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On the Palestinian issue, how much credit should Europe get amongst Arab opinion for its economic and political support?

Ralitsa Trifonova Supervised by Dr. Walid Alkhatib Centre for Strategic Studies- The University of Jordan

November 2010

1 On the Palestinian issue, how much credit should Europe get amongst Arab opinion for its economic and political support?

The formulation in the Council of Ministers’ of the European Union statement, issued on 8 December 2009, that within “an agreed time-frame” an independent Palestinian state should emerge on the Middle East’s political map raised hopes for a breakthrough in the remaining unsolved more than 60 years Palestinian issue. Together with the statement of the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in Moscow in the late 2009, this formulation is viewed by members of the Palestinian National Authority itself as a sign, in being specific in contrast with previous statements excluding a set timeframe for the establishment of a viable independent Palestinian state.

After the unveiled Israeli violations of the international law during the last war over Gaza, a lot of voices not only in Palestine, but from all over world are revealing the impatience, reaching its nadir as Israeli behaviour does not represent threat only to the Palestinian people, but to the whole international system, especially when it shelled the headquarters of one the United Nations agencies on 15 January 2009.

Some analysts believe that after the continued over 60 year’s failure of the USA to reach any significant progress to the benefit of the Palestinian people, it is high time Europe entered the Middle East arena as the third party, which would lead the two parties of the Israeli- Palestinian issue to a balanced solution, which does not reply on forced compromise.

As the distrust of the Palestinian people with the USA is growing, Europe would only play a positive role if it were a trust-worthy ally itself. In order to give this alternative a positive perspective, we need to go back to the beginning of the European involvement in the Palestinian issue, to follow its own history of internal development, to explore the character of its economic aid and the existence of political support to the Palestinian people in their most turbulent and crucial moments in last four decades.

The European involvement in the Palestinian issue dates back to the early 70’s. European Community assistance to the Palestinians began in 1971 when the first contribution was made to the regular budget of the UNRWA. In the following years the position of the then Nine Member states was expressed in several official statements. The first one of them being the declaration of the European Council of 29 June, 1977. Basing on theirs statements of 6 November 1973, 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, the Nine believe that the settlement must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and on:

(i) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, (ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, (iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognize boundaries, (iv) Recognition that, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.

2 The Nine affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner. Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the States of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.

The Nine are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.1

The main principles have been reiterated on several occasions and in different statements – on 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on 25 September 1979 on behalf of the European Community by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. O’Kennedy at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

This speech represented a new detail of the European position on the Palestinian issue. Following the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit Conference recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”, Mr. O’Keneddy expressed the Nine’s view that it is necessary the principles and Security Council resolutions be accepted by those all involved – including the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the basis for negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.2

Another step to the unified European stance on the Palestinian issue was taken in 1980 with the announcement of the Venice declaration. At the June 1980 European Council, the Nine Member states of the European Community agreed that “growing tensions affecting this region of the Middle East constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever. And a just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees”.3 Here, the members speak for the first time on other two important matters of the Palestinian issue – the status of Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements: the Nine stress they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.4

Europe has since developed an acquis politique with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, based on a general principle (partition of former British-Mandate Palestine into two states)

1 Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council. (1975 - 1990), London, 29 and 30 June, 1977. 2 European Political Cooperation, Statements of the Foreign Ministers and Other Documents 1979, Speech by the Irish Foreign Minister, 34th General Assembly of the United Nations, September 25, 1979. 3 Venice Declaration on the Middle East, Venice European Council 12-13 June 1980. 4 Op.cit.

3 and on the application of international law (illegality of settlement activity, inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war). Over the years, these guidelines have been firmly and, increasingly, vocally upheld by the Europeans as they placed stress on the Palestinian right to self-determination.

Progressively, all European countries came to accept the general framework for an Israeli- Palestinian settlement irrespective of whether the left or right was in power.5

Certain events in the 90s have influenced on the European behaviour towards the Palestinian issue. Some of them laying in the internal changes the European Community itself has been undergoing, others related to the dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Palestinian track.

By 1991, global changes such as the end of the Cold war and the first Gulf war, and its aftermath had also affected the Middle East situation. The negotiations resumed in earnest in October 1991, with the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East in Madrid. Held from 30 October to 1 November, it satisfied Israel’s requirement for one-on-one negotiations while discussing for the first time the peace process in the format of an international conference/dialogue. It created bilateral negotiation tracks for Israel and neighbouring Arab States (Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) and the Palestinians, who, in the person of notables from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were included in a joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation.

The multilateral talks were run in parallel with the bilateral negotiations. The idea was grounded in a functionalist, liberalist conception of international cooperation and peace, according to which the enmeshing of the states in the region in an ever-widening web of economic, technical and welfare inter-dependencies would force them to set aside their political and/or ideological rivalries.6

The Madrid Conference established “multilateral working groups”, which in January 1992 began work simultaneously on regional aspects of five fields – arms control and regional security, water, environment, refugees and regional economic development.

