Merciless Marches and Martial Law: Canada's Commitment to the Occupation of the Rhineland

by

Christopher James Hyland

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1999 B.Ed., University of British Columbia, 2000

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: Marc Milner, PhD, History

Examining Board: Steve Turner, PhD, History, Chair Peter C. Kent, PhD, History Alan Sears, PhD, Education

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

University of New Brunswick

November, 2007

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This thesis is dedicated to all the men and women who have fought and are continuing to fight for Canada. I owe you all a debt of gratitude that can never be fully repaid. I hope this thesis, in some small way, adds to the ever-growing narrative of Canada's military past and helps tell your story.

ii Abstract

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Canadian Corps was involved in an epic march to the Rhineland to engage in garrison duties in the Cologne bridgehead, as part of the British Army. Yet, a narrative of the Canadian Corps' experience in the Rhineland is largely absent from the literature concerning the occupation of German territory. A comprehensive account and analysis of the corps' activities, from November 1918 to January 1919, is not present in the Canadian martial and diplomatic texts concerning the First World War. To date, historians have left several questions unanswered concerning the Dominion's first experience occupying the home territory of a European enemy. Using a comprehensive search of existing literature, Chapter 1 outlines the genesis of Canadian involvement in the occupation of the Rhineland. Based on new archival research, Chapter 2 reveals the initial plans and preparations during the week prior to the advance to Germany. Chapters 3 and 4 chronicle the Canadian Corps' experiences during the march to the Rhineland and the impacts of a difficult logistical situation. Defence schemes, duties and methods to maintain discipline are the subject of Chapter 5 while soldier-civilian interactions and the misbehaviour on both sides are described in Chapter 6. Finally, the Canadian Corps' relief from the bridgehead and return to Belgium are accounted for in Chapter 7. Throughout the period of Canadian Corps involvement in the occupation, three themes—demobilization, logistics and image—underpin the Canadian soldiers' experiences and largely explain the manner in which many events unfolded.

iii Acknowledgements

Over the years, a number of people have helped and supported me while I have pursued my academic career. Dr. Milner, thank you for taking the time to review and critique my work. Your high standards and expectations have made me a better historian. Dr. Turner, thank you for all the wonderful talks. The coffee and conversation were greatly appreciated. Thanks to all the students in the Milton F. Gregg Centre. You were a great resource and friendly support network when times were difficult. I thank you too Mark Savoie. Without you, this whole enterprise would not have been possible. To Joe, Lynn, Jon and Lisa I say thanks as well as your insights and understanding were most appreciated. Yet, of all people, I would like to thank my family the most. Your loving support has sustained me throughout. Mom, I could not have done it without you!

iv Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

List of Maps vi

List of Plates vii

List of Abbreviations viii

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. Origins of the Occupation and Canada's Part Therein 18

Chapter 2. Concentration, Preparation and Initial Plans 35

Chapter 3. A Logistical Nightmare: The March across Belgium 49

Chapter 4. Marching in Germany: From the Frontier to the Rhine 64

Chapter 5. Keeping Busy: The Canadian Corps Occupies Cologne and Bonn 77

Chapter 6. Canadian Soldier, German Civilian, British Governor 99

Chapter 7. Relief at Last: The Corps Returns to Belgium 109

Conclusion: Demobilization, Logistics and the Corps' Reputation 116

Bibliography 123

Appendix 1. March Tables - Plans versus Realities 132

Curriculum Vitae

v List of Maps

Map 1. Advances made by the Canadian Corps -

From 11 October 1918 to 1 November 1918 28

Map 2. Stages of Advance to the Rhine 40

Map 3. Line of March to the Rhine River 50

Map 4. British Occupied Area of the Rhineland, December 1918 71

Map 5. Cologne Bridgehead Defences, December 1918 79

Map 6. British Army Areas, December 1918 Ill

vi List of Plates

Plate 1. Canadians Marching through Mons 37

Plate 2. Canadian pacifies a Belgian Baby 43

Plate 3. General Home Inspecting the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade 46

Plate 4. The Last Town in Belgium 56

Plate 5. Canadian Troops Enter Germany 63

Plate 6. The Canadian Corps Crosses the Rhine 75

Plate 7. Officers and Ranks of the 195th Siege Battery below Bonn Bridge 83

Plate 8. Officers of the 2nd Canadian Division under Bonn Bridge 88

vii List of Abbreviations

AA - Assistant Adjutant

AWOL - Absent Without Leave

CEF - Canadian Expeditionary Force

CIB - Canadian Infantry Brigade

C-in-C - Commander in Chief

CMGC - Canadian Machine Gun Corps

CMMGB - Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade

CO - Commanding Officer

GHQ - General Headquarters

GOC - General Officer Commanding

HQ - Headquarters

NCO - Non-Commissioned Officer

QMG - Quarter Master General

RAF - Royal Air Force

YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association Introduction

And so ended the last day of the Great War. One has been feeling one's way through the dark for four and a half years and now one has come out into the sunlight - and behold!! one is blind, one cannot see the sun. But the blindness will pass in time. But we shall be exiles for a few months yet, I'm afraid.

William Fraser, Diary, 11 November 19181

On 11 November 1918, the Great War ended after four and a half years of struggle. The Allied powers were victorious and celebrations rang out in towns and cities across the world.2 The fighting was over; Germany had asked for terms and the soldiers would soon return home. But, for the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), and many other Allied soldiers, their work did not end on 11 November 1918. In fact, the Canadian

Corps was about to embark on one of the more intriguing periods in its history. Instead of demobilizing and returning home, the corps began preparations for a march into Germany as part of the Army of Occupation. Half of the Canadian Corps trekked for twenty-eight days across Belgium and Germany to take up garrison duties around Cologne and Bonn.

This occupation of hostile territory was a first for the Dominion as never before had

Canada's civilian soldiers been asked to garrison the home territory of a European enemy.

It was also conducted during a period of great tension, and social chaos in Germany, with thousands of recently demobilized German troops milling around, and under the cloud of looming negotiations in Paris that would decide Germany's fate. This brief period of

Canadian participation in the occupation forces was very much a military operation conducted in an atmosphere of apprehended war. In short, for the Canadian Corps, there

1 David Fraser, ed., In Good Company: The First World War Letters and Diaries of the Hon. William Fraser (London: Michael Russell, 1990) diary - 11 November 1918, 333. 2 The Americans are included in all references to the Allies, even though they are not technically part of the Entente Cordiale of 1907. 1 remained much to do after 11 November 1918.

No one in the spring of 1918 would have predicted a German collapse before the end of the year, and so plans for an occupation force came late and were made in haste.

The dreaded German spring offensives pushed the British and French Armies to their limits.3 In the summer of 1918, the British Imperial War Cabinet speculated that the war would last until 1920 and all that would be possible, until the Americans arrived in strength, would be a few limited offensives.4 One such operation required the Australian and Canadian Army Corps to drive the Germans back from a rail junction near Amiens.

On 8 August 1918, the two corps plunged forward, with powerful air and tank support, and almost cracked the German line. German General Erich von Ludendorff later lamented that 8 August 1918 was the "Black Day" of the German Army as its morale had collapsed under consistent pressure from Allied attacks.5 Through the rest of August and into September and October, the Allies attacked relentlessly. The Canadians suffered their heaviest casualties of the conflict during this period but thereby, in the brutal arithmetic of combat, they were winning victories. By mid-October, what began as the worst year of the war for the Allies had become the year of victory.6 Germany's Allies began to buckle, then to fall, one by one. In October the German government itself was overthrown, replaced by a socialist democratic republic that immediately sought an end to the war. It

3 William Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1945 (London: Edward Arnold, 1969) 268. 4 George F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1954) 320-1. 5 Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) 420. 6 A number of texts mention the conscription crisis, the Military Services Act, the Wartime Elections Act and the formation of Union government. Two good assessments include Robert Craig Brown, '"Whither are we being shoved?' Political Leadership in Canada during World War I," in War and Society in North America, eds. J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1971) 104-119; and Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970). 2 was only in October 1918, when victory was almost assured, that serious negotiating and planning began for the occupation of the Rhineland.

The Armistice of 11 November 1918 brought an end to the fighting, however, new non-combat tasks awaited elements of the Canadian Corps. The Armistice permitted

Allied troops to advance to the left bank of the Rhine River and establish a series of bridgeheads on the right bank at major crossing points.7 Under the terms of the Armistice agreement, the Rhineland became occupied territory and was divided into four zones:

British, French, American and Belgian.8 The British Army, and by extension the

Canadian Corps, was assigned to a stretch of the occupied territory starting just below

Dusseldorf following the Rhine River south to Cologne and Bonn.9 Upon arrival in

Cologne and Bonn, the Canadians and British were to establish heavily defended bridgeheads in preparation for a potential advance into the German heartland. In

November 1918, Allied military commanders knew the German Armies were not completely defeated and had retreated in good order. The German Army still possessed the capacity to continue the war, so from an Allied military perspective, the occupation of the Rhineland was necessary to deter Germany from renewing hostilities. Furthermore, the occupation of German territory was a symbol of victory and in some minds, punishment for German atrocities against Belgian civilians.10 The French viewed the

7 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1944) 7. 8 The four occupying powers were Belgium, Britain (including several of the self-governing Dominions), the United States and France. 9 The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were formally transferred to Second British Army on 12 November 1918. Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Mortimer Ltd., 1947) 323. 10 John Home and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) 419. 3 occupation as vital for their nation's security and encouragement for Germany to make reparation payments.11

Once the decision was made to occupy the Rhineland, the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Canadian Corps had a variety of experiences as part of the Army of Occupation. The march to the Rhineland began on the cold morning of 18 November 1918 and, after marching hundreds of grueling kilometers on bad roads and with few rations, the determined Canadians crossed the German frontier on 4 December.12 Little did the soldiers of the Canadian Corps know that they had marched into a country full of economic chaos where a fledgling democratic government faced a Bolshevist-inspired uprising. Later, to much fanfare and with great pageantry, the Canadians and British marched across the Rhine on 13 December and took up their defensive positions in the bridgehead. For the Canadians, the occupation was to be a short one as they stayed in the

Rhineland for approximately four weeks. Little friction with the German populace was experienced. Garrison life was boring and routine. The soldiers of the Canadian Corps were generally well behaved, but managed to make trouble on a number of occasions. A variety of distractions were provided in Cologne and Bonn as Canadian officers knew the key to maintaining high morale was keeping the enlisted occupied. Thus, an assortment of education, entertainment, and sports-related opportunities were offered. For most

Canadian soldiers, the end to garrison duties could not come quickly enough. On 5

January 1919, British divisions began relieving the Canadians and by the beginning of

11 Fraenkel, 7-8. 12 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925 (Montreal: The Gazette Printing Co. Limited, 1927) 268. 4 13 February all Canadian units had been sent to Belgium for some much-deserved rest.

Although much has been written on the occupation of the Rhineland, no one has pulled the various narratives together to create a comprehensive account of the Canadian experience. To date, a handful of monographs on the occupation have been written by

American, British and French authors, but an assessment of the Canadian involvement is absent, or constitutes a very small part of a larger work. Partial accounts exist in Canada's official history of the First World War, general texts on the Canadian Expeditionary

Force, and regimental histories. Yet, each martial source provides only a small snapshot of the larger picture and lacks any sustained analysis of events.14 Books concerning both

Canadian foreign policy and German history also omit any reference to the Canadian participation in the occupation of the Rhineland. Contrasted with Canada's involvement in Russia in 1918-19, it seems the largest operation undertaken by the CEF in the aftermath of the Great War has not been the subject of a single scholarly article let alone a book.

The Canadian occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War is an interesting story, but an elusive one. The Allied occupation is the subject of a handful of monographs, but none is written from an exclusively Canadian perspective.15 Authors

13 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962) 524-30. 14 In the interests of economy, only the relevant sections of the literature, those pertaining to the occupation of the Rhineland, are discussed in this thesis. 15 A number of monographs and articles concerning the occupation of the Rhineland exist and include the following: Major General Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis: The Boobs-Merrill Company, 1927); Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987); Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); Robert E. Ireton, "The Rhineland Commission at Work," The American Journal of International Law 17 (1923): 460-9; W.M. Jordan, Great Britain, France, and the German 5 typically write from their nation's point of view (American, British, or French) and use an

assessment of foreign policy to drive the narration of events. The international context

surrounding the end of the war, in particular the genesis of the Armistice agreement and

competing war aims, is discussed in the nation-based monographs.16 The presentation of

a country's experience in the Rhineland, if present, is accomplished through a focus on

the tensions within two sets of relationships: first, among the Allied armies; and second,

between the Allied armies and the German people, and their bureaucracy. Through an

exploration of these two relationships, the political, economic and legal problems in the

Rhineland come to light as do the solutions enacted. To their credit, some authors extend

their analysis by including an investigation of social issues, illuminating the misbehavior

of soldier and civilian alike.17 The only monograph on the Rhineland occupation that

refers directly to the Canadian contingent is Sir James Edmonds' official British Army

history volume, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929 (1987). Yet, Edmonds' 1 o consideration of the Canadian role is brief and buried within the British narrative.

Problem 1918-1939 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1971); Robert McCrum, "French Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919," The Historical Journal 21 (1978): 623-48; Walter A. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924: The Last Bidfor a Balance of Power in Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978); Harold I. Nelson, Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers 1916-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963); Keith Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); B.T. Reynolds, "A Review of the Occupation of the Rhineland," Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 1 (1928): 198-211; David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991). 16 Both Keith Nelson, in Victors Divided, and Walter A. McDougall, in France's Rhineland Diplomacy, provide a discussion of the competing British, French and American war aims. 17 Both General Henry Allen, in The Rhineland Occupation, and Williamson, in The British in Germany, include a discussion of the social interactions in the Rhineland during the occupation. 18 Edmonds refers directly to the Canadian forces three times. The first two times concern 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions' arrival in Cologne and Bonn between 10-12 December 1918 and their crossing of the Rhine River on 13 December. By far the largest reference to the Canadian Corps is its return to Belgium in January 1919. Putting the withdrawal of 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions in a wider context of demobilization, Edmonds focuses on General Currie's insistence that the men be returned home via England and in complete units. 6 Overall, the Canadian experience in the Rhineland escapes the attention of those authors writing monographs on the occupation. This is not surprising as the Canadian contingent was a small part of the larger British Army and did not stay very long.

Canada's role in the Army of Occupation is also absent from German sources which comment on the end of the Great War. Both Holger Herwig, in The First World

War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1997) and Roger Chickering, in

Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (1998), deftly describe the chaotic state of Germany that Canadian soldiers had to confront upon the conclusion of the First World

War.19 The chaos these historians portray existed in many quarters, generated by the political revolution from above. The Bolshevist movement, as represented by the

"70

Spartacists, added to the overall political instability. There were great fears in Paris,

London, and Washington that Germany would sink into the abyss of a Marxist revolution, further destabilizing central Europe. Moreover, the Armistice negotiations themselves created controversy in Germany and led to the development of the "Stab in the Back" thesis, propagated by General Ludendorff and other German elites, which was to colour

German perceptions throughout the interwar period. Adding to the political turmoil, the

German economy faced many pressures, most stemming from the continuation of an economic blockade. In an aptly titled sub-chapter, "Cold and Hungry," Chickering details 19 Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997); Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The exclusion of the Rhineland occupation is reasonable as both authors already had the huge task of discussing Germany's entire war experience. 20 Herwig, 442. 21 The German Army High Command found that its request for an early armistice had some unpleasant consequences for its reputation and the country. Thus it created a legend that shifted responsibility from Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg to others - civilians, Socialists, Bolsheviks, Jews, Free Masons and pacifists - who "stabbed in the back" an army and navy that was willing to continue fighting and achieving complete victory. This myth became a reality for many German citizens, both military and civilian. 7 the staggeringly awful economic conditions under which many Germans were forced to live and how these twin scourges affected so much of daily life.22 By the end of 1918, four years of economic blockade had exhausted Germany's supply of raw materials, resulting in the shutdown of numerous industries. Many German workers lost their jobs and financial security. Furthermore, the quick return of thousands of demobilized soldiers placed extra burdens on a German economy struggling to cope in the post-war period. In a later section, Chickering goes on to explain how, by 1918, pre-war social tensions of class, region, rural/urban, which had been subsumed in the rush of patriotic fervor in

1914, began to re-emerge.23 Put together, Herwig and Chickering paint a rather bleak picture of Germany in the aftermath of the Great War—a country in chaos and confusion on many levels. While it is not surpri sing that neither text mentions the occupation of the

Rhineland, as their focus primarily concerns the First World War, their utility lies in their depiction of the underlying economic, political and social forces at work in the

Rhineland. The chaotic, domestic German environment Herwig and Chickering describe is the one in which Canadian forces had to operate.

The presence of Canadian soldiers in Germany performing garrison duties as part of the British Army should have generated some commentary in the context of Canada's external affairs. However, most texts concerning Canada's external affairs and the First

World War frame events around the evolution of the Dominion's position within the

22 By the end of 1918, Germany was suffering from four years of economic blockade. Its industrial economy required huge imports of raw materials to function normally. Without these imports most German industries collapsed and as a result many aspects of German life were negatively affected. Chickering, 140- 6. 23 Chickering, 140-6. 8 British Empire.24 One key theme in most books is Canada's growing independence from

London, especially in matters of foreign policy and military affairs. Both Robert

McDougall, in A History of Canadian External Relations (1966) and John Hilliker, in

Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1 The Early Years (1990), argue

Canada's military and economic efforts during the war had given the Dominion confidence, a sense of accomplishment and a slowly-rising sense of nationalism. During

1917 and 1918, as the casualty figures rose and the cost of materials mounted, Canadians reasonably felt that function had moved ahead of status. Their Dominion had paid its subscription to the society of sovereign states.26 Yet, by war's end, Canada had an anomalous position. Technically, the Dominion was not a sovereign state and, although it had always had important relations with other countries, it was not recognized as an independent power.27 Moreover, the state of Canadian foreign policy after the First World

War was in a paradoxical position. The Union government of Prime Minister Borden was asserting Canada's independence through international bodies, such as the newly founded

League of Nations, and military commitments, such as those to Germany and Russia.

Meanwhile, Canadian foreign policy in most other areas remained isolationist in spirit.

By early 1919, Canada was retreating into a self-imposed isolation, one based on

24 Canadian foreign policy during and shortly after the First World War is the subject of many books including the following: Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001); Robert L. McDougall, ed., A History of Canadian External Relations. Revised Edition Volume II, In the Empire and the World 1914-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966); James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1 The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1990); and Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994). 25 McDougall, 10-12; Hilliker, 69-70. 26 MacMillan, 44. 27 McDougall, 14. 9 28 geography and a desire to avoid further European entanglements.

Not all examinations of Canadian foreign policy revolve around issues concerning

Imperial-Dominion affairs. The growing complexity and sophistication of Canada's armed forces during the First World War led to the formation of the Overseas Ministry based in London, England, whose function was to manage the entire Canadian military operating outside of Canada. Histories of the Overseas Ministry mention the occupation of the Rhineland; however, the treatment is brief and issues concerning demobilization take primacy. In A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First

World War (1982), by Desmond Morton and Canadian Brass: The Making of a

Professional Army, 1860-1939 (1988), by Stephen Harris, the authors weave narratives about the increasing efficiency and professionalization of the department, under Sir

Edward Kemp's quiet, but competent leadership.29 Harris points out that, to a large degree, Kemp eliminated political influence from many areas under his authority, including promotions and supply contracts, and at the same time achieved a respectable degree of financial control and accountability.30 Furthermore, because the Overseas

Ministry secured a firm grip on Canadian military administration, it could extend

Canadian military autonomy. By war's end, Morton writes, "Canada had become almost a sovereign, if junior, ally."

28 Eayrs, 3. 29 Previous to Minister Kemp's term of service (1917-1919) and Sir George Perley's term of service (1916) guiding the Ministry of Overseas Canadian Forces, Sir Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia was responsible for administration of the CEF. Hughes was both partisan and fiscally irresponsible in his management of Canada's Army. Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982); Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 30 Harris, 127. 31 Morton, Peculiar Politics, 205. 10 While the occupation of the Rhineland is largely absent from most discussions of

Canadian foreign policy, the story is partially told in many books that focus on the CEF in the First World War. In Canada's official history of the First World War, Canadian

Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First

World War (1962), Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson briefly overviews the Canadian Corps' involvement in the occupation of the Rhineland.32 Nicholson narrates a brief chronology of events. The author presents the march to the Rhine as triumphal procession, but tempers the victorious attitude with General Currie's insistence on strict discipline.

Nicholson also includes a section on demobilization plans, relating the timetable for and problems with getting the homesick soldiers back to Canada.34 There are concerns with

Nicholson's treatment, however, as the author provides only the basic details regarding the movement and disposition of the Canadian units. Furthermore, after the Canadian

Corps' arrival in the Rhineland, little commentary or analysis is offered concerning soldiers' duties, dispositions, or relations with German civilians. Considering Nicholson's immense task, and the space limitations involved, the rudimentary treatment is understandable.

Canadian general histories of the First World War have also largely overlooked the occupation of the Rhineland, instead focusing on the CEF's growth in size, professionalization, skill and independence from Britain.35 The Canadian Corps'

32 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962) 524-9. 33 Nicholson, 524. 34 Nicholson, 530-1. 35 A number of texts refer to the themes of growth, professionalization and independence of the CEF including the following: Desmond Morton, Canada and War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1981); Desmond Morton and Jack Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians 11 competence and discipline factored into the British decision to include Canadian units in the Army of Occupation. The British Army needed reliable divisions because they were marching into an unstable region and needed to impress the German public. An understanding of the evolution of the CEF from one small and rather disorganized division into one of the best corps on the Western Front then becomes an important issue.36

In the last One Hundred Days of the First World War, the Canadian Corps spearheaded many victories. These successes instilled a sense of pride and patriotism in the corps that may have been present earlier, but was certainly heightened during the course of the war.37 Furthermore, during the brutal course of battle a strong Canadian officer corps developed. The Canadian General Staffs increasing professionalism and competence, coupled with battlefield success and able administration, had direct bearing on the greater independence of the Canadian Corps from British High Command.

