BSRV 29.2 (2012) 175–250 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897 doi: 10.1558/bsrv.v29i2.175 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (online) 1747-9681 ‘I’ without ‘I am’: On the Presence of Subjectivity in Early Buddhism, in the Light of Transcendental Phenomenology KHRISTOS NIZAMIS INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR
[email protected] ABSTRACT Investigating the Pāli suttas, compiled prior to the development of Abhi dhamma, from a phenomenological perspective reveals an internally coher ent and consistent doctrine/theory whose crucial theme is the intentionality and subjectivity of consciousness. Reductive interpretations tend to inter pret the basic Buddhist principle of ‘nonself ’, and its correlative repudia tion of the concept/conceit ‘I am’, as entailing a rejection of any genuine (phenomenological) meaningfulness for the term ‘I’ as a legitimate expres sion of subjectivity, intentionality, and consciousness. Indeed, it is occasion ally even claimed that Buddhas and Arahants cannot possess subjective intentional consciousness at all. In the following reflections, then, a few key aspects of an alternative (phenomenological) perspective upon early Pāli Buddhism are introduced and sketched out, whereby it is argued that the presence of subjective intentional consciousness, even in the case of Bud dhas and Arahants, is not only presupposed by the suttas, and is not only quite unproblematic for early Buddhist doctrine/theory, but is also actually of fundamental importance for the very possibility of Buddhist truth and practice. Thus, early Buddhist doctrine/theory is not only nonreductive; it also eminently invites a deep dialogue with, and a serious and detailed interpretation from the perspective of, Transcendental Phenomenology. Keywords anattā, consciousness, early Buddhism, Husserl, ‘I’, ‘I am’, intentionality, non-self, phenomenology, subjectivity © Equinox Publishing Ltd.