The European Community was entrusted with the running of the Regional Economic Development Working Group, the largest of the five and the one which most comprehensively reflected the broader goals of the multilateral talks. During the first three rounds, held in Brussels (May 1992), Paris (October 1992) and Rome (May 1993), a list of ten spheres of activity was drawn up. The fourth round took place in Copenhagen in November 1993, shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians. The group adopted the Copenhagen Action Plan, which outlined thirty-three different ventures. At the subsequent plenary meetings in Rabat (June 1994) and Bonn (January 1995), the countries responsible reported on the various activities undertaken and announced new initiatives within their respective spheres. In order to finance these activities, $9.2 million was made available by the European Community for the preparation of he various studies and for the running of inter-session activities to ensure the rapid implementation of the Copenhagen Action Plan. A Monitoring Committee comprised of members of the core main countries in the Middle East – Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the

5 Dieckhoff, Alain, The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Inroads, Issue № 16, Winter/Spring 2005, pp. 53-55. 6 Peters, Joel, The Arab-Israeli Peace Talks and the Barcelona Process, The International Spectator, Volume XXXIII, No.4, October-December 1998, p. 66.

4 Palestinians was established to allow them to take a more direct role in implementing the Copenhagen Action Plan.

By mid-1993, it appeared that the bilateral talks had stalled on a group of political and security issues. However, private talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were taking place, amidst great secrecy, in Norway.

In September 1993, the PLO and Israel signed the Palestinian Declaration of Principles establishing the framework for an interim period of Palestinian self rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. This was the first in a series of steps known as the “Oslo Peace process”.

Following the signature of the Declaration of Principles, in 1993 an international donor mechanism, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), was established to coordinate the international assistance to the Palestinians.

The European political involvement in the negotiations was limited to operating within the framework of the five working groups because the Union was not institutionally adapted to sustaining of foreign policy capacity. This situation changed slightly with Тhe Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which became the starting point for a European foreign policy. In the beginning, it consisted of the foreign ministers discussing foreign policy issues intensively at the Councils of Foreign Ministers in Brussels. One outcome of the new development was the nomination of Angel Moratinos as Special European Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process in November 1996 (a position he held until Summer 2003).

However, Europe was not able to act on a common European policy let alone apply instruments of crisis management.

Another remarkable event in the history of the EU is the launching of the Barcelona process in November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then, 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean partners. The Process was the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. Guided by the agreements of the Barcelona Declaration, it formed the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which was later to be expanded and evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean. It was an innovative alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity.

Barcelona process reflects the increasingly prevalent post-Cold War approach of viewing security from more than just the military perspective, and focus on the underlying cause of conflict and the particular nature of any security issue. In the current international system, security threats are not seen as deriving solely from political challenges to the status quo. The realm of threats to international peace and security is no longer defined in terms of inter-state conflict, but is considered to include a broad range of issues such as: internal disintegration, migration flows, environmental degradation, human rights, economic development.

Thus, the Barcelona process is aimed at creating a new regional multilateral configuration, the achievement of this long-term goal has been based on, and priority given to the negotiation of a series of bilateral association agreements between the European Union and the eleven southern Mediterranean countries and the Palestinian Authority. These replace the first generation of agreements, i.e. the cooperation agreements of the 1970s.

5 While the multilateral talks have been concerned with redefining the relationship between Israel and the Arab world, the Barcelona process has been concerned with re-defining the relationship between the European Union and the Mediterranean states on its southern periphery, and on developing mechanisms for the closer integration of their economies.7

The social, political and security agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has played a secondary role and has increasingly been seen as a long-term offshoot of economic development.

The development and the launching of the Barcelona Process received their impetus from the progress made in the Middle East Peace Process. By 1995 a transfer of powers and responsibilities from Israeli to Palestinian control took place following the Israel–Palestinian Liberation Organisation Cairo Agreement of 4 May 1994 on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. As an immediate result of this agreement, the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat returned from exile in Tunisia to take over as Chairman of the newly established Palestinian Authority.

Although they are bilateral agreements and provide for specific arrangements with each partner State, the association agreements, signed in the frame of the Barcelona process, share a similar structure. They are intended to promote:

 regular dialogue on political and security matters, providing an appropriate framework conducive to developing close relations between the parties;  trade, with the gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital. Developing trade will foster the growth of balanced economic and social relations between the parties. Israel, however, is a special case compared with the other Mediterranean partner countries, and the association agreement with Israel is not intended to create trade and economic relations, but rather to deepen them;  social, cultural and human dialogue. These areas, which include science, culture and finance, will be subject to particular cooperation.

The Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-operation between the European Community and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority) was signed on 24 February 1997 and entered into force on 1 July 1997. The primary objective of this Agreement was to consolidate ties between the Palestinians and the European Union in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and pave the way for the commencement of negotiations with a view to concluding a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement.

