Strength in Numbers
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Download PDF (77.1
Index Abraham, K.S. 133 Beck, Ulrich 129 absorbing risk 133 behavioral anomalies 6, 84–9, 243–4 actuarial estimation 109–10 behavior-control functions 106 ad hoc Beijing Normal University 90, 189, assistance 196 235 compensation tool 45 Ben-Shahar, Omri 134 direct payment 40, 169, 207 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance institutions 30 Reform Act of 2012 69, 152 relief 71, 97 Bruggeman, Véronique 95 adaptation 253 business interruption 104 and climate change 103, 164 adverse selection 5, 13, 47, 54, 66–8, California Earthquake Authority 55, 75, 81–2, 97, 99, 111, 127, 140, 142 162, 246 capacity (of insurers) 6–8, 11, 19, 30, AES v Steadfast 116–19 53, 63–6, 82–4, 89–91, 96, 113, agricultural insurance 122–3, 126, 136, 152, 161–2 173, government-subsidized 50 176, 179–80, 217, 222, 225, 227–8, pilot projects 49 242–3, 249–52 policies 49, 50 and reinsurance 199, 206–8, 215 Regulation on Agriculture Insurance capacity gap 82, 228, 242, 252 50, 94 capital markets 11, 53, 54, 59, 64–5, aircraft insurance 110 212, 217–8, 221, 226–40 all-hazard insurance policy 245 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Alternative Risk Transfers (ARTs) 217, Facility 60 221, 236 catastrophe (cat) bonds 3, 113, 182, ambiguity of risk 112–13 212 217–40 see also uncertainty see also insurance-linked securities, American International Group (AIG) insurance securitization 1, 104 catastrophe derivatives 182, 221–2 “appetite” of insurers 84 catastrophe disasters 5, 8, 12–6, 72, 74, Arrow, Kenneth 35 92, 102, 155, 171–3, 255–6 asbestos claims 108–9 see also natural catastrophes assessment insurance 110 catastrophe fund 142, 210–12, 254 asset-backed securitization 237 catastrophe insurance 6, 8–11, 13–4, Association of British Insurers (ABI) 44, 73, 80, 89–99, 103, 105, 108, 148, 149 112–14, 121–8, 129–175, 208–9, authoritarian regime 7, 33 212–5, 216 availability crisis 52 affordability 63, 66, 69–70, 125, 127–8 174, 206, 250, 256 Baker, Tom 133, 134 demand 84–9, 92–3 Barry, D. -
Employment Practices Liability Insurance Program EPLI
B5848_EPLI 2/14/06 2:49 PM Page 1 For more information about EPLI … Why your firm needs Employment For instant information on the EPLI program offered through Marsh Affinity Group Services, simply visit Practices Liability Insurance www.proliablity.com/EPLI Think your firm won’t be sued by an employee for wrongful termination … You’ll be able to self-rate, apply for coverage EPLI EPLI and submit your premium payment. Or call discrimination … defamation … failure to make partner … negligent supervision … us at 1-888-601-6667. sexual harassment … or other inappropriate employment conduct? Underwritten by Lloyd’s of London Employment (underwriting syndicates 2623 and Six out of ten employers have faced 623 – Beazley Furlonge Ltd. Rated “A” by Practices employee lawsuits within the past A.M. Best) five years. Beazley / Furlonge – Lloyd’s of London These facts show Beazley Furlonge Ltd. is a large syndicate of Liability it can happen and Lloyd’s of London and a recognized world 67% of all employment cases that leader in Specialty Insurance Services. Beazley how much it will go to litigation result in a judgment for is rated “A” by A.M. Best. For more Insurance cost your firm: the plaintiff. information, see www.beazley.com. Statistics show an Edgewater Holdings Ltd. (Edgewater), a Managing General Agency and consulting Program employer is more likely The average amount paid for out-of-court firm, is a leader in the development and to have an employment settlement is $40,000. delivery of EPLI policies. claim than a property or general liability claim.* Offered by Marsh Affinity Defense of the average EPLI case, through Group Services *Society for Human trial, costs more than $45,000. -
THE FREE-MARKET WELFARE STATE: Preserving Dynamism in a Volatile World
Policy Essay THE FREE-MARKET WELFARE STATE: Preserving Dynamism in a Volatile World Samuel Hammond1 Poverty and Welfare Policy Analyst Niskanen Center May 2018 INTRODUCTION welfare state” directly depresses the vote for reac- tionary political parties.3 Conversely, I argue that he perennial gale of creative destruc- the contemporary rise of anti-market populism in tion…” wrote the economist Joseph America should be taken as an indictment of our in- 4 Schumpeter, “…is the essential fact of adequate social-insurance system, and a refutation “T of the prevailing “small government” view that reg- capitalism.” For new industries to rise and flourish, old industries must fail. Yet creative destruction is ulation and social spending are equally corrosive to a process that is rarely—if ever—politically neu- economic freedom. The universal welfare state, far tral; even one-off economic shocks can have lasting from being at odds with innovation and economic political-economic consequences. From his vantage freedom, may end up being their ultimate guaran- point in 1942, Schumpeter believed that capitalism tor. would become the ultimate victim of its own suc- The fallout from China’s entry to the World Trade cess, inspiring reactionary and populist movements Organization (WTO) in 2001 is a clear case in against its destructive side that would inadvertently point. Cheaper imports benefited millions of Amer- strangle any potential for future creativity.2 icans through lower consumer prices. At the same This paper argues that the countries that have time, Chinese import competition destroyed nearly eluded Schumpeter’s dreary prediction have done two million jobs in manufacturing and associated 5 so by combining free-markets with robust systems services—a classic case of creative destruction. -
