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The Next Chapter of the Syria Crises – (Obstacles To) Reconstruction Under the Perspective of the Current and Future Trajectory of the Conflict

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The Next Chapter of the Syria Crises – (Obstacles To) Reconstruction Under the Perspective of the Current and Future Trajectory of the Conflict Christine Strassmaier FOKUS | 5/2017 The next chapter of the Syria crises – (obstacles to) reconstruction under the perspective of the current and future trajectory of the conflict Executive Summary The dilemma of reconstructing Syria While the Syrian regime battered the wave of anti-government protests followed by The reconstruction of Syria will be the new The fall of Aleppo in December 2016, an armed opposition more effectively than chapter in the Syrian conflict. It is also one ultimately turned the tides of the seven its Arab neighbors, it did so only thanks to of the last remaining opportunities for years old war in Syria. Since then, forces the extensive external support it received the European Union to influence develop- aligned with the Government of Syria have from Syria’s key allies Iran and Russia and ments in Syria and use its financial capa- consolidated control over all urban centers by sharing power and financial assets with city as leverage on the Syria government of the country’s west, in addition to the dozens of Syrian businessmen and militias. and its allies Russia and Iran. While Russian recently retaken city Deir ez Zour and large Today, the core of the Syrian regime’s po- and Iranian firms have secured major deals areas of its corresponding governorate wer could not be weaker and the country for reconstruction of the infrastructure and in the east of the country where most of will see new, potentially worse forms of energy sector, these investment projects Syria’s oil and gas resources lie. Raqqa, extremisms and waves of violence. Recent do not address the need to revive civilian the Islamic State’s (IS) former capital, was proposals to stabilize the conflict should life in Syria. Meaningful and comprehen- retaken by the Kurdish YPG-led Syrian not distract from the root causes of the sive reconstruction of Syria requires more Democratic Forces (SDF) in October 2017, current war in Syria that remain. than anything the safe and dignified is likely to return under Damascus’s control return of the Syrian population, more in the mid- to long-term. The violence of the ‘de-escalation zones’ than half displaced inside the country and abroad. They carry the most important, At the same time, right wing and popu- The discussion over the return of Syrian non-material asset for reconstruction: hu- list parties in Europe have capitalized on refugees gained increasing dynamic with man capital, social and economic networks the population‘s economic and security the announcement of the so-called ‘de- and connectivity – their loss exceeds the concerns over refugees in general and escalation zones’ in May 2017 by Russia value of the physical damage.1 However, Syrian refugees in particular, and have – a plan to stabilize the current military return remains for most displaced Syrians increased the pressure on governments to situation and improve the humanitarian unlikely in the foreseeable future given address the return of the 2 million Syrian situation in Syria supported by the guaran- the irreconcilability, absence of reform refugees in Europe. Another 6 million tor states Turkey and Iran, and Russia. The and hostility of the Syrian regime. While a refugees are in the neighboring countries proposal calls for a ceasefire between the formal political settlement of the conflict, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq - many in armed opposition and the Government of enforced by Russia, is possible in 2018, dete riorating humanitarian conditions and Syria along the frontlines of the four pri- the country is expected to remain ridden with restricted or no access to basic servi- mary non-government controlled areas in by conflict, old and new ones, for years to ces or the labor market while political and southern Syria, Eastern Ghouta, northern come. Instead of releasing millions into armed actors increase verbal and physical Homs and Idleb province monitored by early recovering and even reconstruction hostilities against Syrian refugees.2 forces of the guarantor states. Prisoner ex- in the hope that this may be incentive change and increased humanitarian access enough for Syrian refugees to return, Euro- Yet, Syria lies in ruins, while the Syrian and civilian passage between government pean donors should be clear about the government which was declared close to and non-government held areas are political and military realities of Syria today collapse year by year has survived. Debates further components of the proposal. In and the dynamics in a ‘post-conflict’ Syria. among NGOs, U.N. and donor govern- return, the moderate armed groups must This is not only necessary for the sake of ments in the region and in European ca- isolate the al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al political and ethical principles, but for a