There are certain specific characteristics of the agreement concluded with the Palestinian Authority. First, it was an Interim agreement and they generally cover non-political aspects of trade and cooperation between the parties. The Interim Agreement did not lay particular stress on establishing regular dialogue between the parties on political and security matters, but rather on the economic cooperation. It consisted of:

 Protocol 1 – on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of agricultural products originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;  Protocol 2 – on the arrangements applying to imports into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of agricultural products originating in the Community;

7 Peters, Joel, The Arab-Israeli Peace…, pp.71-72.

6  Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of 'originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation;  Final Act;  Joint Declarations;  Declaration by the European Community.8

The distancing and the separation of the Barcelona process from the Arab-Israeli peace process were only possible because of the progress made in the Palestinian question. In short, the resolution of the Palestinian question could be set aside from the economic agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The division of labour between the two multilateral processes continued despite setbacks to the peace process and protracted negotiations surrounding Israel’s redeployment from Hebron following the election of Binyamin Netanyahu. Israel and the Arab states continued to meet in as series of follow-up meetings established within the Barcelona process. However, keeping the problems of the peace process out of the Barcelona deliberations was only possible as long as there was reason to believe that these problems were short-term.

As distrust of Netanyahu grew and differences between Israel and the Palestinians became more ingrained, so issues pertaining to the peace process began increasingly to creep into discussions, especially where these concerned political and security co-operation9. One evidence – the problems at the Malta ministerial conference (April 1997) largely resulted from the stalemate of the peace process after Benjamin Netanyahu’s election. At the Marseille meeting (November 2000), convened in the shadow of the Second (al-Aqsa) Infitada, things were even worse. Not surprisingly, the conference was boycotted by Syria and Lebanon, and the adoption of a Charter for peace and stability had to be postponed.

The economic situation in the Palestinian Authority in the late 90s has been complicated by two contextual factors. First, it lacked control over major economic instruments, due both to Israeli physical control of all points of exit and entry and to the terms of the Oslo framework. This has rendered government revenue and national income especially vulnerable to the fluctuation of political and security relations between the PA and Israel, making them difficult for planners to predict.

The second contextual factor is that the PA must operate in two, nonadjacent territories: the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These two areas are additionally separated from East Jerusalem, which is an important center of Palestinian social, commercial, and cultural activities. Israeli measures restricting travel both between and within the West Bank and Gaza Strip have severely impeded the movement of PA personnel.10

These impediments were clear signs that the economic cooperation could not be set aside the political development as it proved to be the only one with sustainable results.

At its Berlin Council on the 24-25 March 1999 the “European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination”.

8The Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement between the European Community and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority, The Official Journal of the European Communities, N L 187/3. 9 Peters, Joel, The Arab-Israeli Peace…, p.74. 10 Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1999, p.50.

7 And “The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above”.11 Although the Berlin Council Declaration is considered by many as a milestone in the European support for the Palestinians, what draws our attention in its text is the formulation of European readiness to “consider” recognition of a Palestinian state. Although being true that this is the first European declaration literally mentioning the recognition of an independent Palestinian State as a solution to the Palestinian issue, we cannot ignore the fact that it is Yasser Arafat’s threat to issue a unilateral declaration of independence, which forced the EU to take such measures as the readiness to “consider” the recognition of a Palestinian state, designed to compensate the Palestinian Authority in return for delaying the unilateral announcement of independence. The turbulent 1999 marked another development in the EU itself. This year saw the starting point for the development of an effective European foreign policy. The Amsterdam treaty came into force on 1 May 1999 and created the structures, thanks to which one could speak of a European foreign policy for the first time: the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy, The Political and Security Committee, a European military staff, etc. Former secretary of NATO Javier Solana was the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy.

A few months after the breakdown of the Camp David II meetings in July 2000, violence was sparked by a visit to the sacred religious site of the Temple Mount (known as al-Haram al- Sharif to Muslims) by the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon. The date 29 September 2000 marked the eruption of the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada. Palestinians demonstrated against the visit, the demonstrators and police clashed and four Palestinians were killed. In the succeeding months, violence continued, with unprecedented numbers of deaths and injuries on both sides.

On 16 and 17 October a summit jointly chaired by President Mubarak of Egypt and President Clinton of the United States was held and it produced understandings on security cooperation and other measures to end the confrontations and renew the peace process.

A fact-finding report was released by the Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (“the Mitchell Committee”). The report, among other things, called for an immediate ceasefire; a freeze on Jewish settlement construction; denunciation of terrorism, and the resumption of peace talks.

The participation of Javier Solana at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit and his membership in the Fact-Finding “Mitchell” Committee were signs of the enhanced European presence in the conflict.

With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the severe decline of the economic and social conditions put into question the viability of the Palestinian National Authority. The European Community’s assistance was re-orientated from development aid towards direct financial

11 Berlin European Council Presidency Conclusions , 24 and 25 March 1999, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ber2_en.htm#partIV

8 support to the PA budget, while at the same time assisting the PA in preparing itself for statehood, reviving the economy and addressing urgent humanitarian needs.

The continuing in the following months violence between the two parties alarmed the international community that it was time for another political initiative, in which the EU played significant part.

In April 2002 the Secretary-General of the UN met in Madrid, Spain, with the foreign ministers of the United States and Russia (the co-sponsors of the 1991 Madrid peace conference), and with Javier Solana, the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. They declared the need for an immediate cessation of violence, an end to “illegal and immoral” suicide attacks and for progress on the implementation of cease-fire proposals and political measures to end the conflict. This constituted the first meeting of the “Quartet” – the European Union, the United States, Russia and the United Nations, – which would spearhead international efforts in the search for a peaceful solution from then on.

