Downloaded from Brill.Com09/27/2021 07:19:33PM Via Free Access | Regime Change and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia

8 Dayak politics, Reformasi and beyond (1998-2005) The unexpected fall of the New Order regime in May 1998 drasti- cally changed Indonesian politics. Democratic institutions that had been co-opted for decades were restored. New political freedoms led to the blossoming of activities previously considered seditious. Ethnic politics, which had been repressed, found room to manoeuvre. In many parts of the country, the indigenous populations demanded the rights of putra daerah, which were usually translated into leadership positions in the local government. In West Kalimantan the Dayaks were first to seize the op- portunity to openly organize themselves on the basis of ethnicity and to pursue ethnic political objectives. Immediately after the fall of the New Order, Dayaks were on the streets demanding the installation of Dayak district heads in two districts. This chapter examines the role of Reformasi, or the reform era after the New Order, in Dayak politics and how Dayak politics has evolved since. In order to understand the early development of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan, we first discuss how West Kalimantan experienced the political transition and the intensive Dayak political lobbies includ- ing responses from the government and the other major ethnic group, the Malays. Activities of a group of Dayak NGOs under Pancur Kasih had been largely non-political or at least avoided political lobbying. Nonetheless they had an impact on Dayaks politics, particularly after some of their former leaders began to join political parties in the early 2000s. The decline of inter-ethnic politics as well as the effects of elec- toral changes on the politics of the Dayaks will also be examined. © Taufiq Tanasaldy, 2012 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NonDerivative 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC-NDTaufiq 3.0) Tanasaldy License. - 9789004253483 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:19:33PM via free access | Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia dayak politics at the beginning of reformasi Political dynamics in Jakarta since 1996, when the regime sponsored the violent takeover of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, only gradually permeated West Kalimantan. The province did not experience large- scale student demonstrations like those in the national capital until April 1998, when the secretariat of the provincial legislature recorded reform- related demonstrations. Demonstrations sprang up after the Trisakti incident1 and intensified after the fall of Soeharto. There were fourteen demonstrations or visits to the DPRD in May and fifteen in June 1998, compared to only two in April.2 Prior to the Trisakti incident, local newspapers recorded a few small, mostly on-campus demonstrations in April and May 1998 (Akcaya, 15-4, 22-4, 27-4, 8-5 and 13-5-1998). Reform activities in West Kalimantan after the fall of the New Order shared many similarities with those in Jakarta and other areas. The focus first addressed the problems of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (termed KKN, korupsi kolusi nepotisme) in the executive and called for the resignation of officials accused of corrupt practices (Akcaya, 25-6, 7-7, 5-8-1998). The main target was the incumbent Governor Aswin, who had faced a series of impeachment attempts by members of DPRD supported by university students. Newspapers also reported calls for the district heads of Sanggau and Kapuas Hulu to resign.3 Despite popular demands, these executive heads managed to retain their positions until the official end of their terms in office. The next focus was empowerment of the DPRD. During the New Order era, the DPRD often acted as a mere rubber stamp for the provincial or district executive. After Reformasi, members of the DPRD came under pressure to distance themselves from the executive and to be critical of the executive. In response, DPRD members showed their independence of the executive during the district head elections of 1998 1 On 12 December 1998 four students from Trisakti University, who were involved in a demon- stration calling on Soeharto to resign and demanding democratic reform, were killed when the police opened fire. This incident was followed by riots between 13 and 15 May, the most serious targeting the Chinese and their property (Aspinall 2000:298). 