Finally, the outstanding performance of the Canadian Corps on the Western Front gave

Prime Minister Borden the political leverage he needed to promote Canada in international circles and assert the Dominion's independence within the British Empire.39

Upon the conclusion of open hostilities on 11 November 1918, the CEF was a proud, highly skilled, well-led corps that was exhausted from almost three months of continuous

and the Great War 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989); C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940); and John Swettenham, To Seize the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World War /(Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1965). 36 Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997) 139. 37 Harris, 138. 38 By war's end, the Canadian General Staff had both tactical and operation control over the Canadian Corps, but were still subject to Sir Douglas Haig and British Army's strategic vision. 39 Desmond Morton, Canada and War, 79. 12 fighting. It was this Canadian Corps that marched into the Rhine to take up garrison

duties.

Many unit histories include a short section on the occupation of the Rhineland.

These regimental or battalion histories offer a colourful, parochial, and for the most part

dated summary of their role.40 Collectively, the strength of battalion and brigade

narratives is the surprising level of detail provided for their individual units, especially

regarding the time and place of troop movements. During the march to the Rhine

interesting observations are made about the towns through which the units pass and the

mood of the local populaces. Problems during the trek are noted. Yet, once the Canadian

soldiers are in Germany and have taken up their posts, the unit histories say little about

the four week occupation. In their own way, each battalion and brigade's history offers

some very entertaining stories. However, the larger context of military operations in the

Rhineland and the international relations surrounding the occupation are, for the most

40 Most battalion, brigade and division histories for this topic were published prior to 1945, a time when many archival documents were still classified and unavailable to the public. Many Canadian unit histories mention the occupation including the following: Major J.A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919); Daniel G. Dancocks, Gallant Canadians: The Story of the Tenth Canadian Infantry Battalion 1914-1919 (Calgary: The Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, 1990); R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada 1914-1919 (Canada: The 13th Battalion, Royal Highlanders of Canada, 1925); R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925 (Montreal: The Gazette Printing Co. Limited, 1927); Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Mortimer Ltd., 1947); Major H.C. Singer, History of the 31st Canadian Infantry Battalion C.E.F. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1938); Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1932); Major K. Weatherbe, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company and Battalion Canadian Engineers in the Great War (Toronto: The Hunter-Rose Co., Limited, 1928); H.R.N Clyne, Vancouver's 29th (Vancouver: Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964); and S. Douglas MacGowan, et.al., New Brunswick's "Fighting 26th" (Saint John: Neptune Publishing Company Limited, 1994). Furthermore, although not technically part of the Dominion of Canada during the Great War, the Newfoundland perspective on the occupation is narrated by Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson in The Fighting Newfoundlander (London: Government of Newfoundland, 1964). 13 part, absent.41

Other sources on the Canadian military, specifically the biographies of General

Sir Arthur Currie, include short sections on the occupation of the Rhineland. H.M.

Urquhart, Daniel Dancocks, and A.M.J. Hyatt present the Canadian occupation of

Cologne and Bonn using General Currie's point of view to frame a basic discussion of the events.42 General Currie's outlook is useful as it gives a Canadian perspective to the largely British operation. While Hyatt and Urquhart only give the subject the briefest of treatments, Dancocks, in Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography (1985), provides a short, but interesting commentary on the logistical problems of the march to the Rhine, Anglo-

Canadian military relations, and demobilization concerns.43 While offering some appealing anecdotal evidence, the brevity and limited perspective of the Currie biographies hinders their utility.44 Similar to the other military histories concerning the

First World War, the Currie biographies offer another small piece to the overall narrative of the Canadian occupation of the Rhine.

The subject of the CEF in the immediate post-war period has drawn much scholarly attention as well. Two themes have lured the interest of many Canadian historians, but neither one is the occupation of the Rhineland. Issues connected to the

41 The regimental histories generally focus exclusively on the unit in question. However, some authors expand the coverage, briefly, to give a broader context to the events they describe. In particular, MacGowan, et.al., New Brunswick's "Fighting 26th," and Weatherbe's, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company and Battalion Canadian Engineers in the Great War include a wider perspective. 42 H.M. Urquhart, Arthur Currie: The Biography of a Great Canadian (Toronto: Dent, 1950); Daniel Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography (Toronto: Methuen, 1985); and A.M.J. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 43 Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 179-83. 44 The authors only include events where General Currie is present, or discuss debates in which General Currie participated. Understandably, further analysis falls outside the scope of their texts. 14 demobilization of the CEF—including the camp riots—and Canadian involvements in

Russia are the twin stars of the post-war period and their light has overshadowed any consideration of garrison duties in Germany. A number of texts discuss the evolution of demobilization plans as well as the camp riots in France and England.45 Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, in Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to

Civilian Life 1915-1930 (1987), document the painfully slow pace of the demobilization process caused by shipping problems in England, strikes on the docks, winter weather, and poor rail connections in Halifax and Saint John.46 Other historians examine the CEF after the war by focusing on operations in Russia, usually as they relate to Canada's position within the British Empire.47 The Siberian Expedition in particular, is viewed as the pinnacle of Canada's drive to assert control over its own military forces. For the first time a Canadian general would command British battalions.

Outside of the military sources, the histories of two civilian institutions include information about the Canadian experience in the Rhineland. Charles Bishop, in The

Canadian Y.M.C.A. in the Great War (1924), describes the Young Men's Christian

Association's (YMCA) active role throughout the war. The YMCA continued to entertain

45 Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life 1915-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Desmond Morton, '"Kicking and Complaining': Demobilization Riots in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1918-19," Canadian Historical Review 61,3 (1980): 334-60; and J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs: 1918 (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review, Limited, 1919). 46 Morton and Wright, 108. 47 The role of Canadian forces in the various Russian operations after the First World War is the main subject of the following texts: Benjamin Isitt, "Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918," Canadian Historical Review 87,2 (2006): 223-64; Roy Maclaren, Canadians in Russia, 1918-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1976); and John Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919: And the Part Played by Canada (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967). 48 Maclaren, 217; Swettenham, 128. 15 and educate Canada's soldiers into the post-war occupation of Germany.49 Traveling with the troops into Germany, the YMCA was involved in providing canteen services, filling the soldiers' leisure time with recreation and entertainment and enlisting them in education programs.50 Assisted by the Khaki University of Canada, the YMCA established a variety of classes for Canadian soldiers and provided lectures on a wide range of subjects.51 Histories of the YMCA and Khaki University of Canada are useful as they provide insight into the daily life of Canadian soldiers during the occupation.

Even a cursory review of the secondary literature, therefore, makes clear the need for a study of Canada's involvement in the occupation of the Rhineland from November

1918 to January 1919. To a great extent, the monographs directly concerning the occupation exclude any reference to Canada. Texts which discuss the German history of the Great War or Canadian foreign policy provide context, but never mention the occupation directly. A number of military sources offer interesting, but brief, accounts concerning the Canadian Corps' role in the occupation of Cologne and Bonn. Collectively the military histories establish a chronology, and to a limited extent discuss the Canadian experience on the Rhine. However, each history of the First World War lacks a sustained analysis of the occupation and provides only a partial account from a limited perspective.

The CEF in the immediate post-war period has been the subject of many studies, yet to date all historians have not had the time, or the desire, to study the Canadian Corps'

49 Charles W. Bishop, The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in the Great War (Canada: The National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of Canada, 1924); Tim Cook, "From Destruction to Construction: The Khaki University of Canada, 1917-1919," Journal of Canadian Studies 37 (2002): 109-43. 50 Bishop, 287. 51 Both the YMCA and the Khaki University were, to a large extent, staffed by military officers, especially when in the field. However, control and administration of these two organizations was exclusively in civilian hands. 16 garrison duties in Germany. Important questions need to be answered. The effects of partial demobilization on corps discipline and morale need to be explored. The logistical

limitations of post-war period affected the Canadian soldiers in a number of ways and each needs to be examined. Also, Canada's first experience with garrison duties and army

life in hostile territory requires investigation. An analysis of Canada's involvement in the occupation of German territory will further clarify Dominion-Imperial relations.

It is the intent of this thesis to draw together the disparate, partial and limited accounts in order to write a more comprehensive history of Canada's role in the occupation of the Rhineland. Three themes tie events together and help frame an understanding of the Canadian Corps' experience: demobilization, logistics, and the corps' reputation. Through the course of seven chapters, several questions will be posed and answered as, each theme helps explain why events unfolded in the manner they did.

An examination of demobilization policies will help to explain why the Canadian Corps was involved in the Army of Occupation and why the involvement was so brief. An analysis of logistics will reveal how the Canadian Corps got to Germany in such a painful fashion. Preservation of the Corps' reputation will help to clarify the Canadian soldiers' experiences during the march to the Rhineland and garrison duties in Cologne and Bonn.

17 Chapter One Origins of the Occupation and Canada's Part Therein

By October 1918, it was clear that the Allies-including Great Britain, France and the United States-were going to win the First World War. German forces, while not completely defeated and still capable of stiff resistance, were in retreat across the entire

Western Front and had little prospect of holding any defensive line.52 In early October,

Allied political and military leadership turned to thoughts of peace and what victory would entail. In the weeks leading up to 11 November 1918, Allied leadership discussed and debated the terms to include in the armistice agreement with Germany. From the outset of armistice discussions, however, it was uncertain whether an occupation of

German territory would be included in the terms offered to Germany.

Neither the British nor the Americans desired to occupy Germany. Traditionally,

Great Britain favoured a European balance of power-neither a German nor a French hegemony was acceptable. For Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the proposed occupation of the Rhineland would upset the European balance too far in favour of

France.53 British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig believed that harsh armistice terms, such as an occupation, would unnecessarily prolong the war and spur the German Army to greater feats of resistance.54 Moderate peace terms, argued Field Marshal Haig, were assured of acceptance and would result in fewer casualties. Furthermore, Haig argued that the Allies needed to allow Germany to retain some strength in order to resist the

52 Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) 425. 53 Harold I. Nelson, Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers 1916-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) 51 54 David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991) 12. 18 Bolshevist insurrections. The British, and most other western democracies, feared the perceived communist threat and had no desire to see the red flag fly over Berlin. For

American President Woodrow Wilson, military control of the Rhineland contravened the ideals of liberty and self-determination as expressed in his Fourteen Points. According to

President Wilson, mutual assurances and the League of Nations should be employed to resolve future security issues, not military occupations.55 Finally, both Wilson and Lloyd

George were wary of French designs for the Rhineland: once French troops were stationed in German territory annexation would become a real possibility.

The occupation of the Rhineland came to fruition only through French determination and insistence. French political and military leadership conceived of the occupation and pressed for its approval by the other great powers—Britain and the

United States. From the French perspective, the future occupation of the Rhineland was vital both militarily and psychologically. On the military side, although an armistice would have been signed, technically France would still be at war with Germany. In the event of a resumption of hostilities, strong forward bases of operations in the Rhineland would be of great strategic value. The Rhine River was a significant tactical obstacle and the three proposed bridgeheads would make any potential invasion of the German heartland less costly.56 The presence of troops, coupled with the German loss of the industrial and human resources in the Rhineland, would drastically reduce the perceived

55 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001) 172. 56 "Hold the Rhine - Allied Barrier Against the Germans," London Times, 18 January 1918. 19 German threat.57 Further, the threat of military force, embodied in the occupation forces, would compel German representatives to negotiate in good faith during the upcoming peace process, force the German government to pay its reparations and meet the other requirements of the armistice agreement. German diplomats could not be trusted and the western democracies knew it. In extraordinary language, the British Imperial War

Cabinet passed a joint resolution which included their view of German diplomacy:

The Allied Governments cannot lose sight of the fact that the Government of Germany is in a position peculiar among the nations of Europe in that its word cannot be believed, and that it denies any obligation of honour. It is necessary, therefore, to demand from Germany material guarantees on a scale, which will serve the purpose aimecod at by a signed agreement in cases amongst ordinary civilised nations.

Allied leaders believed that German leadership could not be negotiated with, but only coerced into action. The German government would be anxious to regain the significant industrial, agricultural and human resources lost through the Allied occupation of the

Rhineland and therefore might negotiate in good faith during the future peace process.

The need to coerce German diplomats would lend credibility to the French proposal to occupy the Rhineland.

On the psychological side, occupation of German territory addressed French insecurities, giving them hope for a more peaceful future. The French were fearful of their militaristic neighbour, having suffering a crushing military defeat forty-seven years previously, and having just endured almost five years of continuous total war. The French

57 Lieutenant Colonel T.M Hunter, Marshal Foch: A Study in Leadership (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1961) 215. 58United Kingdom, "Annex III - Joint Resolution Regarding Conditions of an Armistice with Germany and Austria-Hungary," Minutes of a Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG 41, CAB, vol.8, 11 October 1918. 20 people needed to feel safe from the German threat and a secure border would help. The occupation was also designed to show German civilians that their country lost the war, to give them tangible proof that their military had failed.59 It is unlikely that French Marshal

Ferdinand Foch, the Allied supreme commander, wanted to come as a conqueror to oppress the German people, but it is likely that he and many other French nationals wanted Germans to experience some of the suffering, hardships, and deprivation of war.

Furthermore, the Rhine River has always been a symbol of German strength and pride, almost mythic in quality. The Rhine represented the last line of defence to the German heartland, the moat around the German keep.60 To have this waterway in enemy hands, even temporarily, was a mental blow to the collective German psyche. Conversely, the occupation was a symbol of victory for French soldiers in particular and the French nation generally. Here was some evidence that French soldiers had won the war, that there was a meaning and a purpose to their suffering.61 Overall, from a French perspective there had to be an occupation of the Rhineland. Nothing less was acceptable.

On 4 October 1918, when Germany unexpectedly appealed to President Wilson for an armistice, Marshal Foch gained the opportunity to forward his point of view and press for the occupation of the Rhineland. On 9 October, at the Inter-Allied Conference in

Paris, Marshal Foch stated his case to the assembled premiers at the Quai d'Orsay.62 What

Marshall Foch suggested on this occasion was the first open proposal for an Allied

59 "The English in Cologne," London Times, 9 December 1918. 60 "On the Rhine: Something More than Geography," London Times, 13 November 1918. 61 Charles F. Home and Walter F. Austin, eds., Source Records of the Great War - 1919, vol. VII (Indianapolis: The American Legion, 1930) 1. 62Keith Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975) 11. 21 occupation of the Rhineland. Briefly he requested the following: first, the German Army

evacuate Alsace-Lorraine within an early time limit; second, the Allied armies occupy

bridgeheads on the east bank of the Rhine with radii of thirty kilometres; third, that the

63 Allies occupy the left bank of the Rhine as a security for payment of reparations.

Despite his best efforts, Marshall Foch's plans were rejected as too extreme. The

assembled premiers believed the German military would never agree to any occupation of their territory. As of 9 October, the military situation, while largely in favour of the

Allies, was still unclear. The premiers feared that if they asked too much, the German

emissaries might refuse their overtures.64

However, events in October would proceed in favour of the French position. On

12 October, the reply by the new German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, to President

Wilson's peace overtures was assuring. Chancellor Baden announced his government's willingness to discuss details of an armistice, thus providing the first visible proof that the enemy was serious about making peace. 65 On 12 October, as well, a German u-boat torpedoed the S.S. Leinster killing 450 passengers. In light of this and other submarine atrocities, the American public and their politicians became indignant. President Wilson refused further negotiations; military commanders were left to settle the armistice. As

Allied supreme commander, Marshal Foch would now lead the armistice negotiations.

On 29 October 1918, sailors of the fleet in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven mutinied and formed

63 United Kingdom, "Annex II - Conditions of an Armistice with Germany," Draft Minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet, LAC, MG 41, CAB, vol.8, 11 October 1918. 64 Nelson, Victors Divided, 11. 65 Because of illness, President Wilson was unable to attend many meetings in Europe and delegated negotiations to Colonel House. 66 Nelson, Victors Divided, 14. 22 revolutionary councils. The revolt spread in waves, first to army garrisons along the coast, then inland.67 Bolshevist and other socialist movements were growing in popularity; signs that Germany was cracking under the pressure from four years of war were beginning to show. The war was also being won. One by one, German allies surrendered. On 30 October, Turkish delegates signed an armistice and from Vienna, /o Emperor Karl sued for peace based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Thus, by the end of October, the Allies' bargaining position had been strengthened, opening the possibility for Marshal Foch's harsher terms of surrender.

Germany continued to crumble in the first weeks of November 1918, further weakening political resolve to resist harsh peace terms. Under pressure from Chancellor

Baden, the military High Command and the civil service, Kaiser William II abdicated on

9 November and went into exile in Holland. The German domestic situation was now quite volatile, with three different factions openly vying for power. Along with the remnants of the old state, the army and bureaucracy, there were the moderate forces of the Reichstag majority of 1917-Social Democrats, Liberals and the Center Party-who favoured the transformation of the authoritarian monarchy into a modern democracy that would retain the basic prewar economic and social structures. These moderate forces were opposed by adherents of a Red revolution, a heterogeneous collection of leftist groups, chief among them the Spartacus League of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl

Liebknecht, who favoured a government based on workers' councils. They rejected

67 Hagen Schulze, Germany: A New History, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 198. 68 Desmond Morton and Jack Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914- 1919 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989) 234. 23 parliamentary rule on principle and wished to see a socialist government installed, based

on overthrowing the existing economic and social order.69 The outcome of this power

struggle was essentially decided in the first few days of the revolution, in favour of the

moderate camp. After the abdication of the Kaiser, the official government was the

revolutionary Council of People's Representatives, composed of Social Democrats (SPD)

and the more left-wing Independent Social Democrats (USPD), under the leadership of

Friedrich Ebert and Hubert Hasse respectively. On 9 November 1918, Prince Max of

Baden, the last Imperial Chancellor, turned his office over to Ebert. The civil service, therefore, placed itself at Ebert's disposal and the military High Command came to a mutual agreement with the Council: the SPD would use its influence to moderate the radical soldiers' councils, while General Wilhelm Groener would add his support to

Ebert's government. This alliance enabled the SPD to use troops of the old regular army and volunteer units to reinforce its claims to political authority in clashes in Berlin and the rest of the country, where unrest was taking on the dimensions of a civil war.71

Throughout October and into November 1918, against this backdrop of German political and military unrest, the French position remained consistent. Both Marshal Foch and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau insisted that any armistice with Germany include an occupation. On 25 October, at the French Headquarters at Senlis, a conference was held so that Allied military commanders could express their views on armistice terms. The prime concern of all commanders involved was to make a resumption of

69 Hagen, 200. 70 Francis Russell, The Horizon Concise History of Germany (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1973) 181. 71 Russell, 182. 24 hostilities as painful for the German Army as possible. Field Marshal Haig contended the

German Army remained unbroken and accordingly terms of a ceasefire must be moderate. He reiterated his previous position that he would rather have the Germans astride the Rhine than dug in behind it.72 Similar to Marshal Foch, American General

John Pershing called for the German Army to evacuate the left bank of the Rhine and for the establishment of bridgeheads.73 At the end of the conference, Marshal Foch did not attempt to formulate a combined report. Instead, ignoring Haig's proposal, he took advantage of his position as Allied supreme commander to draft a proposal of his own, which included the occupation of the Rhineland. Foch presented his proposal to Prime

Minister Clemenceau on 26 October. "After having consulted the commanders-in-chief,"

Foch wrote, "I have the honour to make known to you the military conditions according to which an armistice could be made capable of protecting in an absolute manner the peoples concerned."74 Foch's second of five clauses called for the Germans to evacuate the left bank of the Rhine, and the establishment of bridgeheads at Cologne, Mainz,

Coblenz. On 30 October, at a meeting between the French Prime Minister and Colonel

Edward House, the American president's special envoy, Clemenceau stated that he could not maintain himself in the French Chamber of Deputies unless the occupation of the

Rhine was made part of the armistice. The French Army would insist that it was their due.75 His nation could be satisfied with nothing less than an occupation of German territory.

72 Nelson, Victors Divided, 14. 73 Bullit Lowry, Armistice 1918 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1996) 70. 74 Lowry, 71. 75 Nelson, Victors Divided, 18. 25 Despite French determination, Prime Minister Lloyd George still had to be convinced. The key moment arrived when the Allied heads of government and Colonel

House met with Marshal Foch on 1 November. Only after considerable debate with the marshal did the British Prime Minister finally accept an occupation.76 Exactly why Prime

Minister Lloyd George ultimately consented to French demands remains unclear. In

October of 1918, Lloyd George led a minority government and public opinion was pressing for a conclusion to the war and harsh terms. Further, perhaps it was because he received so little support from Colonel House. House had been charged by President

Wilson to get the European leaders to adopt his Fourteen Points. In order to get French support for Wilson's plan, House had to accept a temporary occupation of the Rhineland.

Lloyd George thus faced French and American pressure for the occupation. In turn, the

French and Americans were willing to compromise: British concerns over freedom of the seas were alleviated and support for the surrender of the German battle fleet granted.77

Another possibility is that Lloyd George may have been reassured about the future of the

Rhineland, because of Prime Minister Clemenceau's promise of eventual troop withdrawal. House's threats of a separate American peace with the Germans may also have been a spur for compromise. Neither the French nor the British desired to alienate the Americans and have the United States retreat into isolation. Whatever the definitive reason, by the end of the meeting on 1 November, Prime Minister Lloyd George was satisfied and collectively the Allies had made their decision to hold the Rhineland during

76 Ibid., 20. 77 Lowry, 100.

26 the writing of the final peace terms. French initiative and stubbornness had carried the day—the Rhineland was to be occupied, at least until the peace treaty was signed.

With the armistice signed and the guns finally silent, British military leadership began serious planning for the advance to and occupation of the Rhineland, centred on the Cologne bridgehead. The war was not over and careful preparations were needed in case of a resumption of hostilities. At a conference held at Advanced General

Headquarters in Cambrai, on 11 November at 11:00am, Field Marshal Haig explained

Marshal Foch's plan for the occupation of the Rhineland to his assembled army commanders. In accordance with Marshal Foch's instructions, only two British Armies,

General Sir Hubert Plumer's Second and Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth, were to advance into Germany on 17 November. Each of these two armies was to consist of four selected corps and sixteen selected divisions. A total of sixteen corps, comprised of sixty-one divisions, was available from which Generals Plumer and Rawlinson could choose. When selecting the divisions, Haig told his two senior army commanders that, "man-power and

7R recruiting had to be taken into consideration."

