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POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

Richard Gunther

Ohio State University

Ann Arbor: Center for Political Studies Institute for Social Research University of Michigan 1988 PREFACE Political Analysis: Cultural Dimensions U.S. Department of State Contract 1724-520100 Politics and Culture in Spain is the fifth monograph to be completed in the Politics and Culture Series series on the analysis of culture and politics in a variety of national settings. The Series Editor series is designed to further understanding of how culture helps shape political Samuel H. Barnes systems and behavior in selected countries. The monographs should be useful to analysts, diplomats, and others with extensive knowledge of the particular country 1. flarlr n Mfthpr Pnliiics and Culture in Thailand. as well as to those seeking an introduction. 2. Thomas M. Callaghy, politics and CilllUie in Zaire. 3. John P. Entelis, Politics and Culture in Morocco. 4. S. Victor Papacosma, Pjiliiicj ajid C^lrnrc in Greece. The Department of State selected the countries to be included in the series. 5. Richard Gunther. Politics and Culture in Spain. As series editor, I chose the authors of individual monographs and prepared a set of 6. Lars Schoultz. Politics and Culture in Argentina. guidelines developed in two conferences organized by the Office of Long-Range 7. William yimmprmnn, Eolitjgp and Culture in Yugoslavia. Assessments and Research at State and attended by government and academic specialists. The guidelines reflect my perspective on "Culture and Politics" as presented in a monograph with that title prepared as part of the project. That general work is available to those seeking more background on the topic.

Each country monograph was revised following a review session attended by academic and government specialists on the country. However, the country author bears final responsibility for the contents of the volume; it should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the Department of State.

The country author also prepared the references and the annotated bibliography of the most important interpretations of culture and politics in the country. For statistical and other basic information on the country, readers should consult the latest issue of Background Notts, issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State.

I am indebted to many people for the success of this series. Dr. E. Raymond Platig, Director of the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at the Department, heads the list. This collaboration between government and the academy has been facilitated and enriched by his understanding of both cultures. He joins me in expressing appreciation to the many participants in our conferences on the conceptual monograph and on individual countries. Their collective experience is formidable. Their insights, criticisms, and advice have been invaluable.

This work was performed under the sponsorship of Samuel H. Barnes The Regents of the University of Michigan and the U.S. Department of State Ann Arbor, Michigan

Copyright© 1988 University of Michigan ACKNOWLEDGMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS

The author would like io express his gratitude for criticism and suggestions HIGHLIGHTS concerning an earlier draft of this manuscript offered by S.N. Eisenstadt, Alex INTRODUCTION Inkeles, Juan Linz, Jose" Ramon Montero. Eusebio Mujal-Le6n, Francisco Orizo, GENERAL CULTURAL PATTERNS Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, Bradley Richardson, Goldie Shabad, Dario Vila, and the SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON CULTURE participants in the conference on Politics and Culture held under the auspices of the Caciquismo, Amiguismo and Village Culture 10 United States Department of State in March, 1987. Maria Pilar Alcobendas and the Secularization 13 Centra de Invesiigaciones Sociol6gicas generously provided invaluable assistance Reading, Viewing, Consuming and Participating 15 and an enormous volume of data upon which much of this manuscript was based. A TRADITION OF DISCONTINUITIES 19 The author also gratefully acknowledges generous support from the Professional The Church 19 Leave Program of The Ohio State University, and the National Fellowship Program The Monarchy, the Franquist Regime and the New Democracy 21 of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, which made the writing of this SIGNIFICANT SUBCULTURES 26 monograph possible. Partisan Subcultures 26 Regional Subcultures 30 CONCLUSIONS. SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY 44 NOTES 63 MAP: THE REGIONS OF SPAIN A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

HIGHLIGHTS

Serious questions concerning Spain's political culture became salient following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 and the beginning of the transition to a new regime. Many believed that certain Spanish cultural features had been incompatible with peaceful democratic competition in the past, and that some had also been responsible for retarding Spain's economic development, excluding it from the West European community of modem democratic societies. These concerns were heightened by the fact that the former dictator's social outlook was conservative, traditionalist, semi-corporatist, and explicitly anti-democratic. Consequently the civics training imparted to generations of young people sought to resurrect a traditionalist view of Spanish society and undermine values often thought to be essential components of a democratic political culture.

A decade later we see in Spain (with the notable exception of Euskadi — the Basque country) a legitimate and consolidated democratic regime. In general terms, the values of contemporary Spaniards are very similar to those of other West Europeans, and the explicitly political components of Spain's mass-level culture can be regarded as fully supportive of democratic politics and the basic institutions of the present constitutional monarchy. At the elite level as well, cordial relations among representatives of competing parties have contributed to consolidation of a new democratic regime — in sharp contrast with the Second Republic. With regard to an understanding of politics in Spain at the national level, the most important and distinguishing feature of Spanish political culture is change. Both at the mass and elite level, the values and rules of the game of the present era represent a marked contrast with the traditional stereotypes associated with Spain, as well as with clearly observable patterns of behavior in the past.

What explains this departure from traditional views of Spanish political culture? One answer (to which we will only briefly allude) is that some of these cultural stereotypes may always have been incorrect, or were accurate descriptions of only a segment of Spanish society in the past. A second explanation (to which we will devote considerable attention) is that rapid and profound socio-economic development over the past three decades has undermined many of the values, perceptions and role definitions central to the traditional culture of Spain. Rigid sex-role definitions have been broken down by transformations in family structures and by the entry of women into the monetized sector of the economy; the drastic decline of religiosity in Spain has weakened the influence of the Church on the formation of values, and reduced the potential for disruptive political conflict over religious issues; patron-client relations have been virtually eliminated as a prominent feature of electoral behavior due to increases in literacy, urbanization, and access to mass communications and transportation networks; and value heterodoxy — if not a breakdown of consensus on many values — has resulted

1 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN from the removal of old restraints, and from exposure to a much broader array of POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN socializing agents and experiences.

A third source of cultural change concerns the behavior of political and social INTRODUCTION elites. Discontinuity was an important characteristic of Spanish 19th- and early 20th-century history. Political and social elites often engaged in behavior which could be characterized by drastic swings of the pendulum from one extreme to the Stereotypes of "the Spanish national character" are deeply ingrained in popular literature, as well as in serious scholarly analyses of Spanish history and other. As a consequence, traditional forces such as the monarchy, the Church and political economy. Among those traits most often associated with Spaniards are an even the concept of national identification divided Spaniards from one another, intense and intolerant religiosity; great concern with dignity, personal honor and rather than serving as sources of national unity. Another factor which undermined social status; pride verging on arrogance; fierce individualism; low levels of Spanish traditions was a highly polemical use of history, through which individuals interpersonal trust; an austere and non-materialist life style; excessive concern with and groups sought to discredit their opponents and present themselves as death and immortality; rigidly sexist role definitions (with machismo and representatives of the "real Spain." "Donjuanismo" strongly prevalent among men); contempt for business enterprise; a propensity towards cruelty and violence; and a preference for glorious imperial This discontinuity is not necessarily undesirable, at least from the standpoint conquest over manual labor.1 of present-day democratic stability. Political elites departed markedly from their predecessors during the transition to democracy insofar as they sought to moderate Historians often attribute the economic and political decline of Spain in the partisan differences, tranquilize public opinion, and reach consensus on traditionally 17th century to certain of these cultural traits. Am£rico Castro (1965) argues that divisive issues. Their successful efforts have culminated noc only in democratic because the Reconquista, which returned the Iberian peninsula to Christian control, consolidation and institutionalization of rules of the game conducive to democratic directly involved the expulsion of Jews and Moors, the core values of the newly stability, but also in a reinforcement of moderate forces in Spanish politics and the emerging society would place great stress upon heroic conquest and contempt for undermining of support for more radical alternatives. The stark contrast between those values associated with the defeated peoples. Specifically, he claims that it this outcome and the violence and instability within Euskadi (whose subculture will resulted in a Castilian repudiation of the values of hard work, technological be analyzed in this monograph) provides clear evidence of the extent to which advance, and material achievement.2 Catalans, with a different culture which patterns of political interaction determined largely by elites may have a profound placed much greater stress upon commercial enterprise, were more aggressive in long-term impact on the basic character of a culture or subculture. business matters; but their economic activities were hindered by restrictive policies While Spanish culture and society have evolved towards the West European enacted by the Castilian central government. Overall, it is argued that these mainstream, there remain some ways in which Spaniards' modal cultural traits are Castilian cultural traits delayed economic development substantially, and that when somewhat distinct. Among these are amiguismo (although it is declining in industrialization did occur it was initially restricted to Catalunya and Euskadi, with importance); a pronounced individualism, which contributes to low levels of civic most of the Castilian heartland remaining backward and agrarian. commitment and affiliation with secondary associations, and to unstable leadership patterns within political parties; emphasis on friendly personal relations; moderate, Scholars and politicians also attributed much of the political instability and left-of-center, and vaguely anticapitalist political views and preferences; and low violence experienced by the Spanish polity to the values and behavioral styles of levels of interest in and involvement with politics, despite keen attentiveness to the political elites, which may or may not (depending on the scholar in question) have personal images of party leaders. But the most important conclusion to be drawn their roots in Spanish culture. The 19th century French psychologist Alfred from this exploration of politics and culture is that differences between the modal Fouillee" claimed that Spaniards are "semi African" and inherently violent and cultural features of Spain and those of other West European societies are fewer and fanatical (cited in Caro Baroja, 1970:104). Francisco Franco argued that important less politically relevant than those distinguishing some regions within Spain from features of the Spanish character were "anarchic spirit, negative critique, lack of others, and are much less marked than differences between the Spain of today and solidarity among men, extremism and mutual hostility," and used these alleged the Spain of the past. qualities as justification for his contention that they must be countered by strong authoritarian government (Linz, I970b:131).

Less sweeping claims are made by contemporary scholars who argue that the norms and behavioral styles of prominent political leaders during the Second Republic directly and powerfully contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War.3 Payne writes, for example, that a central characteristic of political elite norms and behavior "was insistence on ideological purity in the tradition of European

2 3 1

POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN radicalism;... compromise and practical adjustment were adjudged a sellout of values and cultural traits associated with the sociological concept of "modernity" — principle." The moralistic, ideological orientation of left Republicanism is reflected e.g., the predominance of universalism over particularism; the decline of fatalism in the attitudes of Manuel Azana, who once wrote that "It will be necessary to and a "subject orientation" in politics; consumerism; increased optimism and belief restore doctrines in their purity and shield oneself against compromise. in control over one's own destiny; etc. (as described by Inkeles and Smith, 1974). Intransigence will be symptomatic of integrity" (Payne, 1970:91). But by no means has a new set of cultural traits emerged to assume the same dominant position as that occupied by the Spanish Catholic cosmology in past It is not clear whether the "national character" stereotypes set forth above centuries. There is no evidence of a convergence on a "postmaterialist" set of ever were accurate descriptions of the dominant values and norms of most values, for example. Instead, we can crudely describe cultural change in Spain as Spaniards. Some prominent scholars suggest that these characterizations were moving away from orthodox conformity with a clearly definable set of norms (or always exaggerated and perhaps inaccurate.4 Others have suggested that these local-level sets of norms) and towards greater cultural eclecticism.6 , cultural traits may have been appropriate only for the lower aristocracy of Castile — that other social strata and regional cultural minorities, particularly in Catalunya In this respect, the relationship between social structure and cultural values is and Euskadi, may have had greatly different systems of norms and values (Lopez obvious. In pre-modern village society, socialization processes, personal Pintor and Wert, 1982). But it is absolutely clear that this stereotype of the experiences and exposure to cultural models are limited and relatively "Spanish national character" is not valid as a description of political culture today. homogeneous. Social conformity mechanisms are also stronger than they are in urban areas. Informal pressures to conform to village norms in rural Spain were In the remainder of this monograph I shall set forth the basic characteristics reinforced by authoritarian family structures (see Ayala, 1986:164) and, in the of Spanish culture and of several important subcultures. I shall show how these political sphere, by the intervention of the caciqpc (local notable and political boss). cultural features have changed in recent years, and discuss the extent to which they And certainly no present-day institution could rival The Holy Office of the depart from the caricatures often used to label or "explain" contemporary Spanish Inquisition in its efforts to root out heterodoxy and enforce strict adherence to a society. I shall also explore the impact of two forces which have given rise to single set of religious and social values. In contrast, the range of cultural options profound change in the modal norms and values of the peoples of Spain. and variety of socializing agents is much greater in open, urbanized societies with well developed communications media. The first of these forces is socioeconomic modernization. A substantial body of social science research has documented the extent to which structural changes The second source of cultural and subcultural change in Spain is the behavior associated with economic development can exert a powerful influence on a of political and social elites. An exclusive reliance on socioeconomic-reductionist 5 society's culture and basic features of political behavior by its population. analysis would suggest that value change would be relatively steady and Important cultural changes with political ramifications have occurred in Spain at unidirectional. This would not satisfactorily describe the patterns of change which least in part as a result of this process. Over the past 25 years Spanish society has have taken place in Spain. Juan Linz argues that one origin of the weakness of been profoundly transformed. Powerful waves of migration have contributed to an "tradition" and the absence of an integrative value consensus in Spanish social and extensive urbanization and to the progressive disappearance of parochial village political life can be found in the sharply discontinuous patterns of change over the subcultures. Education, exposure to communications media, and access to past two centuries — discontinuities which are largely the result of the independent transportation networks have eliminated patron-client relationships from all but a actions of prominent social or political actors and institutions (Linz, 1972). few relatively isolated rural areas, and substantially expanded the portion of the Traditional institutions which have played important integrative roles in the population engaged in what may be euphemistically referred to as "unmediated" political development of other European countries — institutions such as the political participation. The expansion of the industrial and tertiary sectors of the monarchy, religious organizations, and political parties — were seriously weakened economy has substantially altered the occupational and class structure of society, in Spain by abruptly discontinuous patterns of change. I shall carry Linz's and a technological revolution in the agricultural sector has greatly affected social argument further by arguing that those traditions were so weak that, just as the stratification in rural areas. A profound secularization of society has accelerated in coming to power of Juan Carlos I represented an instauration (not a restoration), so recent years. And the first hints of "postmaterialist" values are beginning to emerge too was the establishment of the current Spanish democracy. Traces of the past among the young. may be seen in certain features of democratic politics (such as the importance of Basque and Catalan nationalism, and certain aspects of voting behavior), but the It is important to note, however, that while socio-economic modernization dominant institutional and behavioral features of the current Spanish democracy in has eroded away the underpinnings of many of the traditional cultural precepts of many respects represent sharp departures from what would have resulted from the Spanish society, it has not culminated in the emergence of a new value consensus or inheritance of traditions. •in convergence on an easily definable new culture. Certainly, old parochialisms and cultural orthodoxy (especially those features associated with Spanish Catholicism) Another factor which has prevented traditions or cultural symbols from have greatly diminished. Likewise, we can document the emergence of a core of unifying all the population of Spain within a single community is linguistic and

4 5 1 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN cultural pluralism. Most Catalans and Gallegos, and some Basques, speak distinct claim to believe in God than do most other Europeans (75%); but only 22% of regional languages. They also define themselves first and foremost as Catalans, Spaniards mentioned "religious faith" as an important virtue — a figure which is Gallegos or Basques. Thus, as Linz has argued, "Nationalism — which for many close to the European average (17%), and much below Ireland's 42%. In addition, societies is one component of the syndrome of modernity — in the case of Spain these studies showed that Spaniards are close to the European average in several acts as a divisive factor, due to the emergence of peripheral nationalisms. measures of tolerance for others and on a composite index of permissiveness. Tradition, the sense of historical continuity... is a Castilian-dominated tradition and therefore questionable to minorities in search of the peripheral national tradition" While we may regard Spain as fundamentally modern and European, there (1972:5). are some features of Spanish culture which do distinguish Spain from other European countries, and some of them have a significant impact on Spanish politics. GENERAL CULTURAL PATTERNS These will be discussed in greater detail later, but for comparative purposes should be succinctly summarized at this point: Recent studies of the beliefs and values of Spaniards clearly reveal that Spain fits well within the ranks of developed Western European societies. Although 1. Amiguismo: At least until the recent past, Spaniards relied heavily upon certain specific values, beliefs, or behavioral norms are either stronger or weaker personal recommendations and personalistic networks (in some instances, than the European average, the overall pattern suggests that Spain has adopted a full-fledged patrons in patron-client networks) in their dealings with typically West European cultural orientation. officialdom. Within the political elite, as well, personal networks often constituted important political resources and channels for political Several of the cliches associated with the "Spanish national character" are communication, recruitment, and interest articulation. debunked in a study by Lopez Pintor and Wen (1982). They derived a list of stereotypes of Spanish character from several works by prominent Spanish writers 2. Anticapitalism: A diffuse anticapitalism was characteristic of opinions on and historians (Mene"ndez Pidal, Americo Castro, Madariaga, Lain Entralgo, and both the left and the right poles of the political spectrum. This general others), and then used recent survey data to see if these cultural traits were, indeed, stance is declining but still pervasive at the mass level. Over the past few widespread among contemporary Spaniards. Two sets of traditional values were years political elites within the largest parties of the left and right (the found to be completely inaccurate as descriptions of contemporary Spanish culture. Socialist PSOE and Alianza Popular, respectively) have more fully endorsed The austerity and non-materialism regarded as components of the traditional life the merits of the free market either in words (AP) or deeds (the PSOE in style have definitely given way to values and purchasing habits of a mass- government). Even at its peak, however, this anticapitalist stance was consumption society. In addition, the exaggerated sexual stereotypes associated always characterized by... with traditional Spain (especially machismo and Donjuanismo) are not widespread. Differences between the values and beliefs of men and women are narrowing 3. Moderation: Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, studies of Spanish public substantially, as are differences between masculine and feminine roles and behavior opinion revealed that the vast majority of Spaniards were to be found near (also see Sani and del Castillo, 1983). Ayala argues that these changes in sex roles the center of the political spectrum. There has been a gradual shift to the are the result of the decline of feudal social relations and the entry of women into left since the mid 1970s, and a decrease in the number of persons placing the labor force (1986:117 and 170). To this list of vanishing traditional traits could themselves at or near the exact center of the continuum (probably be added an exaggerated concern wiih one's position in the social hierarchy: survey representing a gradual depopulation of the "mantis" as "false centrists" data have found that this is now regarded as little more than one aspect of the progressively learned about politics and the meaning of the left-right 7 stereotype associated with the Castilian regional subculture. continuum); but the modal opinion among Spanish voters today is still of the moderate center-left. This moderation also characterizes the most important A more rigorous examination of the contemporary values of Spaniards was "partisan subcultures" of contemporary Spain. In sharp contrast with the undertaken by Francisco Orizo (1983), in conjunction with a cross-national study of Second Republic (where extremist anti-system parties and movements could values in nine European countries (Stoetzel, 1982). the findings of these studies be found on both left and right), there are today no significant parties of the further undermine the credibility of central components of the traditional stereotype. extreme left or extreme right outside of the Basque country.8 Avoidance of work is not found to be a particularly Spanish characteristic. While Spaniards report less job satisfaction than other Europeans (Orizo, 1983, p. 377), 4. Political passivity: Spaniards are less interested in and involved with Uiey place greater stress on the importance of diligence in work than respondents of politics than most other Europeans. Levels of electoral turnout are usually any other European country: 41% of Spaniards mention this as an important virtue, below the average for industrialized societies. Membership in political vs. a European average of 23% (Stoetzel, 1982:25). Neither are intense religiosity parties and other secondary organizations is also quite low. Low levels of or intolerance distinctly Spanish traits. To be sure, until recently religiosity in affiliation may be related to... Spain was much higher than the European average, and more Spaniards (87%)

