Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 246 | 08.08.2017 www.osw.waw.pl

Russian nationalism three years after the annexation of Crimea

Jan Strzelecki

The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military action in the Donbas in 2014 have revealed a major potential for a revival of nationalist sentiments in Russian society. The wave of ‘patriotic’ attitudes that swept through the country back then has enabled the government to co-opt the rhetoric that is typical of nationalist groups. The Kremlin has used this period to shore up its legitimacy among the public and step up control of specific organisations. This has resulted in changes to the structure of the nationalist movement. A weakening was recorded mainly in relation to nationalist organisations that are independent from the government and those organisations which had been involved in the fighting in the Donbas in the initial stage of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. For the Kremlin, nationalist ideology and nationalist organisations that are unable to act in- dependently are a handy political instrument. They are mainly being used to build support for the government and to consolidate power in Russia. At the same time, the fear that independ- ent nationalist movements may become empowered and organisations that are dependent on the authorities may become emancipated poses a potential threat to the country’s internal stability. This makes the Kremlin strive for greater control of those nationalist groups that still remain somewhat independent.

line1. Organisations belonging to the first line Nationalist organisations include monarchist movements and organisa- tions associated with the Orthodox Church, or- In ideological terms, aside from features typi- ganisations that subscribe to the idea of uniting cal of nationalist movements, including placing the areas of the former Russian Empire, those emphasis on national identity, viewing the need that support anti-Western attitudes, paramili- to defend national interests as the most promi- tary organisations, and organisations dealing nent task of the state and elevating such inter- with historical politics. The ethnocentric line, for ests above those of the individual, most Russian its part, is represented by groups that support nationalist organisations are characterised by anti-immigrant policy and promote the suprem- imperialist tendencies and in particular by the acy of ethnic Russians over other members of conviction that it is crucial to maintain and even society. The division into two lines is a certain expand Russia’s zone of influence. According to simplification. In practice, nationalist groups the ideology which these organisations support, two main lines of Russian nationalism can be 1 identified: the imperial line and the ethnocentric See Katarzyna Chawryło, Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, OSW Commentary, 29 De- cember 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ osw-commentary/2014-12-29/russian-nationalists-krem- lins-policy-ukraine

