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Schlicht, Ekkehart: Economic Surplus and Derived Demand
Schlicht, Ekkehart: Economic Surplus and Derived Demand Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-17 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Online at https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.940 Economic Surplus and Derived Demand Ekkehart Schlicht∗ Introduction A M (, v.vi.) has pointed out that most demand – especially labor demand – is derived from the demand for some other product. He wrote: “To take another illustration, the direct demand for houses gives rise to a joint demand for the labour of all the various building trades, and for bricks, stone, wood, etc. which are factors of production of building work of all kinds, or as we may say for shortness, of new houses. The demand for any one of these, as for instance the labour of plasterers, is only an indirect or derived demand.” This note demonstrates that the usual analysis of economic rent, as typically ex- plained for the case of consumers’ surplus, carries over to the case of derived demand. The assertion comes as no surprise; rather such is typically presupposed in all kinds of cost-benefit considerations involving derived demand, yet there is, to the best of my knowledge, no demonstration to the be found in the texbooks or the literature. This note is intended to fill the gap. ∗Institutional Economics Group, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Schackstr. , Munich, Germany, e-mail: [email protected], web: www.lmu.de/tpe/ekkehart. I thank Robert Schlicht for a simplifying suggestion. Derived Demand Consider a market for a consumer good with the falling demand curve (inverse demand function) p = p (x) , p′ < 0 () where x denotes the quantity demanded at price p. -
The Politics of Market Reform Altering State Development Policy in Southern Africa
ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 3rd Quarter 2013 The Politics of Market Reform Altering State Development Policy in Southern Africa SHAUKAT ANSARI* Introduction outh Africa’s transition from a racially exclusive apartheid state to a liberal democracy—referred to as a “double transition” to denote the economic dynamics behind the political transformation—has attracted the attention of a substantial number of researchers from a variety of disciplines.1 The topic of radical transformation in the African NationalS Congress’s (ANC) official position on state developmental policy has aroused perhaps the greatest interest among scholars. Prior to 1994, few observers would have predicted that the white minority in South Africa would relinquish its formal rule predicated on racial domination while avoiding the initiation of structural transformations involving a fundamen- tal reorientation of existing social relations. Yet, the end of apartheid and the liberation movement’s victory did not result in the transformation of capitalist social-property relations. In fact, upon taking power, the ANC implemented a homegrown, neoliberal structural adjustment program that opened South Africa to foreign economic interests and propelled the coun- try down a path of market liberalization. Explanations offered by scholars to account for this policy shift within the ANC can be roughly divided into two competing models. According to the first one, the South African government’s ability to maneuver was se- verely restricted by structural constraints imposed by international and domestic business interests in a post–Cold War environment. The fact that *The author is a doctoral candidate at the University of Toronto in the Department of Political Science. -
Lecture Notes for Chapter 7
Efficiency, Exchange, and the Invisible Hand in Action Chapter 7 McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Learning Objectives 1. Define and explain the differences between accounting profit, economic profit, and normal profit 2. Explain the Invisible Hand Theory and show how economic profit and economic loss affect the allocation of resources across industries 3. Explain why economic profit, unlike economic rent, tends toward zero in the long run 4. Identify whether the market equilibrium is socially efficient, and explain why no opportunities for gain remain open for individuals when a market is in equilibrium 5. Calculate total economic surplus and explain how it is affected by policies that prevent the market from reaching equilibrium 7-2 1 Markets Are Dynamic • Every time you see one of these signs, you see the market dynamics at work: – Store for Lease – Going Out of Business Sale • Everything Must Go – Now Open – Close-Out Model – Under New Management 7-3 The Invisible Hand • Individuals act in their own interests – Aggregate outcome is collective well-being • Profit motive – Produces highly valued goods and services – Allocates resources to their highest value use • Jon Stewart does not wait tables 7-4 2 Accounting Profit • Most common profit idea Accounting profit = total revenue – explicit costs – Explicit costs are payments firms make to purchase • Resources (labor, land, etc.) and • Products from other firms • Easy to compute • Easy to compare across firms 7-5 Economic Profit -
Evolutionary Economics - Geoffrey M
FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS - Evolutionary Economics - Geoffrey M. Hodgson EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS Geoffrey M. Hodgson University of Hertfordshire Business School, Hatfield, Hertfordshire Al10 0ab, UK Keywords: Evolution, Economics, Novelty, Innovation, Darwinism, Variation, Selection, Replication, Game Theory. Contents 1. Introduction 2. The Emergence of Evolutionary Economics 3. First Principles and Shared Concerns 4. Different Evolutionary Approaches 5. The Search for General Evolutionary Principles 6. Evolutionary and Mainstream Economics Compared 7. Evolutionary Economics and Evolutionary Game Theory 8. Conclusion: Prospects for Evolutionary Economics Acknowledgements Glossary Bibliography References Biographical Sketch Summary Historically, a number of approaches in economics, including works by Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall, Thorstein Veblen, Joseph Schumpeter, and Friedrich Hayek, have been described as ‘evolutionary’. This is legitimate, because ‘evolutionary’ is a very broad word, loosely denoting concern with transformation, innovation and development. But today the term ‘evolutionary economics’ is more typically associated with a new wave of theorizing signaled by the seminal work of Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter in their Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). Although there is not yet any consensus on core principles, this wave of evolutionary thinking has given rise to a number of policy developments and has proved to be influentialUNESCO in a number of sub-disciplines, – inEOLSS business schools and in institutions concerned with science and innovation policy. Citation and other bibliometric studies show that despite its internal diversity, modern evolutionary economics has created a global network of identifiable interacting researchers. As well as discussing these background issues,SAMPLE this essay turns to theore CHAPTERStical principles and outlines some of the shared common assumptions of this broad approach. -
Pierre Clastres As Comparative Political Theorist : the Democratic Potential of the New Political Anthropology
This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Pierre Clastres as comparative political theorist : the democratic potential of the new political anthropology Holman, Christopher 2017 Holman, C. (2017). Pierre Clastres as comparative political theorist : the democratic potential of the new political anthropology. European Journal of Political Theory. doi:10.1177/1474885117729772 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145146 https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885117729772 © 2017 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. This paper was published in European Journal of Political Theory and is made available with permission of SAGE Publications. Downloaded on 26 Sep 2021 06:51:29 SGT PIERRE CLASTRES AS COMPARATIVE POLITICAL THEORIST: THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF THE NEW POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Christopher Holman Advanced publication in European Journal of Political Theory in 2017. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1474885117729772 Introduction: Clastres and the Project of Comparative Political Theory Within the history of 20th century French ideas the philosopher-turned-anthropologist Pierre Clastres holds a significant place.1 In particular, Clastres’ ethnological work detailing the social structure of indigenous Amazonian societies and the political mechanisms through which this structure is instituted – in particular their rejection of coercive power in the name of a principle of equality – influenced a generation of some of the most talented democratic political theorists in France, such -
Thorstein Veblen and American Social Criticism Joseph Heath Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Thorstein Veblen Is P
Thorstein Veblen and American Social Criticism Joseph Heath Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Thorstein Veblen is perhaps best thought of as America’s answer to Karl Marx. This is sometimes obscured by the rather unfortunate title of his most important work, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), which misleading, insofar as it suggests that the book is just a theory of the “leisure class.” What the book provides is in fact a perfectly general theory of class, not to mention property, economic development, and social evolution. It is, in other words, a system of theory that rivals Marx’s historical materialism with respect to scope, generality and explanatory power. Furthermore, it is a system of theory whose central predictions, with respect to the development of capitalism and the possibilities for emancipatory social change, have proven to be essentially correct. When stacked up against Marx’s prognostications, this success clearly provides the basis for what might best be described as an invidious comparison. For example, it is Veblen who, at the close of the 19th century, observed that “The exigencies of the modern industrial system frequently place individuals and households in juxtaposition between whom there is little contact in any other sense than that of juxtaposition. One's neighbors, mechanically speaking, often are socially not one's neighbors, or even acquaintances; and still their transient good opinion has a high degree of utility... It is evident, therefore, that the present trend of the development is in the direction of heightening the utility of conspicuous consumption as compared with leisure” (1899, ch. -
Thompson 2019-Dissertation Final