Social Insurance Law PART 1
Social Insurance Law PART 1: THE CONSOLIDATED ACT ON SOCIAL INSURANCE CHAPTER I THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS Article 1 This Law shall be cited as "The Social Insurance Law" and shall include the following branches of Insurance :- 1. Insurance against old age, disability and death; 2. Insurance against employment injuries; 3. Insurance against temporary disability by reason of sickness or maternity; 4. Insurance against unemployment; 5. Insurance for the self-employed and those engaged in liberal professions; 6. Insurance for employers; 7. Family Allowances; 8. Other branches of insurance which fall within the scope of social security. Each of the first two branches shall be introduced in accordance with the following provisions and the protection guaranteed by this Law shall be extended in future stages by introducing the other branches of social insurance by Order of the Council of Ministers. Article 2 The provisions of this Law shall be applied compulsorily to all workers without discrimination as to sex, nationality, or age, who work by virtue of an employment contract for the benefit of one or more employers, or for the benefit of an enterprise in the private, co-operative, or para-statal sectors and, unless otherwise provided for, those engaged in public organisations or bodies, and also those employees and workers in respect of whom Law No. 13 of 1975 does not apply, and irrespective of the duration, nature or form of the contract, or the amount or kind of wages paid or whether the service is performed in accordance with the contract within the country or for the benefit of the employer outside the country or whether the assignment to work abroad is for a limited or an unlimited period. -
Consumers Guide to Auto Insurance
CONSUMERS GUIDE TO AUTO INSURANCE PRESENTED TO YOU BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION INSURANCE DIVISION 1511 PONTIAC AVENUE, BLDG 69-2 CRANSTON, RI 02920 TELEPHONE 401-462-9520 www.dbr.ri.gov Elizabeth Kelleher Dwyer Superintendent of Insurance TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………………………………1 Underwriting and Rating………………………………………………...1 What is meant by underwriting and how is it accomplished…………..1 How are rates and premium charges determined in Rhode Island……1 What factors are considered in ratemaking……………………………. 2 What discounts are used in determining final premium cost…………..3 Rhode Island Automobile Insurance Plan…………………..…………..4 Regulation of Rates……………………………………………………….4 The Tort System…………………………………………………………..4 Liability Coverages………………………………………………………..5 Coverages Other Than Liability…………………………………………5 Physical Damage to the Automobile……………………………………..6 Other Optional Coverages………………………………………………..6 The No-Fault System……………….……………………………………..7 Smart Shopping……………………………………………………………7 Shop for True Comparison………………………………………………..8 Consumer Protection Available...…………………………………………8 What to Do if You are in an Automobile Accident………………………9 Your State Insurance Department………………………………….........9 Auto Insurance Buyer’s Worksheet…………………………………….10 Introduction Auto insurance is an expensive purchase for most Americans, and is especially expensive for Rhode Islanders. Yet consumers rarely comparison-shop for auto insurance as they might for other products and services. Auto insurance companies vary substantially both in price and service to policyholders, so it pays to shop around and compare different insurance companies. This guide to buying auto insurance was developed to help you become a more knowledgeable policyholder and to get the combination of price and service best suited to your needs. It provides information on how to shop for coverage and how insurance premiums are determined. You will also find an Auto Insurance Buyer’s Worksheet in the guide to help you compare premium prices among insurers. -
Tax Risk Insurance: Taking It Captive
taxnotes federal ■ Volume 171, Number 4 April 26, 2021 Tax Risk Insurance: Taking It Captive by Ken Brewer and Albert Liguori Reprinted from Tax Notes Federal, April 26, 2021, p. 549 For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. © 2021 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content. TAX PRACTICE tax notes federal Tax Risk Insurance: Taking It Captive by Ken Brewer and Albert Liguori is to explore the U.S. tax implications of that meeting. Behold: captive tax risk insurance!3 In our experiences, the use of tax risk insurance has been most prevalent in the mergers and acquisitions context. But as we mentioned in our last article, we have seen it becoming more common in the context of large corporate groups seeking to manage their global tax risks, regardless of whether they are related to M&A.4 In either context, the use of tax risk insurance lends itself to captive arrangements, for the same reasons that have caused captive arrangements to be desirable for other types of insurance risks. Ken Brewer is a senior adviser and Captive Insurance and the U.S. Tax Implications international tax practitioner with Alvarez & Thereof Marsal Taxand LLC in Miami, and Albert Liguori is a managing director in the firm’s New As an alternative to traditional insurance York office. The authors send special thanks to protection, which is obtained from one or more of Brian Pedersen, managing director at Alvarez & the many underwriters offering that coverage to Marsal Taxand, for his contributions and the public, captive insurance is obtained from a review. -
