessary for the strategic decision-making process. The preferred attendance is around fifteen to twenty people. Where necessary, a subject matter expert can attend an SCG meeting to provide specialist advice.
The SCG can meet in person at one location, or may use technology such as audio or video conferencing to create a virtual SCG.
The timing, duration and conduct of SCG meetings should be addressed by the Gold Commander. The frequency of meetings may vary considerably over the duration of an emergency or major incident. In dynamic, fast-moving incidents, the SCG can meet regularly, for example, once every two hours. As the tempo of the incident slows, the SCG may meet once or twice daily to receive update reports and confirm existing strategy and policy decisions. The duration of meetings must be kept short to allow attendees to attend to their other responsibilities. A maximum of thirty minutes per meeting is suggested. Minutes of meetings can be condensed to key decisions and actions to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy slowing down the strategic decision-making process. A standard agenda can be used. A suggested format for an agenda is shown in Figure 5.
26 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
Figure 5 Specimen SCG Agenda D U C T
STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP I O
AGENDA N
Item Description Lead No. Person 1. Introduction of Attendees, Roles and Responsibilities. Chair
2. Declaration of Items for Urgent Attention. Chair
2a. Decision on Items for Urgent Attention. Chair
BREAK OUT TIME TO ACTION URGENT ITEMS AS AGREED ABOVE
3. Review and Agree Minutes of Previous Meeting. Chair
4. Update on Strategic Situation Chief of (Common Recognised Information Picture) Staff
5. Review and Agree Strategic Aim and Objectives Chair
6. Review Outstanding Actions. Chair
7. Update from Working Groups/Cells/Attendees. Cell (By exception) Chairs
8. (i) Discuss and Agree on Strategic Decisions All (ii) Confirmation and Allocation of Actions Required. Members
9. Date and Time of Next Meeting. Chair Closure of Meeting.
This agenda may vary slightly between meetings. For example, at the first meeting of the SCG, it may be appropriate for each representative to introduce themselves and give a very brief résumé of the role and responsibilities of each agency. However, if the attendees know each other well as a result of working together within the LRF and through training and exercising, these introductions may be superfluous. At the first meeting, it will be necessary to agree and set the strategic aim and objectives, and to set the media strategy. At subsequent meetings the strategic aim and objectives can be reviewed and updated as appropriate.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 27 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.8.4 GOLD SUPPORT (STRATEGIC COORDINATION CENTRE)
It is essential that the appropriate provisions are put in place as soon as possible to support the Gold Commander and the SCG to discharge their functions and responsibilities. The scale and nature of this support to the strategic tier of command will be relative to the circumstances of the emergency or major incident. Issues that will influence the decision on the support required for the Gold Commander and SCG include:
• Potential impact on the police force(s) involved; • Amount of multi-agency involvement; • Provision of Ministry of Defence assets; • Potential duration of the incident; • Speed of developments in the incident; • Role of central government, government offices in the regions and devolved government administrations, eg, Welsh Assembly Government and Northern Ireland Assembly; • International, national or local response of the media.
The Gold Commander may only require the appointment of a Gold Support Officer (also known as a chief of staff) and a small team to provide the necessary support to manage the incident at the strategic tier. A Gold Support Officer will oversee the provision of command support in terms of planning, intelligence, resources, logistics, finance and legal issues (see 1.10 Command Support Functions ). A Gold Support Officer should not become involved in making command decisions but may be delegated authority to facilitate and direct command support functions.
The Gold Commander may decide to establish a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). Police forces have a responsibility to ensure they have contingency plans to activate an SCC in response to a terrorist incident. The concept can, however, be extended to a range of emergencies or major incidents, with a flexible plan to open elements of an SCC to provide the support necessary for specific incidents. Police forces should have a plan to open an SCC at alternative premises if the pre-designated premises are unavailable for use.
The function of the SCC is to provide support to the SCG and to coordinate the strategic response to the emergency or major incident.
The SCC may be divided into cells or groups based on functions. Some suggested cells which may be considered include:
• Incident Management Group (Police Cell); • Planning, Intelligence, Resources, Logistics, Finance and Legal Cell; • Major Investigation Team; • Mass Fatalities Coordination Team; • Recovery Working Group (Local Authority Cell); • Communication and Information Group (Media Group); • Government Liaison Team; • Environment, Infrastructure and Utilities Group; • Search and Rescue Group; • Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC); • Casualty, Health and Welfare Group; • Military Operations;
28 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
• Security Services (in certain circumstances); D • Joint Intelligence Group; U • Negotiation Cell (where required); C T
• Technical Response Force (where required). I O
Cells may also be formulated based on organisational type, for example, utilities, transport, N local authorities, as appropriate.
1.8.5 SILVER COMMANDER(S)
A Silver Commander is the tactical commander of the incident. Generally, there should be one tactical commander, but it may not be practical or desirable in large-scale incidents to have a single Silver Commander. The Gold Commander (when in command) will decide on how many Silver Commanders are appointed and their span of command.
The Silver Commander is likely to be in place before the Gold Commander, and be the first senior officer taking command at the scene. They will need to initiate priorities before a strategy has been set by the Gold Commander. A Silver Commander may use the following guide for consideration in understanding their role when dealing with a sudden impact major incident.
What – what are the aim and objectives to be achieved? Who – who by, police, emergency services and partner agencies, what resources are available? When – timescales, deadlines and milestones in delivery of tasks; Where – what locations? Why – what is the rationale within the overall aims and objectives set by the Gold Commander (if in place)? How – how are these tasks going to be achieved, what barriers to achieving them may be encountered?
As the response to the emergency or major incident develops, the initial Silver Commander may be replaced by another police officer more senior in rank and with appropriate training, skills and abilities to perform that role efficiently and effectively. There should be a formal handover of command from one individual police officer to another, and the Gold Commander and Bronze Commanders must be aware of who the current Silver Commander is at any one time. A Silver Commander assuming command from another less senior police officer may retain that officer as a Deputy Silver Commander to provide resilience and continuity in command. The Deputy Silver Commander can also be responsible for the Silver Control functions (see 1.10 Command Support Functions ).
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 29 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The key responsibilities of a Silver Commander are to:
• Assume tactical command of the incident; • Establish a tactical and operational command and control structure; • Appoint Bronze Commanders for designated tasks as required; • Determine the composition of the Tactical (or Silver) Coordinating Group (TCG), agree attendance, formulate agenda and chair meetings; • Consult the Silver Commanders from other emergency services and Silver Coordinators from the local authorities and other agencies; • Develop a tactical plan (ie, how the resources are to be used) in order to achieve the strategic intentions of the Gold Commander; • Coordinate and check delivery of the tactical plan; • Review and amend the tactical plan as necessary; • Review, update and communicate any changes to the tactical plan to Gold and Bronze Commanders; • Ensure all decisions are documented in order to provide a clear audit trail; • Ensure all tiers of command are aware of continuing developments; • Assess resource requirements and deploy personnel according to need and priorities; • Advise the Gold Commander of additional resources and logistical arrangements required to deliver the tactical plan; • Ensure all personnel are adequately briefed; • Establish a media liaison point and appoint a Bronze Media.
The Silver Commander should be located at the most appropriate location to exert tactical command over the incident. Depending on the circumstances this may be:
• Near the scene (at a Forward Command Post (FCP)) • At a nearby police station (Silver Control); • At a pre-designated Silver Control; • At a force, area, or basic command unit control room.
At some locations assessed as high risk, for example, sites designated under the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH), airports and military establishments, there may be an agreed location for Silver Control designated in contingency plans. This should be used unless it is not practical to do so, in which case an alternative location should be used.
If the police Silver Commander is located at or near the scene, they should be visually identifiable to both police officers and staff and other emergency services’ Silver Commanders. This can be achieved by them wearing a blue and white tabard, marked with the words ‘Police Silver Commander’.
The Silver Commanders for all emergency services and Silver Coordinators for responding partner agencies should be collocated. By the nature of their roles and responsibilities, Fire and Rescue, and Ambulance Silver Commanders will usually be located close to the scene, on the edge of an inner cordon. This should be taken into account when determining where the police Silver Commander, Silver Control and Silver Support functions will be located. If the police Silver Commander is located away from the scene, for example, at a local police station, but the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service Silver Commanders are located near the scene at an FCP, a police Bronze Scene Commander should be appointed to liaise with the other emergency service Silver Commanders at the FCP. The Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service should each appoint a liaison officer to be present throughout the incident at the designated Silver Control alongside the police Silver Commander.
30 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
For further information on the role of Silver Commanders, see ACPO (forthcoming) D
Guidance on Command and Control. U C
1.8.6 TACTICAL COORDINATING GROUP T I O
Other emergency services will appoint Silver Commanders to act as tactical commanders for N their organisations. In addition, other agencies will send representatives to the scene to act as tactical commanders or coordinators on behalf of their organisation.
The police Silver Commander should bring all these tactical commanders and coordinators together and form a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG), otherwise known as a Silver Coordinating Group. This group should be formed as soon as is practicable in order to determine a coordinated response at the tactical level. The TCG should meet at an agreed location, either near the scene at the FCP or another appropriate location designated as the Silver Control. Appropriate administrative support should be provided. A suitable environment should be used, which may be a local police station, to ensure that an effective meeting can be held. Generally, this will be in a suitable room at a local police station or other building.
The TCG should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. All key decisions should be recorded in writing for audit purposes. A standard agenda can be used, similar to the one shown in Figure 5, but focused on tactical issues.
1.8.7 SILVER CONTROL AND SILVER SUPPORT
A Silver Commander will require suitable personnel to form a Silver Control team. The purpose of the Silver Control is to direct tactical operations within the span of command of the Silver Commander. A Silver Commander should consider appointing a Silver Control Manager, who can also function as the deputy Silver Commander. A Silver Control Manager will appoint relevant police officers and police staff to appropriate roles, which include the following:
• Controller/radio operator(s) (who will control the incident talkgroups to the Bronze Commanders and provide the link to the force or BCU control room); • Silver Control Administrator(s) (who will prepare the TCG agenda and minutes); • Receiver(s) (responsible for receiving all incoming information, logging it and allocating it to the appropriate person); • Policy Officer (who will document all tactical decisions made by the Silver Commander and link to the Gold Policy Officer so the Silver Commander is aware of current Gold policy decisions); • Actions Officer (who will allocate actions required by the Silver Commander, ensure completion and collate returns or outcomes); • Briefing Officer (responsible for arranging and conducting briefings for relevant personnel).
A Silver Commander should also consider appointing a Silver Support Officer. This person should assist in organising the command support functions, namely planning, intelligence, resources, logistics, finance and legal issues. The Silver Support Officer should base themselves at a suitable location, for example, a nearby police station, and form a Silver Support Team to manage the command support functions (see 1.10 Command Support Functions ).
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 31 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Figure 6 Possible Structure for a Silver Control and Silver Support Location n s o s g i e e c l t n c i c i r t a a m m m m m m n s n u g a a a a a a i a m n o e e e e e e e r g n s a L i T T T T T T l o o e f F L P R n I T R O t r P o p r P e p c u i f S U f r O e S v l i S D N r e d A R n E a L V L m I O m S o R C T ) r y t e N l u d o p n r t e a O n D m ( o C r C m e r o g e C v a R l r i n e S a v E l i M S V L I ) s S s ( r c i e t s c i v a T d A ) G s r o ) e r C i l l t s r e T e d o o u ( c p e c i r r i r a c n r u r f t t f i i o f R f f e o o n n / t r f t v r M O o o i O a g a O e r e r C C l s k g & l l t e c y r r n n s o a p e i i c a e e r o t i f i R l t v v n d O l l r i t e i i o n i n c o r P S S o f m e A B ( C d g A A
32 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
1.8.8 BRONZE COMMANDERS D U
The tasks identified by the police Silver Commander will be delegated to police Bronze C T
Commanders to deliver in accordance with the priorities set by the Silver Commander and I TCG. The number of Bronze Commanders and their roles will be determined by the scale O and nature of the incident. Bronze roles will be created and disbanded throughout the N period of an emergency or major incident and can be allocated based on geographic or functional considerations.
Bronze Commanders may be allocated consecutive numbers upon their arrival to enable concise communication. Alternatively, Bronze Commanders may be designated by roles, eg, Bronze Traffic Manager. Whichever system is used, the key is the clarity of an individual person’s roles and responsibilities to all the Silver and Bronze Commanders involved.
Bronze Commanders deployed at or near the scene should be visually identifiable as a police Bronze Commander. This can be achieved by wearing a blue and white tabard marked ‘Police Bronze Commander’ and with suitable wording to identify their role.
Bronze Commanders must have a clear understanding of the tactical objectives of the Silver Commander, ie, what they are required to deliver, in what timescale and with what resources. Some Bronze Commander roles require specialist knowledge, skills and expertise and, therefore, should be allocated to individuals or post-holders who are appropriately trained and competent.
Some police Bronze Commander roles (see Figure 7 ) include:
• Scene Commander; • Traffic Management; • Evacuation; • Survivors Reception Centre; • Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC); • Media; • Community.
If large cordons are in place, in addition to a Bronze Scene Commander, a Bronze Cordons may be appointed to assume command of the inner cordon supervisor, outer cordon supervisor and cordon access control supervisor. The Bronze Scene Commander should then command the police personnel at the Ambulance Loading Point and Casualty Clearing Station (CCS).
Other roles to which a Bronze Commander can be appointed are:
• Crime; • Hospital Documentation Team; • Casualty Bureau Manager; • Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM).
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 33 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Figure 7 Suggested Bronze Commander Roles e r c r e n e c r i a c f e s i f t r g f s r r e O f a i c e o ) i s n s c O f i i S s a f f v r C ) f r n A O e M s C e ( O o t d ( r e n p s t r n a e i i n u t r a r n e r c s i i o o S i a n e r L o i o r f i l o P c e t s e s f i i r i P L o a f c a C y m v r i e v O l t t f r t r f g i a e d g b S f e O n n e n r e n a n i p i o o t T O p g m n e S d f s s a u e u n C i n r L o r n n i e a s S i S r r s a e s e e o o s i m r i o E i i s e c a c n m L n L i a t t C i B A u c e i e f i o a f o l a a c L f e e L f f n n t t e d H r d c C f c r t r t T O o o n n O r i i n A O o y o n e e t t s y y o t O a C l e t t t l C n a a n i i i p m m r a C u r r r o u u s o b u u e R i u c c s e u u b t d n i t c c s r s c c h a a n a a u o o m a o e e e x r v v i n I O C A C E E T R D D E L S S R • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • E D e e z N n m i o A r r C B ) n C M t r o R n i s e e t S r ( d ) M y p o l m n C i e e n v e r i c a R O o t m g v i e e e e e F a r m t n a a i z z z z R F C u F e a ( n d n n n n m s S C u e a o o o o e e o d c r r r r r E z e n n C t M M a B B B B z n e o n v e i i Z c n o r i e t E r n o f F C p r r B e f y N e e c B a d t c l r g S n e T a O a a R u n s R a a C M B e u z a D n e r o E r u B r B T e d S r n e a E v l i m S G m o G C ) r s e U ( ) r r d s e e ( a S r c c y i e i s e f t r L f ) c f i s r f i e s r r e ( f e O c n O m r e i e f c z t f i c a e u d e i O f f n ) n c e t f f a i i s t f T O u f o m ( e o O l n f r r o L O i P r n n t a r O R o e m e r o o B h n i i e P c ) m m o e d t t s o i c o r t d i a a f s p a a s n f f C i u a e t t e e u d p f l T T a R a o n n O o u i M ( O v e e R o L S s y y z t t t y m e n s i i i l m m t a a e G s r r i i i o c b u u i r d i e s u u m d d i c c h o c n c c h e e i o a o o c e e e e x r i C R V P A D D E L S S M M • • • • • • • • • • • •
34 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
A Bronze Commander Crime can advise on evidential issues and management of exhibits D prior to the appointment of a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). They can also coordinate U initial evidence gathering at or near the scene. A Bronze Commander Crime reports to a C T
Silver Commander. If the Gold Commander appoints an SIO, the Bronze Commander Crime I may assume the role as SIO reporting to the Gold Commander. Alternatively, when an SIO O is appointed by the Gold Commander, the Bronze Commander Crime can work directly to N the SIO instead of the Silver Commander.
A Bronze Commander Hospital Documentation Team will be responsible to the Silver Commander for the team of police officers and staff deployed to hospitals that receive casualties from a scene of an emergency or major incident. The team may consist of a documentation team leader, documentation officers, an exhibits officer and a liaison officer. This Bronze Commander may report to the Silver Commander until the appointment of a Senior Identification Manager (SIM).
If the Gold Commander decides to open a casualty bureau, a casualty bureau manager will be appointed to set up and manage the casualty bureau. Initially, this manager may report to the Silver Commander until the appointment of a SIM. For further information see ACPO (2008) Guidance on Casualty Bureau Standard Administrative Procedures (CBSAP).
The Silver Commander may appoint a Bronze Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM). This officer should work alongside the Bronze Crime. For further information on the SERM, see 2.7.2 Scene Evidence Recovery Manager.
In the initial response to a major incident, Bronze Commanders may be appointed to some roles which, when a SIM is appointed, come under the responsibility of that officer. When a SIM is appointed, these roles will transfer from the Silver Commander and report to the SIM. These roles are:
• Survivors Reception Centre (SRC); • Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC); • Hospital Documentation Team; • Casualty Bureau Manager; • Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM).
Detailed role descriptions can be found on the CD-Rom which accompanies this guidance.
1.8.9 PLANNING FOR SPECIALIST OPERATIONAL ROLES
Police forces may consider developing an emergency plan, which may contain the following factors, to help define and clarify the specialist operational roles identified:
• A process map or plan, protocol or operating procedure for each specialist role; • Activation procedures for the role lead, which are regularly reviewed; • Identified deputies for the role lead; • Identified key staff, resilience and succession planning; • Clarification on whether a specific role or function is person or post specific; • Stringent selection and vetting procedures for specific roles where it is considered appropriate; • Identified training needs and appropriate training; • Model generic risk assessments for roles and potential locations, in conjunction with the force health and safety manager; • Identified locations where the role will be performed; • Exercise involvement for each role.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 35 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.9 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT
An emergency or major incident is likely, by its definition, to place a significant burden on the police. A continued policing provision is still required to be delivered, both in the area directly affected and across the rest of the force area. This requirement is one of the strategic objectives in maintaining the rule of law. The effectiveness of any response to an incident can be reduced where there is a partial or full breakdown in law and order in the area concerned.
Business continuity management (BCM) is the strategic and tactical capability of the organisation to plan for and respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue business operations at an acceptable pre-defined level. BCM planning should be aimed at maintaining critical activities, and response to an incident must take into account the likelihood and impact of the loss of one or more critical activities or critical infrastructure of the force.
Police forces, as category 1 responders, have a legal duty under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to prepare business continuity plans to cover the loss of critical activities. Critical activities are those activities which have to be performed in order to deliver the key products and services which enable an organisation to meet its most important and time sensitive objectives. The plan should cater for circumstances where there is a sudden and significant loss of infrastructure or facilities, for example, flooding, major fire or loss of information technology systems. It should also cater for a scenario where the activities of the police force have to be collapsed to concentrate on critical activities, for example, during an emergency where staff absenteeism rises severely or during a major incident where a large number of police personnel are deployed.
The business continuity plan should detail the business continuity management structure and processes to be adopted at times of crisis. A senior police officer or police staff manager should be appointed as the business continuity manager, operating at a strategic level. The business continuity manager should have a clear line of communication with the Gold Commander, and may sit on the Strategic Coordinating Group, although this may not always be appropriate because of the differing focus of business continuity as opposed to the command and control of the emergency or major incident.
The business continuity manager should convene a team of key personnel to implement the business continuity process. The plan should identify the resources, services and actions required to maintain critical activities and, if they are lost, to restore them within a defined timescale. The key to business continuity management is resilience against disruption, and while it is internally focused, it should take account of interdependencies with other organisations that may be affected by similar disruption at the same time.
1.10 COMMAND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
It will be necessary to ensure appropriate functions are in place to provide adequate support to the commanders at all three tiers of command.
These functions should follow the principles of:
• Planning; • Information; • Resources; • Logistics; • Finance; • Legal.
36 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
1.10.1 PLANNING D U
Police forces should have either generic contingency plans or specific plans to respond to an C T
identified risk. However, the response to any emergency or major incident needs to be I flexible to allow modifications in the response outlined in any contingency plan. O N
The Gold Commander may require an individual or team to develop short-term and medium-term action plans during the response to an incident. Personnel with experience in emergency planning can be used to assist in advising the Gold Commander and compiling action plans as required. Short-term action plans should take account of the resources available in the initial phases of an incident, thereby assisting the Gold Commander in determining the aim and objectives for the response. Short-term action plans may be devised for the Silver Commander to assist in determining the tactical response to the incident.
Medium-term action plans may look at future options for consideration by the Gold Commander, for example, a scheme to reoccupy an area evacuated or the handover of lead coordinating authority status from the police to a local authority.
1.10.2 INFORMATION
It is important to provide commanders at all tiers, and coordinating groups at strategic and tactical tiers, with accurate, concise and clearly understandable information throughout an incident.
The management of information generated by responding to an emergency or major incident, including the collection, sharing, retention and disposal of that information, should be conducted in accordance with the procedures agreed by ACPO. For further information see ACPO (2006) Guidance on Management of Police Information.
An intelligence cell or unit may be established to support the Gold Commander and the Strategic Coordinating Group. This cell or unit should be staffed by personnel trained and experienced in intelligence disciplines, who can develop relevant intelligence products. An intelligence cell or unit should work with all three levels of the National Intelligence Model, ie, basic command unit (BCU), force and regional or national intelligence units.
For further information see ACPO (2005) Guidance on the National Intelligence Model.
It is important that intelligence is disseminated to all relevant staff through briefings. A dedicated briefing officer may be appointed to support the Gold Commander and SCG. A separate briefing officer may be appointed to support the Silver Commander and Tactical Coordinating Group, if required. It may be advisable for briefings or their content to be recorded, either in writing, audio or by video, in order to provide an audit trail for later reference in debrief reports or inquiries. The capability to provide briefings should be available throughout the twenty-four-hour period, particularly if a mobilisation event has been declared.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 37 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Briefings should be structured according to the needs of the incident and directions of the Gold or Silver Commanders. One form of briefing structure that can be used is:
• Information – situation report or background to the incident; • Intelligence – what is likely to happen, potential scenarios of development, or output from the intelligence cell; • Risk assessment – hazards and mitigation, including personal protective equipment (PPE) required for specific roles; • Method – tasks, how the strategic and tactical aims and objectives are to be achieved; • Administration – role of command support functions, provision of accommodation, food and drink; • Communications – which Airwave talkgroups are in use, any restrictions on the use of telephony?
For further information see ACPO (2006) Guidance on the National Briefing Model.
1.10.3 RESOURCES
When responding to an emergency or major incident, it is necessary to ensure that the right people with the right skills and abilities are deployed to the appropriate roles. Training and experience should be key factors in determining the suitability of a person for a specific role. In addition, there is the requirement to ensure that the right equipment is available for use by the personnel deployed, either in a command function or command support function. Resources in this context mean the provision of human resources, equipment and supplies to meet the strategic, tactical and operational needs of the commanders at all three tiers, ie, Gold, Silver and Bronze.
The safety, health and welfare of the personnel deployed for an emergency or major incident will need to be managed. The potential duration of the incident will determine the scale and nature of the deployment of personnel. Resource management should include the ability to rotate and replace personnel, and this should be considered from the beginning of an incident. Individuals and teams may feel the need to see the incident through to its conclusion. This may be beneficial in terms of continuity, yet care must be taken to ensure personnel do not ‘burn out’ or continue to work when they are excessively tired or where their judgement is in doubt.
A police force may be able to cope with an emergency or major incident from within its own resources. The scale and nature of an incident or the effect of incidents occurring concurrently, however, may necessitate a force to request mutual aid to meet the resource requirements of the Gold, Silver and Bronze Commanders. A request for human resources should specify any requirements for specialist skills or relevant experience. This is important when requesting mutual aid, but advice can be sought from the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC), which maintains a national skills database. Where mutual aid is required, police forces may use local mutual aid agreements where they exist. If not, recourse should be made to the Police National Mobilisation Plan (see 1.11 Police National Mobilisation Plan ).
38 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED I N T R O
1.10.4 LOGISTICS D U
Once the people and equipment have been resourced, logistics, in this context, means C T
getting the people and equipment to the right place at the right time. Their subsequent I management includes providing: O N • Accommodation; • Meals – taking account of a variety of dietary needs; • Drinks – hot and cold; • Vehicles; • Buildings – both temporary and permanent structures; • Appropriate IT hardware and software.
Forces may have a directory of companies and organisations with the capability and capacity to assist in the response to an emergency or major incident. Local authorities may also have similar directories that can be used.
The force procurement policy, the legal framework surrounding contracts and the tendering process need to be considered. Specialist advice should be sought on whether these arrangements can be derogated from for the duration of that emergency or major incident.
1.10.5 FINANCE
The response to an emergency or major incident is likely to incur significant financial costs for the police force or forces affected.
An individual or team within the command support function (Strategic Coordination Centre or Gold support) should be made responsible for setting up procedures to capture all costs reasonably incurred in responding to that incident. A separate budget code or cost centre may need to be created to which all relevant expenses can be attributed.
The Gold Commander and SCG should be given updates on expenditure during the Response Process. Clarity should be sought on the financial accounting arrangements to be used when the lead coordinating agency responsibility passes from the police to the local authority or other organisation.
These costs may have to be borne by the police force concerned, but it may be possible to reclaim the costs or a proportion thereof from another agency. Options for cost recovery include the Bellwin Scheme, which is updated annually. The current criteria and thresholds can be obtained from the Department for Communities and Local Government. For further information see http://www.communities.gov.uk
As an alternative, full or partial cost recovery may be possible from the site operators or transport operators, in relevant incidents.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 39 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
1.10.6 LEGAL
Such is the scale and complexity of some emergencies and major incidents, the Gold Commander may feel it appropriate to ensure they have access to objective legal advice during the response to an incident. Legal advice may be sought on procedures to limit a police force’s exposure to civil litigation, and possible implications of some form of parliamentary or judicial review of the incident in the future.
