“Christian Thomasius’ Psychology of Prejudices” Seminar on “Anthropology” Sixth International Congress on Enlightenment Brussels, Belgium July 25-27, 1983

Karl J. Fink

Few critics of the eighteenth century would disagree with the position given to

Thomasius as “father of the German Enlightenment,” a position gained through social and academic reform, and yet few would recognize the close parallel between this intellectual awakening in of the eighteenth century and the one in England of the seventeenth century.1 Although it is commonly known that Thomasius relied heavily on Locke and Hobbes for his thoughts on social reform, there is even stronger kinship to the efforts of (1561-1626).2 It was in the late sixteenth century that Bacon outlined the biases inherent in the studies in the natural much in the same way that Thomasius analyzed the prejudices basic to study in the emerging behavioral sciences of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the critical thoughts of these two individuals, one in the natural sciences and the other in the social sciences, are strikingly similar and, while it is not the goal of this paper to do a comparative analysis of Bacon and

Thomasius, it is important at the outset to establish this parallel, for Thomasius’ critical examination of human behavior sets the stage for German studies into the anthropological

1 White, Andrew D., Seven Great Statesmen in the Warfare of Humanity with Unreason (New York: The Century Co., 1915), pp. 113-161, lists Thomasius as the “second of the three great reformers in Germany,” following Luther and preceding Lessing, p. 161, while German critics have traditionally viewed Thomasius as representative of German Enlightenment, “das Licht der neuen Geistes freiheit,” Hermann Hettner, Geschichte der deutchen Literatur (: Paul List, 1928), p. 56. More recently critics have urged a closer look at the writings of Thomasius for their seminal value for the generation of German thinkers following in the late eighteenth century, one that would explain why he was thought of as “the prophet of a new dawn, as the spiritual father of what was best in the intellectual tradition of the German Enlightenment,” F.M. Barnard, “Thomasius’ Practical Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (1971), p.222. 2 Barnard, “Thomasius’ Practical Philosophy,” (1971), dismisses earlier scholarly opinion that Thomasius was an eclectic, arguing that “in most if not all thinkers, originality is largely a matter of degree,” p.222. nature of man.3 It is in this context that the index of British in Thomasius’ writings have significance for the development of eighteenth century theories of anthropological study. Thomasius’ views of man, language, and culture have intellectual affinity to Locke but are expressed in the spirit of Baconian reform and it is at this level of the history of the behavioral sciences that Thomasius plays a role.

There is another striking parallel from the turn of the century worth noting by way of an introduction to a study of epistemological questions asked by Thomasius.

Although one can find in ancient writings thoughts on the nature of man and culture, such study is generally considered an innovation beginning with ’s (1668-

1744) Scienza nuova (1725), a book which in many ways touches on most fields of the social sciences, including anthropology and psychology as well as history and culture.4

Yet it is a book which followed by two or three decades Thomasius’ essays on prejudice and on a psychology of man. In fact Thomasius perceived his work in social psychology to be pioneering for by the end of the seventeenth century he had already written several lessays on the of man and on specifically the means by which we can objectively

3 The protestant basis and the religious appeal in Bacon’s effort to objectify scientific investigation into nature, in his belief that “knowledge of God included the knowledge of self – of one’s ignorance, vanity, and corruption,” Gary Deason, The Philosophy of a Lord Chancellor: Religion, Science, and Politics in the Work of Francis Bacon (to be published), p. 242), is also central to Thomasius’ own effort to objectify knowledge about man. See also Hans M. Wolff, “Die Wiederentdeckung des servum arbitrium: Thomasius,” in: Die Weltanschauung der Deutschen Aufklärung (Bern: Francke, 1949), pp. 27-48, for close examination of the Protestant origins of Thomasius’ deep pessimism concerning the human condition and the progression to the view that the human will free of social influence can only be achieved through inner purity and individual perfection, p. 44. 4 See particularly Book I, “Establishment of Principles,” in Giambattista Vico, The New Science, T. Bergin and M. Fisch, transl., 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 27-106, which outlines the criterion of by which human institutions and cultures evolved and in which resides the “agreement between the vulgar wisdom of all lawgivers and the esoteric wisdom of the philosophers of greatest repute,” p. 106. For an historical survey of anthropological theories prior to Vico see Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 17-78).