The establishment of the Quartet marked the third level, on which Europe became involved in the Palestinian issue – as an entity, on European Union level, thus constituting the biggest donor to the Palestinian people; as independent states, including non-European Union states such as Norway, each one of them contributing alone and participating in development projects in the PA; and now combining efforts with other important actors on the international arena – the United Nations, Russia and USA.

At the Seville European Council convened on 21 and 22 June 2002 a Declaration on the Middle East was adopted. In it, the European Member States expressed their position on the crisis, which overwhelmed the Middle East after the outburst of the Second Intifada: „The objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end result should be two States living side by side within secure and recognised borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours. Restrictions on the freedom of movement must be lifted. Walls will not bring peace”.12

This text is an important note regarding Israel’s behavour in the occupied Palestinian territory. Earlier the same month the Jewish State had begun the construction of the Separation Wall along the length of the armistice line between Israel and the West Bank – in places verging well into Palestinian territory.

In April 2003 a Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict was announced. The Roadmap – a three-stage process, set out the steps which needed to be taken towards a comprehensive settlement to the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, by which time an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state should have emerged, living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its neighbours. The political horizon stipulated in the Roadmap was confirmed at the Aqaba Summit in June 2003. The European Union, along with the international community, supported this process.

The year 2003 experienced also a change in the European human power working closely on the Palestinian issue as Marc Otte replaced Angel Moratinos and was appointed the European Special Representative on the Middle East Peace Process.

12 Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002.

9 On basis of the the Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, the EU-PA European Neighbouring Policy Action Plan was adopted in May 2005, for a period of three to five years. It was inspired by the Palestinian Reform Programme at that time, which aimed at building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state. The Action Plan set out agreed priority objectives to be achieved, which had been jointly agreed by both the EU and the PA. Many of these priorities were based on the ongoing Palestinian reform programme which was launched in June 2002.

Not being able to distinguish between short and medium term actions due to the prevailing political situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the EU and the Palestinian Authority attached particular importance to:

 Facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict, and to alleviate the humanitarian situation;  Enhancing political dialogue and cooperation, based on shared values, including issues such as strengthening the fight against terrorism and incitement to violence, promoting the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities, improving the dialogue between cultures and religions, co-operating in the fight against racism and xenophobia, in particular anti-Semitism and Islamophobia;  Progress on establishing a functioning judiciary and effective enforcement of legislation; strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;  Strengthening institutions and further reinforcing administrative capacity;  Organisation of elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in accordance with international standards;  Building on progress made in establishing an accountable system of public finances;  Developing trade relations with the Palestinian Authority and progress with economic and regulatory reform plans; fully implement the Interim Association Agreement;  Enhanced cooperation on transport and energy issues with the objective of strengthening;  Palestinian participation in Trans Euro-Mediterranean networks.

The Parties agree that progress in meeting these priorities will be monitored in structures under the Interim Association Agreement.13

The European Commission has adopted two reports on the implementation of the Action Plan – the first one in December 2006, and the second in April 2008.14

The EU Civil Missions – construction or continuation of the instability?

The European involvement in the Palestinian security sector began short after the signature of the first agreement in the frame of the Oslo peace process.

13 EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/pa_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 14 For more information, see: Progress Report the occupied Palestinian territory, Commission of the European Communities, SEC(2009) 519/2, Brussels, 23/04/2009: ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_519_en.pdf

10 As agreed upon in the Annex II of the Declaration of Principles, “the two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The agreement will include, among other things: a temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.”15

The first Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH) mission was established in 1994, after Baruch Goldstein shot and killed 29 praying Palestinians in the Ibrahimi Mosque/ Cave of Machpela. The UN Security Council condemned the massacre in Resolution 904, and called for a temporary international presence in Hebron. Yasser Arafat announced that PLO would withdraw from any further peace negotiations with Israel unless they agreed to international observers in the city of Hebron.

On 31 March 1994, representatives from the PLO and Israel signed an agreement asking Italy, Denmark and Norway to provide support staff and observers for a TIPH. Its main mandate was to assist in promoting stability and restoring normal life in the city of Hebron.

On 8 May 1994 the TIPH mission was set up. However, the PLO and the Israeli government could not reach an agreement on an extension of the mandate, and TIPH withdrew from Hebron on 8 August 1994.

On 28 September 1995, the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“Oslo II”, “Taba”), was signed, and called for a partial redeployment of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from Hebron.

On 12 May 1996 the second TIPH mission, consisting of Norwegian members only, was set up under the condition that it would be replaced by a new TIPH mission upon the IDF’s redeployment from parts of Hebron. Subsequently, the mission operated until the partial Israeli redeployment from Hebron, which was set up for in the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on 17 January 1997.

On 30 January 1997, six participating European countries - Norway, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding in accordance to the Agreement on TIPH in Oslo. On 1 February 1997, the six nations’ TIPH mission entered into force and remains active as a civilian observer mission.16

Despite the deficit of international observers, donor funds arrived to support the Palestinian Police units that went into effect in Gaza and Jericho in 1994. These funds were guided by the UN Special Coordinator Office in Gaza (UNSCO) and its UN Police Training Coordinator. Sweden and the United Kingdom emerged as the largest sponsors, followed by the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, for civil policetraining, focusing on traffic control, rules and laws, basic forensics, human rights, woman police management, and narcotics law enforcement. Foreign efforts to implement an effective civil Palestinian police lacked proper coordination and were confronted with adverse political circumstances, including the Israeli

15 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, ANNEX II PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm 16 http://tiph.org/en/About_TIPH/The_establishment_of_TIPH/.