The Gold Commander may also require legal advice during an incident on the interpretation of statutory or common law relevant to the response to that incident.
1.11 POLICE NATIONAL MOBILISATION PLAN
The Police Service has developed a set of procedures and principles to help the coordination and deployment of resources to complex or large policing operations, including the response to an emergency or major incident. These procedures and principles are contained in ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan. If an incident exceeds a police force’s own capability or capacity and that of any existing local mutual aid agreements, it is termed a Mobilisation Event. The response to a Mobilisation Event is coordinated by the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC). The role of PNICC is threefold:
• To enable ACPO to quickly put in place a system for managing information about an emergency; • To coordinate the provision of mutual aid between police forces; • To provide a facility to ensure that HM Government is provided with accurate and current information about an emergency, and to act as a conduit for information from HM Government to all police forces.
If a Mobilisation Event is declared, the force receiving incoming mutual aid should ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for the reception of incoming personnel. This may include setting up strategic and/or tactical holding areas and briefing centres. For further information see ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan.
40 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED S E C
Section 2 T I O RESPONDING TO AN N 2 EMERGENCY OR MAJOR INCIDENT
This section sets out the process for identifying and declaring an emergency or major incident, activating the appropriate response and initiating a formal command and control structure .
CONTENTS
2.1 Threshold for Activation ...... 43 2.1.1 Initial Assessment ...... 43 2.1.2 Initial Responders ...... 44 2.2 Scene Management ...... 46 2.2.1 Forward Command Post ...... 46 2.2.2 Cordons ...... 47 2.2.3 Imposing and Enforcing Cordons Legal Issues ...... 48 2.2.4 Inner Cordon ...... 49 2.2.5 Outer Cordon ...... 49 2.2.6 Scene Access Control Point ...... 50 2.2.7 Traffic Management ...... 50 2.2.8 Rendezvous Point(s) ...... 50 2.2.9 Site Traffic Control ...... 51 2.2.10 Marshalling Area and Strategic Holding Areas ...... 51 2.3 Rescue ...... 51 2.3.1 Casualty Rescue ...... 51 2.3.2 Casualty Clearing Station ...... 52 2.3.3 Hospital Documentation Teams ...... 52 2.4 Reception Centres ...... 52 2.4.1 Survivors Reception Centres ...... 54 2.4.2 Family and Friends Reception Centres ...... 55 2.4.3 Rest Centres ...... 56 2.4.4 Humanitarian Assistance Centres ...... 56 2.5 Decontamination ...... 56 2.6 Shelter and Evacuation ...... 57 2.7 Retrieval and Investigation ...... 58 2.7.1 Senior Investigating Officer ...... 60 2.7.2 Scene Evidence Recovery Manager ...... 60 2.7.3 Health and Safety Executive ...... 61 2.7.4 Air Accidents Investigation Branch ...... 61 2.7.5 Rail Accident Investigation Branch ...... 61 2.7.6 Marine Accident Investigation Branch ...... 61
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 41 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.8 Dealing with Fatalities ...... 62 2.8.1 Mass Fatalities Incident ...... 62 2.8.2 Senior Identification Manager ...... 63 2.8.3 Casualty Bureau ...... 64 2.8.4 Disaster Victim Identification Teams ...... 64 2.8.5 Victim Audit Area(s) ...... 64 2.8.6 Mortuary Arrangements ...... 65 2.9 Family Liaison ...... 65 2.9.1 Family Liaison Officers ...... 65 2.10 Cultural and Faith Issues ...... 66 2.11 Community Impact Assessment ...... 66 2.12 Independent Advisory Groups ...... 68 2.13 Media and Public Information ...... 68 2.13.1 Public Information ...... 68 2.13.2 Coordination of Support to the Media ...... 69 2.13.3 Media Liaison ...... 69 2.13.4 Interactive and Electronic Media ...... 70 2.13.5 Public Meetings ...... 71 2.13.6 Private Meetings ...... 71
42 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.1 THRESHOLD FOR ACTIVATION N D
The majority of incidents that a police force deals with on a day-to-day basis will be I N managed as business as usual. These include incidents that can involve the deployment of G a large number of police officers and staff but they may not be deemed emergencies or major incidents. T O
Where an event is known or believed to be taking place in the future, at a known location A and within a known timeframe, then operational planning should be undertaken to prepare N
and deliver the policing response to that event. These events should be identified through E the force Strategic Tasking and Co-ordinating Group and Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination M
Groups as outlined in the National Intelligence Model. E R
For further information in respect of planned policing events, see ACPO (2005) Guidance G on the National Intelligence Model, ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Tasking and E N Co-ordination and ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan. C Y Each force should have a process in place by which incidents can be identified as potential or actual emergencies or major incidents. The threshold at which each force declares an O emergency or major incident is for that force to determine in consultation with other R emergency services, local authorities and partner agencies. M A
A Local Resilience Forum (LRF) may have a generic LRF major incident response plan, in J which the threshold for declaration of an emergency or major incident should be detailed. O London is an exception and has a regional generic emergency plan. R I N The threshold for declaration should not be set at too high a level. There are advantages in C
an early activation of the required command and control structures, including the I establishment of precautionary Gold Commands. This is particularly relevant for rising D E
tide emergencies. N T 2.1.1 INITIAL ASSESSMENT
A police control room is likely to be the initial point of contact when an emergency or major incident occurs. It is, therefore, an important part of the overall response.
On the initial contact, the control room should:
• Gather information about the incident (see SAD CHALETS in 2.1.2 Initial Responders ); • Declare a major incident or determine if one has been declared; • Contact partner agencies and advise them that a major incident has been declared; • Activate the force emergency plan (if relevant) or other appropriate contingency plans; • Facilitate the deployment of initial responders, taking into consideration health and safety issues; • Establish contact with the initial Silver Commander; • Facilitate the activation of appropriate mobile or fixed site as a forward command post; • Contact the duty chief police officer (or other nominated person) to establish a command structure at the Gold tier; • Remind initial responders of their role and responsibilities and refer to aides-memoire (major incident process maps) to ensure role responsibilities are correctly identified and actioned; • Maintain a communications log to include event information and health and safety risk assessments.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 43 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
An assessment must be conducted by the personnel who receive the initial report(s) (eg, control room staff) in respect of any possibility of the incident involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents. This is conducted using the Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel (STEP 1 2 3), shown in Figure 8, which can provide an initial indication of the potential presence of a CBRN agent.
Figure 8 STEP 1 2 3
STEP 1 ONE CASUALTY Approach using normal procedures
• Approach, with caution , and TWO CASUALTIES consider all options STEP 2 (Same time, same place and • Report on arrival similar unexplained symptoms) • Update control room
• Do not approach • Withdraw THREE OR MORE CASUALTIES • Contain STEP 3 (Same time, same place and • Report similar unexplained symptoms) • Isolate yourself and request specialist help
2.1.2 INITIAL RESPONDERS
The initial police responders to a potential emergency or major incident must undertake an assessment which will help to determine the scale and nature of the response. The initial moments of a sudden impact emergency or major incident will, by their very nature, be chaotic and confused. Initial responders may not be able to clearly determine the scale of the incident at this stage. It is important, however, that any assessment undertaken by an initial responder should be as accurate as possible to allow an appropriate response.
On arrival at the scene, initial responders should:
• Undertake an assessment using the mnemonic SAD CHALETS as a guide; • Declare a major incident , if appropriate; • Transmit a situation report (sitrep), using the CHALETS mnemonic, to the control room; • Not get involved in rescue; • Establish a rendezvous point for incoming personnel; • Establish a forward command post, if safe to do so.
The mnemonic SAD CHALETS has been developed over recent years. The key to the mnemonic is the principle behind it, not the strict adherence to it. The purpose of SAD is to encourage initial responders not to rush into an incident, but to consider issues before they become too involved. The SAD part of the mnemonic is linked to STEP 1 2 3, and is intended to enhance the safety of initial responders. The CHALETS part of the mnemonic is a guide to the information required by police control rooms, Silver and Gold Commanders. It can be used for a series of situation reports, building on previous ones as additional information becomes available or information is clarified. The first situation report will be brief, but subsequent ones should be more detailed.
44 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
Survey (what can I readily see, hear, smell or feel?) N D
Assess (what do I think is happening and needs to be done?) I N
Disseminate and Declare (report back to the control room accurately, concisely and clearly, G and Declare a major incident , if appropriate.) T O
C – CASUALTIES A N • Approximate numbers of all casualties and where they are located. E
• What symptoms are present? M • What percentage of casualties are deceased, seriously injured, have minor injuries or E
are trapped? R G
H – HAZARDS E N
• Present and potential hazards. C • Is there any cloud of gas, smoke or fire present? Y
• Any debris from any explosion. If so, how widely spread? O
• Any other potential hazards? R
• Any environmental hazards or potential pollution? M • If a transport incident, are there any Hazchem markings visible? A J
A – ACCESS/EGRESS O R • Best access routes for emergency vehicles and suitable provisional rendezvous points. I • Is the initial access route safe? N • Are likely access and egress routes congested? C I
• What resources are likely to be needed to maintain clear access and egress routes? D
• Is it necessary to remove parked vehicles? E • What egress routes are available, particularly for the removal of casualties? N • Is it necessary to set up ‘Priority’ (Red) routes to key locations (eg, acute hospitals)? T
L – LOCATION
• The exact location of the incident, using grid references if possible; • How large is the area affected? • Does it contain residential properties, shops or offices? • Are there any venues with large numbers of people nearby? • Are there vulnerable persons involved or nearby?
E – EMERGENCY SERVICES and EVACUATION
• Which emergency services are required? • Is specialist equipment required, eg, the Fire and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams? • Are specialist support organisations required, eg, radiation monitoring, CBRN personnel? • Is evacuation necessary or is shelter a more viable option? • Will evacuation of people and/or animals be required, if so approximate numbers? • Are there vulnerable groups or individuals? • To where will they be evacuated? • Is there an identified safe route to use? • Where will they be taken and are facilities available to receive them?
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 45 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
T – TYPE
• Type of incident with brief details of types and numbers of vehicles, trains, or buildings involved. • Are there any early indications if the incident may be an act of terrorism or a crime?
S – START A LOG/SAFETY
• Consider health and safety, conduct dynamic risk assessments. • Commence incident log (use pocket note book if necessary).
2.2 SCENE MANAGEMENT
These are the recommended procedures to be considered at or near the scene of a major incident.
2.2.1 FORWARD COMMAND POST
At some incidents, while the designated Silver Control may be near to the scene, some of the emergency services personnel may need to be deployed close to or inside an inner cordon. This is particularly relevant to the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service, both of which will be directly engaged in rescuing and treating casualties.
In these circumstances, it may be desirable to establish a police Forward Command Post (FCP). This will be collocated with the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service forward command posts. The Silver Commander may be located at the FCP, or alternatively, the FCP will be under command of the Bronze Scene Commander. The main function of the FCP is to liaise with the Silver Control regarding activity at the scene, and to ensure cordon access control is being properly addressed by responding personnel from all the emergency services. The FCP can serve as the focal point for the work of a scene evidence recovery manager if appointed.
When choosing a location for the FCP, consideration should be given to:
• Safety – is the FCP at risk from any actual or potential hazards?
• Weather – is the FCP upwind of the incident, and what are the predicted weather conditions over the foreseeable future?
• Accessibility – is the FCP readily accessible to relevant personnel?
• Parking – are there sufficient suitable parking facilities close to the FCP?
• Conspicuous – is the location of the FCP clearly identifiable to personnel?
• Security – is the FCP secure from unauthorised access?
Where the response to a major incident is spontaneous, the first marked police vehicle at the scene will normally act as the FCP until more specialist command vehicles can be deployed.
For reasons of being clearly identifiable and conspicuous, the police vehicle should continue to have its blue lights operating, while all other responding police vehicles have their blue lights turned off on arrival.
46 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.2.2 CORDONS N D
A cordon should be instituted as soon as possible. Its purpose is to: I N G • Assist in protecting the scene of an incident, the public and those working within the
scene; T • Control unauthorised access; O
• Prevent unauthorised interference with, for example, wreckage, public and private A
property; N
• Facilitate emergency services operations. E M
Cordons should be established following consultation with the Commanders of other E emergency services, in particular, the Fire and Rescue Service Silver Commander, who can R advise on the size of the cordons in terms of obvious hazards, health and safety issues. G E
Tapes, ropes, barriers and signs should be considered to reinforce the cordons. This is N particularly important where difficult terrain makes it impractical to station individual C Y officers. Use can be made of natural or man-made features, eg, buildings, fences, railway lines, road or rivers, to delineate a cordoned area. People from other agencies can be O requested to assist in staffing a cordon. In particular, people associated with Project ‘Griffin’ R in urban centres could be asked to support the police in maintaining an effective cordon. M A
For further information see http://www.projectgriffin.org.uk J O
Personnel staffing the outer cordon must be alert to the possibility of people trying to gain R unauthorised access, particularly through more remote sections of the boundary. People I N may also believe that they have a right of entry if their premises, family or friends are within C
the cordon. I D
Cordon distances and staff requirements for specific locations or high-risk areas may be E N determined in advance and incorporated into local contingency plans, bearing in mind that T there may be the need for adjustment in an actual event. Where an explosive device is suspected, cordons should be imposed to give a realistic safety margin.
Personnel deployed on cordons must be fully briefed as to their role and ongoing developments. Those deployed at entry and exit points must be made aware of who, in addition to the emergency services and other specialist and support personnel, will be arriving, for example, local authority or insurance assessors. The entry and exit of all personnel within an inner cordon must be recorded in order to account for everyone in the event of an emergency evacuation from that area, and for forensic considerations.
In certain circumstances other agencies’ personnel may require urgent access and, therefore, a police escort. For example, at the scene of an air crash, Aircraft Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) inspectors may require access to the scene at an early stage in order to recover and preserve information contained in the flight recorders, or a structural engineer or building control surveyor from a local authority may require access to assess the safety of buildings affected by an incident.
Consideration should be given to replacing personnel on cordons with physical barriers in appropriate circumstances. In protracted incidents, it may be necessary to provide temporary shelter for personnel manning cordons and checkpoints. Motorcyclists and air support units can usefully assist in monitoring cordons.
The public should be informed when cordons have been reduced in size or removed.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 47 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.2.3 IMPOSING AND ENFORCING CORDONS LEGAL ISSUES
The only statutory provision to allow the police to impose and enforce a cordon is contained in sections 33 to 36 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are authorised to enforce a cordon under the Terrorism Act as one of their standard powers.
Section 33 of the Act defines a cordoned area and states that it applies if considered expedient for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. This section also states that as far as is reasonably practicable, the cordoned area should be designated by means of tape marked with the word ‘police’. Section 34 gives the power to designate a cordoned area, section 35 explains the duration of a cordon and section 36 defines the police powers in respect of enforcement of a cordoned area by a constable in uniform.
In non-terrorist cases, the authority for the police to set up and regulate a cordon is governed by common law. In general, the police are justified in cordoning off an area in order to protect public safety, keep the peace and protect a crime scene, or at the request of, and with the consent of, the landowner.
Any person failing to comply with the directions of a police officer deployed to enforce a cordon may be committing an offence under section 89(2) Police Act 1996, namely resisting or wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his or her duty. The powers of arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will apply where appropriate.
In addition to the powers applicable to police officers, firefighters have some legal powers that may be useful in an emergency or major incident. Section 44 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 allows an employee of a fire and rescue service, who is authorised in writing by the authority for the purposes of this section, to do anything he or she reasonably believes to be necessary:
• For the purpose of extinguishing or preventing the fire or protecting life or property, if they reasonably believe a fire to have broken out or to be about to break out; • For the purpose of rescuing people or protecting them from serious harm, if they reasonably believe a road traffic accident to have occurred; • For the purpose of discharging any function conferred on the fire and rescue authority in relation to an emergency, if they reasonably believe an emergency of another kind to have occurred; • For the purpose of preventing or limiting damage to property resulting from action taken above.
Under section 44 of the Act, firefighters may also:
• Enter premises or a place, by force if necessary, without the consent of the owner or occupier of the premises or place; • Move or break into a vehicle without the consent of the owner; • Close a highway; • Stop and regulate traffic, and restrict the access of persons to premises or a place.
A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, they obstruct or interfere with an employee of a fire and rescue authority taking action authorised under section 44 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.
48 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.2.4 INNER CORDON N D
An inner cordon should enclose the scene of the incident and contain any area of hazard I N or contamination. During the Rescue Phase, the area within the inner cordon may become G the responsibility of the Fire and Rescue Service working in cooperation with the Ambulance Service and medical personnel. Demarcation and control of locations which may be T O hazardous is a matter for the commanders of the relevant agencies to take into account. For some high-risk locations, for example COMAH sites, cordon zones may be A pre-determined. N E
The normal recommended minimum distances for the Inner Cordon are: M E
100 metres for a minor explosive risk (ie, a letter bomb or similar device); R G
200 metres for a moderate explosive risk (ie, a briefcase, parcel, rucksack); E N
400 metres for a serious explosive risk, (ie, a vehicle borne improvised explosive C device (VBIED). Y O There may be circumstances, for example, those involving a large VBIED, or large military R munitions, when a cordon of about 1,000 metres should be considered. If in doubt, think large, and seek advice from the military Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts. M A
For CBRN, nuclear or hazmat incidents, the recommended distance for a cordon is: J O R 400 metres from a CBRN device which has not yet activated; or I N 100 metres from the edge of detected contamination if device activated. C I In incidents where there is no explosive risk, these distances can be used as a guide to the D distance of the cordon from the scene. In addition, a zone extending downwind may need E N to be subject to an inner cordon for health and safety reasons. T
An inner cordon will be designated by use of red and white tape. In addition, fencing, barriers, ropes and signs may be used to reinforce an inner cordon.
When the Rescue Phase is complete, the police have responsibility for the area enclosed within an inner cordon to retrieve any deceased or human remains, carry out any forensic examination of the scene and collect evidence on behalf of an SIO or SIM.
For further information on cordons, see ACPO (2004) Manual of Guidance on Public Order Standards, Tactics and Training.
2.2.5 OUTER CORDON
The purpose of an outer cordon is to create a safe working area for the emergency services and other responding agencies. The radius of the controlled area depends on the type and scope of the incident, the availability of resources and the needs of the community. This will be determined by the Silver Commander in consultation with the other emergency services. All access and exit points must be staffed, and persons seeking access must be questioned about their identity and why they require access.
An outer cordon should be designated by use of blue and white tape, preferably clearly marked with the word ‘Police’. In addition, fencing, barriers, ropes and signs may be used to reinforce an outer cordon.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 49 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.2.6 SCENE ACCESS CONTROL POINT
Access points need to be established for both inner and outer cordons. Control should be exercised early in the emergency or major incident to determine that only personnel with a justifiable reason for being within either cordon are allowed access.
Generally, there should be only one entry and exit point to the inner cordon, known as the Scene Access Control Point. This should be jointly controlled by the Police Service and Fire and Rescue Service. The police have a responsibility to ensure, when practicable to do so, that persons entering or leaving the inner cordon are documented for evidential purposes. Each emergency service has responsibility to ensure personnel from their service entering the inner cordon have the correct personal protective equipment (PPE) and are given an adequate health and safety briefing before entry is permitted.
A written document should be kept of who enters the inner cordon, at what time and why, and the time they leave. This document is disclosable and should be made available to the SIO.
Access through the outer cordon should be via locations known as Access Control Points (to distinguish from the Scene Access Control Point through the inner cordon). There may be more than one Access Control Point, with the possibility of a separate entrance and exit points to assist traffic flow inside the cordoned area. The requirement to document vehicles and personnel entering the outer cordon is unlikely to be necessary.
2.2.7 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
A major incident or emergency is likely to have either a direct or indirect impact on transport networks, especially road and rail. Traffic management can, therefore, be pre-identified as a Bronze specialist function and activated at any incident where traffic management is required. The early involvement of other agencies, for example, local authorities, the Highways Agency (in England), motoring organisations and the media is essential.
The main aspects of traffic management are establishing:
• Rendezvous point(s); • Traffic control; • Marshalling areas; • Diversions; • Communication to the public.
Diversions should be used to divert all non-essential traffic from roads leading to or from the incident. Information on traffic diversions should be passed to the media for public broadcast. The local authority and motoring organisations may be able to assist with suitable signing.
2.2.8 RENDEZVOUS POINT(S)
All police and emergency services personnel attending an emergency or major incident should be directed to a designated rendezvous point (RVP) which has an appointed rendezvous point officer.
The location of an RVP should be secure and safe for emergency services personnel to use. If an RVP is being established in response to a suspected terrorist incident, it is preferable that the RVP is not an obvious, pre-determined location. In addition, it should be searched prior to use. When establishing an RVP, the following should be taken into consideration:
50 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
• That it is large enough for all responding organisations; N
• Parking is on hard standing; D
• The area is well lit; I N Access is available to large vehicles; • G • It is easy to find; • Accommodation is available for the personnel deployed there; T O • There is a degree of security for vehicles left there, some of which may have the ignition keys left in them. A N
The needs of the other emergency services should be considered, and it may be appropriate E for the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service to have different RVPs. Where there M is one RVP, the police are responsible for the logging and deployment of other specialist E and voluntary services attending (with the exception of fire and rescue, and ambulance). R All personnel attending the scene should be directed to the RVP. G E N Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, it may be necessary to identify more C
than one RVP, in which case it is advisable to give them numeric designations, for example, Y RVP1, RVP2. O
2.2.9 SITE TRAFFIC CONTROL R M
Free passage of emergency traffic to and from the site is essential. Wherever possible, a A
one-way system with defined access and egress routes should be implemented to avoid J congestion in the area surrounding the scene. If there is only one access route, turning areas O must be identified and supervised to avoid congestion. Emergency routes to and from R I
designated hospitals should be determined in advance, for immediate implementation. N C
Within an outer cordon, the use of blue lights should be restricted to ambulances collecting I D or conveying patients, and designated command vehicles. E N
2.2.10 MARSHALLING AREA AND STRATEGIC HOLDING AREAS T
An area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles should be designated as a marshalling area for those resources not immediately required at the scene. Liaison officers should be available at the marshalling area. Vehicles should not be allowed to remain at the incident site unnecessarily.
A marshalling area may use pre-determined strategic holding areas or tactical holding areas identified as part of the Police National Mobilisation Plan. Consideration may need to be given to providing a safe area for helicopters to use adjacent to a marshalling area.
2.3 RESCUE
This subsection sets out the aim and objectives for the police during the Rescue Phase of an emergency or major incident.
2.3.1 CASUALTY RESCUE
The primary aim of all emergency services is to save life. A Local Resilience Forum should have plans for the multi-agency response to such an event. The lead responsibility for casualty rescue on land is with the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service; at sea it is with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
For further information see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 51 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.3.2 CASUALTY CLEARING STATION
The purpose of a casualty clearing station (CCS) is to act as a focal point where injured persons can gather or be taken for triage, immediate life saving medical intervention, treatment and then transport away from the scene to the designated receiving hospitals. There may be more than one CCS.
The responsibility for managing a CCS lies with the Ambulance Service (assisted by the voluntary sector), but the police may be requested to support this process. A police liaison officer may be appointed to advise and monitor movement of ambulances for the information of the Bronze Commander Traffic Management.
2.3.3 HOSPITAL DOCUMENTATION TEAMS
A police team should be deployed to each hospital receiving casualties from an emergency or major incident. The purpose of this team is to document the casualties who attend or who are brought to that hospital. The main reason for documenting casualties is to input that information into the Casualty Bureau process. This may also involve taking additional information from casualties, for example, regarding missing persons. The Hospital Documentation Team Leader will report to the Silver Commander until or unless a SIM is appointed, when they will report to the SIM as part of the overall identification and investigation process.
The standard casualty form should be used to record the details of each individual at hospital as a result of that incident. For further information see ACPO (2008) Guidance on Casualty Bureau Standard Administrative Procedures (CBSAP).
2.4 RECEPTION CENTRES
At the very worst time of their lives, the very least we can do is our very best
Duncan McGarry (Family Liaison Adviser on 7 July 2005)
Recognition of the importance of humanitarian assistance and support to people directly and indirectly affected as a consequence of an emergency or major incident is contained in the reports following the terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005 and subsequent guidance from the Cabinet Office.
The humanitarian response to any emergency or major incident will be a package of care, with a range of agencies working together. The exact focus will depend on the scale and nature of the incident, the impact on people and their needs. It is likely to include:
• Basic shelter; • Information about what has happened; • Financial and legal support; • Emotional support; • Advice and direction on how to get further assistance; • Communication facilitation, allowing people to meet or talk to each other; • A point of contact for ongoing support and advice.
The Police Service has a key role in the initial provision of humanitarian assistance, which has to be balanced against their responsibilities of investigation and identification.
52 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
One of the key activities, that take place in a reception centre is the collection of personal N information. The principles of the Data Protection Act 1998 apply to all personal information D collected during an emergency or major incident, even though this may be challenging I N under the circumstances. These principles mean that personal data should be: G
• Processed fairly and lawfully; T O • Obtained only for one or more lawful purpose;
• Adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed; A • Accurate and kept up to date; N
• Not kept for longer than necessary for the purpose required. E M
There are four types of Reception Centre (see Figure 9 ). E R G Figure 9 Reception Centres E N
Title Function Timescale Lead Authority C Y Survivors A secure place, located outside the As soon as Initial lead by the O Reception inner cordon but generally close to the practicable police. Relevant local Centre scene, where survivors not requiring (within 1 hour of authority (LA) to be R
acute medical treatment can start of incident). notified as soon as M congregate in order to ensure they are practicable. The LA A safe from the immediate consequences and voluntary sector J
of the incident, and where should attend to O
documentation of survivors can be support the running R completed for input into the Casualty of a survivor I
Bureau. In addition, immediate reception centre N
humanitarian assistance can be (SRC). C
provided by the local authority at this I D location. E N Family and A secure place, usually located away First 12 hours. Established by the T Friends from the scene of an emergency or police supported by Reception major incident, where the family and a local authority, Centre friends of people directly involved in transport operator that incident can attend in order for (if relevant) and relevant documentation processes to voluntary sector. be undertaken, information can be disseminated to them and humanitarian assistance provided.