Auto Insurance and How Those Terms Affect Your Coverage
Arkansas Insurance Department AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Asa Hutchinson Allen Kerr Governor Commissioner A Message From The Commissioner The Arkansas Insurance Department takes very seriously its mission of “consumer protection.” We believe part of that mission is accomplished when consumers are equipped to make informed decisions. We believe informed decisions are made through the accumulation and evaluation of relevant information. This booklet is designed to provide basic information about automobile insurance. Its purpose is to help you understand terms used in the purchase of auto insurance and how those terms affect your coverage. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact our Consumer Services Division at: Phone: (501) 371-2640; 1-800-852-5494 Fax: (501) 371-2749 Email: [email protected] Web site: www.insurance.arkansas.gov Mission Statement The primary mission of the State Insurance Department shall be consumer protection through insurer insolvency and market conduct regulation, and fraud prosecution and deterrence. 1 Coverages Provided by Automobile Insurance The automobile insurance policy is comprised of several separate types of coverages: COLLISION, COMPREHENSIVE, LIABILITY, PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION, UNINSURED MOTORIST, UNDERINSURED MOTORIST and other coverages. You are required by law to purchase liability protection only. All others are voluntary unless required by a lienholder. LIABILITY Under Legislation passed in 1987 and 1999, it is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle within this state unless the vehicle is insured with the minimum amount of liability coverage: $25,000 for bodily injury or death of one person in any one accident; $50,000 for bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one accident and $25,000 for damage to or destruction of the property of others. -
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data
CHAPTER 3 Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data Raj Chetty*,† and Amy Finkelstein†,‡ *Harvard University †NBER ‡MIT Contents 1. Introduction 112 2. Motivations for Social Insurance 114 2.1. Adverse Selection: Review of the Basic Theory 115 2.1.1. A Stylized Model 116 2.1.2. The Textbook Case 118 2.1.3. Departures from the Textbook Environment: Loads and Preference Heterogeneity 123 2.2. Empirical Evidence on Selection 127 2.2.1. Testing for Selection 128 2.2.2. Evidence on Selection 131 2.2.3. Welfare Consequences 134 2.2.4. Directions for Future Work 139 2.3. Other Motivations 140 3. Design of Public Insurance Programs 143 3.1. Optimal Benefit Level in a Static Model 145 3.2. Sufficient Statistics Implementation 148 3.2.1. Consumption Smoothing 148 3.2.2. Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard 157 3.2.3. Reservation Wages 159 3.3. Generalizing the Static Model 163 3.3.1. Dynamics: Endogenous Savings and Borrowing Constraints 163 3.3.2. Externalities on Private Insurers 168 3.3.3. Externalities on Government Budgets 170 3.3.4. Other Externalities 172 3.3.5. Imperfect Optimization 174 3.4. Other Dimensions of Policy 176 3.4.1. Liquidity Provision and Mandated Savings Accounts 176 3.4.2. Imperfect Takeup 178 3.4.3. Path of Benefits 180 4. Challenges for Future Work 182 Acknowledgments 186 References 186 Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 5 © 2013 Elsevier B.V. ISSN 1573-4420, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53759-1.00003-0 All rights reserved. -
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms in Health Insurance Schemes: a Systematic Review
Cost-sharing mechanisms in health insurance schemes: A systematic review Submitted to The Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, WHO From Meng Qingyue, Jia Liying, Yuan Beibei Center for Health Management and Policy, Shandong University October, 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS AbAbAb stract .............................................................................................................................................. 3 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 6 2 Objectives and definitions ............................................................................................................... 7 3 Criteria for inclusion of studies........................................................................................................ 7 4. Methods ........................................................................................................................................ 8 4.1 Searched databases and websites ........................................................................................... 8 4.2 Search strategy ........................................................................................................................ 8 4.3 Review method ...................................................................................................................... 10 5 Results ......................................................................................................................................... -
Tax-Based Financing for Health Systems