6 7 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

5. Individualism; Some scholars have argued that Spanish culture is America in the west, and to the Middle East and the Arab world. EEC characterized by high levels of individualism and a low sense of civic membership and NATO membership have been accompanied by a shift commitment, resulting in high levels of tax evasion (see Diaz-Plaja:65-81). towards seeing Spain as an integral member of the West European community of democratic nations. 6. Gregariousness: At the same time that Spaniards defend their individuality, they are also regarded as gregarious, and as placing much value on friendly interpersonal relations. I have also found Spanish political elites, in Let us now turn our attention to a more detailed exploration of the manner in particular, to be open, congenial and honest. which important features of Spanish culture have been affected by this extensive development of Spain's economy and social structure. 7. Dependence on television for news: Newspaper and magazine readership is below the European average, while television viewing is relatively high. SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON CULTURE

8. The personalization of politics: Given low levels of "social partisanship" in The largely rural, agrarian underdeveloped Spain of the 1930s — with the Spain (i.e., parties are not well rooted in secondary associations), low levels country's few industrial zones largely limited to Catalunya and Euskadi — no of party identification (in part, due to the relative novelty of partisan longer exists. Since the early 1960s, Spanish society has been rapidly and competition), and a heavy dependence on television as a source of political profoundly transformed. The motor powering this development was an economic information, the images of party leaders have played perhaps growth rate which averaged 7.3% per year in real terms between 1961 and 1973, disproportionately important roles in the dynamics of electoral competition. producing a cumulative expansion in real Gross National Product of 147% during this time period (Gunther, 1980:63). An additional force for change was an 9. "The family demons": While Francisco Franco may have been incorrect opening up of the Spanish economy and society, which greatly increased exposure about the degree to which "the family demons" of "anarchic spirit, negative of Spaniards to foreign values and styles of life. By the end of the 1970s over 40 critique, lack of solidarity among men," etc., were integral parts of a million foreign tourists visited Spain annually; and between 1960 and 1973 over 2 Spanish national character, the almost pathological propensity of party elites million Spanish workers were temporarily employed in other European countries to engage in disruptive and occasionally destructive intra-party conflicts (Rodriguez Osuna, 1985:39). may be rooted in some aspects of an elite-level political subculture as yet unexplored by social scientists. These qualities stand in sharp contrast with The extent of these changes can be appreciated by examining the the pervasiveness of amiability and gregariousness which constitute occupational structure of the Spanish economy at various intervals. In 1930, distinguishing features of Spanish culture in the aggregate. approximately 50% of all Spanish workers were employed in the agricultural sector. By way of comparison, the percentage of the labor force in the agricultural sector 10. Elite compromise and democratic stability: While political elites have that same year in France was 27%, in Germany 22%, and in the United Kingdom engaged in unseemly intra-party squabbles, inter-party relationships have only 10% (Linz, 1981a:365). Compared with other West European countries, the been, with few exceptions, quite civil and even amiable. The moderation of Spanish economy at the time of the Second Republic (Spain's previous experiment inter-party conflict (which was at least in pan a product of the unusually with democracy) could be regarded as underdeveloped. Little change took place keen historical memories of Spanish political elites) greatly facilitated the during the two decades following the Civil War. But as can be seen below, the transition to democracy. The absence of disruptive partisan conflict and the economic takeoff which began around 1960 rapidly transformed the Spanish positive roles played by the King at several crucial junctures have decisively economy into a more modern structure not greatly unlike those of other contributed to the consolidation of Spanish democracy at the national level. contemporary West European countries.

11. Some regional subcultures greatly affect politics: The Basque and Catalan Percentage of Economically Active Population in Eacj] Sector regions are so distinct that they have developed party systems with entirely different dynamics and dominant parties. In addition, the present democratic regime is not yet fully consolidated within Euskadi, and among a 1955 1960 1964 1969 1975 1979 1982 politically significant sector of the Basque population independence is preferred over continued membership within the Spanish state. Agriculture 45.8% 41.5% 35.6% 30.1% 22.8% 19.9% 17.6% Industry 21.5 23.3 25.4 26.3 27.2 25.6 26.0 12. Increasingly European: Spaniards have shifted decisively in the manner in Services 25.8 28.1 31.2 31.2 38.2 45.1 47.7 which they perceive Spain as relating to the rest of the world. Traditional (Source: twiiiuio Nidonil de Eiudttuct, E)p«fli: Am«rjg Eiudtmco. virioui ycm.) self-images had combined elements of isolationism (neutrality in both World Wars being a result) with perceived status as a "bridge" to Latin

8 9 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

Accompanying this restructuring of the economy has been a massive shift of Extremadura and La Mancha, on the other hand, are predominantly landless day- residential patterns from rural to urban. In 1930, 57% of the Spanish population laborers, often employed on huge latifundia, and they tend to reside as a "rural resided in towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, and 21% of all Spaniards lived proletariat" in agro-towns.11 Consequently, social differences and class tensions are in towns or villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants. By 1981, these figures had more acute in the south. Reinforcing these social-structural differences are fallen to 27% and 9%, respectively. And over these same five decades, residents in differences in religious practice: northern peasants tend to be much more religious cities larger than 100,000 increased from 15% of the population to 42%. By the than their southern counterparts.12 Also, in contrast with the political conservatism end of this migratory process, Spain was about as urbanized as the average of the northern peasantry, agricultural workers in the south have a long tradition of European country.9 radicalism.

What has been the impact of these social changes on Spanish culture, Second, the size of the town or village is of considerable importance. particularly those values, norms and practices most relevant to politics? Gilmore places great stress on the "sociopolitical divergences between the homogeneous, unanimist and 'independent* peasant society, and the more complex Caciquismo. Amiguismo and Village Culture and heterogeneous town society" which he studied (1976, p. 99). We must be aware that the village society so exhaustively scrutinized in most anthropological Numerous anthropological studies have been undertaken in Spain examining studies is rapidly vanishing, and is no longer representative of Spanish society in in great detail the dynamics of social life, and the nature of dominant values and the aggregate. By 1981, the share of the Spanish population residing in towns 10 beliefs. Most of these studies have focused upon small villages, and have reached under 2000 had fallen to 9%, and the portion inhabiting villages under 1000 similar conclusions: Village residents had a highly localized image of reality, with amounted to less than 5% of all Spaniards. Thus, Gilmore warns against the strong communal loyalties and attitudes of rivalry or suspicion verging on dangers inherent in extrapolating from studies of small villages, and thereby xenophobia towards neighboring villages and the outside world. Religion exaggerating the applicability of the romantic village integration perspective (particularly local saints and relics) exerted a powerful unifying and integrative (1976:101). influence on village society. In politics, villagers exhibited a "subject" orientation (cf., Almond and Verba, 1963; and Lerner, 1958). They deferred to the authority of Finally, we must be aware that an agricultural revolution has taken place in village headmen (caciques^ in electoral matters: as a villager said to Pitt-Rivers, Spain over the past two decades, mainly as a result of the large-scale mechanization "When they tell me to vote, I ask, who for, and when they tell me who for, I vote. of agriculture. A new prosperity has spread to many areas previously regarded as And if they don't ask me to vote, I stay at home and mind my own business" (Pitt- poor and backward (see Harding, 1984). This has led to a substantial Rivers, 1954:159). transformation of class relations in rural Spain, with considerable political implications. With these caveats in mind, let us briefly examine one feature of Caution must be exercised so that the findings derived from studies of very village society which in the past had a substantial impact on the nature of Spanish small villages (typically in the north of Spain or in isolated mountain valleys) are politics, and which still exists in some rural areas — caciquismo. not inappropriately extrapolated to other parts of the country as well. Gilmore (1976), for example, found in a survey of this literature that 26 of the 27 studies he Prestigious and sometimes economically powerful local notables (caciques! examined dealt with villages having fewer that 2500 inhabitants, and most of them exerted such a powerful impact on electoral politics under the Restoration were smaller than 1000 in population. He found very different patterns of beliefs monarchy (1876-1923) that one prominent scholar has concluded that we cannot and social interactions in his own study of an "agro-iown" of 8000 in Andalucfa. In speak of democratic politics in Spain prior to the founding of the Second Republic place of the integrative function of religion reported in many other studies, for in 1931.13 In the vast majority of constituencies (virtually all of those outside of example, he found that "religion and ceremonial practices often provoke higher large cities), caciques manipulated local electorates in a carefully orchestrated game active negative reactions which ignite class conflict, thereby reinforcing class of pseudo-competition between the two dominant parties. The key to this system polarization" (p. 96). And he found that class tensions within the community were was the patron-client relationship which linked voters to local caciques who were, more salient and intense than feelings of hostility or suspicion between neighboring in turn, connected to influential individuals and bureaucratic agencies in Madrid. towns. As Varela explains, "The power of caciques, is derived from their ability to act as transmission belts between local interests and the Administration" (Varela, Before the findings of these anthropological studies may be properly 1977:292). This relationship can be beneficial for poorly educated or illiterate assessed, some caveats are clearly in order. First, the geographical location of the peasants. Christian (1972) argues that in many villages the intervention of caciques village is of considerable importance. In general terms, the northern rural regions or other literate elites in resolving official matters was necessary since, from the differ profoundly in their social structural characteristics from southern towns peasant's viewpoint, bureaucrats and judges spoke an unintelligible language. (except, perhaps for isolated sierra villages). Peasants in the north tend to own their Overall, electoral domination by caciques required the existence of a "largely own lands, and class differences are minimal; the rural populations of Andaluci'a,

10 11 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN apolitical and even illiterate mass electorate of the countryside and the provincial political and administrative centers. One example is the interior of Galicia, where cities and towns" (Linz, 1967:198). the population is scattered across nearly 40,000 separate nuclei of population in hilly or mountainous valleys, poorly linked to one another by an inadequate Patron-client relationships of a different kind received an additional boost transportation system. Under these circumstances, exposure to political stimuli may from certain characteristics of the Franquist regime. I argued in an earlier study be low, and the utility of a caciquil intermediary in dealing with official matters in (1980) that, somewhat paradoxically, elite recruitment, interest articulation, and far-off bureaucratic offices may still be considerable. policy deliberations within General Franco's authoritarian regime could best be regarded as taking place within a "power vacuum." The dynamics of interpersonal Amiguismo has also declined, in large part as a product of socioeconomic relations, and especially amiguismo (the use of personalistic networks as a political development. Juan Linz has provided strong evidence supporting the thesis that instrument), played a disproportionately important role in the absence of "coercive particularism is displaced by universalism as societies develop economically. His resources" commonly employed in other regimes.w Amiguismo was especially data have also shown that belief in ascription as a basis of status declines and important in elite recruitment and lobbying efforts.15 In a later study of the achievement criteria increase in importance as a product of development O^inz, reestablishment of political parties under the new, democratic regime, I also found 1969).16 The extent to which amiguismo has declined in recent years can be seen in that personal networks often served as embryonic structures upon which party two waves of survey data collected one decade apart. In 1968, Juan Linz and organizations were built, at least with regard to the two main parties of the center Amando de Miguel asked a large sample of Spaniards "What do most people in and right, the Union de Centro Democranco (UCD) and Alianza Popular (see Spain do to resolve an official matter?" Respondents were presented with three Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986:133-139 and 170-177). Thus, in the 1970s universalis tic options (work through normal channels, resolve the matter personally, amiguismo was a significant feature of elite political culture. and hire a lawyer or agent), and three particularistic alternatives (use friendships, favors or acts of courtesy, and 'recommendations' — i.e., a written introduction Both caciquismo and amiguismo appear to have declined in recent years. from a friend of the relevant official). In 1979, we included that same item in our Caciquismo has disappeared from all but rural areas in Galicia, parts of Old Castile survey of the attitudes and political behavior of 5,439 Spanish citizens. During that and Le6n, and isolated villages in Andalucia. Economic development and eleven-year period the number of persons preferring the universalistic channels migration have drastically undermined this institution. As argued above, increased from 39% to 72%, while those selecting particularistic contacts declined caciquismo requires the existence of a sizable bloc of poorly-educated peasants. from 61% of all respondents to 41%.17 Lacking the ability to read, understand, and effectively respond to bureaucratic publications and proceedings, a peasant may find an educated and influential Amiguismo at the elite level of Spanish society and politics may also have intermediary to be a powerful ally. The loss of political autonomy which inevitably declined substantially (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986). Unfortunately, no accompanies the cacique's intervention is regarded as less important than the systematic data are available which would enable us to compare Spain with other tangible gains which the client receives in return. Education, literacy, and West European countries in this respect. Overall, I would contend that ami gui snip improvement of communications media increase the ability of citizens to fend for has decreased in political importance as a consequence of social modernization and themselves, and the increasing desire to participate more actively in politics, which the institutionalization of political parties, although I suspect that it continues to is a product of socio-economic modernization and education, makes the loss of play a more important political role than in northern European countries. political autonomy to the cacique seem all the more objectionable. Secularization Since economic development has, by and large, eroded away the underpinnings of caciquismo. that institution has survived only in a few areas and An intense religious commitment probably did distinguish Spain's culture under certain conditions. It has often taken on a more coercive form, far removed from the cultures of other West European countries until the recent past. Survey from the feelings of mutual admiration and respect which helped to stabilize data from the early 1970s reveal much more widespread attendance at religious traditional patron-client relations, ln his modern guise, the cacique is often head of services than was typical of European societies (see Montero, 1986:137). The the local branch of the Cajas de Ahorro (savings and loan); approval of a loan to a institutional presence of the Church in Spanish life was also greater. Under the client was alleged to be contingent upon political support for the patron, in the Franquist regime, Spain was a confessional state. In 1961, 49% of all students at opinion of some provincial-level party elites I interviewed in 1978 and 1979. Those the secondary level attended Church-operated schools (Payne, 1984:186), and even interviews also suggested that the level of economic development interacts with the in public schools religious training was a mandatory component of the curriculum geophysical properties of the province as determinants of the survival of at all grade levels. Franco reserved key ministerial posts for individuals who were caciquismo. Caciquismo had disappeared from large urban areas by the end of the strong defenders of Church interests, and involved Church officials in the 19th century (Tusell, 1978). It is now entirely absent from those areas linked to censorship of movies and printed matter. metropolitan centers by adequate transportation networks, but it survives in economically undeveloped areas which are also physically isolated from important

12 13 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

But a rapid and extensive secularization of Spanish society has taken place detailed anthropological study.20 The consequences of secularization, however, are within the past few years. In 1965, over 80% of all Spaniards described themselves of considerable significance for Spanish politics. as practicing Catholics; by 1983 only 31% described themselves as "practicing Catholics" or "very good Catholics" (Montero, 1986:134-135). Similarly, as Reading. Viewing. Consuming and Participating recently as 1976, only 17% of those interviewed in a nationwide survey described themselves as "non-practicing," "indifferent" or "atheist"; in a period of only seven The economic take-off of the past two decades has transformed Spain into a years, that segment of the Spanish population rose to 45% (Montero, 1986:135).18 mass-consumption society. Between 1958 and 1980 the percentage of family income devoted to food, clothing, and housing decreased from 74% to 55%, while This process of secularization does not mean that anticlerical sentiments are the amount left over for vacations and other discretionary spending increased from again on the rise in Spain — indeed, the absence of anticlericalism in Spain today 18% to 35% (Tezanos, 1984:50). The cumulative result has been the raising of stands in sharp contrast with the Second Republic. Neither does it imply that a patterns of consumption to typical European levels. Between 1966 and 1980, the complete rejection of religious belief has taken place. A poll taken in 1985 percentage of families with at least one television set increased from 32% to well indicated that Spaniards ranked fifth among a large number of Western industrial over 90%; families with refrigerators increased in number from 28% to 91%, while societies in terms of the importance that persons claim religion plays in their lives those with washing machines rose from 36% to 80%; and families with automobiles — behind the United States, Ireland, Canada, and Italy (Montero, 1986:133). In increased from 12% to 52% (Tezanos, 1984:53). addition, the comparative study of contemporary values in Europe undertaken by Orizo, Stoetzel, et al., showed that more Spaniards claimed to believe in God (87%) In one important aspect of modernity, however, Spain lags substantially than the average European (75%) (Stoetzel, 1982:339). But this process of behind the European average: education and literacy levels are below standard. secularization has led to a marked decrease in the level of religious commitment of This is one legacy of the Franquist regime which will take considerable time to most Spaniards. The demographic locus of the secularization process suggests that overcome. As a result of the budgetary austerity characteristic of the last 15 yean of it may continue into the future, although at a reduced rate of change: younger that regime, public spending on education during the 1960s was abysmally low. A Spaniards arc far less religious lhan the old." While forecasting the future is 1965 study revealed that Spain's level of government spending on education (as a percentage of its GNP) placed it in a tie with Angola in 122nd place out of the 131 always a risky business, it seems reasonable to expect that as the oldest age cohorts countries surveyed (Gunther, 1980:67-70)! These levels of education spending pass out of the Spanish population, replacement by their less religious succesors were the lowest in Western Europe — significantly lower even than those of Greece will further reduce the aggregate level of religiosity in Spain. and Portugal which were less developed economically. Fewer than 40% of children Secularization has also been accompanied by a drastic decline in the attended school beyond the age of 13. As a result, estimates of illiteracy in the mid organizational infrastructure and institutional presence of the Church. Even prior to and late 1960s ranged between 8% and 13% of the total adult population. An the acceleration of this process in recent years, Spain had lagged behind several important reform enacted in 1970 has moved Spanish education rapidly towards other European countries in this respect. No Church-sponsored trade union of any European standards: by 1981 the illiteracy rate had fallen to 5.4% of the adult significance exists today, and only since 1982 has a nationwide Christian population. This represents a significant improvement, but when one realizes that democratic political (i.e., outside of Euskadi and Catalunya) succeeded in electing illiteracy rates were below 5% in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Deputies and Senators to the Cortes — and that party, the Parudo Demdcrata England and Scandanavia as early as 1900, Spain must be regarded as a laggard. In Popular, may not survive its disastrous defeat in the 1987 municipal elections. This the absence of adult education programs, the rate of illiteracy in Spain will decline 21 infrastructural weakness has been exacerbated by the serious shrinkage of the only gradually, as the poorly educated older age cohorts pass on. religious sector of education. Between 1965 and 1984, students in state-operated secondary schools increased from 19% to 70% of total secondary school enrollment Associated with these relatively low levels of educational attainment and (Instituto Nacional de Esiadi'stica, 1966 and 1985), while the number of senior literacy are patterns of exposure to communications media which depart seminary students in Spain declined from 8000 in 1965 to 1728 in 1982 (Payne, substantially from the European average. A 1978 study undertaken by the Ministry 1984:219). of Culture found that only 22% of the 31,000 Spaniards sampled claimed to read a newspaper or magazine every day; another 12% said they read several times a Montero argues that this process of secularization is the product of week; and 9% claimed to read a newspaper or magazine about once a week. Over socioeconomic modernization in Spain: the underpinnings of religious practice half of those sampled stated that they never read newspapers or magazines were eroded away by industrialization and the transformation of the occupational (Ministerio de Cultura, 1978:25). Corroborating these findings, and setting Spain in structure; by urbanization and the shift to more modern life styles; and by the comparative perspective, Stoetzel, et al. found thai 47% of Spaniards regularly or emergence of a new, educated middle class (Montero, 1986:133). It is not my occasionally read newspapers or magazines. This figure was substantially below intention to try to explain why this process of secularization has taken place, the European average (65%), not to mention the much higher scores for Ireland although it is noteworthy that one facet of Montero's argument is substantiated by a (75%), the United Kingdom and West Germany (82%), and Denmark and Holland