pitals are therefore dominated these days Sham (HTS - al Qaeda affiliate and formerly realistic assessment of the sustainability by the question how to engage in Syria’s al Nusra Front) within the respective areas. and priority of investing in Syria’s recon- reconstruction despite the prevalence of According to Russian President Putin the struction instead of supporting durable the Assad regime and how to facilitate ‘de-escalation zones‘ would create “the solutions for refugees in hosting countries. refugee resettlement. Experts are propo- necessary conditions […] for […] the Reconstruction efforts that ignore these sing complex schemes for how the West return of Syrians to a peaceful life and their facts also risk another, even more violent and international donors can rebuild Syria homes”3. internal uprising in the next decade. in spite of Assad or how it can condition its reconstruction money on political conces- However, none of the proposal’s condi- sions from the regime. tions has been fully implemented so far. Despite reports about the conflict in Syria 1 The next chapter of the Syria crises FOKUS | 5/2017 loosing intensity, conflict activity has in December 201710, Russia has signifi- strategic approach of the two powers to increased since August 2017, especially cantly expanded its military presence in the conflict and their envisioned post- along the frontlines of the ‘de-escalation Syria through its Military Police. The force conflict order are fundamentally different zones’ and levels of violence have return which is composed of Chechen and Ingush and increasingly opposing. Iran and Russia to those of December 2016.4 Violations Sunni Muslims and was first deployed to are pitched against each other as com- of the ceasefire in the form of airstrikes Aleppo11 in January 2017 to patrol the city petitors over the modalities of a political and shelling by the Government of Syria after the surrender of the armed groups, settlement, profiteers from Syria’s recon- and ambushes by armed groups in Dara’a, but also in an attempt to win “hearts and struction and post-conflict assets and Quneitra, Idleb and the Rastana–Houla minds” and some of its acceptance among military presence in the country. Russian pocket occur on a daily basis; the situation Syria’s majority-Sunni population.12 After ‘de-escalation zone’ proposal has also to in besieged Eastern Ghoutha is particularly this first mission, Russian Military Police be seen as complementary to the Astana concerning where over the last months at was deployed to three of the four ‘de-es- talks – the Russian led series of talks to least two infants died of malnutrition.5 calation zones’ over the following months politically settle the Syria crisis that has amounting to four Russian battalions that sidelined the UN-led Geneva talks. With Monitoring forces have been difficult to are now in Syria.13 the Astana talks, Russia as created a forum mobilize. While Iranian forces have been in which Moscow can lead negotiation deemed as unacceptable (especially by But long before Russia’s military interven- with the main stakeholders in Syria, Iran Jordan)6, Turkey supported by Free Syrian tion on behalf of the Syrian regime in and Turkey, without Western interference. Army (FSA) launched under the pretext of Sep tember 2015, Iran has provided from Overall, Moscow attempts to strengthen the ‘de-escalation zones’ a ground offen- the onset of the armed conflict in Syria and transform its presence in Syria, sive into Idleb province in early October.7 ex tensive and integrated support for the moving from a purely military posture However, the Turkish intervention is rather Syrian regime. Teheran has advised Syrian to that of a mediator driving towards a motivated by Ankara’s concerns about the intelligence services and provided training, political settlement. Part of this approach Kurdish presence in Afrin than monitoring military supplies but most importantly is the recently announced „Congress of the ceasefire. The Turkish invasion comes man power in the form of Islamic Revolutio- Syrian National Dialogue“ in Sochi to bring six months after the end of the dreadful nary Guard Corps, Hezbollah, in addition to together 33 political groups, including Euphrates Shield operations that pushed a whole range of Afghani and Iraqi Shiites pro-Government of Syria, opposition, and back the ISIS in northern Aleppo, but mili tias – some set up and trained only for Kurdish groups to begin discussions on the primarily aimed at avoiding a connection their mission in Syria.14 The latest offensive future political landscape of Syria. between the eastern and western flank of in the eastern Deir ez Zour has been largely the YPG-held territories in Syria.8 Similar- been accomplished by these Iran-backed Tehran is increasingly upset by Russia’s ly, the recent (bloodless) intervention in forces which may eventually link with Shia approach and deals with the opposition, northwest Syria has been focused on the militias in Iraq and establish the aspired land Turkey, Jordan, Israel and the U.S., which areas bordering Afrin and the established line between Iran and the Mediterranean.
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