Christine Strassmaier

FOKUS | 5/2017

The next chapter of the crises – (obstacles to) reconstruction under the perspective of the current and future trajectory of the conflict

Executive Summary The dilemma of reconstructing Syria While the Syrian regime battered the wave of anti-government protests followed by The reconstruction of Syria will be the new The fall of Aleppo in December 2016, an armed opposition more effectively than chapter in the Syrian conflict. It is also one ultimately turned the tides of the seven its Arab neighbors, it did so only thanks to of the last remaining opportunities for years old war in Syria. Since then, forces the extensive external support it received the European Union to influence develop- aligned with the Government of Syria have from Syria’s key allies Iran and Russia and ments in Syria and use its financial capa- consolidated control over all urban centers by sharing power and financial assets with city as leverage on the Syria government of the country’s west, in addition to the dozens of Syrian businessmen and militias. and its allies Russia and Iran. While Russian recently retaken city Deir ez Zour and large Today, the core of the Syrian regime’s po- and Iranian firms have secured major deals areas of its corresponding governorate wer could not be weaker and the country for reconstruction of the infrastructure and in the east of the country where most of will see new, potentially worse forms of energy sector, these investment projects Syria’s oil and gas resources lie. , extremisms and waves of violence. Recent do not address the need to revive civilian the Islamic State’s (IS) former capital, was proposals to stabilize the conflict should life in Syria. Meaningful and comprehen- retaken by the Kurdish YPG-led Syrian not distract from the root causes of the sive reconstruction of Syria requires more Democratic Forces (SDF) in October 2017, current war in Syria that remain. than anything the safe and dignified is likely to return under Damascus’s control return of the Syrian population, more in the mid- to long-term. The violence of the ‘de-escalation zones’ than half displaced inside the country and ­abroad. They carry the most important, At the same time, right wing and popu- The discussion over the return of Syrian non-material asset for reconstruction: hu- list parties in Europe have capitalized on refugees gained increasing dynamic with man capital, social and economic networks the population‘s economic and security the announcement of the so-called ‘de- and connectivity – their loss exceeds the concerns over refugees in general and escalation zones’ in May 2017 by Russia value of the physical damage.1 However, Syrian refugees in particular, and have – a plan to stabilize the current military return remains for most displaced Syrians increased the pressure on governments to situation and improve the humanitarian unlikely in the foreseeable future given address the return of the 2 million Syrian situation in Syria supported by the guaran- the irreconcilability, absence of reform refugees in Europe. Another 6 million tor states and Iran, and Russia. The and hostility of the Syrian regime. While a refugees are in the neighboring countries proposal calls for a ceasefire between the formal political settlement of the conflict, Turkey, , and - many in armed opposition and the Government of enforced by Russia, is possible in 2018, dete­riorating humanitarian conditions and Syria along the frontlines of the four pri- the country is expected to remain ridden with restricted or no access to basic servi- mary non-government controlled areas in by conflict, old and new ones, for years to ces or the labor market while political and southern Syria, Eastern Ghouta, northern come. Instead of releasing millions into armed actors increase verbal and physical and Idleb province monitored by early recovering and even reconstruction hostilities against Syrian refugees.2 forces of the guarantor states. Prisoner ex- in the hope that this may be incentive change and increased humanitarian access enough for Syrian refugees to return, Euro­ Yet, Syria lies in ruins, while the Syrian and civilian passage between government pean donors should be clear about the government which was declared close to and non-government held areas are political and military realities of Syria today collapse year by year has survived. Debates­ further components of the proposal. In and the dynamics in a ‘post-conflict’ Syria. among NGOs, U.N. and donor govern- return, the moderate armed groups must This is not only necessary for the sake of ments in the region and in European ca- isolate the al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al political and ethical principles, but for a pitals are therefore dominated these days Sham (HTS - al Qaeda affiliate and formerly realistic assessment of the sustainability by the question how to engage in Syria’s al Nusra Front) within the respective areas. and priority of