Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture ⁎ Jonathan H
Journal of Development Economics 82 (2007) 416–447 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Property rights and the political organization of agriculture ⁎ Jonathan H. Conning a, , James A. Robinson b a Department of Economics, Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 695 Park Ave., NY 10021, United States b Department of Government, Harvard University, 1033 Massachuetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States Received 2 January 2002; accepted 1 August 2005 Abstract We propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges, it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact. Property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency. The model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others. We test some implications of the theory using a five-decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 Indian states. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: Q15; O12; N50; D72 Keywords: Agrarian organization; Tenancy; Political economy; Squatters; Agrarian reform 1. Introduction The study of the nature and determinants of agrarian organization is one of the oldest topics in economics and the system of metayage, or sharecropping, was discussed by Adam Smith, J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall. A dominant theme in this literature is that contractual arrangements and equilibrium ownership patterns should be shaped principally by the incentive problems that arise when labor effort or other relevant production actions are difficult to observe, or costly to ⁎ Corresponding author.
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