General Plumer chose the Canadian Corps to participate in the Army of

Occupation for several reasons. First, General Plumer knew he was going into hostile territory and was uncertain of how the population would respond. He therefore required reliable divisions that would perform under pressure.79 Over the course of the First World

War, the Canadian Corps had earned a reputation for discipline, skill, and efficiency.

78 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 12. 79 Daniel Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography (Toronto: Methuen, 1985) 179. 27 "Sketch No. 12 Advances made by the Canadian Corps - From 11 October 1918 to 11 November 1918," Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) opposite page 186. 28 80 Canada's four divisions were recognized as some of the best available formations.

Second, the Canadian Corps was close by and available. During the final few days of the

First World War, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions had led the successful assault on the

Belgian town of Mons, finishing the war in an extremely forward position. 1st and 4th

Canadian Divisions were also nearby, out of the line, in the Valenciennes area.81 Third, the Canadian Corps was part of the British Army and would have to advance if so ordered. Although the Corps had great tactical and administrative autonomy, they were still required to follow British Army commands.82 Finally, General Plumer was likely cognizant of the fact that plans for the deployment of the Canadian Corps to Germany would meet with little resistance from the Canadian Corps Commander, Lieutenant

General Sir Arthur Currie. In fact, General Currie enthusiastically supported the inclusion of the Canadian Corps, quoted in a J. F. B. Livesay article saying: "It was a great gratification and honour to us."

Yet, after an assessment of British and Canadian archival material, it seems likely the Canadian Corps was chosen for garrison duty for two other good reasons: they could not leave Europe and they were not British. In the immediate aftermath of the First World

War, demobilization was the main concern for most nations involved in the conflict.

Upon the signing of the armistice, a huge rush ensued to get the Imperial and American citizen soldiers home as quickly as possible. Despite the best intentions of military

80 Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997) 139. 81 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol.18.11, 9-11 November 1918. 82 Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) 204. 83 General Sir Arthur Currie, as quoted by Fred James in "Report from Cologne and Bonn," LAC, MG 26, H, vol. 103,23 December 1918. 29 planners, delays were inevitable. A shortage of shipping, poor Canadian railways, limited

Canadian port facilities, English strikes, the sheer number of men involved, the decision

to return Canadian units via England, and winter weather all combined to make the

demobilization process a long, drawn out affair.84 In fact, the first Canadian division to

leave France for England, 3rd Canadian Division, did not embark from Havre until 9

February 1919.85

After the fighting was finished and during this period of partial demobilization,

military and political planners worried about soldier morale and discipline. Minister

Kemp noted a change in the attitude of the Canadian soldiers after the signing of the

Armistice:

When the armistice came we had 268,000 Canadians on our hands overseas. We realized at once that we had a difficult problem to deal with. Everyone felt that the war was over, even though the peace had not been signed. These men enlisted in Canada and they had an objective - that of getting at the Hun and fighting him. They were full of enthusiasm and easy to handle. But when the armistice was signed their objective changed; their one desire was to get home as quickly as they could. Men who had been under restraint for long periods ranging up to four years, or even longer, who had been subjected to conditions of privation, suffering and sacrifice, were tired and homesick, and we found it more difficult to handle these men after the signing of the armistice than up to that time. ... They wanted to get home not next year, but next week.86

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Canadian Corps was more difficult to control because their primary focus—defeating Germany—had been taken away. Canada's homesick soldiers believed their task in Europe was finished and wanted an immediate return to Canada. Both Prime Minister Borden and General Currie knew that, without a

84 Jeffrey R Rivard, Bringing the Boys Home: A Study of Demobilization Policy after the First and Second World Wars, unpublished M.A. Thesis (The University of New Brunswick, 1999) 31-2. 85 War Diary, 3"1 Canadian Division, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4855, 9 February 1919. 86 Canada, House of Commons Debates (23 May 1919), p. 2874 (Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of the Overseas Forces of Canada). 30 focus, bored soldiers awaiting demobilization would find ways to create embarrassing problems. Thus, Borden was willing to commit the Canadian Corps to the Army of

Occupation, at least temporarily, because it would engage the troops in a useful activity, passing the months in a meaningful manner.87 Canada's involvement in the occupation of

Germany was never meant to be a long-term commitment. Britain never planned for any of its colonies to be a permanent part of the Army of Occupation. Speaking in the British

House of Commons, on 19 May 1919, Mr. J Davidson asked the Secretary of State for

War:

Are any Colonial troops being retained with the Army of Occupation; and, if so, what is the percentage as compared with British troops? Captain J. Guest replied, No, Sir; all Colonial troops are being repatriated as fast as shipping permits.88

As soon as the logistics allowed, the four Canadian divisions would leave Europe OQ immediately.

Finally, the Canadian Prime Minister viewed the occupation as an appropriate role for Canada, one that would raise the country's profile within the Empire. In the aftermath of the First World War, Prime Minister Borden favoured an active role for Canada in international politics, one that took place within the imperial context.90 Prime Minister

Borden and most of English Canada had supported the British Empire throughout the war and would continue to do so during the peace.91 Borden believed involvement in the occupation of Germany was a chance for the Dominion to shine on the world stage. In 87 United Kingdom, "Retention of Dominion Troops in Armies of Occupation," Draft Minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet, LAC, MG 11, C0537, vol.1122, 12 December 1918. 88 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 116 (1919), 213. 89 "Canadian Overseas Demobilization Committee: First Interim Report," LAC, MG 30, E 46, vol.12. 90 Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970) 156. 91 John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1 The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1990) 25. 31 1918 and 1919, Borden was seeking ways for Canada to distinguish itself and gain prestige. Aiding Britain in the Rhineland was a good opportunity for Borden to obtain the notoriety he desired.92 Thus, the occupation was consistent with Borden's desire to raise the Dominion's profile in international affairs, as noted by both Robert McDougall and

James Eayrs.93

The decision to commit Canadian forces to garrison duty was also made easier for

Prime Minister Borden, because of article 9 of the armistice agreement. This article required the German government to reimburse the Allies for their expenditures while garrisoning the Rhineland and gave the occupying armies the right of requisition. The cost of the occupation to the Canadian government, as submitted to the British War

Office on 8 March 1920, was $7,333,956.70.94 In September 1921, the Canadian government received reimbursement of $6,314,500.00 from England.95 The difference in the two figures was related to a British formula for distributing the German sums it received on behalf of all the colonies engaged in the occupation. As a result, Canada had to spend approximately one million dollars to garrison Germany. A million dollars was a large sum for the 1920s, yet it was willingly spent by Borden and the Union Government to gain prestige for the Dominion.

92 "Sir R. Borden to the Canadian Corps," London Times, 23 November 1918. 93 Robert L. McDougall, ed., A History of Canadian External Relations. Revised Edition Volume II, In the Empire and the World 1914-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966); James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1 The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1990) 94 Correspondence, Pay Office of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada to the Deputy Minister of the Finance Department, LAC, RG 24, vol. 2571 A, 8 March 1920. 95 RP Brown (Chief Accountant of the Finance Department) to the Secretary of National Defence, LAC, RG 24, vol. 2571 A, 4 May 1923. 32 General Plumer also chose the Canadian Corps precisely because it was Canadian.

As the Imperial Army rapidly demobilized its divisions and decreased in size, the number of its military commitments did not. From the Rhineland to Ireland, from Russia to India and beyond, the Imperial Army faced enormous challenges.96 What the British Army needed in the aftermath of the First World War was time: time to demobilize its

Q7 conscripted soldiers, reorganize, and occupy Germany with an all-volunteer force.

Given this context, it is not surprising that General Plumer chose every colonial unit still available. Joining the Canadian Corps in the advance to the Rhine were the four divisions of the Australian Corps, the New Zealand division, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and the 50th South African Heavy Artillery Battery.98

If Canadian politicians and generals wanted an occupation, the average Canadian soldier likely did not. Most Canadian troops wanted a return to civilian life and their mufti as quickly as possible. However, at some level they understood the necessity of tH occupying Germany. A few lines from a sergeant of the 20 Canadian Battalion capture the mood of the Canadian Corps. After completing the gruelling march to Bonn he remarked: I enlisted in August 1914. We have been through many things since, the few of us who are left of the original company. When the armistice was signed I wanted to get right home to the wife and kiddies, but I am glad to be here today. It is what we fought for; it is worth it. Canada on the Rhine; think of it!99

96 MacMillan, 42. 97 "British Home Army to be Sent to the Rhine," New York Times, 30 January 1918. 98 Contribution of the Overseas Dominions Towards the Army of Occupation in Germany, LAC, MG 11, C0537, vol. 1122, 11 December 1918. 99 Quoted from JFB Livesay, "Canada's Men Cross the Rhine," Halifax The Morning Chronicle, 17 December 1918. 33 A general satisfaction existed among the soldiers of the Canadian Corps when they

learned they were to occupy Germany. Knowledge of the future occupation made the

men realize that the German Army had actually been defeated and that they themselves

had taken part in that accomplishment.100 A return to Canada would have to wait.

100 Major J.A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919) 42. 34 Chapter Two Concentration, Preparation and Initial Plans

Just hours before the armistice came into effect, there was a ferocious fight for the

Belgian city of Mons. During the night and into the morning of 11 November, vicious street battles raged as a combined assault by 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions sought to liberate the town.101 After putting up some stubborn resistance, the German Army retreated at 4:20am and the town—where the British had started their fighting four years earlier— was finally secured. The war for the Canadian Corps ended at Mons, victory dearly paid for. When all the guns across the Western Front finally fell silent, the

Canadian Corps was disposed as follows: Corps Headquarters was located in

Valenciennes; 1st Canadian Division was in reserve in the Somain area west of

Valenciennes; 2nd Canadian Division was in the line on the right south-east of Mons; 3rd th Canadian Division was also in the line on the left of and in Mons; and 4 Canadian

Division was also in reserve in the Valenciennes-Anzin area.102

In accordance with the terms of the armistice agreement the leading troops of the

Canadian Corps stood fast on the line reached at 11:00 am on 11 November and placed examining posts on all roads. General Currie banned intercourse and fraternization with the enemy and ordered commanders at all levels to pay the strictest attention to discipline, smartness and especially the well-being of the men.

101 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 11 November 1918; War Diary, 3rd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4855, 11 November 1918. 102 Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) 185. (Hereafter Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps) 103 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 185. 35 A wide range of emotions must have passed through the minds of the men on

Armistice Day. Some mention joy and satisfaction in a job well done, but most express a sense of bewilderment and anti-climax.104 The moment had not yet sunk in and the horrors of war were still all too real.105 One soldier of the 3rd Canadian Division remarked:

The worst of it was that in our brigade we had four officers and a score of men die on the last day. It was a saddening element in our joy - too long out on the last day, too hard luck for the individual. Glory is usually dearly bought.106

Most soldiers lacked basic knowledge of the overall strategic situation and were left wondering what would happen next. In the camps, many rumours circulated. One rumour in particular concerned which divisions would have the honour of marching to

Germany.107 Answers were soon forthcoming.

Meanwhile, on 11 November, at a conference at British Army GHQ in Cambrai,

General Plumer informed General Currie that the Canadian Corps had been selected for the Army of Occupation and provided him with a general outline for the British advance.108 According to the initial plan of 11 November, the four divisions of the

Canadian Corps would form part of Second Army, leading the advance to the Rhine.

Movement of the Second Army was to commence on 17 November and continue for

104 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada 1914-1919 (Canada: The 13th Battalion, Royal Highlanders of Canada, 1925) 304. 105 David Fraser, ed., In Good Company: The First World War Letters and Diaries of the Hon. William Fraser (London: Michael Russell, 1990), diary - 11 November 1918, 331-3. 106 Quoted in the Toronto Daily Star, 7 January 1918. (The report was filed 11 November 1918) 107 Major John Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921) 384. 108 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 12. 36 thirty days.109 General Currie in turn passed on the initial British plans to his division

commanders later on 11 November. Senior Canadian Corps leadership, therefore, knew

almost immediately after the armistice came into effect that the corps would march to the

Rhineland. On 12 November, it is likely that most Canadian soldiers knew their divisions

would march to the Rhine: news of this importance spread fast.110

Plate 1 Canadians Marching through Mons

"Canadians marching through the streets of Mons on the morning of 11 November 1918," Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), PA003547.

Before the armistice, the British had done little planning for the march to the

Rhine and the Canadians none, so initial plans were tentative and would require

109 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 11 November 1918, G.141/19-13. 110 Major J. A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919) 42. 37 definition and elaboration in subsequent days. 111 To date, little has been written on the deliberations, movements and other activities of the Canadian Corps between 12 and 17

November. Most books focus on demobilization, post-war celebrations, or international politics. However, an analysis of Canadian archival sources yields some interesting insights. A meeting of the Canadian Corp General Staff was held at Canadian Corps

Headquarters (HQ) in Valenciennes on 12 November. Plans for the advance to the Rhine were discussed and decisions were made.112 First, the Canadian Corps needed to concentrate its divisions in the vicinity of Mons. Accordingly, 1st and 4th Canadian

Divisions marched over three days, 13-15 November, to Jemappes and Wasmes (villages outside of Mons) respectively.113 The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions closed up under divisional arrangements, clearing an area for the other two divisions.114

On 13 November, information was passed from British HQ to the Canadian Corps that Second Army - to which the Canadian Corps would be transferred on 16 November - would advance on a two corps front, the Canadian Corps to lead on the right.115 Canadian planners in turn decided that the Canadian Corps would march on a two-division front: the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions leading, and the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions following.116 The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were sent to the Rhine first, as they

111 David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991) 9. 112 "Proceedings of a Conference Held at Canadian Corps Headquarters Valenciennes 12th November 1918," Canadian Corps General Staff, War Diary, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, G177/19-13. 113 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 12 November 1918, Operation Order No. 257. 114 Ibid., 13 November 1918. 115 Ibid., 16 November 1918, G.242/19-13. 116 Ibid., 13 November 1918, G.174/19-13. 38 would be later relieved by the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions.117 As of 13 November, therefore, plans were prepared for the presence of all four Canadian divisions in

Germany; no one was to be left behind.

By 14 November, Canadian Corps General Staff planners had provided the

Divisional General Officers Commanding (GOC) with detailed operation orders and instructions.118 The Canadian Corps was scheduled to advance on 18 November, with the

2nd Canadian Division on the right and the 1st Canadian Division on the left. Initially the

3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions would remain halted, beginning their marches on 19

November. Both the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions would march in a three-column formation, one column for each brigade.119 The territory through which the advance was to be carried out was divided into four broad zones, all according to Annex No.l of the

Armistice agreement. The German Army was required to withdraw from each zone the day preceding the commencement of the Allied march into that zone, and to be completely withdrawn from occupied territory by 26 November. A march table, see

Appendix 1, with dates and specified lines of advance was prepared and issued. A British cavalry screen would precede the infantry by one day's march throughout the advance to the Rhine. Further orders included marching under active service conditions—all precautions against surprise were to be taken—and distributing troops in sufficient depth 1 to facilitate supply and to overcome enemy resistance.

117 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 518. 118 "Canadian Corps Instructions for Advance to the German Frontier No. 1," War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 14 November 1918, G.196/19-13. 119 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 14 November 1918, Operation Order No.259. 120 "Canadian Corps Instructions for Advance to the German Frontier No. 1," War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 14 November 1918, G.196/19-13. 39 Map 2 Stages of Advance to the Rhine

STAGES OF THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE

Ordnance Survey 1949.

"Stages of Advance to the Rhine." Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987), frontispiece.

40 From the outset, Canadian planners knew the march to Germany was going to be difficult. Huge logistical obstacles needed to be overcome to feed and supply the 107,000

Canadian troops and 25,000 horses about to walk across most of Belgium.121 Road and rail infrastructure had been destroyed by years of fighting, severing most connections between France and Belgium. From 13 to 17 November, therefore, a number of decisions were enacted to streamline Canadian Corps logistics, easing the provisioning of the soldiers. To add flexibility and capacity, Mechanical Transport Companies (i.e. motor vehicles and trucks) were placed under divisional command and allotted extra trucks.

Additional contingents of soldiers were detailed to help unload at the supply refuelling points. Railheads were moved as far forward as possible.122 Engineer brigades and machine gun battalions would march as one unit. Special formations, such as salvage companies, trench mortar brigades and burial parties, were disbanded and the soldiers ordered to return to their original units. All the rearrangements, however, were still insufficient. Sacrifices had to be made. Stores of ammunition and divisional canteen supplies were cut. The plan to carry the infantry's packs on trucks was scrapped. Unfit horses and remounts were left behind. All extra leave was cancelled. It was even acknowledged that the divisions would be unable to supply showers or underclothes for the men.123

121 War Diaiy, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 17 November 1918. 122 "Administrative Orders and Instructions for the March to the Rhine," War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 17 November 1918, SAQ 52-1700. 123 "Administrative Instructions Issued in Connection with the March of the 2nd Canadian Division to the Rhine," War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 15 November 1918, AQS4-33. 41 If there was one theme consistent with almost every set of orders from 11 to 17

November, it was the need to maintain discipline. The image and reputation of the British

Armies had to be preserved. In British GHQs "Orders for the Advance" of 11 November, the very first order was the following:

The maintenance of discipline is of the highest concern during the period following cessation of hostilities. Breaches of discipline were to be repressed firmly and immediately.124

General Currie as well was keenly concerned with the reputation of the Canadian Corps.

At the meeting on 12 November at Canadian Corps HQ, General Currie drew attention to the necessity of upholding the "smart and soldierly-like appearance" of all the troops and avoiding laxity of saluting. The stress on discipline was also reflected in the Canadian

Divisional Commanders' instructions to their Brigadiers on 15 November:

The Divisional Commander expects the strictest discipline to be maintained during the march. Men are not permitted to leave their billeting area except when on duty. The good name earned by the Division during the past three years of fighting in France and Belgium is to be zealously guarded and upheld in every possible way. Those who fail in this regard will be returned to base.126

In case anyone missed the point, on 15 November Marshal Foch issued a circular, known as the "Pomp and Polish Order," to all Armies involved in the occupation. He desired commanders to attach the greatest importance to the execution of all movements with

124 Edmonds, 13. 125 "Proceedings 0f a Conference Held at Canadian Corps Headquarters Valenciennes 12th November 1918," War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol.18.11, G177/19-13. 126 "Administrative Instructions Issued in Connection with the March of the 2nd Canadian Division to the Rhine," War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division A A and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 15 November 1918, ASQS4-33. 42 rigorous precision and order. No slackness in turn out or march discipline would be tolerated.127

Plate 2 Canadian Pacifies a Belgian Baby

"A Canadian pacifies a Belgian Baby whose mother was killed near Mons by an enemy shell," Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA003538.

For armies, in times of war, discipline is of great importance as it maintains order and control of thousands of men in the most dangerous of situations. In times of peace, discipline protects civilian populations from soldiers, both of friend and foe. But discipline in the aftermath of the First World War was of even more importance. The

Allied armies had a reputation to maintain. Discipline was necessary to avoid embarrassments and to demonstrate to the German people that Allies were superior in

127 Edmonds, 24. 43 their conduct. In General Currie's "Special Order of the Day," 25 November 1918, he encouraged his forces to maintain a good appearance:

Above all, it is of capital importance to establish in Germany the sense of your overwhelming moral and physical standing, so as to complete by your presence of your potential strength, the victories you have won on the Field of Battle. All external signs of discipline must be insisted upon.128

The Canadian Corps helped win the First World War on the field of battle and established a great reputation in France and Belgium. For the march to and occupation of the

Rhineland, Currie ordered the corps to demonstrate their moral and physical superiority to the German people through the creation of a powerful outer image. Not only did the

Canadian Corps have to defeat the German Army, they had to impress the German public.

While the Corps General Staff planned, the boredom and routine of army life continued, punctuated by a few emotion-packed events. Regular route marches, physical training and close order drill continued for all the battalions as did the cleaning and polishing of kit. While marching on the roads, the Canadian soldiers witnessed the return of French and Belgian civilians. The highway from Valenciennes to Mons was a pathetic spectacle of shabby civilians trudging along with all their worldly possessions on their backs.129 Yet, despite their dismal circumstances, the French and Belgian refugees were

128 "Special Order of the Day," War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol.4822, 25 November 1918. 129 Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Mortimer Ltd., 1947) 324 44 full of gratitude for the Canadian troops whom they applauded as the liberators of their 1 "3ft soil and conquerors of the enemy.

The appreciation of the Belgians knew no bounds and many expressions of thankfulness were forthcoming. General Currie made his triumphal entry into Mons on

15 November. He rode into Mons with an escort of the British 5th Lancers, but the 1,500 troops that packed the Grand Place were all Canadian. Several thousand Belgians 10 1 attended the spectacle and cheered their liberators. The Place de la Baverie, where

Canadian troops first entered Mons, was renamed Place du Canada. King Albert made a state entry into Mons and congratulated the Canadian Corps for their efforts in freeing his country.132 In Jemappes, Major General A.C. Macdonell, GOC 1st Canadian Division, and staff attended a special fete and luncheon put on by the Burgomeister1 ^ and Town

Councillors to mark their deliverance from four years of German rule.

Unfortunately, some Canadian soldiers had to miss the celebrations. For the battalions of the 3rd Canadian Division still on the front line, work needed to be done.