2 study human attitudes, biases, beliefs, emotions and feelings.5 The questions which this study addresses are then focused on Thomasius’ development of critical tools for the analysis of human nature, tools which he developed as a method for the study of particularly socialization processes, processes which are conditioned by authorities in cultural and cross-cultural relationships. His views, it should be pointed out, had a double impact, first on the understanding of psychological problems in the relationship of dominant and recessive cultures and, secondly, in bringing German culture a step forward in its maturation as a society independent of foreign dominance and independent in its scientific and literary achievements.6 This study deals only with the first of these two contributions, with his examination of psychological barriers to cultural development.

The second, namely his contribution to the maturation of German culture, has previously been stated in broad terms of Enlightenment philosophy.

Thomasius’ essay on “De Praejudiciis oder von den Vorurteilen” first appeared as a lecture in 1689 at the University of Leipzig.7 It was offered to students as an alternative to lectures in which he planned to defend himself against the accusations made by an orientalist, August Pfeiffer, accusations that he was an atheist. But the University of

Leipzig did not allow him to give these lectures, and so he decided upon a series of

5 Wolf, Erik, Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1963), devotes chapter ten to Thomasius, recognizing that “Die Anthropologie des Thomsius, beschränkte sich demnoch auf eine psychologische Analyse des Menschen als Einselwesen in seinen Beziehungen zur Umwelt,” p. 399. Yet it seems Thomasius’ science of man is hardly known outside of the German scholarly tradition for recent anglo-american histories of the field do not mention early German theories of anthropology as for example in the chapter on the Enlightenment in Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (New York: Crowell, 1968), pp. 8-52. 6 Wolf, Grosse Rechtsdenker (1963), felt that Thomasius’ anthropology as well as his epistemology and ethics combined to form a psychology: “Die Grundlage der Anthropologie, Erkenntnislehre und Ethik des Thomasius bildete demfolge die Psychologie,” p. 398. Max Dessoir, Geschichte der Neueren Deutschen Psychologie, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker, 1902), Vol. 1, p. 59, also recognized in Thomasius’ study of man a unification of ethics and psychology. 7 Thomasius, Christian, “De praejudiciis oder von den Vorurteilen,” Die Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, in: Aus der Frühzeit der Deutschen Aufklärung, ed. Fritz Brüggemann (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 1972), pp. 30-42. All translations into English are by the present author.

3 lectures illuminating his particular dilemma, lectures which dealt with the interference of prejudices in social and intellectual behavior. The University’s censorship of his defense against accusations of was fortunate, for the lecture on prejudices became the cornerstone of his study of human behavior in cross-cultural settings. The lecture therefore forms the basis of his role as “father of the German Enlightenment.”8

Thomasius distinguished between two kinds of prejudices, the prejudice of authority (autoritatis) and that of precipitancy (praecipitantiae), or the prejudices of appearance (Ansehen) and hastiness (Übereilung).9 Thomasisus’ primary concern was analysis of man’s deference to authority and it was this investigation into the psychology of human behavior that became a challenge to all established corners of social and political life in the early phase of Grman Enlightenment thought. Following the lectures in 1689 he twice published his thoughts on the prejudices of the human mind, once in

1691 in a short and concise version found in the last chapter of his Einleitung zu der

Vernunftlehre and again in 1696 in the first chapter of Ausübung der Sittenlehre where he argued that the sources of these two prejudices are found in the corruption of the human will, which he asserted is subject to further prejudices, the prejudices of imitation

(Nachahmung) and impatience (Ungeduld).10 And so Thomasius felt that the prejudices of the mind, authority and precipitancy, evolved from the tendency of the human will to submit to imitation and impatience.