14 15 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

(87%). Only Italy (46%) and France (50%) were close to Spain's low level of Finally, Spaniards are less actively involved with politics, as well as with a exposure to the print media (Stoetzel, 1982:64). wide range of secondary organizations than other Europeans. They turn out to vote in elections less regularly than most Europeans, but more frequently than In sharp contrast, in 1978 (when fewer Spaniards owned televisions than they Americans (see Montero, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c and 1987a; and Lopez Pintor, 1981). do today) 80% of those interviewed by the Ministerio de Cultura claimed to watch Relatively few of them affiliate with political parties (Montero, 1981; and Bartolini, television every day, and another 8% said that they watched at least once a week. 1980), and the infrastructure of secondary associations in Spain (particularly those In 1978 only 8% said that they never watched television (ibid:38); by 1985 that linked to political parties) is substantially less developed than in most other 25 figure had fallen to 1%.22 These findings are of considerable relevance to Spanish industrialized societies. electoral politics, insofar as news about politics tends to come disproportionately from the broadcast media. The 1984 survey conducted by Barnes, McDonough, It would be incorrect to attribute this low level of involvement in politics and Ldpez Pina found that 46% of those interviewed often followed political news entirely to the delayed development of the Spanish economy or to its still lagging on radio or television, and another 28% did someames. By way of comparison, levels of educational achievement. Other factors almost certainly contributed to the only 23% often and 19% sometimes read about political news in newspapers.13 comparative lack of political involvement found in Spain. In any effort to explain Thus, Spaniards are almost twice as dependent upon television and radio as sources the relatively low voting turnout levels of most elections, for example, Ldpez Pintor of news about politics as they are dependent on the print media. As I have argued points out that one must take into consideration the sheer exhaustion of the Spanish elsewhere, this heavy dependence upon television as a source for political news, in electorate. In a period of just over two years Spaniards were called to the polls on combination with the low level of "social partisanship" which is also characteristic five separate occasions; in just over three years, Andaluces were asked to vote six of Spanish society, has led to the disproportionate impact of the image of each times, and Basques and Catalans seven times. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect party's national leader as a determinant of the vote (Gunther, 1986c). voters to expend the time and effort necessary to cast ballots so frequently (Ldpez Pintor, 1981:43). It has often been demonstrated in political science that socioeconomic modernization and increased literacy usually are associated with increased levels of A more significant explanation is set forth by Montero: apathy and non- political interest, information, and involvement. Thus, one could argue that involvement may be part of Franco's legacy. He argues that the basic features of additional consequences of Spain's delayed modernization and poor educational the Franquist political culture may be summarized in "four terms: demobilization, structure may be the low levels of interest in politics exhibited by Spaniards, low depoliticization, apathy and antipartyism" (Montero, 1981:38). Linz (1970a and levels of organizational affiliation (especially with political or quasi-political 1975c) would add that, despite the rhetoric of the Falange, after about 1943 the groups), and relatively low levels of voting turnout. Franquist regime had no interest in mobilizing the Spanish population for the purpose of any radical transformation of society. Citizens were expected to be

26 Despite the great interest in the Spanish transition to democracy exhibited by passive and obedient rather than active and participatory. The widespread lack of political scientists and other international observers, Spaniards have remained political interest under Franco was not surprising, given the stupifyingly colorless remarkably detached from the political evolution of their own country. Apart from nature of the news broadcast by government-run radio and television stations, and 27 a temporary increase as the transition to democracy began, levels of interest in restrictions of press coverage of partisan political developments. My own politics have stubbornly remained low, and expressions of complete disinterest in personal observation in the 1970s was that, for most people, repression was unnecessary: they were simply bored into passivity. politics are more widespread among Spaniards than among citizens of any other West European country except Italy.24 Demobilization and depolarization were also important features of the This lack of interest appears to be accompanied by feelings of powerlessness transition to democracy in Spain, and they further reduced the excitement of and confusion about political matters. In both our 1979 and 1982 surveys, we asked political participation during a crucial stage of attitudinal development.28 Finally, respondents if they agreed with the statement that "Government and politics Di'az-Plaja contends that a pronounced emphasis on individualism remains a sometimes appear to be so complicated that a person like me cannot know what is continuing feature of Spanish culture, and suggests that the resulting commitment to happening." Not only did the level of agreement with that statement remain one's personal autonomy may undermine comrrtitments to organizations: "The unchanged at 60% throughout this period, but the number of persons disagreeing Spaniard lives with a society," he writes, "but never immersed within it" (1986:62). with that statement actually decreased, from 21% in 1979 to 18% in 1982. Spaniards also felt more distant from political parties than most Europeans: in 1982 Linz also sets forth an historical and structural explanation of the weakness of only 29% felt "close" to political parties, compared with the European average of secondary organizations in Spanish society. He claims that this weakness may 38% (Stoetzel, 1982:64). partly be attributed to the turbulence and discontinuities characteristic of the previous two centuries: "Perhaps the organization and legitimation of interests requires prolonged periods of political stability; they may to some extent be

16 17 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN incompatible with intense conflicts," he argues. The turmoil of 19th and early 20th A TRADITION OF DISCONTIhTUITIES century Spanish history "aroused passions, popular mobilizations and violence, which left little room for the defense of more concrete and narrow interests, for In Spain there has been no continuous flow of tradition, no bargaining, and for the creation of stable organizations" (Linz, 198la:367). The continuous transmission of a cultural heritage, no continuous process development of secondary organizations was also disrupted by the Civil War and by of selection of the past to be shared and incorporated into the present. The history of few countries is perceived in such conflictual repression under the Franquist regime. The Second Republic had been a period of terms as by the Spaniards who talk about 'two Spains* in permanent substantial mobilization, accompanied by excessive politicization of rapidly struggle, or as a genuine Spain and an 'anti-Spain' that needs to be expanding secondary organizations, especially trade unions. Franco abolished all destroyed to save the true essence of the nation... Intellectuals have trade unions and many other politicized secondary organizations, and clandestine confronted Spaniards with the choice to approve or reject in toto efforts to reconstruct them met with repression until the very end of the regime. long periods of their history, to choose sides for or against almost any of the great decisions that affected its development... [Thus], it Even the development of religious organizations (which were not persecuted) was becomes difficult for the 20th century Spaniard to use tradition as disrupted on the eve of the restoration of democracy. The breakdown of consensus consensus through time... Tradition as presentness of the past is over political, social, and economic values within the network of Catholic Action limited. organizations in the late 1960s plunged those bodies into internal crisis and overt (Linz, 1972:2 and 66) conflict with the Church hierarchy. As a result, by 1972 total membership in Catholic Action and its ancillary organizations had fallen to 100,000, down from nearly a million the decade before (Payne, 1984:198). In his brilliant essay on "Tradition and Modernity in Spain," Juan Linz argues that repeated patterns of abrupt and discontinuous change which took place in the Whatever the causes, the consequences of these low levels of involvement 19th and early 20th centuries, in conjunction with the polemical use of history by with political parties and voluntary associations arc of considerable importance. As politicians and scholars alike, have undermined the potentially unifying and Barnes, McDonough, and Ldpez Pina (1985) have shown, levels of stable integrative functions of traditional institutions. I argued at the beginning of this identification with political parties are quite low. The high level of volatility essay that the modal set of beliefs, values, and norms which emerged from 16th exhibited by Spanish voters in the 1982 election is at least in part attributable to the century Castile are, by and large, not relevant to culture and politics in Spain today. absence of this kind of psychological anchor of partisanship in Spain. Similarly, One reason, as argued above, is that a profound modernization of Spanish society the absence of links between parties and strong secondary associations also has taken place, irrevocably transforming the environment within which values, deprives partisan alignments of important social-structural sources of stability. This beliefs, and behavioral norms develop. I would now like to turn my attention to a is due both to the weakness of the secondary organizations themselves — especially second reason for the breakdown of cultural and political traditions in Spain — the trade unions, membership in which is lower than in any other West European behavior of social and political elites. In agreement with Linz, I shall argue that the country — and to the absence of linkages between the voluntary associations and past behavior of political elites — specifically, repeated clashes between political parties, which is particularly significant with regard to religious groups increasingly polarized alternatives, leading to pendular swings in policies and (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986, chapter 6). governmental structures — has precluded consensual acceptance of a large number of symbols and institutions. The creation of a new democracy in the late 1970s was The weakness of secondary organizations and mass parties has also successful not because (as Shils would have recommended) it built upon inherited undermined the capacity of the political system to provide for the articulation of traditions, but because the founding elites strove to escape from the past, or at least interests and contain that basic political function within proper institutional not to repeat the errors of their predecessors. Let us begin this discussion with a channels. Orizo wrote prophetically in 1983, "The mobilization potential of the brief summary of the patterns of discontinuous change which undermined Spanish population is greater than the degree of political commitment which it is consensus over the Church, the monarchy and the basic institutions of government. We shall then explore the present status of each of these sets of institutions which, willing to assume. Mobilization is the triumph of the moment, of impulse, of short- fortunately, can best be characterized by an abandonment of the polarization of the term action, and with a specific objective, as contrasted with the permanent past. commitment implied by work with a political party or even merely being affiliated with one" (p. 374). The waves of disruptive strikes and the violent student protests of early 1987 arc perhaps examples of what can happen when the ineffective The Church articulation of interests through weak secondary organizations gives way to direct action. In his history of Catholicism in Spain, Stanley Payne claims that "Religion played a much more direct role in ihe original definition of a Spanish identity and culture than was the case in most western countries" (1984:xi). Indeed, since the current boundaries of Spain were secured through protracted warfare against Islamic armies, Catholicism played a special role in defining the new state and

18 19 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

distinguishing it from its predecessors. And since the "reconquest" of Iberia was Council II encouraged the adoption of new attitudes and a significant shift in the undertaken by kingdoms and peoples speaking different languages and having political orientations of the Spanish clergy, especially among younger priests.33 different cultural traditions, Catholicism was the only thing which the founders of Some priests even played active roles in the clandestine opposition to the Franquist the Spanish state initially shared in common. Moreover, it has been argued that regime, particularly within Euskadi. The extent of these changes should not be until the 18th century the Church functioned as an integrating and leveling exaggerated, however. The Spanish Catholic Church did not as a collectivity move institution. It was a relatively independent national Church, and it often intervened sharply to the left during this period. Indeed, many older priests and several on behalf of the poor (Brenan, 1974). bishops steadfastly remained right-wing in both their social and political views. These changes did mean, however, that by the final decade of the Franquist era the By the late 18th century, however, signs of Church-state tension began to Church could by no means be regarded as a homogeneously conservative appear, and by the mid 19th century the Church had become a source of division institution. rather than national integration. Repression of liberals following the accession to the throne of the reactionary Fernando VII (1814-1822, restored to the throne Perhaps more important as a factor contributing to a depolarization of through the intervention of French troops in 1823) began the process which attitudes towards the Church was its policy of avoiding partisan entanglements progressively alienated liberals from the Church. The outbreak of the first Carlist during the decisive stages of the transition (1975-1979). Under the leadership of War (1833-1840) following the death of Fernando even more drastically polarized Cardinal Taranc<5n, the Church refused to endorse any specific political party and Spanish society between proponents of an ultra-reactionary clericalism and the avoided playing a visible role during the drafting of a new Constitution. While it growing ranks of anticlerical liberals. Enactment of anticlerical liberal legislation has become more active in political controversies in recent years, its ostensible in 1835 led to expulsion of the Jesuit order (the Jesuits were expelled from Spain on partisan neutrality and its low profile during the transition insulated the Church four separate occasions during the 18th and 19th centuries!), but more importantly, from divisive political conflicts during the regime's crucial formative period. closed large numbers of convents and monasteries, and confiscated Church lands, thereby transferring ownership of about 15% of the surface area of the country In sharp contrast with the Second Republic, present-day Spanish attitudes (Payne, 1984, p. 84). It has often been argued that a qualitative change in relations towards religion are largely depoliticized and depolarized. No political party has between the Church and various social groups occurred as a result of the expressed anticlericalism in its public statements or policy proposals. Even the confiscation of Church lands and, in exchange (according to the terms of a 1851 former antagonism between socialism and Catholicism has faded markedly: in our Concordat), state subsidization of the Spanish Church. Loss of its economic 1982 survey, only 18% of those interviewed said that one could not be a "good independence forced the Church into the arms of reactionary propertied classes, Catholic and a good Socialist." thus alienating itself from middle-class liberals and working-class Spaniards.29 These tensions culminated in sporadic outbursts of anticlerical violence.30 This does not mean that religion has become irrelevant to politics. Several studies have clearly demonstrated that there is a strong association in Spain between The founding of the Second Republic coincided with an upsurge of anti• religiosity, on the one hand, and left-right self-placement and partisan preference, 34 clerical sentiments which were reflected in the Constitution of that regime.31 This on the other. Unlike in the past, however, this cleavage is best regarded as latent situation helped to alienate both the Church and religious Spaniards from the new or potential political conflict, and does not overtly divide Spaniards from one regime, and drove them into the arms of the Franquist forces who eventually another. Political intervention by the Church has on occasion exacerbated tensions overthrew the Republic. Upon founding his authoritarian regime, Franco restored and has given rise to overt conflict. Examples of this occurred during deliberations numerous privileges and financial assets to the Church, and again converted Spain over public financing of Church-operated schools and the debate over the Socialist into a confessional state.32 Thus, the 150-yeur period which preceded the founding government's bill to legalize abortion. Until now, the behavior of religious and of the present democratic regime was marked by increasing polarization of opinions political leaders has made it possible to contain these conflicts within reasonable over the proper role of the Church in Spanish society, and by drastic pendular limits, and Spaniards want to keep it that way: a strong consensus has emerged in 35 swings between conservative or reactionary confessionalism and its anticlerical support of the notion that the Church should not intervene in politics. The opposite. electoral disaster experienced by the Christian-democratic PDP in 1987 seems to confirm this widespread desire to keep religion out of politics. Fortunately, by the late 1970s two developments had occurred which contributed to far-reaching compromises over the role of the Church in a newly The Monarchy, the Franquist Regime, and the New Democracy democratic Spain, and helped to stop the pendulum somewhere in the middle. One of these was a marked shift in the values, calculations, and behavioral styles of the Just as the patterns of abrupt and discontinuous change of the 19th and 20th constituent political elites, but this was preceded by a profound transformation of centuries precluded the "inheritance" of a unifying and integrative religious tradition in Spain, so, too, did they destroy consensus concerning basic political the Church itself. During the 1960s the Spanish clergy abandoned both its institutions. Over the preceding two centuries, Spain has swung back and forth reactionary heritage and its close association with the Franquist regime. Vatican

20 21 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN between monarchy and republic, democracy and authoritarianism, rigid centralism indicate that, while there was certainly growing dissatisfaction with the incumbent and regional autonomy. The existence today of a solid consensus in support of a governments of that period, there was no serious decline in support for democratic constitutional monarchy and an unevenly decentralized state is the product of institutions; neither could Spain's relatively low levels of voting turnout be conscious acts of creation by contemporary elites, and not the inheritance of a regarded as evidence of alienation from the political system (see Montero, 1984b traditional legitimacy, and 1986b). Survey data collected by Juan Linz in the immediate aftermath of the 1981 attempted coup even demonstrated that support for democracy in Spain at that This is certainly true of the monarchy. The first three-quarters of the 19th time was more widespread than mass-level attitudinal support for democracy had century saw monarchs deposed, dynastic disputes erupt, and civil wars fought over been in France in 1968.39 Finally, accompanying the increase in support for the position of Head of State, all of which undermined popular support for this democratic institutions there has been a substantial decline in preference for traditional institution. The Bourbon monarchy which was restored in 1875 lasted alternative forms of government.40 only until 1931, and ended in disrepute. By the time of Alfonso's hasty abdication, supporters of the monarchy were demoralized and disorganized, and the There are only two exceptions to my overall conclusion that support for the monarchical tradition had been dealt a serious blow. present regime is fully consolidated. Stable support for political parties is still relatively low. Thus, one can speak of Spain today as characterized by an In the immediate aftermath of the death of Francisco Franco, the status of the unconsolidated party system set within an otherwise consolidated democracy. The new King as a unifying and legitimate head of state was not to be taken for granted. second exception is regional in nature: a significant segment of the Basque Indeed, PCE leader Santiago Carrillo predicted that historians would refer to him as population denies the legitimacy of the current regime, and demands the right to "Juan the Brief." The base of his legitimacy was relatively narrow, and was largely secede from the Spanish state. restricted to a minority of che population on the right. In part, this was a result of a close association between Juan Carlos and ihe Franquist regime. Franco explicitly Barnes has written that "The views of mass publics do not issue full-blown 'pointed out that his selection of Juan Carlos as his successor represented an from 'the people'" (Barnes, et al., 1986:6). Analysis of survey data collected at instauration of a monarchy, not a restoration.36 Thus, Juan Carlos owed his position various intervals during the transition to democracy certainly substantiates this not to tradition, but to appointment by Francisco Franco.37 claim. While Spanish public opinion prior to the death of Franco was vaguely predisposed towards evolution in the direction of other West European systems, Podolny (forthcoming) analyzes in detail the process by which Juan Carlos there was no consensus concerning what form a new regime would take. The established his own legitimacy as a popular and unifying symbol of the new DATA survey undertaken in 1975, for example, revealed that few Spaniards democracy. At the outset, he posessed only the rational-legal legitimacy granted to identified with the institutions of the Franquist regime, and most were anticipating him by Franco. While this "backward legitimacy" (Di Palma, 1980) was crucial in some kind of change. It also showed that substantial majorities favored expanded maintaining the allegiance of the previous regime's supporters, most importantly civil liberties, such as freedom of the press (74%) and freedom of religion (71%). the army, it was insufficient as a basis of regime legitimacy. A poll taken at the At the same time, however, there was no consensus in favor of such a basic time of Juan Carlos' inauguration indicated that only 31% of the population would democratic principle as freedom of political parties (37%) (Linz, et al., 1981a:10). prefer a monarchy to a republic if the King did not induce political change (Jimenez Neither was there any certainty at all that the future democratic regime would be Blanco, 1978:35-38). Political change, however, necessarily implied betrayal of the accepted as legitimate by all politically significant groups, or endorsed by the Fundamental Principles of franquismo to which Juan Carlos had sworn allegiance, substantial majority of public opinion seen in the figures presented above. Instead, and could have undermined the rational-legal legitimacy accorded him by the I agree with Barnes' suggestion that "Mass opinion ... [is} shaped by the interaction former regime's supporters. Thus, an extraordinary balance would have to be of the public with leaders... [and] formed by the continuing dialogue of politics" struck between the maintenance of the "backward legitimacy" granted by Franco, (ibid.). In that dialogue, in the process of founding the present democratic regime, and the building of "forward legitimacy" through steady progress towards Spanish political elites interacted with one another in such a fashion as to stabilize dismantling the Caudillo's authoritarian regime — two inherently contradictory and depolarize the political atmosphere, and build consensual support for the newly tasks. emerging institutions. In this respect, their behavior was markedly different from ihat of the founders of the Second Republic. It was also markedly different from Recent survey data show consistent patterns of support for Juan Carlos and the "dialogue" which erupted in the Basque country. The recent transition to the basic institutions of the present democracy. They also reveal that attitudes democracy in Spain has had a lasting impact on the nature of public opinion in towards Juan Carlos have improved steadily over time (especially following his Spain, at least insofar as its negotiated, evolutionary nature precluded a polarization heroic defense of Spanish democracy in the face of an attempted coup in February of group interactions, such as chose which doomed the Second Republic and have 1981), and that nostalgia for the Franquist past has declined.38 Between 1979 and led to high levels of violence and instability in Euskadi. 1982 the press was full of articles concerning an alleged desencanto (disenchantment or disillusionment) with the new regime. However, survey data