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 1 active in Russia are strongly fragmented and Kremlin. He is the author of the political chan- non-homogeneous in terms of the views they nel “Artpodgotovka” on YouTube, which has promote and the form of their organisation (a gained popularity and gathered a group of new large number of these organisations remain of- activists including individuals active in the unof- ficially unregistered). Aside from the main char- ficial “New Opposition” movement (Mark Galp- acteristic of the nationalist movement in Russia, erin, Ivan Beletski, Denis Romanov, Yuri Gorski). i.e. the fact of subscribing to specific ideological To avoid being tried for extremism, Maltsev left lines, such divisions also reflect specific organ- Russia, which will hinder him from maintaining isations’ degree of dependence on the govern- his popularity among nationalist groups. ment and their attitude towards the Kremlin’s A major portion of organisations that belong policy (in particular their attitude towards the to the ethnocentric line of nationalism remains war in Ukraine). in opposition to the Kremlin. The ideological spectrum of these movements is very broad, and some of them, regardless of their dislike A large number of organisations that fall of the Kremlin, actively support Russia’s activity within the ethnocentric line of nationalism in Ukraine. These organisations include radical remain in opposition to the Kremlin. nationalist and right-wing movements such as the neo-Nazi organisation, Restrukt, and cer- In 2011–2015, the most prominent organisa- tain groups centred around moderate national- tion under the ethnocentric line of nationalism ists, such as the movement centred around the was “the Russians” (Русские or Russkiye), which Sputnik i Pogrom website, which emphasises supported the plan to transform Russia into an ethnicity-related issues and supports imperial ethnically unified state and stemmed from the and anti-Western rhethoric (the government former Movement Against Illegal Immigration, has recently blocked access to this website). Or- which had been dissolved some time ago. In ganisations hostile towards the Kremlin which 2015, a court in Moscow considered “the Rus- nonetheless support Russia’s involvement in the sians” an extremist organisation, which resulted Donbas include the group centred around the in its dissolution. At the same time, the polit- nationalist Bolshevik party, The Other Russia (the ical activity of all three leaders of this move- so-called “natsbols” or нацбол), established by ment has been hampered or prevented: Alek- eccentric writer Eduard Limonov. Although this sandr Belov and Dmitri Dyomushkin are serving group used to be one of the most active nation- prison sentences and Vladimir Basmanov is in alist movements in opposition to the Kremlin, at exile. Numerous other smaller organisations present it has reached an impasse. have sprung up from this group. In their quest A major portion of organisations that belong to recruit new members, they compete with to the imperial line of nationalism support the each other to a certain degree. These organisa- policy pursued by the government. Usually, tions are subject to relatively strict controls by these groups are financially dependent on the the government and are generally not granted Kremlin, they are allowed to function unimped- permission to organise legal public gatherings. ed as long as there is demand for their activi- Therefore, in their activities they focus on or- ty on the part of the state administration. One ganising minor scale events such as lectures, de- example of an organisation whose main task is bates, expeditions, tours and training sessions. to combat opposition groups, channel radical Vyacheslav Maltsev, politician and blogger, has right sentiment using nationalist rhetoric and recently become a prominent figure in a nation- manifest support for the government, is the alist movement which is in opposition to the Anti-Maidan movement established in 2015.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 2 Its leaders include individuals loyal to the Krem- Russia’s supremacy over the so-called Eurasian lin – Aleksandr Zaldostanov (also known as The area. Organisations associated with the Ortho- Surgeon), the leader of the nationalist motorcy- dox Church and monarchist organisations, such cle club Night Wolves, and Dmitry Sablin, mem- as the Black Hundreds and the Association of ber of the Federation Council, one of the lead- Orthodox Warrant Officers, also have close ties ers of the Battle Brotherhood, an organisation with the government. The imperial line of na- that groups war veterans and retired soldiers. tionalism is also represented by several organi- sations that receive official government approv- al. They include the Liberal-Democratic Party of Football fans represent a unique group as- Russia (a populist party having its representa- sociated with nationalist circles. From the tives in the Duma), headed by Vladimir Zhiri- Kremlin’s point of view, they are a potential novsky, and the nationalist-conservative Rodina tool to be used in provocations. party, currently headed by Alexei Zhuravlov (its former leader was Dmitri Rogozin, a politician The organisation Night Wolves, a component known for his nationalist views and current of the Anti-Maidan movement, enjoys person- deputy prime minister). al support from that he demon- In the period of the ‘Russian Spring’ (pro-Rus- strates publicly. Each year it receives significant sian riots and demonstrations in south-east- funds under the state subsidy system. Other or- ern Ukraine in 2014), nationalistically oriented ganisations making up the Anti-Maidan move- volunteers ready to take part in the fighting ment include the National Liberation Move- in Ukraine began to form their own organisa- ment (NOD), which supports imperialist and tional structures. The most prominent figure anti-American rhethoric and at present seems of this part of the nationalist movement is Igor to be the most active organisation supporting Girkin (also known as Strelkov), former leader Russia’s policy towards Ukraine and organis- of pro-Russian separatists and retired Russian ing provocative actions targeting opposition intelligence colonel. He created the Novorossi- groups. This organisation’s very close ties with ya movement that supported the plan to create the Kremlin can, for instance, be confirmed by a separate independent state in the Donbas. the fact that its members ran in the most recent In the period of intense fighting, the Russian Im- elections as candidates put forward by Russia’s perial Movement was particularly active among ruling party (Yevgeniy Fyodorov was included organisations loyal to the Kremlin. At that time on ’s candidate list). it was involved in training militants and send- The imperial line of nationalist movements also ing them to the Donbas, whereas at present it comprises organisations which are strongly deals with national-military education of young pro-Kremlin in their views but are managed by people2. At present, volunteers returning from the government in an undisclosed manner. One the Donbas are welcomed by many national- of these organisations is the Eurasian Youth ist organisations as new members. However, Association, which emphasises Russia’s civili- most of these organisations have neither an at- zational uniqueness and supports the plan to tractive offer for these individuals nor support boost integration with the post-Soviet area and from the Kremlin. with China. The organisation’s creator and ide- ologist is Aleksandr Dugin, who responds to certain demands for propaganda on the part of 2 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/eu- the government in that he challenges liberal ide- rope/a-right-wing-militia-trains-russians-to-fight- the-next-war--with-or-without-putin/2017/01/02/ as and promotes militarism and the concept of f06b5ce8-b71e-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.htm- l?utm_term=.4673b709b849