The Orphaned Past: Ache Autonomy and Relationality in Times of Change by Warren Thompson A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Anthropology) in the University of Michigan 2019 Doctoral Committee Professor Webb Keane, Chair Professor Bruce Mannheim Professor Erik Mueggler Associate Professor Suzanne Oakdale, University of New Mexico Professor Emeritus Thomas Trautmann Warren Thompson [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6963-2175 © Warren Thompson 2019 Acknowledgments The writing of this dissertation was made possible through a Block Grant Write- Up Fellowship and a Rackham Fellowship from the University of Michigan’s Anthropology Department. Research was funded through a doctoral research grant from the Fulbright Institute of International Education, a Rackham International Research Award from the University of Michigan, and two Dokumentation bedrohter Sprachen (DoBeS) grants administered through the Max Plank Institute for Psycholinguistics (MPI) in Nijmegen. I am grateful to these institutions for their support over the years. In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to Jost Gippert and Sebastian Drude for their advice and direction during the DoBeS grants and to Alexander Konig and Nick Wood at the MPI for technical support and the digitalization of a number of near-ruined recordings. The University of Michigan provided a stimulating intellectual environment to work through the ideas of this dissertation. The work of my committee members, Webb Keane, Bruce Mannheim, Erik Mueggler, Suzanne Oakdale, and Tom Trautmann has been an inspiration for my own, and their influence on the pages that follow will be clear to those familiar with their work. -
When Hosios Meets Phillips: Connecting Efficiency and Stability to Demand Shocks
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES When Hosios Meets Phillips: Connecting Efficiency and Stability to Demand Shocks Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Etienne Wasmer New York University Abu Dhabi and CEPR Philippe Weil Université libre de Bruxelles and CEPR February 2021 Working Paper 2018-13 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2018/13/ Suggested citation: Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas, Etienne Wasmer, Philippe Weil. 2021. “Search Demand Effects on Equilibrium Unemployment and a Wage Phillips Curve,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-13. https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2018-13 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. When Hosios meets Phillips: Connecting efficiency and stability to demand shocks Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau Etienne Wasmer Philippe Weil FRB of San Francisco NYU AD ULB and CEPR and CEPR February 2021* Please click here for the latest version Abstract In an economy with frictional goods and labor markets there exist a price and a wage that implement the constrained efficient allocation. This price maximizes the marginal revenue of labor, balancing a price and a trading effect on firm revenue, and this wage trades off the bene- fits of job creation against the cost of turnover in the labor market. We show under bargaining over prices and wages that a double Hosios condition: (i) implements the constrained efficient allocation; (ii) also minimizes the elasticity of labor market tightness and job creation to a de- mand shock, and; (iii) that the relative response of wages to that of unemployment to changes in demand flattens as workers lose bargaining power, and it is steepest when there is efficient rent sharing in the goods market between consumers and producers, thereby relating changes in the slope of a wage Phillips curve to the constrained efficiency of allocations. -
Economic Surplus Measurement in Multi-Market Models by Xueyan Zhao, John Mullen and Garry Griffith No. 2005-3
University of New England Graduate School of Agricultural and Resource Economics & School of Economics Economic Surplus Measurement in Multi-Market Models by Xueyan Zhao, John Mullen and Garry Griffith No. 2005-3 Working Paper Series in Agricultural and Resource Economics ISSN 1442 1909 http://www.une.edu.au/febl/EconStud/wps.htm Copyright © 2005 by University of New England. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided this copyright notice appears on all such copies. ISBN 1 86389 934 0 Economic Surplus Measurement in Multi-Market Models ∗ Xueyan Zhao, John Mullen and Garry Griffith ∗∗ Abstract Despite continuing controversy, economic surplus concepts have continued to be used in empirical cost-benefit analyses as measures of welfare to producers and consumers. In this paper, the issue of measuring changes in producer and consumer surplus resulting from exogenous supply or demand shifts in multi-market models is examined using a two-input and two-output equilibrium displacement model. When markets are related through both demand and supply, it is shown that significant errors are possible when conventional economic surplus areas are used incorrectly. The economic surplus change to producers or consumers should be measured sequentially in the two markets and then added up. Key Words: equilibrium displacement model, multi-market, economic surplus, R&D evaluation ∗ The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions to this work of Professor Roley Piggott, University of New England, and Professor Bill Griffiths, University of Melbourne. ∗∗ Xueyan Zhao is Senior Lecturer, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University. -
All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices*