Three major issues faced Canadian units on the front lines. First, Canadian soldiers were tasked with the restriction of civilian traffic from west to east. Civilians would not be able to move further east into Belgium until the cavalry screen was established on 18

130 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925 (Montreal: The Gazette Printing Co. Limited, 1927) 268. 131 Desmond Morton and Jack Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914- 1919 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989) 236; War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 15 November 1918. 132 John Swettenham, Canada and the First World War (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1969) 116. 133 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 17 November 1918; A Burgomeister is the chief civil official of a German town, roughly the equivalent of a mayor. They are not elected, but appointed by the central government in Berlin. 45 November.134 Second, German Army commanders wanted to establish contact with

Allied commanders in order to meet the requirements of the armistice agreement on such

Plate 3 General Home Inspecting the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade

November 1918, Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA040258. issues as exchanging prisoners of war, locating mines and handing over certain war materials. The German officers, however, did not receive a response until Marshal Foch relaxed the rules concerning communication with the enemy. On 13 November, Foch granted permission to local Allied commanders to communicate with German officers on the location of mines and the repair of roads, but still forbade communication about

134 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 14 November 1918. 135 Initially, Marshal Foch had banned all communication with the enemy, except at the highest levels of command. 46 prisoners or war material.136 The German commanders, however, were quite insistent.

Foch revised his orders on communications with the enemy again on 16 November. He forbade Allied officers to take possession of war materials or prisoners before the

Armistice Commission started work, but instructed German commanders that if they desired to leave material or prisoners behind before retreating, then they must also leave behind guards, commanded by officers, responsible for handing over the material or prisoners. The guards and officers would then be liberated and sent back to German lines.137 Not many German commanders followed Marshal Foch's suggestion and this may have had an impact on the third issue confronting the Canadians—waves of freed prisoners of war. By all reports, there was no systematic exchange of prisoners in the days following the armistice. The German guards at the prisoner of war camps in

Belgium and Germany just opened the gates and encouraged the prisoners to leave. Half starved, often with no boots and with few clothes upon their backs, these brave soldiers were forced to walk, or hitch a ride, back to Allied lines. Upon reaching the Canadian lines, former prisoners were given food and a ride to Mons, where they received further medical attention. Many nationalities passed through the Canadian lines, but for some

Canadian soldiers it was particularly heart wrenching when a hail was answered in their native tongue. It is difficult to determine how many Canadian prisoners of war were encountered by Canadian forces, or when Canadian prisoners were returned. But, when

Sir Edward Kemp was answering questions in the Canadian parliament about Canadian prisoners,

136 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 14 November 1918; Discussions concerning prisoners of war and war materials were not to commence until the Armistice Commission began its talks on 16 November 1918. 137 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 16 November 1918. 138 War Diary, 3rd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4855, 14 November 1918. 47 on 27 May 1919, he stated: "We had something like 2,688 ranks and 130 officers at the time of the armistice, and they have all been repatriated except the ten we cannot find."139

Final preparations for the advance to the Rhineland were made on 17 November.

Operation orders were refined and reissued. Divine services were held. The cavalry

screen advanced. Everything was in readiness for the march. Or so it seemed.

139 Canada, House of Commons Debates, (27 May 1919), p. 2873 (Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada). 48 Chapter Three A Logistical Nightmare: The March across Belgium

This march was probably the sternest test of sheer endurance, as apart from bravery, that the division ever encountered. Food and smokes were short all the way, the men were filthy and covered with lice, and utterly worn out. The marches were very severe - anything up to twenty miles a day, the roads bad and the weather usually appalling.

Rev. Kenelm Swallow, British 29th Division140

Many regimental histories, and some general texts concerning the First World

War, chronicle the Canadian Corps' march across Belgium and into the Rhineland.

However, a full account of this epic trek has never been established. For the first time, this thesis will create a more complete narrative of the Canadian Corps' experiences while marching to Cologne and Bonn in November and December 1918.

On the cold, wet morning of 18 November, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions commenced their march to the Rhine, relieving the examining posts of the 3rd Canadian

Division and assuming responsibility for the front.141 Despite the poor weather, the march initially proceeded according to plan—on a two-division front, each division in three- column formation. The leading brigades of each division furnished an advanced guard of all arms including infantry, field artillery, engineers, cyclists, and a squadron of cavalry.142 By approximately 2:30pm, after a march of 20km, the leading two divisions of the Canadian Corps reached their billets for the night—1st Canadian Division around

140 Captain Stair Gillon, The Story of the 29th Division: A Record of Gallant Deeds (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1925) 220-1. 141 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 18 November 1918; War Diary, 3rd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4855, 18 November 1918. 142 War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4891, 18 November 1918. 49 Map 3 Line of March to the Rhine River

"Sketch No. 13" Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) opposite page 193. 50 Soignies and 2nd Canadian Division around Houdeng-Aimeries. 143 The 3rd and 4th

Canadian Divisions remained in the Mons area, all according to plan.

19 and 20 November were scheduled as halt days, for rest and refit. Many officers took the opportunity to visit Brussels and attend King Albert's official entry into the city.

Others toured the historic battlefields near Waterloo. Most of the enlisted slept or visited with friends. On 21 November, 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions continued the advance and reached the general line Gosselies-Nivelles-Lillois. Problems, however, were starting to appear. The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions' marches for the day were cancelled.144 The supplies for 2nd Canadian Division were very late, making it necessary for the division's quartermaster to draw dry rations.145 Later, the scheduled marches for 22 and 23

November were cancelled for all Canadian divisions. Many wondered what was going on.

By 18 November, the British Army, which was supplying the Canadian Corps, realized they faced huge logistical problems that were complex and proved difficult to solve in the short-term. For the march to Germany, the British quartermasters relied upon trains to supply the approximately eight hundred thousand soldiers of Second and Fourth

Armies. Under normal circumstances, supplies from a base would be brought forward by train to the closest railheads. Trucks would then move the goods to supply refuelling points where they were in turn picked up by the divisions, using another set of trucks.

The problem at the outset of the march was the delay of the trains, (in some cases over

143 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 18 November 1918. 144 Messages and Signals, War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 20 November 1918, G.333. 145 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 21 November 1918. 51 forty-eight hours), in getting to the railheads. The trains arrived late for a number of reasons. Fighting along the Western Front had destroyed most of the railways in an area varying in width from thirty to fifty kilometres and extending the whole length of the

British area in France. Reconstruction of these devastated areas happened quickly and military rail lines were laid across the gap, but these could not handle the same volume of traffic as civilian lines.146 Furthermore, the quick repair of existing civilian lines proved almost impossible, the damage being so severe, and this placed an extra burden on functioning civilian and military rail lines. Even if the civilian lines were undamaged, they were in such a disorganized state that they would require months of reorganization before regaining their pre-war capacity. Signalling and switching equipment, water towers, and office equipment had been damaged or removed by the retreating German

Army. The explosion of delay-action mines, which the German Army had failed to include in their sketches, caused even more delays.147 Finally, French and Belgian civilian traffic and armies in the midst of demobilization were negatively affecting the movement of trains in the rear areas. All of these factors, coupled with a shortage of adequate rolling stock and locomotives, proved insurmountable and the British Army was forced to alter their plans.

British supply problems affected the Canadian Corps in two ways. The original march timetable was scrapped and a less ambitious one scheduled, see Appendix 1.148

Second, the composition of the Army of Occupation was altered. On 20 November, the

146 War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 9 December 1918, 615QA. 147 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 20. 148 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11,21 November 1918, G.369/19-13. 52 British Quartermaster General, Lieutenant General Sir Travers Clarke, decided that of the

eight corps and thirty-two divisions selected for the advance, only half would go

forward.149 The delay of the rearward divisions would make it possible to sustain the

leading divisions. Thus, on 23 November, General Currie received instructions stating that, for the purposes of the advance to the Rhine, the Canadian Corps would be composed of the following: Canadian Corps HQ, 1st Canadian Division, 2nd Canadian

Division, and Canadian Corps Troops.150 The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions would remain in Belgium and, accordingly, were transferred to IV Corps Fourth Army on 24

November.151

With a more sustainable number of divisions moving forward, the Canadian

Corps continued its march across Belgium. From 24 to 28 November, it advanced four out of the next five days. It was a punishing pace. The men marched for seven to eight hours each day, covering distances which ranged between twenty and thirty kilometres.

At times, the marches took so long they were not completed before nightfall and 1 Canadian soldiers had to find their billets by flare light. The troops had to carry full packs, a rifle, a blanket, ammunition and their "beloved" steel helmets.153 Blistered feet and worn-out boots were common and more than one soldier was evacuated because of crippled feet. The mud and continuous drizzle were depressing and the marching on

149 Edmonds, 18. 150 Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) 189. (Hereafter Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps) 151 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 23 November 1918, G.388/19-13, Operation Order No.262. 152 War Diary, 1st Canadian Battalion, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4913,27 November 1918. 153 War Diary, 1st Canadian Battalion, RG 9, III-D3, vol. 4913, 18 November 1918. Occasionally, extra trucks were available to carry the soldiers' packs. However, for most of the march the men had to carry their packs. 53 second and third class roads was difficult.154 To add to the discomfort, clean clothing, canteen supplies, and proper showering facilities were unavailable.155 The extra chores such as mending, laundry, cooking, and washing made a long march seem even longer.156

Canadian soldiers had little choice but to accept the blistering pace. The war was not over. A peace treaty had not yet been signed, so Marshal Foch wanted to penetrate

German territory as far as possible in case of a resumption of hostilities. In a war that had measured advances in yards, it was a pleasing prospect to cover so much ground at relatively little cost. Further, the armistice was set to expire thirty-six days after its signing, on 17 December.157 Marshal Foch wanted the Armies of Occupation in place, firmly entrenched in their bridgeheads before the agreement ended. As a result, General

Plumer's orders of 26 November required the Canadian Corps to cross the German frontier on 1 December, reach the Rhine on 8 December and cross the Rhine on 13

December. Plumer's timetable was consistent with Marshal Foch's directive to have all the Armies of Occupation cross the Rhine together on 13 December. With a reputation to maintain, General Currie and the Canadian Corps could not afford to be late.

As the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions marched through Belgium, they witnessed evidence of the German Army's retreat. With some notable exceptions, the German military retreated in good order.159 But it was not easy. The German retirement left many

154 First and most second-class roads had been allotted to the artillery and transport brigades. 155 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 26 November 1918. 156 John A. Cooper, "From Mons to the Rhine with Canada's Army," Toronto Daily Star, 25 January 1918. (The report was filed 8 December 1918) 157 Edmonds, Appendix I, 327-334. The Armistice was renewed on 18 December 1918, 16 January 1919 and 17 February 1919, each time extending the military occupation of Germany. 158 Edmonds, 86. 159 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 187. 54 casualties in its wake: hundreds of dead horses littered the roadside, some that had been partially butchered for food; trucks that were stripped of all removable parts were found in ditches; articles of equipment were scattered about along the road, even rifles.160

Photographs seen later showed German soldiers pulling their heavy artillery and vehicles with ropes for tires.161

To a limited extent, in violation of article 7 of the armistice agreement, German forces damaged the road and rail networks and detonated ammunition dumps. In some cases entire switching yards and sections of rail and bridges were rendered useless. Along the roads and especially at intersections, German soldiers had detonated small charges.

The resulting craters made the roads difficult to navigate. Ammunition dumps were supposed to be handed over to the advancing Armies of Occupation. However, as it Colonel A.L. Barry of the 26 Canadian Battalion recalled, at Luttre, "as the Germans were falling back, they put a demolition charge to a boxcar full of ammunition, after warning the inhabitants to take cover. The village was flattened." By

no means was the

German retreat marked by a scorched earth policy. However, their limited acts of destruction caused headaches and delays for the advancing Canadian Corps.

Relief from the boredom and exhaustion of marching in Belgium came whenever the Canadian Corps marched into a town. Most regimental histories and published diaries mention that everywhere in Belgium the Canadian soldiers were received with 160 Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawaunbounde: Mortimed hospitalityr Ltd., 1947. Fo) 329r man. y troops, the march must have, at times, seemed like a 161 Edmonds, 88. 162 Colonel A.L. Barry, Batman to Brigadier (Newcastle: 1965) 70. 163 Ibid., 68. 55 triumphal procession. At Nivelles, the vanguard of the 1st Canadian Division was greeted

in the square by a dense crowd all cheering wildly. One soldier remarked, "Nothing was

too good for us at Nivelles, soft feather beds and warm billets. Eight thousand bottles of

wine were dug up from the chateau grounds."164 Colonel A.L Barry remembered that at

Houdeng-Goegnies they were showered with flowers everywhere they went: "It was like

Caesar returning triumphantly from Gaul."165 Flags were flying from every house. Streets were decorated and crowds thronged the thoroughfares. Everywhere could be heard the national anthems of Canada, England, and Belgium.

Plate 4 The Last Town in Belgium

Defence, Libraiy and Archives Canada, PA 003636.

164 Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1932) 325. 165 Barry, 68. 56 Stark counterpoints to the festive atmosphere in the liberated Belgian towns were the revelation of German Army atrocities and the Belgian punishment of collaborators.

Engineers of the 6th Field Company Canadian Engineers reported local accounts of a

German Army massacre of civilians in Tamines, 1914: "Several hundred able-bodied males were rounded up in front of the church and massacred by machine gun fire."166 At

Dinant, Lieutenant Colonel William Fraser wrote in his diary that he overheard Belgians state that in 1914, "the Germans shot some 700 civilians."167 John Home and Alan

Kramer later confirmed these two cases and many others in their text, German Atrocities,

1914: A History of Denial.16* The massacre of civilians happened in 1914 and may account, in part, for the Belgians' intense hatred of the German Army and local sympathizers. After the Germans retreated in 1918, Belgian collaborators faced the collective punishment of their peers. Women who had intimate relations with the men of the German Army had their heads shaved.169 Other collaborators faced ostracism and, in the major cities, some of their houses were burned.170

On 27 November, the Canadian Corps left the heavily populated lowlands of

Belgium and began marching towards the Ardennes, the rugged and hilly region of eastern Belgium. Now advancing on a two-brigade front, the general direction of the corps changed half right, and the boundaries between divisions were rearranged so that

166 Major K. Weatherbe, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company and Battalion Canadian Engineers in the Great War (Toronto: The Hunter-Rose Co., Limited, 1928) 444-5. 167 David Fraser, ed., In Good Company: The First World War Letters and Diaries of the Hon. William Fraser (London: Michael Russell, 1990) diaiy - 28 November 1918, 334. 168 John Home and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) Appendix One. 169 N.M Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson 1914-1919 (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997) letter -19 November 1918, 350. 170 Philip Gibbs, Halifax The Morning Chronicle, 3 December 1918. 57 each would have one first class road.171 The weather, muddy roads and heavy traffic—

accentuated by the overturned trucks inconveniently left by the enemy in the middle of

the path—made the march of 27 November a real hardship for Canada's soldiers. Even

the first class roads were in a very bad condition. By nightfall on 27 November, the

leading troops of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had reached Seilles and Coutisse

respectively. The Canadian Corps had entered the hilly Ardennes and things were about

to get worse.

Commencing with the march on 28 November, two changes marked the Canadian

Corps' advance. First, each division now moved in one column in depth, a change

necessitated by the lack of suitable billets in the sparsely inhabited hills of the

Ardennes.172 Second, the mood of the march changed. The celebrations were over and the journey became an ordinary route march through a sparsely settled district. By 28

November, 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had reached Clavier and Mean respectively. It

is at this point, the night of 28 November, where the logistics began to fail for the second time.

As 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had advanced across Belgium, the difficulty of bringing forward supplies had become more difficult. The railhead was still west of

Valenciennes. To reach the leading troops, trucks needed to haul supplies for over

160km. The strain on the Mechanical Transport Companies was tremendous. Often moving at night on narrow and confusing roads, drivers were frequently misdirected or

171 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 190. 172 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 28 November 1918. 173 Major J.A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919) 43. 58 delayed.174 Furthermore, the trains were still being delayed west of Mons.175 As a result, supplies had been reaching the Canadian Corps later each day, and the ordinary safety margin of one day's rations in hand had been lost.176 The climax was reached on 28

November. Some units of the 1st Canadian Division did not receive their breakfast and

1 77 were forced to consume their iron rations. Supplies failed to appear again on 29

November, so 1st Canadian Division's march was cancelled and its soldiers went hungry.178 The 2nd Canadian Division received its rations in time, on 29 November, and the leading troops reached Villers St. Gertrude by nightfall.179

By securing extra trucks and using trucks from the Canadian Machine Gun Corps for supply work, 1st Canadian Division's situation improved sufficiently to permit the advance to continue on 30 November. Leading troops of the 1st and 2nd Canadian 1 8A Divisions reached Ferrieres and Regne by nightfall. However, during the evening of 30

November it was discovered that the delivery of rations for 1st Canadian Division would again arrive too late to be prepared before the march. After consultations between

Generals Macdonell and Currie, orders were issued cancelling any movement for 1st

Canadian Division on 1 December.181 For the second time, 1st Canadian Division had to cancel its march for lack of supplies. Again, the soldiers of 1st Canadian Division went hungry. The 2nd Canadian Division fared better and continued its advance, reaching the

174 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG9, III D3, vol.4840, 30 November 1918. 175 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 1 December 1918. 176 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 191. 177 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 28 November 1918. 178 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 29 November 1918. 179 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 29 November 1918. 180 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 30 November 1918. 181 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 30 November 1918. 59 mountain village of Regne.182 The 2nd Canadian Division was fortunate that their trains

were not delayed, their roads were in better condition and their drivers better able to cope

with the long hauls.

Logistical problems would continue to plague the Canadian Corps throughout the

advance to and occupation of the Rhineland. Even in late December, trains were still

arriving late and the quartermasters were forced to draw emergency supplies on two

occasions.183 The problem was particularly acute for soldiers stationed in forward

positions, or on guard duty in the bridgehead. On 29-30 December, 1st Canadian Division reported sending emergency rations to forward units.184

The Canadian Corps was not the only unit to experience difficulties. Owing to an accident at La Louviere (a large train junction between Mons and Charleroi), no supply trains arrived on 30 November for II Corps, Second Army. In the afternoon of 1

December, General Plumer noted there was little prospect for improvement in the delivery of supplies, so he ordered a halt for II Corps on 2 and 3 December. The trains arriving on 2 December were forty hours late. Improvements were made and on 3

December the trains were only twenty-four hours late.185

Despite the failure of the logistical network, the Canadian Corps pressed on. By 3

December the heads of the divisional columns had reached the German frontier, the leading elements of the 1st Canadian Division in Petit Thier and the 2nd Canadian

182 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 1 December 1918. 183 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 20 December 1918; War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850,25 December 1918. 184 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 29-30 December 1918. 185 Edmonds, 87. 60 Division in Beho. Most units bore up well under the strain of hard marches and low rations in the Belgian Ardennes. As Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cooper wrote:

The wagons are caked with mud, the steel is a bit rusty and we are all a little bedraggled. But the men are bearing up well. They are cheerful and smile, even though the road is tough.186

When morale sagged and rations did not appear, the Canadian YMCA helped.

Throughout the march, volunteers of the YMCA set up free drink stations and canteens at each rest stop, ahead of the line of march. Their hot tea and biscuits were greatly

1 r7 appreciated by Canada's soldiers, especially when rations failed to arrive.

However, for some units, the lack of food and exhausting marches were cause for mutinous thoughts. As the Canadian Corps exited the Ardennes and approached the

German frontier, the platoons of the 29th Canadian Battalion refused to parade until they received a proper meal. The Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Tobin, handled the situation well and cancelled the parade because of rain, though only one rain drop was felt. He ordered the men to polish kit in their barracks. Meanwhile, the enterprising Lieutenant S. Fletcher of "A" Company managed to procure some supplies.

By evening, after a good hot meal of Mulligan stew, the mutinous thoughts in the 29th 188 th Canadian Battalion had evaporated. Three platoons of the 16 Canadian Battalion also refused to parade when rations were short. In this instance, after a short statement by the

CO, Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Peck, the insubordinate platoons fell in and reached the

186 John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star, 28 January 1919. (The report was filed 1 IDecember 1918) 187 Charles W. Bishop, The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in the Great War (Canada: The National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of Canada, 1924) 290. The YMCA utilized its own trucks and drivers and was, therefore, not as susceptible to the same delays experienced by the British Army. 188 H.R.N Clyne, Vancouver's 29th (Vancouver: Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964) 97-101. 61 battalion parade ground on time.189 It is unlikely that any soldiers of the 29th and 16th

Canadian Battalions seriously considered mutiny, but when food fails to appear there is bound to be some grumbling.

The preparations for and crossing of the German frontier, scheduled for 4

December, are mentioned in many battalion histories, but the accounts are fragmented and lack context and analysis. Put together, however, a clearer picture of this momentous occasion emerges from the disparate regimental accounts. By all reports, the crossing was an extraordinary event and senior Canadian Corps leadership wanted to create an impressive spectacle. General Currie issued a "Special Order of the Day" calling on all units to maintain strict discipline and not show any weakness whether on the march or at rest.190 The men were reminded not to fraternize and to respect private property and the billets they would occupy.191 The motive behind General Currie's orders was clear. The

Canadian Corps had to project a strong, positive image while it operated in enemy territory. The corps had to demonstrate its physical and moral superiority to the German people. To help foster this powerful image, on 3 December, 1st and 2nd Canadian

Divisions spent part of the day polishing and repairing kit for next day's crossing.

On the morning of 4 December, with Union Jacks and Regimental Colours flying, the Canadians passed into Germany. The sound of pipe bands playing "O Canada" and the "Maple Leaf Forever" pierced the still morning air. With pride, Currie took the salute

189 Urquhart, 16lh Battalion, 326. 190 Colonel G. W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962) 526. 191 War Diaiy, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 15 November 1918, AQS6- 34. 62 of the 1st Canadian Division at Petit Thier.192 Capturing the grand moment were cinematographers and photographers.193 It was an amazing sight, but it was unfortunate that not many Germans were watching. The border region was sparsely inhabited and few villages were nearby. The entry into Germany, however, was a sentimental moment for many soldiers. As Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cooper noted, "The wildest Canadian dream has been to march to the Rhine and here today we are well on our way to Prussian soil."194 By nightfall, 1st Canadian Division had reached Amel and 2nd Canadian Division

Setz. It was the corps' first night in enemy territory. Army life just got a lot more interesting.