2 ‘Daftar inventarisasi kegiatan penting DPRD Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat triwulan IV tahun 1997/1998’, 1998 and ‘Daftar inventarisasi kegiatan penting DPRD Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat triwulan I tahun 1998/1999’, 1998, in: Secretariat of DPRD Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak. 3 Akcaya, 17-6, 10-7 and 11-7-1998; ‘Forum warga Kapuas Hulu di Pontianak untuk reformasi’, 1998, in: Secretariat of DPRD Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak. 258 Taufiq Tanasaldy - 9789004253483 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:19:33PM via free access 8 Dayak politics, Reformasi and beyond (1998-2005) | and 1999. When students called on the governor to resign, many legisla- tors, particularly those from the PPP and PDI, supported the demands (Akcaya, 12-6-1998). The DPRD also became involved in other reform initiatives to show their new commitment to democratization. Many other demands resembled those expressed in Jakarta, such as demands to curb excessive military influence in politics, to install democratic institutions/agencies, to amend the outdated constitution, to implement decentralization and to solve a wide range of economic problems. One aspect of political reform that of particular interest in the peripheral regions was the empowerment of the native population. In West Kalimantan such movements were initially led by Dayaks who demanded more top jobs in the government and competed zealously against the Malays, for those political positions.4 Held in check during the authoritarian New Order, political polarization between the two ethnic groups was now unavoidable. Polarization and hostility between the Dayaks and Malays came from several sources. The Dayaks, although relatively marginalized, were the group more ready to take an aggressive stance. Many of the Dayak elite and young people came to understand that without aggressive and radi- cal political pressure they would not achieve political parity with Malays. Within the bureaucracy Malays would certainly take most of the leadership positions because they had a larger pool of qualified bureaucrats ready to assume those positions. Since most promotions in the executive were based on echelon or rank, the opportunities for Dayak bureaucrats to be appointed to higher posts were automatically limited, as there were only a few Dayaks in the higher echelons. Dayak bureaucrats would be further disadvantaged if ethnic and religious considerations came into play. As noted in Chapter 6, many executive bodies responsible for pro- cessing promotions were dominated by Muslims and Malays, who could play the ethnic or religious cards to block promotion.5 Some Dayak bureaucrats believed that the lack of Dayaks in the civil service and their lack of promotion were partly caused by such ceiling practices. Under 4 In West Kalimantan such political demands were complicated by the fact that there were two quite different native populations: the Dayaks and the Malays. The demands for local empowerment in West Kalimantan went beyond the simple native son (putra daerah) issue, and involved questions as to which native sons should be empowered, the Dayaks or the Malays (Bamba 2002a:6-7). 5 Besides Malays, Muslim ethnic groups in the bureaucracy included Javanese, Bugis, Banjarese, and Minangkabauan. During political competition between Malays and Dayaks, the Bugis, Banjarese, and Minangkabauans would very likely support the Malays because they shared the same religious affiliation. 259 Taufiq Tanasaldy - 9789004253483 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:19:33PM via free access | Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia normal circumstances, when higher positions became available to candi- dates, competition for the jobs was mostly among the Malay bureaucrats. The question of the political marginalization of the Dayaks during the New Order started to emerge as early as the 1970s, and the situation began to improve very slowly only in the mid-1990s. A new governor appointed a Dayak, Elyakim Simon Djalil, to head the training section of the human resources office in April 1994 (Akcaya, 29-01-2000). Although this was not the top position in the office, it was a strategic one with responsibility for assigning employees for training or education required for possible promotion.6 Two months earlier, the governor had planned to appoint a Dayak as district head of Sintang, although unfortunately the candidate failed to win the election, resulting in waves of Dayak protests. To compensate, a Dayak, Jacobus Layang, was finally appointed as district head in Kapuas Hulu in March 1995. Overall, these few ap- pointments did not change the fact that only a few Dayaks occupied high office until the end of the New Order Regime. Malay personnel, in contrast, had been enjoying better treatment during the Soeharto era. When the strategic posts, such as district head, were returned to local bureaucrats, they were awarded to Malays. Malays had occupied some district head positions since 1966, while the first Dayak district head during the New Order was not elected until 1995. The momentum toward an expanded role in government for the Dayaks developed only after the collapse of the New Order. district head elections All district head elections during the New Order were under the tight control of the provincial governor and local military commander. The regime usually had a favourite, but it still let the local DPRD accept public nominations so that the election would appear democratic. Whatever the result of public nominations, the governor’s favourite would always make the final list, and in most cases would be elected as district head. 6 This officer was transferred from the post in March 1995 (Akcaya, 29-01-2000).

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