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At yesterday’s committee hearing on HB 2439, a committee member requested information regarding whether other states have laws similar to the provisions proposed in the bill. HB 2439 would create a new subsection in the involuntary manslaughter statute to make the killing of a human being while DUI and while the offender’s license is restricted, suspended, or revoked for DUI, or the offender has been deemed a habitual violator for instances that include at least one DUI, a severity level 3, person felony. Involuntary manslaughter via DUI, without the license restriction, suspension, or revocation, or habitual violator elements, would remain a severity level 4, person felony. The following portion of the sentencing grid shows the possible sentencing ranges for severity levels 1 through 4: As can be seen, a sentence for a severity level 3 felony offense can range from a low of 55 months for an offender with the least criminal history to a high of 247 months for a person with the maximum criminal history. In discussing this situation with Natalie Scott, she pointed out it would be unlikely, if not impossible, for a person in this situation to have a criminal history lower than D, because KSA 21-6811, as amended by the bill, would require any previous DUI conviction be counted as a person felony when calculating criminal history for the offense created by the bill. Thus, the effective sentencing range would appear to be 89 months to 247 months. For the purpose of comparison with the other state information provided below and in the attachment, this range is 7.41 years to 20.58 years. Attached is a chart produced by NCSL showing the penalties provided in each state for DUI accidents that result in serious injury or death. As can be seen from the chart, each state’s approach to such penalties varies, but the chart should give some idea of how Kansas’ current and proposed (via HB 2439) penalties compare. Comparing the specific approach taken by HB 2439 for DUI involuntary manslaughter when the offender is under a license restriction for a previous DUI offense is more difficult, as it appears few states have enacted a specific enhancement for this type of situation. Those states that do have similar enhancements include: • Georgia: § 40-6-393, homicide by vehicle. A person whose license is revoked as a habitual violator who causes the death of another person by motor vehicle is subject to a sentence of 5 to 20 years. • Indiana: IC 9-30-5-5. A person who causes the death of another person while operating a vehicle under the influence commits a level 5 felony, unless the offender has a previous DUI conviction within the previous 10 years, knows his or her license is suspended or revoked for a previous DUI conviction, or the person’s driving privileges are suspended as a habitual violator, in which case the offense is a level 4 felony. In Indiana, the sentencing range for a level 5 felony is 1 to 6 years. The sentencing range for a level 4 felony is 2 to 12 years. While few states may have enacted a substantially similar specific enhancement as proposed by HB 2439, I would note that the attached chart shows a number of states with a maximum sentence length for DUI manslaughter of 20 years (similar to the maximum length under HB 2439), and in these or other states, the specific circumstance contemplated by HB 2439 (DUI manslaughter while under a license restriction for a previous DUI) could possibly serve as an aggravating factor when the court is considering the sentence to impose. I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you or the committee need any further information. Robert G. Gallimore Principal Research Analyst: Judiciary, Corrections, and Juvenile Matters Kansas Legislative Research Department Room 68-W -- State Capitol Building -- 300 SW 10th Ave. Topeka, KS 66612 Phone: 785-296-4420 [email protected] SANCTIONS FOR DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENTS RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURIES AND/OR DEATH State Statutory Citation Description of Penalty Alabama Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-20 & Serious Bodily Injury: Driving under the influence that result in the 13A-5-6(a)(2) serious bodily injury of another person is assault in the first degree, which is a Class B felony. These felonies are punishable by no more than 20 years and no less than 2 years incarceration. Ala. Code § 13A-6-4 Criminally Negligent Homicide: A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide by causing the death of another through criminally negligent conduct. If the death is caused while operating a motor vehicle the punishment is increased to a Class C felony, which is punishable by a prison term of no more than 10 years or less than 1 year and a day. Alaska Alaska Stat. §§ Homicide by Vehicle: vehicular homicide can be second degree murder, 11.41.110(a)(2), manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide, depending on the facts 11.41.120(a), & surrounding the death (see Puzewicz v. State, 856 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Alaska 11.41.130(a) App. 1993)). Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-50- Negligent Homicide: A person commits negligent homicide if he or she 307 negligently causes the death of another person, not constituting murder or Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-10-105 manslaughter, as a result of operating a vehicle while intoxicated or with a prohibited alcohol or drug content. A person who violates this section is Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-401 guilty of a Class B felony. A Class B felony carries a sentence of no less than 5 years nor more than 20 years. Involuntary Manslaughter: When the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in a reckless or wanton disregard of the safety of others, the person operating the vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide. The offense of negligent homicide shall be included in and be a lesser degree of the offense of involuntary manslaughter. California Cal. Vehicle Code §§ Serious Bodily Injury: It is unlawful for a person who is under the 23152 & 23153 influence of alcohol or drug, or who has a blood alcohol content is 0.08 or higher to drive a vehicle and do an act forbidden by law, or neglect a duty Cal. Vehicle Code § 23536 imposed by law, which act or neglect proximately causes the bodily injury et seq. of another. If the first offense occurred without bodily injury to another person, the violation is punishable by imprisonment for no more than 96 hours, of which 48 have to be continuous, and a fine of no less than $390, Cal. Penal Code §§ 17, and no more than $1,000. If the violation is the second within 10 years, or 191.5, 192(c), & 193 results in bodily injury then the violation is punishable by no less than 90 days, and no more than a year in jail, and a fine of no less than $390, and no more than $1,000. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated: Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, and the killing was either the proximate result of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is punishable in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years. Vehicular manslaughter is the same as the description above, but does not require gross negligence, and is punishable by one year in county jail, or 16 months, 2 or 4 years in state prison. Homicide by Vehicle: Vehicular manslaughter requires the driving of a vehicle while intoxicated, and the death of another was the proximate cause of driving while intoxicated, but does not amount to a felony, and with gross negligence. A person can also be convicted if their act might have produced death, with gross negligence. Second degree murder can be imposed if the driver acted with implied malice. If the intoxicated driver causes more than one death, an enhanced prison term of one year is added for each victim (see Cal. Vehicle Code § 23558). Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-3- Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle while under the 205, & 18-1.3-401 influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and this conduct is the proximate cause of serious bodily injury to another, the person is guilty of vehicular assault. This is a strict liability crime. The length of the imprisonment term is determined by the date the felony was committed. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3- Homicide by Vehicle: : If a person operates a vehicle while under the 106(a) influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and this conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, the person is guilty of vehicular homicide. This is a strict liability crime. The length of the imprisonment term is determined by the date the felony was committed. Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a- Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle while under the 60d & 53a-35a influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and causes serious physical injury to another is guilty of second degree assault. Violation is a Class D felony, which is punishable by no more than five years imprisonment. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a- Homicide by Vehicle: 56b, 53a-57, & 14-222a 2nd Degree Manslaughter with a Motor Vehicle: A person is guilty of this offense if he caused the death of another while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both.
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