ENSURING a FUTURE for DETECTING INTERNET DISRUPTIONS a Field Survey of the Ecosystem Around Internet Censorship, Disruptions, and Shutdowns

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ENSURING a FUTURE for DETECTING INTERNET DISRUPTIONS a Field Survey of the Ecosystem Around Internet Censorship, Disruptions, and Shutdowns ENSURING A FUTURE FOR DETECTING INTERNET DISRUPTIONS A Field Survey of the Ecosystem Around Internet Censorship, Disruptions, and Shutdowns JUNE 2017 Acknowledgements About New America Thank you to the following for their contributions to this New America is committed to renewing American politics, work: Collin Anderson, Seamus Tuohy, Liz Woolery, Georgia prosperity, and purpose in the Digital Age. We generate big Bullen, and Enrique Piracés. ideas, bridge the gap between technology and policy, and curate broad public conversation. We combine the best of a policy research institute, technology laboratory, public Thank you also to the members of the internet forum, media platform, and a venture capital fund for measurement community who took the time to participate ideas. We are a distinctive community of thinkers, writers, in this research. researchers, technologists, and community activists who believe deeply in the possibility of American renewal. Find out more at newamerica.org/our-story. About OTI The Open Technology Institute (OTI) works at the intersection of technology and policy to ensure that every community has equitable access to digital technology and its benefits. We promote universal access to communications technologies that are both open and secure, using a multidisciplinary approach that brings together advocates, researchers, organizers, and innovators. Find out more at www.newamerica.org/oti. OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE Contents Executive Summary 2 Introduction 4 Overview of the State of Shutdown Measurement 10 Introduction to Recommendations 15 Recommendations 18 Conclusion 31 Appendices 32 Notes 43 OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY When it comes to the internet, we live in a world of of researchers that study internet censorship, contradictions. While global internet connectivity developing software and publishing papers on is skyrocketing, governments are increasingly the structure of filtering systems. These studies attempting to control their citizens’ access to the are limited in their scope because of the narrow internet, by enacting policies and investing in community of funders and institutions that fund infrastructure that gives them the ability to restrict this work. As a result, researchers have prioritized the information that their citizens can access online. tool creation and fixed-term research projects, In recent years, researchers, journalists, and civil rather than platform maintenance and long-term society have documented an increase in global data collection. Until recently, those supporting internet censorship. Attempts to curtail the free flow the measurement community have not required or of information can be sophisticated or blunt, and rewarded collaboration with organizations outside have included the shutdown of telecommunications of the technical community. networks in targeted regions for extended periods of time. In response to these examples of government Developing an internet measurement community information control, diverse groups of stakeholders that can create, sustain, and explain data-heavy are coming together to advocate against disruptions. outputs focused on highlighting and stopping Recent examples of network shutdowns in several internet shutdowns will require more formal and African countries during elections and periods sustained efforts to collect internet measurements. of political unrest have shown that network Socioeconomic research and advocacy efforts measurement data can be an important tool to that focus on internet shutdowns remain partially demonstrate harm to a broad audience, including to constrained by incomplete information. There is other governments and international organizations. still no common understanding of what sites or applications are blocked across the world, nor Measurement of internet censorship began in the any historical or real time accounts of disruptions. academic computer science field well over a decade Measurement initiatives will have to broaden the ago, starting with the study of nascent filtering geographic and infrastructural diversity of their systems such as China’s Great Firewall. These data collection, and expand to cover more aspects efforts matured in scope and technical design over of internet use. Moreover, recent interventions have time, and branched out to include new areas of shown that data collected by researchers outside expertise, including social scientists and country- of the censorship measurement field can play a specific experts. There is now an active community central role in describing disruptions, necessitating 2 OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE a multi-stakeholder effort that protects for sensitive Building a more inclusive and responsive data sources. To effect policy change, non-technical community will be a slow process, and will require experts will need defensible data that can be facilitation through trusted, independent entities. presented in a factual manner without requiring As a result, a cross-platform dashboard on the intimate knowledge of the technical nuances of internet, mentioned in many of our interviews as network measurement or the underlying datasets. the ideal tool for the community, is still a distant Taken together, the next generation of measurement ambition. These recommendations are targeted, initiatives will require substantial financial medium-term actions that will incrementally investment and structured coordination among all build professional practices and structures around stakeholders. collaboration. A strong, collaborative community of censorship measurement researchers, developers, In order to document the state of measurement- and non-technical stakeholders will help to based research on internet censorship and document all abuses of government censorship disruptions, OTI conducted a series of interviews and improve people’s ability to access the internet with a number of key stakeholders. This paper is around the world. intended to provide a brief overview of current efforts in the censorship measurement community and focuses on recommendations to support the availability and accessibility of data on internet censorship. Primarily, we recommend the creation of: • Collaborative structures for data-sharing and coordination; • Processes that allow the sharing of private- sector datasets and proprietary information within trusted communities; • Funding and resources for long-term maintenance of measurement systems, and targeted support for rapid response interventions; and, • Shared resources for comparison and presentation of measurement data. OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE Ensuring a Future for Detecting Internet Disruptions 3 INTRODUCTION Today, two-thirds of the world’s internet1 users to blocking applications and persecuting users for live in countries where content that challenges their online activities.3 In addition to an already political regimes, social conventions, or national diverse portfolio of techniques, governments are security is subject to censorship.2 Over time, internet increasingly engaging in the complete shutdown of censorship has expanded from restricting access the internet or telecommunication services within to IP addresses and domain names for websites, their borders.4 Governments now have the ability to Figure 1 | Freedom House Freedom on the Net Map Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016, Silencing the Messenger: Communication Apps Under Pressure, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2016. 4 OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE Figure 2 | Blocked Twitter Account Ranking Digital Rights. 2015 Corporate Accountability Index. (Ranking Digital Rights. 2015), 25. https://rankingdigitalrights.org/index2015/assets/static/download/RDRindex2015report.pdf apply shutdowns and other restrictions in a more at stake. While private-sector organizations targeted manner, and authorities commonly cut and governments typically do not engage in off specific regions in response to local instability, public advocacy, they have natural interests dissent, or insecurity. As more governments in the prevention of interference and play an place onerous restrictions to prevent the free flow important role that is relevant to the measurement of information, and directly contradict widely- ecosystems.7 accepted international commitments on human rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human For these stakeholders, censorship measurement Rights, there is an even greater need to shine a is a means to an end. By developing better tools bright light on these practices. This report offers an and providing robust data sets that are accessible, overview of the state of censorship measurement open, and usable, censorship measurement efforts research in order to provide recommendations could allow non-technical stakeholders to more that would make rigorous measurement data more easily substantiate claims of internet censorship available to interested stakeholders, all in service and empower a range of actors to more effectively to the ultimate goal of protecting and promoting challenge abusive practices. The same effort would internet freedom around the world.5 allow social scientists and economists to produce rigorous cross-disciplinary research on the impact Governments have been able to engage in and trends of internet censorship.8 The potential censorship and disruption without repercussions benefits of increased data can be seen in recent because these practices have been opaque to efforts to quantify the financial impact of internet the international
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