investing in Syria’s recon- reconstruction despite the prevalence of According to Russian President Putin the struction instead of supporting durable the Assad regime and how to facilitate ‘de-escalation zones‘ would create “the solutions for refugees in hosting countries. refugee resettlement. Experts are propo- necessary conditions […] for […] the Reconstruction efforts that ignore these sing complex schemes for how the West return of Syrians to a peaceful life and their facts also risk another, even more violent and international donors can rebuild Syria homes”3. internal uprising in the next decade. in spite of Assad or how it can condition its reconstruction money on political conces- However, none of the proposal’s condi- sions from the regime. tions has been fully implemented so far. Despite reports about the conflict in Syria

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loosing intensity, conflict activity has in December 201710, Russia has signifi- strategic approach of the two powers to increased since August 2017, especially cantly expanded its military presence in the conflict and their envisioned post- along the frontlines of the ‘de-escalation Syria through its Military Police. The force conflict order are fundamentally different zones’ and levels of violence have return which is composed of Chechen and Ingush and increasingly opposing. Iran and Russia to those of December 2016.4 Violations Sunni Muslims and was first deployed to are pitched against each other as com- of the ceasefire in the form of airstrikes Aleppo11 in January 2017 to patrol the city petitors over the modalities of a political and shelling by the Government of Syria after the surrender of the armed groups, settlement, profiteers from Syria’s recon- and ambushes by armed groups in Dara’a, but also in an attempt to win “hearts and struction and post-conflict assets and , Idleb and the Rastana–Houla minds” and some of its acceptance among military presence in the country. Russian pocket occur on a daily basis; the situation Syria’s majority-Sunni population.12 After ‘de-escalation zone’ proposal has also to in besieged Eastern Ghoutha is particularly this first mission, Russian Military Police be seen as complementary to the Astana concerning where over the last months at was deployed to three of the four ‘de-es- talks – the Russian led series of talks to least two infants died of malnutrition.5 calation zones’ over the following months politically settle the Syria crisis that has amounting to four Russian battalions that sidelined the UN-led Geneva talks. With Monitoring forces have been difficult to are now in Syria.13 the Astana talks, Russia as created a forum mobilize. While Iranian forces have been in which Moscow can lead negotiation deemed as unacceptable (especially by But long before Russia’s military interven­ with the main stakeholders in Syria, Iran Jordan)6, Turkey supported by Free Syrian tion on behalf of the Syrian regime in and Turkey, without Western interference. Army (FSA) launched under the pretext of Sep­tember 2015, Iran has provided from Overall, Moscow attempts to strengthen the ‘de-escalation zones’ a ground offen- the onset of the armed conflict in Syria and transform its presence in Syria, sive into Idleb province in early October.7 ex­tensive and integrated support for the moving from a purely military posture However, the Turkish intervention is rather Syrian regime. Teheran has advised Syrian to that of a mediator driving towards a motivated by Ankara’s concerns about the intelligence services and provided training, political settlement. Part of this approach Kurdish presence in Afrin than monitoring military supplies but most importantly is the recently announced „Congress of the ceasefire. The Turkish invasion comes man­power in the form of Islamic Revolutio- Syrian National Dialogue“ in Sochi to bring six months after the end of the dreadful nary Guard Corps, Hezbollah, in addition to together 33 political groups, including Euphrates Shield operations that pushed a whole range of Afghani and Iraqi Shiites pro-Government of Syria, opposition, and back the ISIS in northern Aleppo, but mili­tias – some set up and trained only for Kurdish groups to begin discussions on the primarily aimed at avoiding a connection their mission in Syria.14 The latest offensive future political landscape of Syria. between the eastern and western flank of in the eastern Deir ez Zour has been largely the YPG-held territories in Syria.8 Similar- been accomplished by these Iran-backed Tehran is increasingly upset by Russia’s ly, the recent (bloodless) intervention in forces which may eventually link with Shia approach and deals with the opposition, northwest Syria has been focused on the militias in Iraq and establish the aspired land Turkey, Jordan, Israel and the U.S., which areas bordering Afrin and the established line between Iran and the Mediterranean. it sees as being made “behind their back”. surveillance towers point towards