Rest Centre A building pre-designated or used As soon as Local authority, by a local authority as temporary practicable upon supported by police accommodation, including overnight, evacuation and voluntary sector. 1 for people evacuated or homeless as (within 1 /2 hours a result of an emergency or major of evacuation to incident. Centre provides information, open Rest Centre). practical and emotional support to those affected.
Humanitarian Location offering medium to long-term 48 hours and Local authority, Assistance humanitarian assistance to people then ongoing. supported by police, Centre directly or indirectly affected by the voluntary sector and emergency or major incident. other organisations.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 53 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.4.1 SURVIVORS RECEPTION CENTRES
There is no agreed definition of survivors, but the term is generally taken to include all people directly involved in an emergency or major incident. It may be possible to identify those people within a defined situation at the time of the incident and classify them as survivors. Examples of this include people on board an aircraft, train, vehicle or vessel at the time of the incident, or people rescued from a building during a fire. If the incident is widespread, however, or involves a disparate group of people, a less precise definition may be more appropriate. Examples of this situation include a flooding incident, or one occurring in a city centre.
For their welfare, and to assist the identification and investigation process, all survivors, other than those requiring immediate medical treatment, should be directed to a survivor reception centre (SRC). An SRC is a safe and secure location where survivors can be supported, secondary medical triage can take place, minor injuries can be treated, and initial documentation to assist the identification process and any investigation can be completed. Secure in this sense means secure from media and secondary terrorist or criminal intrusion, so that people attending an SRC can do so in the knowledge that their privacy and dignity will be respected.
The requirement to open an SRC in the early stages of an emergency or major incident means that the initial responsibility to manage an SRC is likely to fall on the Police Service. The relevant local authority should be advised as soon as is practicable. The local authority and voluntary sector should attend to support the running of the SRC. The Silver Commander should identify an SRC, which, if not a pre-designated location, can be any suitable premises such as a hotel or leisure centre. The Silver Commander may then designate a Bronze Commander SRC to manage the centre. As an interim measure, it may be necessary to designate a survivors reception point to which survivors can be directed until an SRC can be opened. This will be at or near the scene but outside an inner cordon.
Generally, there will be one SRC, but depending on the scale and nature of the incident more than one SRC can be opened, although they should be consolidated into one location as soon as possible.
Some physically uninjured survivors will choose to leave the scene and make their way home, rather than go to an SRC. Survivors cannot be compelled to attend an SRC, but should be strongly encouraged to do so. Early identification of the location of an SRC, and strong, effective communication to survivors should ensure that most if not all attend.
One of the key functions of an SRC is to document the survivors for the purpose of identification and investigation. This responsibility lies with the Police Service, although other agencies may require similar information. All or some of the survivors may be traumatised and so it is important that an agreement is reached between the agencies that require information to limit the number of occasions a survivor will be asked for the same information. The details of the survivors should be recorded on the standard survivor/evacuee form and then transmitted promptly to the casualty bureau. For further information see ACPO (2008) Guidance on Casualty Bureau Standard Administrative Procedures (CBSAP).
54 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
In addition to the details required for the casualty bureau, the SIO may require some initial N questions to be asked of each survivor to provide information for the investigation process. D
It is the responsibility of the SIM to arrange this, or the SIO or Silver Commander if a SIM I N has not been appointed. Police personnel deployed to an SRC, whether to interview survivors G or for another function, should be aware that the survivors may have been exposed to a traumatic experience. As a consequence survivors reactions will vary considerably, from T O anger to being withdrawn and finding it difficult to communicate. Personnel in direct contact with traumatised survivors should take a non-judgemental approach to dealing with them. A As a result of these difficulties, there are five circumstances when a survivor should leave an N
SRC. They are: E M
• Removal to a hospital or other location for ongoing medical treatment; E
• Supported release when fit and able, preferably to a member of their family or a friend; R • Group repatriation back to their home area; G • To attend a rest centre when unable to be repatriated to their home area, and when E N alternative accommodation cannot be found; C
• If under arrest as a suspect in a criminal investigation. Y
Survivors should not leave an SRC until they have been made aware of further help that is O R available through the local authority or other agencies. M
2.4.2 FAMILY AND FRIENDS RECEPTION CENTRES A J A family and friends reception centre (FFRC) is a safe and secure location, normally away O from the scene of any emergency or major incident, to which the family and friends of those R I
people who may be involved as survivors, casualties or deceased can be directed for support N
and information. C I The decision to open an FFRC will usually be made by the Silver Commander in consultation D E
with the Gold Commander. If early indications suggest there are a large number of survivors, N
casualties or deceased, an FFRC should be opened as soon as possible. Where an FFRC is T required, it should be opened within twelve hours of the commencement of the incident. The relevant local authority should be involved in the decision to open an FFRC. The local authority should attend to support the work of the police, to assume the role as lead authority for the management of the FFRC, and to provide practical and emotional support to those present. If an FFRC has been opened as a consequence of a transport incident, the airline, train operating company or coach company will probably assist in the management of the centre, and in the provision of humanitarian assistance.
In the initial period, a police Bronze Commander should normally be appointed to be the FFRC manager pending the establishment of a full and effective FFRC management team.
An FFRC has a key role in the identification of any deceased in a mass fatalities incident. In these circumstances, the SIM will appoint a police officer or member of police staff to act as the FFRC manager to work in conjunction with the local authority. Family liaison officers should be deployed to collect ante-mortem data for the attention of the casualty bureau.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 55 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.4.3 REST CENTRES
A rest centre is a building pre-designated or used by a local authority as temporary accommodation, including overnight, for people evacuated or homeless as a result of an emergency or major incident. Rest centres provide information and practical and emotional support to those affected.
The relevant local authority is responsible for opening and managing a rest centre, but the police should consider deploying personnel to a rest centre to liaise with the rest centre manager, and to gain and provide information regarding the incident if appropriate.
In many cases people seek shelter with family and friends, or in the case of some emergencies, eg, flooding, insurers may offer hotel accommodation. Generally, rest centres are not open for more than twenty-four to forty-eight hours as the local authority and voluntary sector will seek to repatriate people not resident in the area affected, or rehouse people in temporary accommodation.
2.4.4 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CENTRES
A humanitarian assistance centre (HAC) is a location offering medium to long-term humanitarian assistance to people directly or indirectly affected by the emergency or major incident.
The relevant local authority is responsible for establishing an HAC about forty-eight hours after the commencement of the incident. The police should assist in the establishment of an HAC for the purposes of identification in a mass fatalities incident.
For further information on HACs and ongoing humanitarian assistance, see 3.1.3 Humanitarian Assistance.
2.5 DECONTAMINATION
In order to save lives and contain the consequences of an emergency or major incident, it may be necessary to decontaminate casualties as soon as is practicable.
The Ambulance Service leads in the decontamination of casualties, but may request the support of the Fire and Rescue Service in respect of mass decontamination incidents. The Police Service must create an environment for this to take place promptly and safely.
For further information see ACPO (2008) Guidance on the Police Strategic Management of CBRN Events.
Once a casualty has been decontaminated and no longer requires medical intervention, they should be deemed as a survivor and directed to an SRC for documentation and processing as outlined in 2.4.1 Survivors Reception Centres.
56 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.6 SHELTER AND EVACUATION N D
The purpose of evacuation is to move people and other living creatures away from an actual I N or potential danger to a place of safety via a safe route. Any decision to evacuate should be G taken on the basis of safety of the public and emergency responders. An alternative to evacuation is to require people to shelter inside a place of safety, such as a building. T O
A decision to evacuate or shelter should be taken by the Tactical Coordinating Group, based A upon assessments made by the Fire and Rescue Service and other specialist advisers. The N
STAC, if convened, may also provide advice. The final decision may rest with the police Silver E
Commander on occasions where a prompt decision is required. Where a large-scale M
evacuation is being considered, the SCG may be required to make a policy decision on the E scale and nature of an evacuation. R G
The area within an inner cordon will usually be evacuated except for the emergency services. E N There may also be the need for a shelter or evacuation zone to be extended downwind to C
protect the emergency responders and the public from hazardous material that may be Y carried in the air. A sector extending approximately thirty degrees (in strong or moderate wind conditions) or forty-five degrees (in light and variable wind conditions) either side of O R a line downwind along the prevailing wind direction should be considered where there is a potential hazard from airborne contamination. This downwind sector may extend for up to M one kilometre (or three kilometres in cases of release of nuclear fisson products), in which A people may be requested to shelter indoors, and emergency responders may be required to J O wear PPE, such as face masks. R I
Generally, the police do not have statutory powers to enforce a request or order for people N
to leave a designated area. The exception lies within the Terrorism Act 2000, and is linked C to the statutory power to cordon an area in a terrorist incident (see 2.2.4 Inner Cordon ). I D
Evacuation may, in certain circumstances, be enforced under the Public Health (Control of E
Disease) Act 1984 if necessary as a consequence of infection or disease. However, the police N have a common law duty and power to take reasonable steps to save or preserve life, and T to keep the peace and maintain order.
In cases where a large-scale evacuation has been agreed, the police may establish an evacuation briefing centre to coordinate and brief all the agencies involved in the evacuation. Members of the public may be requested to go to designated evacuation assembly points, from which they can be transported to rest centres (see 2.4.3 Rest Centres ).
Consideration of actions that can be taken before, during and after an emergency situation to promote return and recovery should be central to evacuation planning. It is important that consideration is not just given to evacuating people and animals, but also to their welfare while absent from their homes, the security of their homes and businesses and then a programme for reoccupation. A Bronze Evacuation Officer should be appointed by the Silver Commander to take responsibility for all aspects of the evacuation. The Bronze Evacuation Officer may base themselves at the evacuation briefing centre (if established) or at an FCP. The role of Bronze Evacuation Officer will evolve into Bronze Reoccupation Officer at an appropriate time relative to the scale and nature of the incident, and the tactical plan devised by the Silver Commander.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 57 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
In determining when to evacuate people and which people to evacuate, Silver Commanders and Bronze Evacuation/Reoccupation officers should take into account:
• Transporting people and traffic management; • Shelter and rest centre accommodation; • Supporting people sheltering in situ; • Assisting groups with specific needs, including disabilities and cultural requirements; • Developing a multi-agency crime prevention strategy; • Pets and livestock; • Business continuity; • Protecting items of cultural interest and high value; • Special considerations for flooding, chemical biological radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents, hazardous material, and pandemic flu.
A communications strategy should be developed and then implemented during an evacuation and reoccupation. This strategy should:
• Be persuasive; • Include business and residents; • Aim to reduce anxiety; • Take account of different risks faced by an area; • Take into account different disability and language needs; • Maintain contact with evacuees while they are away from their homes; • Be reviewed and flexible to changing circumstances and amended as necessary; • Make use of a variety of media and communications methods, including local radio, commercial and community radio stations, electronic media, loud hailers and door knocking.
People evacuating their homes should be encouraged to take with them medication, a change of clothing, mobile phone (and charger) and some money but only if by doing so they do not put their own or any other person’s life at risk.
For further information see HM Government (2006) Evacuation and Shelter Guidance.
If it is necessary to evacuate people from a trunk road in England, the Highways Agency has the responsibility to provide emergency customer welfare. For further information see Highways Agency (2007) Provision of Emergency Customer Welfare on Motorways and All Purpose Trunk Roads.
2.7 RETRIEVAL AND INVESTIGATION
The focus of an emergency or major incident will move into a period where the retrieval of the deceased, property and evidence is the priority, and when detailed investigation into the circumstances of the incident can commence. The initial command, control and coordination structure adopted may need to be adapted for this phase as the involvement of a SIM and an SIO assumes prominence. A suggested structure for this phase is shown in Figure 10.
58 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
Figure 10 S uggested Structure During Retrieval and Investigation Phase N D I N G t t r a r i n T o i e d p e v o O l e i p P s S u M n S r o A a e s i v l a i i N h S L P E r e M ) d n s R n ( E r a o E l E e V i L r o m d Z r I R e n t t N S m v a l n i o G O o S C a m R C B E m g o N i s C e r t n o C t e ) s c a s Y I S g i S e t e s C l l ( e O v m i e v r C n D C n R I L a i I O d M G e t s n M d r e A o d t i n a c m J g n o i a O I t o s r R l e o R j v a n ) a g I M n O I i I v t N r S a o ( h i e g r C c i n i r t e e s r a c I r i S e e e s f D v f S d t n m n O D e I a E a L c e e n O T m N e r R G d e m n e i T g o c v o i a C E n t l g n e ) a a s a t d t i i M n n m M v p R e i a E s y E ) e r o r m S e T e C ( u H n v R ) c n s e u o s S r o c o c ( ( i m o e S t D i ) v m t R i s D p ) ( c a v e i n r e e c M r V o u T I t e i e r S t S R n r y ( e r a r e t o r c i e s t i C e v r n f a u i D g o e o s t i L c a S p t n e D n O p e R c a u d G I S u n M u a o ) i e t C r r d p R u n t e F B a c F ( e y y S l t R i l e r s a t m d u n d a s n F e a e C i e C r F t s e g n n o i o y r i t r g s e a a s n c i u i u M o t f r i r m H t o o S m n C M e o d C I
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 59 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.7.1 SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER
All emergencies or major incidents may require a criminal investigation. The Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) will assume responsibility for all aspects of the investigation, including liaison with other authorised investigative bodies. Early appointment of an SIO should be considered by the Gold Commander.
A police SIO is required to:
• Perform the role of officer in charge of an investigation as described in the Code of Practice under Part II of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996; • Develop and implement the investigation strategy; • Develop the information management and decision-making systems for the investigation; • Manage the resources allocated to the investigation; • Be accountable to chief officers for the conduct of the investigation.
For further information see ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual.
2.7.2 SCENE EVIDENCE RECOVERY MANAGER
A scene evidence recovery manager (SERM) will be appointed (if required) to coordinate the recovery of the deceased and any evidence that may assist in the identification of those involved, or in any investigation resulting from the incident. The appointment will normally be made by the SIO in conjunction with the SIM.
The SERM will have command of the disaster victim identification (DVI) recovery teams and scene evidence recovery teams. The constitution of the teams will be determined as appropriate for that incident, but are likely to include:
• DVI recovery team leader; • Property recovery team leader; • Police licensed search adviser (POLSA); • Search trained officers; • Exhibits officers; • Crime scene investigators (CSIs); • Risk assessment officer; • Technical experts (if relevant).
The SERM will develop and then implement a coordinated plan to retrieve the deceased, property and evidence from the scene for examination by appropriate investigating agencies. The plan will take account of issues such as terrain, weather conditions and hazards. It will also include the processes to be adopted for documentation and audit purposes, and a health and safety policy. Staff deployed must be equipped with suitable clothing and equipment, and safe systems of work must be in operation.
The SERM will ensure that all human remains, property and evidence are retrieved to the satisfaction of the SIO and SIM, and will then liaise with the Gold Commander for the scene to be handed over to the local authority or owners for site clearance and reconstruction. Personal property recovered from a scene will be retained in a secure manner, and returned to family or friends as and when appropriate as determined by the SIM or coroner.
60 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.7.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE N D
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the single national regulatory authority responsible I N for promoting the cause of better health and safety at work. The HSE investigates work- G related deaths, major injuries, over three day injuries (an injury that results in the person being absent from work or unable to perform their normal work-related duties for three days T O or more), work-related diseases and dangerous occurrences under the terms of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR). A N
The Association of Chief Police Officers, the British Transport Police, the Director of Public E
Prosecutions, the Local Government Association and the Health and Safety Executive have M
all signed a protocol in respect of work-related deaths. In summary, this protocol states that E the police will conduct an investigation where there is an indication of the commission of R a serious criminal offence (other than a health and safety offence) and the HSE, local G authority or other enforcing authority will investigate health and safety offences. E N
For further information see http://www.hse.gov.uk C Y
The HSE operates an Incident Contact Centre and in addition incidents can be reported online. O R For further information see http://www.hse.gov.uk/riddor M
The Nuclear Installations Act 1965 provides a requirement for the HSE to license sites before A J
they can operate (or continue to operate), and allows the HSE to add safety conditions to O
the licence. If a nuclear incident occurs, the Nuclear Directorate (ND) (which is part of the R HSE) has a mandate to ensure the safety of the public. The ND also conducts the inspections I on behalf of the HSE as required by law. N C I
For further information see http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear D E
2.7.4 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH N T The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), which is part of the Department for Transport (DfT), is responsible for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and serious incidents within the UK. The AAIB focuses its investigation on determining the cause of an air accident or serious incident and then makes recommendations intended to prevent a reoccurrence. The AAIB does not apportion blame or liability.
For further information see http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk
2.7.5 RAIL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is the independent railway accident investigation organisation for the UK. It investigates railway accidents and incidents on the UK’s railways (including heritage railways) to improve safety, not to establish blame.
For further information see http://www.raib.gov.uk
2.7.6 MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) examines and investigates all types of marine accidents to or on board UK ships worldwide, and other ships in UK territorial waters. The objective of the MAIB is to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident in order to preserve life and avoid accidents in the future, not to apportion blame or liability.
For further information see http://www.maib.gov.uk
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 61 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.8 DEALING WITH FATALITIES
An emergency or major incident may result in fatalities. The scale and nature of those fatalities can vary considerably, but, despite the number of deceased, the Police Service will be judged by the manner in which they deal with the deceased and the support that they give to the family and friends during the identification process. The process of identification is also known as Disaster Victim Identification (DVI).
Key advances in the processes by which the Police Service responds to cases of death arising from emergencies and major incidents originate from the report published in 2001 by Lord Justice Clarke entitled ‘Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims following Major Transport Accidents’. While the report enquired into the response to major transport accidents, the recommendations of Lord Justice Clarke apply equally to all emergencies and major incidents. He summarised four general principles to be borne in mind at all times while dealing with fatalities. They are:
• Provision of honest and, as far as possible, accurate information at all times and at every stage; • Respect for the deceased and the bereaved; • A sympathetic and caring approach throughout; • The avoidance of mistaken identification.
These principles apply to all police officers and staff and apply whatever the number of fatalities arising from an incident.
It may be appropriate for fatalities to be processed by use of normal arrangements between the police and HM Coroner, provided Lord Justice Clarke’s four principles and police DVI procedures are complied with. It may, however, be more appropriate to declare a mass fatalities incident, within the overall declaration of an emergency or major incident, where the circumstances are such that normal procedures are not applicable or appropriate.
2.8.1 MASS FATALITIES INCIDENT
The declaration of a mass fatalities incident is an acceptance that the scale and nature of the emergency or major incident is such that the fatalities arising as a consequence cannot or should not be dealt with by normal arrangements or procedures. Whether to declare a mass fatalities incident is a matter of policy for the Gold Commander. A number of factors may influence that decision. These include:
• View of HM Coroner; • Number of deceased (actual or potential); • Location of the deceased; • Level of fragmentation of the deceased; • Integrity and confidence in identification of deceased; • Contamination of deceased; • Criminal investigation issues; • Availability of mortuary capacity.
62 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
The SCG should be consulted on the decision whether to declare a mass fatalities incident, N as the consequences of that decision will affect other agencies, in particular the local D authority in respect of mortuary arrangements. Ultimately, however, the decision lies jointly I N with the police Gold Commander and HM Coroner. G
The declaration of a mass fatalities incident should lead to the appointment of a SIM T O (see 2.8.2 Senior Identification Manager ) and the adoption of police DVI procedures.
A mass fatalities coordination group (or team) should be formed. Potential members of that A group include: N E
• Senior identification manager (SIM) (chair); M
• HM Coroner (chair of the Identification Commission); E
• Senior investigating officer (SIO); R • Casualty bureau manager; G • Scene evidence recovery manager (SERM); E N • Mortuary manager and/or mortuary operations manager; C
• Family liaison coordinator; Y • Survivors reception centre (SRC) manager; • Family and friends reception centre (FFRC) manager; O R • Hospital documentation team coordinator; • Planning, intelligence, resources and logistics manager; M
• Finance manager; A
• Representative of local authority. J O R The purpose of the mass fatalities coordination group is to coordinate all aspects of the I
DVI process on behalf of the Gold Commander. It allows sensitive matters regarding the N
deceased to be discussed outside the SCG. It also allows tactical and operational matters C regarding the DVI process to be discussed at an appropriate forum. The mass fatalities I D
coordination group can meet at any suitable location, with members participating by audio E or video conferencing if appropriate. The SIM and HM Coroner can represent the mass N fatalities coordination group at the SCG. T
The Identification Commission is chaired by HM Coroner. It uses information gathered during the ante-mortem and post-mortem processes managed by the mass fatalities coordination group to identify the deceased.
For further information on the tactical and operational procedures in respect of DVI Procedures, see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Strategy.
2.8.2 SENIOR IDENTIFICATION MANAGER
A SIM should be appointed by the Gold Commander where the need to positively identify the deceased requires the appointment of a specialist police officer to oversee this process on behalf of the coroner. A SIM should be a police officer with experience as an SIO and trained in line with national DVI practices. The primary function of the SIM is to ensure the deceased are:
• Recovered in a dignified manner; • Identified as accurately and speedily as possible using ethical means, while keeping families informed throughout the process.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 63 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The SIM is also responsible for:
• Ensuring the integrity of identification; • Collection and storage of forensic evidence; • Body recovery; • Mortuary documentation; • Casualty bureau; • Family liaison; • Forensic matching (reconciliation).
The SIM will also determine, in conjunction with the coroner and SIO if appropriate, a policy regarding the retention and return of personal property recovered from a scene of a mass fatalities incident. This will include the state and manner in which property is to be returned, and the level of consultation with the family or friends involved as next of kin.
2.8.3 CASUALTY BUREAU
The overall responsibility and management of the casualty bureau process rests with the SIM, using agreed national procedures. A suitably trained and experienced officer should be identified as a casualty bureau manager to be responsible for this process.
It is essential that casualty bureau preparedness is maintained and exercised to support an incident in force, or a regional or national incident.
For further information see ACPO (2008) Casualty Bureau Standard Administrative Procedures (CBSAP).
2.8.4 DISASTER VICTIM IDENTIFICATION TEAMS
Where there are fatalities, the SIM may decide to deploy Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) personnel to retrieve the deceased in a sensitive, dignified and professional manner. If a SIM has not been appointed, the SCG will make this decision. DVI personnel are trained to search and recover deceased people in accordance with the DVI procedures adopted in the UK. There is a national DVI response which can be activated for large-scale mass fatalities incidents. The national DVI Team may be requested to support a mass fatalities incident in the UK in addition to being deployed overseas in response to a disaster.
For further information contact the NPIA Specialist Operations Centre (see Appendix 4 ).
2.8.5 VICTIM AUDIT AREA(S)
A victim audit area (VAA) is a discreet location, near the scene of an incident, to which deceased people can initially be taken prior to removal to a mortuary. A VAA can be an appropriate building or some form of temporary structure, such as a tent. Any deceased recovered by the Fire and Rescue Service during the Rescue Phase or by the Police Service during the Retrieval Phase can be taken to a VAA for the relevant documentation procedures to be complied with. The police Silver Commander should ensure that, wherever possible, the VAA is staffed by appropriately trained personnel.
64 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.8.6 MORTUARY ARRANGEMENTS N D
The deceased should be taken to a mortuary in line with the policy agreed between I N HM Coroner for the area and the SIM. It is the responsibility of HM Coroner for the area to G decide to which mortuary the deceased will be taken; the relevant local authority has the responsibility to provide the facilities. The jurisdiction of a coroner extends to where a T O deceased person’s body lies, or where it was brought ashore. If deceased people resulting from an emergency or major incident lie in more than one coroner’s area, it is A for the coroners themselves to agree whether to appoint a lead coroner and who that N should be. E M
The requirement for mortuary arrangements will depend upon the number of deceased, E their condition and the level of post-mortem investigation required by the SIM and coroner. R There are four options for mortuary arrangements. These are to use: G E • Existing mortuaries; N C • Existing mortuaries with additional storage facilities; Y • A Local Emergency Mortuary Arrangement (LEMA) (including regional arrangements where they exist); O • The National Emergency Mortuary Arrangement (NEMA). R M
Planning for mass fatalities within the Local Resilience Forum should detail the appropriate A arrangements and their activation procedures. J O
For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Disaster Victim R I
Identification (DVI) Strategy. N C I
2.9 FAMILY LIAISON D E
The purpose of police family liaison is to ensure the most effective investigation possible into N
the death of an individual in a mass fatality incident. This will be facilitated in an emergency T or major incident by the early implementation of a family liaison strategy. The SIM will determine the family liaison strategy in consultation with the SIO, to ensure a coordinated approach to the families of any deceased. The strategy should include the criteria for the deployment of family liaison officers (FLOs) to families believed to have lost a relative in the incident.
In order to ensure fair and consistent deployment according to need, the SIM may appoint a family liaison coordinator (FLC). The FLC will be responsible for the deployment of FLOs in line with the policy determined by the SIM or SIO.
2.9.1 FAMILY LIAISON OFFICERS
Family liaison officers (FLOs) will be deployed as determined by the FLC. They will act as the first and primary point of contact between the family and the police. They will collect ante- mortem information and samples to assist in the identification process, and, where appropriate, collect evidence to assist the investigation. For further information see ACPO (2008) Family Liaison Officer Guidance.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 65 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
In some areas FLOs may be assisted by crisis support workers, who may have been trained alongside them. Crisis support workers can offer the family practical and emotional support thereby enabling the FLO to focus on their investigative and information gathering role. A number of transport operators also provide similar support, eg, rail incident care teams.
2.10 CULTURAL AND FAITH ISSUES
People either directly or indirectly involved in an emergency or major incident may be from a variety of nationalities, cultural groups or faiths, including those with no faith.