22 23 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

Space does not permit even a summary of the process by which the present the civil war, and the widespread belief that the cleavages present within Spanish regime was created (see Carr and Fusi, 1980; Huneeus, 1985; Gunther, 1985a; society could still serve as the basis for disruptive conflict which might threaten the Gunther and Blough, 1981; and Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986). Familiarity with democratization process. In numerous interviews with participants in these some of its features, however, is essential to an understanding of its success and of negotiations, I encountered expressions of grave concern that the errors of the past the moderation which is characteristic of Spanish public opinion today: not be repeated. This awareness of the real threats faced by Spanish party elites helped to induce them to behave in a restrained and moderate.manner.41 1. It was an evolutionary process, in which there was no abrupt collapse of authority of the outgoing regime. The outgoing authoritarian regime was The success of this negotiated transition precluded a polarization at the mass dismantled under the authority of a head of state selected by Franco, and level of Spanish society, as I have argued, but it also had a positive impact on through institutions and legal procedures established by Franco himself. subsequent elite-level interactions. Interparty fears and suspicions were reduced, This contributed "backward legitimacy" to the democratization process in confidence in the ability of the system to adequately regulate conflict was increased, the eyes of the former regime's supporters. and cordial relations were established across party lines — even from one extreme end of the political spectrum to the other. In this respect, the elite-level political 2. There was moderately rapid and unidirectional progress towards democracy. culture of contemporary Spain is remarkably different from that of the Second Lack of visible and sustained progress could have led to frustration on the Republic, when ideological posturing, intransigence, and rancorous verbal clashes part of regime opponents, who might have responded by resorting to mass were much more prevalent. mobilizations in lieu of negotiation and dialogue. An improvement in inter-party elite relations has also been facilitated by 3. It was a process which dismantled but did not repudiate the former regime personal friendships and cordial occupational encounters (particularly within the or punish its elites. There were no vigorous attacks on the former regime's university community) which began under the Franquist regime — i.e., during a leaders which might have converted them and their supporters into period of forced depoliticization.42 (In one respect, however, this shared university embittered opponents of the new regime and, perhaps, the core of anti- background may have introduced a divisive element into intra-party politics at the system parties or movements, or organizers of military rebellions. Instead, elite level. The leadership position of Adolfo Suirez — who was not well educated as Linz has demonstrated (1981), they were converted into a sizable and and was not regarded as an intellectual — was resented by other centrist and politically significant bloc in support of Spanish democracy. conservative political leaders, who felt that their academic records and professional achievements made them superior to the poor boy from Cebreros. Linz goes 4. The course of the transition was determined primarily through direct beyond this specific example to argue that this elitism, or "achieved ascription," negotiations between reformist sectors of the outgoing regime and may be a central feature of the values of the traditional bureaucratic middle class representatives of all of the significant forces in opposition. While the threat [the erases, medias). university professors and the engineering professions.43 In of mass-mobilizations by opposition groups provided a useful stimulus for terms of inter-party relations, however, it is clear that personal ties derived from the making of concessions, the absence of widespread mass mobilizations university affiliations have served to dampen the intensity of conflict between party (except in Euskadi) contributed to successful conflict regulation. leaders, thus substantially affecting elite-level political culture.)

5. Elite negotiations adhered to certain consociational or quasi-consociational In addition, social mobility and the greater variety of socializing experiences principles which greatly facilitated the achievement of consensual which accompanies modernization have meant that persons within the same family agreement. Foremost among these were the privacy of those discussions, the have come to adopt vastly different political viewpoints.44 Inter-pariy hostility is more-or-less proportional representation of all significant political groups, almost certainly dampened by the substantial political heterodoxy which now and the explicit abandonment by all participants of majoritarian, winner- characterizes many families. take-all rules of conflict resolution. In one disturbing respect, however, Spanish political elites have behaved in a 6. Inter-party consensus extended to both the political and economic arenas. .manner consistent with their predecessors: they have exhibited an almost The securing of "social pacts" and pursuit of loose fiscal and monetary pathological propensity to engage in destructive intra-party conflicts. Each and policies eased potential social tensions during the most critical stages of the every nationwide party, even the highly institutionalized PNV (Basque Nationalist transition. Party — whose origins can be traced back to the 19th century), has undergone convulsive leadership struggles. Alianza Popular has suffered two major schisms and an ugly fight leading to the resignation of its founder. The PCE (Spanish One reason why constituent elites engaged in such moderate, constructive Communist party) has disintegrated into three parties at the national level, and one behavior in the transition to democracy is related to important features of elite-level significant regional fragment. The UCD (Uni6n de Centro Dem6cratico), at one political culture during the mid 1970s — specifically, the "historical memory" of

24 25 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN time the country's largest party in terms of its share of the electorate, progressively the middle could often be regarded as "semi-loyal" (see Linz and Stepan, 1978). disintegrated in advance of the 1982 elections, and suffered such a serious defeat One of the largest political families under the Second Republic was anarchism, that it has ceased to exist. Even the now predominant PSOE (Socialist party) joined (in some regions) with syndicalism. Anarchism had a particular appeal to underwent a considerable crisis in 1978-1979, leading to the temporary resignation the dechristianized rural proletariat of the latifundist south, while of Felipe Gonzalez as party leader, I know of no political elite in any industrialized anarchosyndicalism had its largest following in Catalunya and Aragdn. The democracy which has been so prone to self-destructive behavior. Thus, while inter- extreme commitment to individual freedom in anarchist thought led to a policy party relations arc restrained and even cordial, the propensity of political elites to oriented towards destroying religion and the state — which were regarded as engage in intra-party struggles hurkens back to the habits of an earlier era. limiting freedom. The means to achieve this objective involved direct action, and totally eschewed representative political institutions and political parties. The only Apart from monographic studies of individual parties, however, this valid tactic (as described by Gdmez Llorente) was "progressive and recurrent phenomenon has not been the subject of systematic scholarly investigation. Ldpez agitation (including terrorism) until the day of the revolutionary explosion" Pintor and Wert (1982) set forth a promising line of argument, involving what they (1976:35-36). Anarchosyndicalists added to this general orientation a commitment believed were unusually low levels of interpersonal trust among Spaniards. io a disciplined trade union (the largest of which was the Confederacidn Nacional Unfortunately, the persuasiveness of that argument was substantially undercut by del Trabajo), which would keep up the workers* fighting spirit and would strive to the findings of the very rigorous studies undertaken by Orizo (1983) and Stoetzel bring about a revolutionary general strike. Pragmatic bargaining was displaced by a (1982): levels of interpersonal trust (measured through several different items) rigid moralism and belief in the mystique of violence (see Brenan, 1962; and Payne, were found to be higher among Spaniards than among the populations of other 1970). The anarchist/anarchosyndicalist political family was the largest on the European countries. Di'az-Ploja (on the basis of rather impressionistic evidence) Spanish left during the first two decades of the 20th century, and labor relations in argues that elite-level fragmentation is a manifestation of individualism and the areas of CNT strength were, indeed, quite violent. fierce defence of personal autonomy (1986:125-127). My own personal suspicion is that this may be related to traditional values and behavioral styles of the Spanish A comparative latecomer was socialism, but by 1936 its organizational academic elite. While academic prima donnas are by no means unique to Spain, presence in the trade union sector had caught up with the CNT.45 Since, by their heavy representation within the leadership ranks of many parties did definition, anarchists do not elect candidates to the national parliament, the socialist distinguish Spain in the 1970s and early 1980s from several other western PSOE was the largest party of the left during the Second Republic, receiving an democracies. Overall, this remains a largely unexplored facet of the Spanish estimated 16% of the vote in 1936. Socialism in most European countries was political culture. ambivalent concerning tactics and ultimate objectives during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The PSOE was no exception: it contained both moderate, SIGNIFICANT SUBCULTURES "parliamentary" factions and supporters of a more revolutionary and militantly obrerista version of socialism; and the intense struggles among them badly divided the Socialist party and contributed to a polarization of Spanish politics in general. The UGT's involvement in the bloody Asturian uprising in 1934 contributed to a The Franquist regime failed utterly in its efforts to socialize the Spanish worsening of the political climate in Spain during the final two years of the population in a manner which might perpetuate that authoritarian system after the Republic, and led to a perception of the party by its opponents as committed to death of its founder. None of the electorally significant "partisan subcultures" or democratic procedures only insofar as they were useful in attaining revolutionary "political families" which exists in Spain today may be regarded as inheritors of a objectives (see Robinson, 1970). Franquist political tradition. This is not to say that the Franquist regime had no impact on the structure of public opinion in Spain: by suspending partisan politics A "conditional" loyalty to the institutions of the Second Republic was also for nearly four decades, and by depoliticizing a formerly polarized society, the slate exhibited by the largest party of the right, the CEDA (Confederacidn Espanola de was "wiped clean" for most Spanish citizens. The profound transformation of Derechas Autdnomas). In several respects, this clerical party was different from Spanish society and of the international environment which occurred during the contemporary Christian Democratic parties. First, in accord with the Papal interregnum meant that, by the time competing parties and ideologies began to encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931), it was reemerge in Spain, more moderate options (at least in comparison with the committed to the same corporatism as was emerging in Italy and Austria (see polarized alternatives of the Second Republic) would have greater appeal. The Montero, 1977). Second, not only was it not fully committed to the institutions of parties and ideologies which dominate Spanish politics today bear little the Second Republic, but its leader (Jos6 Marfa Gil Robles) proclaimed his hostility resemblance to those of that earlier period. to the Constitution immediately following inclusion of its anticlerical provisions. Finally, the rancorous tone of the public siaremenis of GiJ Robles and other CEDA During the Second Republic, revolutionary and/or anti-system parties and leaders may not have been unique within the context of the Second Republic, but ideologies could be found on both left and right, and even the behavior of those in

26 27 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN the style of discourse of this political subculture further contributed to the violent majority (called "the indifferent majority" by Ldpez Pintor and Buceta, 1975, and 46 demise of Spanish democracy. "the absent majority" by Ldpez Pina and Aranguren, 1976) were passive, uninformed, and uninterested in politics (Ldpez Pintor, 1981:17). Indeed, within a Even the behavior of the most important "centrist" political family during the few years after Franco's death, anti-democratic attitudes and a nostalgia for the Second Republic — the left-republicanism most clearly represented by Manuel Franquist past characterized the sentiments of less than 4% of the Spanish Azana — had many traits which contributed to the collapse of the Second Republic. population (Linz, 1982b:42). Its harsh anticlericalism, combined with an insensitivity to the wishes of its opponents and even the passive majority in the middle, contributed to the There are several reasons why this effort to resocialize Spaniards failed. The 47 polarization of social life. Added to this was a verbal style which was described first is that, by the late 1950s, the initial "ideological" formulations were not even 48 by Payne as "cold, sneering, sarcastic, sectarian and often brilliantly eloquent." taken seriously by fhe.goveming Franquist elite. Rather than serving as guidelines for the formulation of public policy or the recruitment of new elites, the An analysis of the basic characteristics of all of the partisan subcultures under "Fundamental Principles" of franquismo were substantially altered in 1958 to fit the Second Republic is clearly beyond the scope of this piece. Let me conclude by belter with the neoliberal.capitalism towards which public policy had shifted (see de simply pointing out that the four described above were the most important which Miguel, 1975, and Gunther, 1980). Second, the economic development which that existed at that time, and that, by no means, were they the most extreme. Spain also policy shift helped to make possible opened up the borders of Spain and massively had a classically Stalinist Communist party which, although initially quite small, exposed its citizens to foreign (i.e., democratic) models for emulation. This grew enormously in numbers and political influence (particularly within the army) exposure occurred through the temporary migration of 2 million workers abroad as the Civil War progressed,49 while on the right were fascist and ami-democratic and the annual influx of 40 million foreign tourists, and through the expansion of rightist parties. higher education. Third, the Franquist regime was a "sloppy" authoritarian regime; the absence of secret police penetration into all but a few centers of active The Franquist regime half-heartedly sought to resocialize the Spanish opposition (such as the Communist party) permitted rebellious subcultures to population. The "ideology" it attempted to teach Spanish school children (as set emerge, particularly in the universities and industrial zones. Finally, it is likely that forth in Fernandez-Miranda, 1966) was one blending features of Spain's religious "civics textbook" beliefs are not particularly salient or central for most individuals, traditions with the corporatist principles set down by the founder of Spanish and may therefore be amenable to change. Whatever the reasons, franquismo did fascism, Jose' Antonio Primo de Rivera. The Franquist regime explicitly rejected not survive Franco. liberal democratic concepts of universal suffrage as a basis of regime legitimacy and as a method of elite recruitment. In his "civics textbook," Fcrna'ndez-Miranda The structure of public opinion in Spain today is greatly different from what claimed that universal suffrage is unacceptable as a basis of legitimacy because it it was in the past. As argued above, there is substantial attitudinal support for the includes no provisions guaranteeing continued adherence to Natural law and divine basic institutions of democracy. The prospects for democratic stability are law.50 It was also rejected on the grounds that, according to the precepts of enhanced as well by the overwhelming moderation which is characteristic of corporatist thought, it is inherently disruptive of social order: the most common Spanish public opinion in the aggregate, and by the partisan subcultures which exist units of organization in liberal democracies, political parties and interest groups, are at the national level. Surveys taken since the 1970s have consistently shown that "mechanistic," unnatural, inorganic and therefore destructive. Legitimacy was to be the great bulk of the Spanish electorate locate themselves just to the left of center. based, instead, upon the regime's alleged roots in Spanish Christian civilization, the exceptional historical position of the Caudillo, and "representation" through a Very few respondents in our 1982 survey placed themselves near either extreme of 52 System of "organic democracy." the left-right continuum. In their socioeconomic views, Spaniards are somewhat anticapitalist, perhaps It would be irrelevant for our purposes to delve deeper into the logic of as a result of a convergence on this theme in the past by parties of both left and political legitimacy under the Franquist regime. Even though the regime survived right, as well as the Church. Survey data show that, even though a large majority until the death of its founder, its basic precepts are not taken seriously by any have consistently endorsed the notion of private personal property, in the mid 1970s sectors of society which are electorally significant today, and it is even doubtful surprisingly large numbers endorsed anticapitalist stands regarding ownership and that, by the 1970s, they were taken seriously by more than a small minority of management of the means of production.53 Enthusiasm for nationalization has Spaniards. Political socialization during the final years of the Franquist regime declined significantly in recent years, particularly under the "socialist" governments 51 involved little more than "going through the motions." The ineffectiveness of this of Felipe Gonzalez. Nonetheless, our 1982 survey still showed that more people socialization process can be seen in survey data gathered just before Franco's death. (35%) preferred the term "nationalization" over the term "private property" (27%). Ldpez Pintor estimates that only about 15% of the Spanish population actively More widespread than anticapitalist attitudes are strong preferences for greater identified with the Franquist regime; about 25-30% made up an opposition equality in the distribution of wealth,54 as well as acceptance (even among business subculture which was active, informed and interested in politics; and the remaining elites) of the notion that government has an important role to play in regulating the

28 29 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

economy and maintaining a social welfare state (see Perez-Di'az, 1985). Overall, Bostonians — they have different accents, styles of dress, modal values, social however, these left-of-center economic attitudes are quite moderate. outlooks, self images, and political preferences.