8 Dessoir, Geschichte der Psychologie (1902), Vol. 1, p. 56, “So war er in gewissem Betracht der Anfänger des 18. Jahrhunderts, der Vater der Aufklärung und der Begründer jener norddeutschen Lebensauffassung, die spatter die Litteratur und Schule sich unterwerfen, in Lessing und Friedrich dem Grossen gipfeln sollte.” 9 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1972), p. 39. 10 Thomasius, “Von denen Ursachen des allgemeinen Unglücks,” Ausbildung der Sittenlehre, ed. Brüggeman (1972), pp. 43-60, deals more specifically with the sources of prejudice in later writings, a direction which brings his study of human nature closer to ethics and philosophy.

4 In the thirteenth chapter of his introduction to the Vernunftlehre he characterized human behavior as it affects the errors in reasoning: “we can do nothing more suitable than to look at the development of people beginning with their youth, so that we may perceive in what period the errors of reasoning originate.”11 Thomasius observed that, although man is supposedly a more advanced creature than any other animal, this advantage is diminished in youth, for many animals are born closer to their full maturity than are human beings. Thus there begins in small children a developmental process strongly influenced by the culture of those in their immediate sphere of existence.

Thomasius like Locke believed the mind was an “empty cabinet” at birth, and that it was conditioned by the stuff of culture and the manner of reasoning typical of the child’s environment. Thomasius felt this process was in part linguistic for children first recognize primarily the sounds designating their surroundings, the signis, and only later are they aware of symbolization of the concepts, the signa, which designate their perception of the environment: “They believe that the sign (signum) and the being

(Wesen) to which it refers are the same, for example, that words like horse, man, and donkey are the idea of these objects.”12

Thomasius found yet another characteristic difference between man and animal which he felt essential to the view that during youth the origin of faulty behavioral patterns begin. Animals at birth know what is good or bad for their existence, while early human life is attracted to both and makes no such distinctions, they are learned distinctions in the human world. Animals reject fire, while children walk into it, for

11 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1971), p. 32. 12 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1972), p. 33. On the close parallels to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) see Wolf, Grosse Rechtsdenker (1963), p. 397, and Barnard, “Thomasius’ Practical Philosophy” (1971), p. 227. However, neither critic looks at the parallel thoughts on the linguistic basis of anthropological study, a focus common to Locke and Thomasius.

5 example. And so he felt the human maturation process must from the beginning distinguish good an evil and not just in its physical but also moral dimensions.

Thomasius argued that in “these gentle years” (diese zarten Jahre) the mind was unsophisticated and unable to make subtle distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, and truth and error, and it is here where he focuses his attention in discussion of a psychology of prejudices.13

Thomasius felt that prejudices are perpetuated through several sources including the inherently poor state of the human society, low level of parental intelligence, and the tendency of children to believe in their peers, hence, even an isolated and well trained child will soon be contaminated with the sorry state of human reasoning. And even if the schools and parents try to teach forms of right reasoning, Thomasius felt there will still remain a wide range of prejudices which fall into that category of canons of belief, namely, of accepted assumptions which no one cares to question.

And what about the individual’s own youthful curiosity to learn about the unknown? Here, too, Thomasius sees problems in human behavior because man is a social animal and even his curiosity cannot lead to an independent observation, so that independent discoveries are also quickly influenced by opinions of society. Indeed, an observation which has been discovered independently by a child is in Thomasius’ opinion subject to the most common prejudice of all, “precipitancy, particularly in children who are often hasty in their judgements. And so Thomasius argues that the prejudice of

“impatience” leads directly to a child’s failures in right reasoning. Thus, even before human beings reach a stage of adult maturity the so-called “empty cabinet” has been negatively conditioned by society, a process which Thomasius designated “premature

13 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1971), p. 34.

