Chapter 2 Power: Naval Force and the Conduct of UN Peace Operations*
From time immemorial the purpose of the navy has beento determine or influence, and sometimes decide, issues on land…the sea has supplied mobility, capability and support throughout history. ose failing the sea power test, notably Alexander and Hitler, also failed the test of longevity.
– Edward Beach
e political object – the original motive for the war – will…determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.
– Carl von Clausewitz,
Introduction e politicisation of oceanspace, particularly since , has been both fundamental (leading to the creation of new sovereign waters such as Archipelagic Waters), and sensitive (impinged upon by more precisely defined international privileges in forms such as the right of innocent passage, or the conduct of UN peace operations). is operational context thus forms one of the core animating factors in whether a UN peace operation can and will take place. It is this operational context which ultimately dictates why a UN peace operation is initiated and how it will be implemented, and which, consequently, also governs the characterisation and practice of authority in such operations. When this operational context is then overlaid by the ocean’s resilience as the world’s major means of trade and communication – Mahan’s “great highway” – it becomes unsurprising that global maritime mobility is “important not only to naval powers but to other states that rely on those powers to maintain
* An earlier, shorter, version of this chapter appeared as “Naval Force and the Conduct of Peace Support Operations” () : International Peacekeeping . Edward Beach quoted in Robert Ross, “ e Role of Amphibious Forces in A Changing World”, RUSI Journal, April ; p . Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (); Chapter , Section . Lorraine Elliot, “ e Sea in International Politics”, in Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood (eds), Oceans Management Policy: e Strategic Dimension, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, ; p . Mahan, e Influence of Seapower Upon History, -; p ; See also Gray, “Sea Power in Modern Strategy”; p ; Reeve, “ e Rise of Modern Naval Strategy c.-”; p , where he discusses the role of modern navies in “the beginning of globalised interna- Chapter stability and deter aggression, directly or through the United Nations”. e value of naval power in UN peace operations covers the full operational spectrum. is utility ranges from the perennial synergy between naval power and diplomacy (such as showing the UN or another flag, and modern ‘gunboat diplomacy’), through constabulary functions (such as monitoring cease-fires at sea and along coasts, or enforcing UN sanctioned embargoes), to military roles (such as sea-land strike, or the insertion of land forces). e US Navy, for example, has been called “the principal military arm of US diplomacy in the post-World War II era”. Indeed, quiet apart for the Freedom of Navigation program previously discussed, approximately per cent of the documented occasions between and when the United States responded to a crisis with military force “included naval forces, with about half the reactions being solely naval”. Yet, as Pugh and others note, “concepts of multinationalism have been con- spicuously absent from theories of sea power, even in post-Cold War studies”, and “the existing literature on maritime security and multinational naval operations to support peace and international order is somewhat sparse”. is anomaly is perhaps most pronounced when considering the interoperability requirements of multina- tional naval forces. As Gordon notes, “when there are a lot of flags at the table” for a particular UN peace operation, the UN can lay claim to significant “moral author- ity”. Indeed, as Gordon continues – not in criticism, but rather as a simple statement of fact – where a homogeneous force of “x” size would achieve a goal, a multinational operation (with its attendant problems of interoperability, and the differing levels of training, equipping, and capability that exist between national contingents) often requires a force of “x” to achieve the same goal. us within the ultimately political UNSC, operational efficacy is routinely viewed as less important than the political requirement for consensus and its attendant promises of multilateralism and the aura of internationalism. As the ICJ observed as early as the Corfu Channel Case (), whilst international organisations do have defects, they still offer the best available
tional relations, strategy and war: the world in which we still live – the Mahanian world in which the sea serves as a great global strategic highway”. Stevenson and Oxman, “ e Future of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”; p – my italics. See Pugh, Ginifer, and Grove, “Sea Power, Security and Peacemaking”; pp -; Also, see generally, Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy; ch , ch ; Staley, e Wave of the Future: e United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping; p ; Reeve, “ e Rise of Modern Naval Strategy c. -”; p , noting “the intimate and long-standing link between naval power and diplomacy. Persuasion and deterrence are about creating an image. Warships were and are well suited to creating the image and symbolism of power in the minds of the inter- national community”. Pirtle quoting Edward A. Smith, “Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium”; p . Michael Pugh, “Introduction”, in Michael Pugh (ed), Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations, Manchester University Press, Manchester, ; p ; See also Pugh, Ginifer, and Grove, “Sea Power, Security and Peacemaking”; p . Gordon, interview, February , Dili, East Timor. Gordon, interview February , Dili, East Timor.