Considerable moderation is reflected in the partisan subcultures which exist at But regional variations are much greater in Spain than in societies like the the national level. The extreme left and extreme right have virtually disappeared. U.S. because of the existence of five regions (Galicia, Catalunya, Valencia, By 1982, fewer than 1% of Spanish voters cast ballots for parlies of the extreme Baleares and Euskadi) within which distinct languages are spoken. In three of these right, and just over 1% supported parties to the left of the PCE (except for extremist regions, significant social movements and political parties have emerged on the • regional parlies, which will be discussed below). None of the national-level basis of this linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. The pressures they have exerted subcultures represented in the Cones exhibited the anti-sysiem or polarizing traits on governments in Madrid since the death of Franco have culminated in a of iheir predecessors. Anarchism and anticlerical liberalism have completely substantial decentralization of the political system. In Euskadi and Catalunya, these disappeared from Spanish politics. The Stalinism of the Communist PCE has given movements have been so powerful as to have created regional party systems whose way to a stand which is not antidemocratic: the Eurocommunist consensus dynamics are distinct from those found in the rest of Spain. In the Basque projected during the first two democratic elections may have broken down, and the provinces, political violence related to demands for independence has posed a grave remaining fragments of Spanish communism may have drifted somewhat to the left, threat to the stability of the new democratic regime. Let us begin this exploration of but this does not imply thai the party has adopted an anti-system or semi-loyal regional cultural patterns with a brief description of some modal cultural traits and stance (see Mujal-Ledn, 1983a; and Gunther, 19S7c). The socialist PSOE, after images not involved with language and national identity, and then move on to a intense internal debate in 1978-79, has moved away from socialist maxitnalism: not somewhat more detailed look at these more powerful cultural cleavages. only have the ambiguities of the past (concerning tactics and ultimate objectives) disappeared, bul the PSOE in government has adopted fiscal policies which are It has often been argued that economic structures and relations which are more conservative than those of the preceding UCD governments (see Share, 1986; geographically distinct have had a profound and lasting impact on culture and and Gunther, 1986a). The conservative Alianza Popular has moved towards the politics in Spain. Until quite recently, industrialization in Spain was largely neoliberal right in economic policies (abandoning the quasi-corporatist rhetoric of restricted to Catalunya, Euskadi, and Madrid, with smaller industrial centers also some of its initial founders), but, at the same time, has laid to rest all of the initial present in Valencia and the mining districts of Asturias. Thus, those cultural 55 suspicions concerning its commitment to the new democracy. Only the final features often associated with urban, industrial working classes were confined to ideological or attitudinal configuration of the center remains in doubt. The inchoate those areas, all but one of which were located in the geographical periphery of nature of public opinion near the center and center-right portions of the left-right Spain. A second broad distinction separated the northern half of the country from continuum, in combination with ihe present partisan fragmentation of that segment the south: since Galicia, Andalucfa and the interior of Spain were overwhelmingly of the available political elite, means that the identities of those individuals or agricultural until the 1960s, it is not surprising to find that patterns of land parties who will mold the public opinions of centrist Spaniards are as yet ownership have had a significant social and cultural impact. While many undetermined. exceptions to these generalizations can be found, it is reasonably accurate to assert that farmers in the northern half of the country tended to own their own land (with Nevertheless, it is clear that the basic orientations of all of the national-level most parcels ranging from medium size to small), while in Andalucfa the most partisan subcultures are substantially different from those which dominated the typical pattern was that of huge estates (latifundia) worked by landless day-laborers politics of the Second Republic. As a result of socio-economic modernization, (see Malefakis, 1970). Thus, rural areas in the north were populated by a elite-level "historical learning," the advent of modern public opinion polling and conservative landowning peasantry, while extreme social inequality was adoption of "rational, vote-maximizing" orientations by party leaders, and altered characteristic of the south. In Andalucfa, in particular, there was considerable postwar circumstances throughout Western Europe (leading to a discrediting of polarization between impoverished agricultural workers (who supported leftist both fascism and Stalinism), moderation, not polarization, is the dominant parties and/or constituted the core of support for an anarchist movement) and an characteristic of most partisan subcultures. There is, unfortunately, one significant often reactionary class of landowners. Historians have also contended that these regional exception; Euskadi. economic patterns were related to geographic differences in aggregate levels of religiosity. As the Spanish Catholic Church tilted towards the right in the 19th Regional Subcultures century, the urban working classes (especially in Catalunya) and landless agricultural workers in the south became dechristianized, while the landowning Spain is a multicultural, multilingual, multinational society. Some regions peasantry of the north remained religious (see Brenan, 1962, chapter 3). possess distinctive cultural features which are merely analogous to regional variations found in the United States. In this respect, residents of Andalucfa are These patterns are still reflected in the modal beliefs and political preferences about as different from those residing in Castilla-Ledn as Texans are different from of the inhabitants of these regions, as revealed in recent surveys of public opinion.36 Our 1982 data, for example, reveal that levels of religiosity in Catalunya and

30 31 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

Madrid arc substantially lower than in any other part of Spain, while religiosity was Regional languages are significant features of subcultures in Catalunya, 37 strongest in the northern regions of the country. Basic political orientations within Euskadi, Galicia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. However, the presence of these regions are roughly parallel, except for Euskadi (which will be discussed distinct languages in these areas (a product of the complex state-building processes below). A study undertaken by Garcia Fcrrando in 1979 revealed that larger which created Spain between the 8th and 15th centuries) is not related in a simple or numbers of persons placing themselves on the right end of the political spectrum direct manner to the emergence of micronationalist parties or movements. were to be found in Galicia (18%), Castilla-La Mancha (15%), Extremadura (13%), Nationalism has had a powerful impact on Basque and Catalan politics and society, and Castilla-Le6n (12%) than anywhere else in the country, while the highest levels has exerted much less influence on Gallego politics, and has had very little impact of leftists sentiments were to be found in Euskadi (where 53% placed themselves on political life in Valencia and the Baleares. Nonetheless, knowledge of the near the left end of the ideological continuum), Catalunya (the figure for Barcelona regional language is much more widespread in Galicia and Valencia than in province was 43%), and Madrid (42%). These attitudes are clearly reflected in Euskadi. The contemporary political relevance of these cultural attributes is a voting patterns. Support for the Communist PCE in the 1983 municipal elections, function of a multiplicity of factors, perhaps most imponandy the behavior of for example, was greatest in Barcelona, the industrial and mining districts of Asturias, and Andalucfa (especially its stronghold in Cdrdoba). The conservative political elites during critical stages of the transition to democracy. Coalici6n Popular, meanwhile, received its highest levels of support in the two Gallego (which is closely related to Portuguese) is the most widely spoken Castiles, Galicia and Santandcr. regional language: according to our 1979 survey data, 86% of the residents of Galicia claim to speak Galego. This compares with the 78% of the residents of Certain other regional cultural attributes have little political impact, but Catalunya who claim to speak Catalan, and the 68% of Valencianos who claim to provide interesting insights into how regional subcultures see themselves and each speak Valenciano (which, like Catalan, is most closely related to the Occitanian other. A study of regional stereotypes in Spain undertaken by Sangrador Garcia dialects spoken in portions of southern France). These figures, however, give a (1981) involved administering an extensive adjective checklist to representative somewhat misleading picture of the real strength of these regional languages. Over samples of Basques, Catalans, Gallegos, Castellanos, and Andaluces as a means of one third of the inhabitants of Catalunya are immigrants from other parts of Spain mapping their perceptions. The resulting data largely confirmed several (especially Andalucfa and Extremadura), who had no prior knowledge of Catalan. widespread, traditional stereotypes. Three of the five adjectives most frequently Separating these immigrants from those born in the region, 97% of native-born selected to describe Catalans (by themselves and by others) were "practical," "hard• Catalans are familiar with the Catalin language. Even among the immigrant working" and "enterprising." This imagery could be traced back over six centuries, community, Catalan is spoken by 38%, who had learned the language following to a time when Barcelona was the capital of an outward-looking trading empire, their migration to the region. The strength of the Catalan language derives in pan while the Kingdom of Castilla-Ledn consisted of an economically backward and from its rich literary tradition, and from the fact that the intellectual, economic, agrarian society (see Vicens-Vives, 1967). Since that time, Catalans have been social, and political elites of the region never abandoned the language, even though most commonly seen as entrepreneurial and pragmatic. The Castilian self-image is they also became fully fluent in Spanish. Thus, Catalan remained a viable language also deeply rooted in tradition, and conjures up imagery of Don Quixote — for use in a wide variety of settings, including the workplace.38 This not only meant "noble," "honorable," "simple," "lovers of their country" and "responsible" are the that native-born Catalans were free to use their regional language in most aspects of terms most commonly selected by Castellanos to describe themselves. daily life, but it also provided a substantia] incentive for immigrants from other Unfortunately, this flattering terminology clashes brutally with the adjectives parts of Spain to learn Catalan as a prerequisite to economic and social selected by others to describe Castilians: while they agreed that "noble" was advancement (see Laitin and Sole", 1987). This stands in sharp contrast with appropriate, respondents representing other regions of Spain indicated that they patterns of language use in other regions. Economic and social elites in Valencia, regarded Castilians as "primping" ("chulos," which can also mean "show-off and Euskadi, and Galicia shifted decisively to the use of Spanish as an occupational "pimp"), "proud/arrogant" ("orgullosos"), "conservative," and "snooty" ("clasistas" language, relegating the regional languages to use within the family and among — mired in class or caste distinctions). Andaluces were also described in terms friends.59 Fluency in Castilian Spanish became the avenue to economic and social which were sometimes less than flattering: "humorous," "excessive," "carousing" advancement in these areas, while the regional languages acquired a certain stigma and "happy-go-lucky" were terms used both by themselves and by other Spaniards. as tongues spoken primarily in rural areas. In particular; Euskera (the Basque Andaluces departed from the terminology used by others only insofar as they did language, which is not an Indo-European language) had experienced a precipitous not describe themselves as "charlatans." Examining the stereotype of Basques as decline by the end of the Franquist era: by 1970 less than 20% of the inhabitants of seen by others leads us into an exploration of the most politically significant aspect the Basque region could speak Euskera, and the level of illiteracy among Basque of regional subcultures: Basques were described by other Spaniards as "strong," speakers was a staggering 66%. Roslyn Frank concludes that until "quite recently,

"separatists," "lovers of their country," "valiant" unci "extremist" — all of which in the Basque country to be a Basque-speaker was to be classified as backward, pertain in varying degrees to activities in support of nationalist aspirations. Let us lower class and rural" (see Frank, 1986). turn our attention to micronationalist sentiments and, more generally, to linguistic cleavages in Spanish society.

32 33 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

Distinct regional and/or national identities have developed among substantial de Arana). As such, they could not be amended, eliminated or (as in 1978) majorities of the Basque, Catalan, and Gallego populations. There are important reinstated by decisions of Spanish politicians. This latter rationale led differences between regions, however, with regard to the basic nature of these representatives of the PNV to walk out of the Cones during the vote on the new identities and their political relevance. The extent lo which these regional identities democratic constitution in July 1978, and led the party to campaign on behalf of are incompatible with a "Spanish" identity is certainly significant in this regard. abstention from the December constitutional referendum. The ambiguous stand The Basque nationalist identity is more exclusive than that of most Gallegos and lowards the new regime by PNV leaders is a continuing source of anxiety on the Catalans. In our 1979 survey, fully one half of those born in Euskadi regarded part of Spanish government officials, as well as a source of considerable tension and themselves as Basque only (the other options being Spanish, more Spanish than conflict. Basque, both Basque and Spanish, and more Basque than Spanish); only about 20% of Gallegos and native-born Catalans described themselves in that exclusionary Contemporary Basque nationalism can be broken down into three politically manner.60 These survey data support our more subjective judgments based on relevant ideological families. The mainline Basque Nationalist Party has come to interviews we have conducted over the past decade with leaders of Basque and place great stress on the preservation of Basque language and culture, and it has for Catalan parties. Catalan politicians did not hesitate io regard themselves as the most part abandoned ihe original Sabiniano racial definition of nationhood. The Spanish.61 Basque nationalist politicians, however, studiously avoided even the PNV, however, still adheres to a relatively conservative (in the Basque context, at mention of the word "Spain," usually referring, instead, to "the Spanish state" least) Christian democratic stance — a substantially modernized version of the (Shabad, 1986). original "God and the Old Laws" ideology formulated by Sabino de Arana (see Payne, 1975:72-73). A schism in the party in late 1986 led to creation of a rival Basque and Catalan nationalist beliefs are different in other important ways centrist party in Euskadi under the leadership of the former president of the Basque as well. Cataldn nationalism has always been an open, integrative doctrine, which regional government, Carlos Garaikoetxea. His new Eusko Alkartasuna advocates values in a positive manner the extent to which the region has successfully a more secular and social democratic version of Basque nationalism (see Llera assimilated immigrants through the ages. Nationalist writers defined the Cataldn Ramo, 1987). The third Basque "political family" combines nationalism with a national identity in terms of language and culture (which are acquired attributes). leftist, anticapitalist, social-revolutionary doctrine. This relatively new variety of Accordingly, the preservation and furthering of ihat national identity could be Basque nationalism stresses the need for a vigorous defense of Basque language, achieved by continued use of Catalan in daily life, and by teaching immigrants culture, and national interests, combined with radical socioeconomic change. This Catalan language and customs. Early Basque nationalists, in contrast, defined the is the version of Basque nationalism which has been advocated by ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) and its allied political party Herri Batasuna, as well as by the more Basque national identity principally in terms of "race" (an ascribed characteristic). pragmatic Euskadiko Ezkerra (which merged with sectors of the regional branch of Consequently, they believed that the best hope for the preservation of that the Eurocommunist PCE in 1982). nationality lay in isolation from the foreign influences of immigrants and the Spanish state.62 Regional subcultures have been relevant to politics in the new democratic It is important io note that Basque nationalist parlies have substantially Spain in three different respects. First, the emergence of strong nationalist redefined the basis of national identity since Sabino de Arana's original movements after the death of Franco meant that the restructuring of the state would formulation. The racial criterion originally set forth has been removed, resulting in have a prominent place on the new political agenda. Thus, the transition to a more open and assimilative stance vis-a-vis those who are not ethnically Basque. democracy was accompanied by a profound political and administrative Most Basque nationalists now believe that one need only live and work in Euskadi decentralization, culminating in the formation of seventeen regional governments. in order to be considered Basque, while about 30% regard the ability to speak Euskera as the basis of the Basque national identity. Still, a majority of immigrants Second, regionalist or micronationalist parties have emerged with great and nearly half of those over age 55 continue to regard descent from a Basque strength in Euskadi and Catalunya, and with significant and increasing support in family as a criterion for identification as a Basque (see Linz, 1986b:32-34). Galicia. Indeed, support for such parties has increased almost steadily in all three regions since the first democratic election in 1977. The share of the popular vote Another important difference between Basque and Catalan nationalist for Basque nationalist parties in parliamentary elections rose from 37% in 1977, to doctrines as originally formulated concerns the ambiguity exhibited by Basques 50% in 1979, to 53% in 1982 and 56% in 1986. Support for Catalan nationalist towards the Spanish state. Prior io the Carlist Wars, the fueros which linked parties has steadily increased during this same period from 22% to 35%, while Euskadi to the rest of Spain could be regarded as constituting a confederal Gallego parties have enlarged their combined share of the vote in nationwide relationship under which, in earlier centuries, Basques "elected" the King of Spain parliamentary elections from 4% to 12%. In elections for regional parliaments, as their sovereign. This implied a tenuous and conditional status within the Spanish support for micronationalist parties has been even stronger: 68% of the seats in the state.63 Basque nationalists, moreover, regarded their fueros as "laws created and current Basque parliament are held by Basque nationalist parties; Catalan nationalist parties hold 51%; and even in the Gallego parliament, representation of legitimized by people who enjoy free sovereignty" (Payne, 1975:76, quoting Sabino

34 35 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN regional nationalist parties has reached 23%. Overall, it can be stated that dominated the transition process in Euskadi was extreme polarization. Between micronationalism has significantly affected partisan politics in three regions of 1976 and 1979, the portion of the Basque electorate placing itself near the center of Spain, and that this influence has grown steadily over the past decade. The impact the political spectrum fell from 39% to 20%; the level of class consciousness 64 of nationalism in Euskadi and Catalunya has been so substantial as to have increased; electoral support for the most extreme revolutionary-nationalist party culminated in party systems whose dynamics are distinct from those found in the has steadily increased, and its electorate has become more exclusionary in its rest of Spain, while the strength of Basque and Catalin nationalist parties within national self-identification and more uniform in its support for Basque their respective regional government bodies appears to have made them dominant if independence (see Sani and Shabad, 1986); and hostility towards the army, the not hegemonic. police and "big business" (symbols of the Spanish capitalist order) was much higher in Euskadi than in any other part of Spain. While one might speculate that The third way in which regional subcultures have affected politics in Spain increasing levels of Basque hostility towards ETA in recent years might augur well involves violence associated with efforts by a sizable minority of Basques to secede for an ultimate decrease in support for terrorist violence, the fact that expressions of from Spain and create their own nation-state. This violence has exerted a support for independence among Basque survey respondents more than doubled powerfully polarizing influence on politics and culture within the Basque region, between 1976 and 1979, and have remained more or less stable at about 25% of the but has also posed a threat to the stability of the Spanish democratic regime itself. population since then, suggests that this divisive political conflict is far from Between 1975 and 1987 over 600 persons (many of them Spanish police and resolution." In addition, there is evidence that acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity has become a distinguishing and potentially military officers) had been assassinated, the vast majority of them by the various durable characteristic of Basque political culture.66 factions of ETA. Frustrations within segments of the military over this breakdown of order led to several conspiracies against the regime, and one coup attempt which came terrifyingly close to succeeding in February 1981. That Spanish democracy If we can conclude that polarization, lasting changes in the region's political has survived in the face of Basque terrorism and attempted military rebellion (not to culture, high levels of political violence, and a pervasive climate of fear (Linz, mention a national unemployment rate which exceeded 22% by the mid 1980s) 1986b:18) have resulted from a markedly different pattern of political development provides encouraging evidence that Spain's new democratic institutions have in Euskadi, then we must still address the question, "Why did the Basque region consolidated and that the post-Franco transition has been successful. Persistent follow such a drastically different path during the transition?" Can we identify any violence and deep political divisions still evident in Euskadi also suggest that an initial cultural traits which predisposed Euskadi to violence and confrontation, analysis of regime consolidation must clearly distinguish between the polarization rather than dialogue and compromise? The answer to the latter question appears to and incomplete consolidation of democratic institutions in Euskadi, on the one be mixed, but generally negative. An examination of "civic textbook" attitudes hand, and the overwhelming success of this process throughout the rest of Spain, on reveals no significant difference between Basques and other Spanish citizens: the other. aggregate levels of agreement by Basques with the statement "A negotiated settlement is the best way to resolve a conflict" are virtually identical to those found Indeed, it has been argued that political developments and the basic dynamics in other parts of Spain, and are actually higher than levels of agreement among of the transition were fundamentally different in Euskadi from what was found in Catalans; and slightly more Basques than other Spaniards agreed that "Democracy the rest of Spain (see Malefakis, 1982). At the national level, the transition to is the best form of government known." Similarly, attempts to explore patterns of democracy following the appointment of Adolfo SuaVez as prime minister in July childhood socialization for signs of early predispositions towards violence or 1976 was characterized by demobilization at the mass level and restraint by partisan aggression have been unsuccessful. Clark's analysis of ETA concludes that elites. The principal method of decision making was private negotiation between "violence plays virtually no role in [Basque] culture... Basques do not support or sets of representative political leaders. The late-Franquist and post-Franco periods practice violence on either an interpersonal or an intergroup level, and traditional in Euskadi, in sharp contrast, were characterized by extraordinarily high levels of Basque culture does not support ETA behavior" (Clark, 1984:278). His survey of mass mobilization over an extended period of time: our 1979 survey data reveal the anthropological and sociological literature on Basques, however, does turn up that an astounding 40% of Basque respondents had personally participated in evidence in support of more modest claims that Basque socialization practices may protest demonstrations. The principal arena for the "dialogue" between government encourage the development of attitudes of mistrust towards the environment, and and opposition was the streets. The progressive fragmentation and polarization of may place a high premium on risk taking and a spirit of adventure. "Basque elite structures (with Basque nationalist parties experiencing repeated schisms, and political culture," he concludes, "offers the outside observer an unusual mixture of with ETA itself dividing and subdividing throughout this period) meant that no moderation and high risk, of compromise and dedication to struggle" (Clark, single set of Basque leaders had the ability to make binding agreements on behalf of 1980:128). His overall conclusion, however, is that the explanation of ETA all politically active Basque nationalists. In marked contrast with "the politics of consensus" (leading to resolution or satisfactory regulation of differences, and the violence and the confrontational style of politics in Euskadi since the late Franco forging of patterns of behavior based upon civility, tolerance, and mutual respect), era is not to be found in any pre-existing cultural predispositions. Instead, he the ultimate consequence of the dialectic of rocks, clubs, and tear gas which argues that polarization and violence in Euskadi are responses to previous repression of Basques (especially of the Basque language and certain cultural

36 37 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

symbols) under ihe Franquist regime, as well as reactions against police repression is anti-Franquist: anti-centralism, ami-militarism, secularism, etc. This suggests of Basque nationalists during the transition to democracy. I would add to his that the appeal of formal ideologies and the clustering of attitudes at the mass level analysis that police repression is a predictable response to pressure for political may be substantially affected by political developments which have their origins at change exerted largely through popular mobilization, accompanied by high levels of the elite level of political systems. political violence. Such processes set in motion a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, in which action by one side engenders desires for revenge by the other. What is CONCLUSIONS, SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND FOREIGN most noteworthy is that this phenomenon was clearly acknowledged by ETA POLICY IMPLICATIONS tacticians, who incorporated it within what served as an officially endorsed strategic option at various stages in the struggle against the Spanish state. According to ihe Most studies of politics and culture cast cultural characteristics in the role of "action-repression-action spiral theory" each repressive act by Madrid had to be independent variables which purport to explain political behavior. The value of the answered by an even more provocative act, eventually spiraling upward toward a preceding analysis must be assessed in light of this criterion. I would argue that, massive conflagration in the course of which prospects for secession were indeed, we can gain a better understanding of politics in Spain by exploring relevant increased. In short, functioning as a clandestine agent provocateur. ETA pushed the cultural traits. At the national level, changes in elite political culture have transition to democracy in Euskadi along a path markedly different from that contributed to the sharp differences between the stability of the current democracy and the disintegration of the Second Republic. Similarly, the disappearance of followed in the rest of Spain. This trajectory was not a product of any deep-seated extremist belief systems (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, fascism, etc.) and the cultural predispositions, but it clearly has culminated in a transformation of the moderation of ideologies of other political families (especially the decline of Basque political culture. 1 agree with Clark's depressing overall conclusion: this maximalist socialism and disappearance of a semi-loyal, corporatist version of process may have been initialed by the independent acts of political elites, but once Chrisuan democracy) have further contributed to the mitigation of political conflict. set in motion, it may no longer be under their control. Consequently, "ETA is And the development of democratic values, combined with the growing legitimacy caught in the grip of forces that are created by insurgent violence itself and that tend of basic democratic institutions, have made it possible for this relatively new regime to make the violence self-sustaining, almost apart from the wishes of the to cope with such potentially disruptive factors as high levels of unemployment, participants or the objective conditions that led to the insurgency" (1984:278). continued terrorist violence and even attempted coups.