6 judgements” (Vorurteil), a judgement which detracts from the search for truth, either because of deference to authority or because of hastiness in forming conclusions: “the errors are small tributaries flowing from these two great sources.”14

While Thomasius felt love for our fellow man, or the need to relate and trust in others, explained the power of authority, particularly in the lives of the youth, he argued that hastiness had its origins in a love of our own comforts, in the appeal of leisure activities which make no critical demands upon existence. Yet Thomasius felt deference to authority is more deeply rooted in mankind for man tends to accept the more easily attained route to truth, a route in which one can accept the word of another, and one in which responsibility and effort of thinking can be avoided. Hence Thomasius’ maxim for explaining prejudice in human behavior: “Love for the other is always stronger than the love for self.”15 And it is this loyalty to others that begins in youth and continues to

“tyrannize” a human being through his entire life.16 Deference to authority once set into motion leads irrevocably to hasty or precipitant views which in turn become the source of corruption evident in schools, in the work of teachers and in general in the entire adult society.

When Thomasius reexamined the problem of prejudice in 1696 he found a new emphasis for the problem. Initially, that is in the lecture of 1689, he discovered in

14 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1972), p. 39. Indeed, Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 271-321, deals with “acquiring prejudices” as a developmental process in which the individual conforms to the environment first as a young child who learns about his surroundings and then later as an adult who selects information about his surroundings which conforms to the patterns developed in the earlier stages of development. See also Allport’s discussion of “The Normality of Prejudgement” in which he argues that “much of this automatic cohesion (toward ethnicity) is due to nothing more than convenience,” p. 17, a point of view basic to Thomasius’ theory of prejudice. 15 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1972), p. 40. 16 Thomasius, “Von den Vorurteilen” (1972), p. 41. For a discussion of the role of developmental theories, such as the one proposed by Erik Erikson in more recent research in social psychology, see Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1978), pp. 87-100, a theory that successful passage from one stage of life to the next the “tyranny” of the personality of which Thomasius writes.

7 authority and in precipitancy two major flaws in human reasoning and then in 1691 he advanced the thesis that this behavior was developmental, that it had its origins in the early childhood stages of life and that the environment, peers, schools, teachers, and the general adult population made it impossible for young curious minds to independently develop unprejudiced views and opinions. Therefore Thomasius devoted his reexamination to the role of prejudice in four realms of the adult world, namely among married people (die eheliche Gesellschaft), in male society (die väterliche Gesellschaft), in the society of masters and servants (die Gesellschaft der Herrschaft), and in the middle class (die bürgerliche Gesellschaft).17 The development of prejudiced behavior in these four realms of society is perhaps obvious, particularly in marriage where mutual exchange of views would have to persist for a harmonious relationship, a relationship similar to the kind formed between parent and child, one where an authority figure conditions the mind toward a certain behavior. In the society of masters and servants

Thomasius finds that there is considerable disloyalty, or independent behavior, but he argues nevertheless, that here, too, the prejudice of authority dominates because of the loyalty and devotion which leads to blind acceptance of the status quo. The degree of prejudiced behavior intensifies in the fourth realm of society, in the middle class where rivalry and competition further biased attitudes because of loyalty to specific groups with like backgrounds and interests. Indeed, the relationship which Thomasius found between nobility, the citizenry, and the farmers was miserable: “I do not trust myself in expressing it well enough so bad have I found it.”18 Here he saw an intolerable state of

17 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), pp. 47-48. On German developmental theory in the eighteenth century see Karl J. Fink, “Herder’s Stages of Life as Forms in Geometric Progression,” Eighteenth Century Life, 6 (1981), pp. 39-59. 18 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 48.

8 the human condition and in his examination of the social misery caused by prejudices he inquired into its source, advancing his theory that prejudices evolved from moral and ethical spheres of existence.