the YPG While Russia pursues eventually a grand rather than the crucial frontline between Russia has limited control over these mili- power style victory and a peace deal that Government of Syria forces and armed tias and sees them as a long-term threat to is also acceptable by the international groups in Idleb. But a further extension the stability in government-held areas and community and the West, Iran is hardly of Turkey’s role is likely. Moscow needs its political and military role which may interested in a settlement, or acceptance Ankara to mediate in Idleb, and whip the also obstruct investment from abroad in by the West and willing to manage Syria moderate armed opposition in line and reconstruction and its own infrastructure similar to Lebanon and Iraq where Teheran unit the groups with the Turkey-based and energy projects in Syria. Therefore, has an influence on the government, but political opposition to eventually agree to Moscow does not want that these forces to more importantly controls paramilitary a formal settlement of the conflict at the play a role in its construct of the ‘de-esca- forces that secure strategic interests on the Astana talks. lation zones’ that has to be also acceptable ground for Teheran. for regional and international actors. The Russia’s integrated political and military Russian Military Police enables Moscow New conflicts on the horizon role in Syria & rivalry with Iran to (slightly) counter-balance the power of these largely uncontrolled local militias. After all, the ‘de-escalation zones’ proposal The most significant, and largely unno­ In addition, Russia rallies for support from should not be confused with Moscow’s ticed deployment of ground forces has a number of Central Asian states, such as strategic objective to dissolve areas under come from Russia itself. In contrast to Pre- Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.15 the control of armed opposition forces and sident Putin’s announcement of a withdra- its will to force fighters and the trapped wal of Russian troops from Syria in March Despite the completing military support civilian population into surrender at any 20169 and January 2017and most recently Russia and Iran have provided in Syria, the cost. The proposal is not intended to be

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long-term settlement of the conflict but be pressured into a political settlement in armed and political opposition and later rather aims at putting further offensives on Astana. As an internationally designated for facilitating reconstruction. Moscow hold until the areas in the east of the coun- terrorist group, HTS is then a legitimate may trade Ankara’s support for the destiny try are retaken from IS and an accommo- target for the Government of Syria and its of the Syrian Kurds, who may experience dation with the Kurdish-led SDF is reached. allies. Turkey may extend its military pre- a similar scenario as the Iraqi Kurds, in Once attention will return to the country’s sence in Idleb and establish a buffer zones which government forces rapidly retake west, an escalation of violence is highly along its border with Syria to shield tens of territory from the SDF, which is unable to likely. Encircled areas, such as Eastern thousands of civilians that will attempt to affront the offensive without external, U.S. Ghouta and northern Homs will expe­ cross into Turkey once fighting escalates. support. Yet, chaos in the northeast where rience a further tightening of the sieges The impact of a military offensive on this over half a million displaced people stay paired with bombardments leading to an ‘open-air prison’ will be catastrophically.18 will be significant.20 erosion of the relation between popula­ tion, local councils and armed groups, and In return for Turkey’s handling of Idleb, The demographics of war & returns for a collapse of the control system - similarly Russia may support Turkey against the whom, to where and how? to Aleppo. Armed groups and civilians will Kurds. So far Russia is positioning itself as then be subject to a so called ‘reconcilia- protector of Afrin, but the rapprochement The stability of a ceasefire and a political tion’ agreement that includes the reloca- between Turkey and Russia may lead to settlement are among the main conditions tion of fighters and civilians to areas still a future alignment of strategic interests for the return of Syrian refugees and for the outside of government control, such as between Ankara, Damascus and Moscow reconstruction for Syria. Bureaucratic and Idleb or northern Aleppo where Turkey is against the . The Syrian legal obstacles imposed by the Govern- expected to manage the situation. Kurds, aware of the short-lived support ment of Syria, and personal security con- the U.S. that is tied to the fight against the cerns are paramount for Syrian refugees The effect of the cessation of payments IS, are turning to Damascus knowing this and an even more complex to monitor to the main opposition umbrella in the may be the only chance to survive. Two and assess for donor governments. At the south, the Southern Front, by the U.S.