It is important that police officers and staff do not make assumptions about people involved in such incidents. Where appropriate, they should ask individuals about their beliefs and cultures and how they wish to be treated. However, the nature of emergencies and major incidents are such that it may not be possible or practicable for the wishes of individuals to be taken into account, particularly in the early and potentially chaotic phases of an incident. As a progression is made through the phases of an emergency or major incident, it becomes more likely that cultural and faith requirements can and should be taken into account when dealing with people as individuals, rather than as a group.
There is a range of people who can support the police in terms of ensuring cultural and faith issues are addressed appropriately during the phases of an emergency or major incident. Police diversity managers and officers should be consulted and use made of their networks of key community leaders or faith leaders.
Faith groups can be part of a voluntary sector working group operating under the LRF. Many LRFs have plans in place to provide cultural and faith support in an emergency.
For further information see Home Office and Cabinet Office (2005) The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines and Communities and Local Government (2008) Key Communities, Key Resources: Engaging the capacity and capability of faith communities in Civil Resilience.
2.11 COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
The concept of undertaking community impact assessments is equally applicable to an emergency or major incident as it is to homicide inquiries and public order incidents. The purpose of a community impact assessment is to identify factors that may have an effect on community stability or cohesion. A community impact assessment may also ascertain the views of the community and implications the emergency or major incident may have on sections of the community or the community as a whole.
The local authorities for the areas affected should have a local community cohesion contingency plan in place, which can be used in response to an emergency or major incident. The development of a local community cohesion plan should be led by the relevant local authority, but will include the emergency services, representatives of the statutory agencies, and community and voluntary sectors. The scale and nature of the incident, however, may require a broader community impact assessment than provided by the local community cohesion plan, for example, by including the effect on the business community.
66 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
The extent and detail that the community impact assessment covers is a matter for the N police Gold Commander to determine. Aspects that may be covered include: D I • History – is there any history around the site or operator involved in the incident? N G
• Current situation – what is the vulnerability of individuals, families, community groups T
and businesses? O A • Police and interagency factors – which agencies are involved and how they are working N together, what resources are available, are there any communications issues and what
media involvement is there? E M
• Future options – how is the incident likely to develop, what are the needs of individuals, E
families, community groups and businesses likely to be, what timescales are there on R developments, how are individuals, families, community groups and businesses G perceiving the response of the police and other agencies to the incident, is the response E N seen as adequate, proportionate and appropriate to the circumstances? C Y The community impact assessment may detail any consultation process to include: O
• Individuals or groups involved in any consultation; R
• Access to established community networks; M
• Use of minority newspapers, internet and local community radio stations. A J In addition, it may include a risk assessment matrix which can grade risk to individuals, O families, community groups and businesses in terms of the effects of the incident and the R I
potential consequences. N C
Community impact assessments should be regularly reviewed and recorded, taking account I of emerging issues. They can also take account of local, regional, national and, if D appropriate, international issues relating to the incident. An assessment may identify ways E N
to allow the police to recover from a poorly perceived response by taking prompt action to T ensure community confidence. The reputation of a police force may be severely damaged by an inappropriate response to an emergency or major incident. The process of community impact assessments is a means to ensure that their reputation is not unfairly tarnished.
In terms of community cohesion, the local community cohesion contingency plan should detail the responses applicable to that area, but some generic responses that may be considered include:
• Dissemination of information and reassurance to vulnerable and majority communities; • Outreach to local faith and other community leaders to provide reassurance to the wider community; • Lead members of the council and the local authority chief executive (or their representative) to publicly meet community and faith leaders; • Community groups to offer public messages of solidarity; • Conflict resolution strategies to be developed and implemented; • Deployment of mediation resources; • Positive engagement with youth and other hard-to-reach groups.
For further information on community impact assessments, see ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management and ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual.
For further information on community cohesion see http://www.communities.gov.uk
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 67 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
2.12 INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUPS
The use of Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) during an emergency or major incident can be a positive step in improving accountability through a transparent approach. The primary role of an IAG is to act as a critical friend to the Police Service and other responding agencies. It can provide information on how decisions are being perceived by the communities affected by an emergency or major incident.
IAGs can provide independent advice including:
• The ability to give real-time critical appraisal of police actions from the perspective of a recipient of policing services and a member of the community; • Immediate access to decision makers through involvement in strategic decision making; • Greater appreciation of resources within communities that may assist in resolving particular incidents; • Ability and willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the Police Service; • Ability to identify wider options for resolution of policing problems; • Improved communications, consultation and engagement with communities.
There are various types of IAG, including:
• Strategic IAG; • Area or BCU IAG; • Strand or interest based IAG; • Specialist IAG.
The type of IAG formed in response to an emergency or major incident can be modified to meet the needs of that incident. In addition, more than one IAG can be formed to cover the scale and nature of the incident. An IAG should have defined terms of reference and its membership should be chosen carefully. It may be appropriate for a security policy to be devised on behalf of the Gold Commander to ensure the IAG can function within the context of the incident.
For further information see ACPO (2008) Guidance on Independent Advisory Groups.
2.13 MEDIA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION
2.13.1 PUBLIC INFORMATION
There will be a large demand for information on a wide range of issues from the public during an emergency or major incident. Although not always obvious, information and apparently trivial details might have considerable significance for people making inquiries.
The BBC has contingency arrangements, called ‘Connecting in a Crisis’, that use the local BBC radio networks. There are several commercial local stations that may also assist in disseminating information to the public. For further information see http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis/index
A strategy should be developed by the SCG clearly defining the amount and style of information to be released to the public. Care should be taken in the manner in which information is released, and assumptions should not be made about how that information may be interpreted by the public. Plain language must be used.
68 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
All organisations must ensure that they coordinate any release of information to the public N to avoid releasing conflicting information. The value of regular and reliable updates cannot D be overstated. I N
2.13.2 COORDINATION OF SUPPORT TO THE MEDIA G T
The media must receive consistent and accurate information throughout the duration of an O emergency or major incident. To achieve this a lead organisation should be appointed by A the SCG to coordinate the response to the media. In most emergencies and major incidents N
this role will be performed by the Police Service. E M To achieve the goal of clear and consistent messages being given to the media and the E
public, all press releases should be passed through a Gold media cell (see 2.13.3 Media R
Liaison ) and approved by the SCG, or Gold Commander in urgent cases, before release to G the media or public. This process needs to be carried out quickly, as any delay will add to the E possibility of speculation by the media and may cause individual agencies to make N independent press releases. C Y
The Gold Commander and SCG may decide that some individuals or organisations may be O better placed to speak to the media on specific and technical issues. These individuals R should, however, ensure that any discussions they have with the media are included within M
the overall media coordination process undertaken by the lead authority. A J
2.13.3 MEDIA LIAISON O R
The media, particularly the visual media, are likely to visit the scene of an emergency or I N major incident in order to obtain images of the response by the emergency services. In C
addition, the media are likely to seek interviews with, and question, senior police officers I and other senior representatives of responding agencies at the Gold tier of command. D E A media liaison point at or near to the scene should be identified and its location N T communicated to the media. The media liaison point should be located so that the Response Process and work of the responding agencies is not disrupted. The media liaison point is the responsibility of the Silver Commander. Press officers from the police and other responding agencies can be deployed to this location to liaise with the media and arrange interviews with personnel. The media may wish to obtain close-up views of the incident. The Silver Commander must decide whether to grant permission, in consultation with the other emergency services. Any statements to the media at the scene should be agreed by the tactical (or Silver) coordinating group, and should be restricted to tactical issues. Strategic issues should be referred to the Gold media cell. Similarly, there must be constant referral between the media liaison point at Silver and the media cell at Gold to ensure consistency in messages given to the media and, by definition, to the public.
At the Gold tier of command, there should always be a media cell established. The media cell is the press office for the incident. It may vary in size from one press officer to larger units staffed by media professionals from the emergency services and partner agencies, eg, local authorities, the Environment Agency and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. It should report to the Gold Commander and the SCG. This cell arrangement allows the press officers to be in close contact with commanders and, therefore, able to advise on and assist with media issues. This includes feeding back incoming intelligence from the media (which can be an important source of information) while preserving the Gold Commander’s privacy and allowing crucial decision making to be conducted without the pressure of immediate media scrutiny. Consequently, media organisations should not normally be granted access to the Gold media cell.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 69 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The Central Office of Information (COI) is the government’s centre of excellence for marketing and communications, replacing the Government News Network (GNN). The COI will form part of any government liaison team (GLT) at a Strategic Coordination Centre and will support the Gold media cell. Where a GLT is not deployed to an emergency or major incident, the COI may still be able to assist the Gold media cell. The News Distribution Service (NDS), which is part of the COI, may be able to assist in the electronic delivery of news releases and information.
For further information on the COI and NDS, see http://www.coi.gov.uk
There may be a requirement in serious, large-scale or long-running incidents to open a media centre at or near the Strategic Coordination Centre. The media centre is the location to where the representatives of the media should be directed. The concept of a media centre can be modified to meet the needs of the incident. It should act as a central venue for press conferences and for briefing the media.
The media are likely to be keen to interview the Gold Commander and Silver Commander(s). However, depending on the intensity of the incident, it may not be appropriate for the Gold or Silver Commanders to speak directly to the media. Any interaction with the media is likely to be time-consuming and will remove the commanders from their key role of decision making. As an alternative, the Gold and Silver Commanders should each appoint an appropriate police officer or member of police staff to speak to the media at the Gold and Silver tiers of command, and these persons should become the public faces of the police during the incident.
The method of interaction with the media can be flexible. Short, factual statements can be useful during periods when the events are fast moving and there is an intensity to the incident. At key moments during the incident, particularly when any intensity has calmed down, it may be prudent to hold a formal press conference. Normally, this involves prepared statements being made followed by a question-and-answer session. A press conference can be multi-agency as appropriate to the incident, but, if so, it needs to be managed to avoid confusion and ensure that the appropriate person answers specific questions. In addition to press conferences, the media are likely to request one-to-one interviews with key personnel. These can be important in achieving the media strategy, but can be very time-consuming.
Particular care needs to be given to media releases and interviews regarding public health issues, as a simple, accurate and concise message may need to be given to the media for dissemination to the public. The Gold Commander may decide that it is appropriate for the chair of the STAC (normally a director of public health) to be delegated as the media lead for issues of public health.
2.13.4 INTERACTIVE AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA
Interactive and electronic media are playing an increasing role in emergencies and major incidents by providing news and public information. They are often one of the primary points of reference for the news media and the public. A well-drafted and informative web page can reduce the amount of telephone contact made by the public, thereby freeing up valuable resources.
Forces may consider producing a standard web page that can be activated in the event of an emergency or major incident.
70 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E S P O
2.13.5 PUBLIC MEETINGS N D
The Gold Commander may decide to hold meetings in order to brief the public on I N developments or to consult on specific issues, such as reoccupation following an evacuation. G
It may be prudent for groups with differing issues to be accommodated at different T meetings. For example, businesses affected by an incident are likely to have different O concerns from residents, so two separate meetings should be held for these groups. A
Whenever a public meeting is considered, the nature of the incident should be taken into N
account as there may be tension among those affected. E M
2.13.6 PRIVATE MEETINGS E R
Private meetings with those known to have been bereaved, and survivors where appropriate, G may have considerable value in meeting information needs and alleviating immediate E anxieties and concerns about issues such as the disaster victim identification process. Such N meetings require careful and sensitive preparation and organisation, and particular C Y attention should be paid to protecting the privacy of those attending. O R M A J O R I N C I D E N T
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 71 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
72 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED S E C
Section 3 T I O RECOVERY AND N 3 POST INCIDENT ISSUES
This section explains the Recovery Process and discusses post-incident considerations .
CONTENTS
3.1 Recovery Process ...... 74 3.1.1 Lead Coordinating Authority ...... 74 3.1.2 Role of the Insurance Industry ...... 75 3.1.3 Humanitarian Assistance ...... 75 3.2 Safety, Health and Welfare ...... 76 3.3 Debriefing and Inquiries ...... 77 3.3.1 Structured Debriefing ...... 77 3.3.2 Reports and Recommendations ...... 77 3.3.3 Subsequent Inquiries ...... 78
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 73 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
3.1 RECOVERY PROCESS
This process covers the reconstruction and restoration of amenities and normal services following an emergency or major incident.
The Recovery Process will usually be led by a designated local authority. A Recovery Working Group (RWG), generally chaired by an executive member of the local authority, should be established during the Response Process. The chair of the RWG is expected to sit on the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).
During the Response Process, the SCG should determine the criteria for establishing when the lead coordinating authority passes from the police to the local authority. When the criteria have been met to the satisfaction of the SCG, a formal handover of the lead coordinating authority should take place. At this time, the SCG becomes the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG), absorbing the role of the RWG.
The police should be represented at the RCG. Police officers and staff can be deployed to support the work of the RCG where appropriate.
3.1.1 LEAD COORDINATING AUTHORITY
A local authority will lead the coordination of the Recovery Process of an emergency or major incident, including chairing and providing the secretariat of the RCG. The RCG will link into regional or national organisations required to support the Recovery Process.
The procedures to transfer the role of lead coordinating authority from the police to the local authority should be agreed by the SCG prior to it evolving into the RCG.
Factors to take into account in making the decision on when the handover of responsibility should occur include:
• There is no known further risk to life; • There are no serious public disorder or crime prevention issues that impact on the overall strategic coordination of this incident; • The Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service are now operating at a level which does not require the Police Service to coordinate and facilitate their activity; • There are no scenarios known that may result in the need to reinstate the Police Service as lead coordinating authority in the foreseeable future in relation to this incident; • The circumstances dictate that it is more appropriate for the responsibility as lead coordinating authority to rest with the relevant local authority; • The focus of the strategic command, control and coordination is on recovery rather than response; • The relevant local authority is confident of assuming the role as lead coordinating authority having due regard to the overall aim and objectives set by the Gold Commander and the SCG; • The local authority is satisfied that they have the infrastructure and processes ready to assume the role as lead coordinating authority.
74 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E C O V
3.1.2 ROLE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY E R
How the insurance industry deals with emergencies or major incidents is detailed in a Y
protocol (which covers England and Wales) agreed between the Association of British A
Insurers (ABI), the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters (CILA), aviation insurers’ N representatives, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), the Local Government D Association, the Chief Fire Officers’ Association and the Association of Chief Police Officers. P O
This protocol is not legally binding, but the parties to it are expected to abide by its provisions S and cooperate. T I Under the protocol, the ABI and CILA will provide a nominated point of contact to act on N C behalf of the insurance industry. The SCG should also nominate an individual to act as the I point of contact between the insurance industry and the SCG. This role will normally be D found within the RCG. E N
3.1.3 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE T I S
The initial provision of humanitarian assistance to people directly and indirectly affected in S an emergency or major incident is explained in 2.4 Reception Centres. However, the U E
provision of humanitarian assistance is an ongoing process, not just a short-term response. S
The Local Government Act 2000 gives local authorities power to promote or improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the communities they serve. Local authorities should lead the planning to provide humanitarian assistance in the event of an emergency or major incident. The provision of humanitarian assistance could include the opening of a humanitarian assistance centre (HAC).
The purpose of an HAC is to:
• Act as a focal point for information and assistance to – bereaved families and friends of those missing, injured or killed – survivors – those directly affected by and involved in the emergency or major incident; • Enable those affected to benefit from appropriate information and assistance in a timely and coordinated manner; • Where necessary, facilitate the gathering of forensic samples in a timely manner to assist the identification process; • Offer access to, and guidance on, a range of agencies and services, allowing people to make informed choices according to their needs; • Ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance, while minimising duplication and avoiding gaps.
Each LRF should have a multi-agency plan to open an HAC when deemed appropriate. The decision to open an HAC will normally be taken by the SCG during the Response Process. This should ensure that the provision of humanitarian assistance is not delayed and there is a seamless transition from any survivors reception centre and family and friends reception centre opened during the early phases of the incident.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 75 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The roles and responsibilities of all the responding organisations should be clarified within the LRF HAC plan, but the provision of an HAC is led by the relevant local authority, supported by the police, and other statutory and voluntary organisations. The role of the police at an HAC will depend on the circumstances of the incident, but may include:
• Appointment of a police HAC liaison officer to sit on the HAC management team to represent police interests; • Deployment of family liaison officers (FLOs) by the family liaison coordinator (FLC) for investigative and identification purposes; • Deployment of investigators to obtain evidence from people to whom the deployment of a FLO is not required; • Provision of an exhibits officer; • Provision of a casualty bureau liaison officer.
The nature of the incident that led to the opening of an HAC may be such that it is appropriate to ensure that people entering the HAC are vetted and searched. The police Gold Commander may make a policy decision to provide the security and searching facility for the HAC, at least for a prescribed period of time. The purpose of a security and searching process is to prevent unauthorised access. In addition, it can be used to check that vulnerable people do not leave the HAC without the necessary support in place, albeit, there is no power to detain people who wish to leave an HAC of their own free will. The security and searching process may involve a collaborative arrangement with the other agencies, including the use of security guards, or the police may assume sole responsibility for this role.
For further information see HM Government department for culture, media and sport, (nd) Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Non-statutory guidance on establishing Humanitarian Assistance Centres.
3.2 SAFETY, HEALTH AND WELFARE
By their nature, emergencies and major incidents can be traumatic events for personnel directly or indirectly involved. Basic needs of personnel should not be neglected as this may affect the response. The Gold and Silver Commanders should ensure appropriate arrangements are in place and identified individuals nominated to deliver these arrangements.
Consideration should be given to appointing a health and safety adviser to assist in preparing appropriate health and safety risk assessments. Health and safety risk assessments should be recorded in writing.
Appropriate control measures and levels of personal protective equipment should be agreed by the Silver Commander, based upon scientific and technical advice and advice from any appointed health and safety adviser. If necessary, in incidents where a widespread or specific risk to personnel has been identified (such as a risk of infection or contamination), personal protective equipment levels, monitoring regimes, medical support and welfare arrangements should be agreed at a Gold level and communicated to all relevant personnel.
For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Police CBRN Operational Procedures and Tactics.
76 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED R E C O V
Forces should determine an ongoing welfare regime once an incident has concluded. E
Employee assistance programmes can be used as part of the support arrangements for R personnel. Consideration should be given to briefing personnel, whether directly and Y
indirectly involved in an emergency or major incident, on the nature of post-traumatic stress A disorder (PTSD) and how to recognise early indications of a possible onset. Supervisors of N personnel involved in such an incident should also be made aware of potential indications D of some form of reaction to traumatic events, and how to respond to any concerns they, as P
supervisors, may have in respect of their colleagues. O S 3.3 DEBRIEFING AND INQUIRIES T I N
The purpose of debriefing is to identify good practice and areas for improvement. The Gold C
or Silver Commander should establish, at an early opportunity, the debriefing arrangements I D to be put in place and identify who should be responsible for compiling and assessing any E
debrief material generated. N T The debriefing process should commence in the early stages of the incident so that those I personnel deployed to the incident in the initial phases can provide information for later S S
phases of the response. U E
Written accounts of all debriefs conducted should be completed and retained for audit and S disclosure purposes. If an SIO has been appointed, they may require all debrief material to be indexed and retained in case of subsequent criminal proceedings or some other form of legal or judicial inquiry. A statement can be added to written material to clarify the purpose of the debrief and to avoid potential litigation in the future.
For further information see ACPO (2006) Guidance on the National Briefing Model.
3.3.1 STRUCTURED DEBRIEFING
The NPIA Uniform Operational Support (UOS) offers a debriefing service for police forces involved in an emergency or a major incident. The service ranges from consultancy on force debriefs to a bespoke service covering aspects of post-incident feedback. The NPIA UOS can conduct debriefs for UK police forces if the incident meets any of the following criteria:
• Events of a national significance; • Events which have a force-wide impact; • Events with unique operational features.
For further information contact the NPIA Specialist Operations Centre (see Appendix 4 ).
3.3.2 REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the conclusion of an emergency or major incident, a report should be produced detailing the experiences gained by those organisations involved in it. This will benefit the wider policing community, emergency services and other organisations.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 77 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The SCG will determine how a multi-agency report will be compiled and circulated. The police Gold Commander determines the methods to apply within that police force. Each of the organisations and emergency services involved in an incident may conduct their own internal debriefs. Issues arising from those debriefs that are internal to an organisation should be addressed by them in an appropriate manner. Issues identified that have implications for more than one organisation, or that apply on a multi-agency basis, should be brought to a forum convened to address the outcomes of the internal debriefs. This forum should be seen as an opportunity for all organisations involved to understand and share what went well during the Response and Recovery Processes, and to identify areas for development. In order to take forward the outcomes of this process, an action plan should be compiled and agreed by all participating organisations. The LRF may be the group best placed to ensure that all recommendations are properly considered and addressed, where appropriate.
The presumption is that a report written as a result of a debrief should be published for the benefit of the Police Service nationally and for the wider emergency planning community. Copies of these reports may be lodged with the library at the Emergency Planning College in Easingwold, and with the National Police Library at NPIA Bramshill.
3.3.3 SUBSEQUENT INQUIRIES
Various forms of public inquiry may result from an emergency or major incident. These include government-led public inquiries, judicial inquiries and local public inquiries. The terms of reference for each inquiry will determine the force’s involvement and response to it. Appropriate legal advice should be sought as necessary.
78 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED S E C
Section 4 T I O ADDITIONAL N 4 RESPONSE ISSUES
This section gives additional information about specific emergencies or major incidents .
CONTENTS
4.1 Aircraft Incidents ...... 81 4.1.1 Introduction ...... 81 4.1.2 Role of the Police ...... 81 4.1.3 Notifications ...... 83 4.1.4 Role of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch ...... 83 4.1.5 Role of the Ministry of Defence ...... 84 4.1.6 Role of Airlines in an Air Incident ...... 85 4.1.7 Additional Information ...... 86 4.2 Flooding ...... 86 4.2.1 Types of Flooding ...... 87 4.2.2 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 88 4.2.3 Health and Safety ...... 89 4.3 Influenza Pandemic ...... 89 4.3.1 Introduction ...... 89 4.3.2 Command and Control ...... 89 4.3.3 Police Roles and Responsibilities ...... 90 4.3.4 Business Continuity Management ...... 90 4.3.5 Policing Public Gatherings ...... 90 4.3.6 Health, Safety and Infection Control ...... 91 4.3.7 Dealing with Fatalities ...... 91 4.3.8 Additional Information ...... 91 4.4 Industrial Incidents and Environmental Pollution ...... 91 4.4.1 Introduction ...... 91 4.4.2 Notifications ...... 92 4.4.3 Health and Safety ...... 92 4.4.4 Command and Control ...... 93 4.4.5 Investigation Issues ...... 93
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 79 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
4.5 Maritime Incidents and Search and Rescue ...... 94 4.5.1 Introduction ...... 94 4.5.2 Command and Control ...... 94 4.5.3 Role of the Police – Search and Rescue ...... 95 4.5.4 Role of the Police – Major Incidents at Sea ...... 95 4.5.5 Aviation Accidents at Sea ...... 98 4.5.6 Media Arrangements ...... 98 4.5.7 Counter Pollution Incidents ...... 98 4.5.8 Additional Information ...... 100 4.6 Ministry of Defence Assistance ...... 100 4.6.1 Introduction ...... 100 4.6.2 Notifications ...... 101 4.6.3 Financial Implications ...... 102 4.6.4 Additional Information ...... 102 4.7 Nuclear Incidents ...... 102 4.7.1 Introduction ...... 102 4.7.2 Incidents at Civil Nuclear Sites ...... 102 4.7.3 Transport Incidents Involving Nuclear Materials ...... 104 4.7.4 Ministry of Defence Fixed Nuclear Sites ...... 104 4.7.5 Ministry of Defence Nuclear Transport Issues ...... 105 4.8 Railway Incidents ...... 106 4.8.1 Introduction ...... 106 4.8.2 Notifications ...... 106 4.8.3 Health and Safety ...... 107 4.8.4 Procedures in Emergencies and Major Incidents ...... 108 4.8.5 Investigation Issues ...... 108 4.9 Road Incidents ...... 109 4.9.1 Introduction ...... 109 4.9.2 Notifications ...... 109 4.9.3 Health and Safety ...... 109 4.9.4 Procedures in Emergencies and Major Incidents ...... 110 4.9.5 Investigation Issues ...... 110 4.9.6 Additional Information ...... 110 4.10 Specialist Advice ...... 110 4.10.1 Scientific and Technical Advice Cell ...... 111 4.10.2 Environment Monitoring and Response Centre ...... 111 4.11 Terrorist Incidents ...... 112 4.11.1 Introduction ...... 112 4.11.2 Notifications ...... 112 4.11.3 Command and Control ...... 112 4.11.4 Considerations at the Scene ...... 112 4.11.5 Investigation Issues ...... 113 4.11.6 Additional Information ...... 113 4.12 Utilities ...... 113 4.12.1 Introduction ...... 113 4.12.2 Loss of Electricity Supply Network ...... 113 4.12.3 Loss of Gas Supply Network ...... 114 4.12.4 Loss of Water Supply Network ...... 114 4.12.5 Disruption to Downstream Fuel Supply ...... 114 4.12.6 Loss of Telecommunications Systems ...... 115
80 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T I
4.1 AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS O N
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION A L
Although some minor aircraft accidents are not required to be reported to the police, it is the R
legal responsibility of the commander of the aircraft to notify the Air Accidents Investigation E
Branch (AAIB) of all aircraft accidents and serious incidents. S P O Aircraft accidents reported to the police should be dealt with in accordance with the N standard response procedures for major incidents and emergencies. However, the nature of S
aircraft accidents and the potential hazards created by them require some additional E
measures to be adopted by the police in the event of an incident. I S S
4.1.2 ROLE OF THE POLICE U E
The role of the police in aircraft accidents normally commences in a similar manner to other S sudden impact major incidents. The initial reports to the police may come from an airport’s Air Traffic Control section (ATC), or from one of the two national Area Control Centres at Swanwick or Prestwick. Reports may also come from passengers using mobile phones on board aircraft. These calls can be very traumatic for the police to handle. Most reports are, however, likely to come from the public on the ground hearing or seeing an aircraft in distress or witnessing an actual crash.