Thus Thomasius went beyond the overt prejudices of authority and precipitancy and looked at the inward prejudices, those which derive from the moral fiber of the human being, from what he calls the will.19 It is Thomasius’ conviction that the mind is conditioned by the will and not the reverse, and so the errors deriving from the prejudice of authority and hastiness are more fundamentally problems of moral and ethical philosophy. This view he illustrates with examples of involuntary behavior; if we find ourselves in a hot and stuffy room, we will enter another that is cool, drafty and refreshing even through we fully realize the ill effects of climatic changes on our body and health. Or, if one in our midst begins to yawn we will fight it but will nonetheless likewise feel the need to yawn. Addiction to food and drink and other weaknesses of behavior are in Thomasius’ view all due to the basic corruption of the human will. Love, passions, desires, impatience are all functions of the will and, in his view, they serve the immediate interests of the human being without advancement of the self or of society.

Thus he argues that an improved society can only be attained through identification and corrections of prejudices and greater emphasis on socialization through reasoned behavior.

In his essay of 1696 on the causes of misery and misfortune Thomasius argues that reasoned love (vernünftige Liebe), as opposed to passionate love, which has a

19 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 49. Thomasius’ psychology of prejudices runs through the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, as for example in the essay “On Thinking for Oneself,” in: Parerga and Paralipomena, 2 vols. transl. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Vol. 1, p. 498, “Those who are so eager and hasty to decide debatable questions by quoting authorities are really glad when they can bring into the field the intellect and insight of someone else instead of their own, which they lack.”

9 rational basis for behavior, is the source of truth and is observable in what we term peace of mind (Gemütsruhe).20 This peace of mind is found when there exists a relationship between the individual and his environment, when there is an inclination toward other creatures, toward harmony. Then Thomasius looks more specifically at those conditions of the will which disrupt such a state of mind; he argues that the prejudice of impatience leads to the prejudice of precipitancy and that of imitation to authority. Imitation is according to Thomasius that behavior which contributes to admiration of a particular style and posture of life and thought over that of other possible choices. A child, he argues, might put its hand in a fire if it sees an adult do so, or adults might eat and drink that which has been recognized as standard behavior elsewhere, even if that behavior disgusts them. The use of medicines, the buying of books, the proclamation of a , the choice of clothes all become selections based on imitation and, in

Thomasius’ view, have their origins in an “illogical affection” (unvernünftige Liebe).21

In the closing analysis of the prejudices of the will, namely of those which lead to the prejudice of the mind, Thomasius poses a final question: “Who is at fault for this misery, for this illogical affection and these prejudices of the human will?”22 The answer he advances suggests that it can not be deferred to a particular realm of society; the answer he feels lies within each individual. All human beings must try to look without partisanship at those attitudes and views which shape their behavior and which affect the presence of others. In his view individuals in the present state of society are more bestial

20 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), pp. 51-53. 21 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 57. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (1974), Vol. II, p. 498, also cloaks this process from hasty judgements to illogical argumentation in psycholinguistic terms, labeling it the “argumentum ad verecundiam,” an appeal to human respect for great men, ancient customs, and authority. 22 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 57.

10 than the animals themselves (mehr Bestie als die Bestien selbst).23 That is, Thomasius felt a child’s disposition toward imitative behavior illustrates a bestial quality which is more difficult to overcome than the other prejudices of the will, namely, than impatience:

“And consequently impatience can more easily be dampened and eliminated than that evil imitation.”24

Following this analysis of human prejudices Thomasius advanced his ideas on prejudice into a general science of psychology, or as he stated it in the title of his new science: “Die Erfindung der Wissenschaft anderer Menschen Gemüt zu erkennen”

(1692).25 The essay specifies more closely prejudiced behavior in cross-cultural relations, specifically in German-French cultural relations and, although it is admittedly primitive by today’s standards, Thomasius’ attempt to define affective dimensions of national character shows a clear tendency toward the practical and useful value of better understanding human behavior. Indeed, the scheme which Thomasius evolved for mathematizing affective behavior clearly anticipates research engaged today by Charles