I would further suggest that even the content of Basque nationalist ideology has been altered as a long-term consequence of reaction against previous conflict But this analysis departs from the traditional treatment of political culture and repression. The formal ideologies of leftist/nationalist groups (Herri Batasuna, insofar as it focuses our attention on cultural change. In this respect, certain Euskadiko Ezkerra, and the various factions of ETA), as well as the attitudes of cultural features are regarded as dependent variables, which may be altered in survey respondents who support greater regional autonomy or outright response to social-structural and contextual influences. Accordingly, we have seen independence, are remarkably different from the original formulation of Basque that important traits often associated with traditional interpretations of Spanish nationalism. Sabino de Arana and the early PNV were conservative, confessional, culture have been substantially transformed as a product of a profound bourgeois, and hostile towards the maketos who had invaded Euskadi from other modernization of Spanish society in recent years, as well as in response to political parts of Spain. Supporters of lefc-abertzale parties and aspirations today, however, events whose origins may be found at the elite level of politics. This raises a crucial tend io be secular, leftist, and (in an effort to build a strong coalition in opposition question: which features of contemporary political culture are likely to remain as to capitalism) in favor of collaboration with working-class immigrants. They are lasting characteristics of Spanish society and politics, and which may be regarded as also militantly anti-Franquist. This clustering of attitudes suggests that the temporary and highly susceptible to pressures for change in the future? alteration of the character of micronationalism or regionalism in Spain may have occurred as a product of a general reaction against the Franquist regime. Franquist The preceding analysis suggests several answers to this question. The first is authoritarianism was a sufficiently powerful negative model, and its four decades of that values, perceptions, modes of interpreting reality, and behavioral norms that existence was of sufficiently long duration, to bring about a realignment of political "fit" with the dominant social context may remain stable over time. The degree of values relating to regionalism and support for regional autonomy. Those who anchoring of attitudes, beliefs, and norms in a social structure or in a particular opposed the regime for whatever reason, according to this line of argument, were social or political environment is a variable; accordingly, such orientations vary in induced by psychological pressures, which moved them towards the establishment stability over time. We have seen that General Franco's efforts to resurrect certain of cognitive consistency, to reject all aspects of that regime: its authoritarianism, its traditionalist values and marry them to a corporatist-authoritarian political structure conservatism, its clericalism, and its centralism of state institutions. Individuals, were doomed to failure by the substantial transformation which Spain underwent particularly in the 1960s. The passivity, deference to authority, narrow religiosity then, were ultimately led to reject the entire Gcstalt of the various features of the and anti-liberal ism which were central components of Franquist "civics training" Franquist regime without carefully distinguishing one set of system characteristics simply did not ring true in a modem, urbanized society set within the context of a (e.g., regionalism) from another (e.g., religiosity). Thus, persons on the left (both in Euskadi and in other pans of Spain as well) have tended to embrace everything that stable, prosperous, democratic, post-war Western Europe. While no consensus on

38 39 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

democratic norms and values had been forged by the time of Franco's death, it is One exception pertains io Spanish language and culture as the basic core of clear that the vague desire to emulate democratic West European societies had Latin American culture. Spaniards regard Spain as the "mother country" for many undermined the credibility of Franquist political culture. societies in the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, in literature, public opinion, and actual foreign-policy behavior, Spaniards exhibit great affection towards their A second relevant generalization is that when political-cultural traits are not brothers in the west, and express great concern over political events which affect psychologically "central," and/or when they are not anchored in a compatible social ihem. In a 1979 poll, for example, 77% of Spaniards expressed the opinion that structural context, they may be highly responsive to salient events which occur in a Spain should maintain its "special relationship" with Latin America, and 78% stated political system. The presence or absence of political violence is perhaps the most that this relationship should extend to both the economic and cultural spheres. salient in this regard, and may leave a lasting imprint on the political culture of a These survey data seem to support the frequently stated assertion that elements of society. Both from a review of scholarly literature and from personal experience Spanish foreign policy are affected by a culturally-rooted perception of Spain as a (as a student in Berkeley during the 1960s and 1970s, and as a field researcher in "bridge" between Europe and Latin America. (These same data, however, provide Euskadi in the 1970s), I have concluded that participation in or observation of little support for the common assertion that Spaniards also see themselves as political violence almost invariably has a powerful, if not gut-wrenching, emotional serving as a "bridge" between Europe and the Arab world.67) Even this "special impact which can instantly polarize political attitudes. If such events are repeated relationship" with Latin America appears to be weakening, however, as a by• with some regularity over time (as in Euskadi), they may substantially transform a product of the ever growing Spanish self-image as an integral member of the West political culture. Thus, the pervasive fear, suspicion, and partisan animosity of European community of wealthy, democratic nations. For over two decades, public Euskadi stands in sharp contrast with the moderation, tolerance, and inter-party opinion polls have revealed overwhelming levels of support for formal entry into civility which characterizes the rest of Spain. the EEC,68 and when asked to choose between closer integration with Latin America and membership in the EEC Spaniards overwhelmingly selected the

69 I have also argued that what may have been a consensus on values and other latter. cultural features of an earlier era has broken down, and has not been replaced by a comparable consensus. Heterodoxy has replaced conformity with a clearly The second exception to my overall conclusion pertains not to the presence of identifiable set of traditional values. This does not mean, however, that the present values and attitudes embedded within the Spanish culture, bui rather to the absence democratic regime is lacking in political-cultural support. Not only do the of elements found in the cultures of some other West European countries. Given its institutions and practices of the current democracy "fit" with the vague abstention from both the First and Second World Wars (and subsequently its predispositions of the Spanish populace already present by the mid 1970s, but after exclusion from the Marshall Plan, etc.), Spaniards do not regard themselves as more than a decade since some of the key institutions were set in place they have integral members of an American-led alliance. Moreover, only 21% of Spaniards acquired attitudinal support and legitimacy. Strong attitudinal support within the polled in December 1979 (CIS study #1207) believed that the Warsaw Pact posed a Spanish population has made it possible for these democratic institutions to weather real threat to Western Europe. This does not necessarily reflect a deep mass-level repealed crises. Similarly, the passage of time may help to stabilize the party commitment to a continuation of isolation and neutralism (as strong support for system, which, to this point, has been ihe sole exception at ihe national level to the EEC membership, the favorable vote on NATO membership and some survey data full consolidation of the current regime. It is likely that in the aftermath of four indicate70), but it does mean that there is no stable core of anti-Soviet or pro- general elections, not to mention numerous local and regional contests, the level of American sentiments present within the Spanish population, as in Great Britain or stable partisan attachments to the PSOE and Alianza Popular has increased West Germany. considerably. If the alignment of partisan forces near the center of the political spectrum can be clarified and stabilized, it is likely that the potential for high By no means does this imply that anti-Americanism is a widespread or electoral volatility (such as that manifested in 1982) will be substantially reduced. permanent feature of Spanish public opinion. I disagree with assertions that anti- Americanism is part of Spain's political culture (see Mujal-Ledn, 1986). To be sure, most Spaniards have consistently favored removal of the American air base from Torrejdn since the late Franquist period, and public opinion data collected in What of the values and attitudes of the Spanish public towards foreign policy the mid 1980s have revealed that many Spaniards hold attitudes which have been issues? Can we see any evidence of cultural traits which directly address the stands portrayed as "anti-American:" a poll taken in December 1985, for example, taken by the Spanish government in international relations? With two exceptions, indicated that more Spaniards (20%) regarded the United States as a greater threat the answer is "no." In general terms, foreign policy issues are not very salient to world peace than the Soviet Union (15% — CIS study #1207). Prior to 1980 the (except temporarily, and only in some cases), and they certainly cannot be regarded USSR was perceived as a much greater threat to world peace than was the US.71 A as "central" elements in the belief-systems of most Spaniards. careful survey of public opinion data collected at regular intervals since the 1960s, however, suggests that these negative opinions represent short-term responses to salient temporary events (such as the Socialist government's demands for reduction

40 41 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

of the American military presence in exchange for continued NATO membership, the increase in anti-American sentiments of the early and mid 1980s will abate and the protracted bilateral negotiations which followed) and a spill-over of other things being equal. hostility towards important features of American foreign policy under the Reagan Administration (such as the revival of Cold-War rhetoric against the USSR, the Another way in which foreign policy attitudes may become stable is if they invasion of Grenada, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, and the bombing of are anchored in social-structural or institutional relationships which persist over Libya). time. It is likely that Spanish membership in the EEC and NATO, and more extensive integration with other European societies and economies will reinforce More importantly, the data available through the end of 1985 indicated that the tendency of Spaniards to regard themselves as Europeans first, and a bridge (to anti-American attitudes were not significantly higher than negative sentiments Latin America or the Arab world) second — if at all. towards other great powers. The proportion of respondents interviewed by the CIS in June 1985 who expressed "unfavorable" or "very unfavorable" attitudes towards the United States stood at 27%: unfavorable sentiments towards France in that same survey were expressed by 24% of respondents; 25% had unfavorable opinions of Great Britain; and 33% expressed dislike of the USSR. Moreover, the level of favorable opinions of the United States in that survey (41%) was higher than for any of these great powers: 36% had "favorable" or "very favorable" opinions of the French; for the British the figure was just 31%; and only 19% had favorable attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

The most striking conclusion to be derived from a survey of these public opinion data, however, is that they are highly unstable over time and almost certainly represent short-term reactions to highly visible current events. In 1968, for example, at a lime when Spanish-British tensions over Gibraltar were high, 75% of those polled by the CIS had unfavorable opinions towards Great Britain; by 1985 only 25% expressed such negative sentiments. Similarly, in 1984, when French farmers were setting Spanish vegetable trucks on fire and dumping carloads of Spanish wine into ihe sea, 47% of Spaniards expressed dislike of the French; yet just one year later (when France was collaborating for the first time in arresting ETA leaders in exile) the level of anti-French hostility had fallen to 24%. (Attitudes towards the US during these same periods of time were relatively favorable: in 1968 only 17% had "unfavorable" opinions, and in 1984 only 33% claimed to dislike the US.)72 In short, none but a handful of foreign policy issues are salient for most Spaniards, and none except the "special relationship" towards Latin America is sufficiently central a belief as to constitute a stable feature of Spanish political culture.

Most foreign policy "attitudes," therefore, are quite transient. If my analysis is correct, then such orientations might become permanent under two conditions. The first involves the repetition of a popular or unpopular pattern of salient behavior over an extended period of time, which might impose a lasting imprint on a culture or subculture (as in Euskadi). Thus, ami-Americanism might have become widespread and permanent if the Soviet bashing of the early 1980s were to have continued unabated; if the rancorous dialogue over the status of the American bases were to have remained unresolved; and/or if US hostility towards the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (which is is a highly salient foreign policy object and is more popular than the US because of the "special relationship" between Spain and Latin America) were lo continue or become exacerbated. Fonunaiely, since only one of these sources of irritation (US policy towards Nicaragua) remains, it is likely that

42 43 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

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Clark, Robert P. 1981. The Basque Insurgents. Madison: University of Wisconsin Diaz Mozaz, Jose\ 1976. Sociologi'a del Anticlericalismo. Barcelona: Ariel. Press. This book provides us with the most thorough analysis available of the Di'az-Plaja, Fernando. 1986. El Espanol y los Siete Pecados Capitales. Madrid: backgrounds of ETA and its clandestine "insurgents." While the reader may Alianza Editorial. occasionally feel uncomfortable with the author's sympathetic stance regarding ETA terrorism (a term which he scrupulously avoids using) and his hostility Di'az-Plaja, Fernando. 1987. La Espana que Sobrevive. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. towards the Spanish state (both under Franco and the current democracy), this must be regarded as an important study. Diez Nicola's, Juan. 1976. Los Espanoles y la Opinidn Publica. Madrid: Ed. Nacional. Clark. Robert P. 1984. The Basque Insurgents. Madison: Wisconsin. Drain, Michel, et al. 1980. Los Andaluces. Madrid: Ediciones 1STMO. Claudin, Fernando. 1977. Eurocomunismo y Socialismo. Madrid: Siglo XXI de Espana. Elorza, Antonio. 1978. Ideologtas del Nacionalismo Vasco. San SebastiSn: Haranburu.

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Elorza, Antonio. 1982. El Nacionalismo Vasco cn la Crisis del Estado Espanol. Fusi, Juan Pablo. 1984. El Pais Vasco: Pluralismo y Nacionalidades. Madrid: Cahiers du Monde Hispanique et Luso-Brasillien (Caravelle), 38:153-185. Alianza.

Equipo, Resina. 1977. La Culiura Espanola Durante el Franquismo. Bilbao: Garcfa Ferrando, Manuel. 1977. Mujer y Sociedad Rural: Un Anfilisis Socioldgico Mensajero. sobre Trabajo e Ideologia. Madrid: CpD.

Esparto, Instituto Nacional de Estadisiica. Espana: Anuario Estadi'stico. Various Garcfa Ferrando, Manuel. 1982. Regionaltsmo y Autonomfas en Esparla. Madrid: years. CIS.

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Linz, Juan J. 1972a. Tradition and Modernity in Spain. Unpublished. Linz, Juan J., and J. Alcaide Inchausti, eds. 1984. La Espafia en Transicidn. Madrid: This is the most brilliant analysis I have read concerning the impact of elites on Espasa Calpe. the evolution of culture. Sadly, only a small segment (Linz, 1977) has been published. Linz, Juan J., Manuel Gdmez-Reino, Francisco Orizo and Darfo Vila. 1981. Informe Socioldgico sobre el Cambio Politico en Espana, 1975-1981. Madrid: Linz, Juan J. 1972b. Continuidad y Discontinuidad en la Elite Poli'tica Espanola: De Editorial Euramenca. la Restauracidn al Regimen Actual. In Homenaje al Profesor Carlos Ollero, One of the FOESSA series, this marvelous compendium presents and analyses a Madrid, Carlevilla. huge volume of data collected by DATA, S.A. at various intervals before, during and after the transition io democracy. Linz, Juan J. 1973a. Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain. In Robert Dahl, Regimes and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale. Linz, Juan J., with Manuel Gdmez-Reino, Francisco Orizo and Darib Vila. 1986. Conflicto en Euskadi. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. Linz, Juan J. 1973b. Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism. In Stein Almost overwhelming in its magnitude, this is certainly the most exhaustive Rokkan and S.N. Eisenstadt, eds.. Building States and Nations. Beverly Hills: study of the dynamics of partisan competition and the origins of political Sage. violence in Euskadi.

Linz, Juan J. 1977. Tradicidn y Modernizacidn en Espana, Discurso en el acto de Linz, Juan J., and Amando de Miguel. 1966a. Los Empresarios ante el Poder Investidura de Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad de Granada, 1977. Publico. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos.

.Linz, Juan J. 1979. Europe's Southern Frontier. Daedalus (Winter). Linz, Juan J., and Amando de Miguel. 1966b. Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains. In Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds.. Linz, Juan J. 1980b. The New Spanish Party System. In Richard Rose, ed., Comparing Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Linz, Juan J., and Amando de Miguel. 1968. La Elite Funcionarial Espanola ante la Reforma Administrativa. In Sociologfa de la Administracidn Publica Espanola, Linz, Juan J. 1980d. Peripheries Within the Periphery. In Per Torsvik. ed.. Anales de Moral Social y Econdmica, 17. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Sociales Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation Building: A Volume in de la Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caidos. Commemoration of Stein Rokkan. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Linz, Juan J., and Jos6 Ramdn Montero, eds. 1987. Crisis y Cambio: Electores y Linz, Juan J. 1980e. La Polftica en Sociedades Multilingiies y Multinacionales. In Partidos en la Espafia de los Anos 80. Madrid: Centro de Estudios FUNDES, Como Articular las Autonomi'as Espaiiolas. Madrid: FUNDES. Constitucionales.

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Ldpez Pintor, Rafael. 1983. Los Espanoles en los Anos 70. Madrid: Tecnos. Martfn Moreno, Jaime, and Amando de Miguel. 1982. Sociologfa de las Profesiones en Espana. Madrid: CIS. Ldpez Pintor, Rafael, and Josd Ignacio Wert Ortega. 1982. La Otra Espana: Insolidaridad e Intolerancia en la Tradicidn. Revista Espanola de Martfnez Alier, Juan. 1971. Labourers and Landowners in Southern Spain. New Investigaciones Socioldgicas (henceforth REIS), 19. York: Rowman and Liulefield.

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Mercadi, Francesc. 1982. Cataluna: Intelectuales Politicos y Cuestidn Nacional. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1978. The PCE in Spanish Politics. Problems of Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsula. Communism, 27 (July-August).

Michener, James A. 1968. Iberia. New York: Random House. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1980-1981. Catalanismo, the Left, and the Consolidation of Centrism in Spain. World Affairs, 143. de Miguel, Amando. 1974. Manual de Estructura Social de Espana. Madrid: Tecnos. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1982. The Left and the Catholic Question in Spain. West European Politics, 5. de Miguel, Amando. 1975. Sociologfa del Franquismo: AnSlisis Ideoldgico de los Ministros del Regimen. Barcelona: Editorial Euros. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1983a. Communism and Political Change in Spain. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. de Miguel, Amando. 1976. La Herencia del Franquismo. Madrid: Editorial Cambio 16. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1983b. Spain: The PCE and the Post-Franco Era. In David E. Albright, ed., Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe. Boulder, de Miguel, Amando. 1976. 40 millones de Espanoles 40 Anos Despuds. Barcelona: CO: Westview. Ediciones Grijalbo. Mujal-Ledn, Eusebio. 1986. The Foreign Policy of the Socialist Government. In de Miguel, Amando. 1977. La Piramide Social Espanola. Madrid: Ariel. Stanley G. Payne, The Politics of Democratic Spain.