As there are health and safety issues relating to aircraft, in particular military aircraft, police officers and staff should not engage directly in the rescue of survivors. This should be left to properly trained and equipped Fire and Rescue Service personnel. In addition, aircraft can contain various hazardous materials, some of which may become airborne. Personnel should, therefore, place themselves upwind of the scene of an aircraft accident, with the cordon extended downwind of the scene to protect people.
The role of the police remains the same as with all emergencies and major incidents. In aircraft accidents, however, the additional police role of securing the accident site is crucial both for safety and evidential reasons.
There are four main scenarios in terms of accident sites:
• Intact aircraft; • Smoking hole; • Extended area; • Multiple sites.
The accident site or sites should be identified as soon as possible and an effective cordon established immediately. A recommended cordon of four-hundred metres should be established around military aircraft and large aircraft accidents, and a cordon of thirty metres around small aircraft or individual items. In addition, the cordon may need to be extended downwind to protect the emergency responders and the public from hazardous material that may be carried in the air. A sector extending approximately thirty degrees (in strong or moderate wind conditions) or forty-five degrees (in light and variable wind conditions), either side of a line downwind along the prevailing wind direction should be considered where there is a potential hazard from airborne contamination. This downwind sector may extend for up to one kilometre, in which people may be requested to shelter indoors and emergency responders may be required to wear personal protective equipment such as face masks.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 81 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The extended area or multiple sites scenarios may produce very large areas in which wreckage, the deceased and their personal effects may be located, particularly if an aircraft has broken up prior to crashing. Early consideration should be given to conducting an effective search to identify the location of all relevant material. This may include the deployment of a police or military helicopter to survey the scene. Digital imaging of the scene or scenes should be recorded for use by both the police and the AAIB. For further information see ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Search Management and Procedures.
Only personnel engaged in search and rescue should be allowed access to the scene. It may be necessary, however, to allow personnel such as airline engineers or technical experts access to the scene for critical safety duties. As soon as survivors have been rescued, the scene should be sealed awaiting the arrival of the AAIB and/or Ministry of Defence (MoD) investigators.
The scene should be secured during the hours of darkness prior to commencing or re- commencing the examination in daylight. Due to the potential size of the debris field, early consideration should be given to the resources needed to maintain an effective cordon over the period of time required.
In addition to site security, the AAIB require the police to undertake the following actions:
• Record, as soon as possible, the positions in the aircraft wreckage from which any survivors were assisted; • Leave the deceased in situ until examined by a pathologist (except in cases where the removal of a deceased person is deemed necessary to facilitate the rescue of a living person, or in other justifiable circumstances); • Take photographs, recordings or sketches of items which have to be removed or may be lost prior to the arrival of the AAIB investigating team; • If necessary, protect key items of wreckage or material from further damage, such as from heavy rain; • Record details and movements of witnesses; • Record details and locations of survivors.
The police have the lead responsibility for the retrieval of the deceased and their identification on behalf of HM Coroner. This will be undertaken in accordance with disaster victim identification (DVI) protocols and local mass fatalities response plans. An aviation pathologist may be required to examine the deceased in situ prior to their retrieval by the police.
Aircraft incidents at sea are dealt with, in terms of the search and rescue phase of the incident, as a maritime incident. The requirement to notify the AAIB remains the same. In addition, the guidance contained within 4.1 Aircraft Incidents applies as far as is practicable in the circumstances. The arrangements for salvage of the aircraft, deceased people and their personal property require the cooperation of the police, maritime agencies and the AAIB.
For further information see 4.5.5 Aviation Incidents at Sea.
82 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T I
4.1.3 NOTIFICATIONS O N When the police become aware of an aircraft accident, they should immediately notify A the AAIB. The AAIB will ask for the following information, which should be provided where L it is available: R E
• Aircraft type; S
• Aircraft registration (letters or numbers); P • Name of owner or operator; O • If a military aircraft, service and operating unit; N S
• Names of pilot, crew and any other persons on board; E • Extent of injuries to occupants and others on ground; I • Date and time of departure; S S
• Last departure point and intended destination; U
• Location of incident and rendezvous point; E
• Nature of accident, eg, on takeoff, while landing or in flight; S • Damage to aircraft; • General description of occurrence.
Notification should not be delayed if all the above information is unavailable as further updates can be given as additional details become known to the police. In addition to the AAIB, the police should also notify either the London Area Control Centre at Swanwick for incidents in England, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or the Scottish Area Control Centre at Prestwick for incidents in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
If the aircraft or one of the aircraft involved is a military plane, the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss should be notified. The ARCC will normally notify appropriate personnel within the MoD and arrange deployment of MoD resources to assist with the incident.
4.1.4 ROLE OF THE AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH
The role of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is to investigate aircraft accidents for the purpose of preventing further accidents and incidents. It is not the role of the AAIB to apportion blame or liability.
The AAIB Duty Coordinator will decide on the response of the AAIB dependent on the scale and nature of the incident. In major incidents, the AAIB will deploy a principal inspector to lead the investigation team as the investigator in charge (IiC). The IiC will work at the Silver tier alongside the police Silver and SIO, if appointed. The chief inspector of the AAIB, or their deputy, will oversee the inquiry and act as equivalent of the Gold tier of command.
The AAIB investigation team may be augmented by investigators and advisers from the airline (if a commercial passenger or freight plane), manufacturers of the aircraft and the engines, and other interested parties. These people may attend from other countries, but they have the same rights of participation under international agreements. The AAIB will provide advisers for health and safety at the accident site, and will normally organise recovery of the aircraft using MoD assets.
Where incidents are less serious, the AAIB may deploy a small field investigation team, whose date and time of arrival at scene will depend on the location and circumstances of the incident.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 83 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
For minor incidents involving light aircraft or microlights, the AAIB will not normally deploy an investigation team, but will manage the investigation remotely. The AAIB will investigate sporting aviation accidents involving a fatality, and incidents involving balloons and airships carrying passengers. The AAIB is not required to investigate the death of a parachutist; such an event will generally be investigated by the police, although the AAIB may assist if appropriate to do so.
4.1.5 ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) have responsibility for investigating accidents involving military aircraft through a Board of Inquiry, although in certain circumstances (under the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Military Air Accidents at Civil Aerodromes) Regulations 2005) the AAIB may also investigate accidents involving military aircraft. The MoD may be involved in the recovery of crashed aircraft and also support the AAIB in other non-military investigations. The MoD lead on post-crash management (PCM) of most serious aircraft accidents.
The ARCC at RAF Kinloss should be the first police point of contact with the MoD. The ARCC may deploy military Search and Rescue helicopters to assist with searches to confirm the location of a reported aircraft accident and to assist with rescue.
The ARRC may also task the RAF Mountain Rescue Service to dispatch a team to secure the accident site in remote locations, or to assist the police in locations not easily accessible by vehicles.
The ARCC will notify the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) of relevant incidents. The DCDSDO will determine the appropriate response, which may include:
• Initiation of an MoD lead unit; • Appointment of an MoD incident officer (MoD IO); • Notifying an RAF liaison officer (RAFLO); • Tasking the Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS); • Tasking the RAF Tactical Communications Wing (TCW); • Liaising with the AAIB, marine salvage and other interested parties.
The MoD IO will usually attend the scene of the accident in the capacity of senior MoD officer at the scene (Military Silver), with the RAFLO representing the MoD at the Gold tier of command.
The responsibilities of the MoD in terms of PCM are:
• Preservation of evidence; • Health and safety; • Corporate communications; • Activities to restore the accident site.
In terms of preservation of evidence, the MoD may be able to assist with cordons, aerial photography, record keeping and obtaining information from radar plots.
84 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
In order to restore the accident site, the MoD can arrange to recover the wreckage, deal I O with contamination and repair the site. If JARTS is deployed, it will be led by a designated N accident recovery officer (ARO). The ARO will determine the arrangements for the recovery A
of evidence, wreckage and other debris in conjunction with the police and AAIB. The ARO L can advise the police DVI team in respect of the retrieval of any deceased. The MoD may R
use specialist personnel from the Centre for Aviation Medicine and the Institute of Naval E
Medicine to provide scientific support to the police or AAIB. S P
When JARTS’ work to restore the accident site is complete, the ARO will sign a site clearance O N certificate handing the site back to the landowners or occupiers. Where contractors have S
been appointed, Defence Estates will complete this certificate. E I The MoD will look after those affected by an accident involving a military aircraft, and will S lead on media relations during the PCM. Claims for damages and liaison with any S U
contractors appointed will be dealt with by Defence Estates. E S 4.1.6 ROLE OF AIRLINES IN AN AIR INCIDENT
In the event of an aircraft major incident at a UK commercial airport, airlines will activate response plans to ensure that passengers, crew, staff and others affected receive appropriate assistance and care.
The United Kingdom Airlines Emergency Planning Group (UKAEPG) assists airlines with emergency response planning and establishing good practice in emergency response to air incidents. There is an ethos of mutual aid between airlines in the event of an aircraft incident involving a commercial airline or commercial airport. Airlines take a human assistance role rather than an accident investigation role. Police should be aware of the assistance an airline can provide in response to an aircraft incident and, where appropriate, establish protocols with airports and airlines.
An airline representative may be able to assist at the FCP or Silver Control, in particular by providing a passenger manifest and register of hazardous substances on board the aircraft. An aircraft engineer may be able to offer appropriate technical assistance and expertise to the Fire and Rescue Service and aircraft accident investigators.
Where there is an aircraft incident at or close to an airport, the airport will set up an emergency operations centre (EOC), located at the airport. The EOC should have representatives of all agencies involved, including a police liaison officer and a representative of the airline involved. Consideration may be given to adopting this as the Silver Control where the location and facilities are appropriate. Airports and airlines may have agreements with local hotels or schools which can be used as assistance centres or reception centres. Larger airports may have designated facilities at the airport for this purpose. Airlines may also set up a telephone helpline for concerned family and friends.
A family assistance centre (FAC) may be set up initially by the airline involved, but this is likely to evolve into the family and friends reception centre (FFRC) run in collaboration with the police, local authority, airline and other interested parties. The reason an airline may set up an FAC before the police and local authority can open an FFRC is because family and friends may be present at the airport and there is a requirement for urgent action to support and inform the family and friends. The airline and airport may assist in the establishment of a humanitarian assistance centre to address medium and long-term support to the bereaved, survivors, families and friends of those directly involved in an aircraft incident. An assessment of need conducted on behalf of the bereaved, survivors, families and friends should be seen to be objective and independent of the airlines and airports involved.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 85 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
UK-based airlines generally have a special assistance team (SAT), which consists of employees of that airline who volunteer to join the SAT. These volunteers receive psychological training for the role, have language skills and are culturally aware of the needs of passengers. They can assist in a major incident by:
• Completing police misper, survivor/evacuee forms; • Providing early defusing; • Providing emergency use clothing and footwear; • Providing food and drink; • Providing small amounts of money to assist passengers with immediate needs; • Contacting family and friends; • Escorting passengers home or providing transport to their destination.
The SAT is part of a larger team of airline personnel, called a Go Team, who can be deployed to air accidents or incidents involving a UK airline anywhere in the world. The team may include accident investigators, media, finance, legal and insurance personnel, and a specialist DVI team as appropriate to the incident.
4.1.7 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
For further information see Air Accidents Investigation Branch (2008) Aircraft Accidents Guidance for the Police, Emergency Services and Airfield Operators.
4.2 FLOODING
The UK has seen several significant flooding emergencies, in particular at Boscastle and North Cornwall in 2004, East Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, the Thames Valley and Gloucestershire in 2007. The latter events led to a review chaired by Sir Michael Pitt, entitled ‘Learning the lessons from the 2007 floods’.
The Environment Agency (EA) is the government agency responsible for flood prevention measures and flood warnings. The EA runs a warning system called Floodline Warnings Direct, which can advise police forces, local authorities, businesses and individuals of the risk of flooding in their locality.
The EA has a system of incremental flood warnings. They are in ascending order of severity:
• Flood Watch – flooding on low lying land and roads is expected.
• Flood Warning – the flooding of homes and businesses is expected. Act now!
• Severe Flood Warning – Act now! Severe flooding is expected with extreme danger to life and property.
For further information on the Environment Agency flood warnings, see http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk
86 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
In addition to flood warnings, where the EA has identified that a place is at particular risk I O of flooding, with significant consequences to homes and businesses above a certain N threshold, this location will be subject to a major incident plan (MIP). Where circumstances A
are such that a severe flood warning has been or is about to be issued, and the EA has L reasonable grounds to believe it may be necessary to invoke the MIP in the near future, R
they will declare a ‘Pre MIP’ alert. Local flood MIPs should detail the actions to be taken E when a Pre MIP has been declared. When the agreed criteria are reached, and the EA has S reasonable grounds to believe it is now necessary to invoke the major incident plan, an MIP P O will be declared, and all the emergency services and partner agencies must implement the N local flood major incident plan immediately. S E 4.2.1 TYPES OF FLOODING I S
There are three main types of flooding, each with a distinct set of circumstances that can S U
affect the response. E S Coastal flooding is where, through the effects of wind and tide, inundation occurs of coastal land and properties. Normally, the Met Office will provide severe weather alerts between two to four days in advance of an event. The EA can provide early indications of the likelihood of coastal flooding up to twelve hours in advance. The level of confidence and accuracy in such predictions improves closer to the time of high tides, and the EA aims to provide at least two hours’ notice prior to potential flooding of property as a consequence of the overtopping of sea defences. Where defences suddenly fail (through a partial or full collapse), there may be no time to give a warning or notice to the emergency services.
It is difficult to assess the scale, impact and potential consequences of coastal flooding in advance. The formation of an SCG prior to the event should be based on pre-determined thresholds and triggers relating to the advice and information provided by the Met Office and EA. The early formation of an SCG will ensure all responding agencies can assimilate the advice and information received, and react accordingly. If the subsequent coastal flooding event does not occur or is not as severe as predicted, this does not invalidate the formation of an SCG.
Fluvial flooding is where a river overtops its banks and floods adjoining land and properties. The speed and impact of fluvial flooding is conditional on the river system involved in terms of its length, fall and confluence with feeder watercourses. Some catchments channel the water very quickly into the rivers, which then rise and fall very quickly. Other catchments drain more slowly and it may take one or two days for runoff to reach main rivers. Therefore, the relationship between rainfall and ground conditions makes a difference to the way flood warnings are issued and to the notice period given to the police. At an estuary where a main river connects to the sea, flooding may occur if the water coming down the river cannot drain out due to high sea levels. Where a flood warning system is provided, the EA aims to give at least twenty-four hours’ notice of potential flooding that may affect property.
Pluvial flooding (also known as localised or surface water flooding) is caused by heavy and sustained rainfall events over a localised area. The sheer amount and intensity of rainfall overwhelms the drainage systems and floods land, roads and property. By its nature, pluvial flooding is more difficult to predict, and police forces may receive little prior warning of the risk of severe pluvial flooding.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 87 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The three types of flooding do not always occur separately. For example, the events in North Cornwall in 2004 and East Yorkshire in 2007 were caused by pluvial flooding; the events in South Yorkshire in 2007 were a combination of pluvial and fluvial flooding; while the events in Gloucestershire in 2007 were a combination of all three, namely coastal (tidal), fluvial and pluvial.
4.2.2 POLICE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
In a flooding emergency or major incident, the police can assume their normal role of lead coordinating agency. The police will also have a role in any evacuation deemed necessary, traffic management and general policing duties.
The police should establish a command and control structure applicable to the scale and nature of the event foreseen. This may include forming an SCG at a central location, for example, the force headquarters, with Silver Commanders appointed for each police basic command unit (BCU) or locality likely to be affected by the flooding. Bronze Commanders can be appointed to each locality or neighbourhood, or allocated to specific roles such as Bronze Evacuation or Bronze Traffic Management.
The early deployment of a police aircraft to survey the extent of flooding can provide useful information for strategic and tactical decision making. Use of thermal imaging and other specialist equipment on police aircraft can also give indications of the number and location of people involved in a flooding incident.
One of the key decisions to be taken early by the SCG regards evacuation. Local authorities and the EA can advise on the potential extent, depth and flow of water in the affected areas. The Met Office can provide regular and detailed weather updates to inform and assist the decision-making process. Flood response plans (also known as major incident plans or MIPs) should identify vulnerable communities, at risk locations (for example, hospitals, schools or care homes), critical national infrastructure or individuals. Identified evacuation assembly points and rest centres may be included in the plan to assist Silver and Bronze Commanders. It is unlikely that an evacuation of all people in an affected area will be practicable; the focus should, therefore, be on people classified as vulnerable either by their physical or mental health, lack of amenities, individual circumstances (including disabilities) or by living in vulnerable properties such as basements or bungalows.
There is no power to require people to evacuate, other than if emergency powers are invoked, however, the EA recommends that people evacuate when told to do so by the emergency services.
The EA provides advice to people on their website, including information on preparing for an emergency and what to do during and after a flooding incident. For further information see http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood
The LRF for the police force area (or RRF in London) should identify the water rescue capability that is available in their area, either locally or by mutual aid. This should include the capability of the Fire and Rescue Service and other rescue organisations in the area, including the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI). Care should be taken in using volunteers unless they have been previously identified as part of an emergency response plan. In addition, where volunteers are used in the response to an emergency or major incident, police forces should check that their insurance provision covers these volunteers when acting under the direction of the police. The police should consider the requirement to maintain law and order in flooded and evacuated areas. This may include using boats and equipment in a dual rescue and enforcement capacity.
88 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
The police should be involved in the planning for reoccupation of areas subjected to I O flooding, and should collaborate with the local authorities and other agencies in the N Recovery Process. A
4.2.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY L R E
Flood water is dangerous. Swift flowing water has obvious dangers, but static water can S conceal missing manhole covers, holes and other obstacles, and all flood water carries the P risk of infection. O N
As a general rule, police personnel should avoid driving or walking through flood water. If it S E is necessary to do so, a dynamic risk assessment should be conducted and care taken by I all staff. S S U
4.3 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC E S 4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
A pandemic is a global epidemic, caused by a new virus to which people have no immunity. It will spread rapidly and cause significant illness and deaths.
The National Risk Register assesses pandemic flu as one of the major risks facing the UK. The lead government department in planning the response to a flu pandemic is the Department of Health (DH). LRF are required to develop plans to respond to a flu pandemic within their area.
The key documents for the benefit of LRF planning teams are Cabinet Office and Department of Health (2007) Pandemic Flu: A national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic, Cabinet Office (n.d.) Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Guidance to Local Planners and Cabinet Office (2008) Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Supplementary Guidance for Local Resilience Forum Planners.
For further information see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/pandemicflu.aspx
4.3.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL
A flu pandemic is likely to be a rising tide emergency (see 1.2.6 Rising Tide Incident ). The World Health Organisation (WHO) has identified six phases. At Phase 6, there is an increased and sustained transmission in the general population and a pandemic is confirmed. However, this does not necessarily mean there are any cases in the UK. The UK has, therefore, subdivided WHO Phase 6 into four alert levels. Alert Level 1 means there are pandemic cases outside the UK, Alert Levels 2 – 4 mean there are some or widespread outbreaks in the UK.
The WHO will inform the Department of Health of any change in the phases. The Department of Health will communicate that information, together with an assessment of the risk to the UK, to all public and private sector organisations. HM Government may determine the UK response on a national basis, with LRF required to implement their contingency plans. At this time the Department of Health will be the lead government department, therefore a health professional may chair the SCG if established.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 89 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
If the scale and severity of the flu pandemic within the UK escalates to an extent that public disorder is anticipated, or widespread disruption to the community occurs, it may be appropriate for the Police Service to assume responsibility for chairing the SCG. If, as expected, the flu pandemic becomes a national emergency, it may be appropriate for each police force in the UK to convene an SCG at the Gold tier of command. Each BCU within the force can then operate at the Silver tier of command. Bronze Commanders may be appointed for each locality, in line with the neighbourhood policing model adopted by that force. It is possible that PNICC will be opened to coordinate the national policing response, and to provide the link to COBR.
4.3.3 POLICE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The roles and responsibilities of the Police Service are no different in the event of a flu pandemic from the standard role and responsibilities applicable to any other emergency or major incident. The police may be requested to provide additional support to other agencies, particularly where there is an anticipated risk of public disorder, but they should avoid being drawn into providing support outside normal policing responsibilities.
The LRF (or RRF) flu pandemic plan should clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the various organisations, including the police, in the event of a flu pandemic. It should also detail the command and control structure for the duration of the emergency.
4.3.4 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT
Provisional indications are that organisations are likely to have to cope with a significant absence of staff during a flu pandemic. Notable local and organisation-specific variations could be experienced. At a peak, it is possible that up to thirty-five per cent of staff may be ill with flu, in addition to those absent for caring responsibilities or other reasons. Absence may not be spread uniformly across an organisation.
It is essential that police forces have business continuity management plans in place which address this risk. Critical activities should be identified along with a plan to collapse police business to concentrate on critical activities as staff absence rises, and to resume normal activities when absence rates improve.
Business continuity management should focus on internal processes within a police force and will be an essential component of the police response to a flu pandemic. These internal processes should be separate but linked to the external, multi-agency role the police may undertake during the response to a flu pandemic.
It may be appropriate for category 1 responders to ensure their business continuity management plans are aligned with each other, so that any interdependencies are identified and addressed. HM Coroner should be included in this course of action.
4.3.5 POLICING PUBLIC GATHERINGS
The government is unlikely to recommend restrictions on public gatherings. Informed judgements by the event organiser or governing body (in conjunction with any regulatory authority), however, may become necessary at the time of the event. If international events are due to be held in the UK with participants from areas affected by a flu pandemic, the government may recommend postponing that event.
90 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T I
4.3.6 HEALTH, SAFETY AND INFECTION CONTROL O N Staff are likely to be concerned about their own, their family’s and friends’ exposure to the A flu virus. Measures can be taken to reduce the risk of infection and to lessen the seriousness L of the illness if a person does contract the virus. Definitive health and safety advice should R
be given to staff at the time of an outbreak, but general advice in advance of a pandemic E has been issued to the Police Service. This advice includes signs and symptoms of flu, the S actions to take if a person has symptoms or is ill, general protection measures, personal P O protective equipment (PPE) and other specific issues. N S
For further information see NPIA (n.d.) Pandemic Flu Guidance for the Police Service. E I 4.3.7 DEALING WITH FATALITIES S S A flu pandemic is likely to lead to an increase in deaths above the normal death rate in U E
society. This increase could be significant, and may occur over a fifteen-week period. The S management of this may involve the police because of their responsibility for investigating sudden and unexpected deaths on behalf of HM Coroner, and to provide coroners’ officers. This does not mean that deaths resulting from a flu pandemic will be classed as sudden or unexpected, but that police forces should have agreements in place to identify which deaths resulting from a flu pandemic are reported to the police and which are not.
The police should be involved in multi-agency planning for excess deaths should pandemic flu occur. These multi-agency arrangements should include:
• Process for notification of deaths; • Completion of medical certificates of cause of death; • Death registration and certification; • Ensuring continued operation of the coroner’s service; • Provision of additional capacity for the storage of deceased people awaiting burial or cremation.
For further information see Home Office (2007) Planning for a Possible Influenza Pandemic – A Framework for Planners Preparing to Manage Deaths, Version 1.1.
4.3.8 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The current situation and response to a flu pandemic will change because of the nature of the disease. Current information and advice is available from the Department of Health and the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat. For further information see http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/flu or http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx
4.4 INDUSTRIAL INCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The lead government department in England and Wales in respect of industrial accidents is the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). In Northern Ireland, the Executive has responsibility. Pollution on land is managed by Defra, working with the Environment Agency in England, and the Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside in Wales. Pollution from vessels and offshore installations is managed by the Counter Pollution Branch of the Department for Transport’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 91 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH), as amended by the Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005, govern the manufacture and storage of dangerous substances in the UK.
COMAH Regulations do not apply to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD have, therefore, produced the Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR) (Joint Services Publication 498). The current version, dated April 2008, governs the MoD manufacture and storage of dangerous substances and is consistent with COMAH regulations.
COMAH regulations identify two levels based upon thresholds, known as Top Tier and Lower Tier. Multi-agency off-site emergency plans are required for Top Tier sites. The relevant local authority (or in some cases the Fire and Rescue Service) is responsible for the planning arrangements in consultation with partner organisations. COMAH emergency plans should be tested once every three years.
For further information on the requirements of COMAH as applicable to the Police Service see http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk/genesis
4.4.2 NOTIFICATIONS
In the event of an incident at a COMAH or MACR site, the off-site plan should detail the notifications to be made. In other cases the appropriate notifications will need to be determined at the time, but may include the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment Agency, local authority environmental health officers and devolved administration departments where relevant.
There are agencies which can assist the police and other emergency services in the response to a suspected or confirmed industrial incident or environmental pollution incident. These include the National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC). Based at Harwell, the NCEC can provide emergency response and chemical safety products and services. It supports HM Government in the response to a range of incidents and operates the Chemsafe scheme.
Chemsafe is a voluntary scheme run by the Chemical Industries Association and is an integral part of the chemical industry's responsible care initiative. It provides a rapid and coordinated response to minimise adverse affects to the public, property and the environment following a chemical distribution incident. Chemsafe sets down performance standards for responding to emergencies, based upon the following response levels:
• Level 1 – Provision of information; • Level 2 – Provision of advice at the incident scene; • Level 3 – Provision of practical assistance at the incident scene.
For further information see http://www.the-ncec.com
4.4.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY
The nature of sites subject to COMAH and MACR is such that an emergency or major incident may result in the release of hazardous material, and/or the threat of some form of explosion. Advice on the nature of any hazardous release can be sought from the site operator, allowing decisions to be taken on the provision of personal protective equipment.
When a STAC is established, it can be asked to advise on the potential risk to emergency responders and the public. It can also advise on the appropriate health and safety measures to put in place.