Plate 5 Canadian Troops Enter Germany

William Rider, "Canadian Troops entering Germany en route to the Rhine River," 4 December 1918, Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA 003642.

192 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 191. 193 War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG 9, III-D-3, vol. 4891, 4 December 1918. 194 John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star, 25 January 1919. (The report was filed 8 December 1918) 63 Chapter Four Marching in Germany: From the Frontier to the Rhine

The inhabitants of Germany seemed almost relieved to see the British and

Canadian forces in and around their towns. For many Germans, the Armies of

Occupation represented stability and order in a country full of confusion. From

November 1918 to January 1919, Germany teetered on the brink of anarchy as a

Bolshevist inspired insurrection swept across the country. As Francis Russell wrote,

"Germany itself seemed on the verge of breaking into its pre-Bismarckian fragments."195

There were Spartacist riots in Munich, Hamburg, Halle, Dusseldorf, Dortmund and

Schwerin. In Munich, the bohemian-radical intellectual, Kurt Eisner, had seized power and proclaimed a "Bavarian Republic."196 The People's Naval Division, made up of red ex-sailors, occupied parts of the imperial palace. Later in December 1918, Karl

Liebknecht transformed his Spartacist League into the Communist Party of Germany and prepared a putsch in Berlin. On 6 January 1919, the anticipated Spartacist revolution erupted and Liebknecht's group was joined by the Independent Socialists and revolutionary Shop Stewards. At first, the revolutionary forces swept everything before them. 197 President Friedrich Ebert was so concerned for his safety that he barricaded himself in the chancellery, while the Defence Minister, Gustav Noske, fled Berlin. Only

195 Francis Russell, The Horizon Concise History of Germany (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1973) 182. 196 Eleanor L. Turk, The History of Germany (London: Greenwood Press, 1999) 99. 197 Hagen Schulze, Germany: A New History, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 198. 64 the rapid and brutal suppression of the Bolshevists by the Frei Korps prevented a

10r complete breakdown of social order.

Furthermore, although an armistice had been signed, the temporary cessation of open hostilities did not end the German people's suffering. The naval blockade of

Germany remained in force and this caused two problems. First, the naval embargo halted all shipments of foodstuffs, resulting in dangerously low food supplies.199 For those in Germany who had money, a variety of food was available. But for the masses of urban poor, starvation was real and grim prospect.200 Second, the blockade restricted the import of raw materials necessary to fuel the German industrial economy. Without raw materials for their factories, manufacturing companies were forced to lay off their 901 employees.

Further complicating the labour market and adding to the overall confusion was the return of thousands of soldiers. Beginning on 11 November, the German generals were given the almost impossible task of bringing back an army of two million men in thirty-one days from France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Rhineland, and Alsace-Lorraine.

The troops marched back in order, under their officers, and returned to Germany on time.

But no sooner had they crossed their own borders than they became an uncoordinated mass of field gray civilians who had the chief concern of getting home as quickly as

198 The Frei Korps was a group of tough veterans who did not want to be demobilized after the First World War. These mercenaries were enlisted by senior army officers into well-equipped, well-disciplined units and placed at the disposal of Ebert's government. It is largely through their efforts that the provisional government survived. 199 General Sir Charles Harrington, Plumer of Messines (London: Butler and Tanner, 1923) 192. 200 Philip Gibbs, "German Gaiety is all a Sham," Toronto The Globe, 16 December 1918. 201 Charles F. Home and Walter F. Austin, eds., Source Records of the Great War - 1919, vol. VII, (Indianapolis: The American Legion, 1930) 15. 65 possible. 202 When the German High Command sent nine of its divisions to Berlin to restore order, those divisions never arrived in the capital, simply dissolving into the

German countryside. These Etappen troops, deserters, caused several problems from the ruination of supply dumps, to street fights with Bolshevists, to the commandeering of trains.203 The German government had planned for demobilization, but had anticipated a slower pace of withdrawal from the occupied territories. Initial government plans had to be amended and the result was that jobs could not be found for all the returning soldiers.204 Unemployed soldiers turned to socialism and fuelled the Bolshevist movement. The blockade, the demobilization of the German Army, and the Spartacist uprising all combined to unsettle the German territory into which the Canadian and

British forces were marching. Thus, although they were despised, the British Army was a sign of stability and its presence offered relief to the German people from the chaos swirling in the Rhineland.

During their first day and night in Germany, Canadian soldiers observed two characteristics of the German people they encountered. The first was the cold, distant, aloof reception from the local population. The cool reception in Germany was a marked contrast to the festive atmosphere of the Belgian towns visited by the Canadians.

John A. Cooper captured this feeling in a news report filed on 11 December 1918:

We are still in a state of war, though some of the chief features of war are lacking. This state is manifest in the attitude of the people towards us and

202 "Scenes in Berlin and Cologne," London Times, 2 December 1918; The Ettapen were also the source of many news reports about German troops retreating in chaos. 203 "German Chaos: Disorderly Return of Soldiers," London Times, 21 November 1918. (The report was filed 16 November 1918) 204 Kolnische Zeitung, 19 December 1918, Evening Edition. 205 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925 (Montreal: The Gazette Printing Co. Limited, 1927) 272. 66 in our attitude towards them. We do not fire shells or bullets, but we fight just the same. We want beds for our soldiers and stables for our horses. We want the right of way over roads and railways. We desire to control their cafes and restaurants ... We temper their freedom of movement. We have the power of life and death over them. Because of this they hate us, though their hate is well concealed when our faces are turned towards their way. But there is enough antagonism that we are still warning peoples. They give us what they must, but we cannot force them to be friendly. They doff their hats to officers, but not with good grace. They yield up their kitchens to our cooks, their best rooms to officers, their stables for our horses and so on - only when ordered or told to by their Burgomeister. They are resisting, passively it is true, but still resisting as their armies did in Northern France. 06

The German peoples' reaction should not have been surprising to the Canadians. From the German point of view, the Canadian Corps was the enemy, here to occupy their towns and villages and Germans were expected to open their homes and provide shelter for their occupiers. German civilians were now at the mercy of a foreign power. They were uncertain what to expect and may have feared reprisals. The retreating German Army further unsettled the civilians by spreading rumours that the British Army was a cruel occupier.207

The second German behaviour the Canadians noticed was the compliant attitude of local civil officials. In almost all the German villages the Canadians marched through, the local Burgomeister and his staff were studiously polite and acceded to every demand made of them.208 The civic and official compliance observed by the Canadian soldiers was the product of advanced planning by the German central government. By the time the British Army arrived, the Rhinelanders had been well schooled in the correct attitude

206 John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star, 28 January 1919. (The report was filed 11 December 1918) 207 H.R.N Clyne, Vancouver's 29th (Vancouver: Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964) 92-3. 208 A Burgomeister is roughly the equivalent of a town or city mayor, one who is appointed by the central government. He is the chief civil official. 67 to adopt during the occupation. The German central government had commanded its local officials and the people of the Rhineland to cooperate with the Army of Occupation. The local newspapers repeated the German government's edicts, spelling out to the people exactly what was expected of them. An article in the Kolnische Zeitung, titled "When the

Enemy Comes," of 21 November 1918, explained the proper behaviour:

At the beginning of December, Cologne and all the outlying neighbourhoods have to make room for the enemy, whether you like it or not. Every German woman has to be advised how to treat or be treated by the enemy, no fraternization. You are advised to be friendly and courteous but aloof with the enemy ... We have to make sure that the enemy knows that although they are here they are not our guests.209

In another article, after a Bolshevik uprising had been suppressed, the President of

Germany addressed the people of Dusseldorf. He asked all the people who were in special positions, (mayors and administrators), to:

Vigorously put all their efforts into doing their best at their tasks and work with the Allied armies. From the people he wants/expects their patience because this occupation will not last forever. The enemy will not be inside Germany's borders for long. Do not forget that you are Germans, be aloof, be courteous and do not associate with the enemy. The time of the occupation will soon be finished.210

The German people were told through their newspapers, therefore, to expect a short occupation, to suffer the presence of Allied soldiers with cool disdain, and to bear themselves with dignity.211 The commands from Berlin were not only expressed in the local papers, but were also displayed on the walls of buildings. Poster-sized notices, repeating the same orders and signed by the Burgomeister, covered each town's public

209 "Wenn de Feind Kommt," Kolnische Zeitung, 21 November 1918, Evening Edition. 210 " Wassenstillstand und Rtickmarsch," Kolnische Zeitung, 27 November 1918, Mid-Day Edition. 211 "To the Rhine: British Troops in Germany," London Times, 4 December 1918. (The report was filed 1 December 1918) 68 buildings. Priests preached the same points from the pulpit. In 1918, the Rhineland was predominantly Catholic and priests encouraged their flocks to comply with the occupying forces.212

Both Marshal Foch and Field Marshal Haig issued their own proclamations to the

German people as well. They were displayed in poster form on the same walls as those of the German government's.213 In their proclamations, Marshal Foch and Field Marshal

Haig both demanded the complete obedience of the German people. Any hostility directed towards the occupying powers would be severely dealt with. The Allied leaders promised that local laws and regulations would be guaranteed as long as they did not conflict with the rights and safety of the Army of Occupation. Further, local courts would continue to administer justice, except for offences committed against the occupational force. Public services would continue to operate, but under the supervision and control of the military authorities.214 It is unclear what impact Allied edicts had on the German population, but the message from the Allied military authorities, the German government, and the Catholic Church was clear: the German people were expected to comply with the occupation.

After crossing the German frontier, the completion of the march to Cologne and

Bonn was carried out over the next eight days, from 5 to 12 December. The Canadian

r Corps continued their march without incident or trouble other than that of supplies. On

212 Colonel A.L. Barry, Batman to Brigadier (Newcastle, 1965) 75. 213 "Neuefte Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 6 December 1918, Morning Edition. 214 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 66-68. 215 Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) 191. (Hereafter Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps) 69 5 December, the 2nd Canadian Division reached Kronenburg, but the 1st Canadian

Division did not move because its supplies had failed for a third time, on this occasion due to a derailment between Valenciennes and Mons.216 On 6 December, the heads of the

1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions reached Helenthal and Blankenheim respectively.217 Once in Germany, the marches averaged sixteen kilometres, shorter than the twenty to thirty kilometres averaged in Belgium. Nevertheless, being on twisty and hilly roads and through dense woods, the marches from the German frontier to the Rhine were still exhausting.218

The boredom and routine of the march to the Rhine was interrupted just as the

British and Canadian forces were preparing to cross the German frontier. On the evening of 3 December, there was an urgent telephone request from the Mayor of Cologne,

Konrad Adenauer, for a quick occupation of his city. Adenauer feared civil unrest during the period between the withdrawal of the German Army and the arrival of the British.

Adenauer believed a military presence in the city would be required to calm a potentially dangerous situation.219 His fears, unfortunately, were realized. During the day of 3

December, as the German Army withdrew, food riots erupted in Cologne, spurred on by

Bolshevist elements in the city.220 Continuing to the next day, on 4 December, a mob of approximately three hundred people looted stores and shops in downtown Cologne.221

The Cologne civic guard managed to restore order, but only by firing their machine guns

216 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 5 December 1918. 217 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11,6 December 1918. 218 Edmonds, 90. 219 David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991) 18. 220 "Stadtische Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 3 December 1918, Evening Edition. 221 "Nearing Cologne," London Times, 6 December 1918. 70 Map 4 British Occupied Area of the Rhineland, December 1918 End Paper

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"British Occupied Area of the Rhineland, December 1918," Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) endpaper.

71 above the crowd.222 Realizing the situation could rapidly deteriorate, General Plumer and

Marshal Foch both agreed to send a relief force to Cologne. On 6 December, a small force of British cavalry and armoured cars was ordered to enter Cologne and seize strategic points.223 General Plumer also ordered the 28th Brigade group—including the

Royal Newfoundland Regiment—on 6 December to move to the suburbs of Cologne by rail. Thus, the first elements of the British Army reached the Rhine on 6 December 1918, unheralded and without much fanfare.224

On 9 December, the heads of the 1st and 2nd Canadian, 29th and 9th Divisional columns all reached the Rhine.225 The leading units of the 1st Canadian Division were allotted billets in the towns and suburbs south and west of Cologne and the 2nd Canadian

Division in villages west of Bonn.226 The first Canadian troops to see the Rhine were those of the 1st Canadian Division, when the advanced guards of the 3rd Canadian

Infantry Brigade (CIB) reached the west bank at 9:50am.227 However, it was not until 12

December before the rear units of infantry and the artillery had completed their marches.228 It was almost miraculous that the artillery arrived on time for the crossing of the Rhine, having had to march over 60km in one day to make up for delays. Upon reaching the outskirts of Cologne and Bonn, the soldiers of the Canadian Corps must have been pleased to arrive at their destination. No more long marches were scheduled.

222 "Order has been Restored in Cologne," Halifax The Morning Chronicle, 7 December 1918. 223 Williamson, 18. 224 "Stadtische Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 6 December 1918, Evening Edition. 225 Edmonds, 91. 226 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 9 December 1918; War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 9 December 1918. 227 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 9 December 1918. 228 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 1 IDecember 1918. 229 War Diary, General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, Canadian Corps, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4958, 13 December 1918. 72 Proper barracks, showering facilities, good food and the prospects for diversion were now all at hand.

Friday, 13 December was set as the date for all the Armies of Occupation to cross the Rhine River. This event has received the greatest coverage in the literature concerning the Canadian Corps' activities in Germany after the First World War. Many general texts concerning the CEF, the regimental histories, and the Currie biographies all mention the crossing of the Rhine. The notoriety of the event is not surprising as this was an occasion of great significance, more so than the crossing of the German frontier. As S. Douglas

MacGowan wrote in New Brunswick's Fighting 26th:

For the Canadians, it was one of the high points during the ravaging war and they were determined to parade at their best. It was a symbolic triumphant ending of the conflict, a proud and well-disciplined victor versus the humbled enemy. This spectacular march was a peaceful way for the Canadians to indicate their supremacy.231

On 11 and 12 December, while the rear battalions of the Canadian columns closed in on the Rhine, the Canadian Corps prepared to cross the river. Guards posted by the British

Cavalry Corps in Cologne and Bonn were relieved. Advanced scouting across the Rhine commenced. Kit was mended and polished. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions concentrated on the left bank of the Rhine opposite Cologne and Bonn, as close to the cities as possible.232 On 12 December, the British 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had come under General Currie's command on 1 December, crossed the river at Bonn to establish

230 Nicholson, 527. 231 MacGowan, et.al., New Brunswick's "Fighting 26th," (Saint John: Neptune Publishing Company Limited, 1994)317. 232 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 11-12 December 1918. 73 control posts for the bridgehead.233 Everything was ready for the infantry's crossing on

13 December.

The morning of the 13th dawned darkly and a steady rain poured down the whole day. The leading troops of the Canadian Corps were soaked as they crossed into the

German heartland at 9:30am. With their bayonets fixed, colours flying and bands playing, the infantry marched over the river. The 1st Canadian Division crossed the Rhine by the

South Bridge in Cologne.234 General Plumer took the salute at South Bridge, while the

Canadians marched past in full battle dress. At Bonn Bridge, General Currie stood for five hours taking the salutes from the soldiers of 2nd Canadian Division.235 To the infantry's relief, their heavy packs were being carried in trucks.

Crowds of Germans lined the route to witness the grand parade and were mute as the Canadians passed. The civilians were curious, polite, and anxious to see the people who would ultimately control their fate.236 The German men must have become tired of taking off their hats; General Plumer's orders required the removal of hats while army colours passed. Yet, those who failed to remove their caps in time had them knocked off by army bouncers passing through the crowds.

By 3:00pm, most Canadian battalions had crossed the Rhine, reaching their billets for the evening. It would take, however, another three days of short marches for 1st and

233 Ibid. 234 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 12 December 1918, G.3-105/8, Operation Order No. 316. 235 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 11 December 1918, AQS5/1865. 236 Major J.A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919) 44. 237 MacGowan, 317; N.M. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson 1914-1919 (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997) letter -14 December 1918, 353-5. 74 2nd Canadian Divisions to complete their deployment in the Cologne bridgehead. From

14 to 16 December, units of the two infantry divisions relieved the 1st Cavalry Brigade,

Plate 6 The Canadian Corps Crosses the Rhine

"The 19 Canadian Infantry Battalion passing General Currie at Bonn Bridge," 13 December 1918, Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA 003776. taking over control of the roads and railways leading into the occupied territory.238 On 15

December, the 2nd Canadian Division relieved the cavalry on the perimeter from Rott to

Neunkirchen and established infantry outposts.239 On 16 December, 1st Canadian

Division completed the relief of the cavalry and established outposts on the perimeter

238 Messages and Signals, War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 13 December 1918, G.765. 239 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 15 December 1918. 75 from Neunkirchen northwards.240 The 1st Cavalry Brigade then concentrated in

Godesberg, on the left bank of the Rhine, south of Bonn.241 By 16 December, the

bridgehead had been completely occupied, just before the armistice was set to expire. The marching was finally over. General Currie meanwhile had established the Canadian

Corps HQ in Bonn; 1st Canadian Division's HQ was in Cologne and 2nd Canadian

Division's was also located in Bonn.

To celebrate the end of the march and the occupation of German territory, Field

Marshal Haig visited units of the Canadian Corps on 16 December. Most soldiers not on duty lined the roads in the towns through which Haig passed.243 No formal inspections were held, but soldiers donned their walking-out-dress with rifles and side arms.244 The

Field Marshal was popular with the troops. During his progress, he was greeted in many places by such a roar of cheers that the pipe bands were almost drowned out.245 During the evening of 16 November, Canadian Corps HQ held a large social during which

General Currie, the Corps General Staff, and the Divisional Commanders got the chance to shake the hand of the man who had led the Empire's armies to ultimate victory.

240 Ibid., 16 December 1918. 241 Messages and Signals, War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 13 December 1918, G.765. 242 Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps, 192. 243 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 16 December 1918. 244 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 14 December 1918, G. 328 and 328/1. 245 Fetherstonhaugh, 13th Battalion, 311. 76 Chapter Five Keeping Busy: The Canadian Corps Occupies Cologne and Bonn

The area over which General Plumer and, by extension, the Canadian Corps were

responsible for contained approximately 1.25 million inhabitants in the winter of 1918. In

normal times, half the citizens were wage earners: half in industry and manufacturing and

the rest in agriculture, trade, and transport. Of the total, 600,000 people lived in Cologne,

which was the seat of provincial government, a large manufacturing centre and an

important railway hub. Cologne had extensive suburbs each with its own Burgomeister

and team of officials. The only other large areas were the following towns: Solingen with

a population of 135,000; Bonn, with 100,000; and Duren with 40,000. Little agricultural

area was available, so imports of food were critical.246

Bonn was the centre of Canadian Corps activities during its time in the Rhineland.

The town itself was a clean, well laid out community noted for its university. The Rhine

River constituted Bonn's chief attraction. Under normal conditions, traffic on the river

was heavy, but after the First World War and with the embargo still in effect, only a few

barges toiled upstream.247 From Bonn Bridge, Cologne Cathedral was visible, being only

twenty-four kilometres away.

After the celebrations associated with Haig's visit were over, the Canadian Corps

began planning defences for its section of the Cologne bridgehead. Although the armistice had been signed, the fighting had not been officially concluded. The possibility

246 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 85. 247 Major K. Weatherbe, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company and Battalion Canadian Engineers in the Great War (Toronto: The Hunter-Rose Co., Limited, 1928) 461. 77 of a resumption of hostilities existed and the necessary plans had to be made. General

Currie and his staff received tactical principles and policies for the defence of the bridgehead from Marshal Foch and General Plumer, but the details and dispositions were

Canadian decisions alone.248 Both Foch and Plumer had issued several directives to the

Canadian Corps, each set modifying and elaborating the previous commands. On 23

November, Marshal Foch's GHQ informed General Plumer that he should be guided by the following principles while organizing defences for the Cologne bridgehead: first, the defences should be arranged to resist a large, hostile attack; second, tactical features were to include ditches, wire entanglements and other obstacles; third, damage to houses and trees was to be kept to a minimum; and fourth, defensive zones had to be kept within the thirty kilometre perimeter.249 While conveying these same instructions to his corps commanders on 28 November, General Plumer added the following: "Until such time as a full reconnaissance can be made, the preliminary disposition of defences will be made by corps commanders within the limits of the areas allotted to them."250 Thus, from the outset, General Currie had complete control over the precise disposition of Canadian

Corps personnel for the defence of the bridgehead.

On 29 November, Marshal Foch sent a note to all Allied Army Commanders clarifying and adding to his previous orders. He explained that the object of the bridgehead was to assure crossing for reinforcements to the right bank of the Rhine. The bridgehead should, therefore, be organized on the following principles. Initially, as many passages from the west to east bank as possible should be constructed. Then, the

248 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 13 December 1918, G.0.83/10. 249 Edmonds, 94. 250 Ibid., 94. 78 Map 5 Cologne Bridgehead Defences, December 1918 Sketch. 2.

I CvpiMia th» Kiitotift SKtiM MVit4tytt***K Ordnance Survey 1943.

"Cologne Bridgehead Defences, December 1918," Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) sketch 2 facing page 61.

79 defensive organization should take account of the topographical features. Also, the

largest possible perimeter, within the thirty kilometre radius, should be taken as the

Outpost Line and behind the Outpost Line should be successive lines of defence. Then,

the troops should be distributed so that in case of a surprise attack they could occupy the

Main Lines of Resistance in time. Marshal Foch was particularly concerned about Allied

violations of the neutral zone. To avoid any cause for complaint, Foch's final order was

to determine the exact limit of each bridgehead and bring those limits to the attention of

the troops with signs and sentries.

On 9 December, General Plumer issued the final set of tactical principles

concerning the Canadian Corps. First, the disposition of the troops was to be oriented for

offence rather than defence. Second, the defences were to be organized to ensure safe

passage over the river by troops coming from the west. Third, the troops were to be so

disposed as to admit an advance eastward on short notice. Fourth, owing to the densely

populated nature of the bridgehead, General Plumer decided that it was necessary to

locate the majority of II Corps and Canadian Corps forces east of the Rhine River. The

exception to this principle was a small force necessary to hold the left bank. Put together, Marshal Foch's and General Plumer's tactical principles gave General Currie a

foundation on which to base the disposition of his forces.