Osgood and others in affective culture studies.26 Thomasius felt there were four kinds of affective domains in human behavior and that one of these four always stood in dominant relationship to the other three on a scale of five to sixty with the most dominant at the highest end and the most recessive at the lowest end of the scale. Thus if greed is dominant then loyalty is recessive and with such tables of relationships he felt it would be possible to structure both individual and national character. For Thomasius it

23 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 59. 24 Thomasius, “Von den Ursachen” (1972), p. 60. 25 Thomasius, “Die Erfindung der Wissenschaft anderer Menschen Gemüt zu erkennen,” ed. Brüggemann (1972), pp. 61-79. 26 Osgood, Charles, et. al., Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), pp. 453-461, has catalogued the statistical dimensions of affective culture in many areas of human behavior where attitudes determine decisions and judgements, including for example, concepts concerning time, race, colors, numbers, and sex.

11 was neither impractical nor esoteric to study human nature in this manner, it was only common sense to come up with a plan for illustrating the need for greater tolerance and for suggesting social change. However, Thomasius did recognize that it could be politically advantageous to specify patterns of human behavior as a means for controlling society and for advancing social reform.27

According to Thomasius each nation has its unique character, the Germans do not have the fiery temperament of the French and hence their culture lacks brilliance (beaux esprits), but then the German character compensates with a greater measure of patience

(Geduld).28 In his view both the French and German dominant traits must be tempered by that of another culture in order to become culturally effective in the world of nations, for in his view no single trait such as patience and brilliance will sustain a culture. Also he felt the traits of an individual or a nation varied with the degrees of freedom in which the subject functions. Yet he did not feel the conditions, in which an individual or a nation function, could necessarily be changed and so in a practical sort of way he focused his efforts on the study of social and psychological behavior, an approach which did not initiate change directly but one from which it would naturally precipitate.

And how did Thomasius hope to research the information needed to define the affective domain of national, or for that matter, individual culture? He felt analysis of conversation was the tool of the new science, “the science of recognizing from daily conversations the hidden dimensions of the heart even against the individual’s

27 Barnard, “Thomasius’ Practical Philosophy” (1971), p. 237, focused his essay on the tactics of social change: “In one sense this preoccupation with actual political behavior, with political persuasion and manipulation, admittedly puts a premium on expediency, on political strategy and tactics rather than on normative considerations.” 28 Thomasius, “Erfindung der Wissenschaft” (1972), p. 65.

12 resistance.”29 In conversations Thomasius felt people lay bare their attitudes for they are capable of concealing only the gross features in their attitudes and biases. According to

Thomasius the greatest statesmen, particularly Armand Jean Du Plessis Richelieu (1585-

1642) and Jules Mazarin (1602-1661) were well-grounded in the science of analyzing conversation as a means toward understanding human nature and attaining political and diplomatic goals. Particularly Cardinal Richelieu was in Thomasius’ view able to perceive the will and character of the people with whom he came into contact. This ability Thomasius felt should generally be recognized as a science, his new science, and one that was practiced by people in powerful positions. It was according to him science and not magic or divine. The new science, Thomasius argued, must be a study of conversations with ordinary citizens (Konversation im bürgerlichen Leben und

Wandel),30 and it is this formalization of the techniques for the analysis of conversation which Thomasius advocated as a field of study which ought to be taught in European

Universities. He pointed out that in his day the only place where the new science was actively practiced was in court society and that it is an art particularly absent in learned societies.31

But Thomasius went still deeper into the question of how to research the affective domain of individual character and cultures and how to identify the prejudices common to cross-cultural relations. Indeed, at one point he advised study of language itself as a

29 Thomasius, “Erfindung der Wissenschaft” (1972), p. 69. This focus on analysis of conversation as a technique for psychological investigation is found again later in the eighteenth century in the writings of Georg C. Lichtenberg, Aphorismen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1977), p. 38, “Man findet Spuren aller Wissenschaften in den Sprachen, und umgekehrt vieles in den Sprachen, das in den Wissenschaften nützen kann,” from whence it forms a direct line to Freudian analysis in the twentieth century. 30 Thomasius, “Erfindung der Wissenschaft” (1972), p. 73. 31 Kiesel, Helmuth, ‘Bei Hof, Bei Höll: Untersuchungen zur Literarischen Hof-Kritik von Sebastian Brant bis (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), pp. 187-197, looked primarily at the resistance to requirements for social change as projected in courtly society.