-led days after Special Presidential Envoy for opening of a conference in August 2017, Military Operations Command (MOC) in the Global Coalition to Counter IS Brett President Bashar al Assad said that Syria Amman, Jordan, may also change radically McGurk visited the ruins of Raqqa, a joined had “lost its best youth and its infrastruc- the political-military landscape in southern Government of Syria and Government of ture,” but had “won a healthier and more Syria as groups previously affiliated with Russia delegation led by Syrian security homogenous society.21 This is why Putin’s the Southern Front will seek new funding chief Ali Memluk and Russian Deputy statement about providing areas for return streams, either via Israel which has strong Foreign Minister Bogdanov met with in the ‘de-escalation zones’ is misleading security objectives in southern Syria, or PYD/YPG representatives, and reportedly and dangerous. The large majority of more radical groups that will attempt to PKK leader Karayılan, in (a town refugees are not from these largely rural take advantage of the vacuum.16 A more within YPG territory in northeast Syria that areas now marked as ‘de-escalation zones’, fragmented armed opposition in the south has been held by the Syrian army throug- but from areas currently under the control may then invite an offensive by Govern- hout the conflict). The parties discussed of the government of Syria, such as the ment of Syria, especially around Dara’a the future of the YPG as an armed forces as country’s main urban centers Homs, Hama, city and the border crossing to Jordan and well as the political future of the Kurdish Aleppo and Damascus, and their surroun- facilitate ‘reconciliation’ agreements. self-administration and the future of US ding villages. Even when their property is bases in northeast Syria. This has been the still intact, many refugees lack legal docu- Finally, the greater Idleb province (inclu- first significant sign that Damascus is ready mentation of their identity and property ding parts of northern Hama and west to engage in negotiations with the PYD which has been lost or destroyed during Aleppo) is facing the most precarious after statements by Syrian Foreign Minister their escape or in the course of the conflict. situation. The area hosts an estimated two Walid al-Moallem on 25 September that million people under dire humanitarian Kurdish autonomy was “negotiable”19. Apart from the massive physical de- conditions, among them many who have struction of property in these areas, been ‘evacuated’ to Idleb after the ‘reconci- While these talks between Damascus the regime has “destroyed and falsified liation’ of their homes or previous areas of and the PYD suggests a negotiated property records, confiscated property displacement.17 In addition, the proscribed re-integration of a semi-autonomous and reallocated it to pro-regime commu- HTS has taken over large parts of Idleb in Kurdish self-administration into the Syrian nities, and prioritized the rehabilitation of August 20. The group is not part of the state, Turkey, Russia and the Government areas inhabited by these same commu- ceasefire and ‘de-escalation’ agreement. of Syria may find common interests nities since the beginning of the conflict Turkey’s task in Idleb is to establish a new against the Kurds in the long-term. Russia in 2011”22. An important aspect of this armed opposition umbrella that adheres understands that Turkey is a key ally in sectarian reshaping policy of Syria’s social to Ankara, is separated from HTS and can Syria, most importantly for managing the fabric have been significant land and

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property purchases by Iran. Since 2011, Russian and Iran firms have secured major selecting the local administrator as head of Teheran has signed off almost every year a deals in Syria. However, these projects are the reconstruction committee or manda- new credit line to Damascus worth billions focused on sectors that promise a high ting that local organizations work with of dollars.23 The Government of Syria will return of investment such as the energy the international community.30 This may never be able to repay this debt in cash. sector, natural resources as well as strate- also enable increased Western funding as Instead, territory has been an accepted, if gic infrastructure.27 Damascus is aware that especially Western, not desired, return of investment. Some of international donors could be reluctant these areas have been purchased for reli- The big junk of the ‘real’ reconstruction, to provide financing through the central gious and ideological reasons, others for such as civilian housing and infrastructure, government and would prefer to promote financial compensation in the form of land basic services, and financial stimuli to some