92 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
The off-site emergency plan should specify any evacuations required in the event of an I O emergency or major incident, or any requirement for members of the public to shelter. The N police will usually lead on the issue of warnings to the public to shelter, and will coordinate A
any evacuation deemed necessary. L R
4.4.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL E S
The off-site emergency plan applicable to each Top Tier COMAH and each MACR site will P detail the command and control arrangements to be used in the event of an emergency or O major incident. N S E Top tier COMAH sites should have a location from where the on-site response to the incident I will be managed. This location may be known as the on-site emergency control centre. The S incident commander on-site is known as the site incident controller. The role of the site S U incident controller is to: E S • Ensure the emergency services are notified; • Ensure appropriate site alarms are activated; • Ensure the public within the immediate area are notified; • Direct the shutting down of the site; • Direct evacuation of affected areas on site; • Ensure key personnel are notified.
In addition to the site incident controller (normally a duty operations manager), a site main controller may be involved in the response. This person is usually the senior site manager or director. The site main controller may assume responsibility for the on-site response from the site incident controller, and act as the point of contact with the police and other emergency services. Contingency planning should include alternative arrangements in case the on-site emergency control centre is not available for use.
The off-site plan may designate a location where the Silver Commanders will base themselves, ie, a Silver Control. Consideration should be given to a flexible response, including the location of an alternative Silver Control, should the pre-designated location not be available or suitable for use on that occasion.
For industrial accidents or environmental pollution incidents that occur where there is no off-site plan in existence, a command and control structure should be established taking into account the scale and nature of the incident. The lead coordinating authority may need to be agreed as it may not be appropriate for the police to assume this role in these situations.
4.4.5 INVESTIGATION ISSUES
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) may investigate an industrial accident under the terms of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR).
The HSE operates an Incident Contact Centre which can be contacted on a twenty-four- hour basis. In addition, incidents can be reported online.
For further information see http://www.hse.gov.uk/riddor
The Environment Agency (EA) may investigate incidents of environmental pollution to water or land, or incidents, damage or danger to the natural environment.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 93 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The EA operates a twenty-four-hour freephone incident hotline. For further information see http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk
4.5 MARITIME INCIDENTS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION
The lead government department for UK search and rescue (SAR) is the Department for Transport (DfT), which delegates the authority for responding to maritime incidents to HM Coastguard. The responsibility for command, control and coordination of maritime incidents lies with HM Coastguard, which is part of the Maritime and Coastguard agency (MCA). HM Coastguard is a 999 emergency service, and the on-call emergency organisation responsible for the initiation and coordination of all civilian maritime SAR within the UK Maritime SAR Region. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the UK.
A major maritime incident may be declared by HM Coastguard if deemed appropriate. Factors determining whether to declare a major maritime incident include where:
• There are a large number of survivors to be rescued and brought ashore; • There are a large number of people missing and unaccounted for, with the potential for a significant loss of life; • There is large-scale press or public interest; • There is a large-scale rescue and/or counter-pollution and/or salvage incident which is causing or is likely to cause public order problems; for example, where a large number of people are removing material or cargo from the shoreline, or gathering on the shoreline or cliffs to view activity at sea, or people who are in some other way interfering with or preventing or hampering the emergency response.
HM Coastguard may request assistance from the police, other emergency services and local authorities in these situations.
4.5.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL
There are nineteen Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) around the UK. They form a network of command and control centres for responding to reports of maritime and coastal incidents, including at sea SAR, salvage and counter-pollution operations. MRCC watch-keeping staff provide a twenty-four-hour service to mariners and coast users by receiving incoming distress calls, alerting the appropriate rescue assets, and coordinating the rescue effort. They have access to various resources, including SAR helicopters, RNLI and other lifeboats, responding vessels, fire-fighting resources and other rescue teams. The centres also coordinate the delivery of survivors and deceased persons to shore reception facilities and/or hospitals.
HM Coastguard may establish a salvage control unit (SCU) at the relevant MRCC. The Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) will be based at the SCU. The SOSREP has legal powers to determine the salvage arrangements for any vessel in distress, and reports to the Minister of Transport. The SOSREP formulates the policy to salvage the vessel, and is in overall command of any salvage operation at sea. The SOSREP can require the Royal Navy and civil authorities, including the police, to assist in enforcing their directions.
94 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
HM Coastguard may also establish a marine response centre (MRC), which is the tactical I O operations centre, to respond to a counter-pollution incident at sea, and an environment N group may be formed to assess and respond to the environmental aspects of that incident. A
4.5.3 ROLE OF THE POLICE – SEARCH AND RESCUE L R E
The police are responsible for coordinating search and rescue for land-based incidents. The S police lead the response for inland waters, except where it has been delegated to P HM Coastguard. O N
The locations where HM Coastguard lead on coordinating search and rescue S E operations are: I S
• Loughs Neagh and Erne; S • Windermere, Coniston Water, Ullswater and Derwent Water; U E
• Norfolk and Suffolk Broads; S • River Severn (to Gloucester); • River Thames (to Teddington).
SAR assets can be deployed inland as demonstrated at Boscastle in 2004, Gloucestershire, South Yorkshire and the East Riding of Yorkshire in 2007. The arrangements for requesting military SAR assets inland are the same as for incidents at sea or on the shoreline, with the ARCC being the point of contact for the police. Other assets, for example, RNLI resources, can be requested through the local MRCC. There may be incidents where the nature of the terrain makes access problematic, or when health and safety considerations make it inappropriate to deploy police officers in the first instance, eg, an aircraft crash in mountainous terrain. There are voluntary mountain and cave rescue teams which specialise in operating in such environments. Individual forces may benefit from liaising closely with such teams in their areas and being aware of the capabilities they offer.
Police forces may be members of a local search and rescue committee (LSARC), whose role is to encourage liaison locally between all the search and rescue organisations in that area. The LSARC should monitor local arrangements and may produce a contact directory and inventory of resources available for deployment in emergencies and major incidents.
For further information see ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Search Management and Procedures.
4.5.4 ROLE OF THE POLICE – MAJOR INCIDENTS AT SEA
The police retain their responsibility to investigate crimes within the limit of British territorial waters, which generally extends twelve nautical miles offshore, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The police also retain their responsibility to investigate sudden and unexpected deaths within the jurisdiction of an HM Coroner and to identify deceased persons on behalf of HM Coroner.
When notification is received of a potential major incident occurring within British territorial waters, it may be prudent for a police force to take the lead for the onshore response. If there is a major incident at sea, a police liaison officer should be deployed to the relevant MRCC. This may require police forces to collaborate on this deployment as the areas of responsibility of the MRCCs are not coterminous with police force boundaries. The police liaison officer has to assess the potential implications of the incident for the police and other emergency services and facilitate communication at the strategic tier of command (Gold) between HM Coastguard and the police.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 95 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The lead police force may establish an SCG at the Gold tier to determine the appropriate response and to set an aim and objectives for the onshore response. It may be necessary to set up tactical (or Silver) coordinating groups in police forces likely to be affected by the incident (see Figure 11 ). It should be borne in mind that an incident offshore may have consequences along a significant stretch of coastline. Early advice from the MCA regarding the tide and weather conditions should identify the possible implications of the incident over a specified timescale.
The appointment of an SIO, SIM and any roles allocated to Bronze Commanders will depend on the scale and nature of the incident. The roles likely to be relevant to this type of incident include:
• Bronze Scene Commander; • Bronze Traffic Management; • Bronze Survivor Reception Centre(s); • Bronze Hospital Documentation Teams; • Casualty Bureau Manager; • Bronze Media; • Scene Evidence Recovery Manager.
Appropriate arrangements may need to be set up at locations where survivors may be landed onshore. There could be several locations at which survivors could be brought ashore depending on whether they are rescued by helicopter, lifeboats or other vessels.
A survivor reception centre (SRC) should be established at each location where survivors will be brought ashore. Consideration should be given to the needs of survivors who may be of different nationalities, and may not speak English. In addition to the usual attendance by the police for documentation purposes, and the local authority and voluntary agencies for humanitarian purposes, personnel from the following agencies may attend:
• United Kingdom Border Agency; • HM Revenue and Customs; • Government office of the regions or devolved administration; • Foreign and Commonwealth Office; • Department for Transport; • Consulate and embassy staff from affected countries; • Representatives from the ship’s owners and operators; • Representatives of the insurers of the ship and operators.
A police hospital documentation team should be deployed to each receiving hospital. They may need to work with staff from the agencies or government departments listed above.
Locations should be identified where deceased persons can be brought ashore. A victim audit area can be established at airports, military bases, harbours and ports where deceased persons are landed, taking into account issues of privacy, dignity and respect for cultural and religious needs. The police will take responsibility for the deceased at the victim audit areas and ensure that the ACPO and Interpol disaster victim identification (DVI) labels and forms are completed in line with the requirements determined by the SIM. The deceased will then be removed with dignity from the victim audit area to a designated mortuary.
For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Strategy.
96 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
Figure 11 Suggested Command and Control Structure Major Incident at Sea: I O Search and Rescue Phase N A L
Suggested Command R E
and Control Structure S P Major Incident at Sea: O N
Search and Rescue Phase S E I S
Maritime Rescue Strategic S U Coordination Centre Coordinating Group E
(MRCC) (SCG) S
SOSREP and Shoreline Response Salvage Control Unit Centre EITHER/OR (SCU) (SRC)
Marine Multi-Agency Response Tactical Coordinating Centre (MRC) Group
Environment Group (EG)
Contractors (if appointed)
Bronze Scene Commander Bronze Traffic Management Bronze Survivors Reception Centre(s) Bronze Hospital Documentation Team(s) Casualty Bureau Manager Bronze Media Scene Evidence Recovery Manager Bronze Family and Friends Reception
Sea Land
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 97 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
4.5.5 AVIATION INCIDENTS AT SEA
All aviation search and rescue on land and sea is the responsibility of the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss. All aircraft accidents at sea must be notified to the ARCC, and to the appropriate MRCC and police force. In some situations, an MRCC may be the first to be notified of an aviation incident at sea and the MRCC will dispatch and coordinate an immediate response until the ARCC takes over coordination. The MRCC may, alternatively, continue to coordinate a rescue response under the supervision of the ARCC. All three organisations will work together in responding to the incident by agreeing their responsibilities at the strategic (Gold) tier.
Recovery and salvage of aircraft which have crashed below the high-water mark, and the retrieval of their occupants and personal property, is challenging. There are some private salvage companies that may be contracted to assist. In addition, the Ministry of Defence have a Salvage and Marine Operations section of the Defence Logistics Organisation. They can be contacted via a Royal Navy regional liaison officer.
4.5.6 MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) have a national media liaison team that can be deployed to any major maritime incident. The MCA will normally lead on the media issues relating to the at sea elements of the incident. In respect of the land-based response, the police can take the lead in coordinating the liaison with the media in line with normal arrangements and appoint a Bronze Commander Media.
A clear agreement at the strategic (Gold) tier of command should be made early in the incident to clarify the media liaison responsibilities of each agency to ensure that a clear, consistent and accurate message is conveyed.
4.5.7 COUNTER-POLLUTION INCIDENTS
Local authorities generally lead on the land-based response to counter-pollution incidents, although, in some cases, the ship’s owners or insurers may appoint contractors to recover oil, debris and other material washed up on the shore.
If the local authority takes responsibility for the response to a pollution incident, they may establish a shoreline response centre. A shoreline response centre will combine elements of the Gold and Silver command tiers in determining both the strategic and tactical land-based response to the incident. The police may send a liaison officer to the shoreline response centre in order to represent the police and to agree the police involvement in the incident. The police have a limited role in respect of responding to incidents of coastal pollution. This could include traffic management, crowd management and public order policing.
If a contractor is appointed to clear up any pollution, it may be agreed at a strategic (Gold) level not to establish a shoreline response centre. There may be circumstances where an alternative is more appropriate, for example, where the incident generates the potential for public disorder, criminal activity or major disruption to traffic. In these cases, a command and control structure in line with the Gold, Silver and Bronze tiers of command can be established. An SCG at the Gold tier can be formed to provide the overall aim and objectives, with a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) at the Silver tier to provide the tactical response to the incident. If an incident extends over more than one police force, a lead police force can be appointed to host the SCG, with TCGs established in each police force area as necessary. See Figure 12.
98 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
Figure 12 Suggested Command and Control Structure Counter-Pollution Incident: I O No search and rescue operation is underway or search and rescue operations N are concluded A L R
Suggested Command and Control E S
Structure for Counter-Pollution Incident: P O
No search and rescue operation is underway N S
or search and rescue operations are concluded. E I S S
Salvage Control Strategic U E
Unit Coordinating Group S (SCU) (SCG)
Maritime Rescue Shoreline Response Coordination Centre Centre EITHER/OR (MRCC) (SRC)
Marine Tactical Response (or Silver) Centre (MRC) Coordinating Group
Environment Group Forward Control (EG) Centres (FCC) (if established)
Contractors (if appointed)
Sea Land
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 99 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Non-polluting wreckage and cargo may also come ashore and will require action from responders on land. This could be dealt with by a shoreline response centre or at the Silver tier of command, if established. A clear agreement at the strategic tier is required to ensure the response is properly coordinated by all agencies. If the owners or their insurers appoint a contractor, there must be effective liaison between the local authority, Police Service, Fire and Rescue Service and other agencies to agree protocols designating responsibilities for dealing with non-polluting material washed ashore. Section 248 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 gives the SOSREP responsibility for any vessel that comes ashore.
In general, wreckage and cargo coming ashore should be treated in the same manner as debris arising from a land-based incident. Evidence should be preserved and property protected until it can be recovered by the appropriate organisation. Risk assessments need to be conducted on potential hazardous cargo, and items washed ashore need to be made safe. The Receiver of Wreck (RoW) has powers in these situations, under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which include requiring people to hand over immediately any property found on shore. The RoW can also give instructions to leave wreckage and cargo in situ for an officially appointed salvor to recover. Early liaison with the RoW, supported by clear and effective statements to the media and public, can reduce the opportunity for theft.
4.5.8 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
For further information see Maritime and Coastguard Agency (2008) Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (n.d.) National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations.
4.6 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE
4.6.1 INTRODUCTION
The UK is a constitutional monarchy; as such the MoD does not have a permanent, guaranteed role in dealing with most emergencies or major incidents. The MoD is not, therefore, designated as a category 1 or category 2 responder within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). The MoD, however, has capabilities that can be made available to the police and other organisations in exceptional circumstances.
Defence operations conducted in support of the UK civil authorities are termed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The provision of MACA is governed by three criteria:
• Military aid should always be a last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies and the private sector must be insufficient or unsuitable.
• The civil authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.
• The civil authority has the capability, but the need to act is urgent (ie, life is in danger) and it lacks readily available resources.
MACA is subdivided into three categories:
• Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP); • Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD); • Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC).
100 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
MACP may be requested by the police to assist with preventing or responding to serious, I O organised criminal activity, including terrorism. MACP requires the authority of a Minister of N the Crown. A L MAGD covers the provision of assistance from the MoD to another government department, R for example, Defra during the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001. E S
MACC is sub-divided into three categories: P O
• Category A is the provision of unarmed military assistance to civil authorities when N they have an urgent need for help to deal with an emergency, major incident or natural S E disaster. MACC Category A tasks do not require ministerial authorisation, but the I
emphasis is on the word urgent . Assistance is provided in order to save life, alleviate S distress and protect property. S U E
• Category B is the provision of routine assistance for special projects or events of S significant value to the civil community.
• Category C tasks include the attachment of volunteers to serve with appropriate organisations on schemes which are of social benefit to the community.
The operational lead on behalf of the MoD in respect of all aspects of the Defence Contribution to Resilience and MACA is the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC (UK)), based at HQ Land Forces. HQ SJC (UK) coordinates the MoD operational response for all aspects of resilience and support to the civil authorities. As far as the three armed services are concerned, the Army maintains a network of regional brigades across the UK, which are aligned loosely to the regional government boundaries. Each brigade has at least one joint regional liaison officer (JRLO) at lieutenant colonel rank whose role it is to act as the primary interface between the MoD and the civil authorities within that region. He or she is supported by a deputy and also by a brigade reinforcement team (BRT), comprised largely of reservists, whose role it is to augment the brigade HQ during times of crisis.
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force also have regional liaison officers in each area of the UK; they work closely with the JRLOs to ensure that specialist advice is available to the civil authorities as required.
The MoD does not have personnel or resources assigned permanently for deployment on MACC tasks, so planning assumptions should not rely on the provision of MACC. The MoD will, however, endeavour to meet reasonable requests made of them, subject to other commitments being undertaken at the time. Military personnel deployed on MACA commitments have no powers other than those of a private citizen. They cannot, therefore, enforce cordons or direct traffic, but this does not prevent such personnel from being used to support cordons.
4.6.2 NOTIFICATIONS
Non-urgent requests for MACA should be made in writing and submitted to the Home Office. JRLOs should be engaged as early as possible in this process to ensure that the correct capability is requested and also that what is being requested is within the ability of the MoD to deliver. Contact details for all JRLOs may be obtained from HQ SJC (UK). JRLOs will be able to provide the appropriate application form. An indemnity form will also be required to ensure adequate insurance provision.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 101 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Requests for search and rescue (SAR) facilities (provided under MACC) should be made to the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre. There is standing ministerial approval for SAR tasks. Requests for explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) resources should be made to the Joint Services EOD Operations Centre (for which standing ministerial approval also applies).
Urgent requests for other military assistance under MACA should be made to the JRLO. The JRLO will assess the scale and nature of the request, and determine the appropriate response that the MoD can provide. In exceptional cases MACC Category A requests can be made direct to the commanding officer of military establishments or units, but the JRLO should be notified of any such requests as soon as practicable.
4.6.3 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The provision of MACC under Category A (ie, life is at risk) usually comes with no costs being levied by the MoD. It is usual, to accord with Treasury rules, for the MoD to recover costs for most other MACA tasks; the JRLO will be able to offer advice in this respect.
4.6.4 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
For further information on all aspects of MACA, see Ministry of Defence (2007) Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Second Edition, Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience.
4.7 NUCLEAR INCIDENTS
4.7.1 INTRODUCTION
Additional response procedures apply to an emergency or major incident involving nuclear material. This subsection applies to non-deliberate incidents. Deliberate acts that result in the release of nuclear fission products fall within the remit of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident.
For further information on CBRN incidents, see ACPO (2008) Guidance on the Police Strategic Management of CBRN Events.
The UK has several facilities that contain nuclear reactors, including power stations and nuclear propelled submarines. In addition, nuclear materials are transported across the UK by the MoD and civilian companies.
Nuclear sites are regulated by the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. Site operators must have a licence to operate; the licensing function is administered by the Nuclear Directorate (ND), which is a section of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The ND also acts as the security regulator for the civil nuclear industry.
The MoD acts as the regulator for defence nuclear assets.
4.7.2 INCIDENTS AT CIVIL NUCLEAR SITES
The Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG) is a forum chaired by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). Its membership comprises a range of organisations, including the police, likely to be involved in the response to a nuclear emergency or major incident. The NEPLG has published consolidated guidance to describe civil nuclear response arrangements.
102 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
Planning for the response to a nuclear accident is required by the Radiation (Emergency I O Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR). These regulations place N the responsibility for preparation of the on-site plan with the site operator, and the off-site A
plan with the relevant local authority. The Nuclear Directorate oversees the compliance L through a regular testing and exercise regime. R E
The response to an emergency or major incident at a civil nuclear site uses the normal Gold, S
Silver and Bronze tiers of command. The command and control structure for nuclear P incidents, however, has the addition of an on-site emergency centre, and an off-site O N Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). S E The SCC may be located at purpose-built premises remote from the civil nuclear site, or they I may be located at the headquarters of the relevant police force. The role of the SCC is to S coordinate the activities of all responding agencies, and to support the SCG, which will be S U
chaired by the police. The SCG will determine the action deemed necessary to protect the E public and arrange for information and advice to be issued to the public. S
The on-site centre, known as the site emergency centre, is responsible for the measures to contain and neutralise the situation that has caused the incident.
It is important that there is a clear communication link between the on-site and off-site centres, and an understanding between all agencies and the site operators of their roles and responsibilities in the event of an emergency or major incident. These should be detailed in the off-site plan prepared under REPPIR.
The off-site plan should detail protective actions (countermeasures) to apply to emergency services responders and the public. The early formation of a STAC, to include radiation protection advisers, should assist in ensuring accurate, clear and concise information is made available to responders and the public. This should minimise any undue anxiety and reduce the fear of the consequences of a nuclear emergency.
Plans should clarify the early policy on shelter or evacuation of people within the pre-planned countermeasure zone, otherwise known as the detailed emergency planning zone.
Contingency plans should detail how the shelter or evacuation zone may need to be extended downwind to protect the emergency responders and the public from hazardous material that may be carried in the air. A sector extending approximately thirty degrees (in strong or moderate wind conditions) or forty-five degrees (in light and variable wind conditions) either side of a line downwind along the prevailing wind direction should be considered where there is a potential hazard from airborne contamination. This downwind sector may extend for up to three kilometres, within which people may be requested to shelter indoors, and emergency responders may be required to wear personal protective equipment, such as face masks. Specific health and safety advice for emergency responders and the public should be given by the STAC once established.
If a nuclear emergency occurs, the lead government department will appoint a government technical adviser (GTA). This individual can provide independent and authoritative advice to the police Gold Commander on appropriate countermeasures to protect the public, the course of the emergency on-site, its effects on the environment and the end of the emergency. The role of the GTA is to develop public health advice in conjunction with the STAC. The STAC will then develop the specific advice to be given to the public.
For further information see http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 103 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
4.7.3 TRANSPORT INCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIALS
The Department for Transport (DfT) has a Dangerous Goods Division which acts as the competent authority for transport of radioactive materials by all modes of transport.
There are two separate schemes available to assist police forces and other emergency services when responding to an incident potentially involving radioactivity.
The first scheme is the National Arrangements for Incidents Involving Radioactivity (NAIR). This scheme is run by the Health Protection Agency, which absorbed the former National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB). NAIR provides quick and available assistance to the police and other emergency services where no radiation expert is otherwise available. Assistance, which is drawn from hospitals, the nuclear industry and government departments and agencies, is provided in two stages.
Stage 1 assistance is provided by a radiation expert who, with the aid of monitoring equipment, can tell whether a hazard exists and can advise on appropriate action.
Stage 2 assistance provides more sophisticated resources for dealing with the incident. This normally involves a team of up to four persons equipped with monitoring and decontamination equipment. This team will have the necessary personal protective equipment to perform the tasks required of them.
The twenty-four-hour contact arrangements make use of the control room for the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, which can act as the first point of reference in any incident. For further information see http://www.hpa.org.uk
The second scheme is RADSAFE, which applies to Great Britain but not Northern Ireland. It is restricted to incidents involving the transport of radioactive material but excludes MoD nuclear movements. The key principles of RADSAFE are:
• Early provision of general advice to the emergency services; • Guaranteed response; • Provision of a framework for media support; • Ownership of clean-up actions.
There are three levels of response.
• Level 1 – notification and communication service, and provision of generic radiological protection advice by the force control room of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary; • Level 2 – provision of radiological advice and support to the scene of an incident; • Level 3 – response by the consignment owner and clean up.
The twenty-four-hour contact arrangements use the control room for the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the same contact number as NAIR. For further information see http://www.radsafe.org.uk
4.7.4 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FIXED NUCLEAR SITES
The MoD Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) aims to ensure, in conjunction with the appropriate civil agencies, an effective response to an accident or incident, including those resulting from terrorist acts involving defence nuclear assets. The key objective of NARO is to protect public health and safety.
104 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
MoD fixed nuclear assets are subject to off-site emergency plans under REPPIR in the same I O manner as civil nuclear sites. Nuclear powered submarines can use designated ‘X’ Berths or N ‘Z’ Berths, all of which are also subject to emergency planning arrangements. A L The MoD maintains a capability to respond to accidents or incidents involving defence R nuclear assets including: E S
• Nuclear reactors; P • Nuclear weapons; O • Reactor fuel; N • Nuclear materials. S E I
The response to a defence-related nuclear accident or incident is similar to that for a civil S nuclear operator, except that the MoD will appoint a military (or MoD) coordinating S U authority (MCA). E S The role of the MCA in the event of an accident is to provide authoritative and timely advice to the police, local health authorities, other emergency services and local authorities on:
• The possible consequences of the accident; • Likely timescales for key events in relation to the incident; • The hazardous materials involved; • Any immediate implications for public health; • Early public protection countermeasures; • The end of the on-site emergency.
The MCA will also provide information on the actions being taken to stabilise the incident, and will direct MoD assets to achieve that aim and objectives. The MCA will act as the principal spokesperson to the media for the MoD in the locality of the incident. The MCA will collocate with the police Gold Commander at the SCC, and will sit on the SCG.
The MoD will establish Headquarters NARO at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, London. HQ NARO is part of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation and will be the liaison point with the political and parliamentary bodies, and will act as the lead department on behalf of HM Government.
At the Tactical (Silver) tier of command, the MCA will appoint an incident commander or director of operations to direct MoD personnel at the tactical and operational tiers.
For further information see Ministry of Defence (2004) Joint Service Publication 471 Defence Nuclear Accident Response.
4.7.5 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT ISSUES
The MoD Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) leads on the response to an incident involving the transport of MoD nuclear material, in addition to those at fixed sites. Defence nuclear materials are moved by a variety of means. Nuclear weapons and new reactor fuel are moved by road, used fuel is moved by rail and special nuclear fuel (SNM) is moved by road and air.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 105 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Movements of military nuclear materials are under the command of a Ministry of Defence Police Silver Commander, also known as the Convoy Commander, who is a qualified Firearms Silver Commander. The convoy comprises both MoD police and military personnel. The military convoy operations officer will act as the initial military coordinating authority (MCA). If an incident occurs, MoD personnel will respond in two phases: the immediate response force (IRF) and the follow-on forces (FoF). An MoD incident commander (IC) commands the IRF, as part of the convoy personnel, and is the point of contact with the police and other emergency services. Movements of nuclear weapons are always planned; a convoy containing escorting personnel travels with the weapons.