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Montero Gibert, Jos6 Ramdn. 1977. La CEDA: El Catolicismo Social y Politico en Nunez, Luis C. 1977. La Sociedad Vasca Actual. San Sebastian: Thertoa. la II Republica. Two volumes. Madrid: Edicidnes Revista de Trabajo. Orizo, Francisco AndnSs. 1983. Espafia, Entre la Apatfa y el Cambio Social. Montero Gibert, Jos6 Ramdn. 1981. Partidos y Participacidn Polftica. REP, 23. Madrid: MAPFRE. This book (in combination with the companion cross-national study by Stoetzel, Montero Gibert, Jos6 Ramdn. 1984u. La Abstencidn Electoral en las Elecciones 1982) systematically explores the structure and evolution of the values of Legislativas de 1982. Revista de Derecho Politico, 22. contemporary Spaniards.

Montero Gibert, Josd Ramdn. 1984b. Niveles, Fluctuaciones y Tendencias del Orizo, Francisco A., Manuel Gdmez-Reino, Pedro Gonzalez, Juan Blasco and Josd Abstencionismo Electoral en Espana y Europa. REIS, 28. Juan Toharia. 1985. Juventud Espanola 1984. Madrid: Ediciones SM.

Montero Gibert, Josd Ramdn. 1985. Elecciones Normales y Elecciones Ortega y Gasset, Jose*. 1974. Invertebrate Spain. New York: Howard Fertig. Excepcionales. In Homenaje a Carlos Ruiz del Castillo. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Admin is tracidn Local. Ortzi. 1977. Los Vascos: Ayer, Hoy y Mariana. Hendaye: Ediciones Mugalde.

Montero Gibert, Jose" Ramdn. 1986. Iglesia, Secularizacidn y Comportamiento Padilla Bolivar, Antonio. 1979. El Movimiento Comunista Espafiol. Barcelona: Politico en Espana. REIS, 34:131-159. Planeta. An eye-opening study of the extent and speed of the process of secularization of Spanish society. Pastor, Manuel, et al. 1982. Ideologfas y Movimientos Pol/ticos Contemporfneos. Madrid: Secretarfa de Estado de Universidades e Investigacidn. Montero Gibert, Jos6 Ramdn. 1987a. La Vuelta a las Urnas: Participacidn, Movilizacidn y Abstencidn. In Linz and Montero, Crisis y Cambio. Payne, Stanley G. 1961. Falange. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Montero Gibert, Jos6 Ramdn. 1987b. El Sub-Triunfo dc la Dcrecha: Los Apoyos Payne, Stanley G. 1967a. Franco's Spain. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. Electorales de AP-PDP. In Linz and Montero, Crisis y Cambio. Payne, Stanley G. 1967b. Politics and the Military in Modem Spain. Stanford: Monzdn-Arribas, Condido. 1982. Ideologfas y Actitudes Polfticas Bilsicas de los Stanford University Press. Espanoles. Sistema, 50-51. Payne, Stanley G. 1970. The Spanish Revolution. New York: W.W. Norton.

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Payne, Stanley G. 1971. The Army, the Republic and the Coming of the Civil War. Perez Dfaz, Victor. 1985. Empresarios y Polfticos. Papeles de Economfa Espafiola, In R. Carr, ed., The Republic and the Civil War in Spain. London: Macmillan.

Payne, Stanley G. 1972. Political Ideology and Economic Modernization in Spain. Perez Diaz, Victor. 1987. El Retorno de la Sociedad Civil. Madrid: Instituto de World Politics (October). Estudios Econdmicos.

Payne, Stanley G. 1973a. A History of Spain and Portugal, Two Volumes. Perez Vilarino, Xos6. 1982. Los Periddicos ante las Autonomfas. Madrid: Akal. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Petschen Verdaguer, Santiago. 1977. La Iglesia en la Espana de Franco. Madrid: Payne, Stanley G. 1973b. Catalan and Basque Nationalism. Journal of SEDMAY Ediciones. Contemporary History, 6. Pi-Sunyer, Oriol. 1974. Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Payne, Stanley G. 1975. Basque Nationalism. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Mediterranean: The Catalan Case. Comparative Studies in Society and History, This book provides an excellent overview of the origins and evolution of Basque nationalism. Particularly useful is Payne's analysis of the early ideology of Basque nationalism. Pitarch, Ismael E., Joan Botella, Jordi Capo and Joan Marcet. 1980. Partits i Parlamentaris a la Catalunya de Avuf, 1977-1979. Barcelona: Libres a'l About. Payne, Stanley G., ed. 1977a. Society and Politics in Twentieth-Century Spain. New York: New Viewpoints. Pitt-Rivers, Julian. 1954. The People of the Sierra. New York: Criterion.

Payne, Stanley G. 1977b. Ejercito y Sociedad en la Espana Liberal, 1808-1936. Pollack, Benny. 1978. Spain: From Corporate State to Parliamentary Democracy. Madrid: Akal. Parliamentary Affairs, 31.

Payne, Stanley G. 1978b. Spain and Portugal. In R. Grew, ed., Crises of Political Press, Irwin. 1979. The City as Context: Urbanism and Behavioral Constraints in Development in Europe and the United Slates. Princeton: Princeton University Seville. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Press. Preston, Paul. 1972. Alfonsist Monarchism and the Spanish Civil War. Journal of Payne, Stanley G. 1981. Nacionalismo Espanol y Regionalismo Nacionalista en Contemporary History, 7. Espana. In Raul Morodo, ed., Cultura, Sociedad y Polftica en el Mundo Actual. Madrid: Universidad Internacional Men6ndez Pelayo. Preston, Paul. 1973. The 'Moderate' Right and the Undermining of the Second Republic in Spain, 1931-1933. European Studies Review, 3. Payne, Stanley G. 1984. Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Preston, Paul, ed. 1976. Spain in Crisis. London: Harvester Press. This is the most complete overview of ihe evolution of Spanish Catholicism in the English language. Preston, Paul. 1978. The Coming of the Civil War. London: Macmillan.

Payne, Stanley G. (ed.). 1986. The Politics of Democratic Spain. Chicago: Chicago Prevost, Gary. 1984. Change and Continuity in the Spanish Labor Movement. West Council on Foreign Relations. European Politics, 7.

Payne, Stanley G. 1987. The Franco Regime: 1936-1975. Madison: University of Puhle, Hans-Jiirgen. 1986. El PSOE: Un Partido Dominante y Heterogeneo. In Linz Wisconsin Press. and Montero (eds.), Crisis y Cambio. This wonderful book is without any doubt the best analysis of Francisco Franco and his political regime in any language. It is thorough, balanced and exemplary Rama, Carlos M. 1977. Ideologfa, Regiones y Clases Sociales en la Espana of the highest standards of scholarship. In addition, it is a great pleasure to read. Contemporanea. Madrid: Ediciones Jikar.

Peirats, Jos6. 1976. Los Anarquistas en la Crisis Polftica Espanola: Ensayo. Madrid: Riviere, M. 1984. La Generacidn del Cambio. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta. Ediciones Jucar. Robinson, Richard A.H. 1970. Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic Penniman, Howard R., and Eusebio M. Mujal-Le6n, eds. 1985. Spain at the Polls, and Revolution, 1931-1936. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1977, 1979, and 1982. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rodriguez de Coro, Francisco. 1978. Pafs Vasco, Iglesia y Revolucidn Liberal. P6rez Dfaz, Victor. 1971. Emigraci6n y Cambio Social: Procesos Migratorios y Vitoria: Biblioteca Alavesa Luis de Ajuria. Vida Rural en Castilla. Madrid: Ediciones Ariel. Rodriguez Osuna, Jacinto. 1985. Migraciones Exteriores, Transicidn Demografica y Perez Dfaz, Victor. 1979. Clase Obrera, Partidos y Sindicatos. Madrid: Fundacidn Proceso de DesarroIIo. REIS, 32. del Instituto Nacional de Industria.

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Romero Maura, Joaquin. 1970. Anarchism Today. Government and Opposition, 5. Share, Donald. 1986. Four Years of Socialist Government in Spain. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Ruiz Rico, Juan Josd. 1977. El Papel Politico de la Iglesia Catdlica en la Espana de Washington, D.C. Franco. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos. Sole" Tura, Jordi. 1974. CataJanismo y Revolucidn Burguesa. Madrid: CpD. San Miguel, Luis G. 1980. Las Clases Sociales en la Espana Actual. Madrid: CIS. Stoetzel, Jean. 1982. Que* Pensamos los Europeos? Madrid: MAPFRE. Sanchez, Jose* M. 1962. Reform and Revolution: The Politico-Religious Background of the Spanish Civil War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Tezanos. Jose* Felix. 1983. Sociologfa del Socialismo Espanol. Madrid: Tecnos. Carolina Press. Tezanos, Jose* Felix. 1984. Cambio Social y Modernizacidn en la Espafia Actual. Sani, Giacomo. 1980. Partisanship and the Structure of Mass Attitudes in Spain and REIS, 28. Italy. Paper presented at the seminar on Encuestas Electorales, Informacidn y Comportamiento Electoral, Madrid (November). Tundn de Lara, Manuel. 1973. Sociedad, Polftica, y Cultura en la Espana de los Siglos XIX y XX. Madrid: CpD. Sani, Giacomo, and Pilar del Castillo Vera. 1983. El Rol Politico de las Mujeres en la Espana Actual. Revista de Derecho Politico, 17. Tundn de Lara, Manuel. 1974. Movimiento Obrero, Polftica y Literatura en la Espafia Contemporinea. Madrid: CpD. Sani, Giacomo, and Goldie Shabad. 1986. Adversarios o Competidores?: La Polarizaci6n del Electorado. In Linz and Montero, Crisis y Cambio. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1971. Las elecciones del Frente Popular en Espafia. Madrid: CpD. Sani, Giacomo, and Jose* Ram6n Montero Gibert. 1986. El Especrro Politico: Izquierda, Derecha y Centro. In Linz and Montero, Crisis y Cambio. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1976. Oligarqufa y Caciquismo en Andalucfa. Barcelona: Planeta. Sangrador Garcfa, J.L. 1981. Estereotipos de las Nacionalidades y Regiones de Espafia. Madrid: CIS. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1978. EI Sistema Caciquil Andaluz Comparado con Otras Regiones Espafiolas (1903-1923). REIS, 2. Santamarfa Ansa, Carlos. 1974. La Iglesia Hace Poli'tica. Madrid: Euramenca. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1978. Polftica y Sociedad en la Espafia del siglo XX. Madrid: Santamaria, J., ed. 1982. Transicidn a la Democracia en el sur de Europa y Amcnca Akal. Latina. Madrid: CIS. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1984. Franco y los Catdlicos: La Poli'tica Interior Espafiola Serran Pagan, Francisco. 1980. Cultura Espanola y Autonomfas. Madrid: Ministerio entre 1945 y 1957. Madrid: Alianza. de Cultura, Secreteria General Tecnica. Tusell Gdmez, Javier. 1986. Los Hijos de la Sangre: La Espafia de 1936 desde Setien, Julio. 1982. El Movimiento Obrero y el Sindicalismo de Clase en Espana 1986. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. (1939-1981). Madrid: De la Torre. Ullman, Joan C. 1968. The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain. Sevilla-GuzmSn, Eduardo. 1979. La Evolucidn del Campesinado en Espafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Barcelona: Editorial Peninsula. Varela, Santiago. 1970. El Problema Regional en la Segunda Republica Espanola. Shabad, Goldie. 1986. After Autonomy: The Dynamics of Regionalism in Spain. In Madrid: Unidn Editorial. Stanley G. Payne, ed.. The Politics of Democratic Spain. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Varela, Santiago. 1977. La Perspectiva Histdrica. In Jorge de Esteban, et al.. El This is the best overview published in English of the autonomy process and its Proceso Electoral. Barcelona: Editorial Labor. consequences for regionalism and nationalism in contemporary Spain. Varela, Santiago. 1978. Partidos y Parlamento en la Segunda Reptiblica Espanola. Shabad, Goldie. 1987. Las Elecciones de 1982 y las Autonomfas. In Linz and Madrid: Fundacidn Juan March, Edit. Ariel. Montero, Crisis y Cambio. Varela Ortega, Jos6. 1977. Los Amigos Polfticos. Madrid: Alianza. Shabad, Goldie, and Richard Gunther. 1982. Language, Nationalism and Political Conflict in Spain. Comparative Politics, 14. Yicens Vives, Jaime. 1967. Approaches to the History of Spain. Berkeley: California. Share, Donald. 1986. The Making of Spanish Democracy. New York: Praeger.

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Vila Cairo, Dario, Francisco Andres Orizo, and Manuel Gdmez-Reino. 1978- Notes Sociologfa del Actual Cambio Polftico en Espana. In FOESSA III Informe. Madrid: Euramdrica. 1. Derived from Ayala, 1986; Bennassar, 1975; Brenan, 1974; Caro Baroja, Yuste, Jose" Luis. 1986. Las Cuentas Pendientes de la Poli'tica en Espana. Madrid: 1970; Di'az-Plaja, 1986; Vicens-Vives, 1967; and popular American Espasa Calpe. literature such as Michener, 1968; and Hemingway, 1954 and 1968.

Weisser, Michael R. 1977. The Peasants of the Monies: The Roots of Rural 2. Also see Bennassar, 1975; Vicens-Vives, 1967; and Brenan, 1974. Rebellion in Spain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. See Linz and Stepan, 1978; Gunther and Blough, 1981; Payne, 1970; and Wiarda, Howard J. 1974. Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World- the polemic between Robinson, 1970 and Preston, 1973. Review of Politics, 36.

Wiarda, Howard J. 1976. The Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin 4. See Ayala, 1986; and Caro Baroja, 1970. Ayala points out, in a chapter American Labor Relations Systems. Studies in Comparative International appropriately tilled "Nudists on the Manzanares," that in sharp contrast with Development, 13. the dour and austere stereotype of Spanish society in the 17th century, women displayed their bodies more generously in Madrid than anywhere else in Europe (1986, pp. 172-178).

5. Classic studies of this kind include Deutsch, 1953; Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1960; and Inkeles and Smith, 1974.

6. Orizo describes this important feature of contemporary Spanish culture:

"The old consensus disappears; new normative codes emerge which enter into conflict with or are shared with the old. Behaviors which yesterday could be regarded as deviant, marginal or contrary to established behaviors, are today practiced by sizable minorities, and are accepted by the majority... This is social change. This crossing of normative codes, still without firm loyalties, is what we see in Spain during these years of transition" (1983:26-27).

7. One superficial indicator of this change can be seen in a comparison of the most common forms of address today and in the past. Until quite recently it was standard for individuals to be addressed using the honorary title "Don" or "Dona," as well as the last names of both father and mother: hence, "Don Felipe Gonzalez Marquez." Nowadays, much more familiar forms of address have become de. rigeur: hence, "Felipe Gonzalez" or even "Felipe" (see Diaz Plaja, 1986:31-34).

8. Only in Euskadi can one find politically significant anti-system parties (Herri Batasuna), parties which adopt semi-loyal or highly ambiguous stands vis-a-vis the current regime (Eusko Alkanasuna and, until recendy, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco), and partisan polarization and fragmentation (e.g., the breakup of the original Euskadiko Ezkerra coalition in 1978 and the PNV in 1986).

9. In the 9-country study undertaken by Stoetzel, et al. (1982), Spain's composite "urbanization" score (188, of a maximum possible score of 300)

62 63 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

was quite close to the West European average (195). And Spain was more church "Sundays and/or various days during the week" or "almost every urbanized than Belgium (169), The Netherlands (172). and Italy (182). Sunday" declined from 78% to 28%, while those who said "never" increased from 13% to 37% (Montero, 1986:136). 10. Cf., Christian, 1972; Freeman, 1970, 1978 and 1979; Gilmore, 1976; Kenny, I960, 1966 and 1968; Lis6n-Tolosana, 1974 and 1979; and Pitt-Rivers, 19. An examination of our 1979 and 1982 survey data shows that during the 1954. three-year interval between those two studies, there was no apparent decline in religiosity among those in the oldest age group (those over 55). But 11. See Malefakis, 1970, 1972 and 1978; Linz and de Miguel, 1966b. religiosity declined significantly in each of the younger age groups. 22% of '12. Guy Hermet, for example, reports that 65% of the citizens of Old Castile those age 18-24 described themselves as "very good Catholics" or and Ledn attended Sunday mass in the late 1970s, while in Andalucfa, "practicing Catholics" in 1979, but in 1982 only 18% did so. The decline in Sunday mass attendance was only 22% (Hermet, 1980, p. 309). religiosity among the middle age groups was much steeper: among those age 40-54 the number of "practicing" or "very good" Catholics fell from 13. Tusell, 1978:8; also see Tusell, 1976; Varela, 1977; Varela Ortega, 1977; 48% to 43%; and within the 25-39 age group, the decline was from 32% to and Linz, 1967. 23%.

14. Distinctive features of these decision-making processes which are indicative 20. Christian (1972) points out that religion plays fundamentally different of an absence of coercive resources include the following: the regime's most functions in small villages, where worship is a community activity which powerful and authoritative figure (Franco) rarely intervened in policy draws together virtually all persons, and urban society, where it does not deliberations; the Movimiento was by that lime a lifeless bureaucratic hulk; necessarily have this social integration function. there existed no authoritative ideology which could generate guidelines for policy deliberation; there was no ministerial responsibility to the Cortes or 21. By 1984 over 10% of ihose age 55-64 were still illiterate; and the illiteracy an electorate; and the mobilization of organizational resources was explicitly rate among those over 65 exceeded 21% (Gunther, 1980:67-70; and Tezanos, 1984:55-56). prohibited.

15. See Gunther, 1980, chapters eight and nine; also see de Miguel, 1975:89, 22. Source: unpublished data collected in June 1985 by the Centro de and Linz and de Miguel, 1966. Investigaciones Socioldgicas, study #1461.