11 occupation and the involvement of Egyptian secrete services and the American CIA in the politics of anti-terrorism assistance in the Palestinian territories.17

In this respect, in April 1997, the EU adopted a joint action – which was an operational action undertaken under the auspices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – in order to support the PA’s capacity to counter terrorism with equipment and training. The program worked in parallel with other programs managed by the CIA: only two Israelis were victims of terrorism in 1999, the lowest toll since 1967. But its effectiveness was contingent on the absence of large scale hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis, and was, thus, destined to degenerate after September 2000.18

Entering late and with fewer resources, the EU remained largely sidelined in matters of intelligence, which continue to be dominated by the Egyptians and US Security Coordinator19. However, the EU efforts to become more involved in the creation of a sustainable Palestinian Police Force resulted in the establishment of a EU mission code named EUPOL-COPPS was set.

At the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, EU leaders reaffirmed the readiness of the EU to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. The mission builds on the work of the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) established in January 2005 within the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte. This lead to the Police Planning Workshop (10-14 April 2005), resulting in the drafting of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme (PCPDP, June 2005). The transitional and operational plans of the PCPDP served as guidelines for the effective implementation of EUPOL-COPPS. In July 2005, EU foreign ministers reiterated the EU commitment to develop the Palestinian security capacity through the Palestinian Civil Police, in coordination with the US Security Coordinator. They also agreed in principle that EU support to the Palestinian Civil Police should take form of a European Security and Defence Policy mission.20

When fully deployed the mission would include approximately 33 unarmed personnel mainly seconded from EU Member States. Mission’s personnel does not have executive powers. The operational capability of the mission began on 1 January 2006. The initial mandate of the mission was 3 years. Currently, 53 EU staff and 27 local staff are working in the mission.21

The other European civil mission is an emanation of the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian relations in 2005. On 15 August 2005 Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip began. On 23 August Israel’s evacuations of all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and of 4 in the northern West Bank were completed.

17 EU Civil Missions in the Palestinian Territories: Frustrated Reform and Suspended Security, CITpax Middle East Special Report №1, Summer 2006, pp. 14-15. For more detailed information on the Palestinian police forces, see: Lya, Brynjar, A Police Force without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza (New York: Ithaca Press, 2006) and Building Arafat’s Police: The Politics of International Police Assistance in the Palestinian Territories after the Oslo Agreement (New York: Ithaca Press, 2006) 18 Dieckoff, Alain, The European Union..., p.56. 19 CIT pax, p.18. 20 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, EUPOL-COPPS/01, November 2005, pp.3-4. 21http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100506%20FACTSHEET%20EUP OL%20COPPS%20-%20version%2017_EN.pdf

12 On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an "Agreement on Movement and Access", including agreed principles for Rafah crossing (Gaza). On 21 November 2005, the Council of the EU welcomed the Agreement and agreed that the EU should undertake the Third Party role proposed in the Agreement. It therefore decided to launch the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah crossing point, code-named EU BAM Rafah, to monitor the operations of this border crossing point. The operational phase of the mission began on 30 November 2005. The EU mission does not take direct executive responsibility for the operation of the Rafah Crossing Point, nor for guaranteeing security.22 Since 25 June 2006 (the abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, preceded by a series of Israeli attacks on civilians on the beach in the Waha area and the assassination of two members of the HAMAS-backed Popular Resistance Committee), the Rafah Crossing Point has been closed for normal operations and opens on an exceptional basis only. The Rafah crossing point was last opened with the presence of EUBAM Rafah on 13 June 2007. Since then, the mission has remained on standby, ready to re-engage in 24 hours and awaiting a political solution. On 25 November 2008, Colonel Alain FAUGERAS took office as the Head of the EUBAM Rafah Mission. On 20 November 2009, the Council adopted a Joint Action extending the mandate of the EU border assistance mission for the Rafah Crossing Point until 24 May 2010. It had previously adopted two Joint Actions extending the mandate of the mission until 24 November 2008 and 24 November 2009 respectively. On 17 November 2009, the Council confirmed the EU's readiness to redeploy at short notice at the Rafah Crossing Point, should circumstances allow. Despite the closure of the Rafah Crossing Point the mission is maintaining its operational capability.

The economic aid – substitution for the political support?

On 25 January 2006 the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) were held in the West Bank and Gaza. The Islamic movement HAMAS won the majority of the votes. Although the head of the EU monitoring team Veronique De Keyser told reporters on 26 January 2006 that “the EU will respect the vote of the Palestinians”, we could not understate the statements of one of the main actors in the EU pointing at a quite different reality. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel said at a press conference after her meeting with Acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Jerusalem: “Germany would not hold talks with Hamas until it recognizes Israel‘s right to exist.” She also said that the EU would not fund the PA involving Hamas if the group did not renounce its commitment to the destruction of Israel. We are faced with a situation that causes me concern,” French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin told journalists in Paris, adding that he still hoped “that the conditions which are indispensable for working with the Palestinian Government, whatever it will be, will be fulfilled.”