World Health Organization Geneva EIP/FER/DP.04.4 Tax-Based Financing for Health Systems: Options and Experiences DISCUSSION PAPER NUMBER 4 - 2004 Department "Health System Financing, Expenditure and Resource Allocation" (FER) Cluster "Evidence and Information for Policy" (EIP) World Health Organization 2004 This document is not a formal publication of the World Health Organization (WHO), and all rights are reserved by the Organization. The document may, however, be freely reviewed, abstracted, reproduced or translated, in part or in whole, but not for sale or for use in conjunction with commercial purposes. The views expressed in documents by named authors are solely the responsibility of those authors. Tax-Based Financing for Health Systems: Options and Experiences by William Savedoff WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION GENEVA 2004 Tax-Based Financing for Health Systems: Options and Experiences I. Introduction Out-of-pocket spending is the most frequent way to pay for health services around the world. However, as a share of the total value of global health spending, it is eclipsed by social insurance, private insurance and general taxation. These latter forms of payment provide better financial protection for households because they are "prepaid" and pool health risks across individuals. Of these prepaid financing mechanisms, general government revenues are the most widespread, providing substantial funding for health services in almost every country. In fact, government revenues are the predominant source for health care expenditures in 106 out of 191 WHO member countries.1 Paying for health services out of government tax revenues is a fairly recent innovation in health care financing. Until the mid-twentieth century, the major alternatives to out-of- pocket payments for health care services were private philanthropies, mutual associations or social insurance plans (e.g. -
Incentives and Barriers of the Cyber Insurance Market in Europe June 2012
Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe June 2012 Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe I Acknowledgements This Study was commissioned and managed by ENISA with specialist services provided by RAND Europe. ENISA would like to thank Mr. Neil Robinson for his professionalism and dedication to this project. In addition, ENISA wishes to acknowledge and thank Prof. Robin Bloomfield of City University of London, Mr. Andrea Renda of CEPS, Mr. Michael Mainelli of Z/Yen, Mrs. Simona Cavallini and Mr. Fabio Bisogni of Formit Foundation for their prompt support, valuable input and material provided for the compilation of this Study. II Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe About ENISA The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA seeks to enhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting the development of cross-border communities committed to improving network and information security throughout the EU. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu Contact details For contacting ENISA or for general enquiries on this Study on cyber insurance market in Europe please contact Nicole Falessi and Dr. Konstantinos Moulinos and use the following details: Resilience and CIIP Program Technical Department Email: [email protected] Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe III Legal notice Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the authors and editors, unless stated otherwise. -
Coronavirus Insurance Coverage and Claims Guidance
Coronavirus Insurance Coverage and Claims Guidance April 15, 2020 With the exposure of the coronavirus (COVID-19) increasing, organizations are evaluating the potential coverage which may be triggered from their insurance policies. Actual loss situations and a review of individual policy forms will be a crucial step to properly evaluate potential available coverage application. Insurance carriers have the ultimate authority in determining coverage for presented claims. Any suspected COVID-19 related losses should be reported per the policy guidelines. Policyholders should be aware that some policies may require specific time frames from notice of potential claim, such as 48 hours. This document provides factors that will be examined in the event losses related to COVID-19 occur. Coronavirus Insurance Coverage and 2 Lockton Companies Claims Guidance Workers’ compensation Each injured employee situation will be evaluated on its own individual merits. Workers’ compensation insurance covers employees who suffer injury or illness “arising out of or in the course of their employment.” Many factors will need to be considered if presented COVID-19-type claims are work related. These include but are not limited to: • The timing of when the loss occurs: were there reports of previously infected individuals made in this same time period? • The location(s) where the injured worker was present leading up the injury or exposure: was the injured worker within an area where exposure of the virus was present or carried a greater risk? • The activities the injured worker was engaged in leading up to when the loss or exposure took place: was the individual in contact with others or working remotely? • The specific nature of the loss: what further details can be uncovered to provide greater clarity around exposure to the virus as an occupational disease? In most jurisdictions, individuals seeking benefits under workers’ compensation will also need to meet the burden that the coronavirus illness arose out of, or was caused by, conditions “peculiar” to the work.