MoD NARO maintains a special safety cell (SSC), which monitors all MoD nuclear movements. The SSC will notify relevant organisations, including the police force of the area in which an incident has occurred, and will activate the IRF and FoF as required.
For further information see Ministry of Defence (n.d.) Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) Edition 6 – Defence Nuclear Materials Transport Contingency Arrangements.
4.8 RAILWAY INCIDENTS
4.8.1 INTRODUCTION
The railway network is complex in both operational and organisational terms. Network Rail (NR) is the infrastructure manager and owns and operates the railway track, power supply, signalling systems and eighteen of the larger stations in major UK cities. The trains which use the NR infrastructure are operated by train operating companies (TOCs) and freight operating companies (FOCs), which also operate the depots associated with those operations and the remaining stations on the network. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) is operated by NR CTRL and owned by High Speed 1 (HS1). London Underground Limited (LU) manages and operates the underground network. The Docklands Light Railway is operated by Serco Docklands Ltd, and the Tyne and Wear Metro by Nexus. In addition, there are various heritage and other railways owned and operated by different companies.
The British Transport Police (BTP) are the national police force for the railways. They provide a policing service to the rail operators, their staff and rail users throughout England, Wales and Scotland. There are a few exceptions, eg, the BTP do not police heritage railways.
4.8.2 NOTIFICATIONS
If a Home Office police force becomes aware of any emergency or major incident that may affect any part of the national rail network, the local police control room should immediately notify the relevant NR, CTRL or LU control room. The NR or LU control room can arrange for trains to be stopped or cautioned (allowed to proceed at a reduced speed), and arrange for the electricity traction supply to be turned off if necessary. They will provide confirmation when this has been done.
In addition to notifying the relevant NR, CTRL or LU control room, the Home Office police force should immediately notify the BTP Force Control Room.
106 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
NR, CTRL and LU will require the following information: I O
• Name and identification of the person making the request; N • Telephone number of the person making the request; A • Reason for the request; L • Nature of the incident; R E
• Location (milepost, signal number, bridge number or other identifying feature); S
• Nearest access point. P O
4.8.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY N S
The primary rule for track safety is that police officers and staff must not go onto the E I
track unaccompanied by NR staff unless there are people in direct and immediate S danger and urgent action is required to preserve human life . Such action must be taken S only as a last resort. In these circumstances personnel must conduct a dynamic risk U assessment ensuring their own safety remains paramount. NR must be informed immediately E S that police officers or staff have taken this action, and of their reasons for doing so.
Network Rail has identified the correct procedures, if emergency services must take immediate action within the track area, as:
• Inform Network Rail Control (via a police control room); • Follow the track safety rules – make sure everyone involved – is aware of the possible hazards – knows the rules for staying safe; • Use hand signals to stop approaching trains in an emergency – if there is an obstruction or incapacitated person on the line, an attempt can be made to stop an approaching train using hand signals – move along the line to give as much stopping distance as possible – stand in a position of safety facing the train – signal the driver by (in daylight) by raising both arms above the head, or (at night) waving a lamp or torch violently; • Realise that a train may not be able to stop in time ; • Take special care on electrified lines – for overhead line systems, do not approach within one metre of any live parts of the system – for ground level conductor systems, do not touch the conductor rail or anything lying across it; • Move to safety as soon as possible.
Network Rail employees are the rail safety experts and will provide protection to police officers who request access to railway tracks. LU has slightly different safety rules and advice should be sought from LU staff. The CTRL has separate arrangements due to the high speed of the trains using that railway. Police officers and staff are not allowed to enter CTRL territory unless accompanied by a CTRL personal track safety trained person.
Any request to have trains stopped or power turned off should be carefully considered and proportionate to the situation. Police officers and staff should be aware that the isolation of power supplies and stopping trains other than at stations can have serious safety implications away from the immediate scene of the incident. Personnel need to be aware that the terms ‘Trains Stopped’ and ‘Power Off’ have separate meanings and one is not conditional on the other. A third option is to have ‘Trains Under Caution’, which allows trains to proceed at a speed where they can stop safely if required. Police officers and staff must be aware there will be a time delay between a request to have ‘Trains Stopped’, ‘Power Off’ or ‘Trains Under Caution’, and authority being given for personnel to go onto railway tracks.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 107 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Police officers and staff who go onto railway tracks must wear approved high-visibility clothing and any other required or appropriate personal protective equipment.
4.8.4 PROCEDURES IN EMERGENCIES AND MAJOR INCIDENTS
In the event of an emergency or major incident affecting the rail network, NR, CTRL or LU will send a representative to the scene to liaise with the emergency services. This trained and accredited person is known as a rail incident officer (RIO), or LU equivalent. The RIO will act as the main link between the police and all parts of the rail industry, operating as a rail Silver Commander. The RIO will advise the police on rail specific issues, including any necessary health and safety arrangements to be adopted.
The TOCs will send a train operator liaison officer (TOLO), who will be appointed on behalf of all the TOCs and FOCs involved to represent their interests. The TOLO reports to the RIO.
Passenger train operating companies have arrangements to provide post-incident care and support to people directly affected in a rail incident. These teams, known as Rail Incident Care Teams, can be deployed to survivors reception centres, family and friends reception centres, railway stations, hospitals or a humanitarian assistance centre.
4.8.5 INVESTIGATION ISSUES
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is the independent railway accident investigation organisation for the UK. It investigates railway accidents and incidents (including heritage railways and tramways) to improve safety, not to establish blame. Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) will appoint a lead investigator in relevant cases.
The RAIB will lead on investigations of railway accidents or incidents unless there is prima facie evidence of a potential serious criminal offence being committed. Consideration should be given to the implications of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.
The division of responsibilities between a Home Office police force and the British Transport Police will be subject to agreement between the two forces at an early stage of the response to an emergency or major incident. Generally, BTP will lead on matters occurring within the inner cordon and on railway property, and the Home Office force on issues off railway property.
A Tactical (Silver) Commander will be appointed by the BTP. Depending on the nature of the incident, the BTP will also appoint Bronze Commanders, an SIO and a SIM.
There is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the RAIB, the British Transport Police, ACPO and the Office of Rail Regulation, for the investigation of rail accidents and incidents in England and Wales. The memorandum sets out the principles for effective liaison, communication and cooperation between the signatories. It ensures rail accidents, criminal incidents and deaths can be independently investigated, as necessary, by each party, in a thorough and professional manner. It takes account of their respective roles and responsibilities, while ensuring that legitimate public expectations are met.
For further information on the MoU, see http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk
For further information on rail incidents, see http://www.raib.gov.uk and http://www.networkrail.co.uk
108 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T I
4.9 ROAD INCIDENTS O N
4.9.1 INTRODUCTION A L
The major road network in the UK is important to the social and economic well-being of R
the country. An emergency or major incident is likely to have a significant impact on the E road network in the locality of the incident. This can escalate to affecting the regional roads S infrastructure, and, in some cases, may have national implications. It is essential to manage P O
the consequences of an incident both in terms of allowing free passage to emergency N
services and other responders, and to minimise the social and economic effects of that S incident on the wider population. E I The early involvement of the Highways Agency (HA) in England and local authority S S
highways departments can assist the police in managing an incident. U E
The HA is an executive agency of the Department for Transport (DfT). It is responsible for S operating, maintaining and improving the strategic road network in England. Most motorways and some all-purpose trunk roads are part of the strategic road network and the responsibility of the HA. All other public roads are the responsibility of local authorities.
The joint operational goals for the police and the HA are given in detail in Highways Agency and ACPO (2005) The Network Operations National Guidance Framework, Second Edition.
They can be summarised as:
• Improving road safety; • Reducing incident-related congestion; • Freeing up police resources.
The HA has Regional Control Centres (RCCs) that coordinate their operational resources. They control Highways Agency Traffic Officers (TOs) and Incident Support Units (ISUs) that can be deployed in support of the police.
Local authorities do not have TOs, but can also support the police in consequence management resulting from an incident. This can include urban traffic control, traffic management arrangements and use of local authority highways personnel.
4.9.2 NOTIFICATIONS
If a police force becomes aware of any emergency or major incident that may affect any part of the major road network, the relevant HA RCC, and, if applicable, the relevant local authority highways department should be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable.
4.9.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY
The road network is a hazardous environment. Due consideration should be given to ensuring that only suitably trained and equipped personnel are deployed on roads. The Bronze Commander Traffic Management should conduct appropriate risk assessments when personnel are working on roads.
Dynamic risk assessments must be carried out regularly so that they take account of the safety of personnel should there be any change in circumstances (such as weather conditions).
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 109 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
4.9.4 PROCEDURES IN EMERGENCIES AND MAJOR INCIDENTS
In dealing with emergencies or major incidents on the major road network, the key difference is the active involvement of the HA or local authority highways department.
The primary responsibilities of Highways Agency TOs are:
• Maintaining and improving the movement of traffic; • Preventing or reducing the effect or potential effect of anything causing, or likely to cause, congestion or other disruption; • Avoiding danger to persons or other traffic, or preventing risk of such danger; • Preventing damage to a road, or to anything near a road; • Purposes incidental to the above.
The conventional role of the Highways Agency TOs at police-led road-related incidents is to manage traffic considerations and diversions, thereby releasing police from that task to concentrate on investigating the scene. To enable this activity TOs are equipped with Airwave inter-agency talkgroups for all forces and, with some forces, electronic command and control interfaces.
The local authority highways department’s primary responsibilities are:
• Implementing emergency road closures; • Maintaining and improving the movement of traffic; • Removing obstructions.
TOs have limited powers to control and direct traffic, but will operate under the direction of a constable. The HA may deploy a TO supervisor to the scene of an incident, who may be able to support the police Bronze Commander or, in some situations, assume the role of Bronze Commander Traffic Management.
4.9.5 INVESTIGATION ISSUES
For investigations into fatalities, potential fatalities or life changing injuries resulting from an incident on the major road network, see ACPO (2007) Road Death Investigation Manual.
4.9.6 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
For additional information regarding incidents on the road network, see ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on the Policing of Roads.
4.10 SPECIALIST ADVICE
Specialist advice can be obtained for a range of emergencies and major incidents. Specialist advice that is specific to a type of incident is included in the relevant section of this guidance, for example, nuclear incidents.
110 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T I
4.10.1 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE CELL O N In England the role of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) is to provide the SCG A with timely, unambiguous and understandable information regarding the potential and L actual consequences of an emergency or major incident in terms of the scientific, technical R
and public health implications. Consideration should be given to convening the STAC as E soon as an emergency or major incident is declared and an SCG is convened. This is S particularly important where there may be significant wider health and environmental P O consequences. N S
Each Local Resilience Forum should have a plan in place to activate a STAC, and to ensure E personnel with relevant expertise are available to attend when required. A STAC will normally I be chaired by a senior public health professional, for example, a director of public health, S S
with the composition and function determined by the scale and nature of the incident, and U
tailored to local requirements. E S The membership may include representatives from:
• Emergency service technical advisers; • Site operator technical advisers; • Health Protection Agency; • Primary Care Trust; • Strategic Health Authority; • Environment Agency; • Food Standards Agency; • Health and Safety Executive; • Local Authorities (eg, Environmental Health Officers); • Met Office; • Government Decontamination Service; • Defra; • Any other agencies deemed necessary.
The chair of the STAC will normally sit on the SCG to represent all agencies that constitute the STAC. The terms of reference for the STAC should be agreed by the LRF as part of the planning process, but should be ratified by the SCG on formation during an emergency or major incident. The terms of reference should include the process for decision making within the STAC, and how advice is to be given to the emergency responders and to the general public. The SCG may agree on a senior public health official to be the spokesperson for the SCG on matters pertaining to public health.
For further information see HM Government (2007) Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic Coordination Centre – Guidance to Local Responders.
4.10.2 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND RESPONSE CENTRE
The Environmental Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) is one of the public weather service production units within the Operations Centre of the Met Office. EMARC is continually staffed to provide a quick response to customers requiring forecast information to help them with a variety of environmental incidents.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 111 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
EMARC can provide a service to police forces and other emergency services in incidents where there is a release of hazardous materials or other substances into the environment, in particular into the air. How fumes or a plume may spread can assist when making decisions on public health, evacuation and potential clean up operations. EMARC can produce models showing expected localised weather conditions. A forecast supplied in these cases is called a CHEMET. A CHEMET forecast is in two parts: firstly, a brief text that forecasts relevant metrological parameters, and secondly, an Ordnance Survey map that is overlayed with the main areas at risk from any plume. CHEMETs can be produced in about twenty minutes following the request.
With respect to nuclear incidents, EMARC can produce a similar product to a CHEMET, but this is called a PACRAM forecast. PACRAM stands for Procedures And Communications following Release of r Adioactive Material. The Met Office has developed a computer programme called the nuclear accident model which can assess and predict the movement, deposition and dispersal of large plumes of material over several days.
4.11 TERRORIST INCIDENTS
4.11.1 INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a crime and, therefore, a matter for the chief officer of police in whose area an incident occurs, supported by the Counter Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police.
A range of incidents with a terrorist element can require a multi-agency response in support of the main police activity. These can include arrests of suspects and searches of properties within communities. Issues such as community cohesion may need to be addressed in line with this guidance, see 2.11 Community Impact Assessment.
4.11.2 NOTIFICATIONS
If a Home Office police force becomes aware of an emergency or major incident that is or may be terrorist related, the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorist Command (SO15) Incident Response and Coordination Centre (IRCC) must be notified immediately.
In addition, the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office should be notified of the incident. The OSCT will notify the MoD and other government departments.
4.11.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control of a terrorist incident will be in accordance with the standard Gold, Silver and Bronze structure. The Gold Commander should give early consideration to convening a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), and establishing a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) appropriate to the scale and nature of the incident. The SCG should take account of the large and complex investigation that may result from the incident, and the media interest a terrorist incident may create, when deciding on the structure of the SCC.
4.11.4 CONSIDERATIONS AT THE SCENE
Care should be taken at the scene of a suspected terrorist incident. The situation that emergency responders are attending may not be the only incident terrorists are intending to perpetrate. Urgent and thorough consideration must be given to the safety of the initial emergency responders, including the possibility of secondary improvised explosive devices, or the presence of terrorists with firearms or other weapons.
112 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
Rendezvous points (RVPs) must be chosen with care and, if possible, a search conducted to I O ensure the location chosen is safe and secure prior to the attendance of other responders. N If that is not possible, the designated rendezvous and marshalling points should be searched A
and secured as soon as possible. L R Consideration should be given to the increased need for safety and security on the part of E
survivors and bereaved, and this may influence the location for the SRC and FFRC following S a terrorist incident. P O
4.11.5 INVESTIGATION ISSUES N S E In a terrorist incident, the early collation of personal and forensic evidence is important. I
Emergency responders should, therefore, give thought to the preservation and collection of S evidence at the scene. Survivors taken to an SRC and casualties taken to hospital may be S U potential witnesses to a serious crime, or may be suspects for an offence. The Gold and E
Silver Commanders should recognise this possibility and ensure relevant personnel are S properly briefed on this subject.
4.11.6 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
See Home Office (2007) Counter Terrorist Contingency Planning Guidance, Sixteenth Edition [RESTRICTED].
4.12 UTILITIES
4.12.1 INTRODUCTION
In 2003 there were several major failures of the electricity supply network in the United States, Italy and London. In 2007 there was the water emergency in Gloucestershire after the flooding of a water treatment works. The loss of one or more of the utilities for a medium or long period of time is likely to become an emergency and require police involvement.
Each LRF should assess the risk, based on likelihood and impact of the loss of one or more of the utilities, as part of the Community Risk Register and prepare contingency plans to mitigate the risk.
4.12.2 LOSS OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY NETWORK
The loss of electricity to a large part of London was described as chaos in London Assembly (2004) The power cut in London on 28 August 2003 – A report from the London Assembly’s Public Services Committee. The reliance of modern society on electricity is such that the sudden loss resulted in a wide variety of consequences.
The response to managing the consequences of a significant and sudden loss of the electricity supply network is likely to involve the police assuming the role as lead coordinating authority and convening an SCG.
One challenge will be the provision of information to the public. The loss of electricity is likely to lead to the loss of many forms of media, for example, television and the internet, so alternative methods of communication may be required.
The transport infrastructure may be affected. If people are stranded, provision should be made for their welfare. It may be necessary to implement traffic management measures in response to congestion resulting from the failure of traffic lights and other traffic control systems.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 113 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
In addition to the external aspects of the emergency, there is the need to focus inwards on the continued business of the force. It may be necessary to form a business continuity management team to ensure the continued delivery of critical activities and to plan for the return to business as usual when the emergency ends.
The Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) is the lead government department responsible for the electricity supply. BERR have plans to manage disruption to the electricity supply, which include rote disconnections and supply control measures.
For further information see http://www.berr.gov.uk
4.12.3 LOSS OF GAS SUPPLY NETWORK
This may not have the same significant impact as the sudden and sustained loss of electricity.
In a similar manner to the electricity supply network, BERR have gas priority user arrangements.
For further information see http://www.berr.gov.uk
4.12.4 LOSS OF WATER SUPPLY NETWORK
The consequences of a loss of drinking water supply across a wide area became apparent in events in Gloucestershire in 2007. In addition to drinking water, the water supply system provides the water for cooking and sanitation, and for business and industry. Facilities such as schools, hospitals and care homes can be particularly vulnerable where there is a loss of water supply.
Water companies have a legal obligation to continue to supply drinking water to domestic customers in the event of disruption of normal supply. However, the scale and nature of the event may overwhelm the capacity of that water company to supply adequate water to all affected communities. In Gloucestershire the police led the coordination to the response to that water emergency, and it may be appropriate for a police force to lead the response in other similar water emergencies. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) may be considered as an option in maintaining adequate supplies, as should using the capacity of the private sector.
4.12.5 DISRUPTION TO DOWNSTREAM FUEL SUPPLY
BERR is the lead government department for coordinating the response to a significant disruption in the downstream oil supply system. In such cases there are a number of measures that can be brought into effect to respond to the disruption. BERR may consider invoking emergency powers under the Energy Act 1976 to allow the regulation or prohibition of the production, supply, acquisition or use of substances used as fuel.
BERR has a number of emergency response tools that can be considered as part of the response to a fuel emergency. These include:
• Demand calming measures; • Forecourt supply management; • Priority user scheme; • Bulk distribution scheme; • Stockdraw – reduction of strategic reserves; • Crude oil and imported products allocation scheme.
114 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A D D I T
BERR acknowledges that the communication strategy linked to a fuel emergency will I O be important to inform the public and thereby minimise anxiety and discourage N impulse buying. A L An MoU has been signed by the UK Government, the Scottish Executive, the Cabinet of the R National Assembly for Wales, oil companies, the Trades Union Congress and the police. This E
MoU states that the normal supply of oil fuels is a national priority and economic imperative. S
It also advocates the establishment of an effective crisis management system, that has P clear guidelines and appropriate flexibility for local implementation in accordance with O N local circumstances. S E In order to achieve the intentions stated in the MoU, it may be appropriate for the police I force in areas affected by a fuel emergency to take the role of lead coordinating authority S and establish a command, control and coordination structure at strategic, tactical and S U
operational tiers in line with ACPO guidance. E S For further information see http://www.berr.gov.uk
4.12.6 LOSS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
There have been occasions where telecommunications systems have failed for a significant period of time. An example of this is the fire in Manchester on 29 March 2004, which blocked about 130,000 phone lines across the north west of England. While it is possible to use an alternative means of communication where a particular system of communications fails, telecommunications can be lost completely. Such is the police reliance on modern methods of communication, for example, email and mobile phones, the loss of these systems can severely affect a force’s activities.
Police forces should plan for telecommunications resilience, both internally and externally with partner organisations. Each LRF should have a telecommunications subgroup (TSG), of which the police should be a member. The purpose of a TSG is to ensure that all local responders and their partners within their area of responsibility are able to communicate effectively even during the most challenging circumstances. Developing a memorandum of understanding between agencies to support each other during a failure in communications could be beneficial. The TSG are expected to liaise with neighbouring LRFs, effect local coordination and act as the custodian of local arrangements, which are consolidated into a local telecommunications plan. Plans should be tested by running multi- agency exercises within the LRF, region or devolved government area. In their role as the centre of local knowledge, a TSG will identify, share and use good practice, and provide assistance in responding to and recovering from emergencies.
TSGs will provide local management of the privileged access schemes, including MTPAS (Mobile Telephone Privileged Access Scheme, previously known as ACCOLC). MTPAS can be requested by the police Gold Commander during an emergency or major incident. The police should advise network operators that an emergency or major incident has been declared and a higher concentration of mobile phone calls is likely to be experienced. Measures can then be taken to increase capacity or restrict usage of mobile phones. The police can use the voluntary sector, when normal telecommunications systems fail.
A TSG should have a clear understanding of the communication activities underpinning response arrangements, identifying and focusing on those that are deemed critical and enhancing the resilience of communications to support critical activities.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 115 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
The guiding rule is that communications needs are requirements driven not technology led. The key principles are:
• As no technical solution is going to be available all of the time – a layered fall-back approach should be taken; • Interoperability must not be taken for granted; • Arrangements should be based upon risk.
All organisations which play a role in the response to emergencies should be effectively represented (at an appropriate level) in each TSG. Membership should include:
• Local authority emergency planners (and others involved in response and recovery arrangements); • Telecommunications specialists; • Members of a contingency communications group; • Members of LRF utilities groups; • RAYNET.
A telecommunications plan gives a snapshot of the current picture and typically contains:
• Identification of key sites and infrastructure at the Gold, Silver and Bronze tiers of command; • Who needs to communicate (individuals and roles); • Identification of communications requirements and flows; • Identification of the types of information to be communicated; • Details of equipment in use, including underlying resilience, fall-back and interoperability, identifying users and providing a directory; • Statements regarding testing, training and exercising.
The plan will provide useful details on the communications resources available in each area, thereby assisting in communicating and liaising with other agencies and partners during an emergency. It will also help in managing and understanding the information and communication flows during emergencies.
If a failure of telephone systems (including the 999 system) prevents the public from contacting the police, forces may consider deploying police vehicles and personnel at major road junctions, public areas (such as shopping centres) and community venues in affected areas. This will allow the public to continue to contact the emergency services in place of the 999 system.
For further information see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx
116 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED PEDX1 APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAIB...... Air Accidents Investigation Branch ABI ...... Association of British Insurers ACPO ...... Association of Chief Police Officers AH...... Animal Health (an agency of Defra) ARCC ...... Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre ARO ...... Accident Recovery Officer AWE ...... Atomic Weapons Establishment BCM ...... Business Continuity Management BCU ...... Basic Command Unit BERR ...... Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform BTP ...... British Transport Police CBRN ...... Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear CCA...... Civil Contingencies Act 2004 CCS ...... Casualty Clearance Station CFOA ...... Chief Fire Officers’ Association CHALETS ...... Casualties, Hazards, Access/Egress, Location, Emergency Services and Evacuation, Type, Start a Log/Safety CILA ...... Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters CNC ...... Civil Nuclear Constabulary COBR ...... Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms COI ...... Central Office of Information COMAH...... Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 DCDSDO ...... Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer Defra ...... Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs DfT ...... Department for Transport Dstl ...... Defence Science and Technology Laboratory DVI ...... Disaster Victim Identification EA ...... Environment Agency EMARC ...... Environmental Monitoring and Response Centre (Met Office) EOC...... Emergency Operations Centre FAC ...... Family Assistance Centre FCP ...... Forward Command Post FFRC...... Family and Friends Reception Centre FLC ...... Family Liaison Coordinator FLO ...... Family Liaison Officer FOIA...... Freedom of Information Act 2000 FTPAS ...... Fixed Telephone Privileged Access Scheme GDS ...... Government Decontamination Service GLO...... Government Liaison Officer
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 117 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
GLT ...... Government Liaison Team HAC ...... Humanitarian Assistance Centre HMRI ...... Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate HPA ...... Health Protection Agency HSE ...... Health and Safety Executive IEM ...... Integrated Emergency Management IiC ...... Investigator in Charge JRLO ...... Joint Regional Liaison Officer LEMA ...... Local Emergency Mortuary Arrangement LGA ...... Local Government Association LRF ...... Local Resilience Forum MACA ...... Military Aid to the Civil Authorities MACC ...... Military Aid to the Civil Community MACP ...... Military Aid to the Civil Power MAGD ...... Military Aid to other Government Department MAIB ...... Marine Accident Investigation Branch MCA ...... Military Coordinating Authority MCA ...... Maritime and Coastguard Agency MoD ...... Ministry of Defence MRCC ...... Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre MTPAS ...... Mobile Telephone Privileged Access Scheme NAIR ...... National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity NARO ...... Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (MoD) NCEC ...... National Chemical Emergency Centre NDS ...... News Distribution Service NEPLG ...... Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group NEMA ...... National Emergency Mortuary Arrangement NIM ...... National Intelligence Model NPIA ...... National Policing Improvement Agency PCM ...... Post-Crash Management PPE ...... Personal Protective Equipment RAIB ...... Rail Accident Investigation Branch RCC ...... Regional Control Centre RCCC ...... Regional Civil Contingencies Committee REPPIR ...... Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 RIDDOR ...... Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 RRF ...... Regional Resilience Forum RVP ...... Rendezvous Point SACP ...... Scene Access Control Point SAT ...... Special Assistance Team SCC ...... Strategic Coordination Centre SCG ...... Strategic Coordinating Group SERM ...... Scene Evidence Recovery Manager SIO ...... Senior Investigating Officer SIM ...... Senior Identification Manager SRC ...... Survivor Reception Centre SRC ...... Shoreline Response Centre SSC ...... Special Safety Cell (MoD Ensleigh) STAC ...... Scientific and Technical Advice Cell TCG ...... Tactical Coordinating Group TSG ...... Telecommunications Subgroup UOS ...... Uniform Operational Support VAA ...... Victim Audit Area WHO ...... World Health Organisation
118 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N D
APPENDIX 2 I X GLOSSARY OF TERMS 2
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
BRONZE A tier of command at which operational delivery of tasks in undertaken. Bronze is below Silver.
BRONZE COMMANDER An individual with responsibility for the delivery of operational tasks as determined by the Silver Commander, and who may be a police officer of any rank, but usually a constable, sergeant or inspector. The tasks may be based on a geographic area or on a function.