form of local autonomy. But the old for agriculture as well as strategic areas in revive the local economy have not seen habits of the Syrian regime die hard: The urban centers. Refugees from these areas, contributions from Syria’s key allies. These minister of local administration, Hussein many of them Sunnis, who are largely sectors have a negligible return of invest- Makhlouf, also happens to be a relative of perceived as potentially dangerous for ment, and are also at risk to fail if internal Bashar Al-Assad and of his maternal cousin the regime’s stability will hardly be able to stability remains fragile. Neither Russia nor Rami Makhlouf. return to these areas. Moreover, Syrian re- Iran have the financial resources or interest fugees, especially men and male children to lift this tasks and take such risks. Despite Outlook and adolescents, face forced conscription the posturing of the Syrian regime, at least with the Syrian Arab Army or militias, or Russia is aware that reconstruction in Syria In contrast to early recovery and recon­ arbitrary detention and arrest for defection needs the financial capacity of the major struction in Afghanistan and Iraq (with all or perceived or de facto association with international institutions and Western its flaws) where allied forces largely secu- anti-government groups. donors – according to Putin in the form red the ground and Western government of a ‘Marshal Plan for Syria’28. In addition, had strong ties to the local government, Avoiding the uncomfortable: Schemes for the Russian and Iranian deals in Syria will control and oversight over reconstruction reconstruction require subcontractors, probably Western and the safe return of refugees in Syria companies, with the capacity and know- remain absent. While Syrian government officials regularly how to actually implement these project. talk about reconstruction and banned full- The current political and military lands- throated Western countries from playing Russia may also court the support and cape of Syria remains conflicted, complex any role on the reconstruction24 in favor investment of more compliant actors. Chi- and entails more violence and human of allied countries25, the four Ws of the na is likely to play a major role in funding suffering in the foreseeable future. New reconstruction remain unclear. The main Syria’s reconstruction in addition to a small regional dynamics generated by Saudi challenge is how to cover the estimated military presence.29 While investment in Arabia under the proactive leadership of costs of $ 100 billion USD26. While finan- Syria enhances China’s “One Belt, One Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman are cing remains the very big question mark, Road” initiative, the Asian power offers also likely to have an impact on Syria. Also other issues such as what sectors and/or “politically unconditioned investments” – Israel, which has keep a wary eye on Syria projects will be prioritized or what dedica- in contrast to many Western donors. Yet, since 2011, may consider an increased in- ted agencies will be in charge of handling Chinese investors have traditionally been volvement, especially with new partners in the effort also loom large. hesitant to invest in unstable environ- Riyadh at hand. Finally, the stability and ca- ments. In order to decrease these political pacity of the Syrian regime remains largely Despite its official posture, the Syrian obstacles and hesitations by Chinese and unclear. After seven years of war, there is government itself seems to lack a strategy, Western donors, Russia is pushing for a also a risk that once external threats to the and allies are reluctant to financially com- political settlement of the conflict. regime decrease, internal conflict among mit to the reconstruction without an end the fragmented political, economic and se- of the conflict in sight. At the 10th meeting The Syrian government seems to be aware curity actors erupts resulting in a potential of the Syrian-Russian joint Committee for of donors’ concerns too: The government’s regime collapse. Scientific, Technical, Commercial and Eco- committee in charge of reconstruction, nomic Cooperation early October in Sochi, originally headed by the deputy prime Christine Strassmaier is Associate Fellow at Mr Rogozin, Russia’s deputy Prime Minister, minister, has recently been transferred the AIES. said that economic relations between the under the leadership of the minister of two countries will witness “an important local administration. This could be an Acronyms change after we move to the peaceful indication that the Syrian government is stage,” effectively postponing significant conducting reconstruction at the local SDF Syrian Democratic Forces developments in these relations to after a level by creating opportunities for public- IS Islamic State political deal. private financing within local authorities, YPG People Protection Unit

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