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 3 Football fans are a unique group associated The level of xenophobia in Russian society also with nationalist circles. They are characterised continues to be high – almost 60% of Russians by very aggressive rhetoric and a readiness to report a dislike of other nationalities4. Russians use violence. Despite the fact that frequently clearly support a strict policy of curbing im- they are members of various nationalist groups, migration – 70% of the population surveyed they have their own organisational structures approved of the plan to limit the flow of rep- comprising football fans specifically. From the resentatives of other nationalities to Russia5. Kremlin’s point of view, they form a poten- tial tool to be used in provocations, but they The level of xenophobia in Russian socie- also pose a threat connected with their violent ty also continues to be high – almost 60% methods. At present, Russian football fans are of Russians report a dislike of other nation- among the world’s most aggressive groups of alities. this type. They have repeatedly been involved in riots organised during football tournaments abroad in which Russia’s team took part. Russians particularly dislike migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, which is where the biggest proportion of migrant workers comes Nationalism and xenophobia from. Regardless of the drop in the scale of in Russian society immigration to Russia recorded over the last two years, Russians believe that the number of Despite the fact that in recent years the sta- immigrants in their immediate surroundings is tus of nationalist groups has declined, Russian on the rise. The research has also shown that society continues to be characterised by a rel- the majority of the individuals surveyed claim atively high degree of support for nationalist that immigrants destroy Russian culture, have views. According to research conducted by the a negative impact on the economy, contribute Levada Centre in August 2016, as many as 52% to an increase in the crime rate and take jobs of Russians approve of the slogan “Russia for away from ethnic Russians. Only a relative- Russians”3. However, it should be noted that ly small group of respondents (20%) opposes this mood does change to reflect specific events the plan to introduce limitations for any of the and the intensity of the nationalist narrative in nationalities. Such beliefs have been of key im- state propaganda. Due to frequent appearanc- portance for the popularity of those Russian es of celebrities and opinion-forming journalists nationalist movements that supported the plan supporting nationalist views (including Dmitri to create an institutional framework to guaran- Kiselov, Maksim Shevchenko, Aleksandr Dugin) tee the supremacy of ethnic Russians over other in media controlled by the Kremlin, nationalist nationalities. However, the support for radical ideology has made its way to the centre of po- nationalist groups enjoining their followers to litical discourse. In this context, to challenge the use violence is much lower. It is noteworthy that idea that the nation, understood as a perceived there is a negative correlation between the atti- cultural and political community, is the highest tude towards migrants from the Caucasus and value in the public realm, is seen as a violation the attitude towards the United States which is of the unofficial consensus and a move away traditionally seen as hostile. In periods in which from political correctness. Russians expressed more hostile attitudes to- wards the United States, their attitudes towards

3 http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/11/intolerantnost-i-ksen- 4 Ibid. ofobiya/ 5 Ibid.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 4 the residents of were more pos- nationalist-oriented youths. The number of par- itive. This relation indicated that there is a need ticipants in the Russian Marches did not rise within society to seek an enemy and that this any further and from the beginning of 2013 it need is being boosted by state propaganda ac- began to decrease. This was partly due to the cording to its current demand. effectiveness of administrative barriers created The year 2013 saw a culmination of national- by the government and partly to the reorienta- ist and xenophobic attitudes6. This was due tion of social mobilisation to rhethoric empha- to the rising number of economic migrants sising the power of the state and the interna- in Russia and the lack of mechanisms for in- tional threat. The period of the ‘Russian Spring’, tegrating them, as well as the fact that back followed by Russia’s military activity in Crimea then this sentiment was being boosted by the and in the Donbas, has triggered an elevated state propaganda machine across all-Russian patriotic mood within Russian society and re- TV channels. Manifestations of aggressive na- vived the nationalists’ hopes. However, the tionalist mobilisation within society included mobilisation organised after the annexation of the ethnically-motivated riots that happened in Crimea has diverted the attention of the general Moscow’s suburban Biryulevo district in 2013. public from immigration-related issues, which are of key importance for the Russian national- ist movement, and caused a slackening in the The Kremlin uses the nationalists it ‘man- nationalist movement itself. The proportion of ages’ as a tool for consolidating society individuals expressing dislike of immigrants de- and boosting support for the government. clined (for example, the proportion of people experiencing dislike, fear and irritation towards Over the last three years, anti-immigrant feelings migrants from southern republics fell from and inter-ethnic tensions have eased. This is due to 61% in November 2013 to 42% in June 2014), a drop in the number of economic migrants and which can be interpreted as a consequence of to the fact that the propaganda machine has the drop in immigration to Russia caused by been reoriented towards the conflict with the the economic crisis and the increasingly less fa- West. State propaganda outlets have begun to vourable exchange rate of the rouble, as well as create a narrative that the West poses a threat society’s mobilisation in connection with the to Russians and that it has a ‘Russophobic’ ori- military conflicts waged by Russia. This places entation. As a consequence, anti-immigrant the movements which consolidate their sup- rhethoric began to lose ground. Formerly, they porter base using the ethno-nationalist narra- were an area in which nationalist groups dis- tive in a difficult situation. tanced themselves from the Kremlin. The number of participants in the so-called Rus- The Kremlin’s attitude sian Marches organised each year since 2005 in towards nationalists Russia’s biggest cities can be viewed as a touch- stone of the power of nationalist movements. The Kremlin uses the nationalists it ‘manages’ These demonstrations, which are independent as a tool to consolidate society and boost sup- from the government, showed their greatest port for the government. Despite the fact that potential in 2010–2013, when they were at- in recent months the activity of pro-Kremlin tended in Moscow by up to 6 000 individuals. nationalist organisations has weakened, the Most of the participants were radically-inclined government continues to strive to channel the actions of nationalist groups within the struc- 6 http://www.levada.ru/2015/08/25/ksenofobiya-i-nat- tures it controls. The form and the degree of sionalizm/

