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Rational Irrationality: Nature of Suicide Bombers Choice RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY : NATURE OF SUICIDE BOMBERS CHOICE By Gulnisa Asymova Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Andrés Moles Velazquez CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary -- 2011 -- ABSTRACT This thesis studies the phenomenon of the suicide bombers’ choice. There have been many studies made in analyzing the terrorist organizations but fewer talking about the individual level of decision-making. In this thesis I show that one of the prominent theories of choice explanation – rational choice theory – is not capable of explaining this phenomenon to the fullest need. Are the suicide bombers rational, or are they fanatics? None of the options available in the area are absolutely right and it is important to find out to what extent each of the major theories is useful in explaining suicide bombers’ choice. A method of literature and available data analysis is used for creating a new approach to explain the phenomenon. As the result the black box framework is proposed, where black box is a metaphor, referred to a motivation system of an individual which in part is influenced by psychological and sociological conditions. The black box model stresses the need of combination of views that exist in explanation of the suicide attackers’ motives for the sake of having a tool with stronger explanation power of the phenomenon. CEU eTD Collection i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am dedicating this work to my family that has supported me throughout all the years of my pursuit of education. Certainly, I would like to express a deep gratitude to my supervisor for being actively involved in all stages of writing my thesis; his advices and guidance have led me to the finish line I am standing now upon. In addition I want to thank two special people in my life who have always been there for me and encouraged all through the two year path at CEU; I would not make it without Diana Babaeva, my sister-like best friend, and Matej Košalko, my beloved fiancé. CEU eTD Collection ii TABLE OF CONTENT ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: CLOSED “BLACK BOX” AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY ........ 12 1.1 “Traditional” Rationality of Individual Homo Oeconomicus Behavior ......................... 12 1.2 Additional Axioms of Broader Rationality .................................................................... 15 1.2.1 The case of Tamil Tigers ......................................................................................... 16 1.2.2 Assumption of responsiveness to incentives ........................................................... 17 1.2.3 Assumption of narrow selfishness ........................................................................... 18 1.2.4 Assumption of possessing rational expectations ..................................................... 19 1.3 Application of the RCT to the Behavior of the Suicide Bombers .................................. 20 1.3.1 Problems with rational explanation of suicide bombers’ choice ............................. 22 CHAPTER 2: OPENING THE “BLACK BOX” -MOTIVATIONS, REASONS AND CAUSES FOR SUICIDE MISSIONS ................................................................................... 26 2.1 Motivations and Reasons for the Choice of Suicide Attackers ...................................... 26 2.2 Causes of the Choice of Suicide Bombers ...................................................................... 33 CHAPTER 3: THE “BLACK BOX” MODEL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................... 37 3.1 The Psychological Perspective on Suicide Bombers’Choice ......................................... 37 3.1.1 Cognitive psychological theories and cognitive dissonance ................................... 38 3.1.2 Humiliation – aggression theory .............................................................................. 40 3.2 The Sociological Perspective on the Suicide Bombers Behavior ................................... 41 3.2.1The relative deprivation theory ................................................................................. 42 3.2.2 The social learning theory and normalization of violence....................................... 43 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 47 CEU eTD Collection REFERENCE LIST ............................................................................................................... 50 iii INTRODUCTION It is this apparent readiness to sacrifice oneself, perhaps more than any other fact, which makes the threat of suicide terrorism so large and so incomprehensible - Wintrobe, 2006 - On 24 January, 2011 a man and a woman entered the baggage reclaim area of the international airport Domodedovo in Moscow, Russia with an improvised explosive devise filled with about 5 kg of trinitrotoluene, the explosion of which resulted in the death of 35 people – nationals of 15 different countries. The motivations and reasons behind this horrifying act are still unclear, though the suspects are claimed to be the radical Islamist groups of the North Caucasus region. The numerous events of such nature have taken place in the human history, starting with crusaders and Japanese kamikazes, ending with the anarchists and radical religious groups. Clearly, the suicide bombings are unfortunate and puzzling actions from all possible perspectives one may look at it. Many questions arise including a one of humanist nature of how someone can for a cover of a good reason kill innocent people? And of rational nature of how it is possible that someone prefers to blow him- or herself up for the sake of some, not clearly identified, beliefs and goals. Thus, such acts pose a great challenge to the rational choice theory following which it is hard to claim that suicide bombers are rational agents, even if it intuitively seems to be the right position. How come it might be an option to bypass a large part of ones future utility, when it is presumed that individuals act in such a way as to CEU eTD Collection maximize their own utility? Various theories of behaviors have been providing their view of the nature of suicide bombers’ choice. The most plausible to a general public seem to be the idea of psychopathy 1 and high hatred level of the actors (Pittel & Rubbelke, 2009). However, recent findings show that this is not what motivates most terrorists (Wetherston, 2003) rather the feeling of belongingness to a group and presence of overall good purpose (Routledge & Arndt, 2008, Wintrobe, 2006). Therefore, some still argue that it is due to true belief system that suicide bombers have (Allen, 2002); others claim it is due to the financial remuneration their families will receive (Pape, 2003). The most diplomatic ones say that all of these factors and many more might be playing a role in decision-making and that it is strongly dependent on the case by case basis. Before going into profound discussion of the rationality and motivations it is necessary to define terrorist mission and particularly suicide terrorism. Some authors think that the attackers use suicide bombing as one of the vital methods to fight against a much stronger enemy (Evans, 2005; Madsen, 2005; Pape, 2003, 2005). Others argue that the suicide bombing is the revengeful result of the constant humiliation of a certain group, be it nation or a social group, by their enemies (Altman, 2005; Haqqani & Kimmage, 2005). Thus, suicide bombers are seen as the only available army that might be of some effect against the enemy (Allen, 2002). Some of the scholars exclude the individual sets that make up a group of suicide terrorists and rather claim that the only important way to understand the motivations is to analyze the terrorist organizations (Gambetta, 2006; Pape, 2005) since it provides some sort of reliable data and sources; whereas, to analyze suicide bombers’ behavior is difficult because 1) they ceased to exist and thus are physically unapproachable, and 2) it is an analysis of individuals and the nature of individuals has proved to be less consistent than that of an organization. Though I accept the idea that CEU eTD Collection terrorist organizations play a vital role in such points as process of alienation and so-called “brain washing” of the actors who ally themselves with the organization’s goals, still the actual actors are not just puppets in the hands of organizations; at least not in the beginning, when the decision of joining organization and at many times even becoming a martyr is 2 taking place. Ernest Evans (2005) believes that most of the suicide terrorists are rational individuals who have same desires, wishes and motivations as all of us. Even though mostly suicide attacks are analyzed on the level of terrorist organizations, they still should be looked at on three, rather than one, levels of analysis: the individuals, the terrorist organizations, and the environmental levels (Moghadam, 2006). Actors from all these levels experience different motivations that drive this triangle of terrorist attacks. The
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