13 means for understanding the emotions and biases hidden beneath ordinary conversation.

He suggested that “daily empirical tests” (tägliche neue Proben) should be designed, not like those found in the sciences of mathematics and physics, but tests with a new and distinct format for measuring the attitudes and prejudices behind human reasoning. Tests should be found which recognize man as a reasoning animal who can in fact hide prejudices through choice of words and phrases as skillfully as a scientist might try to discover them.32 These tests he suggested should be used to investigate questions in areas of concern (Problemata), which he felt formed the basic dimensions of research into affective culture.33 In the first area he asked about the various types of individuals from whom biased affective culture could be determined and these he suggested would come from the most disguised hypocrite, the dissimulated man of middle class position, the withdrawn woman, and from a crafty nine or ten year old child. Secondly he suggests the problem of how one could research the character of a dissimulated man who has never been observed and with whom one has not had a conversation. In the third problem set he suggested inquiry into whether it was possible that an individual could to any degree be greedy and lascivious and, if it is possible, that a person of this character can also have other traits of a high degree, and indeed, if these traits are in mixture and in degrees of intensity, how are they to be described with relation to each other? These then were the type of questions which Thomasius felt were basic to his new science, a science devoted

32 Thomasius, “Erfindung der Wissenschaft” (1972), p. 75. Most critics on the development of the , such as Eric Blackall, The Emergence of the German Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 19-24, Rudolf Eucken, Geschichte der Philosophischen Terminologie im Umriss (Hildesheim: Olm, 1964), p. 131, and Friedrich Maurer and Friedrich Stroh, Deutsche Wortgeschichte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1958), pp. 30-31, credit Thomasius with contribution to communication and development of the German language for scientific and literary purposes. 33 Thomasius, “Erfindung der Wissenschaft” (1972), p. 76.

14 to the study of stereotypes, images, biases, and attitudes, a science devoted to the critical examination of human behavior.

Thomasius’ discovery of a new science was predominantly an investigation into affective culture, a field which only in the second half of the twentieth century received full attention. As a native of German culture, a culture under strong influence of British and French culture, he was particularly sensitive to the problems in prejudice which lead to dominant and recessive culture.34 To Thomasius, understanding meant progress toward overcoming, and as a child of the Enlightenment, he felt this new science was a means for advancing positive cross-cultural relations generally, and for enhancing

German cultural development specifically. The status of German culture among that of the other European nations was low in Thomasius’ view, so it is not difficult to understand why he would examine psychological behavior in its broad cultural context.

However, it is unique that he would recognize that through everyday conversation and through ordinary language one could penetrate the surface realities of cognitive culture sufficiently to reveal the emotions and attitudes of affective culture. And while

Thomasius felt much progress had been made in other sciences, he felt none of the knowledge from physics and chemistry, for example, had much meaning for the maturation of mankind without integration into the knowledge about man’s self. This knowledge of self meant for Thomasius an investigation into affective domains of culture, a domain which he felt could be discovered through study of a psychology of

34 Said, Edward, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 3-28, treats the problem of recessive and dominant cultures in the twentieth century with particular reference to current relationships between the western nations and the middle east cultures, dealing primarily with problems of prejudice, biases, and the creation of images about another culture without an understanding of that cultures own perceptions of itself. See Karl J. Fink, “Goethe’s West Östlicher Divan: Orientalism Restructured,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 14 (1982), 315-328, for a study on Goethe’s response to the image projected by western scholarship on the Orient in his day.

15 prejudices. And yet this discovery of man’s prejudices has only begun and is one that becomes increasingly important to a world of cultures dependent upon each other.

16