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 5 governmental control of nationalists vary: from Yakunin, who funds Russian influence networks creating nationalist organisations and ‘manual in Europe and ‘patriotic’ initiatives in Russia, steering’ thereof (the NOD organisation is one and Konstantin Malofeyev, accused of spon- example), through supporting these organisa- soring the units fighting in the Donbas, among tions (for example, most organisations associ- other things. ated with the Orthodox Church and the Night The government is aware of the risk involved Wolves), to infiltrating them and bringing about in supporting the nationalists, it fears that they their disintegration (this happened, for exam- may become emancipated and that new forms ple, to the ‘natsbol’ groups and “the Russians”). of spontaneous and independent social activi- ty may emerge in Russia. Therefore, it is trying to control Russian nationalist groups and avoid Abroad, Moscow is winning over support- making overt statements regarding ethnic dif- ers in the form of radical right groups, ferences, fearing that these views – which re- mainly by criticising the United States. main popular with Russians – may pose a threat to the state’s stability. The Kremlin is gradual- In recent years, nationalist organisations con- ly trying to neutralise independent nationalist trolled by the government have less frequently groups. These actions became notably strong- been used as tools in domestic politics, where er in the second half of 2014, when the gov- they formerly served as instruments for com- ernment used a series of measures to subdue batting political opponents and demonstrating the so-called Russian March. Several individuals support for the Kremlin. They are still being were arrested, including Aleksandr Belov, one used in foreign policy, under which Moscow of the event’s organisers, who openly criticised is pursuing the tactic involving offering sup- the ‘Russian Spring’. On the day of the march, port to radical and populist movements in a major demonstration was organised to express other countries. One example of such actions support for the government. Other manifesta- from the soft power repertoire was the Interna- tions of the system’s increasingly repressive na- tional Conservative Forum organised in March ture towards independent nationalists included 2015 in St. Petersburg by the nationalist Rodina the arrest of Dmitri Dyomushkin, another leader party, attended by extreme right-wing organi- of this movement, in April 2015 (in April 2017 sations from Europe. Abroad, Moscow is win- he was sentenced to 2.5 years’ imprisonment). ning over supporters in the form of radical right Attempts by the Kremlin to control and neutral- groups that potentially serve as a means of put- ise the radical factions of the nationalist move- ting pressure on Western societies, mainly by ment have largely proved successful: most in- criticising the United States, which is seen as dependent organisations are in deep crisis and a symbol of liberal democracy and globalisation, pose no threat to Russia’s political stability. This and by emphasising Russia’s moral supremacy. is also evident in the declining number of par- The Kremlin is trying to maintain a network of ticipants in the Russian Marches – it diminishes pro-regime organisations and is creating mech- with each year. anisms of financial and organisational support The Kremlin is trying to prevent the possible re- for them. Each year, patriotically-oriented, vival of nationalist groups that are in opposition Orthodox and nationalist organisations receive to the government and which emphasise ethnic a major chunk of state subsidies for non-gov- issues in their discourse. Attempts to quell this ernmental organisations, as well as funds from point of view can be confirmed, for instance, by oligarchs and businesspeople associated with the fact that the state media almost completely the government. This group includes Vladimir ignored the case of the killing of a four-year-