In addition to directives from superiors, General Currie incorporated a variety of geographical features into the Canadian Corps' defence scheme. The eastern and south- eastern portion of the Canadian Corps sector was divided into clearly defined sections by

251 Ibid., 95. 252 Edmonds, 97. 80 four streams: the Wahn, the Agger, the Ennefer and the Sulz, which made the ground ideal for an infantry battle. This terrain with its four streams could have limited hostile artillery to a great extent by allowing observation over only short stretches of country.

Further, the ruggedness of the south-eastern portion made it a simple matter to lay out successive lines of defence.253 The area south of the Sieg River—extending to the

Rhine—included the foothills of the Siebengebirge. This area was vulnerable to hostile attack because the neutral ground just beyond the perimeter commanded not only Bonn with its bridge, but also the great road and rail centre at Siegburg.

After preliminary reconnaissance, from 12-18 December, the Canadian Corps

General Staff issued plans for the defence of the Canadian Corps Area of the Cologne bridgehead. Each divisional area was to have the following defensive features: an

Outpost Line—to control all exits and approaches to and from the perimeter; a Main Line of Resistance—composed of available defended localities sited on the main tactical features of the area; and a Support Line to the Main Line of Resistance, also based on available defended localities. Each defended town site was to be organized for ground defence—trenches, barbed wire and other obstacles. Field artillery and machine gun emplacements were to be sited, but equipment was not to be deployed. The towns were to be stocked with reserve ammunition supplies and rations in case of a surprise attack.254

To staff these defensive features, each of the divisions' three brigades was to deploy the infantry in the following manner: Each brigade was to position one battalion on the

253 "Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919, 1. 254 "Principe of Defence of Cologne Bridgehead in Canadian Corps Area," Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 19 December 1918, G.O. 83/21. 81 Outpost Line, specially instructed in both the chosen locations of pickets and the administrative work of regulating civilian movement over the perimeter. Next, two battalions per brigade were responsible for staffing the Main and Support Lines of

Resistance. These battalions were instructed on the location of chosen positions and the preparations necessary for the defensive fortifications. Finally, one battalion was held in

Divisional Reserve. Of central importance to the Canadian Corps' defence was that the selected Main Line of Resistance had to be held whatever circumstances arose. No retreat from the Main Line of Resistance was acceptable.

Geography dictated that the best method for the defence for the Canadian Corps' area was to be oriented for offensive rather than defensive action. Assessments of the terrain suggested the Outpost Line be pushed as near the thirty kilometre perimeter as possible and the Main Line of Resistance be placed as near the Outpost Line as favourable town sites could be found.256 Plans for an offensive orientation could be easily followed in the south-eastern part of the Canadian sector because favourable town locations for the Main Line of Resistance existed. In the most southern part of the

Canadian sector, however, the Main Line of Resistance was of necessity practically coincident with the Outpost Line. Neither favourable localities nor defensive geographic features existed for a suitable Main Line of Resistance. Furthermore, the Outpost Line

255"Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919, 3. 256 The Outpost Line was the perimeter, or extent, of Canadian patrols. These were lightly defended checkpoints on road and rail routes and general patrol sectors. The Main Line of Resistance was based on a line of heavily defended villages. The villages had machine gun and artillery emplacements sited and defensive fortifications prepared. Unfortunately, some of the villages were not as near the Outpost Line as the Canadian General Staff would have preferred. In other cases, no defensible localities existed and the terrain offered little cover so the Outpost Line and the Main Line of Resistance were positioned closely together. 82 was merely a fringe of foothills covering the flat lands from Bonn to Siegburg, so the

Main Line and Outpost Line had to be positioned closely together to ensure the best chance of holding the perimeter.257

Infantry was not the only asset deployed by the Canadian Corps. Five brigades of the Canadian Heavy Artillery were available for the defence of the Cologne bridgehead.

Two brigades of the Canadian Heavy Artillery were affiliated with the infantry, one each for 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions. The Canadian Heavy Artillery took up positions near

Rosrath and Hangelar, respectively. The remaining three brigades were assigned to

Plate 7 Officers and Ranks of the 195th Siege Battery below Bonn Bridge

"Officers and Ranks of the 195 Siege Battery below Bonn Bridge," Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA 003972. counter-battery work. In the event of a German attack, two of the three brigades designated for counter-battery work would take up positions east of the Rhine at

257 "Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919, 2. 83 Altenrath and Walsdorf, sited to cover the Agger and Sieg Valleys. The final brigade of artillery would be situated on the west bank of the Rhine, near Rolandseck, sited to cover the approaches to Bonn.258 In addition to the Canadian Heavy Artillery, 272 machine guns of the 1st and 2nd Battalions Canadian Machine Gun Corps (CMGC) and the 1st and

2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun (CMMG) Brigades were also available for the defence of the Canadian Corps Area. The machine guns of the CMMG were to be located in nests of four or more guns in an Intermediate Area, between the Outpost Line and the Main

Line of Resistance. The machine guns themselves were not set in position, but the emplacements were sited and marked. The 1st and 2nd CMMG Brigades remained in

Corps Reserve with orders to be ready to occupy localities situated between the Main

Line of Resistance and the Rhine.259

In the event that hostilities resumed, it was possible that the Army of Occupation itself would resume the advance eastward. However, as the perimeter held by the

Canadian Corps' two divisions was over fifty-six kilometres in length, it was probable that a reinforcing corps would carry out any movement eastward. However, if ordered to move forward, the Canadian Corps' advance would be carried out by bounds to successive tactical features. No further plans for an attack were made, suggesting a further advance into Germany for the Canadian Corps was highly unlikely.260

258 "Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany Appendix B: Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery Defence Scheme of the Occupied Area East of the Rhine," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919. 259 "Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany Appendix C: Canadian Corps Machine Gun Defence Scheme for Cologne Bridgehead," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919. 260 "Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead - Germany," Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E 100, vol. 38, 2 January 1919, 3. 84 The necessities of war were to take priority in the disposition of the Canadian

Corps, but one exception was made: the comfort of the troops. All commanders were advised by Canadian Corps HQ to reduce the number of troops in the Outpost Line to the minimum necessary. For the rest, the best available accommodations were to be found.

As the final battalions of the Canadian Corps took up positions in the Outpost

Line, Second Army commanders faced another large task. Not only did they have to defend the bridgehead against German Army attacks, but they also faced the daunting prospect of governing the people in their areas. The soldiers of the occupying armies were thus required to fill a dual role: instruments of war and instruments of government.

According to the armistice, for a period left undetermined, the Army of Occupation was responsible for the administration of the Rhineland. On 15 November 1918, Marshal

Foch decreed that the conditions of normal life were to be re-established within the occupied area, and he promised assistance in restoring the usual functioning of schools, churches, courts, hospitals, chambers of commerce, and other institutions of community organization. Nevertheless, at the moment the armistice was signed, ultimate authority in the Rhineland was transferred to the victorious powers and their agents.262

The Rhine region, however, already had an extensive system of local administration of not only regional and municipal officials, but also a vast network of offices and agencies associated with routine government. It would have been almost impossible to replace the entire German bureaucracy, substituting agents of the

261 "prjncjpies of Defence of Cologne Bridgehead in Canadian Corps Area," Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.11, 19 December 1918, G.O. 83/21. 262 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1944) 7. 85 occupying government. The only practical procedure was to retain the German agencies as organs of administration and to place them under the supervision of Allied Army officials.263 Article 5 of the Armistice addressed the issue of government in the

Rhineland, declaring that occupied territory should be "administered by the local authorities under the control of the ... armies of occupation."264 Article 7 of the Armistice further provided for the retention of "all civil and military personnel at present employed" on railroads, bridges, telegraphs, telephone systems."265 Marshal Foch extended the retention to all officials of the Reich, the states and municipalities. Thus, the German bureaucracy was taken over en bloc by the occupation authorities.

While the Canadian Corps was present in Germany, the Rhineland was under a purely military government. The military administration was necessary as the armistice was set to last for a period of only five weeks. On 11 November, no one could foresee with certainty whether the war might be renewed. The first step taken by the commanders of individual Allied armies—Belgian, British, American and French—was the proclamation of a state of martial law. By declaring martial law, the military forces took responsibility for preserving law and order. The army commanders drastically reduced the civil liberties of the German population, but still followed all the provisions of the

Hague Convention. As Commander of Second Army, General Plumer had control of all civil government in the British area included as part of his command.267 From the beginning of the occupation, Plumer possessed a considerable degree of independence.

263 Fraenkel, 8. 264 Edmonds, Appendix I. 265 Edmonds, Appendix I. 266 Fraenkel, 8. 267 Edmonds, 63. 86 Only those measures requiring action, which in ordinary circumstances would derive from a national legislature, were reserved for the highest command as represented by

Marshal Foch.268 Otherwise, Plumer held autonomous power in the British area of responsibility, needing only to follow Foch's basic guidelines.

In a letter to the Second Army Corps Commanders, of 8 December, General

Plumer outlined the system of administration to be established in the British area.269

General Plumer appointed Sir Charles Ferguson as Military Governor of British occupied

Germany. General Ferguson acted as deputy for General Plumer in all civil affairs.

Brigadier General C. Yatman was appointed Military Governor of Bonn, but was subject to Ferguson's overall command. General Plumer's system of administration required the division of Canadian and II Corps' sectors into sub-areas. A Sub-Area Commander, usually a brigadier general, was charged with the administration of each sub-area. Each

Sub-Area Commander was to appoint a staff captain to coordinate all civil duties. This staff captain was a key figure as he would remain in place after his unit had moved on, thus ensuring a continuity of administration.270 Each Sub-Area Commander was also 971 required to establish a Summary Court. The sub-areas were further divided into districts and a Town Major appointed to oversee each district's administration. On all matters requiring policy decisions, the Sub-Area Commanders and Town Majors needed to consult the Military Governor through their corps commanders.

268 Fraenkel, 9. 269 War Diaiy, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 8 December 1918, A.2489. 270 Ibid. 271 Summary Courts dealt with all minor offenses in the area; for more serious cases, the Town Major was required to refer the matter to the Divisional Commander for a Military Court Martial. 87 Plate 8 Officers of the 2nd Canadian Division under Bonn Bridge

"Officers (2nd Canadian Division) taken under Bonn Bridge," Canada, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA 022749.

The Canadian Corps implemented General Plumer's system of administration with little difficulty. Each of the Canadian Corps' two divisional areas was divided into four sub-areas and the three brigadiers and one artillery officer became the Sub-Area

Commanders. Each Brigadier (Sub-Area Commander) chose a staff captain for civil duties, one who would remain in the area for a minimum of six months, and a German bureaucrat to act as a chief civil official. All the Canadian Corps dealings with the local populace were handled through official German channels. Each sub-area was further divided into districts based on, as much as possible, local municipal boundaries. Each

Brigadier appointed Town Majors, usually a lieutenant colonel or major, to administer the

88 districts. Town Majors were given the powers of Summary Court Officers to deal with • • • 272 local offences and were responsible for duties such as billeting, sanitation and supplies.

On 1 December 1918, General Plumer issued guidelines for the administration of

German civilians in the Canadian Corps Area, setting out the principles the Sub-Area

Commanders and Town Majors were to follow.273 In general, Plumer adopted a policy of minimum interference. Civilian institutions were to continue. Civilian authorities would maintain local laws and those passed by the Military Government. Order of the civilian population was to be kept by German law courts and police. Yet, the British Army's presence was clearly established in a new layer of courts imposed upon the German people. Summary courts and courts martial were established and staffed by the military authorities for transgressions against orders issued by the Military Government, or for offences against the military authority's personnel or property. The consequences for misbehaviour, if necessary, could be stiff: fines of up to 5000 marks, prison, deportation, or death.

The British military authorities imposed rules on the German people that were strict, but not harsh. The rules performed three functions: they made it easy to control people's movements, made espionage difficult, and encouraged the German people to respect the British Army. Movement between the territory occupied by the Allies and the rest of Germany was suspended.274 All civilian rail, road and pedestrian traffic from the

272 "Administration of 1st Canadian Divisional Area in Occupied German Territory," 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 18 December 1918, A.Q. - 52-1693. 273 "Controlling of German Population in the Occupied Territory," 1st Canadian Division A A and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840,4 December 1918, Q 77/21-1. 274 "Englsische Borschriften stir die Kolner Beuosterung," Kolnische Zeitung, 11 December 1918, Morning Edition; Initially, there were two exceptions to the restrictions on civilian movement. Civilian traffic was permitted to meet the needs of industry and provisioning of the local population. 89 occupied territory to Germany (or any other country) was denied. Except for doctors, midwives, and clergymen, no one was allowed to use an automobile, horse, or bicycle.

Travel outside local areas, even within the occupied territory, required a pass. Telephone calls, in most cases, were not permitted. Postal and telegraph communications were allowed, subject to British censoring.275 All assemblies were cancelled, except for the church. Each household was required to post a list of the occupants on the inside of the front door. All Germans over the age of twelve had to carry identification cards.276 Yet, of all the restrictions, it seems the citizens of the British area hated two the most. First, the curfew, initially set from 7:00pm to 6:00am, was despised. The second required men

977 to tip their cap to Allied officers, flags, and during national anthems.

Over time, however, the initially strict rules were relaxed. Passes were no longer required to move within Britis97h8 occupied territory. The restrictions on motorcars, bicycles, and horses were eased. General permission was granted to hold private, non- religious meetings. 970 The curfew was pushed back to 9:00pm on 15 December, then 9RO midnight on 26 December. It is likely the initially strict rules were eased because of the

German population's compliance and orderly conduct.

275 "Stadtische Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 13 December 1918, Morning Edition; "Stadtische Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 15 December 1918, Morning Edition. 276 "Controlling of German Population in the Occupied Territory," 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840,4 December 1918, Q 77/21-1. 277 "British Establish Rigid Martial Law in the City of Cologne," Halifax The Morning Chronicle, 12 December 1918. 278 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 29 December 1918, S.A.Q. 52-1693/3. 279 Ibid., 28 December 1918, A.Q. 58-1693/2. 280 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 15 December 1918, A.Q.50- 268; War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840,23 December 1918, A.Q. 58-260. 90 The only rules not changed or amended regarded Bolshevism. In the immediate post war period, Bolshevism was being spread throughout Germany and was perceived by western democracies as a virus and harbinger of destruction.281 During the march to

Germany, the Canadian Corps had enacted strict rules to prevent the distribution of

Bolshevist literature amongst its soldiers. Mere possession of Bolshevist literature meant immediate arrest. The intolerance and fear of Bolshevism continued into the occupation of Germany. The Canadian Corps was instructed that should any German civilian attempt to distribute Bolshevist propaganda or instructions, the Bolshevists were to be arrested and immediately brought to trial. Canadian patrols, therefore, were always vigilant for signs of Bolshevist activities.

The system of administration and rules imposed upon the German public were effective and did not burden the average Canadian soldier with many duties. A description and analysis of these Canadian garrison duties is largely absent from all literature concerning the Canadian Corps' occupation of the Rhineland. For the first time, this thesis will document in detail in what activities the Canadian soldiers were engaged while stationed in Germany.

Overall, the military work associated with garrison duty was minimal, routine and boring. Regular patrol and guard duty comprised the largest task assigned to the Canadian

Corps. A series of posts on all roads, rail lines, and lines of approach were established.284

281 Sir George Foster Diary, LAC, MG 27, II D7, vol.7, 9 November 1918. 282 War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 20 November 1918. 283 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 12 December 1918, A.Q. 58- 260. 284 Major J. A. Cooper, History of Operations of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade 1915-1919 (London: Charles and Son, 1919) 45. 91 A double sentry was mounted on bridges over the Agger and Sieg Rivers, while the usual sentries were posted over supply dumps, transport lines, and headquarters. Pickets were also mounted on all villages, railway stations, and German munitions dumps. Patrol and guard duties were not a problem. The chief annoyance for the Canadian soldiers was restricting civilian movements between occupied and German territory. The lack of interpreters and a population unfamiliar with the rules caused many headaches for the soldiers on the Outpost Line. Smuggling was also an issue of concern. A thriving black- market for luxury goods and foodstuffs tempted some Germans to sneak contraband through Canadian lines. Many German women were involved in smuggling operations.

The exploitation of women as smugglers became such a problem that the British had to send for women officers to aid in the search and seizure of concealed goods.287 The busiest Canadian soldiers, however, proved to be the engineers. The Canadian Engineer

Companies were involved with the repair and construction of new roads, bridges, showering facilities, and rifle ranges. Moreover, they had to prepare emplacements for artillery and machine gun posts and lay charges for demolition of bridges and other infrastructure 289

The connections between morale, discipline and entertainment has been noted by many scholars. However, a full exploration of the issues surrounding Canadian

Corps discipline during its time in Germany is largely absent from the literature concerning the CEF. With minimal duties, most Canadian soldiers had a lot of free

285 War Diary, 1st Canadian Battalion, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4913, 28 December 1918. 286 H.R.N Clyne, Vancouver's 29th (Vancouver: Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964) 108. 287 Major John Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921) 388. 288 Weatherbe, 466. 289 Ibid., 471. 92 time. The need to keep the members of the Canadian Corps occupied was recognized by all levels of command, so a large program of education and entertainment was offered as a diversion.290 At some levels of command, support for the educational scheme was strong. Canadian Corps HQ encouraged brigadiers and senior non- commissioned officers (NCOs) to give their "personal attention" to establishing a system of education and to arrange suitable hours for lectures and classes.291 Each division was required to assign officers and other ranks to teach courses. As a result,

909 each battalion had to find its own teachers. A variety of courses was offered so

Canada's citizen-soldiers could gain an elementary education, or learn a new trade or farming techniques. The battalions were greatly assisted in their educational efforts by the Khaki University of Canada. As Tim Cook observed, "the aim of the Khaki

University system was threefold: to meet the soldiers' educational needs, to keep 901 soldiers busy, and to help with reintegration into Canadian society." The war pulled many men away from civilian life before they could receive the education they desired.

As such, the Khaki University provided the soldiers of the Canadian Corps with courses, textbooks, and lectures to refresh, or further their education before they were reintegrated into the post-war Canadian economy.

Initially, the educational scheme met with some resistance below the corps level of command. At first, battalion officers and junior NCOs were quite sceptical in their

290 Charles W. Bishop, The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in the Great War (Canada: The National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of Canada, 1924) 287. 291 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 11 December 1918, G.7-250/4. 292 Tim Cook, "From Destruction to Construction: The Khaki University of Canada, 1917-1919," Journal of Canadian Studies 37 (2002): 120. 293 Ibid., 115. 93 attitudes. When teachers were found, they were loath to take on extra responsibilities.294 Schoolbooks were very hard to find and became an excuse not to hold classes. The YMCA ordered a large quantity of textbooks, but they arrived only after the Canadians had left Germany.295 It was also a difficult transition for the soldiers. As John A. Cooper wrote:

The soldier's mind had become as dull and stiff as the English boots he wore from Namur to Cologne. To ask him to do the mental gymnastics of a boy of ten or twelve was to ask the impossible. But he is doing it.296

Some battalions were also too scattered or in too remote a location to receive any classes.

However, the soldiers appreciated their corps' efforts in providing educational opportunities. Many viewed the educational scheme as practical and worthwhile. The troops were grateful to know that the army was preparing them for a return to civilian life.297 By January, most battalion officers and junior NCOs had realized the benefits of the educational program and lent their support. The educational scheme met with moderate success. In the House of Commons, on 27 May 1919, in response to a question about the number of men attending Khaki University courses, Minister Kemp stated that: "For the month of December 1918, there were from the 1st Division, 2000 men;

294 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Restless in Hun Territory," Toronto Daily Star, 4 February 1919. (The report was filed 31 December 1918) 295 "Report of the Department of the General Staff OMFC for the Month of December 1918," General Staff Overseas Military Forces of Canada, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4865, 5-6. 296 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Not Sorry to Be Leaving Germany," Toronto Daily Star, 6 February 1919. (The report was filed 9 January 1919) 297 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Restless in Hun Territory," Toronto Daily Star, 4 February 1919. (The report was filed 31 December 1918) 94 from the 2nd Division, 2018 men."298 This represented about 8% of Canadian soldiers stationed in Germany.

In addition to the classes and lectures, a number of other entertaining distractions were provided for the troops. The most coveted possession in the ranks was the day pass to Cologne or Bonn. In the cities, Canadian soldiers could enjoy the baths, the cinema, sight-seeing, and shopping. Several cafes and restaurants were set aside for military personnel and a favourite activity was drinking and spending time with friends.299 On a battalion level, sightseeing trips were organized in order to visit Cologne, Bonn, the

Drachenfels, and Coblenz.300 Tickets to a performance of the "See Toos" concert party were popular. Presumably taken from the phrase "See to this or that," the "See Toos" were a performance group of soldiers from the 2nd Canadian Division. They were famous, offering their show of war comedy and drama to audiences in London and Paris.