22 CITpax, p.16.

13 After the new HAMAS-led government was sworn in on 29 March 2006 the position of the EU towards the democratically elected Palestinian majority changed dramatically but not surprisingly. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made a statement on the swearing-in of the new PA Cabinet, saying, “I want the UK to continue to deliver that aid [to the Palestinians]. But the British public will need to be assured that our funding is not going to terrorists or those who support terrorism.” This conditional was to be institutionalised in a week. At the meeting in April 2006 the EU foreign ministers decided that aid for electricity, water, food, health and education would be channelled via agencies close to, but not controlled by, HAMAS. EU foreign ministers’ decision to suspend the direct financial support came after the Palestinian finance minister, Omar Abdel Razek, warned that the Palestinian National Authority's financial crisis was desperate, leaving him unable to pay 140,000 civil servants. EU ministers dismissed such talk as exaggerated. Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, said aid had been suspended while "an urgent search for other routes to ensure that public servants like teachers and doctors get paid is undertaken".

He added: "Our overwhelming concern is to make sure that ordinary people's lives are not damaged. At the same time European taxpayers would find it intolerable if they found their money used for terrorists or terrorist operations."23

The financial catastrophe of the Palestinian National Authority was also aggravated by the actions of the occupying State of Israel, and in particular by the decision taken at a special security cabinet session the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convened in the wake of the swearing-in of the HAMAS-led Government.

Israel will cut off ties with the Palestinian National Authority, view it as a "hostile" entity and act to prevent Hamas from becoming an established Government, Mr. Olmert said at the meeting. Hamas leaders, including newly-elected Palestinian Legislative Council deputies will be prevented from travelling between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Amos Gilad, a senior Defence Ministry official, told Israel Radio.

As an integral part of the Paris Protocol (29 April 1994), the Government of Israel agreed to collect $ 50 million in customs revenues every month of the Palestinian National Authority. Acting Prime Minister Olmert stated that after Hamas sets up a Government, Israel would stop transferring to the PA custom duties and taxes it had collected on their behalf until it was satisfied that they would not end up in the hands of “terrorists”. NIS200 million (some US$40 million) were due to be handed over to the PA on 1 February, which did not happen due to the new political circumstances.

As a result, the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) was elaborated by the EU and released on 17 June 2006. It was approved by the USA and endorsed by the Quartet. The EC, 15 Member States, Norway, Canada, Switzerland and Australia contributed to the TIM. The Mechanism was aimed to provide the assistance to the Palestinian people, without the money passing to or through the HAMAS-led government. Different accounts were set up, which meant that the Single Treasury Account the EU itself had successfully pressed for, as one of

23 Gow, David, Urquhart, Conel, EU suspends aid to Palestinian Authority, The Guardian, 11 April 2006.

14 the mechanisms of good governance, was replaced by multiple routes for money transfer thus “making it unclear who gets what”.24

There were three main preconditions that needed to be met:

 “Necessary contacts with the Palestinian Authority (PA) government will be authorized and will only take place at the lowest possible technical/working level;  The Office of the President (OoP) will act as an interface for the Management Unit of TIM, signing and authorizing all necessary documents and legal agreements;  International banks will be selected to pay eligible expenditures, bills, and basic needs allowances directly to eligible Palestinians; and  There will be an agreed-upon process of validation, certification, audit, and oversight of payments provided via TIM, in accordance with the EC Financial Regulations.”

Assuming the pre-conditions are met, TIM will have three windows:

 Mechanism Window I: Emergency Services Support Programme (ESSP). This is a World Bank Trust Fund (TF) providing support for non-salary expenditures of the health and other social service sectors. The pilot ESSP programme will provide for recurrent non-wage expenditures limited to the health sector and basic allowances for health care service providers only. The initial contribution for this Window is € 10 million form the EC.  Mechanism Window II: Interim Emergency Relief Contribution (IERC) This a European Commission programme in support of the uninterrupted supply of essential utility services. The ongoing IERC (now with an interface in the Office of the President) will provide the remaining funds of €12 million for the next two months. New resources up to €40 million will allow its continuation for a further three months and beyond.  Mechanism Window III: Needs-based Allowances. The objective is to create a “social safety net” to provide needs-based allowances to the Palestinian people. For the payment of basic needs allowances a new programme will be developed as quickly as possible by the World Bank to make payments into the bank accounts of Palestinians based on an assessment of urgent need.25

In 2006 the EC disbursed a total of €107.5 million through the TIM. In 2007 the EC committed €350 million through the TIM.