All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices* Joao Montez Nicolas Schutz November 13, 2020 Abstract We study production in advance in a setting where firms first source inventories that remain unobservable to rivals, and then simultaneously set prices. In the unique equilibrium, each firm occasionally holds a sale relative to its reference price, resulting in firms sometimes being left with unsold inventory. In the limit as inventory costs become fully recoverable, the equilibrium converges to an equilibrium of the game where firms only choose prices and produce to order|the associated Bertrand game (examples of which include fully-asymmetric clearinghouse models). Thus, away from that limit, our work generalizes Bertrand-type equilibria to production in advance, and challenges the commonly-held view associating production in advance with Cournot outcomes. The analysis involves, as an intermediate step, mapping the price-inventory game into an asymmetric all-pay contest with outside options and non-monotonic winning and losing functions. We apply our framework to public policy towards information sharing, mergers, cartels, and taxation. Keywords: Oligopoly, inventories, production in advance, all-pay contests. 1 Introduction Most retail markets are characterized by production in advance, as each store chooses not only its price but also its inventory level, sourced from suppliers and made readily available *We thank the Editor, Christian Hellwig, three anonymous referees, Simon Anderson, Heski Bar-Isaac, Pierre Boyer, Mathijs Janssen, Bruno Jullien, S´ebastienMitraille, Volker Nocke, Hans-Theo Normann, Martin Peitz, Alexander Rasch, R´egisRenault, Markus Reisinger, Patrick Rey, Armin Schmutzler, Sandro Shelegia, Andre Speit, Yossi Spiegel, Roland Strausz, Thomas Tr¨oger,Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Ralph Winter, as well as many seminar and conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions. -
Instinct and Habit Before Reason: Comparing the Views of John Dewey, Friedrich Hayek and Thorstein Veblen
Instinct and Habit before Reason: Comparing the Views of John Dewey, Friedrich Hayek and Thorstein Veblen Geoffrey M. Hodgson 2 July 2005 Published in Advances in Austrian Economics The Business School, University of Hertfordshire, De Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK http://www.herts.ac.uk/business http://www.geoffrey-hodgson.ws Address for correspondence: Malting House, 1 Burton End, West Wickham, Cambridgeshire CB1 6SD, UK [email protected] KEY WORDS: Darwinism, reason, intentionality, habit, instinct, Veblen, Dewey, Hayek ABSTRACT This article compares the views of Veblen, Dewey and Hayek on the roles and relations between instinct, habit and reason. From a Darwinian perspective, it is shown that Veblen had a more consistent and developed position on this issue than others. While Dewey embraced instinct and especially habit in his early works, these concepts gradually disappeared from view. Despite their shared opposition to the rising behaviorist psychology, the works of both Dewey and Hayek bear the marks of its hegemony. Consequently, at least in the context addressed here, the works of Veblen deserve reconsideration. Instinct and Habit before Reason: Comparing the Views of John Dewey, Friedrich Hayek and Thorstein Veblen Geoffrey M. Hodgson „But in fact men are good and virtuous because of three things. These are nature, habit or training, reason.‟ Aristotle, The Politics (1962, p. 284) Among species on Earth, humans have the most developed capacity for reason, deliberation and conscious prefiguration.1 However, humans have evolved from other species. Their unique attributes have emerged by the gradual accumulation of adaptations. Our capacity for reason did not appear as a sudden and miraculous event. -
The Last Gasp of Neoliberalism
The Last Gasp of Neoliberalism John P. Watkins, Professor of Economics at Westminster College and James E. Seidelman, Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Former Provost at Westminster College [email protected] [email protected] Presented before the Association for Evolutionary Economics Allied Social Science Association Atlanta, Georgia January 4, 2019 Abstract: The ideas of both Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi shed light on understanding the last gasp of neoliberalism. The last gasp refers to Donald Trump’s abandonment of free trade, long considered a corner stone of the neoliberal agenda, and his overt attacks on democratic institutions. In Trump, neoliberalism’s attempt to overcome the gridlock of liberal democracy has revealed its fascist leanings. Both Polanyi and Veblen warned about the trend towards fascism. Trump got elected, in part, by filling the void left by the factioning of neoliberalism, in part by the injustice felt by people in rural areas, those with stagnant incomes, males, and others. Trump has transcended the neoliberal agenda, approaching market relations from the point-of- view of the fight. The emergence of a predatory culture, in both the domestic and international realms, resembles the cultural outlined in Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise. Trumps actions reveal the need to extend Polanyi’s idea of social protection given the the negative effects of modern technology and Trump’s efforts to limit some regulatory agencies. Changing demographics and the adverse reaction to Trump’s fascist leanings may yet see the emergence of a new progressive era, suggesting, at least, that Trump represents the last gasp of neoliberalism.