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Radicalization and the Social Space: the Case of Jordan

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SCUOLA DI DOTTORATO UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO-BICOCCA Dipartimento di / Department of Sociology and Social Research Dottorato di Ricerca in / PhD program Analysis of Social and Economic Processes (ASEP) Ciclo / Cycle XXXIII RADICALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL SPACE: THE CASE OF JORDAN Cognome / Surname Al-Khoury Nome / Name Dareen Matricola / Registration number 835702 Tutore / Tutor Professor Sonia Stefanizzi Coordinatore / Coordinator Professor Maurizio Pisati Anno accademico / Academic year 2019 - 2020 Abstract In this study, the radicalization phenomenon is investigated. Value is brought in the sense that it offers a strong domestic perspective that aims to compensate for insufficient efforts in analysing contextual specificities and domestic factors in radicalization studies. Focusing on the case of Jordan, a country known to have produced the highest number of fighters to have joined Islamic organizations in Syria and Iraq, and specifically on youth, the research draws insights from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social space and utilizes the desk research analysis and semi-structured interview methods to acquire profound contextual knowledge. Moreover, the research uses the survey method to collect and analyse 2,200 collected questionnaires using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to reveal unknown patterns and structures formed between a complex set of social, economic, cultural and symbolic local factors and an opinion indicator, acquired using the experimental vignette method (VEM), to measure the level of progressiveness, religiousness and extreme opinions of the young participants. The findings in this research are organized in a typology and a framework of five individual profiles that propose initial points of differentiations in the profiles of those who choose or reject the idea of joining a radical organization. The findings pinpoint the importance of differentiating between Jihad and terrorism, and propose policy recommendations that include investing in providing rich, high-quality and accurate data about Islam to fill the gaps in knowledge for those who seek additional religious profundity, and enhancing the cultural capital ‒ an underestimated aspect in counter-radicalization strategies ‒ for its revealed strong association with a progressive and tolerant mindset in the country. Keywords: radicalization, extremism, terrorism, Islamic State, Pierre Bourdieu, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), youth, Jordan 2 Abstract (in Italian) La tesi si basa su una ricerca empirica sul fenomeno della radicalizzazione contribuendo ad arricchire la conoscenza su un tema ancora poco esplorato, soprattutto relativamente alle sue dinamiche interne e specificità contestuali. Il contesto di riferimento è stato la Giordania, paese da cui proviene il maggior numero (pro capite) di militanti nelle organizzazioni islamiche presenti in Siria e in Iraq. La popolazione oggetto d’analisi sono stati i giovani (nella fascia 18-30 anni) e alcuni testimoni privilegiati, esperti del fenomeno. Il quadro teorico di riferimento ha tratto spunto dalla teoria dello spazio sociale di Pierre Bourdieu, mentre il disegno della ricerca ha utilizzato approcci qualitativi (desk analysis, interviste semi strutturate) e quantitativi (survey). In particolare, nell’ambito della survey sono stati raccolti 2200 questionari rivolti alla popolazione giovanile con l’obiettivo di analizzare opinioni e atteggiamenti progressisti/conservatori nei confronti della religione e della società. La tecnica di analisi utilizzata è stata quella delle corrispondenze multiple (ACM) con lo scopo di individuare i fattori latenti e le loro relazioni di interdipendenza alla base delle opinioni dei giovani intervistati nei confronti della religione e dell’estremismo islamico. Sulla base dei risultati ottenuti è stata costruita una tipologia di giovani favorevoli o meno a far parte di una organizzazione radicale. I risultati complessivi della ricerca forniscono indicazioni utili per prevenire il fenomeno della radicalizzazione. In particolare, emerge l’importanza di avere a disposizione dati di qualità per colmare le lacune oggi esistenti unitamente agli stereotipi sull’Islam e sul fenomeno della radicalizzazione. Inoltre, sottolineano l’importanza della distinzione tra Jihad e terrorismo e dell’importanza dell’investimento sul capitale culturale dei giovani che, come è emerso dalla ricerca contribuisce a sviluppare una mentalità progressista e tollerante e ad allontanarli dalle organizzazioni radicali. Parole chiave: radicalizzazione, estremismo, terrorismo, Stato Islamico, Pierre Bourdieu, analisi delle corrispondenze multiple (ACM), giovani, Giordania 3 Acknowledgements First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Sonia Stefanizzi, for her guidance, thoughtful comments and consistent support throughout the course of this research. In addition, I would like to extend my thanks to the faculty, staff and my colleagues for making my time at the University of Milano-Bicocca a wonderful experience. I would like to thank Dr Ayat Nashwan for her dedicated guidance, positive spirit and kind support during my study abroad period in Jordan. I am greatly indebted to the administration of Yarmouk University and the Director of the Presidency Department, Dr Mashhour Hamadneh, for facilitating my mission, and for putting me in touch with the Nawafeth Foundation for Training and Sustainable Development, who enabled the distribution of the survey questionnaire across the country. Special thanks to my friend Areej Khreis for her help in reaching out and setting up interviews in Jordan. I am deeply thankful to my family for their love and support, and particularly my partner, Mohammad Ismail, for his unwavering support, continuous encouragement and belief in my potential and goals. 4 Table of contents Abstract ............................................................................................................... 2 Abstract (in Italian)............................................................................................ 3 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ 4 Table of contents ................................................................................................ 5 List of figures ............................................................................................................................ 8 List of tables.............................................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................. 10 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 10 2. Arabic term definitions ................................................................................................... 16 3. Outline of chapters .......................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2: Literature review .......................................................................... 19 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 19 2. Conceptual dispute in the definitions of radicalization ............................................... 20 3. Challenges in research on radicalization ...................................................................... 24 3.1. Challenges in the data acquisitions ................................................................................ 24 3.2. Lack of contextual considerations ................................................................................. 24 3.3. Limitations of the research methods .............................................................................. 26 4. Drivers towards radicalization ...................................................................................... 27 5. Summary .......................................................................................................................... 34 Chapter 3: Theoretical considerations ........................................................... 36 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 36 2. Radicalization models ..................................................................................................... 37 2.1. A review of five of the radicalization models ................................................................ 37 5 2.2. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 48 3. Pierre Bourdieu’s social space theory ........................................................................... 49 3.1. The history of the concept .............................................................................................. 50 3.2. The construction of the theory ....................................................................................... 54 3.3. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) ..................................................................... 58 Chapter 4: Research objectives and conceptual framework ....................... 60 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 60 2. Research
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