On 27 June 2006 Palestinian National Authority President Abbas and Prime Minister Haniyeh reached agreement on a manifesto implicitly recognizing Israel, officials said. “All the obstacles were removed and an agreement was reached on all the points of the ‘prisoners’ document’”, Rawhi Fattouh, a senior aide to Mr. Abbas, said after factions meeting in Gaza initialled the accord. Mr. Fattouh said the two leaders would formally announce the deal later in the day. Although this was one of the three preconditions, mentioned by European leaders, TIM continued its work thus bypassing the legitimate Palestinian HAMAS-led Government. Moreover, US approval of the Mechanism depended on prohibiting funds to the Palestinian

24 Youngs, Richard, “The European Union and Palestine: a new Engagement”, 28 March 2007 available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-middle_east_politics/union_engagement_4485.jsp 25 Temporary International Mechanism for Assistance to the Palestinian People.

15 security sector. This implies that security personnel that might have been required at schools, hospitals and clinics would have not received salaries.26

The overall security and political context stalled progress in the implementation of the Action Plan during 2006 and the first half of 2007.

On 8 February 2007 PA President Abbas and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Mashaal signed an agreement on formation of a National Unity Government in a ceremony hosted by Saudi King Abdullah. The agreement reaffirmed the importance of national unity as a basis for the achievement of the legitimate goals of the Palestinian people, and endorsed dialogue as the only language to solve political differences in the Palestinian arena. It announced the formation of a Palestinian national unity government according to a detailed formula approved by the two parties and an urgent start of constitutional measures to implement it. Officials said the two sides had agreed on a distribution of Cabinet posts with a Fatah Deputy Prime Minister and the posts of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Interior ministers going to independents. They named former PA Culture Minister Ziyad Abu Amr as Foreign Minister and Salam Fayyad as Finance Minister, a post he had held before.

The World Bank reported in March, when the National Unity Government was overwhelmingly approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council, that the Palestinian Authority faced a fiscal crisis that could threaten its existence. However, it was not until June 2007, when the internal struggle between the two leading political factions FATAH and HAMAS lead to the separation of power and the establishment of two governments in the West Bank and Gaza, that the EU resumed normal relations with the Palestinian Authority (now represented by the FATAH government) and re-established the political dialogue. A meeting between the European Commission and the PA to discuss the re- launch of the Action Plan was held in Ramallah in November 2007 with a view to convening the Joint Committee in the first half of 2008 and to formally re-launch the implementation of the Action Plan.

On 5 December the Palestinian Authority presented the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 requesting $5.6 billion in international assistance. On 17 December officials from some 68 countries attended a one-day Donors’ Conference for the Palestinian State, hosted by France in Paris, pledging a total of $7.4 billion in aid for the Palestinians. The new PA Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad said that some 70 per cent of the requested financial aid would go towards the PA’s ongoing expenses, such as salaries and welfare payments, with the rest going towards development projects, including industrial parks and factories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A large portion of the funds would contribute to the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. The assistance will be disbursed under a new Palestinian European Aid Management mechanism, known by the French acronym PEGASE.

Launched on 1 February 2008, PEGASE replaced the earlier EU mechanism – TIM, and reflected the normalised relations between the EU and the Palestinian Authority.

The EU provides two key types of support through PEGASE. First, the EU is providing significant amounts of direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, to help the PA to deliver public services throughout the occupied Palestinian territory. EU funds therefore go towards the salaries of civil servants and pensioners, helping to ensure that vital services – such as schools and hospitals – can keep operating. Funds are also provided to the more

26 CITpax, p.20.

16 vulnerable Palestinian families, through a social allowances scheme which is coordinated with the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, EU funds help to ensure that the people of Gaza have electricity, by purchasing the fuel that is needed to run the only Gaza power plant.

Secondly, through PEGASE, the EU aims to shift away from shorter-term, emergency assistance to a sustainable Palestinian development process, thereby widening the range of activities supported in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The EU is supporting major infrastructure development projects that will deliver concrete benefits to Palestinians in areas such as better water and sanitation, safer schools, safer electricity networks and better roads.

As a sign of the re-established European trust into the new government, the Mechanism would channel funds directly to the PA Ministry of Finance, not exclusively to the beneficiary of a certain development project, as TIM did. In the view of some Palestinian officials, dealing with the implementation of PEGASE, this mechanism is more flexible, used more easily and undoubtedly shows the increased trust in the Palestinian Authority. The contracts on the development projects are concluded with development agencies from EU Member States, which have representative offices in the Palestinian Authority. The management of the project is either decentralised or centralised, the two differing from each other by the EU participation in the first procedures regarding the certain project such as the tendering, the compatibility with the procedures of a certain donor country, which would insist that the project be implemented by its own procedures, the opening of the tender and the award of contractors. The fact, that some donors continue to be paying directly to the beneficiaries, not to the Ministry of Finance continue to be an obstacle as the latter finds difficulties in finding a clear future projection of its budget.

In addition to the direct budget support and the development aid, the EU funds a wide range of projects that support the priorities of the Palestinian authority in areas such as judicial reform, support to the Palestinian civilian police, enhancing the health and education systems and improving public financial management.