BUSINESS CONTINUITY The strategic and tactical capability of the organisation to plan for and respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue business operations at an acceptable pre- defined level.
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT An holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation and the possible impact on business operations if those threats are realised. It also provides a framework for building organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value creating activities.
CRITICAL ACTIVITIES These are activities which have to be performed in order to deliver the key products and services which enable an organisation to meet its most important and time-sensitive objectives.
FAMILY AND FRIENDS RECEPTION CENTRE This is a secure place, usually located away from the scene of an emergency or major incident, where the family and friends of people directly involved in that incident can attend for relevant documentation processes to be undertaken, information to be disseminated to them and humanitarian assistance provided.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 119 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
FORWARD COMMAND POST (FCP) This is a location, near the scene of operations, where either the police Silver Commander or Bronze Scene Commander is based. At emergencies or major incidents where there is a defined scene, the FCP is where the Fire and Rescue Service, and Ambulance Service Silver Commanders will be located. Mobile command facilities can be used to establish an FCP. The term is consistent with the current Fire and Rescue Service Fire Service Command doctrine.
GOLD A tier of command, control and coordination at which policy, aim and objectives, including the overall response framework, are established and managed. Gold is a higher tier than Silver.
GOLD COMMANDER This is an individual with responsibility for the overall command of an incident at the Gold tier. It can be a police officer of any managerial rank, but is normally a chief officer (Assistant Chief Constable or Commander).
GOLD SUPPORT A team of people constituted to provide the necessary administrative, strategic, scientific and technical support to the Gold Commander.
INCIDENT COMMAND POST (ICP) This term is obsolete; the term Silver Control is now used.
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT This is a term used within the statutory guidance to describe the overall process. It includes six activities: anticipation; assessment; prevention; preparation; response and recovery management.
INITIAL RESPONDER(S) This generic term is used to describe the police officers, police community support officers, special constables or police staff, of whatever rank or grade, who are the initial individuals to attend the scene of a sudden impact emergency or major incident. It replaces the term first officer at the scene.
LOGISTICS Logistics in this context mean getting the right people and equipment to the right place at the right time. It includes the subsequent management of these human and equipment resources, and the provision of: • Accommodation; • Meals – taking account of a variety of dietary needs; • Drinks – hot and cold; • Vehicles; • Buildings – both temporary and permanent structures; • Appropriate IT hardware and software.
RESOURCES Resources in this context mean the provision of human resources, equipment and supplies to meet the strategic, tactical and operational needs of the commanders at all three tiers, ie, Gold, Silver and Bronze.
120 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N
SENIOR IDENTIFICATION MANAGER D
A police officer, normally a detective chief inspector or detective superintendent rank, and I one trained for the role, who assumes responsibility for the retrieval and identification of X deceased people in line with the requirements of HM Coroner for the area and the 2 recommendations of Lord Justice Clarke.
SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER In the context of this guidance, a police officer, normally a detective chief inspector or of detective superintendent rank trained and accredited for the role, who assumes responsibility for a criminal investigation arising from an emergency or major incident.
SILVER A tier of command, control and coordination at a tactical level, where the response to the incident is actually managed. Silver is a tier below Gold but above Bronze.
SILVER COMMANDER This is an individual with responsibility for the tactical command of the incident at the Silver tier. It can be a police officer of any supervisory rank, commencing initially at sergeant rank, and depending on the duration, scale and nature of the incident progressing through inspector, chief inspector to superintendent rank.
SILVER COORDINATING GROUP An alternative name for a Tactical Coordinating Group.
SILVER CONTROL This is a location where the functions can be based to direct and control the tactical operations within the span of command of the Silver Commander.
SILVER CONTROL MANAGER A police officer responsible to the Silver Commander for the efficient running of Silver Control (may also act as deputy Silver Commander).
SILVER SUPPORT A suitable location, normally a police station near to the scene of the incident, where the Silver Support functions (planning, information, resources, logistics, finance and legal) can be undertaken, and personnel working on these functions on behalf of the Silver Commander can be accommodated.
SILVER SUPPORT OFFICER A police officer or member of police staff responsible to the Silver Commander for the provision of planning, information, resources, logistics, finance and legal arrangements in relation to the incident, and who manages the Silver Support functions.
SURVIVOR RECEPTION CENTRE A secure place, located outside the inner cordon but close to the scene, where survivors not requiring acute medical treatment can congregate in order to ensure they are safe from the immediate consequences of the incident, and where documentation of survivors can be completed for input into the Casualty Bureau. In addition, immediate humanitarian assistance can be provided by the local authority at this location.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 121 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
TACTICAL COORDINATING GROUP This is a group of tactical commanders who meet regularly to determine and deliver the tactical response to an emergency or major incident. The group is normally chaired by the police Silver Commander. This is also known as a Silver Coordinating Group.
VICTIM AUDIT AREA This is a place, often a temporary structure, where deceased persons and human remains retrieved from the scene of a major incident can be taken initially, pending transfer to the designated mortuary. The VAA should be a discreet place, shielded from the public and media to ensure dignity for the deceased. The documentation processes in line with Interpol and ACPO DVI standards should be adhered to at the VAA.
122 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED PEDX3 APPENDIX
APPENDIX 3 REFERENCES
ACTS OF PARLIAMENT
UNITED KINGDOM. Parliament. 2000. Terrorism Act 2000. London: TSO.
UNITED KINGDOM. Parliament. 2004. Civil Contingencies Act 2004. London: TSO.
UNITED KINGDOM. Parliament. 2004. Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. London: TSO.
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005. Statutory Instrument No. 2042. London: TSO.
The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999. Statutory Instrument No. 743. London: TSO.
The Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005. Statutory Instrument No. 1088. London: TSO.
The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001. Statutory Instrument No. 2975. London: TSO.
STATUTORY GUIDANCE
HM Government (2005) Emergency Preparedness – Guidance on Part I of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and non-statutory arrangements [Internet]. London: HM Government. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NON-STATUTORY GUIDANCE
HM Government (2005) Emergency Response and Recovery – Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement Emergency Preparedness [Internet]. London: HM Government.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 123 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
OTHER
Alison, L. and Crego, J. (Eds) (2008) Policing Critical Incidents – Leadership and Critical Incident Management. Uffculme, Devon: Willan Publishing. [ISBN 978-1-84392-279-7]
NATIONAL GUIDANCE
ACPO (2002) Emergency Procedures Manual. London: ACPO.
ACPO (2004) Manual of Guidance on Public Order Standards Tactics and Training. London: ACPO.
ACPO (TAM) (2005) Manual of Major Covert Terrorist Investigations. London: ACPO. [CONFIDENTIAL. Available from ACPO TAM on application]
ACPO (2006) Police Service Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Team Strategy. London: ACPO. [Available from ACPO on application]
ACPO (2007) Survivor Reception Centres and Family and Friends Reception Centres: Interim Multi Agency Guidance. London: ACPO. [Available from ACPO. Accessible only from ACPO Intranet]
ACPO (2007) The Role of the Insurance Industry in Dealing with Civil Emergencies [Internet]. London: ACPO. Available from http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/Guidance_Insurers_Protocol_UOBA_ website_17x09x071.doc [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Audit Commission (2007) Staying afloat: Financing emergencies [Internet]. London: Audit Commission. Available from http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/ reports/NATIONAL-REPORT.asp?CategoryID=&ProdID=FE7A55D1-B7D7-4746- B27D-A665ECB07DED [Accessed 27 March 2009]
British Standards (2006) British Standard BS25999 Business Continuity Management Parts 1 and 2. London: BSI. [Available on application from British Standards]
Cabinet Office and Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (n.d.) Voluntary Sector Engagement Guidance Note [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office.
Cabinet Office (2005) Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132685/conops.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Cabinet Office (2007) Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132709/dataprotection.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009] [Non-statutory guidance to complement Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery. ISBN 0711504784]
Cabinet Office (2007) National Recovery Guidance Recovery Plan Guidance Template [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ ukresilience/response/recovery_guidance/generic_issues/structures_processing.aspx [Accessed 27 March 2009]
124 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N
Cabinet Office (2007) Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic D
Coordination Centre – Guidance to Local Responders [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. I Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132949/stac_guidance.pdf X
[Accessed 27 March 2009] 3
Cabinet Office (2008) Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132976/vulnerable_guidance.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Communities and Local Government (2008) Guidance for local authorities on community cohesion contingency planning and tension monitoring [Internet]. West Yorkshire: Communities and Local Government. Available from http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/cohesionplanning [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Communities and Local Government (2008) Key Communities, Key Resources: Engaging the capacity and capability of faith communities in Civil Resilience [Internet]. West Yorkshire: Communities and Local Government. Available from http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/846112.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Highways Agency and ACPO (2005) The Network Operations National Guidance Framework, Second Edition. Wyboston: NCPE.
Highways Agency (2007) Provision of Emergency Customer Welfare on Motorways and All Purpose Trunk Roads [Internet]. London: Highways Agency. Available from http://www.highways.gov.uk/business/17026.aspx [Accessed 27 March 2009]
HM Government (2006) Evacuation and Shelter Guidance. Non-statutory guidance to complement Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response & Recovery. London: HM Government.
HM Government, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (n.d.) Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Non-statutory guidance on establishing Humanitarian Assistance Centres [Internet]. London: TSO. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132796/hac_guidance.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
HM Government (2008) Fire and Rescue Manual (Volume 2). Fire Service Operations: Incident Command, Third Edition [Internet]. London: TSO. Available from http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/incidentcommand3rd [Accessed 27 March 2009] [ISBN 978-0-11-341321-8]
Home Office (n.d.) Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies, 2nd Edition. London: Home Office. [RESTRICTED. Consultation draft only]
Home Office (n.d.) Recovery: An Emergency Management Guide [Internet]. London: Home Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132910/recovery.pdf [Accessed 30 March 2009]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 125 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Home Office (n.d.) Supplementing Local Response Options – A Concept of Operations for Accessing Central Assistance to Supplement Local Responses to Mass Fatalities Incidents in England and Wales. London: Home Office. [RESTRICTED] [Available from the Home Office or Regional Government Offices on application]
Home Office (2005) Draft – Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies – Follow up guidance and report on progress made since May 2004. London: Home Office. [RESTRICTED] [Available from the Home Office on application – guidance under review.]
Home Office and Cabinet Office (2005) The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines [Internet]. London: Home Office. Available from http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/guidance- disasters/faith-communities?view=Binary [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Home Office (2007) Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning Guidance, 16th Edition. London: Home Office. [RESTRICTED] [Available on application to the Home Office, Office for Security and Counter Terrorism.]
London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) (2007) Major Incident Procedure Manual, Seventh Edition [Internet]. London: TSO. Available from http://www.leslp.gov.uk [Accessed 27 March 2009]
London Resilience (2007) London Mass Fatality Plan [Internet]. London: London Resilience. Available from http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk/londonsplans/emergencyplans/ massfatality.jsp [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2005) Guidance on Development of a Site Clearance Capability in England and Wales [Internet]. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. Available from http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/guidancedevelopment [Accessed 27 March 2009]
AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (2008) Aircraft Accidents Guidance for the Police, Emergency Services and Airfield Operators. Hampshire: AAIB. Available from http://www.aaib.gov.uk/guidance_and_regulations/guidance_for_police__ emergency_services_and_airfield_operators_2008.cfm [Accessed 27 March 2009]
FLOODING
Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Environment Agency and Defra (2008) Developing a Multi-Agency Flood Plan (MAFP) Guidance for Local Resilience Forums and Emergency Planners. London: Environment Agency. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132757/flooding_ma_planning_guidance_ 0208.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Met Office (2007) Together – Make a difference with a coordinated response to emergency management. Devon: Met Office. Available (on application) from http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/corporate/pws/emergency_response.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
126 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N
FLU PANDEMIC D I Cabinet Office (n.d.) Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Guidance to Local Planners X
[Internet]. London: Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Available from 3 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131636/flu_lrf_guidance1.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Cabinet Office and Department of Health (2007) Pandemic Flu: A national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic [Internet]. London: COI. Available from http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicy AndGuidance/DH_073168 [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Cabinet Office (2008) Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Supplementary Guidance for Local Resilience Forum Planners. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131627/flu_lrf_best_%20practice_final.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Home Office (Version 1.1) Planning for a Possible Influenza Pandemic – A Framework for Planners Preparing to Manage Deaths [Internet]. London: Home Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131642/flu_managing_deaths_ framework.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NPIA (n.d.) Pandemic Flu Guidance for the Police Service [Internet]. London: NPIA. Available from http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/hpa_police_icg_final.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency (1999 reprinted 2008) Emergency planning for major accidents Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999. London: HSE Books.
Ministry of Defence (April 2008) Joint Service Publication 498 Major Accident Control Regulations [Internet]. London: MoD. Available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/5C6CE78C-2516-4517-AC62- 9CE611AE771C/0/chap_5.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
MARITIME INCIDENTS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (2008) Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [Internet]. Southampton: MCA. Available from http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/uksar.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (n.d.) National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations [Internet]. Southampton: MCA. Available from http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga-contin.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 127 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ASSISTANCE
Ministry of Defence (September 2007) Joint Doctrine Publication 02, 2nd Edition. Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience [Internet]. London: MoD. Available from http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/ OurPublications/JDWP/JointDoctrinePublicationjdp02OperationsInTheUk TheDefenceContributionToResilience.htm [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NUCLEAR INCIDENTS
BERR – Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group 2008) Consolidated Guidance [Internet]. London: BERR. Available from http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/sources/nuclear/key- issues/emergency/neplg/guidance/page18841.html [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Health and Safety Executive (1994) Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies. London: HSE Books.
Ministry of Defence (n.d.) Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) Edition 6 – Defence Nuclear Materials Transport Contingency Arrangements [Internet]. London: MoD. Available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/226E622E-356E- 4CB0-A2CD-979AE352B848/0/20080424LAESIv6U.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Ministry of Defence (2004) Joint Service Publication 471 Defence Nuclear Accident Response [Internet]. London: MoD. Available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C319A4D6-586D-455F-BB00-9517C4BB4A05/ 0/JSP471_UC.pdf [Accessed 3 February 2009]
NRPB (2000) National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity – Users Handbook 2000 Edition [Internet]. Oxon: NRPB. Available from http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1195733848080 [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NRPB (2002) NAIR Technical Handbook 2002 Edition – Technical Handbook on the National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity [Internet]. London: NRPB. Available from http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1195733848080 [Accessed 3 February 2009]
RADSAFE (n.d.) The RADSAFE Plan [Internet]. Available from http://www.radsafe.org.uk/docs/radsafe_plan.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
RAIL INCIDENTS
Network Rail (n.d.) Emergency services rail incident protocol [Internet]. London: Network Rail. Available (on application) from http://www.networkrail.co.uk [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Network Rail (n.d.) Railway Safety for the Emergency Services [Internet]. London: Network Rail. Available (on application) from http://www.networkrail.co.uk [Accessed 27 March 2009]
128 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED PEDX3 APPENDIX
Network Rail (n.d.) The management of a fatality occurring on Network Rail controlled infrastructure in England and Wales [Internet]. London: Network Rail. Available (on application) from http://www.networkrail.co.uk [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Office of Rail Regulation (2006) Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, The British Transport Police, Association of Chief Police Officers, and the Office of Rail Regulation for the investigation of rail accidents and incidents in England and Wales [Internet]. London: Network Rail. Available from http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources/ORR-RAIB-BTP- ACPO_MOU_April_2006.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
UTILITIES
BERR (2006) Proposals to update the Gas Priority User Arrangements [Internet]. London: BERR. Available from http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page32587.html [Accessed 27 March 2009]
BERR (2007) Electricity Priority User arrangements (Consultation Document) [Internet]. London: BERR. Available from http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40466.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Cabinet Office (n.d.) Ensuring Resilient Telecommunications – A Survey of Some Technical Solutions [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131462/resilient_telecomms_survey.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Cabinet Office (n.d.) Towards achieving resilient telecommunication; interim guidance [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132919/resilient_comms_guidance.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
INQUIRY REPORTS
7 July Review Committee (2006) Report of the 7 July Review Committee [Internet]. London: London Assembly. Available from http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/general.jsp [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Anderson, Dr I., (CBE) (2008) Foot and Mouth Disease 2007: A Review and Lessons Learned. London: TSO.
Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (2006) Buncefield Major Incident Investigation – Initial report to the Health and Safety Commission and Environment Agency of the investigation into the explosions and fires at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, on 11 December 2005 [Internet]. Suffolk: HSE Books. Available from http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/initialreport.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (2007) Recommendations on the emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery from incidents [Internet]. London: Buncefield Major Incident Investigation. Available from http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/preparedness.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 129 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Department of Transport (1994) Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas: Report of Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping. London: HMSO.
Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum and Dorset Local Resilience Forum (2007) Multi Agency Response to the Shoreline Aspects of the Grounding of the MSC Napoli – Debrief Report [Internet]. Available from http://www.devon.gov.uk/multi_agency_debrief_v5.0.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Emergency Planning Society (Spring 2006) Blueprint Issue 44. Cardiff: Emergency Planning Society.
Government Office for the North West (and other agencies) (2005) Carlisle storms and associated flooding – Multi-agency debrief report [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Synopsis only available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132643/carlislereport.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Hertfordshire Resilience Forum (2007) Buncefield – Multi-agency Debrief Report and Recommendations [Internet]. Hertford: Hertfordshire Resilience Forum.
HM Government (2006) Addressing lessons from the emergency response to the 7 July 2005 London bombings [Internet]. London: Home Office. Available from http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication- search/general/lessons-learned [Accessed 27 March 2009]
House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2008) Flooding – Fifth Report of Session 2007-08 Volume 1 [Internet]. London: TSO. Available from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvfru/49/49.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Independent Police Complaints Commission (2008) Stockwell One – Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005 [Internet]. London: IPCC. Available from http://www.ipcc.gov.uk [Accessed 24 July 2008]
Independent Police Complaints Commission (2008) Stockwell Two – an investigation into complaints about the Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of public statements following the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005 [Internet]. London: IPCC. Available from http://www.ipcc.gov.uk [Accessed 24 July 2008]
London Assembly (2004) The power cut in London on 28 August 2003 – A report from the London Assembly’s Public Services Committee [Internet]. London: Greater London Authority. Available from http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/pubserv/powercut.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
London Assembly 7 July Review Committee (2007) Follow up report [Internet]. London: London Assembly. Available from http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/general.jsp [Accessed 27 March 2009]
130 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N
London Assembly (2007) Report of the 7 July Review Committee – Response to Follow D
Up Report [Internet]. London: London Assembly. Available from I http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/7july/responses-to-follow-up.rtf X
[Accessed 27 March 2009] 3
London Regional Resilience Forum (2006) Looking Back, Moving Forward – The multi-agency debrief – Lessons identified and progress since the terrorist events of 7 July 2005 [Internet]. London: Government Office for London. Available from http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/lookingbackmovingforward.pdf [Accessed on 27 March 2009]
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2008) Report on the investigation into the structural failure of MSC Napoli, English Channel on 18 January 2007 [Internet]. Southampton: MAIB. Available from http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/msc_napoli.cfm [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Professor Tom Coulthard et al (2007) The June 2007 floods in Hull [Internet]. Hull: Hull City Council. Available from http://www.coulthard.org.uk/downloads/floodsinhull1.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Report of Lord Justice Clarke (2001) Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims following Major Transport Accidents. London: TSO. [ISBN 0 10150122 6]
South Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum (2008) Final Report on the Flooding of Summer 2007 [Internet]. Available from http://www.southyorkshireemergencies.co.uk/ LocalResilienceForum/flooding_report.asp [Accessed 27 March 2009]
The Environment Agency (2007) Review of 2007 summer floods [Internet]. Bristol: Environment Agency. Available from http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/ research/library/publications/33887.aspx [Accessed on 27 March 2009]
The Pitt Review (2008) Learning lessons from the 2007 floods. An independent review by Sir Michael Pitt [Internet]. London: Cabinet Office. Available from The Pitt Review, Cabinet Office, 22 Whitehall, London SW1A 2WH or http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview.html [Accessed 27 March 2009]
The Stationery Office (2006) Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s Review of the Fire Response [Internet]. Norwich: TSO. Available from TSO and via http://hertsdirect.org/yrccouncil/hcc/fire/reports/buncereport [Accessed 27 March 2009]
PRACTICE ADVICE/GUIDANCE PRODUCED BY THE NPIA
ACPO (2005) Guidance on the National Intelligence Model. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Management of Police Information. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Guidance on the National Briefing Model. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan. Wyboston: NCPE.
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 131 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Search Management and Procedures. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-ordination. Wyboston: NCPE.
ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management. London: NPIA.
ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on the Policing of Roads. London: NPIA.
ACPO (2007) Road Death Manual Investigation Manual. London: NPIA.
ACPO (2008) Family Liaison Officer Guidance. London: NPIA.
ACPO (2008) Guidance on Casualty Bureau Standard Administrative Procedures (CBSAP). London: NPIA.
ACPO (2008) Guidance on the Police Strategic Management of CBRN Events. London: NPIA.
ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Command and Control. London: NPIA.
ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Strategy. London: NPIA.
ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on Police CBRN Operational Procedures and Tactics. London: NPIA.
PRACTICE ADVICE/GUIDANCE PRODUCED BY ACPO
ACPO (2008) Guidance on Independent Advisory Groups. London: ACPO. Available on ACPO Intranet.
ACPO Media Advisory Group (2008) Guidance Notes on Media Handling at Major Incidents (Including Counter Terrorism) . London: ACPO. Available on ACPO Intranet.
STATED CASES
DPP v Morrison (2003) Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) Kennedy LJ, Hooper LJ 4 April 2003 [Internet]. Available from http://www.nexis.com/uk/legal (log in required) [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2005) . High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). Tugendhat J: 23 March 2005 14 April 2005 Times 699, 571 [Internet]. Available from http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2006/06/343933 [Accessed 27 March 2009]
Austin and Saxby v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2007) Court of Appeal 15 October 2007 EWCA Civ 989 [Internet]. Available from http://www.3serjeantsinn.com and http://www.nexis.com/uk/legal (log in required)
132 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED PEDX4 APPENDIX
APPENDIX 4 USEFUL CONTACTS
USEFUL CONTACTS
Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC), RAF Kinloss Tel: 01309 672161 Ext 6202 Website: http://www.kinlossrescue.com
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Tel (general enquiries): 01252 510300 Tel (to report an accident): 01252 512299 Website: http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Tel (general enquiries): 0118 981 4111 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.awe.co.uk
British Red Cross Tel (general enquiries): 0844 412 2804 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.redcross.org.uk
British Transport Police, Force Control Room (MICC) Contact through force control room Website: http://www.btp.police.uk
The Central Office of Information Tel (general enquiries): 020 7928 5037 Website: http://www.coi.gov.uk
The Central Office of Information, News Distribution Service Tel (general enquiries): 020 7261 8527 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.dstl.gov.uk
Department for Communities and Local Government Tel (general enquiries): 020 7944 4400 Website: http://www.communities.gov.uk
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 133 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Defence Science and Technology (Dstl) Tel (general enquiries): 01980 613121 Tel ( for urgent medical advice ): 01980 613325 Website: http://www.dstl.gov.uk
Environment Agency Tel (24-hour incident hotline): 0800 807060 Tel (floodline): 0845 988 1188 Website: http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk
Genesis Website: http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk/genesis
Government Decontamination Service (GDS) Tel (general enquiries and advice): 0845 850 1323 Website: http://www.gds.gov.uk
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Tel (Incident Contact Centre): 0845 300 9923 Website: http://www.hse.gov.uk
Health and Safety Executive – Nuclear Directorate (ND) Tel: 01519 51 3484/3290 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear
Health Protection Agency – Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 0JG Tel: 01980 612100 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.hpa.org.uk
Health Protection Agency – Centre for Infections 61 Colindale Avenue, London NW9 5EQ Tel: 020 8200 4400 Fax: 020 8200 7868 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.hpa.org.uk
Health Protection Agency – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards Chilton, Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 0RQ Tel: 01235 831600 Fax: 01235 833891 Email: [email protected] (Radiation Protection Division) Email: [email protected] (Chemical Hazards & Poisons) Website: http://www.hpa.org.uk
134 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED A P P E N
London Area and Terminal Control Centre, Swanwick D
Tel: 01895 426003/426422 I Website: http://www.nats.co.uk X 4 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) Tel: 02380 232527 Website: http://www.maib.gov.uk
Met Office Environmental Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) Tel (24-hour): 01392 886095 Website: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk
Metropolitan Police, Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) Incident Response and Coordination Centre Contact through Force Control Room Tel (Anti-Terrorist hotline): 0800 789 321 Website: http://www.met.police.uk/so
Ministry of Defence Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) Tel (24-hour): 020 7218 8938 Website: http://www.mod.uk (Search on ‘duty officer’ will bring up DCDSDO)
Ministry of Defence Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (SJC) (UK) Contact through Force Control Room
National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity (NAIR) Tel (general enquiries): 01235 831600 Tel (24-hour Incident Reporting): 0800 834 153 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.hpa.org.uk
National Chemical Emergency Centre Tel (general enquiries): 0870 190 6621 Email: [email protected] Website: http://the-ncec.com
NPIA Specialist Operations Centre Tel (24-hour): 0845 000 5463 Website: http://www.npia.police.uk
Network Rail Tel (National Helpline): 0845 711 4141 Website: http://www.networkrail.co.uk
Police National CBRN Centre Tel (24-hour Duty Officer): 0845 000 6382 Email: [email protected]
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009 135 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
RADSAFE Tel (24-hour Incident Reporting): 0800 834153 Website: http://www.radsafe.org.uk
Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) Tel: 01332 253300 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.raib.gov.uk
Scottish Area and Terminal Control Centre, Prestwick Tel: 01292 479800 Ext 2661/2663/2763
WRVS Tel (Customer Service Centre): 02920 739000 Tel (24-hour Emergency Contact): 07714 898526 Website: http://www.wrvs.org.uk
136 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Guidance on Emergency Procedures © ACPO NPIA 2009