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 6 old girl by her carer from Uzbekistan in February Alongside the shifts in the Kremlin’s narrative 20167. Rapprochement between nationalists regarding the conflict in Ukraine (abandoning and opposition groups with a different (non-na- the plan to include the Donbas in the Russian tionalist) orientation is also seen as a potential Federation and to create a separate state or- threat to the government. This is why the gov- ganism there called Novorossiya), the role of ernment became concerned about the increas- nationalist movement activists in the conflict ing popularity of Alexei Navalny, an opposition with Ukraine weakened, which also reduced politician known for his nationalist views, and their hopes regarding Kremlin policy. After the about the cooperation between liberal groups ‘Russian Spring’, most nationalist organisations and nationalists centred around Vyacheslav independent of the Kremlin have been in crisis – Maltsev. Since the spring of 2017, the govern- their membership and activity have decreased. ment has taken measures to break up the group centred around Vyacheslav Maltsev – Yuri Gorski, Nationalist attitudes within society are his collaborator, was arrested (he escaped from deep-rooted and enduring. house arrest and at present is in exile), and Maltsev himself was charged with involvement in extremist activities, as a result of which he These organisations lost their distinctiveness too fled abroad. The ruling elite fears that mass when, in the period of the ‘Russian Spring’, protests resembling those organised in Decem- a large segment of them toned down their crit- ber 2011 may take place again. Back then, anti- icism of the government. It is noteworthy that -Kremlin rallies held on Bolotnaya Square were on the day that the Federation Council issued guarded by units composed of members of the its consent to deploy and use Russian troops independent nationalist movement. abroad, leaders of several nationalist organisa- One of the tools for controlling nationalist or- tions (including “the Russians”, which was in- ganisations is constituted by the legal measures dependent from the government) announced preventing extremism. Reports compiled by the that they would defend Russians in Ukraine and SOVA Center for Information and Analysis that other parts of the world9. Several organisations monitors the situation of nationalist groups in have reached a deadlock – these are mainly the Russia, suggest that in 2015 there was an in- radical organisations that supported the ‘Rus- crease in the number of individuals sentenced sian Spring’ and opted for recognising Novor- for extremist activities not covered by other pro- ossiya as an independent state organism to be visions of the penal code (i.e. activities that do created on the basis of separatist republics in not involve violence)8. This type of control on south-eastern Ukraine. Most of these organisa- the part of the government is facilitated by the tions are in favour of reviving the plan to cre- fact that the leaders of independent nationalist ate Novorossiya or include the Donbas in the movements in Russia seldom change and the Russian Federation. Some continue to be in- state of the organisations themselves depends volved in a support initiative for Donbas sep- on the attitude and activity of their leaders. aratists (for instance, they organise so-called humanitarian aid convoys). The involvement of nationalist groups in the war in Ukraine is 7 Some media informed about an instruction from the much smaller than in 2014. Should this change, Kremlin demanding that the case of the killing be omitted, http://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/01/03/2016/ it will not be down to efforts by specific organi- 56d48e289a79477f2af24d82 sations but as a result of a shift in the Kremlin’s 8 In September 2015, 26 individuals served their sentenc- political strategy. es for political and propaganda-related activities and around 30 individuals for membership of banned organ- isations (however, these were mainly radical Islamists), http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/09/22/ 9 https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2014/03/01/ 609638-tyurma-za-slovo n_5985181.shtml

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 246 7 by it will form a convenient tool for shaping the Prospects public mood. This is why they will be held in re- serve for deployment as and when required, re- Nationalist attitudes within society are deep-root- gardless of how insignificant their activities are. ed and persistent. In the future, nationalist sen- It is very likely that they will be used by Russian timents and ethnically-motivated tensions are services to escalate tensions in those parts of the likely to rise if the economic crisis lessens and world that are of key importance for Russia, due economic migrants from post-Soviet states re- to these organisations’ ties with radical organisa- turn to Russia, which remains their primary for- tions abroad. The crisis of independent national- eign destination for work purposes. If this is the ist groups that stand in opposition to the Kremlin case, the crime rate may rise and ethnically-mo- is likely to continue. Their prospects of prevailing tivated clashes may be organised (such clashes in the contest with pro-regime organisations and happen regularly in marketplaces in Moscow and the media, for playing the role of advocates of other big cities). The questions of migration and nationalist views and serving as a mouthpiece nationality policy, which are hot topics in Rus- of public opinion, remain negligible. Similarly, it sian politics, are likely to be discussed both by is unlikely that in the short-term perspective the the government and by the Kremlin’s opponents nationalist mood within Russian society, which in the campaign ahead of the 2018 presidential has recently shunned political involvement, will election. In the long-term perspective, any drop translate into active participation in independent in the government’s approval rating or a sudden nationalist movements. Due to the fact that their internal crisis will likely increase the risk that the resources are considerably smaller, reconstruc- Kremlin may look for social support by making tion of the independent organisations’ capabil- increasingly strong references to nationalist ide- ities is unlikely. as and by confronting external enemies. For the Kremlin, nationalist organisations that are loyal to the government and are ‘managed’

EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak Centre for Eastern Studies Halina Kowalczyk, Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00 Co-operation: Timothy Harrell e-mail: [email protected] DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski

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