16. In a contextual analysis of values and beliefs, Linz found that Spaniards 23. Data collected by the Centro de Investigaciones Socioldgicas generally residing in economically developed provinces much more frequently confirm this impression, although they indicate that the overall level of expected to be treated equally in official matters, such as traffic violations, political involvement of Spaniards is lower than that reflected in the Barnes, than those residing in less developed areas, even when controls are imposed et al. survey. In May, 1986, for example, only 26% of those interviewed for occupational status. He also found that, as you move from said that they paid much or some attention to political news in the press, underdeveloped to developed provinces, the proportion of respondents while 42% said that they paid much or some attention to politics as reported believing that success in life is largely attributable to particularistic factors on television (CIS study #1531, unpublished). (such as "luck" and "acquaintance with influential people") declines markedly, while the number of respondents opting for universalistic 24. Surveys by the Centro de Investigaciones Socioldgicas have found that 5% explanations of success such as "hard work" and "intelligence" increases. of Spaniards were very interested in politics in 1971, 3% in 1973, 11% in 1976, 8% in 1979. 8% in 1980, 6% in 1981, 7% in 1982, 4% in 1985, and 17. Multiple responses were permitted in our 1979 survey, but not in the 1968 4% in 1986. Disinterest in politics reached a peak in 1973, but the Linz and de Miguel study. Thus, responses in the 1979 survey total 113% percentage of Spaniards who professed to have no interest in politics (not 100%, as is the case with the 1968 data), and some care must be taken whatsoever has remained surprisingly high: 51% in 1971, 62% in 1973, 35% in 1976, 36% in 1979, 43% in 1980, 45% in 1981, 45% in 1982, 37% in comparing the two sets of results. Nevertheless, the decline in the in 1985, and 43% in 1986. These levels of disinterest are substantially percentage of respondents selecting particularistic contacts from 61% to higher than those found in most other European countries, such as the 41% (despite the possibility of multiple responses in the latter survey) gives United Kingdom (28%), France (26%) and West Germany (14%). Once clear evidence of significant change. again, only Italians (50%) surpass Spaniards in their lack of interest in the 18. Behavioral measures of religiosity reveal the same pattern of decline: politics of their country (Ldpez Pintor and Wen, 1982:22; Ldpez Pintor, between 1973 and 1985. the percentage of Spaniards who claimed to attend

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1982:113; 1985 and 1986 data from unpublished CIS studies #1461 and and sex, appeared as inadequate to a modem world... The presence of 1559). corporaiivist, neo-traditional currents of thought in European Catholicism, reinforced by the rise of fascism and the Action Francaise, sealed the fate of 25. Only 31% of Spaniards belonged to organizations of any kind, as compared a modem Catholicism" (Linz, 1972, p. 52). Payne argues that by this time with a West European average of 40%. Again, this feature of political "the middle classes were more convinced than ever that Catholicism was the culture appears to be shared with other Latin countries: France (27%) and bulwark of authoritarianism and reaction, and hence the main obstacle to Italy (26%) are actually lower in affiliation with voluntary associations than progress and enlightenment. In somewhat parallel fashion, urban workers Spain; and these are well below the levels reported for Belgium (42%), and the southern rural proletariat saw the Church as the cultural and moral West Germany (50%), the UK (52%), Ireland (53%), Denmark (62%) and support of the possessing classes, the principal dike against revolution" the Netherlands (62%) (Stoetzel, 1982. p. 337). (Payne, 1984, p. 148).

26. Linz, as well as Amando de Miguel (1975), also pointed out that by the 31. For descriptions of its provisions and the decision-making process that led 1960s flamboyant or potentially charismatic personalities were to their inclusion in the Constitution, see Gunther and Blough, 1981; Meer systematically shunted aside as candidates for ministerial posts, and the Lecha-Marzo, 1975; Vidarte, 1976; and AlcaW-Zamora, 1977. government was increasingly led by grey technocrats. 32. See Fierro Bardaji, 1976; Heubel, 1977; Hermet, 1980; Gunther and Blough, 27. Since it was not possible for the press to deal direcdy with political issues 1981; Tusell, 1984; and Payne, 1984. such as democratization, the reemergence of political parties, and the replacement of the Head of State or prime minister, newspapers and 33. A poll of the Spanish clergy undertaken by the Joint Assembly of Bishops magazines used coverage of partisan political developments in other and Priests in 1971 clearly revealed the extent of this change, ln that survey countries to make thinly-veiled allusions to domestic politics. Thus, well- of over 15,000 priests (about 85% of the total Spanish clergy), the political educated readers could be drawn into a vicarious involvement in partisan preference that received the greatest support was "socialism" (25% of those politics. While only a small proportion of the population was sophisticated polled), while "workers' movements" followed in third place (13%) (Payne, enough to be able to decode these messages, this practice served as an 1984, p. 203; and Heubel, 1977, p. 135). This change from the Church's important source of political attitudes and information for future elites and past political conservatism occurred largely along generational lines: 47% of semi-elites. Juan Linz has suggested, for example, that such basic concepts the youngest priests most highly favored "socialism," while among the as left-right designations and political families (social democratic, liberal, oldest priests in this sample only 4% expressed such a preference. At that etc.) were conveyed to significant sectors of the population by this means. same assembly, motions were passed that called for a significant revision of the existing relationship between the Church and the Franquist state in the 28. See Montero, 1981; Gunther, 1985a, 1986a, 1987c, 1987d; Gunther and direction of greater institutional" autonomy and independence" and the Blough. 1981; and Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986. progressive elimination of "every real or apparent situation of mutual concession of privileges (Heubel, 1977, p. 135). 29. As Payne reminds us, "Traditionally, the Church had been the chief provider of charity and welfare... The elimination of much of the Church's 34. Linz, et al. (1981), McDonough, Barnes, and Ldpez Pina (1984), Gunther, endowment income made it impossible to continue many of these, or Sani and Shabad (1986) and Gunther (1982). required that they function on a reduced scale" (1984, p. 118). Brenan (1974) adds that in addition to its financial dependence on the state. Church 35. A public opinion poll published in 1984 revealed that 63% of those officials shifted their sympathies towards the propertied classes, and interviewed rejected the notion that "The Church should support in elections abandoned their former defense of the poor. Thus, in addition to middle- those candidates and political parties which best defend its ideas and class liberals, the Church became increasingly alienated from the landless interests"; only 17% agreed. Even stronger opposition was expressed when agricultural workers of the south and from the expanding urban working respondents were asked if "The Church should actively participate in classes. politics in order to make public life more moral": 67% disagreed, and only 12% agreed. 30. Linz summarizes the position of the Church at the birth of the Second Republic: "A decadent Church, dependent on the government and the rich, 36. This distinction is not just a technicality: it enabled Franco to bypass Juan largely out of tune with intellectual currents emerging among European Carlos' father, Don Juan, the son of Alfonso XIII, who by tradition would Catholics, led by a clergy of rural extraction and low intellectual level, have been the rightful heir to the throne, but who had alienated Franco by dedicated to the preaching of a bourgeois morality centered on the family calling for the end of his authoritarian regime.

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37. The association between Juan Carlos and Franquismo in the minds of many system. (Some intellectuals, for example, had hoped that democratization Spaniards was strengthened by the fact that Juan Carlos, at Franco's would culminate in a great flourishing of artistic expression, and when this insistence, swore allegiance to the Fundamental Principles of the regime failed to occur they criticized the democratic system as responsible [see upon being named heir in 1969. several of the chapters in Cagigao, et al., 1982].) Second, some socialist politicians and journalists wishing to bring down the UCD government 38. One study has shown that "feeling thermometer" evaluations of the King integrated the "desencanto" theme into their partisan attacks, attempting to have increased from 6.4 in 1978 (which even at that time made him the most portray the shortcomings of the incumbent government as so serious as to popular political figure in the country) to 8.0 (McDonough, Barnes and threaten the new democracy itself. Ldpez Pina, 1986, p. 743). Even more striking evidence of the importance of the King as a unifying symbol of the new regime can be seen in a 40. Between 1979 and 1982, the number of our survey respondents who comparison of data gathered by Linz, et al., shortly after enactment of the preferred "Republic" over "Monarchy," when asked to choose between the Political Reform Law in 1976. When asked, "How important is the role of two concepts declined from 26% to 16% of the total. By 1982 only 6% of the King in the transition?", 34% said it was "very important," and another our respondents disagreed with a statement that "democracy is the best form 43% said "quite important." By way of comparison, only 22% of a British of government for our country." And between 1977 and 1982, the number sample interviewed by Rose and Kavanagh said that the British monarchy of survey respondents who preferred the term "Franquismo" over was "very important," with 32% answering "important" (Linz, et al., 1981a, "Antifranquismo" declined from 29% to 14% (1977 data from Linz, et al., p. 141). 1981a). Expressions of support for democratic elections and for democracy in the abstract are also endorsed by overwhelming majorities of respondents in 41. See Gunther, 1985; Gunther and Blough, 1981; and Gunther, Sani and numerous surveys (see Barnes, et al., 1986; Linz, et al., 1981a; and Ldpez Shabad, 1986, chapters 3 and 4. Pintor and Wert, 1982). Interestingly, support for democracy is stronger among civil servants (often attacked by those on the left on the grounds that 42. To cite some examples: two prominent Communist leaders (Ramdn they represent an unreformed remnant of the Franquist regime) than it is Tamames and Enrique Curiel) were students of Manuel Fraga (founder of among the public at large. Sixty per cent of our 1979 sample of Spanish the right-wing Alianza Popular); the parliamentary spokesman for the citizens agreed that "Democracy is the best system of government," and Cataldn centrist party (Josep Maria Trias de Bes) studied under the 10% disagreed with that statement. (A 1985 survey indicated that the prestigious former Communist Deputy Jordi Soli Tura; and the editorial portion of Spaniards agreeing with a similar item ["Democracy is preferible board of the Reriata ds Estudios Polfticos includes prominent leaders of all to any other form of government"] had risen to 70%.) Among a sample of major political parties: in 1985, these included Fraga, Sold Tura, the civil servants interviewed by the Centro de Investigaciones Socioldgicas, Christian democrat Oscar Alzaga, former UCD parliamentary spokesman 89% agreed with that same statement, and only 4% disagreed. Even among Miguel Herrero de Mindn, CDS Deputy Raul Morodo, and the late Socialist the oldest age cohort (those over 60), who had spent most of their mayor of Madrid, Enrique Tiemo Galv5n. professional lives working within the core of the Franquist state apparatus, support for democracy was stronger than it was among the public at large — 43. Linz, 1972: pp. 36-43. Amando de Miguel implies that this concept may be 80% agreed with that statement and 9% disagreed. (Sources for 1985 data, better regarded as "ascribed achievement," insofar as access to university unpublished CIS study #1461; for civil-servants data, "Encuesta a education (the basis of this elitism) was sharply restricted to persons of Funcionarios de la Administracidn Civil del Estado," Revista Espanola de. upper class social backgrounds until quite recently (de Miguel, 1975, p. 39). Investigaciones Socioldgicas. #23, 1983, pp. 189-206.) 44. An excellent example of this can be seen among the descendents of Jose" Calvo Socelo, the right-wing politician whose murder in July 1936 triggered 39. Poll results published in Carnbjo. 1£ (April 6, 1981) showed that 47% of the outbreak of the Civil War. His descendents include Leopoldo Calvo Spaniards interviewed would have been willing to "defend the democratic Sotelo (conservative, who served as UCD prime minister 1981-1982), system" if the February coup had succeeded, while only 9% of the French Carlos Bustelo (social democrat, served in UCD cabinets), Carlota Bustelo interviewed in 1968 expressed a willingness to defend their democratic system. (feminist leader within the PSOE) and Francisco Bustelo (former leader of the left-wing criticos within the PSOE, who strongly opposed the party's My own interpretation of the "desencanto" polemic of the 1979-1982 period shift away from maximalist socialism). is that it was produced by two phenomena: First, expectations concerning the consequences of democratization were unreasonably high; thus, when 45. Both the anarchosyndicalist union and the Socialist UGT had about 2 many problems remained or (as in the case of the economy) got worse, million members (Alba, 1983). expressions of disappointment were sometimes focused on the political

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46. As Preston has written of Gil Robles, "On his own admission he was always 56. Cf., Jimenez Blanco, et al., 1977; Garcia Ferrando, 1982; Gunther, Sani and pushing his audiences towards escalatory conflicts with the authorities. He Shabad, 1986; Linz and Montero, 1986; and Shabad, 1986. claimed to be training them to defend their rights in the streets" (Preston, 1970, p. 380). 57. The percentages of respondents in Madrid and Catalunya describing themselves as "very good Catholics" or "practicing Catholics" were only 47. Linz points out that Azana based his claim that "Spain has ceased to be 25% and 29%, respectively. Levels of religiosity were much higher in Catholic" on the fact that its intellectual life was not. "The fact that many Castilla-La Mancha (55%), Extremadura (54%), Asturias (47%), Castilla- Spaniards were still believers, he admitted, was for him irrelevant" (Linz, Ledn (45%), Galicia (43%) and Euskadi (44%). Andalucfa (35%) and 1972, p. 52). Valencia (32%) were near the lower end of the scale.

48. He quotes Maura: "I once asked him the reason for his mania of wounding 58. The Garcia Ferrando study found that 55% of Catalan speakers living in simply in order to wound, of never losing an opportunity to pour scorn on Barcelona in 1979 used the regional language on the job; and the percentage the opposition, and he replied, '1 do it because it amuses me'" (Payne, 1970, of Catalans residing in other pans of the region who used Catalan in the p. 91). workplace increased from 35% in 1976 to 68% in 1979 (Garcia Ferrando, 1982, p. 436). 49. At its peak during the democratic era it elected only 15 deputies to the Cortes out of a total of 263. 59. The percentages of regional language speakers using the regional language on the job was only 38% in Valencia, 37% in Galicia, and 17% in Euskadi 50. Liberal democracy, in his view, is not anchored in any firm respect for (Garcia Ferrando, 1982, pp. 318, 366 and 536). morality; it is purely relativistic: "There exists no certainty about what is truth or error, about what is good or bad in the sphere of social life. 60. It should be noted that the strength of such exclusionary identifications is Everything is a question of opinions... Whatever the people want is lower when calculated as a percentage of the total population of the region legitimate. It is the doctrine of the absolutism of the popular will, (i.e., including immigrants from other parts of Spain). In 1979, 34% of the characteristic of extreme liberalism, that has been expressly condemned by total population identified themselves as "Basque" only; while in Catalunya, the Catholic Church" (pp. 121 and 30). 14% of all inhabitants opted for that exclusionary identification.

51. Anecdotal evidence of the cynicism with which most Spaniards regarded the Another study measured this dimension of national identification by asking Fundamental Principles of the National Movement can be seen in the survey respondents whether they regarded themselves as Basques (or political careers of two of the last secretaries general of the Movement — Catalans or Gallegos) when traveling abroad, or whether they identified Torcuato Fernandez- Miranda (author of the "civics textbook" quoted above) themselves as Spanish. Catalans emerged as strikingly different from both and Adolfo Suarez — two of the three persons (along with the King) who Basques and Gallegos in this respect: two thirds of the Catalan respondents played the most decisive roles in dismantling the regime. said they would regard themselves as "Spanish" under those circumstances, while only 36% of Basques and 39% of Gallegos did so (Garcfa Ferrando. 52. A total of 12% placed themselves in the four most extreme positions on a 1982). Moreover, in our surveys the number of persons describing ten-point scale; and only 4% placed themselves at the two extreme points of themselves in exclusionary terms (either "Catalan" only or "Spanish" only) the scale. There has been a gradual shift towards the left since the mid declined in that region between 1979 and' 1982, while those placing 1970s, but most of this movement has been from the center and right to the themselves in the three non-exclusionary categories increased by 14% and center-left. now constitute an overwhelming majority of the population of Catalunya (see Shabad, 1986, p. 154). 53. In 1975, 42% agreed with the statement that "It is not enough to eliminate private property and nationalize factories and land, those who work should 61. Even a nationalist leader who advocated a shift throughout the region to the personally direct businesses"; only 21% disagreed (Linz, et al., 1981, p. 9). use of Catalan as a single official language nonetheless believed that such a policy would be compatible with loyal citizenship within Spain: he regarded 54. In both our 1979 and 1982 surveys over 70% agreed with the statement that Switzerland as a model society in this respect. "the distribution of wealth in this country is totally unjust."

55. See Montero, 1987b; Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986; and Gunther, 1986e. 62. See Shabad and Gunther, 1982:447-448; and Payne, 1975. 63. As Payne, paraphrasing Sabino de Arana, describes it, "It was not necessary for Basques to become 'separatists,' for they had never been really joined

70 71 POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

wiih Spain. H was impossible to separate that which had never been united; the EEC, with Portugal, with Latin America, or with none), 44% choose the Basques need only reassert their fundamental independence" (Payne, 1975, EEC, and only 6% selected closer integration with Latin America (don't P- 75). know and no answer totaled 40% of the sample). (Source: CIS Study #1224, March. 1980.) 64. The percentage of Basque respondents stating that they identified with a social class increased from 48% in our 1979 survey to 63% in 1982, which 70. Only 19% of Spaniards interviewed in 1979 (CIS study #1207), for is the highest level of any region in Spain. example, believed that Spain would be able to stay out of a Third World War, as it had on two previous occasions. 65. Our survey data indicate that between 1979 and 1982 the percentage of Basques identifying ETA as "common criminals" increased from 10% to 71. In December, 1979, for example, many more Spaniards (34%) regarded the 29%, and that negative evaluations of ETA as measured by "feeling USSR as the greatest threat to world peace than believed the US was (22%). thermometers" increased from 53% to 83%. On the other hand, the number In should be noted that the 1979 data are derived from an open-ended item, of Basques describing ETA as "patriots" remained constant during this which was somewhat different from the forced-choice item used in later period. Garcia Ferrando (1982) reports that preferences for independence waves. In addition, the figures for the Soviets includes "USSR" and "the rose from 11% of Basques interviewed in 1976 to 26% in 1979. Our survey Communists," and the American figure is the combined total of the "US" data reveal that support for independence remained roughly constant at and "the CIA." Despite these slight differences, however, these items are about 25% over the following three-year period. quite similar, and clearly reveal that a substantial shift in Spanish public opinion took place after 1980. (Sources: CIS studies #1207 and #1467, both 66. A 1984 DATA study of Spanish young people, for example, found that in unpublished.) Further evidence that the increase in negative attitudes Euskadi fully 44% of those interviewed said that the use of violence was an towards the US in the 1980s was primarily a reflection of anti-Reagan acceptable means of defending Basque national interests, while only 16% sentiment can be seen in the fact that only 13% of Spaniards wanted Reagan said that the use of violence was not justified. In Catalunya, by way of to be reelected in 1984 (CIS study #1436, October 1984, unpublished). contrast, these opinions were endorsed by 22% and 36%, respectively; in Valencia, by 23% vs. 37%; and in Galicia, 22% said violence was 72. These data were derived from CIS studies #1036, October 1968, and #1381, acceptable, while 48% said that it was not justified. It is also important to January 1984, both unpublished. Many other data could be presented which note that young Basques' expressed willingness to endorse violence has further substantiate my contention that anti-American sentiments are neither spread into other policy areas as well: 48% said that it was a legitimate permanent nor disturbingly high. A June 1983 CIS study (#1360), for means of addressing labor disputes, with only 12% denying its acceptability; example, asked about "the degree of confidence inspired by different and 46% of young Basques said that violence was an acceptable means of peoples." Only 44% said that Americans inspired "little" or "no opposing NATO membership. Again, tolerance of violence was much confidence"; this compares favorably with the Russians (52%), the British lower in the other regions studied. (Source: Orizo, et al., 1984: p. 406.) (59%) and the French (61%).

67. Only 25% of the respondents in that same study (CIS study #1207, December, 1979) believed that there was a "special relationship" between Spain and Arab countries.

68. See the large volume of data published in the Revista Espanola dc Investigaciones Socioldgicas. #29, January-March, 1985. The only variations in this overwhelming public support appear to have been the result of increasing skepticism over the actual benefits to Spain of membership, as the harshness of some of the terms of entry were made public in the course of negotiations. Support remained overwhelming among the electorates of all political parties, ranging from 60% among UCD supporters to 73% among Communist voters, according to a 1983 poll (p. 367).

69. When asked in a 1980 poll to choose one among six economic and political integration options (with Arab countries, with Eastern bloc countries, with

72 73 A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

Richard Gunther received his B.A. (1968), his M.A. (1971) and his Ph.D. (1977) degrees from the University of California at Berkeley. He studied at the London School of Economics and Political Science during the 1966-67 academic year. He is currently Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. His publications include Public Policy »n a No-Party State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era (1980), Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (1986), five chapters of Crisis y Cambio: Electores y Partidos en la Espana de los Anos Ochenta (1986), and numerous articles published in journals and edited volumes.