In the late 2008 two remarkable events reflected the Palestinian situation though indirectly because they showed the paradigm shift in the European-Israeli relationship. The first one was the agreement signed between Israel an the EU on 2 December, that stated on enhancing cooperation I the fight against terrorism, the strengthening of military relations and the exchange of intelligence information, which reinforces the previous agreement reached between the two parties in October 2006. The second event in the decision of the EU Foreign Ministers on 8 December for strengthening the European-Israeli relations in accordance with the principles adopted by the EU in June 2008. The European Parliament postponed voting on this resolution until Israel showed “serious signs of good intentions”. Bernard Kushner, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, said referring to the EU’s decision to that enhancing the relations with the Palestinians will come next, but it is somewhat difficult with the Palestinians, because it would be more complicated in the absence of a state.27 The “serious signs” did no come late as on 27 December 2008 Israel began bombing the Gaza Strip, killing 364 Palestinians in 3 days.

27 www.elaph.com/web/politics/2008/12/389691.htm

17 On 30 December the EU issued an official statement, known as the French proposal to ending the military operation. In it, “the European Union, conscious of the suffering and anguish of all civilian populations, puts forward the following proposals to resolve the crisis:  Immediate and permanent ceasefire: there must be an unconditional halt to rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel and an end to Israeli military action. The cessation of fighting should allow lasting and normal opening of all border crossings, as provided for in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access. The European Union is ready to re-dispatch the EUBAM to Rafah to enable its re-opening, in cooperation with Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Israel.  Immediate humanitarian action: food, urgent medical aid and fuel should be delivered to the Gaza Strip, the evacuation of the injured and unhindered access of humanitarian workers should be made possible through the opening of crossing points.  Stepping up the peace process, as called for by Security Council Resolution 1850. The solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be based on the process set out in Annapolis and on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel in peace and security.”28 It is noticeable that the text on halting the Israeli military action is always preceded by the text on halting the Palestinian military action; the Israeli military action seems to be a response to the Palestinian reaction.29 The proposal does not take into account the fact that it was on 12 December 2007 – only two weeks after the Annapolis peace conference that Israel’s Security Cabinet met to consider a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip. However, no particular decision was taken then, but the Israeli blockade of the Sector marked the beginning of the year 2008, when on the 18 January 2008 Israel closed all border crossings with the Gaza Strip used for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The inevitable result of this action was the blackout the the Gaza Strip suffered three day after as its only power plant was shut down for lack of fuel. The military operation was unilaterally ceased by Israel on 19 January 2009. On 2 March an international conference in support of the Palestinian economy for the reconstruction of Gaza took place in Sharm al-Sheikh (Egypt) where the European community pledged €439, 9 million even though the official position of the EU remained that HAMAS had to share the responsibility for the unprecedented violence in the Gaza Strip with the Israeli Defense Forces.

At the end of the day

We cannon deny that the facts and figures point out that the EU has been the biggest donor to the Palestinian people disbursing only for the 2000-2008 period € 2916, 49 million. The EU deserves the credit of the Arab opinion for supporting economically the Palestinian Authority since its creation in 1995, by providing direct budget support and money for development projects, as well as contributions to UNRWA and other UN agencies, non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors developing their activities to help the Palestinian people. However, this support has not been unconditional.

28 Statement by the European Union on the Situation in the Middle East, 30 Décembre 2008, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/105082.pdf 29 The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008, Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, p.237.

18 First, because we notice that every time the political development in the Palestinian Authority has moved to a non-favourable for the EU direction, the economic support has also moved to a negative but for the Palestinian people direction, and it was the people who were left to gather the fruits of their democratically expressed choice, as happened in 2006-2007 events regarding the election of HAMAS and the subsequent separation of the West Bank and Gaza, which was the inevitable result of the international community’s, including EU’s, boycott of the HAMAS-led government, despite the concessions the Islamic movement was ready to make in order to comply with the conditions, imposed by that same international community.

Second, because it is no secret that some EU member states, such as Italy and Spain, require that the materials needed for the implementation of some infrastructure projects be purchased by Italian and Spanish companies – a fact, which leads us to the conclusion that a significant amount of the money budgeted for a certain development project will go back to the profit of the donor state itself.

Another thing, which we cannot leave unnoticed, is that despite its enhanced political presence as regards the Middle East Peace Process on its Palestinian track, the EU does not deserve applause for its performance.

Some authors justify this supporting character role with EU playing best in low politics but the distribution of characters could be different. Especially with the severe conditions where the political uncertainty leads to more economic loses both for the Palestinian people and the EU itself. The lack of an independent Palestinian State, which controls its borders, poses obstacles to the full implementation of the Interim Association Agreement and to the development of the Palestinian business sector and to its economy in general. The ever imminent threat of another Israeli military attack makes it impossible for the Palestinian Authority to elaborate and implement a long-term strategy as a bomb raid could destroy years of construction work as it happened in Gaza in 2008-2009. In other words, the political solution is a condition sine qua non for the economic support to be effective.

And last but not least, the EU could render more active political support by putting pressure on Israel, especially as regards the core issues, integral parts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognised by the EU as violations of international law – such as the occupation of the Palestinian territories, the settlements and the construction of the Separation Wall and the unacceptability of unilateral change of the status of Jerusalem. Even though these important elements have been endorsed and reiterated by the EU since the mid-70s of the 20th century in a list of declarations and official statements, no concrete action has been taken by the international community and Europe in particular for their implementation. Namely the more critical attitude will prove to be the most efficient form of both economic and political support of the EU for the Palestinian people.

19