However, their primary function was the entertainment of the troops. By contrast to the

"See Toos," tickets to the opera were not as popular. Some German theatres ran special screenings of English movies twice daily, taking advantage of the new market.301 The

YMCA established clubs, reading rooms and their social centres became a focus of leisure time. The YMCA also operated several movie theatres and beer gardens and its

298 Canada, House of Commons Debates, (27 May 1919), p. 2873 (Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada). 299 "Routine Order 2009 - Cafes in Bonn," Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822,27 December 1918, A. 105-491. 300 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 22 December 1918. The Drachenfels are low lying mountains that feature the ruins of a large castle. 301 War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 17 December 1918. 95 staff provided hot drinks and canteen services at almost all brigade and divisional headquarters.302

The Christmas season as well was a welcome distraction. Although far from home and under difficult circumstances, soldiers of the Canadian Corps made the best of the holiday season. One obstacle, noted in almost every regimental history, was obtaining provisions for Christmas dinner. Germany had barely enough food to meet its own needs, so Christmas supplies for the Canadians had to be drawn from rear areas. Unfortunately, as the railway system once again proved unreliable, the Christmas provisions did not arrive until 27 December.303 As a result, Canadian units had to scrounge for Christmas fare. Some units of the 2nd CIB went deer hunting in the Imperial Forest.304 Purchasers from the 31st Canadian Battalion visited the countryside and managed to buy a few large

•jac geese, turkeys, pigs and some quantities of wine. Despite the difficulties, the messes managed and there was plenty of food for all. The YMCA brought an extra smile to many

Canadian soldiers. During the march to the Rhine, the YMCA had bought presents and souvenirs in Paris and then brought them to Germany. Soldiers could buy presents for family and friends from the YMCA and then the YMCA would handle the shipping. The

YMCA also brought in many special Christmas treats: fruit, figs, nuts, and plum puddings, all of which arrived in time.306 Special midnight mass parades were held for the

Catholic soldiers, some with local congregations. Colonel AL Barry fondly recalled the 302 Bishop, 292. 303 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Restless in Hun Territory," Toronto Daily Star, 4 February 1919. (The report was filed 31 December 1918) 304 Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Mortimer Ltd., 1947) 333. 305 Major H.C. Singer, History of the 31st Canadian Infantry Battalion C.E.F. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1938)441. 306 Bishop, 294. 96 Christmas Eve when, "Father McGillvary said the mass, which being in Latin, was familiar to German and Canadian alike and the parish priest helped serve

Communion."307 In a strange twist, it was the first time Colonel Barry had gone to Mass wearing a revolver.308 On Christmas Day there was much visiting of friends and carolling at the various messes. No parades or fatigues were held and only those on duty were absent. For once, the weather cooperated: it was a white Christmas.

Thus, in theory, entertainment and distractions were readily available for the soldiers. The Canadian Corps had promised to see to the comforts of their troops.309 In reality, however, the soldiers were largely confined to the small towns in which they were billeted, which offered little scope for diversion. The YMCA resources were limited and often could not reach the majority of soldiers scattered throughout the bridgehead. The brigades tried to organize concert parties, but largely without success. The German picture shows were patronized to some extent, but only the large towns offered worthwhile attractions. Some battalions arranged sightseeing trips and other excursions to urban centres, but the majority did not.310 For entertainment, Canada's soldiers were largely left to their own devices.

Regular parades, route marches, close combat drills, and inspections occupied most mornings. However, after the regular fatigues had finished, sports became the prime pastime. Nearby fields were converted into soccer pitches and baseball

307 Colonel A.L. Barry, Batman to Brigadier (Newcastle, 1965) 73. 308 Barry, 73. Regulations required all Canadian officers to be armed while in public. 309 War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 21 November 1918, GHQ 12466. 310 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Restless in Hun Territory," Toronto Daily Star, 4 February 1919. (The report was filed 31 December 1918) 311 War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4891, 18 December 1918. 97 diamonds.312 Inter-company and inter-battalion soccer matches were scheduled. Once again, the YMCA made garrison life a little more pleasant through its timely donations of

313 sports equipment.

The largest organized sporting event was held on 18 January—an interdivision

Sports Day between 2nd Canadian Division and 42nd American Division.314 It was a daylong affair held at Bonn University. Canadian massed brass and pipe bands attended and the field was decorated with flags. The YMCA provided refreshments and a canteen service. The Canadians walked away with the honours in all the events - soccer, indoor baseball, and the tug-o-war. It was estimated that nearly 10,000 troops were present and many German civilians as well.315 While the men were playing sports, some of the officers from the 28th and 31st Canadian Battalions had a joy ride over the Rhine with

No.5 Squadron Royal Air Force (RAF).316

As with the education scheme and other entertainments, sports events were designed to keep the Canadian soldiers busy and out of trouble. The minimal duties and fatigues filled only a portion of a soldier's day and therefore officers had to find ways to keep their units distracted. Canadian political and military leadership did not want any lapses of discipline that would tarnish the reputation of the Canadian Corps and therefore tried to provide a number of diversions. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Borden's and

General Currie's desires for an incident-free occupation would not be fulfilled.

312 Weatherbe, 467. 313 Bishop, 293. 314 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, 18 January 1919. 315 Clyne, 112. 316 War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4891, 18 January 1919. 98 Chapter Six Canadian Soldier, German Civilian, British Governor

The system of military administration coupled with all the distractions for the soldiers proved effective. No major clashes between the Canadian military and the

German public occurred. The German people accepted the presence the Canadian Corps; their daily life went on much as it always had. There was little friendliness between the soldiers and inhabitants, but the discipline of the Canadian forces and the fairness of their behaviour were gratefully acknowledged by the townspeople.317 After an interview with

Mayor Adenauer, Fred James reported, "The Burgomeister of Bonn told me he has received no complaints from the citizens about the behaviour of the Canadians, in fact they are all feverishly impressed."

Officially, fraternization was absolutely forbidden by German and Canadian

• 11Q authorities alike, but it happened nonetheless. Prostitutes, for example, were registered and brothels placed out of bounds, but they were frequented.320 In fact as James Edmonds wrote: The anti-fraternization order became a dead letter and 'to frat' obtained special significance. The principle shopping street in Cologne, the Hohe Strasse, was pronounced by the troops with one syllable with a 'W' in front of it.321

317 Major John Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921) 387. 318 "Behaviour of Canucks Impresses Germans," Toronto Daily Star, 17 January 1919. 319 "Special Order of the Day," Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822, 25 November 1918. 320 "Controlling of German Population in the Occupied Territory," 1st Canadian Division A A and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840,4 December 1918, Q 77/21-1. 321 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 83. 99 In many cases, however, German women seemed genuinely frightened of the soldiers, probably for good reason. They faced ostracism from their domestic circles if caught in

Canadian hands.322

There were some acts of kindness on both sides. The Canadian soldiers were particularly friendly with the German children. Many bars of soap and chocolate were handed out to children. Little boys always seemed to be nearby the mess kitchens and, after the meal was finished, could always find something to eat.323 Further as Philip

Gibbs wrote, "Here and there English-speaking Germans who were soldiers until a week or so ago act as guides to the British who lose their way in the maze of streets, and I have heard them exchange reminiscences of battles in which they fought against each other."324 Most Canadian soldiers could not speak German, and most Germans could not speak English, but there was one word in common: beer.

Inevitably, however, the Army of Occupation placed a considerable strain on the

German people. Two different worlds clashed: a large military organization was superimposed on the civilian population. As a result, there was some tension at almost every level between soldier and civilian. The complaints department, which Mayor

Adenauer established, was flooded with grievances ranging from out of control army trucks to the RAF conducting exercises over grave sites.325 The British Army's billeting and requisitioning policy complicated life for civilians. In Cologne, all the large hotels

322 John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star 25 January 25 1918. (The report was filed December 8) 323 Major H.C. Singer, History of the 31st Canadian Infantry Battalion C.E.F. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1938)442. 324 Philip Gibbs, "See British Army Cross the Rhine," New York Times, 16 December 1918. (The report was filed 13 December 1918) 325 David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991) 56. 100 and three hundred houses were taken over for officers and messes. In addition, ninety-six schools in the Cologne area were requisitioned for use as barracks.326 School was out and many children were seen roaming the streets. Requisitioning also proved to be a problem as some soldiers "requisitioned" food and other supplies without proper authority or payment. Other soldiers refused to pay for meals in restaurants.327 There were also so many cases of looting that a special bureau was established by Second Army to deal with all the complaints.

Quality accommodations for the Canadian soldiers could be found in most areas.

In Cologne and Bonn, and in some larger towns, barracks and factories were converted into temporary housing, much to the chagrin of their owners. The barracks and factories were clean, warm and all ranks had their own beds and sheets. In the smaller towns, the Canadians stayed in comfortable German homes. Yet, the soldiers were not welcome.

Their German hosts were coolly polite, resenting their unwanted guests. Canadian soldiers handled the situation in a variety of ways. Some accepted the minimal hospitality of their German hosts while others refused to tolerate their host's presence. Soldiers told stories of being given warm milk before bed by motherly matrons, while others ate nothing offered to them for fear of poison.331

Despite all the distractions and duties, Canadian soldiers still managed to find trouble. Discipline problems were inevitable. Over a period from 17 to 26 December, the

326 Williamson, 56. 327 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 19 December 1918, A.Q. 58- 260. 328 Edmonds, 83. 329 H.R.N Clyne, Vancouver's 29th (Vancouver: Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964) 104. 330 John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star, 25 January 1918. (The report was filed 8 December 1918) 331 Lieutenant Colonel H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1932) 327. 101 British Provost Marshal's office in Cologne recorded the following offenses committed by the Canadian enlisted: in Cologne without a pass, 38 cases; improperly dressed, 21 cases; drunkenness, 12 cases; absent from billets, 10 cases; failing to salute, 5 cases; robbery, 5 cases; and fraternizing, 3 cases. 332 As a specific example of Canadian misbehaviour, some soldiers defaced Kaiser Wilhelm II's statue, removing its helmet, nose and sword.333 During the same period, there were charges also laid against seven

Canadian officers including drunkenness, disputing with the police, and fraternization.

British officers complained that, in general, Canadian officers were disorderly and unruly while visiting Cologne.334

The cumulative effect of Canadian misconduct resulted in the souring of Imperial-

Dominion military relations. The British authorities, Military Governor General Sir

Charles Ferguson in particular, became increasingly frustrated with a perceived lack of discipline in the Canadian Corps. 335 The frequency of Canadian delinquency offended

General Ferguson so much that he went to the extreme of barring the entire Canadian

Corps from Cologne. In a telegram to Canadian Corps HQ, on 26 December, General

Ferguson wrote:

Owing to continued misbehaviour of Canadian troops they will be confined to the Canadian Corps Area from 27th inst inclusive except when on duty. The Canadian Corps will piquet all exits from their area and in particular the entrance into the town of Cologne which is placed out of bounds to Canadians.

332 "The Cologne Incident," RG 24, vol. 1739, 7 April 1943. 333 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 6 January 1919. 334 "The Cologne Incident," RG 24, vol. 1739, 7 April 1943. 335 N.M. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson 1914-1919 (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997) letter - 1 January 1919,357, 336 War Diary, Canadian Corps AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4822,27 December 1918, A.105-504. 102 General Currie was furious. The reputation of the corps had been called into question and

a stern defence had to be mounted. He immediately responded with a letter to General

Plumer. After assuring the Army Commander of his compliance with General Ferguson's order, Currie wrote:

To receive the order that Cologne was out of bounds to Canadians would not have hurt, and I would have appreciated the Military Governor giving me privately his reasons for so doing, but to state that owing to continued misbehaviour the Canadian Troops were to be confined to the Canadian Corps Area can be considered nothing short of insulting. The only people who are confined in an area with pickets guarding all exits are criminals awaiting trial or serving their sentence, and I submit the Canadian Corps does not deserve this treatment. ... The wording of this order is most • 117

bitterly resented, and I consider it should be withdrawn.

In a meeting on 27 December, Currie put the matter before Plumer, demanding nothing less than a full apology. Plumer tried to laugh off the incident118 , but still in a rage, Currie threatened to take the matter to Field Marshal Haig. General Ferguson's apology arrived the next day and the reputation of the Canadian Corps, while a little bruised, was still intact. Yet, in what can only be described as a petty move, General Ferguson placed

Cologne back in bounds to Canadian soldiers on 5 January 1919. This was the same day

1st Canadian Division was scheduled to depart for Belgium.339 The relations between

Currie and Ferguson suggest a tension between British and Canadian soldiers. It seems

Imperial-Dominion military relations were not always cordial, or mutually supportive.

General Currie was not the only Canadian commander who was frustrated with

General Ferguson. On 2 January 1919, Major General Sir Henry Burstall, GOC 2nd

Canadian Division, expressed his opinion to General Currie that there was an effort on 337 Ibid. 338 Daniel Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography (Toronto: Methuen, 1985) 183. 339 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 5 January 1919. 103 the part of some Imperial officers to throw dishonour and discredit upon members of the

Canadian Corps. General Burstall outlined the basis for his opinion, and while admitting

some crime, committed by five or six soldiers, stated that, "Of the provost reports made, some were found entirely without foundation and others misleading."340 Burstall blamed the British military administration for any misbehaviour writing that, "Their arrangements and methods were faulty."341 Later in March 1919, in the Canadian House of Commons, Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Peck railed against General Ferguson's actions and promised to "do everything in [his] power to make the name of Sir Charles Ferguson stink in the nostrils of every patriotic Canadian."342 Peck made several interesting allegations against Ferguson in an attempt to explain the general's attitude. Peck claimed that Ferguson "had it in for the Canadians from the very beginning," and that because

Ferguson was married to a woman from Cologne he had "strange ideas." Furthermore, th Ferguson was in charge of 17 Corps at Arras when the Canadian Corps was rushed in to save that flank. Ferguson was the commander who gave up Monchy, arguably the key to the Arras battlefield. His failures on the battlefield and the Canadian Corps' success led to some personal tension between Generals Currie and Ferguson. Peck's revelations in parliament, therefore, suggest why Ferguson went to the extreme of barring all Canadians from Cologne.343

The barring of the Canadian Corps from Cologne was not the only time the corps' reputation was threatened. On 7 January, reports of a riot and thievery in Deutz were

340 "The Cologne Incident," RG 24, vol. 1739, 7 April 1943. 341 Ibid. 342 "Colonel Peck Scores Sir Charles Ferguson," Toronto Daily Star, 15 March 1919. 343 Canada, House of Commons Debates, (10 July 1919), p. 469 (Lieutenant Colonel Peck, MP). 104 received at 1st Canadian Division HQ. One Canadian soldier was implicated.344 The report, however, turned out to be hoax; one man not known to Canadians smashed a cash register in a cafe and stole a small amount of money. The GOC of 1st Canadian Division,

Major General Sir A.C. Macdonell, was not pleased with the faulty report. He went

straight to General Ferguson to file an official complaint.345 In another incident, on 22

January, the Military Governor again questioned Canadian conduct. This time two civilians complained about three officers from the 22nd Canadian Battalion.346 General

Burstall dispatched an officer to investigate the allegations. The resulting investigation found the German accusations against the Canadian soldiers were without merit.347 The actions of the two Divisional Commanders suggest that the reputation of the Canadian

Corps had to be vigorously protected, its integrity jealously guarded. The corps was trying to project a powerful outer image and any accusations, British or German, which may have diminished the corps' reputation, had to be challenged and defeated.

Some Canadian soldiers, however, did commit offences serious enough to warrant a court martial. A survey of the infantry battalion and brigade courts martial records, of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, from 11 November 1918 to 31 January 1919, reveals that forty-four soldiers were formally charged. The three most frequent charges were the following: being absent without leave (AWOL), fourteen cases; drunkenness, nine cases; and conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline, eight cases.349 Forty-

344 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 7 January 1919. 345 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 8 January 1919. 345 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 22 January 1919. 347 Ibid. 348 Ministry of Overseas Forces of Canada Court Martial Records, LAC, RG 150, vols. 1-684. 349 Some soldiers were charged with multiple offences. 105 four cases is not a large number considering the number of soldiers involved, some

50,000. It is likely that two factors were to account for the low number of courts martial.

First, the soldiers of the Canadian Corps were engaged in active service in hostile territory. To a certain extent, formal duties would keep the soldiers focused. Second, the educational scheme and other distractions were effective. The men were occupied, for most of the time, and thus were less likely to find trouble.

The nature of almost all the forty-four court martial cases was related to maintaining discipline and had little to do with the German population. On 9 December,

Private George Auger of the 27th Canadian Battalion was charged and convicted of disobeying a superior officer. His crime was taking seven biscuits instead of four from an

•5 ca offered plate and refusing to give them back. On 20 December 1918, Private Eugene

Bisonnett of the 29th Battalion was tried and convicted of disobeying the lawful command of a superior officer. He had refused to wash the company cook wagon when ordered.351

On 19 December 1918, Private Ernest Chiles was tried and convicted of being AWOL.

His defence was that, being on leave until 11 November, when the war ended he believed he did not have to report back to his unit. His story was not credible but, like the other cases, it demonstrates the benign nature of most Canadian soldiers convicted of a crime.352 One incident was more serious in nature and did involve German citizens. On 8

January 1919, Sergeant David Crosby and seven of his friends got involved in a drunken brawl with some local Germans in downtown Bonn. Sergeant Crosby was charged with,

350 Ministry of Overseas Military Forces Canada Court Martial Records, LAC, RG 150, file 649- A - 12845. 351 Ibid., file 649-B-41288. 352 Ibid., file 649- C- 17871. 106 but not convicted of, striking a civilian and striking a soldier. He was, however, found guilty of public drunkenness.353

A similar search of the court martial records for the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions for the same time period reveals a significantly higher incidence of infractions. Sixty-four cases were brought to trial, the most frequent charge by far being AWOL, forty-two cases. The comparison between 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions and 3rd and 4th Canadian

Divisions, however, is unfair. The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were in reserve in

Belgium. The higher number of cases, however, suggests what happens to soldiers without a focus. This number of court martial cases clearly demonstrates the need to keep soldiers properly occupied either with duties or distractions.

Some German citizens as well faced trial in military courts, but generally transgressions against the military authorities was not a large concern. The detection and punishment of crime in the communities Canadians soldiers governed remained the responsibility of the German police. Military authorities were primarily concerned with violations of military law and infractions against military property or personnel. The most common offences, dealt with by Canadian soldiers, were supplying alcohol to soldiers, possession of firearms, and breaking curfew.354 In fact, the first evening the curfew went into effect, some two hundred people were arrested by the Military Police in Cologne.

Facing trial the next morning, the punishment for staying out too late was a fine of twenty marks.355 Smuggling was a more serious crime, but the criminals of most concern to the

Military Government were those involved in Bolshevist activities. Men and women

353 Ibid., file 649- C - 14148. 354 Edmonds, 75. Only beer and wine could be legally sold to soldiers. 355 "Stadtische Nachrichten," Kolnische Zeitung, 18 December 1918, Evening Edition. 107 caught spreading Bolshevist propaganda faced stiff fines of up to five thousand marks, prison or deportation. As Agar Adamson wrote in a letter to his wife:

We landed two thoroughly dangerous women this morning doing [Bolshevist] propaganda work. The whole country is using every means in its power to spread dissatisfaction amongst our troops. For this reason everyone is very kind to them. They are always talking about the power of labour, if used with might, and trying to show all officers, both British and German, in a bad light. 56

The Canadian Corps' concern was that Marxist ideals might negatively affect the morale of the troops. It is unlikely German Bolshevists gained any Canadian converts, but the corps did not want to take any chances.

356 N.M. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson 1914-1919 (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997) letter - 31 December 1918, 356-7. 357 Williamson, 34. 108 Chapter Seven Relief at Last: The Corps Returns to Belgium

The demobilization of the Canadian Corps has received a lot of scholarly attention; the subject fills entire books.358 However, historians have yet to fully establish how demobilization policy affected the Canadian Corps' operations in the Rhineland. For soldiers of the Canadian Corps stationed in Germany, demobilization plans were of the greatest interest. Soldiers desired a "first over first back" policy; the Canadian government was more concerned with economics and wanted to return units based on length of service and marital status.359 However, General Currie was to make the final decision. On 23 November 1918, Currie held a meeting with the Canadian Corps General

Staff and Divisional Commanders for the purpose of discussing demobilization. The members of the meeting unanimously decided to have the Canadian Corps return by units and from England. Currie eventually convinced Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of the

Overseas Military Forces of Canada, and the Canadian government to consent to his plans. However, two issues remained unresolved: which of Canada's four divisions would be sent home first and when they would leave.

358 Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life 1915-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 359 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962) 528. 360 Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, "Interim Report on the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918," in Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) 187. (Hereafter Currie, Interim Report on the Canadian Corps) 361 Jeffrey R Rivard, Bringing the Boys Home: A Study of Demobilization Policy after the First and Second World Wars, unpublished M.A. Thesis (The University of New Brunswick, 1999) 32. 109 On 16 December, the Canadian Corps received some good news. Just as 1st and

2nd Canadian Divisions had established themselves in the bridgehead, General Currie received the following telegram, from Canadian GHQ, asking his views:

War Office order GHQ [to] dispatch 400 men daily this month, 17,500 in January and 20,000 each succeeding month, and that two Canadian divisions be released for this purpose. GHQ desire 3rd Division to go in January - this owing to railway situation - and 1st Division in February.362

Currie would have preferred to send the divisions home based on the order in which they had arrived in Europe: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and finally 4th.363 Yet, it was Iogistically impossible to have the 1st Canadian Division concentrated near the French coast in time for it to leave in late January. Thus, Currie reluctantly arranged for 3rd Canadian Division to be demobilized first.364 Currie pointed out to the Canadian government, however, that when one Canadian division had been sent home, the other three divisions would clamour to follow. He therefore suggested, in a letter to the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant

General Sir E.W. Turner, that the Canadian Corps as a whole should be concentrated in some area not too far from the French coast, so that he could supervise the further demobilization of the corps.

Over the course of two weeks, from 16 to 30 December, it was arranged that the

Canadian divisions involved in the Army of Occupation would be relieved by the X

Corps (32nd, 34th, and 41st Divisions), under Lieutenant General Sir R. Stephens.366 To

362 Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) 106. 363 Sir Edward Kemp, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 (London: Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919) 518. 364 Ibid., 518. 365 Edmonds, 106. 366 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 19.2, 3 January 1919, Operation Order No. 267. 110 Map 6 British Army Areas, December 1918 Sketch 1. __ ARMY AREAS DECEMBER 1918

Frontiers. Raiheays in Service.

Scaii or Mutt. u 20 OmiWiitkr tiUcnMSttn tltt/tur trticU. (Mhw Survtg 1849. "Army Areas, December 1918," Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929, Facsimile Edition with Introduction by Dr. G.M. Bayliss (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987) sketch 1 facing Page 9.

