Securepost : Verified Group-Anonymity on Social Media
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SecurePost : Verified Group-Anonymity on Social Media Michael Nekrasov Daniel Iland Miriam Metzger UC Santa Barbara UC Santa Barbara UC Santa Barbara [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Ben Zhao Elizabeth Belding UC Santa Barbara UC Santa Barbara [email protected] [email protected] Abstract maintaining credibility. These two requirements provide a need that existing tools do not adequately address. We As Internet freedoms are increasingly threatened both at cater to these requirements through SecurePost, a novel home and abroad, marginalized groups, such as journal- tool for verified group-anonymity on social media. Se- ists, activists, and government watchdogs require new curePost developed through research and partnerships tools to retain free and open discourse on-line. In this pa- with affected individuals as a means of balancing per- per, we introduce SecurePost - a tool for verified group sonal anonymity with group credibility. In this paper we anonymity on social media. SecurePost gives social me- present the research that went into developing Secure- dia posters anonymity while safeguarding group credi- Post, its technical contributions and operation, and an bility through the use of revocable asymmetric keys and evaluation of our work. an anonymizing proxy. It provides trust to readers via the use of HMAC verification signatures appended to posts verifying integrity and authenticity of a post. We 2 Research into Internet Freedom root our work in survey-based research and ethnographic interviews conducted with marginalized groups in Mon- As the basis for developing SecurePost, we partnered golia, Turkey, and Zambia from 2014 to 2016. Secure- with communities directly affected by censorship. We Post widens the toolkit of security applications, by giving sought to design a tool that would augment the commu- vulnerable communities a way of balancing individual nication of these communities while paying heed to re- anonymity and safety with group credibility. strictions imposed by needs and existing usage patterns. To that end, we conducted ethnographic interviews and survey-based research from 2014 to 2016 in three distinct 1 Introduction communities: Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Lusaka, Zambia. Worldwide, the Internet is a critical medium for the ex- We selected these countries as a cross-section into change of ideas. Due to its importance, the United Na- global censorship. They are in differing levels of socio- tions has declared Internet access and free speech basic economic development, with disparate cultural and his- human rights [34, 35]. However, Internet freedoms are torical backgrounds, leading to a variety of censorship under attack globally [23, 32, 7, 18, 15, 19]. Even liberal strategies. Moreover, the research examining censor- democracies increasingly restrict content [3, 13]. By lim- ship for these countries is sparse compared to China iting the ability for groups to organize and share ideas, [39, 17, 6, 37] and the Middle East [2, 4, 21]. We believe governments and corporations are able to suppress voices our work could bring new perspectives to the discussion that are critical to a functioning democracy. Limiting In- of Internet censorship. ternet freedom limits personal freedom. In total, across the three countries we surveyed 525 Censorship of mainstream social media is a challenge individuals, conducted 109 formal interviews, as well as not adequately addressed by existing counter-censorship informal conversations with dozens more. We obtained tools. On the one hand, groups seeking to broadcast their IRB approval prior to conducting the user studies. We ideas to the widest possible audience prefer social media predominantly interacted with higher socio-economic as the platform for communication due to its pervasive- status participants compared to the overall populations. ness. On the other hand, out of fear of reprisal, indi- In the interviews we focused on individuals vulnerable viduals in a group may wish to retain anonymity while to Internet censorship. They included journalists, politi- 1 cal groups, LGBT activists, government watchdogs, aca- terviewed at the Zambian Watchdog (ZWD) indicated demics, and other individuals vulnerable to persecution that they maintain anonymous blogs to avoid being mon- and censorship. All three countries have harsh laws lim- itored by government authorities when discussing sensi- iting on-line content with frequent examples of censor- tive issues. Yet others object to the use of anonymity and ship [31, 10, 11, 16, 28, 26]. lack of a physical address for accountability and verifica- We sought to understand how individuals and groups tion, which they say has led the ZWD to lose credibility are affected by Internet censorship, and the limitations among some readers. of currently available security tools. Our team included Anonymous accounts can get lost in the noise, find- experts from computer science, communication, and film ing it difficult to establish trust. Increasingly, adversaries and media studies. We used descriptive statistics of sur- generate spam [36] and fake-news [1] to drown out com- vey data coupled with ethnographic analysis of inter- peting ideas. Journalists whose livelihood depends on views to guide initial design. We coupled this with iter- reputation find it difficult to resolve anonymous commu- ative critique from participants during the development nication and reputation building. of SecurePost to guide design decisions. For brevity, this Additionally, masking public identity of an account paper focuses on research outcomes related to verified is not enough, as social media platforms are inundated group anonymity. We provide a more comprehensive ex- with information requests and may co-operate with gov- ploration of insights from our research on Internet free- ernments or corporations to reveal IPs of users and tie dom in [22]. identities to individual posts [33, 8]. Requiring all users Our research focused on nation capitals, which have to use VPNs or Tor [29] for each post is often unrealistic a far greater adoption of technology than the rural coun- as groups can be composed of posters with varying tech- tryside. Capitals are also epicenters of journalism and nological expertise, and a single mistake can be costly. political activism, as well as censorship battlegrounds. In more extreme cases, adversaries confiscate devices al- Our results confirm global trends in these local contexts. lowing access to their applications [30]. The majority of participants in our research used smart- phones, usually running Android, as the primary means 3 Verified Group-Anonymity of accessing the Internet. This is in line with global statistics, where, as of 2016, 49% of the world’s popu- Based on participant feedback, we designed Secure- lation had a mobile-broadband subscription, while only Post to protect groups against some of the unmet cen- 12% had fixed broadband subscriptions [24]. In terms sorship challenges outlined in Section 2. While in- of operating system, as of end of 2016, Android made dividuals can communicate privately and anonymously up 82% of the market share [12]. We therefore targeted amongst themselves using a variety of existing security mobile devices running Android for development. tools, groups encounter difficulties communicating pub- The majority of our participants used social media to licly when confronted with censorship. SecurePost seeks communicate on-line, with Facebook the most used on- to address this by providing a mechanism for verified line social network in all three countries. Globally, as of group-anonymity for mainstream social media. We pro- June 2017, Facebook had approximately 2 billion active vide its technical description in Section 4. users [27], the most of any social media platform. The SecurePost allows individual members of groups to majority of our participants reported limiting their social share a single group identity, while retaining individual media usage and self-censoring content due to feeling anonymity. When a member of a SecurePost group posts unsafe on-line. For participants, the use of purpose-built on social media, the identity of the poster is not tied to social media platforms for anonymity, such as [5], would the post. The identity is hidden from the network, which be unsuitable as the expansive active user base of top so- may be monitored by government, corporations, or other cial media sites provides a substantially broader audience adversaries. The identity is also hidden from other mem- than other platforms. We therefore selected Facebook bers of the group. So, the group itself has a social media and, due to its similarity and high usage rate, Twitter, as presence that builds trust, while adversaries are unable to the primary social media platforms to support. link specific individuals to a particular post, giving indi- A key frustration voiced by our participants is the viduals plausible deniability. clash between anonymity and trust. The public relies Because preserving credibility is important, Secure- on the reputation of an account or organization to pro- Post allows compatibility with existing social media ac- duce trustworthy content. However, reputable accounts counts. So, users may choose to form groups based on with self-identifying information are targets for oppres- existing organizations. For example, SecurePost allows a sion [9, 20]. To avoid prosecution (or worse), users newspaper, like The Zambian Post, to use their name and sometimes