Ill make room, 3 rd Canadian Division, which had previously marched from Mons to Wavre, was ordered to relocate to the Tournai area and then to demobilize into the concentration camps at Aubin St. Vaast and Etaples.367 The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions would then join 4th Canadian Division in the area between Brussels and Liege vacated by 3rd

Canadian Division.368 Because of the clogged railways, it was impossible to get the remaining three Canadian divisions any closer to the French coast in preparation for movement to England.369

On 27 December, a warning order from Canadian Corps was sent to 1st and 2nd

Canadian Divisions notifying them of the corps' relief in early January and transfer to

Fourth Army.370 It was likely, therefore, that most Canadian officers knew the corps would be leaving Germany before the end of 1918. Lt-Col. Peck began preparations for the move that very same day.371 The warning order was confirmed on 3 January and 1st

Canadian Division's relief commenced on two days later.372 Three trains a day moved the

1st Canadian Division from Cologne to the Huy area in Belgium. The whole process - including infantry, artillery, engineers, machine gunners and field ambulance units - would last until 18 January. The 13th, 14th and 15th Canadian Battalions of the 3rd CIB were the first to leave, followed by the units of the 2nd CIB and 1st CIB.373 The artillery

367 War Diary, 3rd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4855, 25 December 1918, Operation Order No. 209. 368 War Diary, 4th Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4861, 28 December 1918, Operation Order No. 130. 369 Edmonds, 106. 370 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 18.12, 27 December 1918, 0.2/270. 371 Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus Wesley Peck Diary, LAC, MG 30, E 134, 27 December 1918. 372 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 19.2, 3 January 1919, Operation Order No. 267. 373 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4840, 4 January 1919, Operation Order No. 319. 112 departed next and the engineers were that last ones to vacate German territory. The 1st

Canadian Division was replaced in the bridgehead by 41st Division. On 7 January, the first British units to arrive were the 10th Queens, 26th Royal Fusiliers and 20th Durham

Light Infantry of the 124th Brigade.374 Formal command of the 1st Canadian Division

Sector of the Cologne Bridgehead passed to the 41st Division on 12 January.375

The 2nd Canadian Division began withdrawing to the Namur area of Belgium on

19 January. The 20th and 21st Canadian Infantry Battalions of the 4th CIB were the first units from 2nd Canadian Division to leave. After completing its entrainment, the 4th CIB was followed by the units of the 5th and 6th CIBs.376 On 27 January, after the relief of the infantry was complete, the artillery began its movement to the Andenne area, east of

Namur.377 Formal command of the 2nd Canadian Divisional Sector of the Cologne

Bridgehead was transferred to 34th Division on 24 January.378 Officially, Canada's commitment to the occupation of the Rhineland ended on 26 January 1919 as command 170 of the entire right sector was handed over to X Corps at 1600 hours. However, the last

Canadian units did not leave Germany until 6 February. That distinction went to the 2nd

Brigade Canadian Royal Engineers.

Canada's soldiers were anxious to get home as quickly as possible. John A.

Cooper wrote: We were not glad to come, we were not anxious to stay, we were not sorry to go. Of course it is an honour to the Canadian Corps to have crossed the

374 War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, 7 January 1919. 375 Ibid., 12 January 1919. 376 War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA and QMG, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, 18 January 1919, AQS/4-37. 377 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol.19.2, 27 January 1919. 378 Ibid., 18 January 1919, G.0.100/60. 379 Ibid., 26 January 1919. 380 War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4818, 6 February 1919. 113 Rhine. It will be memorable in the history of some units. Nevertheless, as 1d1

individuals we would just as soon have passed up the honour.

Currie as well noted the troops' desire to leave. In a letter to Minister Kemp he wrote,

"They are very anxious to get home ... We all want to get away from [the occupation] and are very glad that early in January we are to be moved." Some soldiers had enjoyed their time in Germany. It had the effect of rounding off their operations, establishing an awareness that the German Army had actually been defeated and that they themselves had taken part in that accomplishment. However, there may have been a tinge of regret when the Canadian Corps returned to Belgium. During their five weeks in

Germany, the Belgian people's attitude had changed. Canadian soldiers were no longer welcomed with open arms by their Belgian hosts. Instead, the Canadians felt some hostility. The Belgian distaste for soldiers, even their liberators, was understandable:

Belgian towns had been continuously occupied since 1914. Canadians might have been more comfortable awaiting demobilization in Germany. In the Rhineland, every Canadian soldier had a warm bed and some opportunity for distraction. But, as J. F. B. Livesay reported, Canadian soldiers were dissatisfied with their new billets in Belgium: Here in Fosse many of the houses are empty, some unfurnished, some half-furnished and all badly heated. Coal is scarce and expensive. In short, we are out of luck in an isolated district, torn and battered and bedraggled by more than four years of military occupation.384

381 John A. Cooper, "Canadians Not Sorry to Be Leaving Germany," Toronto Daily Star, 6 February 1919. (The report was filed 9 January 1919) 382 General Arthur Currie to Sir Edward Kemp, Sir Edward Kemp Papers, LAC, MG 27, IID9, vol.133, 1 January 1919. 383 War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4891, 26 January 1919. 384 J.F.B. Livesay, "Return to Flanders Brings Some Regrets," Toronto Daily Star, 4 March 1919. (The report was filed 5 February 1919) 114 The soldiers of the Canadian Corps did not want to stop in Belgium, but would have preferred to carry on straight through to England and Canada. Their sojourn in Germany had ended; their duties completed. All that was left was to return to Canada. For that trip home, however, the Canadian soldiers would have to wait a few more months.

115 Conclusion: Demobilization, Logistics, and the Corps' Reputation

The Canadian commitment to the Occupation of the Rhineland lasted for only a brief period. Canadian soldiers were present in Germany from 4 December 1918 to 6

February 1919, a span of approximately eight weeks. They performed actual garrison duties for an even shorter amount time: 1st Canadian Division, three weeks; 2nd Canadian

Division, five weeks. Despite its brevity, the march to and occupation of the Rhineland was a historic occasion for the Canadian Corps. Never before had they marched so long, approximately 400km. Never before had any British colony been called upon to occupy the home territory of a European enemy. Yet, Canadian involvement in Germany should never have happened. The Dominion's participation in the occupation was a product of the unique circumstances existing in the aftermath of the First World War, all related to demobilization, logistics and the Canadian Corps' image.

The divisions of the Canadian Corps were available for duties in Germany largely due to the strains on Allied logistics. The necessary rail links and shipping were unavailable for a quick return to Canada, thus delaying the Canadian Corps' demobilization plans. In the period of partial demobilization that ensued, the British

Army selected the Canadian Corps for garrison duty precisely because it was available and Canadian. The Canadian divisions were a temporary solution that, in a small way, provided the British Army with time to demobilize its own conscripted units and organize an all volunteer force for duties in Germany. Both Prime Minister Borden and General

Currie consented to the British use of Canadian divisions because involvement in the occupation would raise the Dominion's profile in international circles and garner prestige 116 for the Canadian Corps. The resulting elevation in status would also serve to bolster

Borden's and Currie's reputation both at home and abroad.

Officers of the Canadian Corps learned of their involvement in the occupation on

11 November and planning began immediately. From the outset, the Canadian Corps

General Staff knew that the logistics for the march to and occupation of the Rhineland would be difficult. Road and rail infrastructure had been devastated by four years of war.

It was unlikely the limited rail connections could supply the huge armies in the field and the local Belgian population. Thus, Canadian Corps unit structures were streamlined and surplus kit and ammunition shed in preparation for the advance to the Rhine. While planning for the march, the need to maintain discipline and a positive outer image were stressed. The high reputation of the Canadian Corps, earned on the field of battle, had to be maintained in the post-war period to further Borden's plans for the Dominion abroad

• t ioc and to protect Currie's image at home. Furthermore, all Allied armies wanted to project a positive image because it was seen as necessary to impress the German people and visibly demonstrate the power and discipline of Allied forces.

During the march through Belgium, soldiers of 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions encountered many sights both wonderful and horrible. The reception in the Belgian towns was gratifying and the sight of former POWs heart-wrenching. But the most important factor affecting the Canadian advance to the Rhineland was logistics. Poor rail infrastructure was the reason why the Canadian Corps was marching, not taking the train.

385 General Currie faced criticism in Canada for the large number of casualties incurred during the final one hundred days of the First World War. Sir Sam Hughes and other were especially loud in the objections to Currie's command. See Tim Cook, "The Madman and the Butcher: Sir Sam Hughes, Sir Arthur Currie, and Their War of Reputations," The Canadian Historical Review 85,4 (2004): 693-719. 117 The difficulties of supply forced 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions to remain in Belgium. A

lack of supplies meant that march tables had to be amended. When the pack trains failed

to arrive, Canadian soldiers went hungry. When not enough trucks could be found, the

troops had to carry their packs and helmets. The soldiers marched on muddy roads, in

worn-out boots, without showering all because of the logistics. Given these conditions for

the march to Cologne and Bonn, is not surprising that some soldiers considered mutiny.

The need to protect and enhance the Canadian Corps' reputation affected the marching in Belgium and Germany as well. The Canadian Corps had to be ready to cross the Rhine on 13 December, the date set for all Allied armies to cross. The Canadians could not afford to be late, so from the beginning a brutal pace was set. Crossing the

German frontier, on 4 December, was a great moment for many men. The crossing of the

Rhine River, however, was the greatest spectacle. Its main purpose was to demonstrate the supremacy of Allied forces to the German public. All the soldiers of the Canadian

Corps had to offer their best outward appearance, not showing any weakness. The crossing of the Rhine displayed the Canadians at their best, even though the artillery barely made it on time.

The task of creating plans for defence of the Canadian Corps Area of the Cologne

Bridgehead was delegated to Currie and his General Staff. Canadian planners were given tactical principles, but the specific details were Canadian decisions alone. While garrisoning Germany, the Canadian soldiers carried out their military and administrative duties well, upholding the prestige of the corps. Their military related tasks were minimal, boring and routine, consisting largely of patrol, guard, and engineering-related

118 responsibilities. The administrative duties associated with controlling the German civilians were also minimal, but far more frustrating.

During garrison life in the Bonn and Cologne areas, logistics and the need to maintain the Canadian Corps' reputation continued to impact soldiers' lives. The late arrival of trains persisted. As a result, some units, especially those deployed in the

Outpost Line, occasionally did not receive their rations on time. Even the Christmas turkeys were late. While in the Rhineland, a number of distractions were provided for the

Canadian soldiers; some were more successful than others. Yet, the education classes and lectures, trips to the cities, and sports all had one basic function—to keep the troops content and out of trouble. Bored soldiers cause problems and senior military leadership wanted to avoid any incidents that may have tarnished the Canadians' hard-earned reputation.

There was little friendliness between Canadian soldiers and German civilians.

Both the German church and state required its citizens to maintain an aloof and distant attitude. The discipline and fairness of the Canadian soldiers, however, were acknowledged by residents of Cologne and Bonn. Considering the number of men involved, there were few incidents of Canadian misbehaviour. Acts of misconduct by

Canadian soldiers occurred, but the incidents were minor and generally did not involve the German public. Distractions and discipline were likely the reason for so few confrontations. Whenever the British authorities questioned the reputation of the

Canadian Corps, a rigorous and largely successful defence of the corps' image was mounted by senior leadership.

119 The YMCA greatly assisted the Canadian Corps throughout the march to and occupation of the Rhineland. Their hot tea and biscuits on the march were a welcome relief. Their canteen supplies helped when other rations failed to arrive. Their Christmas supplies, sports equipment, theatres, trips, and beer gardens were all welcome distractions. The YMCA made army life a little more enjoyable and was a tangible reminder of the Canadian public's support for their armed forces.

The relief of the Canadian Corps from the Army of Occupation was directly connected to demobilization plans. The British War Office's notice that two Canadian divisions could be demobilized initiated a series of events that culminated with 1st

Canadian Division's withdrawal on 5 January 1919 and 2nd Canadian Division's on 19

January 1919. During the march to and occupation of the Rhineland, a span of approximately two months, the logistical situation had improved in Western Europe.

More trains and ships were available to transport the Canadian soldiers home. Logistics finally permitted the Canadian Corps to demobilize.

At the conclusion of the First World War, Canadian soldiers desired a quick return home. That wish would never come true. Yet, there was a sense of satisfaction among the men of the Canadian Corps when they learned in November 1918 that they were to occupy Germany. This was confirmation to the men that the Germans had been defeated and that they themselves had taken part in that accomplishment. Despite the brutal march to the Rhine, absent rations and a cold and indifferent German public,

Canadian soldiers considered it an honour to be part of the Army of Occupation. In fact,

120 the Canadian Corps' brief commitment in the Rhineland was a mark of distinction, one to be remembered for many years to come.

It is unfortunate, however, that most Canadian historians have not fully explored this unique period in Canadian history, offering only partial and superficial accounts.

This thesis does not claim to tell the full story of the largest operation conducted by the

CEF in the aftermath of the First World War: there is a need for further study. Yet, there are a number of contributions this thesis has made to the understanding of Canada's commitment to the occupation of the Rhineland. First, after a survey of the secondary literature and an analysis of archival material, the reasons for the Dominion's participation have become clearer. Ostensibly, the Canadian Corps was selected because of its competency on the field of battle and reputation for discipline and reliability.

However, during the time of partial demobilization which ensued after the cessation of open hostilities, Prime Minister Borden and General Currie committed Canadian soldiers to the operation to keep them occupied and out of trouble. Furthermore, Canadian involvement was part of larger British Army demobilization plans, as the extensive use of colonial troops in the initial occupation allowed British forces to demobilize and reorganize. Second, this thesis established a chronology for the Canadian Corps' movements and activities from 11 November 1918 to 6 February 1919. It represents a foundational framework for reference and further study. By covering this gap in the literature, a greater understanding of Canada's demobilization policy and the impacts of logistics in the post-armistice period has been achieved. In particular, the Canadian

Corps' experiences and difficulties marching across Belgium and Germany have been

121 exposed. Third, the precise number, location, and disposition of Canadian forces in the

Cologne bridgehead have been described in this work. These martial details, coupled with

an examination of the administrative and judicial duties performed by the Canadian

soldiers, presents a clearer picture of the Canadian Corps' role and purpose in the

Rhineland. Fourth, this thesis examines the civil-military interactions involved in

Canada's first experience with garrison duties in the home country of a European power.

There were tensions at many levels between German citizens and Canadian soldiers, however, clashes were minimal and operations were conducted with little civilian interference. The Canadian Corps was rough and rowdy at times while stationed in the

Rhineland, but it accomplished its mission and caused relatively few problems. Finally, a greater understanding of the Dominion of Canada's changing position within the British

Empire has been outlined. In the post-armistice period, Prime Minister Borden was seeking to place Canada within the community of sovereign states through the

Dominion's participation in the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization and military commitments in Russia. Committing soldiers to the occupation of the

Rhineland represents another example of Borden's foreign policy, which was designed to gain notoriety and prestige for Canada and redefine the Dominion's status within the

Imperial framework.

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131 Appendix 1 March Tables - Plans versus Realities

The Original March Table for Belgium - Issued 16 November

17 November 25 and 26 November Cavalry Corps to Line "A" Cavalry Corps will Halt Canadian Corps will Halt 18 November Cavalry Corps to Line "B" 27 November Canadian Corps to Line "A" Cavalry Corps to Line "G" Canadian Corps to Line "F" 19 and 20 November Cavalry Corps will Halt 28 November Canadian Corps will Halt Cavalry Corps to Line "H" Canadian Corps to Line "G' 21 November Cavalry Corps to Line "C.l' 29 November Canadian Corps to Line "B" Cavalry Corps to Line "I" Canadian Corps to Line "H'' 22 November Cavalry Corps to Line "E" 30 November Canadian Corps to Line "C" Cavalry Corps to Line "J" Canadian Corps to Line "I" 23 November Cavalry Corps will Halt 1 December Canadian Corps to Line "D" Cavalry Corps to Line "K" Canadian Corps to Line "J" 24 November Cavalry Corps to Line "F" 2 December Canadian Corps to Line "E" Cavalry Corps to Line "L" Canadian Corps to Line "K"

War Diary of the 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, Appendix One: March Table for the Advance to the Rhine, issued 16 November 1918.

132 The Real March Table for Belgium

17 November - Cavalry Corps to Line "A" Cavalry Corps - Soignies

18 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "A" 1st Canadian Division - Soignies, 2nd Canadian Division - Houdeng-Aimeries,

19 and 20 November - Canadian Corps Halts

21 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "B" 1st Canadian Division - Nivelles 2nd Canadian Division - Gosselies

22 and 23 November - Canadian Corps Halts

24 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "C" 1st Canadian Division - Mellery 2nd Canadian Division - Velaine

25 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "D" 1st Canadian Division - Gembloux 2nd Canadian Division - Namur Notes: The Meuse River was reached. The divisions marched in two column formation, with a two brigade front.

26 November - Canadian Corps halts

27 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "E" 1st Canadian Division - Seilles 2nd Canadian Division - Coutisse Notes: The general direction of the corps' advance was now changed half right, and the boundaries between Divisions were rearranged so that each would have one first class road.

28 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "F" 1st Canadian Division - Clavier 2nd Canadian Division - Mean Notes: The heads of the divisional column reached the Ardennes. Each Division moved in one column in depth, owing to the lack of billeting.

29 November - Half the Canadian Corps moves to Line "G" 1st Canadian Division - Halt

133 2nd Canadian Division - Villers St. Gertrude Notes: 1st Canadian Division's march was cancelled due to the non-arrival of rations.

30 November - Canadian Corps moves to Line "H" 1st Canadian Division - Ferrieres 2nd Canadian Division - Regne

1 December - 2nd Canadian Division moves to Line "I" 1st Canadian Division - Halt 2nd Canadian Division - Beho Note: 1st Canadian Division's march was cancelled due to the non-arrival of rations.

2 December - 1st Canadian Division moves to Line "I" 1st Canadian Division - Grand Halleux 2nd Canadian Division - Halt

3 December - Canadian Corps Moves to Line "K" 1st Canadian Division - Petit Thier 2nd Canadian Division - Beho Note: The Cavalry Corps preceded the Canadian Corps by one day's march throughout.

134 The Original March Table for Germany - Issued 28 November

1 December Cavalry Corps - Setz - Amel - Krinkelt Canadian Corps - Beho - Petit Thier

2 December Cavalry Corps - Kronenburg - Krinkelt Canadian Corps - Setz - Amel

3 December Cavalry Corps - Halt Canadian Corps - Halt

4 December Cavalry Corps - Waldorf - Schleiden - Wollensheim Canadian Corps - Kronenburg - Krinkelt

5 December Cavalry Corps - Effelsburg - Euskirchen Canadian Corps - Blankenheim - Schleiden

6 December Cavalry Corps - Halt Canadian Corps - Halt

7 December Cavalry Corps - Gelsdorf - Lechenich Canadian Corps - Effelsberg - Satzvey

8 December Cavalry Corps - Rhine Canadian Corps - Gelsdorf - Lechinich

9-13 December Cavalry Corps - Halt until 13 December Canadian Corps - Halt until 13 December

War Diary of the 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847, Operation Order 286, 28 November 1918.

135 The Real March Table for Germany

4 December 1st Canadian Division - Amel 2nd Canadian Division - Setz Note: The Canadian Corps crossed the German frontier.

5 December 1st Canadian Division - Halt 2nd Canadian Division - Kronenburg Note: 1st Canadian Division's march was cancelled due to the non-arrival of rations.

6 December 1st Canadian Division - Helenthal 2nd Canadian Division - Blankenheim

7 December 1st Canadian Division - Satzvey 2nd Canadian Division - Effelsburg

8 December 1st Canadian Division - Halt 2nd Canadian Division - Halt Note: Many units spent the day closing up under divisional arrangements.

9 December 1st Canadian Division - Weilerswist 2nd Canadian Division - No advance was made, just closing up. Note: Advanced units of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions reach the Rhine.

10 December 1st Canadian Division - Meschnich (suburbs of southern Cologne) 2nd Canadian Division - Bonn

11 December - Concentration and Closing up 1st Canadian Division - Halt 2nd Canadian Division - Halt Notes: No forward movement of 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions as they had reached the line of the Rhine yesterday. Rear units continued their marches and concentrated as far forward as possible, all under divisional arrangements.

12 December 1st Canadian Division - Halt 2nd Canadian Division - Halt

136 Notes: No forward movement of 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions as they had already reached the line of the Rhine. Rear units continued their marches and concentrated as far forward as possible, all under divisional arrangements. 1st Cavalry Brigade crosses the Rhine at Bonn, and reached the line Obercassel - Siegburg - Altenrath - Rosrath.

13 December 1st Canadian Division reached the line Lohmar - Altenrath - Rosrath - Lustheide. 2nd Canadian Division reached the line Obercassel - Hoholz - Siegburg - Lohmar 1st Cavalry Brigade occupies the perimeter of the bridgehead. Note: The Canadian Corps crossed the Rhine River.

14 December - Taking up positions in bridgehead 1st Canadian Division reached the line of the Agger River (Lohmar to Overath) - Heiligenhaus - Immekeppel and Moitzfeld. 2nd Canadian Division reached the line Neunkirchen - Birlinghoven - Obercassel Note: 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions relieved the 1st Cavalry Brigade and established outposts from the Rhine to Rott.

15 December Notes: 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions completed their march, occupying the entire Canadian Corps area of the Cologne Bridgehead. 1st Cavalry Brigade outposts on the perimeter are relieved.

137 March Statistics

March Duration - 18 November to 15 December 1918; a period of 28 days

Days Marching - 1st Canadian Division 16 days; 2nd Canadian Division 17 days

Days Halted - 1st Canadian Division 12 days; 2nd Canadian Division 11 days

Reflecting the impacts of logistics, these were the first six days on the march. Day 1 - March Day 4 - March Day 2 - Halt Day 5 - Halt Day 3 - Halt Day 6 - Halt

Distance - approximately 250 miles; 400 kilometres

Average distance per march - 15-16 miles; 25 kilometres

138 Curriculum Vitae

Christopher James Hyland

University of British Columbia 1999 - BA History 2000 - BEd Secondary School Education

University of New Brunswick 2007 - MA